

APPENDIX B

POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE ENHANCEMENT OF AIR NAVIGATION SECURITY

1. AIM OF THE DOCUMENT

1.1 This document provides policy guidance related to the enhancement of Air Navigation Security. It results from the close cooperation and coordination between ad-hoc security working groups established by EUROCONTROL and NATO, and takes account of current ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices.

2. POLICY GUIDANCE

2.1 It is of paramount importance to harmonise national policies regarding the identification and the handling of suspicious aircraft, in order to avoid a complexity of different procedures that may need to be applied to an aircraft flying through different flight information regions (FIRs) across Europe. As the reaction time and dissemination of information between adjacent area control centres (ACCs) is crucial for eventual action, it is assumed that both civil and military communications systems will be used for collecting and disseminating accurate and timely information to appropriate decision-makers.

2.2 The policy guidance will concentrate on:

- a) optimising awareness;
- b) implementing ATM actions that may be necessary when experiencing an occurrence of unlawful interference with an aircraft; and
- c) longer term measures to enhance Air Navigation Security.

3. OPTIMISING AWARENESS

3.1 Awareness is dependent on information, surveillance/detection, identification and tracking. Maintenance of radio contact is essential, not only for reasons of safety, but also to avoid the unnecessary deployment of costly military resources such as interceptor aircraft.

3.2 **Identification of suspicious aircraft.** The various circumstances surrounding each situation preclude the establishment of exact, detailed procedures to be followed. Air traffic services personnel should be prepared to recognise any indication of the occurrence of unlawful interference with an aircraft, but because of the large variety of possible suspicious situations that may be encountered, a finite list of aircraft/pilot activities that will lead to the identification of a suspicious aircraft cannot be prescribed. However, a set of well-defined criteria must be developed. The criteria must ensure, as far as is possible, a full description of situations that may indicate a current or imminent suspicious aircraft/pilot activity. Therefore, adherence to the approved flight plan is of paramount importance for identification purposes.

3.3 **Notification of an incident.** It may be that suspicious behaviour will be noticed first by an air traffic controller in the normal course of his/her duty. For such situations, the responsibilities of the controller must be clearly defined and agreed. One of the immediate responsibilities will be the requirement to notify the appropriate authority if there is a belief that a suspicious activity is taking place or is imminent.

3.4 **Dissemination of information.** As a general rule, all information concerning suspicious aircraft should be disseminated to adjacent ATS and Air Defence (AD) Units (including across the national borders) in accordance with set criteria that must be established. It is essential that appropriate communication lines between civil and military facilities, as well as between higher ATC and AD echelons and decision-makers, is activated in accordance with pre-established rules. Appropriate procedures and phraseology must be established to avoid misunderstanding.

3.5 **Maintenance of awareness.** Should the activity of a particular aircraft appear suspicious, it will be essential to maintain track of that aircraft. To enable this to take place, there may be a requirement for supplementing secondary surveillance radar information with active or passive sensor information. Consequently, maintaining primary radar coverage and radar data exchange between civil and military centres should be promoted. Furthermore, it is recommended that communication links be established to facilitate a common understanding of the situation by all interested parties.

4. **IMPLEMENTING ATM ACTIONS IN THE EVENT OF AN OCCURRENCE OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE**

4.1 To ensure the maintenance of flight safety, the airspace around a suspicious aircraft will need to be cleared. Such action will also facilitate AD measures such as interception for identification or intervention. National instructions may direct the withholding of a clearance or denying access to particular airspace. The temporary closure of airspace or the establishment of any temporary airspace restrictions (be they emanating from civil or military requests) and any additional ATM measures necessary as a consequence of such actions, must be closely coordinated between appropriate authorities. Pan-European agreed procedures and phraseology, with the appropriate associated training, would facilitate this requirement. Making the ATM system available to air traffic after an incident will require detailed planning and close coordination between all parties involved.

5. **LONG-TERM MEASURES**

5.1 A number of technical improvements to enhance Air Navigation Security must be considered. These may include a reconsideration, in some instances, of current planning for decommissioning civil and military ATC primary radar, and the need for better radar data exchange between civil and military facilities. The implementation of secure and direct lines of communication should also be considered.

5.2 In addition, there may be a need to consider the establishment of a central location for the gathering and dissemination of information to benefit both civil and military decision-makers.

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