Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan America (RASG-PA)

Pan America – Regional Aviation Safety Team (PA-RAST)

PA-RAST/71 Meeting – Draft Summary of Discussions

São Paulo, Brazil, 17 to 20 August 2026



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Acknowledgements

We express sincere appreciation to those who contributed to and participated in this meeting, all of whom contributed to its great success.

Special thanks are extended to *GOL Linhas Aéreas* for hosting the meeting and providing the venue, and to the *Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil* (ANAC) and the Brazilian authorities for their support in hosting PA-RAST/71 and for their commitment to supporting the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan America (RASG-PA) and aviation safety within the South American (SAM) Region.

Acronyms

ACI	Airports Council International
ACI-LAC	Airports Council International – Latin America and Caribbean
ACSA	*Agencia Centroamericana de Seguridad Aeronáutica*
AFAC	*Agencia Federal de Aviación Civil*
AIDC	ATS Inter-facility Data Communication
ALTA	Latin American and Caribbean Air Transport Association
ANAC	*Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil* (Brazil)
ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider
APRAST	Asia Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Team
ASAP	Aviation Safety Action Programme
ASIAS	Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
ASN	Aviation Safety Network
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATS	Air Traffic Services
BCAST	Brazilian Commercial Aviation Safety Team
CAG	Collaborative Analysis Group (Canada)
CANSO	Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation
CAR	Caribbean
CARSAMMA	CAR/SAM Monitoring Agency
CARSAMPAF	*Comité Regional CAR/SAM de Prevención del Peligro Aviario y Fauna*
CAST	Commercial Aviation Safety Team
C-CAST	Canadian Commercial Aviation Safety Team
CENIPA	*Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos*
CFIT	Controlled Flight Into Terrain
COCESNA	*Corporación Centroamericana de Servicios de Navegación Aérea*
CST	Collaborative Safety Team
CST-CA	Central American Collaborative Safety Team
DCA	Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport

DECEA	Department of Airspace Control (Brazil)
ESC	Executive Steering Committee
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FDM	Flight Data Monitoring
FDX	Flight Data eXchange
FIR	Flight Information Region
FRMS	Fatigue Risk Management System
FSF	Flight Safety Foundation
GAPPAC	Global Aviation Plan for the Prevention of Airborne Conflict
GAPPRE	Global Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions
GAPPRI	Global Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions
GASP	Global Aviation Safety Plan
GESOC	*Grupo de Seguridad Operacional Centroamericano*
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System
GREPECAS	CAR/SAM Regional Planning and Implementation Group
GRF	Global Reporting Format
GTE	GREPECAS Scrutiny Working Group
HRC	High-Risk Category
IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IDX	Incident Data eXchange
IFR	Instrument Flight Rules
ITA	*Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica*
LAR Latinoamericanos)	Latin American Aeronautical Regulations (Reglamentos Aeronáuticos
LHD	Large Height Deviations
LNAV/VNAV	Lateral Navigation/Vertical Navigation
LOC-I	Loss of Control In-flight
MAC	Midair Collision
NAARMO	North American Approvals Registry and Monitoring Organization
NACC	North American, Central American and Caribbean

NAM	North American
NASP	National Aviation Safety Plan
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (United States)
NOTAM	Notice to Airmen
NTSB	National Transportation Safety Board (United States)
PAPI	Precision Approach Path Indicator
PA-RAST	Pan America – Regional Aviation Safety Team
PASO	*Programa de Acción de Seguridad Operacional*
PCAST	Peruvian Collaborative Aviation Safety Team
QNH	Altimeter sub-scale setting (barometric pressure adjusted to sea level)
RASG-APAC	Regional Aviation Safety Group – Asia and Pacific
RASG-PA	Regional Aviation Safety Group – Pan America
RBAC	*Regulamento Brasileiro da Aviação Civil*
RNP AR	Required Navigation Performance – Authorization Required
RSA	RASG-PA Safety Advisory
RSIA	RASG-PA Safety Issue Alert
RST	Runway Safety Team
RVR	Runway Visual Range
RVSM	Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum
SAC/MPOR	National Secretariat of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Ports and Airports (Brazil)
SAM	South American
SCFNP	System/Component Failure – Non-Powerplant
SE (CAST)	Safety Enhancement
SEI	Safety Enhancement Initiative
SENEAM	*Servicios a la Navegación en el Espacio Aéreo Mexicano*
SMS	Safety Management System
SPI	Safety Performance Indicator
SRVSOP	Regional Safety Oversight Cooperation System *(Sistema Regional de Cooperación para la Vigilancia de la Seguridad Operacional)*
SSP	State Safety Programme
TCAS	Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System

TCAS RA	Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory
TMA	Terminal Maneuvering Area
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRIP	Thermal Runaway Incident Program
ULSE UL	Standards & Engagement
UPRT	Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
USCAST	United States Commercial Aviation Safety Team
VFR	Visual Flight Rules

Participants

A total of 12 States, 9 members of the industry and 4 international organizations, comprising 47 delegates, participated in the 71st Pan America – Regional Aviation Safety Team Meeting (PA-RAST/71). This broad and diverse representation reflects the strong regional engagement and multisectoral collaboration that characterize the work of the Team. The variety of perspectives contributed by regulatory authorities, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), airlines, manufacturers, pilot associations, and international bodies further strengthened the collective efforts to enhance aviation safety in the Pan-American region.

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Summary of discussions

1. Opening remarks and agenda approval

1.1 Mr. Alexandre Gandini, Safety Director of GOL Linhas Aéreas, welcomed the participants to São Paulo on behalf of the host airline. Mr. Virginio Corrieri, of the Latin American and Caribbean Air Transport Association (ALTA) and PA-RAST Co-Chair representing the industry, thanked Brazil, GOL and ANAC for hosting the meeting, while the Secretariat also extended its welcoming remarks. The Meeting then proceeded with the review of the agenda, which was approved.

2. Safety Intelligence — Industry and State Presentations

Adverse Weather — El Niño 2026–27 Seasonal Risk Outlook (Aeroméxico)

2.1 Aeroméxico presented a seasonal risk outlook on the ongoing *El Niño* episode and its connection to Loss of Control In-flight (LOC-I) precursors. The United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has maintained an *El Niño* Advisory since June 2026, with a 97% probability that the event continue into early boreal spring 2027 and a 63% chance of a very strong episode at the November–January peak; seven named storms had occurred to date in the Eastern Pacific against a seasonal outlook of 15–22, while NOAA assigns a 75% probability of a below-normal Atlantic season.

2.2 The expected regional distribution comprises high exposure of Mexico and Central America from July to October 2026, with six to nine direct tropical-cyclone impacts projected and rapid intensification compressing decision windows below 24 hours — Hurricane Otis (2023) being recalled as the reference case; a favourable Caribbean and Atlantic outlook with late-season western Caribbean vigilance; an elevated North American winter corridor from November 2026 to February 2027, with atmospheric rivers, ground stops at major hubs and increased winter fog on the central Mexico plateau; a mixed SAM pattern from December 2026 to March 2027; and an estimated 20–35% increase in moderate-to-severe clear-air turbulence on the North Pacific track structures in boreal winter. The presenters urged full use of the Global Reporting Format (GRF) and the recommendations of the Global Action Plans for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (GAPPRE) and Runway Incursions (GAPPRI).

2.3 The presentation framed *El Niño* not as a hazard in itself but as an amplifier of an operational chain leading from adverse weather through tactical deviations, workload and monitoring gaps to LOC-I precursors.

2.4 As an aggregated internal case, Aeroméxico's Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) LOC-I dashboard registered 472 events year-to-date in 2026, a 16.3% year-over-year increase, with bank angle alerts the leading precursor category — such events not being LOC-I by definition, but early warning signals. Operators were recommended to establish seasonal FDM Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs), issue station- and route-specific threat-and-error briefings, build combined training scenarios pairing weather, automation surprise and workload, revalidate alternates and contingency fuel, manage post-disruption recovery through the Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS), and share sanitized SPIs; and four regional proposals were put forward — a standing watch item with review at PA-RAST/72 and closure after boreal spring 2027, SPI and event-data sharing through the Collaborative Safety Teams (CSTs) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Flight Data eXchange (FDX), evaluation of AI-based ensemble tropical-cyclone guidance as a shared regional monitoring layer, and State/Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) mass-diversion and ground-stop contingency coordination ahead of the November–February peak.

2.5 In the discussion, IATA stressed that the same early warning must reach States as well as ANSPs and meteorological providers, and Aeroméxico noted that, the Mexican CST not yet functioning as desired, coordination with the ANSP has proceeded bilaterally. The Meeting agreed to take the topic forward as a regional initiative: States and operators will send their lessons learned to the Secretariat for consolidation into a report and a PA-RAST recommendation. A draft RASG-PA Safety Issue Alert (RSIA) on *El Niño* 2026–27, developed by ALTA with Aeroméxico and prepared in Spanish and English, will be reviewed with the airlines before circulation, with *El Niño* retained as a standing adverse-weather item for a lessons-learned review at PA-RAST/72 (**Action Item 13/2026**).

DECEA — Analysis and Mitigation of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory (*TCAS RA) Events in Brazilian Airspace*

2.6 The Brazilian Department of Airspace Control (DECEA) presented the State's analysis of TCAS RA events, contributing São Paulo root-cause input to the hotspot work under **Action Items 20/2025 and 05/2026**. DECEA has moved from monitoring event counts to investigating causes: two São Paulo hotspots were mitigated — (RAs) by projection between Campo de Marte departures and Congonhas arrivals, reduced through climb-rate coordination, and helicopter interactions on the Congonhas final, reduced through a dedicated helicopter control position in the tower — while a deeper analysis of 155 commercial-aviation occurrences at 33 locations (January 2025–April 2026) assigned contributing factors to each event, enabling targeted guidance to the units concerned; events without Air Traffic Services (ATS) participation are passed to the airlines for crew-side analysis.

2.7 The Meeting welcomed the presentation as an example of a regulator/ANSP sharing the other side of hotspot data that operators routinely observe, noting the monthly Brazilian Commercial Aviation Safety Team (BCAST) and the quarterly meetings of DECEA, the *Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos* (CENIPA) and the airlines through which the exchange continues.

Aircraft Survivability and Lithium Battery Risk (Embraer)

2.8 Embraer presented an application of aircraft survivability theory to the lithium battery risk in the cabin, observing that regulations, recommendations and training exist — from International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) *Annex 18* and the *IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations to RASG-PA Safety Issue Alert 02 (2025)* — yet incidents continue, and operator measures remain insufficiently harmonized and prepared. The framework maps susceptibility, vulnerability and recoverability, together with upstream risk identification and learning, onto the Safety Management System (SMS), and proposes proactive preventive indicators — such as intercepted lithium battery exposures per flight, route and thousand passengers — suggesting that the region share not only occurrences, but preventive indicators and barrier effectiveness.

2.9 At the invitation of the Industry Co-Chair, operators shared their current cabin policies, which are converging on two-unit limits, in-sight stowage, no in-flight charging and, in some cases, a prohibition on the use of power banks during flight: Aeroméxico will limit passengers to two power banks kept in view at the seat from 1 September 2026, absent any Mexican regulation on the matter; Delta Air Lines prohibits in-flight charging of power banks; and the Brazilian operators have harmonized a two-power-bank limit and a prohibition on recharging power banks on board, the national regulator not yet having issued corresponding requirements. The Meeting requested that the survivability study be shared with all participants once concluded, which Embraer agreed to do (**Action Item 21/2026**).

Flight Safety Foundation — ASN Regional Database and GAPPAC

2.10 Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) presented the Aviation Safety Network (ASN) regional dashboards, showing regional fatality levels trending gradually downward, with Runway Excursions (RE) the most frequent accident category followed by non-powerplant and powerplant component failure. FSF drew attention to the problem of unpublished accident reports — approximately 40% of the region's accidents in the period lack any published report — while praising CENIPA's timely preliminary reports, and the Meeting agreed to add the FSF to the Boeing-led Ad hoc Group on the study note concerning the lack of accident reports (**Action Item 20/2026**).

2.11 FSF then introduced the Global Aviation Plan for the Prevention of Airborne Conflict (GAPPAC), launched in March 2026 after the midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (KDCA) and a series of near-collisions worldwide, modelled on GAPPRE and GAPPRI and now involving nearly 200 participants from more than 80 organizations. Noting limited Latin American representation, FSF invited States, operators and organizations of the region to join; ALTA declared itself ready to collaborate, and the interest of the PA-RAST Midair Collision (MAC) project team was recorded. FSF also highlighted fatigue as a recurring factor in recent accident reports and offered the Foundation's support for human factors training.

ALTA — Safety and Flight Operations Initiatives and Regional Safety Survey Results

2.12 ALTA presented its role as implementation partner of the regional safety system — the PA-RAST. prioritizing based on data, RASG-PA guiding strategy, and ALTA converting priorities into mitigation at State and operator level through the promotion and maturation of CSTs. The CST in Colombia has been launched, Argentina is in reactivation with an industry group already functioning, Mexico is under analysis, and Peru's team is being followed closely; the bird strike issue was cited as a model of the intended cycle, from operator identification through joint ALTA–IATA analysis to a working group with CARSAMPAF, IATA and the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

2.13 ALTA also presented the results of ALTA's second annual Regional Safety Survey, discharging **Action Item 18/2025** (delayed from PA-RAST/70), in which 31 regional airlines participated anonymously. Across the 39 identified airports, bird strikes ranked as the region's top perceived risk for the second consecutive year, followed by unstable approaches, Air Traffic Management (ATM)/communication concerns at the major hubs, and MAC/TCAS RA events. The strongest airport–risk association was recorded for Bogotá, where every respondent who identified the airport selected MAC/TCAS RA as the critical risk. Nearly 70% of respondents use no dedicated turbulence management tool, and an aggregated and anonymized summary of the survey results, together with the identified turbulence hotspot data, was shared with the Secretariat subject to the applicable confidentiality terms (**Action Item 23/2026**, completed). The discussion noted unruly passengers as a growing concern, with Brazil introducing substantially harder disruptive-passenger rules from September 2026, and ALTA indicated that the next survey cycle would characterize the top risks more deeply so that the PA-RAST can determine how to assist.

ANAC Brazil — Safety Management Structure and High-Risk Category (*HRC) Safety Issues Update*

2.14 Brazil presented its safety management architecture — civil and military authorities sharing responsibilities under a common high-level safety committee, with the National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) 2026–2028 recently approved and a four-group collaborative framework including BCAST — and its current HRC safety issue projects: improving Runway Incursion (RI) protections following recent occurrences including a loss-of-separation case at Congonhas; monitoring the effective implementation and rule quality of the recently introduced Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) requirements; examining flight dispatch decision-making and safety margins, an issue related to the Voepass accident; and human factors challenges including fatigue, mental health and the open question of how an authority can objectively identify degraded safety culture before an accident.

SAC/MPOR Brazil — Wildlife Risk Management Project

2.15 Brazil's National Secretariat of Civil Aviation (SAC/MPOR) presented the national Wildlife Risk Management Project (2022–2026), which addressed the gap in species identification: through a DNA-identification network of 42 airports and three federal universities, 584 samples yielded 84 species and raised the national species-identification rate from 41% to 45%, while an evidence-based database consolidates 5,377 mitigation measures covering 122 species, complemented by a guide covering the 20 km airport safety area. All products remain available on the Hórus platform, with continuity subject to lessons learned and 2027 funding. The Meeting noted the Brazilian model as a State-led practice of direct relevance to the region's top perceived risk and to the engagement pursued under **Action Item 04/2026**; with Ecuador having asked to join that engagement, the Meeting agreed that the Brazilian wildlife project be shared with the Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Panama as the successor initiative (**Action Item 27/2026**).

Azul Airlines — Runway Markings and Aiming Point Displacement

2.16 Azul Airlines presented an analysis of deep landing events which identified, at Curitiba, Cuiabá and São Luís (125, 157 and 75 deep landings respectively over ten months of 2024), aiming point markings displaced to coincide with the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) without corresponding adjustment of the other runway markings — a configuration permitted by Brazilian regulation *Regulamento Brasileiro da Aviação Civil* (RBAC) 154 but, in contrast with FAA guidance, carrying no chart annotation, and inducing touchdown beyond the touchdown zone with undefined responsibility should an excursion ensue. Azul's mitigations include an approximately 150 m reduction of the Landing Distance Available applied in performance software through internal Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), awareness campaigns, monthly safety talks with ANAC, and referral to the BCAST Runway Safety Working Group. (WG) The Meeting commended the constructive Azul–ANAC dialogue as a model of collaborative safety, and operators across the region were invited to report similar marking or runway-condition issues to the PA-RAST so that ad hoc engagement with the States concerned may be arranged.

2.17 Complementing this analysis, the BCAST Runway Safety WG presented the revision of the Brazilian safety enhancement on touchdown point awareness, documenting that repositioned aiming point markings misalign the visually-perceived infrastructure with the published landing distance used in performance calculations, and assigning responsibilities to airlines (manuals and training), to ANAC (assessment of a Supplementary Instruction to RBAC 154 to ensure marking commonality) and to airport operators (correction of inconsistent markings). The Industry Co-Chair confirmed the intention to update both the BCAST safety enhancement and the corresponding RASG-PA Safety Advisory (RSA) so that the material serves the whole region, as part of the continuation of **Action Item 12/2025** (see Section 5).

GOL — Runway Safety: A Collaborative System Risk

2.18 GOL presented runway safety as a complex, collaborative system risk — some 46% of roughly 1,500 accidents globally over 2015–2025 involved runway safety events — driven by interacting factors that no single stakeholder controls. As evidence, the GOL described a 2026 wet-runway event at the Salvador airport, in which tight performance, a late runway change, a tailwind at the threshold and reduced friction combined to consume the margins — demonstrating that some factors can be addressed by the operator, while others require collaborative treatment. Separately, the serious 2025 Galeão incursion, in which a departing aircraft struck a truck on the runway, illustrated the degraded surface-awareness dimension of incursion risk. GOL's toolkit includes FDM analysis, short-runway training, an inter-airline pool for aerodrome inspections and Runway Safety Team (RST) coverage with shared notes, a slippery-runway dashboard and a last touchdown point policy; five priorities were identified for airports and agencies — runway conditions, precision information management, visual aids, surface awareness and collaborative reviews.

2.19 The ensuing discussion focused on RSTs: no operator can attend the RST of every destination, and prioritization risks missing the aerodromes most in need of attention. The Meeting therefore agreed that a proposal should be developed recommending to States the creation of national-level RSTs that aggregate and elevate airport-level issues and connect to the CSTs where available or, where no CST exists, work with the CAA — with Boeing to share ideas on how the PA-RAST could connect to RSTs (**Action Item 18/2026**). FSF offered the Foundation's GAPPRI workshop content, packaging and facilitation support at no cost — with a GAPPRE workshop possible once the updated GAPPRE is completed, expected by April 2027 — and the PA-RAST will decide on this offer (**Action Item 17/2026**).

LATAM Airlines — Runway Excursion (RE) Prevention: Barrier Maturity and In-Flight Landing Distance

2.20 LATAM Airlines contrasted the industry's mature RE barriers — the sixty-year-old dispatch landing distance rule, twenty-five years of stabilized approach policy, and two decades of mandated flight data monitoring — with the region's "baby barrier": the time-of-arrival landing distance assessment under the ICAO GRF, applicable only since 2021 and still carrying a winter-operations heritage that requires "tropicalization" for a region which principal contaminant is heavy rain. In Brazil, the Runway Condition Report is mandatory only at Class 4 airports, covering just 17.9% of LATAM's operations — the long-runway hubs where risk is lowest. LATAM's analysis of over 600 pilot reports found 151 with anti-skid activation, 52% of which showed deceleration losses relative to expected performance, typically after heavy rain on runways due for rubber removal; with none of the 75 runways it operates declared "slippery when wet" by NOTAM, the airline has internally designated 18 runways slippery when wet, planning them at Runway Condition Code 3.

2.21 The presentation recommended that aerodrome operators reassess runways after heavy rain rather than relying on report validity periods, that regulators create standards for accrediting operator FDM evidence in runway condition decisions, and that pilots report braking action to Air Traffic Control (ATC) in real time. The Meeting recommended that LATAM continue reporting this issue to the PA-RAST, and agreed that a RSA addressing slippery and wet-runway condition reporting gaps — undeclared slippery-when-wet runways, Runway Condition Code under-declaration and braking-action reporting — be developed by the Runway Safety project team with ALTA, informed by LATAM's flight-data findings (**Action Item 15/2026**). FSF drew attention to Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) Safety Enhancements (SE)-236 and SE-237 on go-around decision-making as material the region could take up, the Secretariat recalling the pending conversion of SE-237 into an RSA under **Action Item 14/2023**.

ITA — InfraSegura Aerodrome Risk Diagnostic Tool

2.22 Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica (ITA) presented the InfraSegura project to institutionalize an aerodrome risk management diagnostic tool for Brazil's more than 500 public aerodromes, evolving the checklist-based bow-tie tool developed by ANAC and refined by BCAST into an online system integrating meteorological, aeronautical information and performance data — demonstrated through a prototype assessing landing overrun potential at Chapecó — so that aerodromes can be monitored, scored and benchmarked on a common basis, with risk-based oversight for the authority and prioritized corrective action for operators. The Meeting expressed interest in the tool's evolution and eventual export to other States, and the ITA appealed for operator flight-data and airport data contributions.

3. Safety Data Review

IATA Regional Safety Data Review (FDX/IDX)

3.1 IATA presented its periodic review of regional safety priorities based on FDX and Incident Data eXchange (IDX) analysis for January 2025 to June 2026, emphasizing that proactive analysis of incident data must complement learning from accidents. On Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference, signal loss remains a global and regional concern, with jamming distinguished from the more hazardous spoofing; hotspots persist in Colombia, Mexico and — following a recent significant increase — Panama, and the first spoofing event recorded in Mexico, involving an Embraer fleet, is under analysis and was offered for presentation at the next meeting. The proposed action plan comprised identifying causes, timely NOTAM publication and preservation of a Minimum Operational Network of conventional navigation aids consistent with ICAO guidance. The Meeting debated whether the issue should remain a Team priority and converged on a two-track response — extending the recently published alert RSIA-03A to the newly identified hotspot areas, and engaging directly with the authorities concerned — with a request that the manufacturers brief the Team on the effects of jamming, spoofing and single-event upsets on their aircraft, since operators are currently issuing their own guidance on when to inhibit safety systems in spoofing areas, resulting in uneven levels of safety. Panama committed to convene, on its return, a meeting with the national authority responsible for frequency management, with IATA participation, and to share the resulting information with the PA-RAST (**Action Item 25/2026**).

3.2 On MAC risk, TCAS RA hotspots persist in the Mexico City, Monterrey and Mérida–Cancún areas and in the Bogotá and Medellín terminal areas, while a previously flagged helicopter-interaction hotspot at São Paulo was de-prioritized after the ANSP presented its action plan; IATA reported that both Mexico and Colombia have acknowledged procedure-design contributions and initiated airspace redesigns with industry collaboration (see **Action Item 13/2025**, Section 5). Participants cautioned that crews habituated to nuisance advisories are losing the sense of risk — a normalization/acceptance of deviation demanding attention — and airlines were urged to remind crews to treat every resolution advisory as genuine. On Large Height Deviations (LHDs), the joint work with the Scrutiny Working Group (GTE) of the CAR/SAM Regional Planning and Implementation Group (GREPECAS) continues on events clustering near Flight Information Region (FIR) boundaries, and operators were asked to share unusual boundary-crossing behaviors with the PA-RAST, since the GTE receives information only from ANSPs.

3.3 On RI, the regional trend runs slightly above the global trend, with a March 2026 spike driven by events in Bogotá involving military aircraft; under-reporting was emphasized — authorities drawing on ATC sources record far more events than airline reporting alone — and the Meeting noted the new Joint Runway Safety Initiative of IATA, Airports Council International (ACI) and the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO) strengthening local runway safety teams, with Boeing engaging regulators to obtain ANSP-sourced incursion counts (see **Action Item 18/2026**). LOC-I precursors remain comparatively benign, concentrated in climb and approach with Mexico City the main focal point. Bird strikes remain above the global benchmark, occurring mostly on take-off and landing outside the aerodrome's formal area of responsibility; IATA welcomed Brazil's extension of the radius of wildlife control plans, proposed replicating it regionally, and reiterated the recommendations pursued under **Action Item 04/2026**.

USCAST Update

3.4 The United States Commercial Aviation Safety Team (USCAST) reaffirmed CAST's goal of reducing commercial fatality risk over 2026–2036 together with international partners, and presented its two active studies: an Abnormal Runway Contact study prompted by the Delta Connection accident in Toronto, defining measurable risk criteria for elevated-risk landings — in the discussion, an operator reported that a post-Toronto "flare briefing" had reduced hard landings on one wide-body fleet to nearly zero — and a National Airspace System-wide MAC risk study prompted by the DCA Mid-Air Collision (MAC), characterizing collision risk across all airspace users, launching within the month; updates on both will be brought to future PA-RAST meetings.

DCA MAC — Event Sequence and SE Mapping

3.5 USCAST presented the event sequence of the 29 January 2025 MAC near DCA, drawn from the published National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) final report — expressly a timeline walk-through, not an accident analysis. Contributing factors included compacted traffic demand exceeding the airport's capacity margin with normalized controller workarounds; degraded radio transmissions leaving each aircraft unaware of the other; helicopter route altitude non-compliance with an erroneous indicated altitude; acceptance of visual separation without positive identification; TCAS resolution advisories inhibited below 900 ft; night visual factors; and a helicopter route with no published lateral limits, since eliminated.

3.6 The presentation walked the Meeting through the event sequence and the mapping of relevant USCAST SEs to the corresponding points in that sequence, identifying SE-011, SE-027, SE-047, SE-053, SE-059, SE-131, SE-159, SE-165, SE-186 and SE-191 as potentially relevant to specific points in the sequence. The presenter emphasized that the SE mapping showed which enhancements were potentially relevant to the specific circumstances present at each point in the sequence and was not intended to suggest that any SE had been disregarded or that its application would have prevented the accident. The central point conveyed to the Meeting was that no existing USCAST SE would have prevented this accident, as it resulted from an airspace design issue rather than an operator behaviour issue. The Meeting was informed that the MAC HRC project team would convene to conduct a full accident analysis of the event collaboratively (see Section 5).

CENIPA — Final Report of the Voepass Flight 2283 Accident

3.7 CENIPA presented the recently published final report on the Voepass flight 2283 (ATR 72-500) accident of 9 August 2024. The reconstruction showed cruise in icing conditions with degraded performance, an "increase speed" aircraft performance monitoring alert followed thirteen seconds later by autopilot disconnection and loss of control, aerodynamic stall, stick pusher activation — confirmed through filament analysis of the annunciator lamp — pitch uncoupling under instinctive crew pull forces, a sudden rudder deflection, and entry into a flat spin. The report identified fifteen contributing factors, and CENIPA emphasized that, although classified as LOC-I, this was fundamentally an organizational accident: maintenance deficiencies and deferred, unrecorded defects existed well before the day of the accident. In particular, the Meeting underscored that the aircraft had been dispatched with known system failures — a condition that likewise long predated the day of the accident. The manufacturer has updated the relevant maintenance task and its aircraft performance monitoring function, and recommendations to ANAC include revising oversight risk management processes and disseminating lessons learned.

3.8 In the discussion, CENIPA cautioned that the accident cannot be analysed as a pure LOC-I event — the crew were qualified and trained, yet the deeper lessons concern the organization and its safety culture maturity — and participants noted that the failed component was known to the company and uncorrected, connecting the case to the region's system/component failure risk (see Section 6). The investigator-in-charge recommended that PA-RAST systematically harvest lessons from significant published investigations and consider generalizing applicable recommendations as regional bulletins or advisories — a practice the PA-RAST intends to institutionalize — and it was proposed that the LOC-I project team assess the organizational, dispatch and decision-making dimensions of the accident with a view to advisories for operators of comparable size and developing safety culture (see Section 5).

UL Standards & Engagement — Lithium Battery Thermal Runaway Thermal Runaway Incident Program *(TRIP) Update*

3.9 UL Standards & Engagement (ULSE) updated the Meeting on the TRIP, a free, voluntary and confidential lithium battery incident surveillance system now comprising 50 airlines, including Avianca, JetSMART and Copa Airlines from the region, with discussions under way with Aeroméxico, GOL and LATAM. Passenger-operation incident rates have risen 57% since 2019; 149 thermal incidents were recorded in 2025 and 77 in the first half of 2026, with vapes and power banks the dominant device types, about one quarter of incidents in the most severe category, and aggregate disruption costs of approximately USD1.8 million per year across the TRIP airlines; the total loss of an aircraft in the Republic of Korea, attributed to a power bank in an overhead bin, was cited as the severity ceiling.

3.10 A 2025 regional survey found 79.5% of travellers concerned about lithium battery incidents, while 48.5% still pack rechargeable devices in checked baggage. ULSE's key messages — power banks deserve specific policy attention; effective crew response supports keeping devices where problems can be detected; and passenger communication should say "rechargeable devices", kept within arm's reach, never in the overhead bin or checked baggage — have been incorporated into the recently issued RASG-PA alert on rechargeable battery risks, adapted from the Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Team (APRAST) material. ULSE recommended that authorities lead passenger education, encourage their airlines to join TRIP and ensure representation in the ICAO Dangerous Goods Panel; Canada noted that lithium batteries were being considered as an additional Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) risk category, with a taxonomy clarification requested; and the Meeting was invited to the TRIP Summit (Miami, 20–22 October 2026).

4. Collaborative Safety Teams and Safety Programmes

RASG-PA ASAP Implementation Project — Brazil and Colombia Update

4.1 In follow-up to the RASG-PA Aviation Safety Action Programme (ASAP) initiative under **Action Item 02/2026**, Brazil (ANAC) updated the Meeting on its work to enable ASAP-type programmes; the Meeting was also informed that the pilot project in Colombia had been paused — though not abandoned — owing to leadership changes in the State. ANAC has concluded the regulatory impact analysis for a general regulation supporting Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with individual airlines, most likely starting with pilots and expanding to other workgroups; a round of individual airline consultations will conclude by the end of 2026, and ANAC expects to present a concrete case at PA-RAST/72, possibly including a demonstration MoU, acknowledging the mentoring of Delta — including observation of an Event Review Committee meeting — and Aeroméxico. ANAC noted that, with very low accident numbers, voluntary protected reporting is the route to safety information before problems manifest as events.

4.2 The Meeting congratulated ANAC on its regional leadership on just culture, noting interest from other regions, and encouraged the documentation of lessons learned for the RASG-PA ASAP guidance package. Aruba shared that it is adapting the model internally through a restricted review process suited to a small State, and panellists observed that there was no single sequencing requirement between ASAP and CST implementation — either can be the practical starting point.

Canada — Collaborative Analysis Group and New Protections for Voluntary Information Sharing

4.3 Canada reported that the Canadian Aeronautics Act amendments described at PA-RAST/70 as in the final parliamentary stages entered into force on 26 March 2026, empowering Transport Canada to establish voluntary information sharing programmes under which shared information is confidential and protected from disclosure and enforcement action, in alignment with ICAO Annex 19 — voluntary sharing not discharging mandatory reporting obligations. The Collaborative Analysis Group (CAG) held its first full plenary on 7 May 2026 with close to one hundred participants, producing three commitments: to pursue protected safety information exchange solutions; a call to action for Canadian airlines and airports to complete the GAPPRI tracker, with the results to be shared with the PA-RAST; and a call to increase Canadian participation in the TRIP programme.

4.4 Canada emphasized a deliberately measured implementation — trust takes years to build and a single bad experience could destroy the momentum — with an ASAP-type programme among the solutions under consideration. In the autumn of 2026 the CAG will launch a Ground Operations Safety Committee co-led by industry and the regulator and select a new deep-dive topic, likely lithium batteries, which Canada agreed to share with the PA-RAST once chosen. Its lessons for States starting the CST journey: approach the work as being genuinely "in it together", start collaborating before formal protections exist, involve industry in advocating legislative change, and select participants with a collaborative mindset.

Panama — PAN-CST Progress

4.5 Panama presented the implementation of its national CST (PAN-CST), running ahead of the intention announced at PA-RAST/70 to establish a CST by 2027: a letter of intent was signed on 4 December 2025 by the Director General and the chief executives of six Panama-based airlines, six coordination meetings have produced the manual of procedures and information-protection arrangements — underpinned legally by Panama's Law 6 of 2022 — and the initiative is supported by an ICAO project strengthening State Safety Programme (SSP) implementation under the FENIX pilot project. The team has defined the high-risk categories and indicators for Panama's National Aviation Safety Plan 2026–2029 — runway incursion/excursion, wildlife strikes and turbulence — and will begin structured data exchange at its next meeting, presenting results at the second national safety forum in December 2026, with 2027 devoted to consolidation and incorporation of the air navigation services provider and the airport operators.

4.6 The Meeting congratulated Panama and reiterated the PA-RAST's support, offering to participate virtually or in person wherever visible backing would help engage local stakeholders — an offer extended to all States implementing CSTs — and the Co-Chairs invited all CSTs to communicate both their implementation progress and their internally identified risks, so that the Team can connect issues across the region and share existing RASG-PA products.

Central American Regional CST (GESOC / COCESNA-ACSA)

4.7 Costa Rica, on behalf of *Grupo de Seguridad Operacional Centroamericano (GESOC)*, presented the establishment of the first regional CST for the voluntary, de-identified and non-punitive sharing of flight-data-analysis information among Central American operators, the States' SSPs and the *Agencia Centroamericana de Seguridad Aeronáutica* (ACSA) of the *Central American Corporation for Air Navigation Services* (COCESNA) — reviving the legacy of the *Programa de Acción de Seguridad Operacional* (PASO, 2008–2018), the first flight-data-sharing initiative in Latin America, whose findings corrected approach aids and airspace deficiencies at San José and Guatemala City. Approved by the COCESNA Directive Council, the initiative held its first meeting in Belize on 26 May 2026 and follows a phased plan: confidentiality agreement modelled on the PA-RAST's (Phase 1), completed manual, signed MoU and additional operators by November 2026 (Phase 2), and integration of the ANSPs and international airports by May 2027 (Phase 3), with periodic regional safety reports and prioritized common risks as deliverables.

4.8 The Meeting welcomed the initiative — the only regional, multi-State CST, setting a precedent for other sub-regions — and confirmed the PA-RAST's support, asking the team to define specifically what support it needs; periodic joint meetings with adjacent CSTs such as Panama's were suggested. The presentation constituted the progress report due under **Action Item 14/2025**, which the Meeting recorded as completed, with progress to continue being reported at each PA-RAST meeting.

Peruvian Collaborative Aviation Safety Team (PCAST)

4.9 The Secretariat presented, on behalf of the Peruvian Collaborative Aviation Safety Team (PCAST), a progress update illustrating the CST Strategy's intended sequence of collaboration first and structure afterwards: the team's three working groups address runway and taxiway incursions — including a first joint workshop in July 2026 bringing together maintenance technicians, tow-tractor drivers and controllers who share the Lima runway-crossing risk but rarely train together, highlighted as a replicable low-cost model — infrastructure, with a concern-classified assessment of the 20-airport national network volunteered by the aerodrome operators and a novel tool using FDM vertical-acceleration data as an early indicator of pavement degradation, and wildlife hazard management, convening authorities, operators, the Armed Forces and the National Police on land-use issues that lie outside aeronautical competence. It confirmed that the effect of a functioning CST is immediately visible to operators in Lima.

Aruba — Safety Collaboration Initiative Update

4.10 Continuing the updates encouraged at PA-RAST/70, the State Co-Chair reported that the Aruba Safety Collaboration Initiative, while facing difficulties, continues: its initial approach is a risk-identification process, and the aerodrome's RST — to which the ANSP and the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) were added — was being used as the vehicle to address one of the identified issues, bird strikes; the Meeting welcomed this pragmatic approach, and the Secretariat offered support, including virtual briefings to local stakeholders on the CST concept.

Mexico CST

4.11 With respect to the Mexican CST under **Action Item 15/2025**, the authority and airlines being absent, ownership of the item was transferred to the Secretariat, which has scheduled a meeting with the Federal Civil Aviation Agency (AFAC) in early September 2026; the engagement will support the authority in reviewing its current arrangement against the revised CST guidance and in identifying opportunities to further strengthen collaboration between the authority and the Mexican operators.

Revision of the CST Strategy and Implementation Guidance

4.12 The Secretariat briefed the Meeting on the revision of the CST Strategy and Implementation Guidance undertaken pursuant to Decision RASG-PA/15/D06 — forty-four substantive changes to be submitted to the Forty-First Executive Steering Committee meeting (ESC/41, Mexico City, 2–3 September 2026). The revision corrects two observed barriers — States treating structure as the entry point, and operator data as a prerequisite — establishing instead that trust is the foundation of a CST and that collaboration can begin with a conversation, structure following once collaboration has demonstrated value; it adds a "begin with collaboration, formalize later" principle, a preliminary collaboration stage, alignment with the Third Edition of Annex 19 and the GASP 2026–2028, an implementation checklist gated on trust, and a model tripartite Declaration of Intent. Members were invited to provide comments before ESC/41.

4.13 The Meeting noted that the model Declaration of Intent completed **Action Item 01/2026**, recorded as completed, and that the revision constitutes the substance of **Action Item 03/2026** (Canada — CST Implementation Guide update), likewise recorded as completed at PA-RAST/71, approval of the revised documents resting with ESC/41.

5. HRC Project Status Review

CFIT (Champion: United States)

5.1 The Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) project team briefed the Meeting on the hectopascal altimeter-setting issue raised by France at the 2026 GREPECAS Plenary, following the Paris Charles de Gaulle incident already flagged in RASG-PA Safety Issue Alert RSIA-01, in which an aircraft came within approximately 2 m of the ground after an altimeter-setting (QNH) error of some 10 hectopascals (hPa) on a Baro- vertical navigation (VNAV) approach. A French/EUROCONTROL study of approximately 1.7 million landings found Baro-VNAV operations missing the ICAO safety target by a factor of 1,000 to 10,000; because an error in hPa produces a much larger altitude discrepancy than a comparable slip in inches of mercury, every hectopascal-using State — much of SAM and parts of the Caribbean (CAR)— carries the exposure. France has responded by raising Latera Navigatioon (LNAV)((/VNAV decision heights by 100 ft, setting the Required Navigation Performance – Authorization Required (RNP AR) minimum decision height at 350 ft and updating Runway Visual Range (RVR) values.

5.2 In the discussion, FSF noted that terrain-alerting is inhibited below the heights concerned, so a crew on an erroneous setting may receive no warning before impact; a United States regional operator's practice of unlinking "check altimeter" messages when flight data is inconsistent with the destination QNH was cited as a detection approach; and Brazil (ANAC) supported an update while cautioning that raised minima would affect a very large number of regional non-precision approaches, proposing that States and operators first research the prevalence of the issue in their own operations. The Meeting agreed that RSIA-01 be updated to recommend raised minima for hPa -using States per the French model, together with that research recommendation (**Action Item 12/2026**).

LOC-I (Champion: Boeing, transferred to Embraer)

5.3 The LOC-I project team recalled why the category remains a priority: the most recent Boeing statistical summary of commercial jet airplane accidents shows that LOC-I contributed 429 fatalities in six accidents over the last ten years, keeping it the highest-risk accident category in commercial aviation. The most effective mitigation remains the UPRT framework developed by ICAO in partnership with the airframe manufacturers; however, a survey released to States through the ICAO regional offices found that, while approximately 80% of States in the region report a UPRT mandate in their regulations, deeper analysis showed that the figure might be misleading, some declared mandates being only superficial requirements that do not address the full ICAO framework.

5.4 In response, the WG developed the UPRT workshop for civil aviation authorities in partnership with United States, Airbus, ATR, Boeing, and ICAO. The second edition, hosted by ATR at its Miami training facilities in February 2026, gathered 24 attendees from 14 States, together with seven participants from four manufacturers and four participants from three airlines; special recognition was extended to ANAC Brazil for coordinating the case-study exercise on developing and implementing the UPRT framework in a fictitious State and for sharing its lessons learned through the breakout sessions. The Team's next steps comprise: a potential virtual UPRT workshop targeting States unable to attend the previous sessions; conversion of the recently released BCAST Safety Bulletin on UPRT into a RSA; translation of the BCAST Safety Bulletin on adverse weather; and the study of lessons learned from the Voepass ATR 72-500 accident (Brazil, August 2024), including the organizational, dispatch and decision-making dimensions identified in the final report (see Section 3). The Team is also following up on CAST SE-236 and SE-237 under **Action Item 14/2023**, on which the United States will report after the forthcoming CAST briefing.

5.5 Boeing transferred the championship of the WG to Embraer, which also champions the BCAST LOC-I WG — a transition welcomed as creating a direct two-way channel between the Brazilian and regional teams. In the discussion, the Secretariat proposed generalizing the workshop's case-study exercise into a model UPRT regulation published as RASG-PA guidance for States to use, which the incoming Embraer lead agreed to take forward within the Team, possibly in coordination with the FAA. The Secretariat further suggested involving the Regional Safety Oversight Cooperation System (SRVSOP), since the Latin American Aeronautical Regulations (LAR) already contain UPRT provisions and the RASG-PA model regulation should be harmonized with them, so that the many SAM States applying the LAR are not left out of step (Action Item 30/2026). Brazil's ANAC noted that the ICAO Flight Operations Panel is planning a review of UPRT provisions, offering a channel for the regional experience to feed the global review.

MAC (Champion: Canada)

5.6 The MAC project Team presented its recent and upcoming activities, its published products and products under development, and its ongoing collaboration with the GREPECAS GTE. In spring 2026 the first RSA on LHD in Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) airspace was published: it promotes proactive reporting, shifting the focus from attribution to systemic improvement and inviting collaborative recalibration across the North American (NAM), CAR and SAM Regions, with key recommendations for operators — strengthen standard operating procedures for FIR boundary transitions, notify ATC immediately of any deviations and maintain readback discipline; for FIRs — expand ATS Inter-facility Data Communication (AIDC) implementation across all FIR boundaries and standardize coordination protocols; and for oversight bodies — review and align reporting formats and monitor the effectiveness of corrective actions.

5.7 In continued collaboration with the GTE, a new RSA, "Unauthorized RVSM Operations: Strengthening Equipage Compliance and Reporting", is under development with target publication in December 2026; the group obtained an initial intake of LHD data from the NAM Approvals Registry and Monitoring Organization (NAARMO) and the CAR/SAM Monitoring Agency (CARSAMMA), with additional years pending, and IATA and the FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) programme are working together to overlay the LHD and TCAS RA data. On TCAS RA hotspots, the CANSO-led ad hoc group established at PA-RAST/70 coordinates action on the Bogotá, Mexico and Brazil airspace hotspots, with the MAC project Team meetings serving as the update point for the coordinated actions of the ICAO Secretariat, CANSO, IATA and ALTA (**Action Item 05/2026**); recent safety intelligence identified the need to validate the potential addition of Guatemala's La Aurora Airport as a TCAS RA hotspot, where urban development and construction may be pushing Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic into Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) corridors. In the autumn of 2026 the team will conduct in-depth analysis of available MAC accident investigation reports — including the full collaborative analysis of the DCA midair collision (see Section 3) — and develop the MAC project team roadmap.

5.8 In follow-up to **Action Item 13/2025**, Aeroméxico presented the progress of the Mexico City and Cancún Terminal Control Area (TMA) airspace redesign undertaken in response to the TCAS RA hotspot information provided through IATA FDX and RASG-PA Safety Partners. Aeroméxico's flight data shows a measurable reduction — 37.2% year-over-year — in the Mexico City TCAS RA rate, confirming that the measures initiated a year earlier are working. In the absence of authority-led coordination, the operator engaged the ANSP (SENEAM) directly with its data, generating controller familiarization flights, TCAS training, reciprocal visits, and working tables with the accident investigation directorate correlating FDM events with ATS surveillance data; SENEAM has since convened the other principal operators and launched the final phase of the TMA redesign — including the visual helicopter corridors implicated in one hotspot — for release to airlines in the second quarter of 2027 for simulator validation.

5.9 The Secretariat proposed that this direct operator–ANSP engagement be captured and promoted as a RASG-PA lesson learned, replicable by operators in States without a functioning CST, which Aeroméxico accepted (**Action Item 28/2026**). Monitoring continues through the joint mechanism, the results will be fed to the CANSO-led Ad hoc Group under **Action Item 05/2026**, and a consolidated progress report will be presented at PA-RAST/72; the Meeting recorded **Action Item 13/2025 as completed**, with Aeroméxico's written progress report incorporated in the present Summary.

Runway Safety (Champion: ALTA)

5.10 The Meeting was informed that BCAST is developing two SEs for adaptation into RSA — the runway markings revision (see Section 2) and a barrier analysis of RI investigation reports against the GAPPRI recommendations. The Secretariat then presented the initial results of the RASG-PA GAPPRI Implementation Tracker, replicated from the APRAST exercise under the inter-regional initiative (see Section 7): only seven of the 49 States and Territories circulated returned the tracker, with no State completing all five worksheets. In the pooled cohort, Essential-tier implementation stood at 65% for aerodromes, 75% for operators, 74% for ANSPs and 44% for regulators — inverting the Asia-Pacific (APAC) finding, where regulators led — while the Advanced tier has effectively not been started; the weakest items are those no single party can implement alone, with surface surveillance failing simultaneously on the aerodrome and ANSP sides and stop bars/warning systems failing at aerodrome, ANSP and regulator levels together. The Industry Co-Chair raised the response rate itself as a serious concern — seven responses against thirteen States answering a single letter in the smaller APAC Region — asking what this reveals about how RASG-PA communications reach States (see Section 8).

5.11 The Secretariat then presented a barrier analysis of four runway collision occurrences — Lima (2022), New York JFK (2023), Rio de Janeiro Galeão (2025) and New York LaGuardia (2026, for which only a preliminary report is available, so only observed facts were used, without attribution of cause) — framed as one set of eighteen defences existing at every aerodrome in the region, three of the four conflicts involving rescue-and-firefighting or maintenance vehicles engaged in routine, largely authorized activity. The governing finding was that outcome tracked recovery, not how the conflict began: detection succeeded in three of the four cases, but the recovery chain (detect — decide and issue — recognize and act) completed only at JFK, the sole occurrence without a collision, breaking one link further along in each other case.

5.12 The Meeting identified the principal lessons to be captured for the region: clearance integrity failed in all four occurrences through two opposite mechanisms — entry without any clearance, and a conflicting clearance issued by the system itself — requiring distinct mitigations, with no example in the set of a system recovering from its own erroneous clearance; tower detection was degraded in all four, in three because a concurrent task competed for the controller's attention — a workload-design, not a discipline, finding; joint planning of non-routine runway activity failed wherever examined; recovery demands the discipline to revoke a clearance within seconds, call-sign-prefixed stop instructions and unique vehicle call signs, targeted to the party with the most reliable communication link; automated safety nets cannot be assumed protective — illuminated red lights were crossed twice, pointing to a driver-facing equivalent of the GAPPRI never-cross rule for flight crews; the weakest barriers require coordinated action by more than one party and belong on the agenda of every local RST; and barriers must be evidenced before an occurrence — through the GAPPRI tracker and functioning RSTs — rather than scored after one, as the four investigations could only do.

5.13 In discussion, IATA recounted serious incidents in Colombia involving military helicopters in which haste, inadequate tower supervision support and non-standard phraseology defeated functioning technological barriers, and participants noted both unreported vehicle runway crossings in the region and a widespread unawareness at towers and aerodromes that a vehicle crossing in front of an aircraft is a serious incident notifiable under Annex 13.

5.14 The Meeting agreed that these lessons be consolidated and disseminated as recommendations through a RSA capturing the barrier analysis of the four occurrences (**Action Item 29/2026**), developed together with the runway-markings advisory by ALTA as Runway Safety champion with BCAST/Brazil and the Secretariat, in coordination with the continuation of **Action Item 12/2025**, for presentation at PA-RAST/72 — Brazil contributing the lessons of a serious incursion incident at Curitiba, and the Airports Council International – Latin America and Caribbean (ACI-LAC) to be engaged for the aerodrome perspective. The Secretariat will also reissue the GAPPRI tracker request in simplified format, elevate the results to ESC/41, keep State submissions open and share the results with APRAST for cross-regional benchmarking (**Action Item 16/2026**, successor to **Action Item 17/2025**), and is preparing a working paper to ESC/41 on integrating RST activities into the PA-RAST work programme, for which this analysis constitutes the safety case.

6. Confirmation of the RASG-PA High-Risk Categories and GASP Roadmap Exercise

6.1 Canada and the Secretariat conducted the working session on confirming the RASG-PA High-Risk Categories and aligning the Team's work to the GASP Roadmap (ICAO Doc 10161, Second Edition, 2025). The intent was to validate, through a data-driven and repeatable methodology mirroring the GASP framework, which categories are relevant for the region: the GASP distinguishes the global high-risk categories (CFIT, LOC-I, MAC, RE, RI) from "other risk categories" capturing strong non-fatal signals, and the mapping exercise connects existing RASG-PA products to the Roadmap actions for regions and industry, marking each Covered, Partial or None and assigning a custodian, a metric and a date to every accepted gap — a worked CFIT example finding GNSS radio-frequency-interference mitigation the one real CFIT gap.

6.2 The Meeting reviewed the compiled regional evidence — fatalities and accidents by occurrence category since 2020, fatality risk, the regional safety plans, and the ALTA survey, IATA FDX, ASIAS, CST, Industry and State inputs presented during the week. A substantial discussion developed around system/component failure: high-frequency, currently low-fatality failures rank first in several datasets, the Voepass accident originated in a known uncorrected component, and any regional work must include maintenance personnel from airlines and authorities.

6.3 Delta, for which the category is a key risk area this year, noted that it is rarely the failure itself but the crew's subsequent task saturation that produces the bad outcome, and agreed to discuss its forthcoming publication on pilot decision-making after system/component failures with the Safety Partners and the new System/Component Failure Non-Powerplant (SCF-NP) project team (Action Item 22/2026). The Secretariat also announced the reactivation and reformulation of the Safety Partners group of regional airlines as the forum for such operator-level issues, beginning with a webinar for Mexican operators on LOC-I overbank events, organized by the Secretariat and Aeroméxico with Embraer invited as manufacturer (**Action Item 14/2026**).

6.4 The candidate additional categories were then ranked by live poll: (1) SCF-NP; (2) fire–non-impact (rechargeable devices/lithium batteries); (3) GNSS interference; (4) system/component failure powerplant; (5) bird/wildlife strike; and (6) dispatch decision-making. The Meeting disposed of them as follows. A new SCF-NP HRC project Team was created — the most significant structural change of the meeting — led by the FSF for a limited period with a co-lead to be identified, joined by ALTA, Boeing, Airbus, Embraer, ATR, Delta Air Lines and ANAC Brazil, to develop its framework by PA-RAST/72, distinguishing design/manufacturing failures from maintenance-process failures and including maintenance representation (Action Item 10/2026). GNSS interference was integrated into the CFIT project team's work plan rather than creating a new team, the FAA bringing its interference WG material including EUROCONTROL exchanges.

6.5 Fire–non-impact/lithium requires no project team at this stage: the agreed path is qualitative exploration through the Safety Partners with ULSE — a session at which the question of whether States should be encouraged to require the reporting of lithium battery fires and related occurrences will also be raised (**Action Item 31/2026**) — promotion of TRIP participation, and connection through the ICAO North American, Central American and Caribbean (NACC) Regional Office to the ICAO groups already active. For bird/wildlife strike, the HRC project team leads will determine by PA-RAST/72 which existing team absorbs the issue (**Action Item 11/2026**). Dispatch decision-making was acknowledged as a contributing factor rather than an occurrence category, to surface through the LOC-I team's Voepass analysis. The HRC project teams are accordingly CFIT, LOC-I, MAC, Runway Safety and SCF-NP, with adverse weather, lithium/fire–non-impact, wildlife and GNSS interference treated as cross-cutting topics.

6.6 A call for volunteers was made to join HRC teams. After the meeting, the Secretariat will send pre-filled Roadmap worksheets to every project Team — including the new SCF-NP Team (**Action Item 32/2026**) — to complete the Covered/Partial/None gap analysis between meetings, so that a consolidated framework can be presented at PA-RAST/72; the results of the prioritization exercise will also be relayed to the NACC and SAM Regional Offices as input to regional aviation safety plan development and review, in coordination with their timelines (**Action Item 09/2026**). The facilitators noted that the exercise also renders RASG-PA's work legible in SSP and national-plan language, answering the observation that the Team's work and the GASP had not previously been visibly connected.

7. Inter-regional and Partner Coordination

APRAST/PA-RAST Collaborative Initiative

7.1 The Meeting received a virtual update from the APRAST State Co-Chair on the inter-regional coordination mechanism trialled since its approval by the Regional Aviation Safety Group – APAC (RASG-APAC) and RASG-PA in 2024. APRAST reported three areas of practice adopted from PA-RAST: a reorganized structure with champion-led teams per safety enhancement initiative; "Focused Discussions" adapted from PA-RAST's Safety Days, the most recent — on safety culture and voluntary reporting, with PA-RAST and Aeroméxico presenting — leading to an APRAST Safety Culture Task Force; and Regional Safety Advisories inspired by RASG-PA's products, published on LHDs and lithium batteries. APRAST also presented its GAPPRI implementation experience: recommendations tiered into Essential, Intermediate and Advanced levels, a detailed tracker answered by thirteen of the 41 APACC States, and a July 2026 workshop with the FSF in Bangkok with over 400 virtual participants — the finding being that the weakest areas are those no single party can deliver alone, and that many new aerodromes are being built without runway entry stop bars, which are not currently an Annex 14 standard.

7.2 The Secretariat noted the cross-adoption in the other direction — the APRAST advisories on lithium batteries and RVSM/LHD adapted for the Pan-American context, the GAPPRI tracker translated and issued to RASG-PA States (results in Section 5), and the forthcoming APRAST RE (GAPPRE) tracker to be adopted in turn — with PA-RAST results shared back for benchmarking. The APRAST Co-Chair proposed converting the trial into a standing mechanism, subject to endorsement by both RASGs; the Meeting welcomed the proposal and agreed that a meeting of the PA-RAST and APRAST Chairs be convened by December 2026 to define the standing arrangement (**Action Item 19/2026**), with Boeing suggesting the model could in time extend to other regions.

RASG-PA Safety Partners and Accident Investigation Coordination

7.3 Across the meeting, the Secretariat signalled the reactivation and reformulation of the RASG-PA Safety Partners group of regional airlines as the standing forum for operator-level issues — the LOC-I overbank webinar in Mexico, the lithium battery qualitative session with ULSE, and the sharing of operator publications (see Section 6) — and the partner organizations (FSF, IATA, ALTA, CANSO and ULSE) reiterated their support for the Team's work programme. With respect to accident investigation matters, Canada indicated its intention to bring a proposal to the ESC on how accident-investigation work could integrate with ICAO and other regional aviation safety teams, an initiative tracked at ESC rather than PA-RAST level.

8. Dissemination of RASG-PA Safety Products

8.1 The Secretariat opened a discussion on whether RASG-PA safety products — Safety Advisories, Safety Issue Alerts, toolkits and the Annual Safety Report — actually reach the desks that act on them. Current dissemination through the website and LinkedIn is passive, and no reach indicators are collected, so it can be demonstrated neither that a product arrives at the office that acts on it nor that it does not; the formal Regional Office distribution lists are designed for official correspondence, the regional organizations do not cover all States and Territories between them, and two different readers must be reached — the authority Director who decides, and the technical officer who uses the product.

8.2 In the ensuing brainstorming, Boeing proposed that RASG-PA safety products should carry an implementation plan and stakeholder commitments to implement them, as in the CAST model, and described its practice of communicating directly with airline safety offices through designated focal points; Canada distributes bulletins through the CSTs; ALTA proposed LinkedIn, SKYbrary, the Annual Safety Report and event presentations as vehicles; and several interventions — Bahamas, the ICAO Secretariat, Aruba, Costa Rica Panama and Venezuela, — converged on a properly maintained network of designated focal points, possibly built on the SSP counterparts and organized by topic, paired with disciplined use of the PA-RAST WhatsApp channel, while recognizing the missing link inside authorities between the leadership and working levels. The Secretariat will consolidate the suggestions into a proposal for the improvement of the dissemination and communication of RASG-PA products, to be presented by PA-RAST/72 (**Action Item 24/2026**).

9. Administrative Aspects

Review of action items from previous meetings

9.1 The Secretariat conducted the review of the valid action items from previous meetings. Each open item was reviewed in turn and its status agreed by the Meeting; the resulting dispositions, together with the new action items arising from PA-RAST/71, are all consolidated in the table in **Appendix A**, including the items remaining valid for Secretariat follow-up with the ICAO Regional Implementation Groups and the GREPECAS GTE (**Action Items 19/2025 and 21/2025**).

9.2 Noting that the composition of the project teams is uneven, the Meeting agreed to open an action item, to remain open until PA-RAST/72, calling for contributions and participation in all HRC project teams (**Action Item 08/2026**). Separately, States were invited to connect their national aerodrome and runway safety team contacts to the RASG-PA runway safety work (**Action Item 26/2026**).

Governance items to ESC/41

9.3 The Meeting considered the draft PA-RAST Code of Conduct developed pursuant to **Action Item 22/2025** and the “active member” Terms of Reference (ToRs) amendment prepared pursuant to **Action Item 07/2026**, together with related membership-criteria changes to the RASG-PA Procedural Handbook and the revised meeting-model proposal developed by the Brazil-led Ad hoc Group pursuant to **Action Item 06/2026**; the proposals were completed for submission to ESC/41. The Meeting also reviewed the RASG-PA/15 and ESC/40 decisions falling due by ESC/41: the working paper on the GASP implementation-indicator monitoring mechanism is prepared, with members invited to join the corresponding ad hoc group; the CST guidance revision (Decision RASG-PA/15/D06) is complete (Section 4); and the implications identified by the ESC/40 Ad hoc Group on the GASP 2026–2028 update will be brought back for discussion at PA-RAST/72.

Industry Vice-Chair elections

9.4 The Meeting was informed that a vacancy will arise in the position of PA-RAST Industry Vice-Chair, currently held by Mr. Fabio Catani (Boeing), owing to his change of role. Elections to fill the position will be conducted at PA-RAST/72 (Lima, Peru, November 2026) and interested industry members were invited to consider candidacies.

Calendar of PA-RAST meetings for 2027

9.5 The Meeting discussed the 2027 calendar under the revised three-meeting model, constrained by the RASG-PA plenary — now held jointly with the GREPECAS plenary and moved to the first quarter so that the RASG-PA report reaches the Air Navigation Commission (ANC) and the Council with current information — and by the ESC, with the Third High-Level Safety Conference expected at the end of 2027 imposing further deadlines; a suggestion that RASG-PA prepare working papers for that conference and use it for engagement with other regions was welcomed for offline development. Drawing on the lesson of holding PA-RAST/70 immediately before the plenary, the Meeting converged on the following tentative calendar, to be refined by the Chairs and Secretariat and presented at PA-RAST/72: **PA-RAST/73, 10–13 May 2027; PA-RAST/74, week of 16 August 2027; PA-RAST/75, 8–11 November 2027; ESC/42, September 2027; RASG-PA plenary, March/April 2027**, with the Regional-Office-hosted meeting at the NACC Regional Office in Mexico City, subject to confirmation, and the November week to be revisited in the light of participation at the Lima meeting.

Closing

9.6 Before closing, the Secretariat invited feedback on the value of the meeting and encouraged members to advise how future meetings could better connect to their day-to-day operations, stressing that the products of the PA-RAST are meant to be used rather than shelved.

9.7 The list of resulting action items from this PA-RAST meeting and the follow-up to valid action items from previous PA-RAST meetings are all included in **Appendix A**.

Appendix A – Action Items derived from PA-RAST Meetings

Action items are listed newest first. The new action items arising from PA-RAST/71 are numbered 08/2026 to 32/2026, continuing the 2026 sequence after Action Items 01/2026–07/2026 opened at PA-RAST/70.

Action Item	Meeting	What	When	Who	Status
32/2026	PA-RAST/71	Send the pre-filled GASP Roadmap worksheets to every HRC project team, including the new SCF-NP team	September 2026	Secretariat	Valid
31/2026	PA-RAST/71	Convene the qualitative session on lithium battery/fire–non-impact risk with ULSE through the Safety Partners, including the question of whether States should be encouraged to require the reporting of lithium battery fires and related occurrences	October 2026	Secretariat with ULSE and Safety Partners	Valid
30/2026	PA-RAST/71	Develop a model regulation for UPRT, published as RASG-PA guidance, for States to use, harmonized with the UPRT provisions of the Latin American Aeronautical Regulations (LAR)	By PA-RAST/72	LOC-I project team (Embraer lead), possibly in coordination with the FAA, with SRVSOP involvement	Valid
29/2026	PA-RAST/71	Develop a RASG-PA Safety Advisory capturing the lessons of the barrier analysis of the four runway collision occurrences (Lima 2022, JFK 2023, Galeão 2025, LaGuardia 2026) mapped against the GAPPRI recommendations, in coordination with Action Item 12/2025	By PA-RAST/72	ALTA (Runway Safety champion) with BCAST/Brazil and the Secretariat; ACI-LAC to be engaged	Valid

Action Item	Meeting	What	When	Who	Status
28/2026	PA-RAST/71	Capture and promote the Aeroméxico–SENEAM direct operator–ANSP engagement as a RASG-PA lesson learned, replicable by operators in States without a functioning CST	By PA-RAST/72	Secretariat with Aeroméxico	Valid
27/2026	PA-RAST/71	Share the Brazilian wildlife risk management project with the civil aviation authorities of Panama, Colombia and Chile, plus Ecuador, which asked to be considered (successor to Action Item 04/2026)	By PA-RAST/72	Brazil's National Secretariat of Civil Aviation within the Ministry of Ports and Airports (MPOR)/ IATA / Secretariat	Valid
26/2026	PA-RAST/71	States to connect their national aerodrome/runway safety team contacts to the RASG-PA runway safety work	By PA-RAST/72	All States / Runway Safety project team	Valid
25/2026	PA-RAST/71	Follow up on the results of the meeting with Panama's national directorate responsible for frequency management on GNSS interference, with IATA participation, and share the resulting information with the PA-RAST	By PA-RAST/72	Panama (Civil Aviation Authority) with IATA	Valid
24/2026	PA-RAST/71	Consolidate the members' suggestions from the dissemination discussion into a proposal for the improvement of the dissemination and communication of RASG-PA safety products	By PA-RAST/72	Secretariat	Valid

Action Item	Meeting	What	When	Who	Status
23/2026	PA-RAST/71	Share an aggregated and anonymized summary of the ALTA Regional Safety Survey results with the Secretariat, together with the identified turbulence hotspot data, subject to the applicable confidentiality terms	As soon as possible	ALTA	Completed
22/2026	PA-RAST/71	Discuss the Delta Air Lines publication on pilot decision-making following system/component failures with the Safety Partners, and share it with the Safety Partners and the SCF-NP project team	Upon completion of publication	Delta Air Lines with the Secretariat	Valid
21/2026	PA-RAST/71	Share the Embraer aircraft survivability/lithium battery study, including the proposed preventive indicators, with all participants after its conclusion	Upon conclusion of the study	Embraer, via the Secretariat	Valid
20/2026	PA-RAST/71	Add the FSF to the Boeing-led ad hoc group on the study note concerning lack of accident reports (linked to RASG-PA/15/D02 Creation of an Ad Hoc Group to Support States in the Production of Accident Investigation Reports)	September 2026	Boeing / FSF	Valid
19/2026	PA-RAST/71	Convene the meeting of the PA-RAST and APRAST Chairs to convert the inter-regional coordination mechanism into a standing mechanism, for onward proposal to RASG-PA and RASG-APAC	December 2026	PA-RAST Co-Chairs/Secretariat with the APRAST Co-Chairs	Valid

Action Item	Meeting	What	When	Who	Status
18/2026	PA-RAST/71	Develop a proposal recommending that States create national Runway Safety Teams that aggregate and elevate airport-level issues and connect to the CSTs	By PA-RAST/72	Runway Safety project team / Co-Chairs, with Boeing to share ideas on connecting to RSTs	Valid
17/2026	PA-RAST/71	Decide on the FSF offer to provide GAPPRI workshop content, packaging and facilitation support to the PA-RAST at no cost (with a GAPPRE workshop possible after the updated GAPPRE is completed, expected April 2027)	By PA-RAST/72	PA-RAST with FSF	Valid
16/2026	PA-RAST/71	GAPPRI Implementation Tracker: elevate the results to ESC/41; keep State submissions open, including a simplified reissue of the tracker request; and share the results with APRAST for cross-regional benchmarking (successor to Action Item 17/2025)	By PA-RAST/72	Secretariat / ALTA (Runway Safety champion)	Valid
15/2026	PA-RAST/71	Develop a RASG-PA Safety Advisory addressing slippery/wet-runway condition reporting gaps (runways not declared slippery-when-wet by NOTAM, Runway Condition Code under-declaration, and pilots not reporting braking action to ATC), informed by LATAM's flight-data findings	PA-RAST/72	Runway Safety project team / ALTA	Valid
14/2026	PA-RAST/71	Convene the LOC-I overbank webinar for Mexican operators, with Embraer invited as manufacturer, with possible expansion to the wider Safety Partners community	October 2026	Secretariat and Aeroméxico	Valid

Action Item	Meeting	What	When	Who	Status
13/2026	PA-RAST/71	El Niño 2026–27: finalize the draft RSIA developed by ALTA with Aeroméxico and review it with the airlines before circulation; consolidate the lessons learned and recommendations submitted by States and operators; and keep El Niño as a standing adverse-weather item, with a lessons-learned review at PA-RAST/72	October 2026	Secretariat with Aeroméxico and ALTA (supported by IATA)	Valid — RSIA draft done; goes through the ALTA Safety and Flight Operations Committee, then to the Secretariat
12/2026	PA-RAST/71	Update RASG-PA Safety Issue Alert RSIA-01 (incorrect altimeter setting) to recommend raised minima for hectopascal-using States (per the French model: LNAV/VNAV decision heights +100 ft; RNP AR minimum decision height 350 ft; RVR updated to match), together with a recommendation that States, operators and associations research the prevalence of the issue in their operations	By PA-RAST/72	CFIT project team (lead: United States/FAA) with ANAC Brazil	Valid
11/2026	PA-RAST/71	Determine which existing HRC project team absorbs the wildlife/bird-strike risk area, once its effect within the overall HRC picture is identified	By PA-RAST/72	All HRC project team leads	Valid
10/2026	PA-RAST/71	Develop the working framework of the new System/Component Failure – Non-Powerplant (SCF-NP) HRC project team, established at PA-RAST/71, for presentation at PA-RAST/72	By PA-RAST/72	FSF (lead), with ALTA, Boeing, Airbus, Embraer, ATR, Delta Air Lines and ANAC Brazil; co-lead to be identified	Valid

Action Item	Meeting	What	When	Who	Status
09/2026	PA-RAST/71	Complete the GASP Roadmap gap analysis in each HRC project team (Covered/Partial/None per SEI action, with a custodian, a metric and a date for every accepted gap), consolidate the framework for presentation at PA-RAST/72, and relay the results of the HRC prioritization exercise to the NACC and SAM Regional Offices as input to regional aviation safety plan development and review	By PA-RAST/72	Secretariat and all HRC project team leads	Valid
08/2026	PA-RAST/71	Call for contributions and participation in all HRC project teams (CFIT, LOC-I, MAC, Runway Safety and the new SCF-NP team)	Open until PA-RAST/72	All members; Co-Chairs and Secretariat	Valid
07/2026	PA-RAST/70	Prepare a proposal of amendment to the ToRs regarding changes in the "active member" criteria	By ESC/41	Secretariat	Completed at PA-RAST/71 — proposal prepared, to be submitted to ESC/41
06/2026	PA-RAST/70	An ad hoc group to develop a detailed proposal for the structure and organization of future PA-RAST meetings under a revised meeting model	By ESC/41	Brazil (with support from Dominican Republic, Panama, ALTA and Boeing)	Completed at PA-RAST/71 — proposal developed, to be submitted to ESC/41
05/2026	PA-RAST/70	Establish an ad hoc group to engage with appropriate stakeholders to take action on TCAS RA hotspots in BOG, MEX and Brazil airspace	PA-RAST/72	CANSO (with support from Canada, Dominican Republic, United States, IATA, Aeroméxico, Airbus, Avianca)	Valid — actioned through the discussions held at PA-RAST/71; to receive the Mexico City TMA redesign results

Action Item	Meeting	What	When	Who	Status
04/2026	PA-RAST/70	Meet with the aeronautical and environmental authorities of Panama, Colombia and Chile to facilitate information sharing between these authorities and airports to coordinate bird strike mitigation efforts	PA-RAST/72	IATA	Completed — Ecuador asked to join; successor opened as Action Item 27/2026
03/2026	PA-RAST/70	Update the CST Implementation Guide to better reflect the range of practical approaches available to States	PA-RAST/73	Canada	Completed at PA-RAST/71 — revised CST Strategy and Implementation Guidance package delivered (44 revisions incorporated); approval of the revised documents rests with ESC/41
02/2026	PA-RAST/70	Develop strategy and guidance material for voluntary safety reporting programmes	PA-RAST/72	United States, RASG-PA Secretariat and Aeroméxico	Valid — ongoing project; Brazil regulatory track advancing (see Section 4); the Colombia pilot project is paused, not abandoned, owing to leadership changes in the State

Action Item	Meeting	What	When	Who	Status
01/2026	PA-RAST/70	Develop a template for an agreement document, like a declaration or letter of intent, to ensure a sustained commitment to the ongoing activities of local CSTs	PA-RAST/72	Airbus (supported by the Secretariat)	Completed — model Declaration of Intent delivered as an appendix to the revised CST Implementation Guidance; letter of intent finalized and sent to Colombia
22/2025	PA-RAST/69	Prepare a draft amendment to the PA-RAST Terms of Reference to include a section on the PA-RAST Code of Conduct	By PA-RAST/71	Canada and CANSO	Completed — Code of Conduct prepared with the Chairs, to be submitted to ESC/41
21/2025	PA-RAST/69	Collaborate with the GREPECAS GTE to mitigate the events of aircraft entering FIRs without establishing contact with ATS	By PA-RAST/72	Secretariat (NACC RO) and CANSO	Valid — ongoing; group validating whether the events represent a genuine flight-crew issue; a crew-awareness product may result
20/2025	PA-RAST/69	Work on the identified TCAS RAs in Mexico, São Paulo and Bogotá to define root causes and corresponding mitigation and resolution actions, providing feedback to the PA-RAST	By PA-RAST/72 (re-deadlined)	IATA (with the MAC Ad hoc Group and the GTE)	Valid — updates provided at PA-RAST/71; work continuing

Action Item	Meeting	What	When	Who	Status
19/2025	PA-RAST/69	Coordinate with ICAO Regional Implementation Groups (ANS, Safety, AVSEC) to determine the most appropriate approach for addressing the top safety issues identified by the PA-RAST	By PA-RAST/72	Secretariat	Valid — to be progressed offline within the Regional Offices
18/2025	PA-RAST/69	Launch a survey to collect the Safety Partners' "Top 5 Safety Priorities" and present the results to the PA-RAST	Delayed to PA-RAST/71	ALTA	Completed — survey completed and results presented at PA-RAST/71
17/2025	PA-RAST/69	Coordinate, through the ICAO NACC and SAM Regional Offices, the implementation of the GAPPRI Tracker across the Pan-American region, representing the PA-RAST as Champion of the Runway Safety Working Group	By PA-RAST/71	ALTA	Completed — coordination carried out (tracker circulated twice; seven State submissions); successor Action Item 16/2026 opened (elevate to ESC; keep submissions open; share with APRAST)
15/2025	PA-RAST/69	Evaluate how to implement a CST for Mexico, considering lessons learned and the example of C-CAST/CAG functionality, presenting to the PA-RAST the progress achieved	By PA-RAST/71 (ongoing)	RASG-PA Secretariat (ownership transferred from AFAC and CST-Mexico airlines)	Valid — Secretariat–AFAC meeting scheduled **early September 2026** to support the authority's review of its current arrangement against the revised CST guidance

Action Item	Meeting	What	When	Who	Status
14/2025	PA-RAST/69	Review the processes to be developed for the implementation of the CST-CA to ensure the Team's activities go beyond notification and reporting, presenting to the PA-RAST the progress achieved	By PA-RAST/71	ACSA/COCESNA	Completed — progress presented at PA-RAST/71 (GESOC regional CST phased implementation); recurring updates to continue at each meeting
13/2025	PA-RAST/69	Present the progress made in the Airspace redesign for Mexico City and Cancún TMAs following the TCAS RA reports and safety information provided by IATA/FDX and RASG-PA Safety Partners	By PA-RAST/71	Mexico (SENEAM) and Aeroméxico	Completed — progress presented at PA-RAST/71 (see Section 5); consolidated progress report at PA-RAST/72 via Action Item 05/2026

Action Item	Meeting	What	When	Who	Status
12/2025	PA-RAST/67	Develop a RASG-PA Safety Advisory that integrates lessons learned from final reports of accident and serious incident investigations, incorporates updated procedures, and includes revisions to the existing advisory on runway incursion prevention (also tied to the recommendation to the PA-RAST arising from the CENIPA Voepass investigation to integrate lessons learned from final reports)	Re-deadlined to PA-RAST/72	ALTA (with BCAST/Azul, Brazil; ACI-LAC to be engaged)	Valid — two distinct deliverables are due at PA-RAST/72: (1) adaptation of the BCAST runway-markings/touchdown-point-awareness safety enhancement as a RASG-PA Safety Advisory under this action; and (2) the runway-incursion barrier-analysis advisory tracked separately under Action Item 29/2026
14/2023	PA-RAST/60	Determine feasibility of converting CAST SE-237 into an RSA	December 2026	Boeing	Valid — Boeing deferring to the FAA on SE-237 status; update expected following the CAST briefing

Appendix B – Key Information for States

This appendix digests the outcomes of PA-RAST/71 for States: a suggested action, the reason behind it, and where to find the detail. Cross-references point to the Summary of Discussions sections and to the action items in Appendix A. The tick boxes are provided for each State's own internal follow-up; nothing is to be returned to the PA-RAST or the RASG-PA Secretariat.

	Suggested action	Why it matters — what PA-RAST/71 found	Reference timing
ACT NOW			
☐	**Review the depth of your national UPRT mandate** Check it against the full ICAO framework, not the minimum requirement.	About 80% of the region's States report a UPRT mandate, but the survey behind that figure shows some mandates are only superficial. A model UPRT regulation is being developed as RASG-PA guidance, harmonized with the UPRT provisions of the LAR through SRVSOP.	**Section 5** Action Item 30/2026 Model regulation due by PA-RAST/72
☐	**If your ANSP uses hectopascals, prepare for the RSIA-01 update** Consider raised minima and research the prevalence of altimeter-setting errors in your own operations.	The update will recommend considering raised minima per the French model — LNAV/VNAV decision heights +100 ft; RNP AR minimum decision height 350 ft — following the Paris Charles de Gaulle incident.	**Section 5** Action Item 12/2026
☐	**Submit or complete your GAPPRI Implementation Tracker return**	Only seven of the 49 States and Territories responded. Submissions remain open; the results are elevated to ESC/41 and benchmarked with the Asia-Pacific region.	**Section 5** Action Item 16/2026 Open now
☐	**Take an active role on GNSS interference** Identify the causes of signal loss in your airspace, publish NOTAMs in a timely manner, and preserve a minimum operational network of conventional navigation aids consistent with ICAO guidance.	Hotspots persist in Mexico, Colombia and — after a recent significant increase — Panama; the first spoofing event recorded in Mexico is under analysis. Operators are issuing their own guidance on inhibiting safety systems in spoofing areas, which produces uneven levels of safety.	**Section 3** RSIA-03A to be extended to the new hotspot areas

	Suggested action	Why it matters — what PA-RAST/71 found	Reference timing
☐	**Prepare for El Niño 2026–27 with your ANSP** Coordinate mass-diversion and ground-stop contingency plans ahead of the November–February peak, and send lessons learned and recommendations on State facilitation to the Secretariat.	El Niño amplifies the operational chain from adverse weather to LOC-I precursors. The lessons received will feed the consolidated report and the forthcoming RSIA, developed by ALTA with Aeroméxico.	**Section 2** Action Item 13/2026 Before the November–February peak
PREPARE / CONTRIBUTE			
☐	**Consider facilitating operator participation in the ULSE TRIP programme** Subject to the Secretariat confirming that such promotion is appropriate.	TRIP is a free, voluntary and confidential lithium battery incident surveillance programme; several regional carriers already participate.	**Section 3**
☐	**Nominate participants to the HRC project teams** CFIT, LOC-I, MAC, Runway Safety and the newly created SCF-NP team.	The call for contributions and participation covers all five teams. SCF-NP was created at PA-RAST/71 following the data-driven prioritization exercise.	**Section 6** Action Items 08/2026 and 10/2026 Open until PA-RAST/72
☐	**Support the GASP Roadmap gap analysis** Provide State data and, where relevant, take custodianship of an accepted gap.	Led by the HRC project team leads, the teams will complete the Covered/Partial/None mapping between meetings; every accepted gap needs a custodian, a metric and a date.	**Section 6** Action Items 09/2026 and 32/2026
☐	**Raise the accident-report publication gap internally** With your civil aviation and accident investigation authorities.	Approximately 40% of the region's accidents lack any published report. An ad hoc group linked to RASG-PA/15/D02 is supporting States in the production of reports.	**Section 3** RASG-PA/15/D02

	Suggested action	Why it matters — what PA-RAST/71 found	Reference timing
COMING TO YOU			
	Revised CST Strategy and Implementation Guidance	The revision lowers the entry barrier: trust, not structure or data, is the foundation; a preliminary collaboration stage precedes formalization; a model tripartite Declaration of Intent is available when parties choose to formalize. Reference models presented at PA-RAST/71: Panama's staged national CST, the first regional CST in Central America, Canada's Collaborative Analysis Group, and Aruba's build-out from an existing Runway Safety Team.	**Section 4** Approval at ESC/41
	Legal protection for voluntary reporting	Canada's Aeronautics Act amendments (in force March 2026) protect voluntarily shared information from disclosure and enforcement action in alignment with Annex 19; Brazil's ASAP-type regulatory track — impact analysis complete, airline consultations closing in 2026 — offers a rulemaking model other States can follow.	**Section 4** Action Item 02/2026

Appendix C – Key Information for Collaborative Safety Teams

This appendix digests the outcomes of PA-RAST/71 for Collaborative Safety Teams: a suggested action, the reason behind it, and where to find the detail. Cross-references point to the Summary of Discussions sections and to the action items in Appendix A. The tick boxes are provided for each team's own internal follow-up; nothing is to be returned to the PA-RAST or the RASG-PA Secretariat.

	Suggested action	Why it matters — what PA-RAST/71 found	Reference timing
ACT NOW			
☐	**Report your implementation status and internally identified risks at each PA-RAST meeting** Take up the standing invitation.	It lets the Team connect issues emerging across the region, share existing RASG-PA products, and prevent each CST from working in isolation.	**Section 4** Every PA-RAST meeting
☐	**Encourage member airlines to join the ULSE TRIP programme**	A free, voluntary and confidential lithium battery incident surveillance programme, with several regional carriers already participating.	**Section 3**
PREPARE / CONTRIBUTE			
☐	**Turn national products into regional ones — follow the BCAST path** Offer your CST's products for adaptation as RASG-PA Safety Advisories.	BCAST's runway-markings safety enhancement, runway-incursion barrier analysis and UPRT safety bulletin are all being adapted into RASG-PA Safety Advisories — a model any CST can replicate with its own products.	**Sections 2 and 5** Action Items 12/2025 and 29/2026
☐	**Feed your data into the PA-RAST regional cycle** HRC prioritization, GASP Roadmap gap analysis and El Niño SPI/event-data sharing.	CST priorities were a formal input to the HRC prioritization exercise at PA-RAST/71, and CST data will support the GASP Roadmap gap analysis and the El Niño seasonal monitoring.	**Sections 2 and 6** Action Item 09/2026

	Suggested action	Why it matters — what PA-RAST/71 found	Reference timing
COMING TO YOU			
	A proposal for national-level runway safety teams	Teams that aggregate airport-level issues and connect to the CSTs — or, where no CST exists, work with the civil aviation authority.	**Sections 2 and 9** Action Items 18/2026 and 26/2026 By PA-RAST/72
	A role in disseminating RASG-PA safety products	CSTs are recognized as an effective dissemination channel, as practised in Canada, and will feature in the Secretariat's dissemination improvement proposal.	**Section 8** Action Item 24/2026 By PA-RAST/72
	Joint meetings between adjacent CSTs	Periodic joint meetings between CSTs sharing airspace — such as the Central American CST and Panama's — were suggested and encouraged.	**Section 4**

Appendix D – Key Information for Industry

This appendix digests the outcomes of PA-RAST/71 for industry — aircraft operators, manufacturers and industry associations: a suggested action, the reason behind it, and where to find the detail. Cross-references point to the Summary of Discussions sections and to the action items in Appendix A. The tick boxes are provided for each organization's own internal follow-up; nothing is to be returned to the PA-RAST or the RASG-PA Secretariat.

	Suggested action	Why it matters — what PA-RAST/71 found	Reference timing
ACT NOW			
☐	**Check runway markings and runway-incursion barriers at your destinations** Report displaced aiming point markings and other inconsistencies to the PA-RAST; use local RSTs and GAPPRI to verify clearance integrity, joint planning of runway work and rapid compliance with stop instructions.	Repositioned aiming point markings misalign the visually perceived touchdown zone with the declared distances, and the barrier analysis of four runway collisions showed that outcome tracked recovery, not how the conflict began. Advisories are coming on both, and on runway-condition reporting gaps.	**Sections 2 and 5** Action Items 12/2025, 29/2026 and 15/2026
☐	**Tighten runway condition reporting discipline** Declare slippery-when-wet runways by NOTAM, avoid under-declaring Runway Condition Codes, and have pilots report braking action to ATC in real time.	Flight-data evidence shows deceleration losses concentrated after heavy rain on runways due for rubber removal.	**Section 2** Action Item 15/2026
☐	**Treat every TCAS resolution advisory as genuine**	Crews habituated to nuisance advisories during level-offs are losing the sense of risk — a normalization of deviation the Meeting flagged for immediate attention.	**Section 3**

	Suggested action	Why it matters — what PA-RAST/71 found	Reference timing
☐	**Report GNSS interference events and support harmonized guidance**	Operators are improvising their own procedures for inhibiting safety systems in spoofing areas, creating uneven levels of safety; manufacturers have been asked to brief the Team so that operator and State guidance can converge.	**Section 3**
☐	**Prepare for El Niño 2026–27 at operator level** Seasonal FDM SPIs; station- and route-specific threat-and-error briefings; combined UPRT scenarios pairing weather, automation surprise and workload; revalidated alternates and contingency fuel; post-disruption recovery through the FRMS.	El Niño amplifies the chain from adverse weather to LOC-I precursors; bank-angle alerts and unstable approaches are the early warning. A bilingual RSIA is in development by ALTA with Aeroméxico.	**Section 2** Action Item 13/2026 Before the November–February peak
PREPARE / CONTRIBUTE			
☐	**Verify UPRT training against the full ICAO framework** Rather than the minimum national mandate.	The BCAST UPRT safety bulletin is being converted into a RASG-PA Safety Advisory, and a model UPRT regulation is being developed for States.	**Section 5** Action Item 30/2026
☐	**Review cabin lithium battery policies and contribute event data** Join ULSE TRIP (mytripportal.org) and take part in the coming Safety Partners qualitative session with ULSE.	Practices presented at PA-RAST/71 include two-power-bank limits, in-sight stowage, no in-flight charging and, in some cases, prohibition of use on board. The session will also examine whether States should be encouraged to require reporting of lithium battery fires.	**Sections 2, 3 and 6** Action Item 31/2026

	Suggested action	Why it matters — what PA-RAST/71 found	Reference timing
☐	**Contribute operational evidence** Complete the aircraft-operator elements of the GAPPRI tracker and encourage aerodrome and ANSP partners to complete theirs; keep feeding FDX/IDX; support GAPPAC and the GASP Roadmap gap analysis.	Use the ALTA Regional Safety Survey priorities — bird/wildlife hazards, unstable approaches, air traffic management/communication and MAC/TCAS RA — to focus internal action, and review whether your operation requires a dedicated turbulence-management tool.	**Sections 2, 3, 5 and 6** Action Items 09/2026 and 16/2026
COMING TO YOU			
	A RASG-PA lesson learned on direct operator–ANSP engagement	Bringing flight data straight to the ANSP produced joint training, familiarization flights and a terminal-area redesign with a measurable TCAS RA reduction — a model replicable by operators in States without a functioning CST.	**Section 5** Action Item 28/2026

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