



| ICAO

2026 ICAO **TRIP** SYMPOSIUM

22 - 24 SEPTEMBER | MONTRÉAL, CANADA



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LATEST FRAUD CASES DETECTED AT THE FRENCH BORDER

SOUCHET Jérémy

Document specialist


**National Division for combatting Document and
Identity Fraud**

FRANCE


High quality counterfeit documents



Neutral reaction + UV features



Background printing in offset



Optically variable ink



DOVID



Laser engraving

High quality counterfeit documents



Fraudulent duotone watermark

Some potential solutions to combat this fraud phenomenon

- To integrate innovative first level security features.
- To disseminate those security elements at different locations.
- To implement a secured digitally signed QR code (Visible Digital Seal).
- To implement an electronic chip.

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5

Lack of standardisation of the border inspection systems

MRZ et Photos Infos puce  FIELDS

 L'authenticité des données de la puce n'est pas garantie 

Pays: SVK

Numéro: RA1248

Expiration: 26/09/2034

Titulaire

Nom:

Prénom:

Nationalité: SLOVAQUIE

Date de naissance: 10/05/1998

Age: 27

Sexe: M

FRANCE

CZECH REPUBLIC

DG

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

EF.COM EF.SOD EF.CVCA

 Overall result

 BAC

 PACE

 CA

 TA

 AA

 PA

CYPRUS

RFID Data

DG1	DG5	DG9	DG13	SOD Sign	Chip Auth
DG2	DG6	DG10	DG14	DS Cert	Term Auth
DG3	DG7	DG11	DG15	CSCA Cert	Act Auth
DG4	DG8	DG12	DG16		Pass Auth

FINLAND


BAC	SAC	CA	TA	PA	AA	DG1	DG2	DG3	DG4	EF.SOD
										

Different information available on the screen for the same fraud (non original chip)

Some potential solutions to combat this fraud phenomenon

- To fix some **common rules in terms of border inspection systems** making visible on the screen:
 - > The most important data groups (at least the 1, 2, 3, 14, 15 but also the 11 and 12).
 - > The access protocols BAC and PACE (waiting for the 01.01.2028).
 - > The SOD and the authentication protocols AA, CA and PA.
- To better exchange, collect and implement the **CSCA certificates** in the different IS.

ICAO
TRIP 2026



Date de naissance
04 2012

2

Impostors using a silicon mask and a false document







Use of false EU or Asian passports

Some potential solutions to combat this fraud phenomenon

- To facilitate the **exchange of CVCA** certificates to be able to compare the document user fingerprints with the ones stored in the electronic chip (DG3).
- To better link the different **databases containing biometrics** (EURODAC, EES, VIS...).
- To parameter the **e-gates** for a more detailed facial comparison / to detect silicon masks.
- To increase the **size of the main document picture** for the TD3 format documents (as for the TD1).

Genuine documents obtained by fraud

The different modus operandi:



By providing a counterfeit or fantasy birth certificate to the issuing authorities

By providing a photo from someone else or a morphed picture

By providing a genuine document from someone else for renewal

By the way of corruption

THE solution to combat this fraud phenomenon

TO MAKE STRONGER THE DOCUMENT DELIVERY CHAIN

- By fixing some common rules for the birth certificates:
 - > An **unique model** at national level.
 - > The presence of some **physical security features** and/or a **secured QR code** (digitally signed).
 - > The use of a **digital and centralise system**.
- By implementing the **live enrollment** at national level (picture taken on the spot by the issuing authorities).

Jérémy SOUCHET

e-mail: jeremy.souchet@interieur.gouv.fr

Phone : +33698547736

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Thank You

