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ASSEMBLY — 42ND SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Agenda Item 13: Aviation Security — Policy

CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT ON CONTINUING ICAO POLICIES RELATED TO AVIATION SECURITY

(Presented by the Council of ICAO)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2022, the 41st Session of the ICAO Assembly adopted Resolution A41-18: *Consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security*. In accordance with Resolving Clause 2 of Resolution A41-18, the consolidated statement must be reviewed at each ordinary Session of the Assembly. Proposed revisions to Resolution A41-18 contained in the Appendix to this working paper are presented for consideration by the Assembly.

Action: The Assembly is invited to adopt the revised Resolution on the *Consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security*, which is provided in the Appendix.

<i>Strategic Goals:</i>	This working paper relates to the Strategic Goal <i>Every Flight is Safe and Secure</i> .
<i>Financial implications:</i>	The ICAO activities referred to in this paper are expected to be undertaken within the resources available in the 2026-2028 Regular Budget and/or from extra-budgetary contributions as guided by the ICAO Business Plan 2026-2028.
<i>References:</i>	Doc 10184, <i>Assembly Resolutions in Force</i> (as of 7 October 2022) Doc 10118, <i>Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)</i> State letter AS 8/1.5-25/53, <i>Muscat Declaration on Aviation Security and Aviation Cybersecurity</i> , dated 22 May 2025 A42-WP/4 <i>Implementation of the ICAO Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) Safety and Security Audit Programmes</i> A42-WP/13 <i>Outcome of the High-level Ministerial Segment of the ICAO Security Week 2024 held in Muscat, Oman</i>


1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 There have been significant developments in the aviation security field since the 41st Session of the ICAO Assembly, which have been taken into account in amending the consolidated statement on the continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security, and which are described hereunder.

2. KEY DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE 41ST SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY

2.1 The ICAO Assembly, at the 41st Session in 2022, requested that the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP), which had been in effect since November 2017 be revised taking into account the lessons learned in implementation thus far and the changes that have occurred in the aviation industry, including the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Aviation Security (AVSEC) Panel's Task Force on the GASeP thereafter began working on a draft Second Edition of the GASeP, which was subsequently approved by ICAO Council in June 2024. As a strategic document to guide States, industry and ICAO in their efforts to enhance aviation security, the Second Edition of the GASeP reaffirms the aspirational goal to achieve and sustain a strong global aviation security system that is underpinned by full and effective implementation of ICAO aviation security Standards by all Member States.

2.2 In pursuit of the said aspirational goal, GASeP highlights 6 global priority areas¹ on which States, industry, and other stakeholders may focus their efforts, and which are of equal importance. It is recalled that progress towards the aspirational goal will be continuously tracked with the aim of achieving a positive improvement in effective implementation (EI) every year. Defined global milestones for 2027 (65% of States reach or surpass 75% EI), 2030 (80% of States reach or surpass 75% EI) and 2033 (100% of States reach or surpass 75% EI) are included as checkpoints at which the global community will assess the progress made and take action to ensure that delivery of the aspirational goal is on track. It should be noted that as of 31 December 2024, the States' global average EI, also known as the Sustainability Indicator, was 72 per cent.



¹ <https://www.icao.int/Security/Pages/Global-Aviation-Security-Plan.aspx>

2.3 To foster broader understanding and collaboration on the challenges and opportunities facing aviation security and aviation cybersecurity, and to serve as a preparatory step, shaping the agenda and guiding the work programme of the 42nd Session of ICAO the Assembly, a High-level Ministerial Segment took place on 11 December 2024 as part of the ICAO Security Week 2024 hosted by the Civil Aviation Authority of Oman in Muscat. The Ministerial Segment also served as a platform for the endorsement of the Muscat Declaration encompassing aviation security and aviation cybersecurity, and the protection of aviation critical infrastructure. The Muscat Declaration affirms that aviation connects the world, making trade, tourism, and development possible, and therefore must be appropriately protected. The Declaration also focusses on collaboration, the capability to recognize threats, integration between safety and security, and ensuring a well-trained, motivated, and capable workforce (A42-WP/13 on the Outcome of the High-level Ministerial Segment of the ICAO Security Week 2024 in Muscat, Oman, refers).

2.4 Recent security occurrences that have been reported to ICAO as acts of unlawful interference (AUIs) involved improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) shipped in air cargo and mail that ignited before being loaded on board aircraft. These serious events impacting air cargo and mail supply chains prompted some States to impose regulatory measures applied to some categories of shipments for international flights inbound to their jurisdiction. These restrictions range from applying additional screening measures to prohibiting the loading of certain air cargo and mail shipments. The AVSEC Panel, which met in Montréal from 7 to 11 April 2025, encouraged a coordinated international response to addressing this new threat, as follows:

- a) need to further strengthen the resilience of the air cargo sector and harmonize the approaches of Member States to guard against increasing and evolving threats;
- b) need for timely sharing of information to help States and stakeholders understand the nature of the threat. This would allow the relevant security authorities and stakeholders to respond promptly with appropriate measures, considerations, and in turn, inform and allow for a more considered deliberation when devising responses and measures, if necessary; and
- c) opportunity for ICAO to engage more closely with the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and World Customs Organization (WCO) to foster a greater understanding of each other's priorities and work programmes, and to work towards greater harmonization of security measures of air cargo and mail.

2.5 The ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme — Continuous Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA) is implemented by the Aviation Security Audit (ASA) Section. Over the past 3 years, a total of 114 USAP-CMA activities were conducted, and a number of improvements were made to the programme with the assistance of the Secretariat Study Group (SSG) on USAP-CMA. Many States have contributed to the success of the programme by, participating in the SSG, releasing experts to participate as auditors, providing financial contributions, supporting training initiatives and sending long-term secondees to participate as audit Team Leaders. Further details of the work undertaken to implement the USAP-CMA are available in A42-WP/4.

2.6 The Implementation Support and Development – Security (ISD-SEC) Programme provides targeted assistance and capacity-building, based upon a needs assessment process, to address identified aviation security deficiencies to help States implement the requirements of Annex 17 – *Aviation Security*. The ISD-SEC Programme continues to deliver aviation security assistance and training in all working languages, available to all States globally. The programme, supported by voluntary financial and in-kind contributions from States, utilizes the network of Aviation Security Training Centres (ASTCs), certified instructors, training and workshop packages, and assistance and capacity-building tools.

3. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT

3.1 In light of developments described above, and after consulting with the Aviation Security Panel (AVSECP), a number of changes are proposed to Assembly Resolution A41-18, including:

- a) in **Appendix A** (General policy), some changes are introduced to align with pillars of the Muscat Declaration on Aviation Security and Aviation Cybersecurity. For example, the recitals clause is introduced recognizing the aviation sector as critical infrastructure on which national security, prosperity and development are dependent, and calling for aviation security and cybersecurity to be treated with highest priority. The Appendix also refers to new policy frameworks such as the Second Edition of the GAsEP, and also highlights new and evolving threats to aviation security, including but not limited to the threat of IIDs placed on air cargo and mail;
- b) no change proposed in **Appendix B** (International law instruments, enactment of national legislation and conclusion of appropriate agreements for the suppression of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation);
- c) in **Appendix C** (Implementation of technical security measures), underscoring the importance of professionalization, specialized skills, and fostering a culture of collaboration across all levels of the aviation sector, particularly in addressing threats to air cargo and mail, and global supply chains resulting from attempted sabotage through placement of IIDs on aircraft. The Resolution also calls for the sharing of best practices that have been implemented to mitigate the threat posed by IIDs or when new technology has been developed to aid in the detection of IIDs;
- d) in **Appendix D** (The ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach), minor changes are proposed related to the use of audit information in supporting development work for Annex 17 – *Aviation Security* and urging the Secretariat to continue ongoing work to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme. The main change is the introduction of language in the Resolution urging all Member States to accept an audit as scheduled by ICAO. This new proposed text is a result of frequent postponement requests, which have significant impacts on the budget of the audit programme;
- e) in **Appendix E** (The ICAO Implementation Support and Development - Security (ISD--SEC) Programme), the main change is the specific mention of the importance of ICAO's *No Country Left Behind* Strategic Goal in expanding access to aviation security and cybersecurity training, assistance and capacity-building for States is now included. Also, that such efforts should be guided by the ICAO Aviation Security Assistance and Capacity Building Strategy;
- f) no change proposed in **Appendix F** (Action by the Council with respect to multilateral and bilateral cooperation in different regions of the world); and
- g) in **Appendix G**, a minor change is proposed to support ICAO's regional groups in aviation security and cybersecurity, as well as aviation security cooperative programmes where they exist in different regions, which are vital to help States implement ICAO Standards to enhance operational efficiencies.

A41-18 A42-xx: Consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security

Whereas it is considered desirable to consolidate Assembly resolutions on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security in order to facilitate their implementation and practical application by making their texts more readily available, understandable and logically organized;

Whereas in Resolution A410-18~~1~~ the Assembly resolved to adopt at each session a consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security; and

Whereas the Assembly has reviewed proposals by the Council for the amendment of the consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security in Resolution A410-18~~1~~, Appendices A to G inclusive, and has amended the statement to reflect the decisions taken during the 42~~nd~~^{1st} Session.

The Assembly:

1. *Resolves* that the Appendices attached to this resolution constitute the consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security, as these policies exist at the close of the 42~~nd~~^{1st} Session of the Assembly;
2. *Resolves* to request that the Council submit for review at each ordinary session a consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security; and
3. *Declares* that this resolution supersedes Resolution A410-18~~1~~.

APPENDIX A

General policy

Whereas the development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a threat to general security;

Whereas acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation ~~have become the main~~ remain a threat to its safe and orderly development and thus civil aviation shall be effectively protected;

Whereas the evolving nature of the threat of ~~terrorist~~ harmful acts, including ~~those posed by concealed explosive devices~~, the new threat of improvised incendiary devices (IID) placed on air cargo and other abuses of the air cargo system for nefarious purposes, concealed explosive devices, landside attacks, surface-to-air threats, including man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), other attacks from a distance, chemical threats, attacks using unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), ~~abuse of the air cargo system for terrorist purposes~~, use of aircraft as a weapon, cyber-attacks and other acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, including, in particular, the insider threat, that has a serious adverse effect on the safety, efficiency and regularity of international civil aviation, endangering the lives of persons on board and on the ground and undermining ~~people's~~ the confidence of the peoples of the world in the safety of international civil aviation;

Whereas the sophistication of certain threats, attack scenarios and improvised devices targeting air transport is increasing;

Whereas all acts of unlawful interference against international civil aviation constitute a grave offence in violation of international law;

Recalling that Resolutions A27-12 and A29-16 remain in force;

Recognizing that the exploitation of the aviation sector for by a variety of criminal activities, including the illicit transport of narcotics and psychotropic substances by air, as well as the trafficking of humans, wildlife, and other illicit goods can reveal or exacerbate vulnerabilities that could be exploited by those aiming to carry out acts of unlawful interference;

Recalling Resolution A40-12 on the Declaration on Aviation Security;

~~*Recalling the Joint Communiqués issued by the ICAO World Customs Organization (WCO) Joint Conferences on Enhancing Air Cargo Security and Facilitation, held in Singapore in July 2012, in Manama, Bahrain in April 2014, and in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in July 2016;*~~

Mindful of the importance of a common United Nations (UN) approach involving cooperation and coordination among all relevant UN bodies and specialized agencies in recognizing the aviation sector as critical infrastructure on which national security, prosperity and development, as well as the global economy are dependent;

Mindful of United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) 2178 (2014), 2309 (2016), 2341 (2016), 2395 (2017), 2396 (2017), 2482 (2019) and 2617 (2021) related to threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts;

Mindful of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006) as a global instrument to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism, which 8th review was adopted in 2023 by the UN General Assembly resolution (A/RES/77/298);

Mindful of the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Delhi Declaration (2022) on countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes;

Mindful of the efforts by ICAO and its Member States to implement the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy to enhance international, regional and national efforts to counter terrorism, including to take practical steps to strengthen Member State capacity to counter terrorist threats and to reinforce the coordination of the counter-terrorism activities undertaken by the UN System;

Recognizing that global consultations and outreach efforts with Member States to elaborate and refine the elements of the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) successfully led to the initial adoption of the Plan by the Council in November 2017, and adoption of the Second Edition of the GASeP in June 2024;

Recognizing increased efforts that need to be made by Member States towards the GASeP global aspirational goal to achieve and maintain a strong global aviation security system that is underpinned by full and effective implementation of ICAO aviation security Standards in all Member States targets of the GASeP set for 2023 and 2030, with the collective support of other Member States, ICAO, regional

organizations, industry and all other stakeholders;

Recognizing the importance of the implementation and promotion of global security practices, by both ICAO and Member States, that are risk-based, appropriate and proportionate to the threat;

Emphasizing the need to maintain vigilance as the perceived absence of major aviation security incidents does not mean the risk is lower, and that proactive measures remain essential;

Recognizing the ongoing need to promote the enhancement of security awareness and a strong and effective security culture in aviation, by Member States, industry and other stakeholders;

Mindful of the Regional Roadmaps adopted at Regional Conferences on Aviation Security held in Egypt, Panama, Portugal and Thailand between 2017 and 2018;

Recalling the Communiqué of the Second High-level Conference on Aviation Security held in Montréal in November 2018, and the conference conclusions and recommendations;

Mindful of the Muscat Ministerial Declaration on Aviation Security and Aviation Cybersecurity adopted at ICAO Security Week 2024 in Muscat, Oman on 11 December 2024;

Recalling the importance of Member States taking a comprehensive view of aviation security and other aviation disciplines, maintaining effective coordination among their different bodies to ensure consideration of all appropriate information, and assessment of the consequences of any measures on civil aviation activities, in particular on aviation safety;

Recognizing that air cargo plays a crucial role in transporting essential goods, including medical supplies and vaccines, as witnessed during the restrictions and public health measures brought by the COVID-19 pandemic have had a serious impact on the aviation industry and that this impact must be taken into account by ICAO and Member States when making decisions on aviation security policies and measures; and

Recalling the Joint Communiqués issued by the ICAO-World Customs Organization (WCO) Joint Conferences on Enhancing Air Cargo Security and Facilitation, held in Singapore in July 2012, in Manama, Bahrain in April 2014, and in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in July 2016;

Whereas acts of sabotage or attempted sabotage in the form of incendiary devices placed in air cargo and/or mail introduce new security and safety risks to global supply chains and have devastating consequences for interconnected national economies and global commerce;

Reaffirming the commitments made in the Ministerial Declaration of the High-level Conference on COVID-19 (HLCC 2021), among others, the need to importance of ensure ensuring a safe, secure, and orderly flow of traffic with operational readiness of aviation, and to ensure the long-term resilience of international aviation and incorporate the lessons learned from the current and past pandemics global events.

The Assembly:

1. *Strongly condemns* all acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation wherever and by

whomsoever and for whatever reason they are perpetrated;

2. *Notes with abhorrence* all acts and attempted acts of unlawful interference aimed at the destruction of civil aircraft in flight and civil airports by surface-to-air threats, incendiary threats to air cargo and mail and the supply chain, attacks using UAS and other attacks from a distance, and the misuse of civil aircraft as a weapon of destruction and the death of persons on board and on the ground;

3. *Reaffirms* that protecting aviation against complex and sophisticated threats security is critical for the sustainability of air transport and aviation security and cybersecurity must continue to be treated as a matters of highest priority and appropriate resources should be made available by ICAO and its Member States as applied to other aspects of civil aviation;

4. *Calls upon* all Member States to confirm their resolute support for the established policy of ICAO by applying the most effective security measures as required and recommended in Annex 17 — *Aviation Security* and security- related provisions in Annex 9 – *Facilitation*, individually and in cooperation with one another, to prevent acts of unlawful interference and to punish the perpetrators, planners, sponsors, sophisticated actors and financiers of conspirators in any such acts;

5. *Reaffirms* ICAO's responsibility to facilitate the consistent and uniform resolution of questions which may arise between Member States in matters affecting the safe and orderly operation of international civil aviation throughout the world;

6. *Directs* the Council to continue, as an urgent priority, its work relating to measures for the prevention of acts of unlawful interference, and ensure that this work is carried out with the highest efficiency and responsiveness;

7. *Calls upon* ICAO and its Member States to implement UNSCR 2178, 2309, 2341, 2395, 2396 and 2482 in accordance with their respective competencies and collectively demonstrate ICAO's global leadership in safeguarding international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference;

7bis *Calls upon* ICAO and its Member States to implement the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Delhi Declaration on countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes, particularly those stipulated in the non-binding guiding principles on threats posed by terrorist use of UAS;

8. *Recognizing* the leadership role of ICAO in the area of aviation security, ~~requests~~ *directs* the Secretary General to raise the profile of aviation security within ICAO and its regional offices and ensure the long-term sustainability of the Organization's aviation security programme within the context of the Regular Programme Budget;

9. *Urges* all Member States to continue to financially support the Organization's aviation security activities with voluntary contributions in the form of human and financial resources beyond those budgeted for under the regular budget programme;

9bis. *Urges* all Member States to ensure effective implementation of ICAO Standards and strive to achieve together the aspirational goal of the ICAO Global Aviation Security Plan (GASep) and its six Priority Areas, and to actively participate in global and regional efforts in pursuit of such aspirational goal;

10. *Directs* the Council to ensure the regular review of the GAsEP by the Aviation Security Panel so that it remains relevant, its priorities address existing and emerging threats and continues to serve as a useful tool for supporting Member States' efforts to achieve full implementation of Annex 17 — *Aviation Security*;

11. *Directs* the Council to consider the lessons learned from the implementation of the GAsEP, ~~including the changes that have occurred in the aviation industry as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, when making refinements to the Plan, ensuring it contains clear and collective aviation security goals and targets,~~ taking into account the global milestones for 2027, 2030 and 2033 as checkpoints at which the global community will assess the progress made along with a progress monitoring mechanism using existing processes and tools to assist ICAO, Member States and stakeholders in ensuring continuous improvement in aviation security;

12. *Directs* the Secretary General to continue reviewing and improving the ICAO aviation security plans and programmes holistically, using consultative mechanisms with Member States and industry, to ensure these plans and programmes are still serving their intended purpose and are adapting to the new and emerging aviation security challenges, while considering innovative approaches to further improve or enhance their effectiveness. Results of the reviews, including any recommendations, should be reported to the Council on a regular basis.

~~13. *Urges* all Member States to actively participate in global and regional efforts towards meeting the GAsEP objectives, goals, targets and priorities at the national and regional levels, taking into account global aspirational targets of the GAsEP set for 2023 and 2030; and~~

~~14~~13. *Urges* all Member States, industry and other stakeholders to continue to take practical actions towards the enhancement of security culture in aviation to support the effective implementation of security measures, and promote security awareness and optimal security behaviour by all entities and individuals; and

APPENDIX B

International air law instruments, enactment of national legislation and conclusion of appropriate agreements for the suppression of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation

a) *International air law instruments*

Whereas the protection of civil aviation from acts of unlawful interference has been enhanced by the *Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft* (Tokyo, 1963), by the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* (The Hague, 1970), by the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation* (Montréal, 1971), by the *Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation* (Montréal, 1988), by the *Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection* (Montréal, 1991), by the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation* (Beijing, 2010), by the *Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* (Beijing, 2010), by the *Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft* (Montréal, 2014), and by bilateral agreements for the suppression of such acts;

The Assembly:

1. Urges Member States which have not yet done so to become parties to the *Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft* (Tokyo, 1963), to the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* (The Hague, 1970), to the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation* (Montréal, 1971) and the 1988 *Supplementary Protocol to the Montréal Convention*, to the *Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection* (Montréal, 1991), to the *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation* (Beijing, 2010), to the *Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* (Beijing, 2010), and to the *Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft* (Montréal, 2014)¹;

2. Calls upon Member States not yet parties to the above-mentioned air law instruments to give effect, even before ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, to the principles of those instruments and calls upon Member States which manufacture plastic explosives to implement the marking of such explosives as soon as possible; and

3. Requests the Secretary General to continue to remind Member States of the importance of becoming parties to the Tokyo, The Hague, Montréal and Beijing Conventions, to the 1988 *Supplementary Protocol to the Montréal Convention*, to the 2010 *Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft*, to the 2014 *Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft*, and to the *Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection*, and to provide assistance requested by Member States encountering any difficulties in becoming parties to these instruments.

b) *Enactment of national legislation and conclusion of appropriate agreements*

Whereas deterrence of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation can be greatly facilitated through the enactment by Member States of national criminal laws providing severe penalties for such acts;

The Assembly:

1. Calls upon Member States to give special attention to the adoption of adequate measures against persons committing, planning, sponsoring, financing or facilitating acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, and in particular to include in their legislation rules for the severe punishment of such persons; and

2. Calls upon Member States to take adequate measures relating to the extradition or prosecution of persons committing acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation by adopting appropriate provisions in law or treaty for that purpose and by concluding appropriate agreements to provide for the extradition of persons committing criminal attacks on international civil aviation.

¹ Lists of States Parties to aviation security legal instruments can be found at www.icao.int under the ICAO Treaty Collection

APPENDIX C

Implementation of technical security measures

Whereas protection of civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference requires continued vigilance and development and implementation of actions to mitigate the threat, including those in Annex 17 – *Aviation Security* and security-related provisions in Annex 9 — *Facilitation*, by Member States;

Whereas a clear need exists for the strengthening of security to be applied to all phases and processes associated with the carriage of persons, their cabin and hold baggage, cargo, mail, courier and express parcels, and in protecting civil aviation against cyber-attacks, and threats to the landside areas of airports, as well as attacks carried out or facilitated by insiders;

Whereas threats to the air cargo and mail systems as a whole, including incendiary threats to air cargo and mail and global supply chains resulting from attempted sabotage through placement of IIDs on aircraft require a global approach in the development and implementation of security requirements and best practices, including continued information sharing and cooperation with relevant international organizations, such as the World Customs Organization (WCO), Universal Postal Union (UPU), and International Maritime Organization (IMO), and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In this regard States should share new best practices that have been implemented to mitigate the threat posed by IIDs or when new technology has been developed to aid in the detection of IIDs;

Whereas the responsibility for ensuring that security measures are applied by government agencies, airport authorities, aircraft operators and other entities rests with the Member States;

Whereas the effective implementation of the security measures advocated by ICAO is an effective means of preventing acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation;

Whereas a broad set of risk management strategies and tools must be employed to align security measures with security risk in order to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of aviation security measures, taking into account any unintended impact on the safety of civil aviation. In turn, effective coordination of aviation safety, security, and cybersecurity will benefit from shared knowledge and strengthened efforts;

Whereas countermeasures for protection of civil aviation can only be effective through employment of highly trained and competent security personnel, in addition to background checks, certification and quality control;

~~*Whereas* the COVID-19 pandemic may have required temporary alleviations of certain security requirements to be authorized as the case may be;~~

~~*Recognizing* the importance of carefully assessing and addressing the risks associated with the resumption of aviation operations, paying particular attention to risks deriving from the impact of the pandemic on staff;~~

~~*Whereas* the COVID-19 pandemic requires addressing security threats and risks, taking into account new health-related risks, while ensuring a balance with facilitation and sustainability;~~

Whereas the integration of a robust security culture for all personnel, in both security and non-security functions, at all levels and across the entire aviation domain, is imperative to the development and sustainability of an effective security environment; and

Whereas technology, process innovations and appropriate training are required to achieve effective and efficient aviation security and facilitation measures for passengers and cargo, and in defining the future of security screening regimes, while recognizing the specialist skills needed to operate and manage current and emerging aviation security technologies, and hire and train staff for their use, while pursuing efforts to attract the next generation of aviation professionals.

The Assembly:

1. *Urges* the Council to continue to attach the highest priority to the adoption of effective, evidence- and risk- based, and operationally-viable measures for the prevention of acts of unlawful interference commensurate with the current threat to the security of international civil aviation, to take into account the innovative and evolving nature of that threat, and to keep up to date the provisions of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention from a threat and risk perspective;
2. *Urges* all Member States on an individual basis and in cooperation with other Member States to take all possible measures for the prevention of acts of unlawful interference, in particular, those required or recommended in Annex 17 as well as those recommended by the Council;
3. *Reiterates* the responsibility of all Member States for the implementation of effective aviation security measures within their territory, taking into account the evolving threat;
4. *Urges* Member States to fully and sustainably implement Annex 17 — *Aviation Security* and the security-related provisions of Annex 9 — *Facilitation*, to intensify their efforts for the implementation of existing Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), and procedures relating to aviation security, to monitor such implementation, to rectify any gaps or deficiencies as a matter of urgency, to take all necessary steps to prevent acts of unlawful interference against international civil aviation and to give appropriate attention to the guidance material contained in the ICAO *Aviation Security Manual* (Doc 8973 — Restricted), *ICAO Aviation Security Training Manual* (Doc 10207), and other security-related guidance material available on the ICAO ~~restricted~~ public website;
5. *Encourages* Member States to place high importance on the ~~recently-adopted~~ Standards that respond to the insider threat and ensure their effective implementation within their respective jurisdictions, and to continue adapting and adopting measures against this threat;
6. *Encourages* Member States to promote aviation security as a fundamental component of national, social and economic priorities, planning and operations;
7. *Encourages* Member States to work in partnership with industry to develop, conduct operational trials of, and implement effective security measures and innovative technologies, techniques and processes;
8. *Encourages* Member States and industry to coordinate their efforts to evolve aviation security screening to become more agile in responding to new threats, more seamless and passenger-centric while ensuring security objectives in Annex 17 — *Aviation Security* are constantly met;

9. *Encourages* Member States and all aviation entities to promote a strong and effective security culture in aviation; including the development of security awareness programmes and campaigns among workforces and the general public that emphasize that security is everyone's responsibility;

10. *Urges* Member States to secure resources to ensure qualified and competent professionals are available to regulate, operate, maintain and oversee the effective implementation of measures related to aviation security ~~to maintain a competent, motivated and well-trained workforce and take actions to guarantee and maintain staff competencies that existed prior to the COVID-19 pandemic;~~

11. *Encourages* Member States to implement effective oversight, including remote techniques when restrictions or other circumstances do not allow for on-site monitoring activities, over all aspects of their aviation security regime in order to ensure that security measures are effectively and sustainably implemented;

12. *Encourages* Member States, pursuant to their domestic laws, regulations and aviation security programmes, and in accordance with applicable SARPs, to promote the implementation of aviation security measures in a practical manner to:

- a) broaden existing cooperation mechanisms among Member States and industry, as appropriate, for prompt information exchange and the early detection of security threats to civil aviation operations, including cyber threats. At the technical level, this prompt sharing of information should include all relevant experts;
- b) share expertise, best practices and information relating to preventive security measures, including screening and inspection techniques, the detection of explosives and incendiary devices, airport security behavioural detection, screening and credentialing of airport staff, human resource development and the research and development of relevant technologies;
- c) use ~~advanced-modern~~ technologies to detect prohibited items and materials and to prevent the carriage of such items and materials on board aircraft while respecting the privacy and safety of individuals;
- d) define aviation security measures that are evidence and risk-based, appropriate and proportionate to the threat, effective, efficient, multi-layered, operationally-viable, economically- and operationally-sustainable, and take into account the impact on passengers, crew and on legitimate trade;
- e) intensify efforts in securing the air cargo and mail security system, ~~by particularly in mitigating incendiary threats to air cargo and mail:~~
 - 1) developing a strong, sustainable and resilient air cargo and mail security framework;
 - 2) implementing robust security standards effectively and sustainably;
 - 3) adopting a total supply chain approach to air cargo and mail security, if appropriate;
 - 4) establishing and strengthening oversight and quality control of air cargo and mail security;
 - 5) engaging in bilateral and multilateral cooperative efforts to coordinate actions to harmonize and enhance air cargo and mail security and secure the global air cargo supply chain;

- 6) sharing best practices and lessons learned with other Member States to enhance the overall level of air cargo and mail security; and
- 7) strengthening initiatives to intensify capacity-building and innovation in air cargo and mail security;
- f) ~~give consideration to~~ address the potential misuse of UAS and Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) systems, and apply security measures in order to prevent their use in acts of unlawful interference;
- g) ensure that civil aviation security threat and risk assessments within their respective territories and airspace are performed continually, use these assessments to appropriately inform counter-measure development and adjust aviation security policy settings, and provide information to relevant stakeholders in a timely manner on all possible risks to civil aviation;
- h) address the risk of attacks in landside areas, including terminal buildings, by working with all stakeholders to:
 - 1) maintain an appropriate balance between the needs of effective and sustainable security measures and passenger facilitation;
 - 2) implement a set of risk-based measures that are flexible and practical, with clearly defined responsibilities among relevant actors;
 - 3) avoid, to the extent possible, the creation of vulnerabilities posed by areas of mass gathering either inside or proximate to the terminal; and
 - 4) sustain a culture of constant vigilance, deterrence, prevention, response and resilience in a coordinated manner in the face of evolving threats;
- i) ensure the protection of civil aviation against cyber-attacks and cyber threats; and
- j) address the risk posed by insiders through the exploitation of staff and their privileged access to secure areas and sensitive security information, ~~taking into consideration the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the possibility that the pandemic has created new or exacerbated existing insider vulnerabilities.~~

13. *Calls upon* Member States, while respecting their sovereignty, to minimize disruption to air travel resulting from confusion or inconsistent interpretation of Standards by cooperating and coordinating actions in order to implement SARPs and guidance consistently, efficiently and effectively and by providing clear, well-timed and readily available information to the travelling public;

14. *Calls upon* Member States, when requesting another State to apply security measures to protect aircraft flying into its territory, to take fully into account the security measures already in place in the requested State and, where appropriate and continuously validated, to recognize those measures as equivalent to reduce duplication;

15. *Requests* ICAO to:

- a) ensure that the provisions of Annex 17 — *Aviation Security* and Annex 9 — *Facilitation* are compatible with and complementary to each other;

- b) continue to promote the development of effective and innovative security processes and concepts, through awareness-raising regional and sub-regional aviation security events at the request of the Member States concerned, including in cooperation with industry stakeholders and equipment manufacturers to develop the next generation of passenger and cargo screening processes;
- c) continue to support the work of the Aviation Security Panel in addressing new and existing threats to civil aviation, and to develop appropriate preventive evidence and risk-based measures and guidance material;
- d) promote the development of ~~mutual~~-recognition of equivalence processes with the goal of assisting Member States in achieving mutually beneficial arrangements, including one-stop security arrangements, which recognize the equivalence of their aviation security measures where these achieve the same outcomes, consistent with Annex 17 requirements, and which are based on an agreed comprehensive and continuous validation process and effective ongoing exchange of information regarding their respective aviation security systems and do not create vulnerabilities and introduce new risks into the aviation network; and
- e) continue to address other threats and risks, including complex and sophisticated ones, cyber threats to aviation security, risks to landside areas of airports and air traffic management security, in consultation with the Aviation Security Panel and the Cybersecurity Panel; and

16. *Directs* the Secretary General to update and amend at appropriate intervals the ICAO *Aviation Security Manual* (Doc 8973 — Restricted) and develop new guidance material designed to assist Member States in responding to new and existing threats to aviation and implementing the specifications and procedures related to civil aviation security;

16bis *Directs* the Secretary General to update and amend at appropriate intervals the ICAO *Aviation Security Training Manual* (Doc 10207) and develop new guidance material designed to assist Member States in the recruitment, selection, and training of their staff, including consideration for quality assurance and human factors, while implementing the specifications and procedures related to civil aviation security;

17. *Directs* the Secretary General to ensure the periodic review and updating of the ICAO *Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement* (Doc 10108 — Restricted), which provides a risk assessment methodology for aviation security which may be considered by Member States for use in further developing their own national risk assessments and to include risk-based assessments, in line with Doc 10108, with any recommendations for the adoption of new or amended aviation security measures in Annex 17 or in any other ICAO document;

18. *Directs* the Secretary General to ensure that appropriate fields of expertise are engaged in the assessment of aviation security risks and the development of SARPs, specifications, guidance material, and other mean to address issues of aviation security, including coordination with other panels;

19. *Directs* the Council to continually assess the Aviation Security Panel terms of reference and establish governance procedures to ensure there are no constraints on the Panel's ability to consider the full scope of aviation security issues; and

20. *Directs* the Secretary General to continue to ensure that aviation security is appropriately

positioned as a core tenet and functional component of the ICAO Secretariat, commensurate with its criticality to the advancement, sustainability, and safe and orderly development of international civil aviation.

APPENDIX D

The ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach

Whereas the ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA) has been successful in meeting the mandate of Resolution A40/1-148, Appendix D;

Whereas one of the primary objectives of the Organization continues to be ensuring the security of international civil aviation worldwide;

Whereas Member States are committed to compliance with Annex 17 — *Aviation Security Standards*, and the security-related Standards of Annex 9 — *Facilitation*;

Whereas the establishment of an effective aviation security oversight system by Member States supports the implementation of international aviation security Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and contributes to this objective;

Recalling that the ultimate responsibility to ensure the security of civil aviation rests with Member States;

Considering that the USAP-CMA ~~can~~ has proven to be instrumental in the identification of aviation security concerns and in providing recommendations for their resolution, and that the Programme continues to enjoy the support of Member States, serving as a catalyst for their continued efforts to meet their international obligations in the field of aviation security;

Considering that USAP-CMA audit results make an important contribution to the understanding of the aviation security posture globally, regionally, and in individual Member States; and that compiled USAP-CMA data can also be used to ascertain whether Member States are ~~reaching~~ ~~achieving~~ the ~~aspirational targets~~ milestones set out in the GAsEP and can help inform the Aviation Security Panel in prioritizing areas of work including in the development and update of Annex 17;

Recognizing that the effective implementation of State corrective action plans to address deficiencies identified through USAP-CMA audits is an integral and crucial part of the monitoring process in order to achieve the overall objective of enhancing global aviation security;

Recognizing the importance of a limited level of disclosure with respect to ICAO aviation security audit results, balancing the need for Member States to be aware of unresolved security concerns with the need to keep sensitive security information out of the public realm;

Considering the approval by the Council of a mechanism to address significant security concerns (SSeCs) in a timely manner;

Recognizing the importance of a coordinated strategy for facilitating assistance to Member States through the high-level Secretariat Monitoring and Assistance Review Board;

Recognizing that the continuation of the USAP-CMA, and the continued evolution of this programme, is essential to create mutual confidence in the level of aviation security between Member States and to encourage the adequate implementation of security-related Standards;

Recognizing that the USAP-CMA has recovered from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic by increasing the number of ~~and resource constraints have limited the frequency with which audits can be conducted~~ during the past triennium, largely funded by voluntary contributions;

Recalling that the ~~40th~~ 41st Session of the Assembly requested the Council to report on the overall implementation of the USAP-CMA;

The Assembly:

1. *Notes* that the USAP-CMA ~~is fundamental in improving~~ *contributes* to global aviation security through auditing and continuous monitoring of the aviation security performance of Member States;
2. *Requests* the Secretary General to ensure that the USAP-CMA continues to assess and measure the sustainable and effective implementation of Annex 17 Standards, including risk-based approaches to their compliance as appropriate, and security-related Standards of Annex 9, and that audit prioritization is based on risk, and that USAP-CMA addresses serious deficiencies in a timely manner;
3. *Expresses its appreciation* to Member States for their cooperation in the USAP-CMA audit process and for making available security experts to be certified as USAP-CMA auditors to serve as short-term experts for the conduct of USAP-CMA audits, as well as long-term experts to act as USAP-CMA audit team leaders;
4. *Requests* the Council to ensure the continuation and sufficient resourcing of the USAP-CMA and to oversee its activities, as it monitors Member States' ability to establish and maintain sustainable aviation security systems, in compliance with the ICAO security-related Standards, and implementation of corrective action plans to address deficiencies identified during USAP-CMA audits in a timely manner;
5. *Urges* ~~Notes the work carried out by the ICAO Secretariat, in consultation with Member States, to review the scope and methodology of the USAP-CMA and urges the Secretariat~~ to continue to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme, while maintaining its quality, ~~in consultation with the Secretariat Study Group on the USAP--CMA and with the assistance of the Aviation Security Panel members and observers, as appropriate;~~
6. *Endorses* the policy of a limited level of disclosure of USAP-CMA audit results including the prompt notification of the existence of significant security concerns;
7. *Urges* all Member States to give full support to ICAO by:
 - a) signing the Memorandum of Understanding regarding the USAP-CMA;
 - b) preparing and submitting to ICAO all required documentation according to established timelines prior to USAP-CMA activities as scheduled by ICAO;
 - c) facilitating the work of USAP-CMA teams during the conduct of USAP-CMA activities;

- d) preparing and submitting an appropriate corrective action plan to address deficiencies identified during USAP-CMA activities; and
- e) implementing those corrective measures within timelines agreed upon between Member States and ICAO.

8.bis *Urges* all Member States to accept audits as scheduled by ICAO, unless prevented from doing so by Force Majeure, to ensure the provision of timely and relevant information in support of other ICAO programmes and activities, and prevent negative financial and administrative impacts on the audit programme;

8. *Requests* the Secretary General to ensure the long-term financial sustainability of the USAP-CMA by taking measures to incorporate the funding requirements for staffing and its activities within the Regular Programme Budget as soon as possible; and

9. *Requests* that the Council submit a progress report to the next ordinary session of the Assembly on the implementation of the USAP-CMA.

APPENDIX E

The ICAO Implementation Support and Development – Security (ISD-SEC) Programme (~~ISD-SEC~~)

Whereas the implementation of technical measures for the prevention of acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation requires financial resources and training of personnel; ~~and~~

Whereas notwithstanding assistance given, some countries, in particular developing countries, lack aviation security oversight capacity and still face difficulties in fully implementing preventive measures due to insufficient financial, technical and material resources; ~~and~~

Reaffirming the value and importance of ICAO's *No Country Left Behind* Strategic Goal that aims to help States in need by delivering expanded access to targeted and effective aviation security and cybersecurity training, assistance and capacity-building while promoting long-term self-sustainability for States.

The Assembly:

1. *Directs* the Secretary General to promote efforts worldwide by Member States and other aviation entities to deliver effective technical assistance and support for Member States by encouraging coordinated, targeted and prioritized international aviation security capacity-building activities guided by the ICAO Aviation Security Assistance and Capacity Building Strategy;
2. *Urges* Member States to voluntarily contribute financial and in-kind resources to increase the reach and impact of ICAO aviation security enhancement activities;
3. *Directs* the Secretary General to ensure that contributions received for aviation security implementation support and development activities be fully committed to those activities only;

4. *Urges* Member States able to do so to assist in the delivery of effective and targeted capacity-building activities in the area of aviation security. Such activities should include training, technical assistance and implementation support and development, technology transfers and the provision of other necessary resources, where it is needed to enable all Member States to achieve an enhanced and effective aviation security regime;

5. *Invites* Member States to take advantage of ICAO's capacity to provide, facilitate or coordinate short-term remedial assistance and long-term assistance to remedy deficiencies in their implementation of Annex 17 SARPs, and ICAO's capacity to make best use of USAP audit results for defining and targeting aviation security capacity- building activities for the benefit of Member States in need;

6. *Invites* Member States to consider requesting assistance from other international and regional organizations to meet their technical assistance requirements arising from the need to protect international civil aviation;

7. *Urges* Member States and organizations to share with ICAO information on their assistance programmes and activities in order to promote the efficient and effective use of resources;

8. *Directs* the Secretary General to facilitate the coordination of assistance programmes and activities to the extent possible, including by collecting any available information on such initiatives;

9. *Directs* the Secretary General to monitor and evaluate the quality and effectiveness of ICAO assistance projects and to provide regular reports on the use of financial and in-kind resources and on the measured impacts of such contributions;

10. *Urges* Member States and relevant stakeholders to partner for the organization and delivery of capacity- building activities, documenting the commitments made by each party;

11. *Requests* the Secretary General to update and enhance the ICAO programme of Aviation Security Training Programme, including maintaining and developing Aviation Security Training Packages (ASTPs) and Aviation Security Workshops, and promoting other methods of aviation security training such as e-learning and blended learning;

12. *Urges* Member States to contribute to the activities of the ICAO programme of Aviation Security Training Programme activities;

13. *Requests* the Secretary General to oversee, develop, promote, support, maintain and regularly re-evaluate the ICAO Aviation Security Training Centre (ASTC) network to ensure that aviation security training requirements are met and sound levels of cooperation are achieved; and

14. *Urges* Member States to use ICAO ASTCs for aviation security training.

APPENDIX F

Action by the Council with respect to multilateral and bilateral cooperation in different regions of the world

Whereas the rights and obligations of Member States under the international air law instruments on aviation security and under the SARPs adopted by the Council on aviation security could be complemented and reinforced in multilateral and bilateral cooperation between Member States;

Whereas the multilateral and bilateral agreements on air services represent the main legal basis for international commercial carriage by air of passengers, baggage, cargo and mail;

Whereas provisions on aviation security should form an integral part of the multilateral and bilateral agreements on air services; and

Whereas focusing on security outcomes, recognition of equivalence and one-stop security, and respecting the spirit of cooperation defined in multilateral and/or bilateral air services agreements are policy principles whose implementation can contribute significantly to aviation security sustainability;

The Assembly:

1. *Recognizes* that success in eliminating threats to civil aviation can only be achieved through the concerted effort of everyone concerned and a close working relationship between national agencies and aviation security regulators of all Member States;

2. *Urges* all Member States to insert into their multilateral and bilateral agreements on air services a clause on aviation security, taking into account the model clause adopted by the Council on 25 June 1986 and the model agreement adopted by the Council on 30 June 1989;

3. *Urges* all Member States to adopt the following key principles as the basis for international cooperation in aviation security and to ensure effective aviation security cooperation among Member States, ICAO and other relevant international organizations:

- a) respect for the spirit of cooperation defined in bilateral and/or multilateral air services agreements;
- b) recognition of equivalent security measures; and
- c) focus on security outcomes;

4. *Urges* all Member States, who have not yet done so, to participate in the ICAO Aviation Security Point of Contact (PoC) Network, established for the communication of imminent threats to civil air transport operations, with the objective of providing a network of international aviation security contacts within each State, and to intensify their coordination and cooperation to ensure the exchange of best practices through the AVSECPaedia;

5. *Urges* ICAO to promote initiatives which enable the establishment of technological platforms for the exchange of aviation security information among Member States;

6. *Requests* that ICAO continue to:

- a) encourage Member States to report on their experience in cooperating with each other to prevent acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation;
- b) analyse differing circumstances and trends in preventing threats to international civil aviation in different regions of the world; and
- c) prepare recommendations for strengthening measures to deter and prevent such acts of unlawful interference;

7. *Directs* the Council to act with the requisite urgency and expedition to address new and existing threats to civil aviation, seeking to mitigate unnecessary disruption to air travel as a result of confusion or inconsistent implementation or interpretation of necessary measures, facilitating a common and consistent response by Member States, and encouraging clear communication by Member States to the travelling public.

APPENDIX G

International and regional cooperation in the field of aviation security

Recognizing that the threat posed to civil aviation requires development of an effective global response by Member States and concerned international and regional organizations; and

Recognizing the development of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact to strengthen the common UN approach to supporting Member States with the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant UN resolutions and mandates.

The Assembly:

1. *Invites* the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization (CANSO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO/INTERPOL), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation for Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UNCTED), United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the World Customs Organization (WCO), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Arab Civil Aviation Organization (ACAO), the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC), the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), the Latin American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC), the International Air Transport Association (IATA), Airports Council International (ACI), the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations (IFALPA), the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC), the International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations (ICCAIA), the Global Express Association (GEA), the International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations (FIATA), The International Air Cargo Association (TIACA), and other stakeholders to continue their cooperation with ICAO, to the maximum extent possible, to safeguard international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference;

2. *Directs* the Council to continue its cooperation with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee

(CTC) in areas of aviation security and border management, in the global effort to combat terrorism and requests the Secretary General to use the Organization's expertise to assist the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UNCTED) in the conduct of country visits to assess the counter-terrorism efforts of Member States including progress made, remaining shortfalls, and priority areas for technical assistance needs, as well as to identify terrorism-related trends and challenges and best practices employed in the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions; ~~and~~

3. *Directs* the Secretary General to use the Organization's expertise in the field of aviation security and border management to support the work of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact framework to strengthen the common UN approach to prevent and counter terrorism, and to assist the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) in their efforts to provide technical assistance and capacity-building support to Member States while ensuring assistance activities are coordinated to avoid duplication of effort and ensure the efficient use of resources; and

4. *Invites* Member States to proactively support ICAO's regional groups in aviation security and cybersecurity, as well as aviation security cooperative programmes where they exist in different regions, which are vital to help States implement ICAO Standards, to enhance operational efficiencies, and promote long-term self-sustainability of States' AVSEC programmes and operations.

— END —