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Agenda Item 6: Aviation Security (AVSEC) Developments

PASSENGER AND CABIN BAGGAGE SCREENING MAJOR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

(Presented by IATA)

SUMMARY

Passenger and cabin baggage screening is one of the key front line security measures that helps ensure the security of international civil aviation. The human element is key to the success of that process. Therefore, training of screening personnel is paramount.

Additionally, the use of adequate screening technology and proper layout can ensure that the screening checkpoint can detect all dangerous and prohibited items without impeding on the flow of passengers.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Screening and searching of passengers and their baggage is an essential and basic part of aviation security. States and air carriers have a responsibility to make sure that people and baggage boarding the aircraft will not decrease the safety and security of a flight.

1.2 Generally, the basic rule is that all passengers and their cabin baggage must undergo screening before being permitted to have access to an aircraft or a sterile area of an airport.

1.3 Screening of passengers and cabin baggage may be carried out by the use of metal detectors, X-ray, explosive trace detection equipment or other devices, by manual search or by a combination of both. In the interests of facilitation and to reduce the number of passengers and amount of cabin baggage subjected to manual search, experience has shown that screening devices should be used as a matter of standard operating procedures.

1.4 In addition to a standard complement of personnel, any screening system should also utilize technical equipment. The manual search of persons and cabin baggage can be effective, provided that there is ample time and the procedures are conducted by well-trained and skilled personnel. The use of metal detectors, X-ray and explosive trace detection equipment will significantly enhance the effectiveness of processing and facilitate passenger flow.

1.5 Whether the screening procedures are completely manual or are supported by the use of screening equipment, if the personnel in charge of performing the screening is not properly trained, the appropriate level of security will not be reached and the safety and security of the aircraft as well as some parts of the airport terminal may be put in jeopardy.

1.6 Security screening equipment, while essential to ensure the safety and security of international civil aviation, should always be considered as providing support to the security personnel. Therefore, it is paramount that training of security screening personnel is of the highest possible quality as it will have a direct correlation on the quality of the screening performed.

2. TRAINING OF SCREENING PERSONNEL

2.1 Amendment 11 to Annex 17 – *Security*, Standard 3.4.3 states that: *Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons carrying out screening operations are certified according to the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme to ensure that performance standards are consistently and reliably achieved.*

2.2 The requirement for certified persons carrying out screening operations signifies that not only initial training is essential for screening personnel but recurrent training followed by testing to ensure that the screening personnel has maintained the level of competency necessary to carry on security screening duties

2.3 The training curriculum for screening personnel will need to cover a variety of subjects which include but is not limited to:

a) Screening regulations and legislations;
b) Identification of firearms, weapons, incendiary or explosive devices, other dangerous devices, or parts thereof; (both visually and through the use of security equipment);
c) Operation and testing of security equipment (metal detectors, X-ray units, explosives detection devices);
d) Manual search of the person;
e) Manual search of baggage, cargo, mail and stores;
f) Screening procedures;
g) Emergency procedures; and
h) Customer service

2.4 Training programmes should have both theoretical and practical training that covers all the subjects of the training programme. Theoretical training is normally performed in classroom settings but can also be given via computer based training. Practical training will require the recruits to have perform the necessary duties in a “real-world” setting. The use of computer-based software and/or Threat Image Projection Software (TIPS) (for security equipment operations training) are efficient methods to ensure that recruits can utilise security equipment effectively.

2.5 “On-the-Job” training will provide the best method to ensure recruits are performing security procedures as they are prescribed. Ensuring that formalised screening procedures exist and are documented will greatly facilitate learning by new screeners since all will be expected to perform their duties in the same manner. For “On-the-Job” training, it is important that recruits are paired with competent and experienced personnel for a determined amount of time.

2.6 Security procedures should be designed in such a way that the passenger experience during screening is a pleasant one. It should aim to facilitate the duties of the personnel which will contribute in achieving a higher standard of performance.

2.8 In order for any training to be validated, personnel attending training courses must be assessed on all training they receive. The purpose of assessment is to evaluate the knowledge (what), skills (how) and attitude (why) of personnel in the aims and objectives of the training. Knowledge must be tested in written tests. Skills must be tested by practical tests.

2.9 When choosing tests, care must be taken to ensure their technical quality and appropriateness to the task. Systematic and thorough validation of tests is necessary prior to their use in an aviation security operational context. Those responsible for procuring, designing, administering and providing feedback on tests should have the necessary professional qualifications and training.

3. SCREENING PROCEDURES, EQUIPMENT AND CHECKPOINT LAYOUT

3.1 It is important that screening procedures are documented in order to ensure a harmonized approach to the screening process. Passengers and their cabin baggage should be screened by the same method and subjected to same screening standards every time they visit the airport.

3.2 However, should there be an increase or change in the threat, it is then necessary that additional or new screening measures be implemented. Additional screening measures should not become permanent. Once the threat level returns back to its baseline, the screening procedures should follow.

3.3 Procedures need to be developed in such a way that they contribute to assisting screeners:

a) In detecting and removing all prohibited and dangerous items before passengers and cabin baggage enter the sterile area
b) In being considerate of customer service and privacy. This is especially relevant when passengers need to be submitted to secondary screening, which normally includes manual search. While essential to protect civil aviation, these measures may appear invasive, therefore it is paramount that screeners are especially considerate of passengers' privacy while conducting hand searches of passengers and their cabin baggage.

3.4 Additionally screening procedures need to be developed for special categories of passengers such as but not limited to:

a) Babies in pushchairs and children (will require consent of adult)
b) Pregnant women
c) Disabled persons
d) Passengers in wheelchairs
e) Passengers with medical conditions (limbs in plaster)
f) Passengers with religious reasons that prevent the hand search of them or their baggage.

3.4 The screening equipment used must be able to detect items that can pose a threat to international civil aviation in the current environment. Additionally, the equipment should be calibrated at the beginning of each day of operations to ensure that it functions properly. Regular testing and preventative maintenance should be conducted based on the manufacturer's guidelines.

3.5 There should be enough screening equipment to ensure that passenger flow is not negatively impeded at the screening checkpoint. Not having sufficient equipment will lead to long queues, which risks making passengers tense and less co-operative during the screening process and the rest of the journey. It can also put additional pressure on screeners to process passengers and cabin baggage faster. This could lead to screeners performing their duties ineffectively.

4. SECURITY AND FACILITATION BALANCE

4.1 Security screening is a step that every passenger has to go through. When a person decides to travel by air, they expect that some time will have to be allocated to the various security measures.

4.2 However, in recent times, some States have required screening measures that have obligated passengers to arrive a substantial time before the scheduled flight departure time.

4.3 Also, screening measures are not always customer friendly. The so-called hassle factor of flying has pushed many people away from flying. If the security process dissuades a significant number of potential passengers from flying, then the security process has accomplished one of the terrorist's major goals of negatively affecting a State's economic activity.

4.4 Amendment 11 to ICAO Annex 17 – *Security*, Recommended Practice 2.3 states: *Each Contracting State should whenever possible arrange for the security controls and procedures to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to the activities of, civil aviation provided the effectiveness of these controls and procedures is not compromised.* In this context, airport authorities should aim to have layouts of screening checkpoints and procedures that favor passenger flow.

4.5 Management of the Security and Facilitation balance is a very important component of airport security measures and therefore screening procedures should be drafted with flexibility in order to ensure that the proper level of security is constantly being implemented no matter what the threat level may be.

5. SCREENING OF LIQUIDS, GELS AND AEROSOLS (L/G/A)

5.1 Following the foiled plot in the UK on August 10, 2006, some States identified the carriage of L/G/A in normal quantities as potentially posing a threat to the security of Civil Aviation.

5.2 Initially, the countermeasures introduced ranged from a complete ban on all cabin baggage, to limited allowances to no restrictions based on individual State threat assessment. L/G/A have now been re-admitted, where banned, with some restrictions. While the EU, US and Canada have found a common ground on L/G/A quantities allowed, there are still discrepancies globally on L/G/A limits, duty free procedures and crew exemptions. It is essential that any State that decides to impose restrictions on carriage of L/G/A ensures that its measures are harmonized with other States already imposing such restrictions

5.3 Screening checkpoint wait times have increased significantly in some States because of L/G/A restrictions. Further, the ban on L/G/A is creating confusion for passengers especially with regard to duty free items allowances especially when their travels involve transiting in a third-party State.

5.4 Finally, It is essential that the additional measures, when implemented, do not lead to any unauthorized transport of dangerous goods in hold baggage which could jeopardize the safety of the flight

6. ACTIONS BY THE MEETING

6.1.1 States are invited to

a) note the importance of having a well trained staff, standardized procedures and optimal equipment in order to ensure that passenger and cabin baggage screening is both effective and efficient

b) take into account the balance between security, facilitation, passenger flow and the safety of passengers and staff when implementing passenger and cabin baggage screening checkpoints.

c) consider the threat posed by liquids explosives and, if necessary, implement countermeasures that are harmonized with other restrictions put in place by other States.

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