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WORKING PAPER

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Mexico City, Mexico, 2 to 3 September 2026

Agenda Item 4: **Pan America Regional Aviation Safety Team (PA-RAST) Projects and Activities**

RUNWAY SAFETY TEAMS

(Presented by the Secretariat)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper aims to report the status of implementation of local Runway Safety Teams in the Pan-American Region and proposes the way forward.

Action:	See section 5.
Strategic Goals 2026-2050:	• Every Flight is Safe and Secure • No Country Left Behind
References:	• ICAO Assembly Resolution A37-6 • ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan 2026-2028 (Doc 10004) • ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161) • ICAO Doc 9981 PANS Aerodromes • ICAO USOAP CMA AGA Protocol Questions • ICAO Global Runway Safety Action Plan • CANSO Runway Safety Maturity Checklist

1. Introduction

1.1 The Global Aviation Safety Plan in its 2026-2028 edition (GASP Doc 10004), identified Runway Excursion (RE) and Runway Incursion (RI) as Global High-Risk Categories of occurrences (G-HRCs).

1.2 The Document 9981 (PANS-Aerodromes), Part II, Chapter 8, provides that “the aerodrome operator shall establish a runway safety team comprised of relevant organizations operating or providing services on the aerodrome”, and that “the terms of reference and composition of the runway safety team (RST) should be established and included in the aerodrome manual.”

1.3 The Global Aviation Safety Roadmap 2026-2028 (Doc 10161) recommends States, Regions and Industry, actions to promote the establishment and implementation of State Runway Safety Programmes and local Runway Safety Teams (SEI 4, SEI 5, SEI 9, SEI 10, SEI 14, SEI 15).

1.4 In the Pan-American Region, the strategy by the ICAO NACC and SAM Regional Offices has been oriented towards supporting the implementation of local runway safety teams thru Runway Safety Go-Teams missions, following ICAO's RST Go-Team Methodology.

2. Progress (what has been done)

2.1 Due to its impact to safety and relative low implementation costs, RASG-PA supported the strategy effort and approved on ESC/37 a project to support the implementation. Thanks to that project, and contributions from Member States such as the U.S., both NACC and SAM Regional Offices developed activities towards supporting implementation, including RS Go-Teams to airports with no reported RST implemented:

- Philip S.W. Goldson International Airport (MZBZ), in Belize
- Juan Santamaria International Airport (MROC) and Guanacaste (MRLB), in Costa Rica
- El Salvador International Airport (MSLP), El Salvador
- La Aurora International Airport (MGGT), Guatemala
- Palmerola International Airport (MHPR), Honduras
- Ramón Villeda Morales International Airport (MHLM), Honduras
- Juan Manuel Gálvez International Airport (MHRO), Honduras
- Augusto C. Sandino International Airport (MNMG), in Nicaragua
- Jorge Chavez International Airport (SPJC), in Peru
- Silvio Pettirossi International Airport (SGAS), in Paraguay
- El Dorado International Airport (SKBO), in Colombia
- Colombian International Airports, workshop with Aerocivil and airports that drove RST implementation in all Colombian International Airports.

2.2 Runway Safety Teams implementation is reported on ICAO's iSTARS platform and can be accessed in real-time thru this link: https://istars.icao.int/Sites/PortalDashboard/NACC and https://istars.icao.int/Sites/PortalDashboard/SouthAmericaRegion. Nowadays, RST implementation at international aerodromes in both regions is about 67%.

3. The "effectiveness" problem and RST x Collaborative Safety Team (CST) relationship

3.1 Despite the efforts made by ICAO and International Organizations (such as LACAC, FAA, IATA, ACI, CANSO, IFALPA among others) in developing guidance material and conducting Go Teams, organizing seminars/workshops and virtual meetings, there are some States that have not ensured yet the implementation of any RST at their international aerodromes. In addition, some States and aerodrome operators report the implementation of RST but can't demonstrate that the RST is active and effective, with tangible results and outcomes.

3.2 The project also accounted for the development of an “effectiveness mechanism” to “measure” how effective an RST is really acting to reduce specific risks to aviation safety.

3.3 There were already some initiatives that tackled the effectiveness problem but from other perspectives. For example:

I. the one existing benchmark is the **CANSO Runway Safety Maturity Checklist**, which several regulators reference as a runway safety benchmarking tool. It is intended to assess the maturity of organizations managing runway safety risks; however, it is not specifically an "RST effectiveness" tool.

II. Another available tool is FAA’s Surface Safety Metric (SSM), which was developed to more accurately identify the greatest risks in the runway environment. According to their website, it does that by modelling to assign risk weights to the outcome of an event such as aircraft damage, injuries, and fatalities. The weights are based on proximity to a fatality and give credit for saving lives and minimal aircraft damage.

3.4 In the framework of RASG-PA RST Project, an expert group created to address this matter presented a proposal for an effectiveness tool, based on their experience and other references. This tool, presented in **Appendix A**, is aimed at measuring the effectiveness of the RST in a given airport, not as a mean to check for compliance with RST requirements that a State may have, but the actual results of the local forum.

3.5 The presented tool may be used by operators and regulators to evaluate the RST effectiveness in their airport/State and may be adapted and/or improved by comments from these stakeholders.

3.6 In parallel with this project, RASG-PA has been actively promoting the establishment of CST in States of the Region — voluntary, non-regulatory and data-driven partnerships between the State and industry, co-chaired by government and industry and aimed at a prioritized safety agenda. The Peruvian Collaborative Aviation Safety Team (PCAST) is a recent example of such an initiative in the SAM Region. Although the CST and the RST are different in nature — the RST is a local team under the responsibility of the aerodrome operator, whereas the CST is a voluntary State-level mechanism — both share the same underlying logic of collaborative hazard identification and risk mitigation, and they operate at complementary levels: the RST at the tactical and local level of a given aerodrome, and the CST at the strategic and aggregated level of the State.

3.7 This complementarity is directly relevant to the effectiveness problem described above. One of the recurring weaknesses observed in RSTs across the Region — and reflected in the indicators proposed in effectiveness tool on **Appendix A** — is the limited participation of aircraft operators and flight crew, whose safety personnel cannot realistically attend the local meetings of every aerodrome they serve. Where an active CST already convenes the CAA, the aerodrome operators, the ANSP and the aircraft operators, that platform offers an opportunity to bring those stakeholders into the runway safety discussion at a reasonable cost, and to consolidate and analyze runway safety data across aerodromes in a way that a single local RST cannot achieve on its own.

3.8 It should be noted that a CST can neither replace nor absorb an RST, and that participation in a CST does not discharge the aerodrome operator from its obligation to establish and maintain an effective RST. Where the two mechanisms coexist, the CST should be understood as an enabler — providing convening power, aggregated data and visibility for actions that exceed the reach of a single aerodrome operator — while the ownership of the runway safety action plan and the follow-up of local mitigations remain with the RST and its members.

3.9 In practical terms, this complementarity can be operationalized by ensuring that the RSTs established at the aerodromes of a State are represented in the CST, so that hazards, recurring action plan themes and indicators that prove to be systemic — that is, common to more than one aerodrome or beyond the reach of an individual aerodrome operator — can be elevated to the State level for coordinated treatment, while local matters continue to be resolved by the RST concerned. Such representation may take the form of a designated RST focal point or a rotating representative, as each State considers appropriate.

3.10 A further limitation concerns the flow of safety information between the local and the regional levels. RSTs identify hotspots, record runway incursion and runway excursion occurrences and agree local mitigations, and this information presently remains at the aerodrome and State level. It is not conveyed to the PA-RAST, which is the RASG-PA body responsible for the analysis of the runway incursion and runway excursion G-HRCs. Conversely, the trends, precursors and safety products developed by the PA-RAST from operator and industry data are not systematically made available to the RSTs, which would benefit from the operator´s perspective that is frequently absent from their local meetings, as noted in 3.8.

4. Proposal

4.1 As there is still no consensus on the best way to implement an effectiveness tool, the Secretariat proposes to follow a phased approach to collect data using the effectiveness tool developed (**Appendix A**) and then analyse the best solutions.

4.2 Based on this concept, it is proposed to request, thru a survey, a sample of States and Airport Operators to use the effectiveness tool and send their results and comments to help its improvement.

4.3 Additionally, and as a complement to the survey referred to in 4.2, the Secretariat proposes to explore, in those States where a CST is already established, the use of that forum to support RST effectiveness — for example, by including runway safety as a standing item in the CST agenda, by dedicating sessions to the review of the hazards and action plans of one or two aerodromes on a rotating basis with the mandatory participation of the local stakeholders concerned, and by consolidating the indicators from the effectiveness tool at national level. The experience gained would be documented and shared with other States of the Region as a good practice.

4.4 In order to address the limitation described in 3.10, it is proposed to establish a two-way channel between the RSTs and the PA-RAST, using the Aerodromes and Ground Aids (AGA) Officers of the ICAO NACC and SAM Regional Offices as the point of connection:

a) the AGA Officers consolidate, on an aggregated and de-identified basis, the runway safety information reported by RSTs — including hotspots identified, recurring action plan themes, and runway incursion and runway excursion occurrences — and make it available to the PA-RAST for analysis; and

b) the PA-RAST, through the same channel, make available to the RSTs the regional trends, precursors and safety products it develops on runway incursion and runway excursion, so that local teams may take them into account in their own hazard identification and action plans.

5. Action by the Meeting

5.1 Taking advantage of the data managed by PA-RAST and diverse stakeholders' participation, the Secretariat requests the Meeting to:

a) Take note and comment on the contents of this working paper;

b) continue supporting the efforts of the Secretariat to implement effective runway safety teams at all international aerodromes as a cost-effective action but from a more risk-based and data-driven approach.;

c) endorse or comment on the initiative by the Secretariat to send a survey to States to monitor specific indicators as suggested on 4.2;

d) support the exploration of synergies between local Runway Safety Teams and the Collaborative Safety Teams promoted by RASG-PA, including the representation of RSTs in the CST for the elevation and discussion of systemic runway safety issues on the understanding that such mechanisms complement, and do not replace, the RST required at each aerodrome

e) support a more risk-based and data-driven approach by requesting PA-RAST to contribute with potential indicators or data from their analysis;

f) support the establishment of a two-way information channel between local Runway Safety Teams and the PA-RAST, through the Regional Offices' AGA Officers, as described in 4.4; and

g) any other action that the Meeting considers.

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APPENDIX A
RUNWAY SAFETY TEAM EFFECTIVENESS QUESTIONNAIRE

1 This Appendix reproduces the Runway Safety Team (RST) effectiveness questionnaire developed by the expert group constituted under the RASG-PA RST Project and referred to in Section 3 of this working paper. It is intended to measure the effectiveness of the RST at a given aerodrome — the actual results of the local forum — and not compliance with any RST requirements a State may have established.

2 The questionnaire comprises 41 questions in eight sections, each question carrying one point.

Instructions for completing the questionnaire

1) Enter the name of the aerodrome and the date in the header fields below.
2) Complete the "Answer" column with "Yes" or "No" according to the situation of the RST.
3) Record in the "Remarks" column whatever is considered appropriate.
4) After completing each section, enter the points obtained and the percentage achieved for that section.
5) At the end, the overall percentage of compliance with RST requirements is obtained.

Aerodrome: _____ Date: _____

No.	Question	Answer (Yes / No)	Points obtained	Remarks
1. Statutes				
1.1	Does the RST have internal rules of procedure approved by its members?			
1.2	Do the internal rules define the scope of action of the RST?			
1.3	Do the internal rules establish the responsibilities of the members?			
1.4	Do the internal rules establish the procedure for handling the information, data and reports received from the organizations participating in the RST?			
1.5	Do the internal rules establish the decision-making procedure of the RST?			
1.6	Do the internal rules identify the members of the RST by name?			
1.7	Do the members identified in the statutes include representatives of at least the following areas: Operations Management; Safety Management (SMS); Control Tower (TWR); pilots operating at the aerodrome; air carriers; and General Aviation, where general aviation movements are significant at the aerodrome?			
	TOTAL POINTS FOR THE SECTION: 7			Percentage obtained for the section:
2. Meetings				
2.1	Does the RST meet regularly?			
2.2	Is the meeting agenda, together with the supporting material, sent to all members in advance?			
2.3	Are the activities and deliberations of the meeting documented in the minutes?			

No.	Question	Answer (Yes / No)	Points obtained	Remarks
2.4	Do the RST members regularly indicate the items to be included in the agendas of RST meetings?			
2.5	Does at least one meeting agenda per year include a visit to the manoeuvring area of the aerodrome?			
2.6	Does one of the RST meeting agendas include measures to identify the factors contributing to runway incursions at the aerodrome?			
2.7	Is the RST consulted when changes are planned in the manoeuvring area, including planned works, in order to analyse the implications for runway incursion prevention?			
	TOTAL POINTS FOR THE SECTION: 7			Percentage obtained for the section:
3. Hazard identification				
3.1	Does the RST have a formal collection of safety data on runway operations?			
3.2	Does the RST have a procedure for documenting the operational hazards associated with the runway?			
3.3	Do all RST members contribute to the formal safety data collection and hazard identification by sharing the operational hazards identified by the SMS of their organization?			
3.4	Does the RST identify and document the specific consequences of the operational hazards identified?			
	TOTAL POINTS FOR THE SECTION: 4			Percentage obtained for the section:
4. Risk management				
4.1	Does the RST have a formal process for managing operational risk?			
4.2	As part of risk management, are the consequences of the operational hazards assessed in terms of probability and severity?			
4.3	Is there a formalized process for determining the level of risk the RST is prepared to accept?			
4.4	Does the RST develop risk mitigation strategies to control the level of risk within the manoeuvring area?			
4.5	Is there a procedure for the RST to make recommendations to all those involved in runway operations?			
4.6	Is there a procedure for documenting the decisions taken by the RST during the risk management process?			
4.7	Are the decisions taken by the RST periodically reassessed to determine whether the intended effect has been achieved through the mitigation measures or recommendations?			
	TOTAL POINTS FOR THE SECTION: 7			Percentage obtained for the section:
5. Communication				

No.	Question	Answer (Yes / No)	Points obtained	Remarks
5.1	Does the RST have a formal process for communicating with the organizations directly involved in runway operations?			
5.2	Does the RST periodically produce runway safety information or educational material for the operational personnel involved in runway operations?			
5.3	Does the RST take part in sharing information with other RSTs?			
5.4	Does the RST have the means to obtain runway safety related information from the organizations participating in the RST?			
	TOTAL POINTS FOR THE SECTION: 4			Percentage obtained for the section:
6. Action Plan				
6.1	Does the RST have an Action Plan approved by its members to improve runway safety?			
6.2	Were the actions defined in the Action Plan developed on the basis of a runway safety diagnosis?			
6.3	Are the actions defined in the Action Plan being carried out as planned?			
6.4	Does the RST have a procedure for following up the effects produced by the implementation of the Action Plan actions?			
	TOTAL POINTS FOR THE SECTION: 4			Percentage obtained for the section:
7. Effectiveness				
7.1	Are the actions defined in the Action Plan being carried out in accordance with the established schedule?			
7.2	Does the RST have a procedure for monitoring the effects produced by the implementation of the Action Plan actions?			
7.3	Has the RST already proposed measures, other than those contained in the Action Plan, to improve runway safety, and have these been implemented?			
7.4	Was there a positive impact (reduction) on runway incursion, runway excursion, wildlife strike and FOD occurrences following the implementation of the RST?			
7.5	Is an opinion survey being conducted among aerodrome users — pilots, airlines and ATS — to establish whether safety has improved following the establishment of the RST?			
	TOTAL POINTS FOR THE SECTION: 5			Percentage obtained for the section:
8. Continuous improvement				
8.1	Does the RST have a formal process for the continuous improvement of its activities and products?			
8.2	Does the RST carry out formal and periodic reviews of its programme of activities to ensure that it is improving runway safety?			

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No.	Question	Answer (Yes / No)	Points obtained	Remarks
8.3	Are the results of the continuous improvement processes documented?			
TOTAL POINTS FOR THE SECTION: 3				Percentage obtained for the section:
RST EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION — Average percentage obtained: _____				

— END —