



Airport Preparedness Guidelines for Outbreaks of Communicable Disease

1st Meeting of the ICAO CAPSCA Americas Project Steering Committee

Mexico City, Mexico, 25 June, 2009

0. Content

- 
1. Introduction
 2. Responsibility
 3. General Communication
 4. Communication with Departing Travellers in an outbreak event
 5. Screening
 6. Inbound aircraft suspected case
 7. Exercises
 8. Summary

1. Introduction

- 
- ⇒ 1. Introduction
 - 2. Responsibility
 - 3. General Communication
 - 4. Communication with Departing Travellers in an outbreak event
 - 5. Screening
 - 6. Inbound aircraft suspected case
 - 7. Exercises
 - 8. Summary

1. Introduction

- ✈ Aviation can potentially increase the rate of disease spreadness
- ✈ Airport operators need to protect passengers, staff and the public
- ✈ Rapid, collaborative decision-making and action is crucial
- ✈ Results of following these guidelines:
 - ⇒ greater predictability of the measures to be taken by the various stakeholders



1. Introduction (2)



10

250000

Source: Forecast and control of epidemics in a globalized world, Hufnagel, Brockmann, Geisel, PNAS, 2004

2. Responsibility

- 
- ✓ 1. Introduction
 - ⇒ 2. Responsibility
 - 3. General Communication
 - 4. Communication with Departing Travellers in an outbreak event
 - 5. Screening
 - 6. Inbound aircraft suspected case
 - 7. Exercises
 - 8. Summary

2. Responsibility (1)

- ✈ Main Responsibility: Local/Regional/National Competent Authorities
 - ✈ Competent Authorities as defined in IHR Article 22
- ✈ Risk management responsibilities for Health Authorities and Airport Operators
- ✈ Gain Predictability and International Cooperation
- ✈ Special Focus on Personal Protection Equipment
 - ⇒ Including hand washing facilities and /or sanitising gels
- ✈ Training in aspects of preparedness planning
 - ⇒ Specific for each airport/non airport staff role

2. Responsibility (2)



↳ Special Focus on Personal Protection Equipment

↳ Training Sessions in aspects of preparedness planning



Source: HKIA Public Health Preparedness

3. General Communication

- 
- ✓ 1. Introduction
 - ✓ 2. Responsibility
 - ⇒ 3. General Communication
 - 4. Communication with Departing Travellers in an outbreak event
 - 5. Screening
 - 6. Inbound aircraft suspected case
 - 7. Exercises
 - 8. Summary

3. General Communication (1)

- ✈ Good communication is the key of effective preparedness planning
- ✈ Airport operators should establish:
 - ✈ A clear contact point of operational organisation of preparedness
 - ✈ A responsible for the operational implementation of the airport preparedness plan
- ✈ Communication links with the following entities/stakeholders:
 - ⇒ Internal
 - ⇒ External

3. General Communication (2)



HKIA: Circular to all stakeholders

- airlines
- handling agents
- air traffic management
- airport medical service providers
- emergency medical services
- police
- customs
- immigration
- security



Safety, Security, Business Continuity & Environmental Circular

Ref: SSBCE/08/09
28 April 2009

Issued to:	Lists A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I
cc:	Airport Management Director Deputy Director, Airport Operations GM – Terminal 1, GM – Terminal 2 and Landside, GM – SSBCE, GM – Airfield & GM – TSD
Subject:	Human Swine Influenza Airport Preparation

The purpose of this circular is to promulgate current airport procedures in respect of Infectious Disease Preparedness. As you are aware on 26 April 2009 in response to the international health concerns posed by Human Swine Influenza, the Department of Health has raised the Flu alert level from 'Alert' to 'Serious'.

At Hong Kong International Airport, additional measures are being introduced to enhance the level of health checks for arrivals passengers. Further measures may also be introduced at a later date.

Together with this circular please find attached as appendices:-

1. Department of Health (DH) press release on the Statutory Reporting of Human Swine Influenza.
2. Latest DH general information on Human Swine Influenza as reproduced from their website.
3. Relevant excerpts from AAHK's Infectious Disease Preparedness and Response Plans. The Plans may be downloaded from this website : <http://aotranspider.hkairport.com>
4. The latest WHO information on Swine Influenza Frequently Asked Questions.

Under the AAHK Infectious Disease Preparedness Plan, a HKIA Stepped Response Plan has been formulated. Measures required under this Stepped Response Plan are addressed on pages 11 to 15, under paragraphs 3.1 to 3.19. Opportunity is taken to remind all airport organizations as to the following requirements applicable at this time under the "Serious Response Level". In particular all Airport Organizations are to:-

- encourage staff to have their temperature taken before reporting for duty at the airport;
- keep their respective staff updated on developments;
- review stocks of Personal Protection Equipment (face masks, alcohol swabs, gloves, hand disinfectant gels, etc.) to ensure stocks are adequate;

Page 1

4. Communication with Departing Pax

- 
- ✓ 1. Introduction
 - ✓ 2. Responsibility
 - ✓ 3. General Communication
 - ➡ 4. Communication with Departing Travellers in an outbreak event
 - 5. Screening
 - 6. Inbound aircraft suspected case
 - 7. Exercises
 - 8. Summary



- ✈ Access to consistent information for travellers and health professionals
- ✈ Provide information by web sites, telephone and written messages
 - ✈ Establish links to Government and WHO media sources
 - ✈ Provide reports and briefs to radio and TV stations is very effective
- ✈ In the airport, messages can be provided by
 - ⇒ Signage
 - ⇒ Stands
 - ⇒ Posters
 - ⇒ Electronic displays
 - ⇒ Public address
- ✈ Sample information text provided in the guidelines
 - ⇒ Languages: at least in English and the local official language
 - ⇒ Explain the measures in place as fully as possible to gain confidence

4. Communication with Departing Pax (2)



↳ Travel Health Service information website

↳ Public Health information stands at HKIA



5. Screening

- 
- ✓ 1. Introduction
 - ✓ 2. Responsibility
 - ✓ 3. General Communication
 - ✓ 4. Communication with Departing Travellers in an outbreak event
 - ➡ 5. Screening
 - 6. Inbound aircraft suspected case
 - 7. Exercises
 - 8. Summary


5. Screening (1)

- ✈ Potential reduction of transmission opportunities
- ✈ Need to balance the probable effectiveness
 - ✈ Epidemiology, extent of transmission, severity of the disease and cost
 - ✈ Consider proportion of transmission during incubation or asymptomatic period
- ✈ Selection of the most appropriate screening method:
 - ⇒ Transmission characteristics
 - ⇒ Associated illness patterns
 - ⇒ Risk groups affected
- ✈ WHO monitors the behaviour of new infectious agents
 - ⇒ WHO may recommend screening when considered effective to limit spread
 - ⇒ Explain the measures in place as fully as possible to gain confidence

5. Screening (2)



↳ Thermal infrared scanning system / base mounted



↳ Ceiling mounted camera

5. Screening (3)

- ✈ In some cases, screening on departure is more effective
 - ✈ Fewer passengers screened
 - ✈ Transmission on aircraft is reduced
- ✈ Considerations on arrival screening
 - ✈ For geographically isolated infection free areas (islands)
 - ✈ Indication from epidemiological data
 - ✈ Departure screening considered inefficient
 - ✈ Internal outbreak surveillance capacity limited
 - ⇒ Inefficient for any other cases
- ✈ Public health authorities to develop acceptable plans with the airport
 - ⇒ Costs associated would normally be met by health authorities
- ✈ Travellers determined as a risk: secondary medical screening
 - ⇒ The decision on denying acceptance has legal implications

5. Screening (4)




↳ Thermal Infrared camera

↳ Temperature monitor display



Source: HKIA Public Health Preparedness

5. Screening (5)



↳ Thermal Screening management flowchart

Source: HKIA Public Health Preparedness


5. Screening (6)

- ✈ Positive secondary screening
 - ✈ Appropriate diagnosis and management in accordance with IHR (2005)
 - ✈ Quarantine facilities off-airport
- ✈ Negative secondary screening
 - ✈ Passenger allowed to continue the journey
 - ✈ Appropriate medical advise
- ✈ Private acceptance area should be identified at the airport
 - ⇒ Temporary accomodation of risk passengers
- ✈ Travellers through an 'at risk' area should be provided with the available information about:
 - ⇒ risks ⇒ risk avoidance ⇒ symptoms associated with the disease
 - ⇒ when and where to report should these symptoms develop.


6. Inbound aircraft suspected case

- 
- ✓ 1. Introduction
 - ✓ 2. Responsibility
 - ✓ 3. General Communication
 - ✓ 4. Communication with Departing Travellers in an outbreak event
 - ✓ 5. Screening
 - ➡ 6. Inbound aircraft suspected case
 - 7. Exercises
 - 8. Summary

6. Inbound aircraft suspected case (1)

- 
- ✈ Actions
 - ✈ Decide on the parking position (collaborative process)
 - ✈ Communicate this position to the pilot in command
 - ✈ Evaluate and institute the public health response as needed
 - ✈ Disembark passengers as soon as the situation is evaluated
 - ✈ Considerations
 - ✈ Flight and ground crew need to be advised
 - ✈ Public health officials need quick and efficient access
 - ✈ Appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) should be worn
 - ✈ Passenger having a communicable respiratory disease: should wear a mask
 - ✈ Treatment of surfaces in contact
 - ✈ Appropriate escort of sick passenger
 - ✈ Segregation of travellers and crew on the same aircraft as sick pax

6. Inbound aircraft suspected case (2)

- 
- ✈ Considerations (2)
 - ✈ Procedures in place to obtain customs & security clearance for sick pax
 - ✈ No evidence on effectiveness of disinfection of bags
 - ✈ No evidence on effectiveness of disinfectant mats for arriving pax
 - ✈ Comfort of passengers: provision of food, water and other essentials
 - ✈ Affected travellers should be kept continually informed
 - ✈ Procedure to transport a sick pax to hospital should be in place

6. Inbound aircraft suspected case (3)



↳ One bus for each category

↳ Category color code

Identification of Passengers

Category	Count
Collaterals	9
Close Contacts	8
Social contacts	12
Other Passengers	164

Total 194


Source: HKIA Public Health Preparedness

7. Exercises

- 
- ✓ 1. Introduction
 - ✓ 2. Responsibility
 - ✓ 3. General Communication
 - ✓ 4. Communication with Departing Travellers in an outbreak event
 - ✓ 5. Screening
 - ✓ 6. Inbound aircraft suspected case
 - ➡ 7. Exercises
 - 8. Summary

7. Exercises

- ✈ Airport operators should establish a method of testing their preparedness
 - ✈ by means of drills/exercises involving all relevant stakeholders,
 - ✈ especially public health authorities, airport operators and airlines.




Source: HKIA Public Health Preparedness

8. Summary

- 
- ✓ 1. Introduction
 - ✓ 2. Responsibility
 - ✓ 3. General Communication
 - ✓ 4. Communication with Departing Travellers in an outbreak event
 - ✓ 5. Screening
 - ✓ 6. Inbound aircraft suspected case
 - ✓ 7. Exercises
 - ➡ 8. Summary

8. Summary (1)



Airport Preparedness plan – Schematic example of actions



THANK YOU

Contact us

ACI World
Geneva

Tel: +41 22 717 8585

Fax: +41 22 717 8888

E-mail: aci@aci.aero

www.aci.aero