



A42-WP/685
P/48
2/10/25

ASSEMBLY — 42ND SESSION

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON AGENDA ITEM 13

(Presented by the Chairman of the Executive Committee)

The attached report on Agenda Item 13 has been approved by the Executive Committee. Resolutions 13/1, 13/3 and 13/2 are recommended for adoption by the Plenary.

Note.— After removal of this covering sheet, this paper should be inserted in the appropriate place in the report folder.

(37 pages)

Agenda Item 13: Aviation Security — Policy

13.1 At its eighth meeting, the Executive Committee considered the subject of aviation security (AVSEC) policy based on the Council reports on the Outcome of the High-level Ministerial Segment of the ICAO Security Week 2024 held in Muscat, Oman (WP/13), and the Ongoing Work Related to Conflict Zones and Obligations of Member States (WP/35). The Committee also considered the Council's proposal for updating the following Resolutions: Consolidated Statement on Continuing ICAO Policies Related to Aviation Security (WP/11 Revision No.1) and Cybersecurity in Civil Aviation (WP/12 Revision No. 1). In addition, there were 35 papers submitted by States and observers: WPs/ 78 Rev. No. 1, 79, 86, 100, 101, 102, 111, 117, 118, 119, 120, 124, 165, 199, 200, 201, 233 Rev. No. 1, 239 Rev. No. 1, 240, 241, 324, 369, 370, 371, 398, 419, 438 Rev. No. 1, 453, 454, 470, and 482.

13.2 The following information papers were noted: WP/498, WP/513, WP/515 and WP/516 from Bangladesh, WP/562 from Cameroon, WP/586 from Denmark, WP/116 and WP/198 from the Dominican Republic, WP/551 from Indonesia, WP/580 from Kazakhstan, WP/561 from the Republic of Korea, WP/80 from Saudi Arabia, WP/584 from the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) and WP/667 from the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

Muscat Declaration and Assembly Resolution for adoption

13.3 In WP/13, the Council outlines the outcome of the High-level Ministerial Segment convened during ICAO Security Week 2024 in Muscat, and which aims to ensure that aviation remains a secure and resilient force for global progress. The paper calls for reaffirming commitments made in the Muscat Declaration on Aviation Security and Aviation Cybersecurity.

13.4 The Council, in WP/11 Revision No. 1, proposes updates to Resolution A41-18 on continuing ICAO aviation security policies to reflect developments since the 41st Session of the Assembly.

Discussion

13.5 The Committee took note of the outcomes of the High-level Ministerial Segment convened during ICAO Security Week 2024 in Oman, as presented in WP/13, and reaffirmed the commitments made in the Muscat Declaration on Aviation Security and Aviation Cybersecurity. The Committee also noted that key elements of the Declaration were reflected in the updates to Resolutions A41-18 and A41-19, as proposed in WP/11 Revision No. 1 and WP/12 Revision No. 1, respectively.

13.6 In presenting WP/11 Revision No. 1, the Council recalled that the 41st Session of the ICAO Assembly adopted Resolution A41-18: *Consolidated Statement on Continuing ICAO Policies Related to Aviation Security*. In accordance with Resolving Clause 2 of Resolution A41-18, the consolidated statement must be reviewed at each ordinary Session of the Assembly.

13.7 In conclusion, the Committee received broad support to submit for adoption by the Assembly a revised Resolution A41-18 on the *Consolidated Statement on Continuing ICAO Policies Related to Aviation Security* incorporating key elements agreed upon during the discussions on the subject.

13.8 One Member State proposed an amendment to new operative clause 4 in Appendix G (International and regional cooperation in the field of aviation security) of Resolution A41-18 so it reads: “Invites Member States to proactively support ICAO’s regional groups in aviation security and cybersecurity, as well as aviation security cooperative programmes and groups where they exist in different regions,...”. This proposed amendment, however, was not supported by the Committee.

~~A41-18~~ Resolution ~~A42-xx~~ 13/1: Consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security

Whereas it is considered desirable to consolidate Assembly resolutions on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security in order to facilitate their implementation and practical application by making their texts more readily available, understandable and logically organized;

Whereas in Resolution A410-18~~1~~ the Assembly resolved to adopt at each session a consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security; and

Whereas the Assembly has reviewed proposals by the Council for the amendment of the consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security in Resolution A410-18~~1~~, Appendices A to G inclusive, and has amended the statement to reflect the decisions taken during the 42~~nd~~^{1st} Session.

The Assembly:

1. *Resolves* that the Appendices attached to this resolution constitute the consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security, as these policies exist at the close of the 42~~nd~~^{1st} Session of the Assembly;
2. *Resolves* to request that the Council submit for review at each ordinary session a consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security; and
3. *Declares* that this resolution supersedes Resolution A410-18~~1~~.

APPENDIX A

General policy

Whereas the development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to general security;

Whereas acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation ~~have become the main~~ remain a threat to its safe and orderly development and thus civil aviation shall be effectively protected;

Whereas the evolving nature of the threat of terrorist harmful acts, including those posed by concealed explosive devices, the new threat of improvised incendiary devices (IID) placed on air cargo and other abuses of the air cargo system for nefarious purposes, concealed explosive devices, landside attacks,

surface-to-air threats, including man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), other attacks from a distance, chemical threats, attacks using unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), ~~abuse of the air cargo system for terrorist purposes~~, use of aircraft as a weapon, cyber-attacks and other acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, including, in particular, the insider threat, that has a serious adverse effect on the safety, efficiency and regularity of international civil aviation, endangering the lives of persons on board and on the ground and undermining ~~people's~~ the confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of international civil aviation;

Whereas the sophistication of certain threats, attack scenarios and improvised devices targeting air transport is increasing;

Whereas all acts of unlawful interference against international civil aviation constitute a grave offence in violation of international law;

Recalling that Resolutions A27-12 and A29-16 remain in force;

Recognizing that the exploitation of the aviation sector ~~for~~ by a variety of criminal activities, including the illicit transport of narcotics and psychotropic substances by air, as well as the trafficking of humans, wildlife, and other illicit goods can reveal or exacerbate vulnerabilities that could be exploited by those aiming to carry out acts of unlawful interference;

Recalling Resolution A40-12 on the Declaration on Aviation Security;

~~*Recalling the Joint Communiqués issued by the ICAO World Customs Organization (WCO) Joint Conferences on Enhancing Air Cargo Security and Facilitation, held in Singapore in July 2012, in Manama, Bahrain in April 2014, and in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in July 2016;*~~

Mindful of the importance of a common United Nations (UN) approach involving cooperation and coordination among all relevant UN bodies and specialized agencies in recognizing the aviation sector as critical infrastructure on which national security, prosperity and development, as well as the global economy are dependent;

Mindful of United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) 2178 (2014), 2309 (2016), 2341 (2016), 5 (2017), 2396 (2017), 2482 (2019) and 2617 (2021) related to threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts;

Mindful of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006) as a global instrument to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism, which 8th review was adopted in 2023 by the UN General Assembly resolution (A/RES/77/298);

Mindful of the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Delhi Declaration (2022) on countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes;

Mindful of the efforts by ICAO and its Member States to implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy to enhance international, regional and national efforts to counter terrorism, including to take practical steps to strengthen Member State capacity to counter terrorist threats and to reinforce the coordination of the counter-terrorism activities undertaken by the UN System;

Recognizing that global consultations and outreach efforts with Member States to elaborate and refine the elements of the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) successfully led to the initial adoption of the Plan by the Council in November 2017, and adoption of the Second Edition of the GASeP in June 2024;

Recognizing increased efforts that need to be made by Member States towards the GASeP global aspirational goal to achieve and maintain a strong global aviation security system that is underpinned by full and effective implementation of ICAO aviation security Standards in all Member States ~~targets of the GASeP set for 2023 and 2030~~, with the collective support of other Member States, ICAO, regional organizations, industry and all other stakeholders;

Recognizing the importance of the implementation and promotion of global security practices, by both ICAO and Member States, that are risk-based, appropriate and proportionate to the threat;

Emphasizing the need to maintain vigilance as the perceived absence of major aviation security incidents does not mean the risk is lower, and that proactive measures remain essential;

Recognizing the ongoing need to promote the enhancement of security awareness and a strong and effective security culture in aviation, by Member States, industry and other stakeholders;

Mindful of the Regional Roadmaps adopted at Regional Conferences on Aviation Security held in Egypt, Panama, Portugal and Thailand between 2017 and 2018;

Recalling the Communiqué of the Second High-level Conference on Aviation Security held in Montréal in November 2018, and the conference conclusions and recommendations;

Mindful of the Muscat Ministerial Declaration on Aviation Security and Aviation Cybersecurity adopted at ICAO Security Week 2024 in Muscat, Oman on 11 December 2024;

Recalling the importance of Member States taking a comprehensive view of aviation security and other aviation disciplines, maintaining effective coordination among their different bodies to ensure consideration of all appropriate information, and assessment of the consequences of any measures on civil aviation activities, in particular on aviation safety;

Recognizing that air cargo plays a crucial role in transporting essential goods, including medical supplies and vaccines, as witnessed during the restrictions and public health measures brought by the COVID-19 pandemic ~~have had a serious impact on the aviation industry and that this impact must be taken into account by ICAO and Member States when making decisions on aviation security policies and measures; and~~

Recalling the Joint Communiqués issued by the ICAO-World Customs Organization (WCO) Joint Conferences on Enhancing Air Cargo Security and Facilitation, held in Singapore in July 2012, in Manama, Bahrain in April 2014, and in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in July 2016;

Whereas acts of sabotage or attempted sabotage in the form of incendiary devices placed in air cargo and/or mail introduce new security and safety risks to global supply chains and have devastating consequences for interconnected national economies and global commerce;

Reaffirming the commitments made in the Ministerial Declaration of the High-level Conference on COVID-19 (HLCC 2021), among others, the need to importance of ensure ensuring a safe, secure, and orderly flow of traffic with operational readiness of aviation, and to ensure the long-term resilience of international aviation and incorporate the lessons learned from the current and past pandemics global events.

The Assembly:

1. *Strongly condemns* all acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation wherever and by whomsoever and for whatever reason they are perpetrated;
2. *Notes with abhorrence* all acts and attempted acts of unlawful interference aimed at the destruction of civil aircraft in flight and civil airports by surface-to-air threats, incendiary threats to air cargo and mail and the supply chain, attacks using UAS and other attacks from a distance, and the misuse of civil aircraft as a weapon of destruction and the death of persons on board and on the ground;
3. *Reaffirms* that protecting aviation against complex and sophisticated threats security is critical for the sustainability of air transport and aviation security and cybersecurity must continue to be treated as a matters of highest priority and appropriate resources should be made available by ICAO and its Member States as applied to other aspects of civil aviation;
4. *Calls upon* all Member States to confirm their resolute support for the established policy of ICAO by applying the most effective security measures as required and recommended in Annex 17 — *Aviation Security* and security- related provisions in Annex 9 – *Facilitation*, individually and in cooperation with one another, to prevent acts of unlawful interference and to punish the perpetrators, planners, sponsors, sophisticated actors and financiers of conspirators in any such acts;
5. *Reaffirms* ICAO's responsibility to facilitate the consistent and uniform resolution of questions which may arise between Member States in matters affecting the safe and orderly operation of international civil aviation throughout the world;
6. *Directs* the Council to continue, as an urgent priority, its work relating to measures for the prevention of acts of unlawful interference, and ensure that this work is carried out with the highest efficiency and responsiveness;
7. *Calls upon* ICAO and its Member States to implement UNSCR 2178, 2309, 2341, 2395, 2396 and 2482 in accordance with their respective competencies and collectively demonstrate ICAO's global leadership in safeguarding international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference;
- 7bis *Calls upon* ICAO and its Member States to implement the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Delhi Declaration on countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes, particularly those stipulated in the non-binding guiding principles on threats posed by terrorist use of UAS;
8. *Recognizing* the leadership role of ICAO in the area of aviation security, requests-directs the Secretary General to raise the profile of aviation security within ICAO and its regional offices and ensure the long-term sustainability of the Organization's aviation security programme within the context of the Regular Programme Budget;

9. *Urges* all Member States to continue to financially support the Organization's aviation security activities with voluntary contributions in the form of human and financial resources beyond those budgeted for under the regular ~~budget programme~~;

9bis. *Urges* all Member States to ensure effective implementation of ICAO Standards and strive to achieve together the aspirational goal of the ICAO Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) and its six Priority Areas, and to actively participate in global and regional efforts in pursuit of such aspirational goal;

10. *Directs* the Council to ensure the regular review of the GASeP by the Aviation Security Panel so that it remains relevant, its priorities address existing and emerging threats and continues to serve as a useful tool for supporting Member States' efforts to achieve full implementation of Annex 17 — *Aviation Security*;

11. *Directs* the Council to consider the lessons learned from the implementation of the GASeP, ~~including the changes that have occurred in the aviation industry as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, when making refinements to the Plan, ensuring it contains clear and collective aviation security goals and targets,~~ taking into account the global milestones for 2027, 2030 and 2033 as checkpoints at which the global community will assess the progress made along with a progress monitoring mechanism using existing processes and tools to assist ICAO, Member States and stakeholders in ensuring continuous improvement in aviation security;

12. *Directs* the Secretary General to continue reviewing and improving the ICAO aviation security plans and programmes holistically, using consultative mechanisms with Member States and industry, to ensure these plans and programmes are still serving their intended purpose and are adapting to the new and emerging aviation security challenges, while considering innovative approaches to further improve or enhance their effectiveness. Results of the reviews, including any recommendations, should be reported to the Council on a regular basis.

~~13. *Urges* all Member States to actively participate in global and regional efforts towards meeting the GASeP objectives, goals, targets and priorities at the national and regional levels, taking into account global aspirational targets of the GASeP set for 2023 and 2030; and~~

~~14~~¹³. *Urges* all Member States, industry and other stakeholders to continue to take practical actions towards the enhancement of security culture in aviation to support the effective implementation of security measures, and promote security awareness and optimal security behaviour by all entities and individuals; and

APPENDIX B

International air law instruments, enactment of national legislation and conclusion of appropriate agreements for the suppression of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation

a) *International air law instruments*

Whereas the protection of civil aviation from acts of unlawful interference has been enhanced by the *Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft* (Tokyo, 1963), by the

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague, 1970), by the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation* (Montréal, 1971), by the *Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation* (Montréal, 1988), by the *Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection* (Montréal, 1991), by the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation* (Beijing, 2010), by the *Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* (Beijing, 2010), by the *Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft* (Montréal, 2014), and by bilateral agreements for the suppression of such acts;

The Assembly:

1. *Urges* Member States which have not yet done so to become parties to the *Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft* (Tokyo, 1963), to the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* (The Hague, 1970), to the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation* (Montréal, 1971) and the 1988 *Supplementary Protocol to the Montréal Convention*, to the *Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection* (Montréal, 1991), to the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation* (Beijing, 2010), to the *Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* (Beijing, 2010), and to the *Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft* (Montréal, 2014)¹;

2. *Calls upon* Member States not yet parties to the above-mentioned air law instruments to give effect, even before ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, to the principles of those instruments and calls upon Member States which manufacture plastic explosives to implement the marking of such explosives as soon as possible; and

3. *Requests* the Secretary General to continue to remind Member States of the importance of becoming parties to the Tokyo, The Hague, Montréal and Beijing Conventions, to the 1988 *Supplementary Protocol to the Montréal Convention*, to the 2010 *Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft*, to the 2014 *Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft*, and to the *Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection*, and to provide assistance requested by Member States encountering any difficulties in becoming parties to these instruments.

b) *Enactment of national legislation and conclusion of appropriate agreements*

Whereas deterrence of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation can be greatly facilitated through the enactment by Member States of national criminal laws providing severe penalties for such acts;

The Assembly:

1. *Calls upon* Member States to give special attention to the adoption of adequate measures against persons committing, planning, sponsoring, financing or facilitating acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, and in particular to include in their legislation rules for the severe punishment of such persons; and

¹ Lists of States Parties to aviation security legal instruments can be found at www.icao.int under the ICAO Treaty Collection

2. *Calls upon* Member States to take adequate measures relating to the extradition or prosecution of persons committing acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation by adopting appropriate provisions in law or treaty for that purpose and by concluding appropriate agreements to provide for the extradition of persons committing criminal attacks on international civil aviation.

APPENDIX C

Implementation of technical security measures

Whereas protection of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference requires continued vigilance and development and implementation of actions to mitigate the threat, including those in Annex 17 – *Aviation Security* and security- related provisions in Annex 9 — *Facilitation*, by Member States;

Whereas a clear need exists for the strengthening of security to be applied to all phases and processes associated with the carriage of persons, their cabin and hold baggage, cargo, mail, courier and express parcels, and in protecting civil aviation against cyber-attacks, and threats to the landside areas of airports, as well as attacks carried out or facilitated by insiders;

Whereas threats to the air cargo and mail systems as a whole, including incendiary threats to air cargo and mail and global supply chains resulting from attempted sabotage through placement of IIDs on aircraft require a global approach in the development and implementation of security requirements and best practices, including continued information sharing and cooperation with relevant international organizations, such as the World Customs Organization (WCO), Universal Postal Union (UPU), and International Maritime Organization (IMO), and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In this regard States should share new best practices that have been implemented to mitigate the threat posed by IIDs or when new technology has been developed to aid in the detection of IIDs;

Whereas the responsibility for ensuring that security measures are applied by government agencies, airport authorities, aircraft operators and other entities rests with the Member States;

Whereas the effective implementation of the security measures advocated by ICAO is an effective means of preventing acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation;

Whereas a broad set of risk management strategies and tools must be employed to align security measures with security risk in order to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of aviation security measures, taking into account any unintended impact on the safety of civil aviation. In turn, effective coordination of aviation safety, security, and cybersecurity will benefit from shared knowledge and strengthened efforts;

Whereas countermeasures for protection of civil aviation can only be effective through employment of highly trained and competent security personnel, in addition to background checks, certification and quality control;

~~*Whereas* the COVID-19 pandemic may have required temporary alleviations of certain security requirements to be authorized as the case may be;~~

~~Recognizing the importance of carefully assessing and addressing the risks associated with the resumption of aviation operations, paying particular attention to risks deriving from the impact of the pandemic on staff;~~

~~Whereas the COVID-19 pandemic requires addressing security threats and risks, taking into account new health-related risks, while ensuring a balance with facilitation and sustainability;~~

~~Whereas the integration of a robust security culture for all personnel, in both security and non-security functions, at all levels and across the entire aviation domain, is imperative to the development and sustainability of an effective security environment; and~~

~~Whereas technology, process innovations and appropriate training are required to achieve effective and efficient aviation security and facilitation measures for passengers and cargo, and in defining the future of security screening regimes, while recognizing the specialist skills needed to operate and manage current and emerging aviation security technologies, and hire and train staff for their use, while pursuing efforts to attract the next generation of aviation professionals; and~~

~~Recognizing that the timely and efficient testing and certification of both current and rapidly advancing aviation security equipment is critical to strengthening global aviation security and meeting the growth in passenger traffic.~~

The Assembly:

1. *Urges* the Council to continue to attach the highest priority to the adoption of effective, evidence- and risk- based, and operationally-viable measures for the prevention of acts of unlawful interference commensurate with the current threat to the security of international civil aviation, to take into account the innovative and evolving nature of that threat, and to keep up to date the provisions of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention from a threat and risk perspective;
2. *Urges* all Member States on an individual basis and in cooperation with other Member States to take all possible measures for the prevention of acts of unlawful interference, in particular, those required or recommended in Annex 17 as well as those recommended by the Council;
3. *Reiterates* the responsibility of all Member States for the implementation of effective aviation security measures within their territory, taking into account the evolving threat;
4. *Urges* Member States to fully and sustainably implement Annex 17 — *Aviation Security* and the security-related provisions of Annex 9 — *Facilitation*, to intensify their efforts for the implementation of existing Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), and procedures relating to aviation security, to monitor such implementation, to rectify any gaps or deficiencies as a matter of urgency, to take all necessary steps to prevent acts of unlawful interference against international civil aviation and to give appropriate attention to the guidance material contained in the ICAO *Aviation Security Manual* (Doc 8973 — Restricted), *ICAO Aviation Security Training Manual* (Doc 10207), and other security-related guidance material available on the ICAO ~~restricted~~ public website;
5. *Encourages* Member States to place high importance on the ~~recently adopted~~ Standards that respond to the insider threat and ensure their effective implementation within their respective jurisdictions, and to continue adapting and adopting measures against this threat;

6. *Encourages* Member States to promote aviation security as a fundamental component of national, social and economic priorities, planning and operations;

7. *Encourages* Member States to work in partnership with industry to develop, conduct operational trials of, and implement effective security measures and innovative technologies, techniques and processes;

7bis. Urges Member States and relevant entities to collaborate and improve procedures for the certification of security equipment, aiming to reduce delays and eliminate fragmentation, thereby enhancing global aviation security;

8. *Encourages* Member States and industry to coordinate their efforts to evolve aviation security screening to become more agile in responding to new threats, more seamless and passenger-centric while ensuring security objectives in Annex 17 — *Aviation Security* are constantly met;

9. *Encourages* Member States and all aviation entities to promote a strong and effective security culture in aviation; including the development of security awareness programmes and campaigns among workforces and the general public that emphasize that security is everyone's responsibility;

10. Urges Member States to secure resources to ensure qualified and competent professionals are available to regulate, operate, maintain and oversee the effective implementation of measures related to aviation security ~~to maintain a competent, motivated and well-trained workforce and take actions to guarantee and maintain staff competencies that existed prior to the COVID-19 pandemic;~~

11. *Encourages* Member States to implement effective oversight, including remote techniques when restrictions or other circumstances do not allow for on-site monitoring activities, over all aspects of their aviation security regime in order to ensure that security measures are effectively and sustainably implemented;

12. *Encourages* Member States, pursuant to their domestic laws, regulations and aviation security programmes, and in accordance with applicable SARPs, to promote the implementation of aviation security measures in a practical manner to:

- a) broaden existing cooperation mechanisms among Member States and industry, as appropriate, for prompt information exchange and the early detection of security threats to civil aviation operations, including cyber threats. At the technical level, this prompt sharing of information should include all relevant experts;
- b) share expertise, best practices and information relating to preventive security measures, including screening and inspection techniques, the detection of explosives and incendiary devices, airport security behavioural detection, screening and credentialing of airport staff, human resource development and the research and development of relevant technologies;
- c) use ~~advanced-modern~~ technologies to detect prohibited items and materials and to prevent the carriage of such items and materials on board aircraft while respecting the privacy and safety of individuals;

- d) define aviation security measures that are evidence and risk-based, appropriate and proportionate to the threat, effective, efficient, multi-layered, operationally-viable, economically- and operationally-sustainable, and take into account the impact on passengers, crew and on legitimate trade;
- e) intensify efforts in securing the air cargo and mail security system, ~~by~~ particularly in mitigating incendiary threats to air cargo and mail:
 - 1) developing a strong, sustainable and resilient air cargo and mail security framework;
 - 2) implementing robust security standards effectively and sustainably;
 - 3) adopting a total supply chain approach to air cargo and mail security, if appropriate;
 - 4) establishing and strengthening oversight and quality control of air cargo and mail security;
 - 5) engaging in bilateral and multilateral cooperative efforts to coordinate actions to harmonize and enhance air cargo and mail security and secure the global air cargo supply chain;
 - 6) sharing best practices and lessons learned with other Member States to enhance the overall level of air cargo and mail security; and
 - 7) strengthening initiatives to intensify capacity-building and innovation in air cargo and mail security;
- f) ~~give consideration to~~ address the potential misuse of UAS and Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) systems, and apply security measures in order to prevent their use in acts of unlawful interference;
- g) ensure that civil aviation security threat and risk assessments within their respective territories and airspace are performed continually, use these assessments to appropriately inform counter-measure development and adjust aviation security policy settings, and provide information to relevant stakeholders in a timely manner on all possible risks to civil aviation;
- h) address the risk of attacks in landside areas, including terminal buildings, by working with all stakeholders to:
 - 1) maintain an appropriate balance between the needs of effective and sustainable security measures and passenger facilitation;
 - 2) implement a set of risk-based measures that are flexible and practical, with clearly defined responsibilities among relevant actors;
 - 3) avoid, to the extent possible, the creation of vulnerabilities posed by areas of mass gathering either inside or proximate to the terminal; and
 - 4) sustain a culture of constant vigilance, deterrence, prevention, response and resilience in a coordinated manner in the face of evolving threats;
- i) ensure the protection of civil aviation against cyber-attacks and cyber threats; and
- j) address the risk posed by insiders through the exploitation of staff and their privileged access to secure areas and sensitive security information, ~~taking into consideration the~~

~~impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the possibility that the pandemic has created new or exacerbated existing insider vulnerabilities.~~

13. *Calls upon* Member States, while respecting their sovereignty, to minimize disruption to air travel resulting from confusion or inconsistent interpretation of Standards by cooperating and coordinating actions in order to implement SARPs and guidance consistently, efficiently and effectively and by providing clear, well-timed and readily available information to the travelling public;

14. *Calls upon* Member States, when requesting another State to apply security measures to protect aircraft flying into its territory, to take fully into account the security measures already in place in the requested State and, where appropriate and continuously validated, to recognize those measures as equivalent to reduce duplication;

15. *Requests* ICAO to:

- a) ensure that the provisions of Annex 17 — *Aviation Security* and Annex 9 — *Facilitation* are compatible with and complementary to each other;
- b) continue to promote the development of effective and innovative security processes and concepts, through awareness-raising regional and sub-regional aviation security events at the request of the Member States concerned, including in cooperation with industry stakeholders and equipment manufacturers to develop the next generation of passenger and cargo screening processes;
- c) continue to support the work of the Aviation Security Panel in addressing new and existing threats to civil aviation, and to develop appropriate preventive evidence and risk-based measures and guidance material;
- d) encourage States and stakeholders to pursue strengthened cooperation through bilateral or multilateral arrangements, as appropriate, in order to improve information sharing mechanisms, and testing capabilities and certification for security equipment, addressing the evolving global aviation security threat picture;
- ~~de~~ e) promote the development of ~~mutual~~ recognition of equivalence processes with the goal of assisting Member States in achieving mutually beneficial arrangements, including one-stop security arrangements, which recognize the equivalence of their aviation security measures where these achieve the same outcomes, consistent with Annex 17 requirements, and which are based on an agreed comprehensive and continuous validation process and effective ongoing exchange of information regarding their respective aviation security systems and do not create vulnerabilities and introduce new risks into the aviation network; and
- ef) continue to address other threats and risks, including complex and sophisticated ones, cyber threats to aviation security, risks to landside areas of airports and air traffic management security, in consultation with the Aviation Security Panel and the Cybersecurity Panel; ~~and,~~

16. *Directs* the Secretary General to update and amend at appropriate intervals the ICAO *Aviation Security Manual* (Doc 8973 — Restricted) and develop new guidance material designed to assist

Member States in responding to new and existing threats to aviation and implementing the specifications and procedures related to civil aviation security;

16bis *Directs* the Secretary General to update and amend at appropriate intervals the ICAO *Aviation Security Training Manual* (Doc 10207) and develop new guidance material designed to assist Member States in the recruitment, selection, and training of their staff, including consideration for quality assurance and human factors, while implementing the specifications and procedures related to civil aviation security;

17. *Directs* the Secretary General to ensure the periodic review and updating of the ICAO *Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement* (Doc 10108 — Restricted), which provides a risk assessment methodology for aviation security which may be considered by Member States for use in further developing their own national risk assessments and to include risk-based assessments, in line with Doc 10108, with any recommendations for the adoption of new or amended aviation security measures in Annex 17 or in any other ICAO document;

18. *Directs* the Secretary General to ensure that appropriate fields of expertise are engaged in the assessment of aviation security risks and the development of SARPs, specifications, guidance material, and other mean to address issues of aviation security, including coordination with other panels;

19. *Directs* the Council to continually assess the Aviation Security Panel terms of reference and establish governance procedures to ensure there are no constraints on the Panel's ability to consider the full scope of aviation security issues; and

20. *Directs* the Secretary General to continue to ensure that aviation security is appropriately positioned as a core tenet and functional component of the ICAO Secretariat, commensurate with its criticality to the advancement, sustainability, and safe and orderly development of international civil aviation.

APPENDIX D

The ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach

Whereas the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA) has been successful in meeting the mandate of Resolution A401-14⁸, Appendix D;

Whereas one of the primary objectives of the Organization continues to be ensuring the security of international civil aviation worldwide;

Whereas Member States are committed to compliance with Annex 17 — *Aviation Security* Standards, and the security-related Standards of Annex 9 — *Facilitation*;

Whereas the establishment of an effective aviation security oversight system by Member States supports the implementation of international aviation security Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and contributes to this objective;

Recalling that the ultimate responsibility to ensure the security of civil aviation rests with Member States;

Considering that the USAP-CMA ~~can~~ has proven to be instrumental in the identification of aviation security concerns and in providing recommendations for their resolution, and that the Programme continues to enjoy the support of Member States, serving as a catalyst for their continued efforts to meet their international obligations in the field of aviation security;

Considering that USAP-CMA audit results make an important contribution to the understanding of the aviation security posture globally, regionally, and in individual Member States; and that compiled USAP-CMA data can also be used to ascertain whether Member States are ~~reaching~~ ~~achieving~~ the ~~aspirational targets~~ milestones set out in the GAsEP and can help inform the Aviation Security Panel in prioritizing areas of work including in the development and update of Annex 17;

Recognizing that the effective implementation of State corrective action plans to address deficiencies identified through USAP-CMA audits is an integral and crucial part of the monitoring process in order to achieve the overall objective of enhancing global aviation security;

Recognizing the importance of a limited level of disclosure with respect to ICAO aviation security audit results, balancing the need for Member States to be aware of unresolved security concerns with the need to keep sensitive security information out of the public realm;

Considering the approval by the Council of a mechanism to address significant security concerns (SSeCs) in a timely manner;

Recognizing the importance of a coordinated strategy for facilitating assistance to Member States through the high-level Secretariat Monitoring and Assistance Review Board;

Recognizing that the continuation of the USAP-CMA, and the continued evolution of this programme, is essential to create mutual confidence in the level of aviation security between Member States and to encourage the adequate implementation of security-related Standards;

Recognizing that the USAP-CMA has recovered from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic by increasing the number of ~~and resource constraints have limited the frequency with which audits can be conducted~~ during the past triennium, largely funded by voluntary contributions;

Recalling that the ~~40th~~ 41st Session of the Assembly requested the Council to report on the overall implementation of the USAP-CMA;

The Assembly:

1. *Notes* that the USAP-CMA ~~is fundamental in improving~~ contributes to global aviation security through auditing and continuous monitoring of the aviation security performance of Member States;
2. *Requests* the Secretary General to ensure that the USAP-CMA continues to assess and measure the sustainable and effective implementation of Annex 17 Standards, including risk-based approaches to their compliance as appropriate, and security-related Standards of Annex 9, and that audit prioritization is based on risk, and that USAP-CMA addresses serious deficiencies in a timely manner;
3. *Expresses its appreciation* to Member States for their cooperation in the USAP-CMA audit

process and for making available security experts to be certified as USAP-CMA auditors to serve as short-term experts for the conduct of USAP-CMA audits, as well as long-term experts to act as USAP-CMA audit team leaders;

4. *Requests* the Council to ensure the continuation and sufficient resourcing of the USAP-CMA and to oversee its activities, as it monitors Member States' ability to establish and maintain sustainable aviation security systems, in compliance with the ICAO security-related Standards, and implementation of corrective action plans to address deficiencies identified during USAP-CMA audits in a timely manner;

5. *Urges* ~~Notes the work carried out by the ICAO Secretariat, in consultation with Member States, to review the scope and methodology of the USAP-CMA and urges the Secretariat~~ to continue to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme, while maintaining its quality, in consultation with the Secretariat Study Group on the USAP--CMA and with the assistance of the Aviation Security Panel members and observers, as appropriate;

6. *Endorses* the policy of a limited level of disclosure of USAP-CMA audit results including the prompt notification of the existence of significant security concerns;

7. *Urges* all Member States to give full support to ICAO by:

- a) signing the Memorandum of Understanding regarding the USAP-CMA;
- b) preparing and submitting to ICAO all required documentation according to established timelines prior to USAP-CMA activities as scheduled by ICAO;
- c) facilitating the work of USAP-CMA teams during the conduct of USAP-CMA activities;
- d) preparing and submitting an appropriate corrective action plan to address deficiencies identified during USAP-CMA activities; and
- e) implementing those corrective measures within timelines agreed upon between Member States and ICAO.

8.bis *Urges* all Member States to accept audits as scheduled by ICAO, unless prevented from doing so by *force majeure*, to ensure the provision of timely and relevant information in support of other ICAO programmes and activities, and prevent negative financial and administrative impacts on the audit programme;

8. *Requests* the Secretary General to ensure the long-term financial sustainability of the USAP-CMA by taking measures to incorporate the funding requirements for staffing and its activities within the Regular Programme Budget as soon as possible; and

9. *Requests* that the Council submit a progress report to the next ordinary session of the Assembly on the implementation of the USAP-CMA.

APPENDIX E

The ICAO Implementation Support and Development – Security (ISD-SEC) Programme (~~ISD-SEC~~)

Whereas the implementation of technical measures for the prevention of acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation requires financial resources and training of personnel; ~~and~~

Whereas notwithstanding assistance given, some countries, in particular developing countries, lack aviation security oversight capacity and still face difficulties in fully implementing preventive measures due to insufficient financial, technical and material resources; ~~and~~

Reaffirming the value and importance of ICAO's *No Country Left Behind* Strategic Goal that aims to help States in need by delivering expanded access to targeted and effective aviation security and cybersecurity training, assistance and capacity-building while promoting long-term self-sustainability for States.

The Assembly:

1. *Directs* the Secretary General to promote efforts worldwide by Member States and other aviation entities to deliver effective technical assistance and support for Member States by encouraging coordinated, targeted and prioritized international aviation security capacity-building activities *guided by the ICAO Aviation Security Assistance and Capacity Building Strategy*;
2. *Urges* Member States to voluntarily contribute financial and in-kind resources to increase the reach and impact of ICAO aviation security enhancement activities;
3. *Directs* the Secretary General to ensure that contributions received for aviation security implementation support and development activities be fully committed to those activities only;
4. *Urges* Member States able to do so to assist in the delivery of effective and targeted capacity-building activities in the area of aviation security. Such activities should include training, technical assistance and implementation support and development, technology transfers and the provision of other necessary resources, where it is needed to enable all Member States to achieve an enhanced and effective aviation security regime;
5. *Invites* Member States to take advantage of ICAO's capacity to provide, facilitate or coordinate short-term remedial assistance and long-term assistance to remedy deficiencies in their implementation of Annex 17 SARPs, and ICAO's capacity to make best use of USAP audit results for defining and targeting aviation security capacity- building activities for the benefit of Member States in need;
6. *Invites* Member States to consider requesting assistance from other international and regional organizations to meet their technical assistance requirements arising from the need to protect international civil aviation;
7. *Urges* Member States and organizations to share with ICAO information on their assistance programmes and activities in order to promote the efficient and effective use of resources;

8. *Directs* the Secretary General to facilitate the coordination of assistance programmes and activities to the extent possible, including by collecting any available information on such initiatives;
9. *Directs* the Secretary General to monitor and evaluate the quality and effectiveness of ICAO assistance projects and to provide regular reports on the use of financial and in-kind resources and on the measured impacts of such contributions;
10. *Urges* Member States and relevant stakeholders to partner for the organization and delivery of capacity- building activities, documenting the commitments made by each party;
11. *Requests* the Secretary General to update and enhance the ICAO programme of Aviation Security Training Programme, including maintaining and developing Aviation Security Training Packages (ASTPs) and Aviation Security Workshops, and promoting other methods of aviation security training such as e-learning and blended learning;
12. *Urges* Member States to contribute to the activities of the ICAO programme of Aviation Security Training Programme activities;
13. *Requests* the Secretary General to oversee, develop, promote, support, maintain and regularly re-evaluate the ICAO Aviation Security Training Centre (ASTC) network to ensure that aviation security training requirements are met and sound levels of cooperation are achieved; and
14. *Urges* Member States to use ICAO ASTCs for aviation security training.

APPENDIX F

Action by the Council with respect to multilateral and bilateral cooperation in different regions of the world

Whereas the rights and obligations of Member States under the international air law instruments on aviation security and under the SARPs adopted by the Council on aviation security could be complemented and reinforced in multilateral and bilateral cooperation between Member States;

Whereas the multilateral and bilateral agreements on air services represent the main legal basis for international commercial carriage by air of passengers, baggage, cargo and mail;

Whereas provisions on aviation security should form an integral part of the multilateral and bilateral agreements on air services; and

Whereas focusing on security outcomes, recognition of equivalence and one-stop security, and respecting the spirit of cooperation defined in multilateral and/or bilateral air services agreements are policy principles whose implementation can contribute significantly to aviation security sustainability;

The Assembly:

1. *Recognizes* that success in eliminating threats to civil aviation can only be achieved through the concerted effort of everyone concerned and a close working relationship between national agencies

and aviation security regulators of all Member States;

2. *Urges* all Member States to insert into their multilateral and bilateral agreements on air services a clause on aviation security, taking into account the model clause adopted by the Council on 25 June 1986 and the model agreement adopted by the Council on 30 June 1989;

3. *Urges* all Member States to adopt the following key principles as the basis for international cooperation in aviation security and to ensure effective aviation security cooperation among Member States, ICAO and other relevant international organizations:

- a) respect for the spirit of cooperation defined in bilateral and/or multilateral air services agreements;
- b) recognition of equivalent security measures; and
- c) focus on security outcomes;

4. *Urges* all Member States, who have not yet done so, to participate in the ICAO Aviation Security Point of Contact (PoC) Network, established for the communication of imminent threats to civil air transport operations, with the objective of providing a network of international aviation security contacts within each State, and to intensify their coordination and cooperation to ensure the exchange of best practices through the AVSECPaedia;

5. *Urges* ICAO to promote initiatives which enable the establishment of technological platforms for the exchange of aviation security information among Member States;

6. *Requests* that ICAO continue to:

- a) encourage Member States to report on their experience in cooperating with each other to prevent acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation;
- b) analyse differing circumstances and trends in preventing threats to international civil aviation in different regions of the world; and
- c) prepare recommendations for strengthening measures to deter and prevent such acts of unlawful interference;

7. *Directs* the Council to act with the requisite urgency and expedition to address new and existing threats to civil aviation, seeking to mitigate unnecessary disruption to air travel as a result of confusion or inconsistent implementation or interpretation of necessary measures, facilitating a common and consistent response by Member States, and encouraging clear communication by Member States to the travelling public.

APPENDIX G

International and regional cooperation in the field of aviation security

Recognizing that the threat posed to civil aviation requires development of an effective global response

by Member States and concerned international and regional organizations; and

Recognizing the development of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact to strengthen the common UN approach to supporting Member States with the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy and relevant UN resolutions and mandates.

The Assembly:

1. *Invites* the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO/INTERPOL), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation for Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED), United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the World Customs Organization (WCO), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Arab Civil Aviation Organization (ACAO), the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC), the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), the Latin American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), Airports Council International (ACI), the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations (IFALPA), the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC), the International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations (ICCAIA), the Global Express Association (GEA), the International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations (FIATA), The International Air Cargo Association (TIACA), and other stakeholders to continue their cooperation with ICAO, to the maximum extent possible, to safeguard international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference;

2. *Directs* the Council to continue its cooperation with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in areas of aviation security and border management, in the global effort to combat terrorism and requests the Secretary General to use the Organization's expertise to assist the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED) in the conduct of country visits to assess the counter-terrorism efforts of Member States including progress made, remaining shortfalls, and priority areas for technical assistance needs, as well as to identify terrorism-related trends and challenges and best practices employed in the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions; ~~and~~

3. *Directs* the Secretary General to use the Organization's expertise in the field of aviation security and border management to support the work of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact framework to strengthen the common UN approach to prevent and counter terrorism, and to assist the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) in their efforts to provide technical assistance and capacity-building support to Member States while ensuring assistance activities are coordinated to avoid duplication of effort and ensure the efficient use of resources; and

4. *Invites* Member States to proactively support ICAO's regional groups in aviation security and cybersecurity, as well as aviation security cooperative programmes where they exist in different regions, which are vital to help States implement ICAO Standards, to enhance operational efficiencies, and promote long-term self-sustainability of States' AVSEC programmes and operations.

Conflict Zones

13.9 The Council provides, in WP/35, an overview of the activities undertaken by ICAO and Member States to protect civil aviation against the inherent risks in operating over or near conflict zones.

13.10 In WP/120, Canada, co-sponsored by Israel, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, New Zealand, Oman, Republic of Korea, United States, the European Union and its Member States, the other Member States of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC), the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA) and the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA), presents progress and future work on enhancing conflict zone risk mitigation and preventing further tragedies, stressing the need to update Doc 10084, strengthen civil-military coordination, and advance the Contingency Coordination Team (CCT) framework. The paper also calls, inter alia, to raise awareness of ICAO *Manual on Civil-Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management* (Doc 10088), and develop an ICAO Implementation Package (iPack) on conflict zones covering implementation support, CCT guidance and training.

13.11 Egypt highlights, in WP/201, its role in assisting conflict-affected States to reintegrate into global civil aviation through security cooperation, capacity building and operational support. Further to Egypt's efforts, the paper invites ICAO to assist other States recovering from conflict or crisis, and urges Member States to share technical expertise and operational support.

Discussion

13.12 The Committee reaffirmed the pressing need for continued global efforts to enhance conflict zone risk management in international civil aviation. While ICAO has established comprehensive guidance, as found in the Third Edition of the *Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones* (Doc 10084), its implementation remains uneven across States and operators. It was also noted that current guidance must evolve to reflect emerging risks, including interference with Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS); the growing use of advanced weapon systems, including those designed for military use, by a variety of actors in ways that endanger civil aviation; and weaponized UAS. Therefore, the Committee recommended that ICAO review Doc 10084 to address the identified gaps and heightened vulnerabilities.

13.13 The Committee noted that the lack of established protocols for information sharing related to conflict zones hindered effective coordination among relevant stakeholders, including aircraft operators and air navigation services providers. The Committee therefore supported global initiatives, such as the Safer Skies Initiative, as an effective means to share best practices and information, and invited Member States and relevant stakeholders to join such endeavours.

13.14 The Committee also stressed the importance of establishing structured frameworks for civil–military cooperation, recognizing the challenges inherent in engaging with military stakeholders. To that end, the ICAO Doc 10088 was identified as a key reference for fostering such cooperation, ensuring that States meet both national requirements and obligations under the Chicago Convention.

13.15 The Committee welcomed Canada's engagement and financial support for the development of an ICAO iPack on conflict zones, which should provide practical tools to assist States in efficiently mitigating safety and security risks to civil aviation over and near conflict zones. In particular, the Committee noted the need for the iPack to provide guidance and awareness on contingency coordination teams, which are designed to ensure the safety of civil aviation with minimal interruption to air traffic in the event of an airspace disruption due to a conflict zone.

13.16 Finally, the Committee considered international and regional efforts for States impacted by armed conflicts to restore air traffic services and mitigate the risks thereof. In that regard, the Committee commended Egypt's efforts in supporting conflict-affected States in restoring international air connectivity through aviation security collaboration and acknowledged such efforts as a practical model of the Strategic Goal of "No Country Left Behind." It encouraged ICAO and Member States to continue assisting those States recovering from crisis through structured bilateral assistance mechanisms that provide technical and operational support, in accordance with ICAO provisions and guidance material.

13.17 In conclusion, the Committee underscored ICAO's central leadership role in guiding the global civil aviation community to prioritize and strengthen the mitigation of risks associated with operations over or near conflict zones. While the Committee noted comments by some Member States, it agreed to submit for adoption by the Plenary a Resolution on *Addressing risks to civil aviation arising from conflict zones*, as proposed in the Appendix to WP/35, which, inter alia, calls for the development of a dedicated ICAO work programme on conflict zones to help States and operators mitigate risks and better manage airspace closure and reopening.

13.18 A few States expressed reservations with regard to the references to Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 and Malaysia Airlines MH17 in WP/35 and in the draft resolution appended to the paper.

Resolution ~~A42-xx~~ 13/3: Addressing risks to civil aviation arising from conflict zones

Recalling the tragic loss of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 on 25 December 2024, and noting with grave concern similar civil aircraft downing's over or near a conflict zone, including Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 in 2020 and Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in 2014;

Recalling Article 3 *bis* of the *Convention on International Civil Aviation* reaffirms the principle of non-use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight;

Recalling that in accordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation and its Annexes thereto, Member States should take preventive measures in airspace controlled by them, including timely promulgation of prohibited, restricted or danger areas as appropriate, when military activities or conflict pose a risk to civil aviation;

Acknowledging the increased complexity of risk management over conflict zones, including the threats posed by the use of military or weaponized unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), global navigation satellite System (GNSS) radio frequency interferences (RFI), electronic warfare and air defence systems;

Recalling Assembly Resolution A41-8 that civil-military coordination should facilitate the sharing of relevant information with airspace users, especially for civil aircraft operations over or near conflict zones;

Recognizing the need for enhanced coordination, timely dissemination of risk information and decision making, and updated guidance for States and operators; and

Recalling that the ICAO Strategic Plan 2026-2050 has one of its essential aspirations to achieve zero fatalities in international aviation from accidents and acts of unlawful interference.

The Assembly:

1. *Strongly condemns* the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and reiterates that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of the aircraft must not be endangered;
2. *Reaffirms* that every State must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight as reflected in Article 3 *bis* of the *Convention on International Civil Aviation*;
3. *Urges* Member States, which have not yet done so, to ratify, as soon as possible, the Protocol incorporating Article 3 *bis* into the *Convention on International Civil Aviation*.
4. *Calls upon* Member States to identify, notify and take appropriate measures in airspace controlled by them, in accordance with the *Convention on International Civil Aviation* and its Annexes thereto, including timely promulgation of prohibited, restricted or danger areas as appropriate, when military activities or conflict pose a risk to civil aviation;
5. *Urges* Member States to share relevant information with air navigation services providers and aircraft operators under their authority, and ensure that they on a timely basis assess and mitigate risks posed to civil aircraft over or near conflict zones;
6. *Urges* Member States to call upon aircraft operators to ensure that their decision-making for flight planning includes updated risk assessment and appropriate risk mitigation measures, taking into account information regarding conflict zones by every reasonable means;
7. *Calls upon* Member States to improve and strengthen civil-military cooperation in air traffic management (ATM), and support the development and implementation of a regional ATM contingency management framework;
8. *Calls upon* Member States to support global initiatives, such as the Safer Skies Initiative, as an effective means to share best practices and information, including existing regional initiatives, and promote effective implementation of global standards and guidance on mitigating the risks conflict zones pose to civil aviation;
9. *Directs* the Council to continue to update relevant ICAO documents, including ICAO *Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones* (Doc 10084), to reflect current operational and technological threats, including attacks using weaponized unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), GNSS RFI and electronic warfare;
10. *Directs* the Council to ensure the development of a dedicated ICAO work programme on conflict zones in order to support crosscutting efforts within ICAO; and

11. *Directs* the Council to monitor the implementation of this Resolution and report progress to the next ordinary Session of the Assembly.
- — — — —

Experiences with Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) Engagement

13.19 In WP/370, Belize, on behalf of the Member States of Central American Corporation for Air Navigation Services (COCESNA), urges States to strengthen policies, strategies, and security measures for domestic commercial operations, to prevent and mitigate unlawful interference. States are encouraged to enhance threat detection at domestic airports, standardize security procedures in line with ICAO SARPs, raise awareness, train personnel and improve interagency coordination.

13.20 In WP/470, Bolivia describes the implementation of their new State Aviation Security Management System, which supported their preparation for a USAP-CMA audit. The system also includes a tool for the collection, processing and analysis of civil aviation security data. Bolivia promotes States to use digital tools for the management of security data as well as encourages the sharing of knowledge.

13.21 In WP/118, Brazil, co-sponsored by 16 Latin American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC) Member States, highlights the work of its Aviation Security Team as a successful example of translating GASeP priorities into action, and presents Brazil's best practices in strengthening aviation security. States are encouraged to adopt similar measures to advance GASeP's global priorities.

13.22 In WP/398, Oman, reaffirms its commitment to aviation security and presents its demonstration of this, in particular through its commitment to aviation security training and the work of its security agencies, encourages international collaboration to exchange knowledge, expertise and resources.

13.23 In WP/239 Revision No. 1, Panama, co-sponsored by 14 LACAC Member States, describes the State's experience in implementing unilateral OSS with other States in the region. Recognizing that OSS depends on a robust validation programme and considering existing guidance and AVSEC Panel prioritization, the Committee is requested to consider a need for developing additional guidance by the relevant expert groups.

13.24 In WP/100, the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) on behalf of 54 African States, stresses that achieving aspirational goals requires stronger aviation security oversight and enhanced cooperation among States. The paper indicates that reaching the milestone of 65% of States attaining or exceeding 75% Effective Implementation (EI) within two years is ambitious but achievable with enhanced effort and focus.

Discussion

13.25 The Committee expressed its appreciation for WP/118 and WP/470, and for the valuable experiences shared therein regarding the alignment of national aviation security activities and systems in support of the GASeP. The Committee requested the Council, with the support of the relevant technical bodies, to explore additional avenues to assist States in making use of the GASeP, building on the experience-sharing mechanism of the Second Edition, and in promoting the exchange of best practices at

the global level. Furthermore, the Committee took note of Oman's commitment to aviation security, as outlined in WP/398, and encouraged States, regional groups, and international organizations to take note of the expertise and facilities available for enhanced cooperation and collaboration.

13.26 In its consideration of WP/100, a few States questioned whether USAP-CMA data is the best tool to measure a State's progress towards reaching the GAsEP milestones and Aspirational Goal. The Committee noted the challenges in ensuring that technical assistance is coordinated and made available to achieve the GAsEP milestones that have been established, and the proposal to increase the frequency of USAP-CMA audits. The Committee cautioned against relying solely on increased audits and noted the limited resources of the USAP-CMA and recommended sharing the paper with the Task Force on the USAP for consideration.. The Committee encouraged States to recognize the importance of all priority areas within the GAsEP and emphasized the value of global collaboration and cooperation, particularly through initiatives such as information sharing and peer reviews, as highlighted in the paper.

13.27 With respect to the proposal outlined in WP/239 Revision No. 1, regarding the development of additional guidance and the provision of technical assistance to support States in implementing One-Stop Security (OSS), the Committee acknowledged the ongoing regional efforts to implement OSS arrangements through close collaboration and the sharing of best practice and expertise. The Committee noted the benefits of OSS arrangements in not duplicating security controls only if such arrangements ensure the highest levels of security are implemented and upheld over time and account for changes in threat and risk, innovations in aviation security practices and processes, and developments in advances screening technologies. The Committee also noted the request for OSS arrangements between States to be made known to all States and industry stakeholders so that they can respond as appropriate, and encouraged Member States to be measured and mindful when entering and implementing OSS. Furthermore, the Committee expressed support for the message conveyed in WP/370, which reminded all States of the importance of ensuring that domestic aviation security operations are as robust and resilient as those applied to international operations, but noted comments made that ICAO's remit should remain focused on international civil aviation.

13.28 Finally, the Committee recognized the efforts and strong commitment from States and industry stakeholders to advance the GAsEP, taking into account the aspirational goal and the global priorities, and giving some inspiration on future revisions/improvements to the GAsEP.

Promoting innovation in aviation security

13.29 China, in WP/86, highlights its progress in using Artificial Intelligence (AI) for automated detection of prohibited items from X-ray screening images. The paper encourages exploring the application of AI-powered image recognition technology to enhance screening efficiency, including its integration with Open Architecture (OA) for security screening systems.

13.30 In WP/199, the Republic of Korea, co-sponsored by China, notes the growing use of AI in aviation security equipment, such as Automated Prohibited Item Detection Systems (APIDS) and intelligent metal detectors, which enhances threat detection, highlights the need for international guidance on performance certification of AI-enabled systems.

13.31 WP/79, presented by Saudi Arabia, stresses the rising complexity and security risks in the air cargo sector due to growing volumes and stakeholders, highlighting the need for digital transformation in

line with the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP). The Committee was invited to consider the proposal for ICAO to organize an international symposium on digital transformation in aviation security, to be hosted by Saudi Arabia.

13.32 The United Arab Emirates emphasizes, in WP/419, the transformative potential of AI in aviation security and broader civil aviation, while noting associated risks. States were encouraged to strengthen collaboration with others and with industry to share information challenges on emerging AI trends to fully realize AI's potential for safer, more secure and more efficient air travel.

13.33 WP/233 Revision No. 1, presented by the Airports Council International (ACI), co-sponsored by Brazil, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, stresses the need for a harmonized, globally coordinated approach to testing and certifying advanced aviation security equipment through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The paper recognizes ICAO's role in assisting Member States to enhance collaboration, promote mutual recognition, and modernize certification frameworks.

Discussion

13.34 The Committee considered WP/86, WP/199 and WP/419 which address AI's transformative potential in aviation security, particularly in the areas of aviation security screening systems, certification, operational efficiency, risk awareness and workforce development. Taking note of the various initiatives on the subject carried out by States, such as the successful field pilots using AI for automated detection of prohibited items (APIDS), the Committee highlighted the need for harmonized certification frameworks and AI-specific performance evaluation methodologies, noting the increased certification requests for AI-integrated equipment yet recognizing certification as a State's responsibility.

13.35 The Committee acknowledged the importance of international cooperation and information sharing, while protecting sensitive information, in the ongoing efforts to develop and adopt AI for aviation security in a harmonized approach, particularly in security screening systems. The Committee consequently considered that sharing information and collaborating on testing for AI-enabled aviation security systems among States can help unify approaches and build trust in AI technologies. The Committee also noted a growing need for guidance on AI-specific performance evaluation methodologies and certification criteria.

13.36 Considering the aforementioned, the Committee welcomed the recent establishment of the AVSECP Task Force on AI (TF-AI) for developing comprehensive implementation strategies to make air travel more secure and efficient, recognizing it as the appropriate forum to address key issues, particularly information sharing, coordination, and the certification of AI-based functions. Due to the cross-cutting nature of AI technology in aviation, it also encouraged ICAO to coordinate its efforts on the matter with AVSECP and other relevant ICAO technical Panels and expert groups, as required. Furthermore, to ensure a responsible, ethical and unbiased use of AI technology in aviation security, the Committee stressed that all stakeholders should be mindful of the risks and limitations of such technology, and that caution and comprehensive understanding thereof is paramount.

13.37 In WP/79, the Committee considered the increase in the volume of cargo and rising complexity of air cargo supply chains. Noting the security challenges inherent with the rapid growth of the global air cargo sector, and the potential exploitation of security gaps and vulnerabilities, the Committee supported

the general principles of digital transformation for air cargo security, and recommended to the relevant ICAO expert groups explore the possibility of organizing an event aimed at fostering such an initiative.

13.38 The Committee recognized the challenges in testing and certifying aviation security equipment, as well as the lack of a harmonized and globally coordinated approach thereon, as detailed in WP/233 Revision No. 1. Noting the need to ensure an effective coordination of efforts in testing and certification processes of security equipment, the Committee strongly supported actions for Member States and relevant stakeholders to strengthen cooperation through established or new collaborative mechanisms.

13.39 Furthermore, the Committee supported a proposal from ACI to amend the preamble of the consolidated statement to address the challenges in the current testing and certification framework for aviation security screening equipment. While this updated preamble read out from the floor supersedes that proposed in WP/233 Revision No. 1, the Committee also supported the two additions to the Operative Clauses of the consolidated statement, as found in Appendix A of that paper.

Prioritization of aviation security work

13.40 In WP/102, Australia, co-sponsored by Canada and the United States, stresses that the aviation sector faces a dynamic and increasingly complex range of threats. Given the rise of non-traditional threat actors, ICAO is encouraged to ensure stronger links between security, cybersecurity, and facilitation, calling on Member States and industry to collaborate closely through ICAO, particularly via the Aviation Security, Cybersecurity, and Facilitation Panels.

13.41 In WP/454, presented by Colombia, and co-sponsored by 16 Member States of the Latin American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC) and the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC), invites the ICAO Council and Member States, the ICAO Council and Member States are invited to prioritize regulation and control of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to protect safety, security, infrastructure and lives, by adopting regulatory frameworks, safe operating standards, stakeholder and public awareness strategies, a global system for sharing threat data, and inter-agency coordination to minimize risks of terrorist or illegal use.

13.42 In WP/111, Denmark, on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, the other Member States of ECAC, and EUROCONTROL, co-sponsored by Brazil, Kazakhstan, Peru and the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC), presents the opportunities offered by technological advancement and the importance of regulatory frameworks that allow for innovation. In this regard, the importance of targeted assistance to narrow the technological gap between States is underscored, as well as the essential role of a professional workforce in maintaining global aviation security. The Committee is invited to consider the need for a High-Level Aviation Security Conference during the upcoming triennium to reaffirm States' commitment to aviation security and the development of an ICAO Next Generation of Aviation Professionals AVSEC Strategy.

13.43 WP/482, presented by Oman, highlights that the increasing use of UAS has resulted in growing security challenges across the civil aviation ecosystem, and invites ICAO to develop harmonized rules for UAS to address emerging threats from unlawful UAS use, and to strengthen international cooperation and information sharing to counter cross-border risks.

13.44 Saudi Arabia, in WP/200, highlights the security challenges posed by Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and related technologies such as UAS and Urban Air Mobility (UAM), including risks of unauthorized access, cyberattacks, and terrorist misuse.

13.45 WP/78 Revision No. 1, presented by the United Arab Emirates, and co-sponsored by Brazil, Jordan, Nigeria, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa and the United States, underscores the importance of international cooperation, coordination, and support in aviation security. States are urged to strengthen collaboration in line with established principles and encourages voluntary contributions, resources and expert support to enhance capacity-building activities, including USAP-CMA, through the provision of short- and long-term experts.

13.46 The United Kingdom emphasizes, in WP/119, the need to prioritize ICAO's aviation security work amid persistent threats and limited resources. The Committee is invited to consider the need for multi-year aviation security objectives – to be further established and coordinated via the AVSECP, and also with the Secretariat to focus on high impact issues.

13.47 WP/117, presented by the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) on behalf of 54 African States, highlights the growing threat of unruly and disruptive passenger behaviour to aviation safety and operations both in-flight and at airports. The paper calls on States, organizations and ICAO to strengthen legal frameworks, ensure consistent enforcement, enhance international cooperation and launch global awareness campaigns.

13.48 In WP/241, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) identifies areas for potential improvement in ICAO's aviation security bodies and guidance materials. In this context, the Assembly is invited to encourage all Member States, including those involved in ICAO security bodies, to utilize industry technical input to further enhance safety and security.

Discussion

13.49 As threats to civil aviation are becoming increasingly complex, involving non-traditional threat actors as noted in WP/102, Member States were urged to ensure that global response remains effective against these evolving threats. Emphasizing the importance of sustained focus on aviation security, the Committee encouraged closer collaboration between the Aviation Security, Facilitation, and Cybersecurity Panels.

13.50 Building on this, and noting WP/111, the Committee highlighted that addressing such evolving threats requires investment in both advanced technology and skilled professionals, however, noting that some States still require support in these areas. Accordingly, the Committee agreed that ICAO should consider developing a Next Generation Aviation Professional AVSEC Strategy to strengthen workforce capabilities globally. In view of all these priorities, there was broad support for convening a High-Level Aviation Security Conference (HLCAS/3) in the next triennium in Montréal, Canada, and the Committee recommended that the Assembly refer this matter to the Council concerning organization, agenda and modalities of the event.

13.51 Several papers, including WP/200, WP/454 and WP/482, highlighted risks from potential misuse of advanced air mobility and drones, emphasizing the need for harmonized regulations. The

Committee called on Member States to strengthen national regulation where appropriate, and based on a threat and risk context for control and awareness of unmanned aircraft, enhance inter-agency coordination and share threat data globally. Draft guidelines were welcomed, and further examination of this matter by relevant ICAO expert groups was supported.

13.52 The Committee recognized that promoting aviation security requires international collaboration, coordination and support as noted in WP/78 Revision No. 1. Therefore, States were encouraged to provide voluntary contributions and resources, including aviation security experts for short- and long-term assignments, to support targeted capacity-building activities and the USAP-CMA. In this context, and mindful of resource constraints highlighted in WP/119, the Committee strongly supported the need for effective prioritization of aviation security work, and for the development of multi-year objectives coordinated via the AVSECP and the ICAO Secretariat as part of this prioritization process.

13.53 In addressing the growing issue of unruly passengers in WP/117, the Committee considered the need for consistent global action in accordance with applicable ICAO guidance, cooperative measures, and support for passenger awareness campaigns. Some States had concerns with a number of proposed actions in the paper and Committee considered that such matters require further review, noting that responsibility for this issue is distributed across several ICAO bodies, including the Legal Committee and technical expert groups. Specifically with regard to the proposal to review Annex 9 – *Facilitation* and Annex 17 – *Aviation Security* to address unruly passengers, the Committee recommended that the relevant ICAO expert groups, consider the way forward with regard to the proposals outlined in the paper.

13.54 Finally, the Committee commended the role of industry in providing input to ICAO and its technical bodies such as the AVSECP, as highlighted in WP/241. Such input remains essential, and States were encouraged to continue making extensive use of industry contributions when developing provisions and improving guidance, particularly those actively involved in ICAO aviation security expert groups.

Aviation cybersecurity

13.55 WP/12 Revision No. 1, presented by the Council, provides an overview of ICAO's aviation cybersecurity activities during the past triennium and proposes updating Resolution A41-19 on Addressing Cybersecurity in Civil Aviation to highlight the need for enhanced protection and resilience against cyber threats, reflecting the ongoing development of ICAO's work in this area.

13.56 WP/240, presented by Brazil, outlines their initiatives to strengthen cyber resilience in line with ICAO's Aviation Cybersecurity Strategy, particularly Pillars 6 (Incident Management and Emergency Planning) and 7 (Capacity Building, Training, and Cybersecurity Culture) and invites States to foster cyber incident management plans and establish regular cyber drills with relevant stakeholders, based on their experiences.

13.57 WP/369, presented by Colombia and co-sponsored by 16 LACAC Member States, calls on States to strengthen cybersecurity by implementing ICAO's Aviation Cybersecurity Strategy and Cybersecurity Action Plan, tailored to national contexts through enhanced organizational culture, technological infrastructure, and regulatory frameworks, and proposes that ICAO develop a self-assessment tool for States to measure aviation cybersecurity maturity.

13.58 WP/371, presented by Cuba, and co-sponsored by 17 LACAC Member States, highlights the influence of human factors on the development and performance of aviation security personnel. Emphasis is placed on developing comprehensive strategies to strengthen both human factors and cybersecurity management, including alignment with Annex 17 and the ICAO Aviation Cybersecurity Strategy, underscoring the importance of international cooperation, risk assessment, continuous personnel training, and a robust cybersecurity culture.

13.59 WP/124, presented by Denmark on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, the other Member States of ECAC and EUROCONTROL, and co-sponsored by Brazil, Kazakhstan and Peru, emphasizes the need for a holistic approach to aviation cybersecurity to overcome fragmented risk mitigation efforts. Key principles include robust governance frameworks, integration of security-by-design into systems, proactive cyber risk management aligned with safety and security protocols, and competency-based training across all aviation disciplines.

13.60 WP/324, presented by El Salvador on behalf of the Member States of COCESNA, shares current cybersecurity practices within COCESNA Member States and identifies key areas for improvement to enhance resilience against emerging cyber threats, requesting ICAO to support States in establishing regulatory frameworks, strengthening staff competencies, and developing cyber resilience plans that support including cybersecurity into National Civil Aviation Security Programmes (NCASPs).

13.61 WP/101, presented by Morocco, highlights the importance of promoting coordination between civil aviation and cybersecurity authorities at the national level to ensure a harmonized approach. The paper notes that Action Item 2.4 of the ICAO Cybersecurity Action Plan (CyAP) is aimed at improving governance through such coordination mechanisms and encourages ICAO to consider developing further guidance on this matter.

13.62 WP/438, presented by Oman, outlines its experience in regulating aviation cybersecurity and engaging with Universal Security Audit Programme – Continuing Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA), and encourages other States to consider its experience in establishing a uniform cybersecurity governance structure.

13.63 WP/453, presented by Venezuela and co-sponsored by 16 LACAC Member States, highlights the international nature of aviation cybersecurity which requires a collective, coordinated approach that considers individual capabilities of States as well as the regional context affecting the cyber threat landscape, and proposes the establishment of regional aviation cybersecurity groups in ICAO regions to bolster the implementation of ICAO provisions and guidance material.

13.64 WP/165, presented by the International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations (ICCAIA) and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA), co-sponsored by the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA), requests ICAO to establish an internal, coordinated governance framework addressing digital threats across safety, security, and operational disciplines, initially focusing on intentional and malicious threats. The paper also encourages ICAO to accelerate the development of Standards and guidance material to achieve consistent and effective cybersecurity performance across the aviation ecosystem.

Discussion

13.65 In discussing WP/12, the Committee noted with satisfaction the development of ICAO's work on aviation cybersecurity during the past triennium, and commended ICAO and its groups of experts on their work. In particular, the Committee welcomed the advancement of work to identify potential gaps in ICAO Standards in relation to aviation cybersecurity, as well as the continuous development of aviation cybersecurity policies, guidance material, capacity-building, and awareness initiatives.

13.66 The Committee reviewed the proposed Resolution 13/2 and agreed to recommend to the Assembly its adoption, with two amendments, to supersede Resolution A41-19 *Addressing Cybersecurity in Civil Aviation*.

Resolution ~~A41-19~~ ~~A42-XX~~ 13/2: Addressing Cybersecurity in Civil Aviation

Whereas the global aviation system is a highly complex and ~~integrated~~ interconnected one system that comprises data, information and systems which ~~that~~ are critical for the safety, ~~and~~ security, efficiency and capacity of civil aviation operations;

Noting that the aviation sector is increasingly reliant on the availability, ~~and~~ integrity ~~and confidentiality~~ of data, information, ~~data~~, and systems, and in certain circumstances, their confidentiality;

Recognizing that aviation cybersecurity is critical for the sustainable and efficient development of air transport and therefore should be prioritized and appropriately resourced;

Mindful that cyber threats to civil aviation are ~~rapidly and~~ continuously evolving and growing in scale, sophistication and frequency, that aviation continues to be a target for malicious actors ~~perpetrators~~ in both the cyber ~~domain as in the~~ and physical domains ~~one~~, and that cyber threats ~~can evolve to affect~~ could pose significant risks to ~~critical~~ civil aviation's critical infrastructure, potentially jeopardizing aviation systems ~~worldwide~~ safety, security, efficiency or capacity;

~~*Recognizing* that not all cybersecurity events cyber incidents affecting the safety, security, efficiency or capacity of civil aviation are unlawful and/or intentionally targeting civil aviation;~~

Recognizing the multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary nature of cybersecurity challenges and solutions and noting that cyber risks can simultaneously affect, and spread through, a wide range of aviation areas ~~and~~ spread rapidly;

~~*Recognizing* that not all cybersecurity events cyber incidents affecting the safety, security, efficiency or capacity of civil aviation are unlawful and/or intentionally targeting civil aviation;~~

Reaffirming the obligations under the *Convention on International Civil Aviation* (Chicago Convention) to ensure the safety, security and continuity of civil aviation;

Considering that the *Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation* (Beijing Convention) and *Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* (Beijing Protocol) would enhance the global legal framework for criminalizing ~~dealing with~~ cyber-attacks on international civil aviation ~~as crimes~~ and therefore wide ratification ~~and~~

implementation by States of those instruments by Member States would ensure that such attacks would be deterred and punished wherever in the world they occur;

Reaffirming the importance and urgency of addressing enhancing the cybersecurity and cyber protection and resilience of civil aviation's critical systems, data, and information against data, information and systems to cyber threats and risks hazards, including common interfaces between civil and military aviation and other connected sectors;

Considering the need to work collaboratively towards the development of an effective and coordinated global framework to address aviation cybersecurity framework and to address support the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of the global aviation system to the protection and resilience of the sector to cyber threats and risks in a harmonized and consistent manner that may jeopardize the safety and/or security of civil aviation;

Recognizing ICAO's leadership and work in the fields of aviation cybersecurity and cyber resilience across the different aviation disciplines;

Recognizing that aviation cybersecurity needs to be harmonized at the global, regional and national levels in order to support ensure the consistency and full interoperability of protection and resilience measures and processes risk management systems;

Recognizing the importance for States of to developing and implement clear and comprehensive aviation cybersecurity plans, that address national governance and accountability laws, regulations, policies, procedures and measures for civil aviation cybersecurity, including the designation of a competent national authority responsible for aviation cybersecurity in coordination with concerned national authorities and agencies; and

Acknowledging the value of relevant provisions, guidance material and initiatives, action plans, publications and other media designed to address cybersecurity issues in a collaborative and holistic manner; and

Considering the outcomes of the 14th Air Navigation Conference held in Montréal from 26 August to 6 September 2024, as well as the provisions of the Muscat Declaration on Aviation Security and Aviation Cybersecurity which was adopted in Muscat – Oman on 11 December 2024.

The Assembly:

1. Urges Member States to adopt and ratify and implement the *Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation* (Beijing Convention) of 2010 and *Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* (Beijing Protocol) of 2010 as a means for dealing with cyberattacks against civil aviation;

2. Calls upon States and industry stakeholders to take the following actions to address cyber threats to civil aviation:

- a) implement the ICAO Aviation Cybersecurity Strategy, and make use of the ICAO Cybersecurity Action Plan as a tool to support ~~its~~ the implementation of the Aviation Cybersecurity Strategy;
- b) develop and implement national aviation cybersecurity plans that address strategic aviation cybersecurity objectives, governance and responsibilities, policies, communications, cyber risk management, incident response and recovery, identity management, capacity building and training, regulatory compliance and audits, monitoring and continuous improvement, documentation and record keeping, with the objective to address cyber threats and risks to civil aviation in a holistic manner across all aviation disciplines;
- c) develop and implement processes and tools that support the implementation and monitoring of aviation cybersecurity plans;
- d) ~~b)~~ designate the authority competent for aviation cybersecurity as part of the national aviation cybersecurity plan, and define the interaction between that authority and concerned national aviation and non-aviation agencies;
- e) ~~e)~~ define the responsibilities of national agencies and industry stakeholders with regard to cybersecurity in civil aviation;
- f) secure sufficient resources to ensure the availability and continuous training of qualified and competent aviation and cybersecurity professionals who would be able to regulate, operate, manage, maintain, and oversee the effective implementation of relevant aviation cybersecurity laws, regulations, policies, procedures and measures;
- g) ~~d)~~ develop and implement a robust cybersecurity risk management framework that integrates cyber risk management into ~~draws on~~ relevant safety, and security, efficiency and capacity risk management practices, and adopt a risk-based approach to enhance the protection and resilience of ~~protecting~~ critical civil aviation data, information and systems, ~~information, and data from~~ to cyber threats and risks;
- h) ~~e)~~ establish laws, regulations, policies, procedures and measures ~~and instruments~~, as appropriate, and allocate adequate resources to ensure that, for critical aviation systems: system architectures are secure by design; systems are protected and resilient; data is secured and available in storage and while in use or in transfer; system monitoring, and cyber incident detection and reporting, methods are implemented; cyber incident response and recovery plans are developed and practiced in coordination with established emergency response and crisis management plans; and forensic analysis of cyber incidents is carried out;
- i) ~~design and implement a robust~~ develop and implement practical actions to enhance cybersecurity culture across all civil aviation entities ~~across the civil aviation sector~~;

-
- ~~f) encourage government/industry coordination with regard to aviation cybersecurity strategies, policies, and plans, as well as sharing of information to help identify critical vulnerabilities that need to be addressed;~~
- j) ~~h)~~ develop and participate as practical, in government/government and government/industry partnerships and mechanisms, nationally and internationally, for the systematic sharing of information on cyber threats, incidents, vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise, trends, and mitigations, best practices and lessons learned efforts;
- k) ~~g)~~ encourage develop civil/military cooperation mechanisms with relevant national entities, including but not limited to military, law enforcement and cybersecurity authorities, with regard to identifying, protecting, and monitoring common vulnerabilities and data information flows at interfaces between civil and military that may affect civil aviation systems, and collaborate in the mitigation of, and preparedness for response to common cyber threats, and in response and recovery from cyber incidents; and
- ~~j) encourage States to continue contributing to ICAO in the development of international Standards, strategies, guidance and best practices to support advancing aviation cybersecurity and cyber resilience; and~~
- l) ~~k)~~ continue collaborating and contributing to ICAO in the development of ICAO's aviation cybersecurity framework according to a horizontal, cross-cutting and functional approach involving aviation safety, aviation security, facilitation, air navigation, communication, surveillance, air traffic management, aircraft operations, airworthiness, and other all relevant aviation disciplines, in order to holistically address cyber threats and risks to aviation safety, security, efficiency and capacity.
3. *Instructs* ICAO to:
- a) continue to promote the universal adoption and ratification of the *Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation* (Beijing Convention) of 2010 and *Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* (Beijing Protocol) of 2010; and
- b) continue to ensure that aviation cybersecurity and cyber resilience matters are considered and coordinated in a cross-cutting and holistic manner through collaboration between all relevant ICAO bodies the new mechanism in ICAO to address aviation cybersecurity.
4. *Declares* that this resolution supersedes A41-19.
- — — — —

13.67 The Committee recognized the importance of developing and practicing cyber incident response and recovery plans, as outlined in WP/240, to help States and stakeholders enhance their cybersecurity posture and respond effectively to cyber incidents, and recommended that the ICAO Council refers the subject to the relevant ICAO expert groups to consider the experience of Brazil in their relevant work items.

13.68 The Committee acknowledged the value of adapting the ICAO Aviation Cybersecurity Strategy and the Cybersecurity Action Plan to national contexts to effectively address cyber threats and risks to civil aviation, as outlined in WP/369. In discussing the proposal for ICAO to develop a self-assessment tool to support States in assessing their aviation cybersecurity maturity, the Committee recognized the potential usefulness of the proposal and recommended that the ICAO Council refers the proposal to the relevant ICAO expert groups for consideration.

13.69 The Committee recognised the importance of human factors in addressing cyber threats and risks to civil aviation across aviation disciplines, including aviation security personnel, as outlined in WP/371. It agreed on the importance of international cooperation, cyber risk assessment, continuous personnel training, information sharing, and a robust cybersecurity culture, while highlighting the importance of balancing international initiatives with national requirements. The Committee agreed with the proposed actions in the paper, while expanding their scope to cover all aviation disciplines.

13.70 The Committee acknowledged the importance of a holistic approach to aviation cybersecurity, including robust governance frameworks, systems' security-by-design, cyber risk management aligned with safety and security practices, and competency-based training across all aviation disciplines, as outlined in WP/124. The Committee also agreed on the need for a collaborative approach in aviation cybersecurity training to leverage existing resources. The Committee invited ICAO to continue addressing aviation cybersecurity holistically across relevant aviation disciplines, while strengthening its work around Standards and Recommended Practices and policies and fostering a collaborative approach to capacity-building initiatives.

13.71 The Committee noted the experience of COCESNA Member States in enhancing the protection and resilience of civil aviation to cyber threats and risks, as outlined in WP/324. It recognised the value of cooperation, regulatory frameworks, information sharing, capacity building, and cyber incident management plans to enhance the cybersecurity posture of organizations, while agreeing to expand the scope of the actions presented in the paper to include all relevant aviation disciplines in support of a holistic approach to aviation cybersecurity. The Committee noted that careful consideration should be given to the sharing of confidential and sensitive information. It further recommended that the ICAO Council refers the proposal to the relevant ICAO expert groups for consideration.

13.72 The Committee acknowledged the importance of coordination between civil aviation and cybersecurity authorities at the national levels to support a consistent and harmonized approach to aviation cybersecurity, as outlined in WP/101, and encouraged ICAO to consider developing further guidance on this matter. As a result, the Committee recommended that the ICAO Council refers the proposal to the relevant ICAO expert groups for consideration.

13.73 The Committee discussed the proposals in WP/281 related to ensuring a proper governance structure for aviation cybersecurity. In that regard, the Committee agreed on the necessity for States to develop an adequate governance structure to coordinate the regulatory and oversight functions of aviation cybersecurity across the different aviation disciplines, and to ensure the coordination of the topic with aviation and non-aviation agencies and stakeholders on the national levels. However, given States' various governance structures to regulate and oversee aviation safety, security, efficiency, and cybersecurity, the Committee recognized the need for flexibility to States in identifying an appropriate national authority for aviation cybersecurity.

13.74 The Committee acknowledged the value of regional cooperation to further enhance the protection and resilience of aviation to cyber threats and risks as outlined WP/453. In discussing the proposal for dedicated aviation cybersecurity groups across all ICAO Regions, the Committee recalled Recommendation 4.2/1 of the 14th Air Navigation Conference, which recommended that States align aviation cybersecurity activities in the regional air navigation, safety, and security and facilitation plans through the coordination processes of the Planning and Implementation Regional Groups, Regional Aviation Safety Groups and Regional Aviation Security and Facilitation Groups. In line with the above, the Committee recommended that the ICAO Council develops and implements an adequate mechanism to strengthen regional cooperation in aviation cybersecurity, while also taking into consideration the availability of resources.

13.75 In discussing WP/165, the Committee agreed on the importance of addressing cyber threats and risks to civil aviation holistically, including ICAO's work, through a multi-disciplinary governance structure. The Committee cautioned against the use of the term "digital threat" which is not a defined term in ICAO aviation cybersecurity context, and noted that the governance structure established by ICAO for aviation cybersecurity as well as the work and mandate of the Council's Ad Hoc Cybersecurity Coordination Committee and the Cybersecurity Panel already responds to the proposal for a coordinated and holistic approach to cyber threats and risks across aviation disciplines. The Committee agreed with the proposal that ICAO accelerates the development of provisions and guidance on aviation cybersecurity, while recalling Recommendation 4.2/1 of the 14th Air Navigation Conference which called for timely, relevant and actionable guidance material to meet the needs of Member States and other aviation stakeholders. The Committee did not agree with the proposal for ICAO to strengthen awareness and communication on the coordinated treatment of cyber threats through its regional networks as that requires the organization to undertake an operational role beyond its mandate.

— END —