



International Civil Aviation Organization

**The Fourth Meeting of the Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring Advisory Group
(RASMAG/4)**

Bangkok, Thailand, 25 – 28 October 2005

Agenda Item 2: Review of APANPIRG/16 and 42nd DGCA Conference outcomes

Outcomes of APANPIRG/16 in relation to RASMAG

(Presented by the Secretariat)

SUMMARY

This paper brings to the attention of RASMAG relevant extracts from the Report of the 16th Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group, held from 22-26 August 2005.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The 16th meeting of the Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group (APANPIRG/16) was held at Bangkok, Thailand, from 22-26 August 2005. APANPIRG/16 engaged in extensive discussion in relation to matters of relevance to RASMAG.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 An extract from the APANPIRG/16 Report has been included as an attachment to this working paper, for review by the meeting. In summary, APANPIRG/16 endorsed a total of 62 Conclusions and Decisions, of which the following 11 Conclusions and one Decision relate to the work and areas of interest of RASMAG:

List of Conclusions

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| Conclusion 16/2 | – | Funding arrangements for regional airspace safety monitoring |
| Conclusion 16/3 | – | Large Height Deviations – Western Pacific/South China Sea area |
| Conclusion 16/4 | – | Traffic Sample Data Collection |
| Conclusion 16/5 | – | Non-implementation of reduced separation unless compliant with Annex 11 |
| Conclusion 16/6 | – | Non-provision of safety related data by States |
| Conclusion 16/12 | – | Implementation of 30/30 NM Separation Minima |
| Conclusion 16/18 | – | Assistance to States to develop safety management systems |
| Conclusion 16/19 | – | Study of States' preparedness to implement safety management systems |

- Conclusion 16/20 – Guidance Material for End-to-End Safety and Performance Monitoring of Air Traffic Service (ATS) Data Link Systems in the Asia/Pacific Region
- Conclusion 16/57 – Workshop on Fuel Savings Measures
- Conclusion 16/62 – State focal point for safety-related activities

List of Decision

- Decision 16/1 – Safety Monitoring Agency (SMA)

3. ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

- a) review the Extract from the Report of APANPIRG/16 attached to this paper;
- b) note the APANPIRG/16 Conclusions and Decision of relevance to RASMAG; and
- c) identify matters and RASMAG actions arising from the Report of APANPIRG/16.

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Extract from the Report of APANPIRG/16
(Bangkok, 22-26 August 2005) in relation to RASMAG

Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring Advisory (RASMAG)

2.1.1 The meeting recalled that the establishment of RASMAG resulted from the initiatives of APANPIRG under Decision 14/48 in addressing the inclusion by ICAO of safety management provisions in Annex 11 -*Air Traffic Service* and the extensive implementation of reduced separation applications. The RASMAG/2 meeting was held in October 2004 and RASMAG/3 in June 2005, and a 3-day ATS Safety Management Seminar was conducted in conjunction with RASMAG/3.

APANPIRG/15 Review

2.1.2 In reviewing the work of APANPIRG/15 (August 2004), RASMAG/2 noted APANPIRG Decision 15/5 to adopt the term safety monitoring agency (SMA) for safety monitoring of horizontal separation applications. Upon reviewing Decision 15/5, RASMAG/2 identified a need to amend the wording. Accordingly, the meeting adopted the following Decision:

Decision 16/1 – Safety Monitoring Agency (SMA)

That, the term Safety Monitoring Agency (SMA) be used to describe an organization approved by regional agreement to provide airspace safety monitoring and implementation services for international airspace in the Asia/Pacific region for implementation and operation of reduced horizontal separation.

Funding arrangements for regional airspace safety monitoring

2.1.3 The meeting noted the emphasis placed by RASMAG/3 on addressing how States could best organize and finance the safety monitoring services necessary for the international airspaces in the region, such as for the application of RVSM and reduced horizontal separation. The meeting further observed that the expertise required for safety monitoring activities was not readily available in each State, requiring States to collaborate in the provision of safety services and to work towards establishing suitable mechanisms for the funding of multinational infrastructure and services.

2.1.4 In discussing experiences in establishing safety monitoring services on a regional basis, it was observed that progress was being made to provide for CRA services for the Bay of Bengal. The meeting was advised that the funding model developed for the CRA had limited applicability and was designed specifically to meet an urgent need to engage highly specialized expertise required to perform the service on behalf of the participating States as the ADS/CPDLC operational trials had already commenced in February 2004.

2.1.5 The meeting was advised by Thailand that MAAR would be willing to accept the responsibility of additional safety management tasks in the areas they are currently appointed as RMA, specifically in the role of an organization approved by regional agreement to provide airspace safety services in international airspace in the Asia/Pacific Region for implementation and operation of reduced horizontal separation. Noting that Thailand would need the support of other States in financing any such expansion, Thailand was urged to develop its proposal further.

2.1.6 It was noted that the United States had informed ISPACG/19 that the FAA would discontinue funding of the ISPACG CRA in September 2005 and other funding arrangements would be necessary. The Secretariat also drew attention to the serious concerns that had been expressed recently by ICAO in respect of the non-availability of RVSM safety monitoring services in the Middle East (MID) Region. This situation in the MID Region had led the Secretary General of ICAO to notify MID States, via State Letter, that unless a concrete action plan was developed by affected States, the withdrawal of RVSM operations from the MID Region would be considered by ICAO. Subsequent actions by MID States had now averted this scenario.

2.1.7 Notwithstanding the difficulties involved, the meeting recognized the urgent need to develop feasible and sustainable funding solutions for regional safety monitoring so that on-going initiatives to carry out trials and to implement CNS/ATM systems in Asia/Pacific would not be delayed and that safety and efficiency were not compromised. Recalling that APANPIRG's CNS/ATM technical experts had previously found it difficult to resolve the complex legal, financial and organizational issues involved in establishing a regional safety monitoring agency, the meeting considered that this matter should be addressed by States' experts in these specialist fields.

2.1.8 In light of the foregoing, the meeting agreed to the following Conclusion:

Conclusion 16/2 – Funding arrangements for regional airspace safety monitoring

That, a study group be convened to develop a feasible and sustainable proposal to equip States to organize and finance necessary safety monitoring mechanisms for the provision of safety services for the international airspaces in the Asia/Pacific region and that States be represented at that meeting by their appropriate legal, financial and organizational experts who would be best equipped and empowered to resolve any difficulties. The study group should report to RASMAG not later than the end of June 2006.

Report of Australia's RMA activities

2.1.9 Australia reported that, for RVSM operations, overall assessed risk during 2004 did not meet the Target Level of Safety (TLS). The operational errors recorded in the 12 month period to December 31, 2004 resulted in an estimate of risk due to operational errors that exceeded the TLS in both Australian domestic RVSM airspace and Indian Oceanic RVSM airspace.

2.1.10 Australia confirmed to RASMAG/3 that although the TLS had been exceeded in the Australian FIRs during 2004, an inspection of the operational error data indicated that this was a direct consequence of three or four large height deviations (LHD - vertical excursion of 300 ft or more). Airservices Australia had investigated the circumstances surrounding these incidents by formal process, with the result that specific recommendations and actions had been identified and were being implemented in an effort to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents occurring in the future.

2.1.11 The meeting was informed that since RASMAG/3, a follow up safety assessment using data post December 2004 had been completed by Airservices Australia. The follow up safety assessment results satisfied the TLS and this was expected to be maintained.

Report of PARMO's RMA activities

2.1.12 The PARMO briefed RASMAG/3 in respect of their activities and presented their quarterly report for review by the meeting. The report detailed safety monitoring outcomes for the Pacific RVSM airspace over the first quarter of 2005. RASMAG/3 was advised that while most States involved had provided the necessary data to enable suitable safety analysis, some States had not provided any data. RASMAG/3 noted with concern the lack of routine provision of LHD reports from some States (including 'NIL' reports) and the fact that 2 States had not reported any data since April 2004.

2.1.13 PARMO informed RASMAG/3 that the analysis indicated that the overall RVSM vertical collision risk for the Pacific was approximately 67 percent below the TLS.

Report of MAAR's RMA activities

Bay of Bengal

2.1.14 MAAR presented a report to RASMAG/3 on their review of airspace safety for the RVSM implementation in the Bay of Bengal (BOB) area. MAAR noted that there were a number of instances where some States had not provided the required data for analysis. However, MAAR considered that the lack of data, while of note, did not impact significantly on the review in a statistical sense. MAAR reported that the Bay of Bengal airspace overall risk satisfied the TLS.

Western Pacific/South China Sea (WPAC/SCS)

2.1.15 MAAR informed RASMAG/3 that in the case of the WPAC/SCS airspace there were significant issues regarding the lack of data provision by States which directly impacted on the level of confidence that could be placed in the results of the safety assessment.

2.1.16 The WPAC/SCS review showed an increase in LHD since 2003, and MAAR noted that 85 percent of the reports related to issues with ATC-unit to ATC-unit transfer/transition messages. MAAR reported that the overall risk for the WPAC/SCS area was provisionally assessed as 4.9×10^{-9} , compared to the required TLS of 5×10^{-9} fatal accidents per flight hour. MAAR was significantly concerned that the TLS may have been exceeded given the calculated high risk value and the fact that there was a significant amount of data unavailable from some States.

2.1.17 In considering the information provided by MAAR in respect of the LHDs occurring in the WPAC/SCS area, the meeting agreed with the strong concern that had been expressed by MAAR, RASMAG/3 and the ATM/AIS/SAR/SG/15 and agreed to the following Conclusion:

Conclusion 16/3 – Large Height Deviations – Western Pacific/South China Sea area

That, in noting the prevalence of RVSM large height deviation occurrences in the Western Pacific/South China Sea area, the Regional Office draw the attention of all States concerned to identify and put in place remedial actions to mitigate such significant errors on an urgent basis.

What is meant by a Target Level of Safety (TLS)?

2.1.18 In view of the fact that the TLS had been exceeded in areas under the jurisdiction of the Australian RMA and in the WPAC/SCS area as reported by MAAR, RASMAG/3 considered the question of what the term TLS actually meant and the action to be taken if the outcomes of airspace safety monitoring determined that the TLS had been exceeded.

2.1.19 RASMAG/3 reviewed references in Annex 11, the *Air Traffic Services Planning Manual* (Doc 9426) and the *Manual on Airspace Planning Methodology for the Determination of Separation Minima* (Doc 9689) in this respect, noting guidance in respect to the derivation and application of TLS.

2.1.20 Accordingly, RASMAG/3 considered that a single event, in which airspace safety monitoring identified that the TLS had been exceeded, was not sufficient cause to cease the application of the separation minimum. However, it would be important to continue closely monitoring and re-assessing the safety level on a regular basis to ensure that there was not an unsafe trend. RASMAG/3 recognized the importance of providing guidance to States in respect of the TLS issues discussed above and agreed to add an item to the RASMAG Task List in this regard, for future action.

Annual December Traffic Sampling Requirements

2.1.21 In considering the requirements for routine safety assessments, RASMAG/2 agreed that an annual provision by States of traffic sample data as well as LHD and Gross Navigational Error (GNE) reports was sufficient for vertical and horizontal analysis. RASMAG/2 agreed that as the month of December routinely experienced high traffic levels, this should be adopted as the standard sample period for traffic sample data collection, commencing from December 2005.

2.1.22 Data should be sampled and recorded in accordance with the requirements, as amended from time to time, of regional safety monitoring agencies, including RMAs, during December every year and as required for specific purposes. In endorsing the use of a standardized approach to the sampling of vertical and horizontal traffic data, the meeting drafted the following Conclusion:

Conclusion 16/4 – Traffic Sample Data Collection

That, States be advised by the Regional Office that December every year had been adopted for the routine collection of 30 days of traffic sample data to satisfy airspace safety monitoring requirements.

Safety assessment for RNP10 Operations in the SCS area

2.1.23 RASMAG/3 recalled that a safety analysis had been carried out by Airservices Australia prior to the implementation in November 2001 of the revised South China Sea route structure based on RNP 10. The safety assessment results were below the required TLS of 5×10^{-9} fatal accidents per flight hour and, accordingly, the SCS route network was implemented.

2.1.24 At subsequent reviews by the SCS/TF/7 (January 2002) and SCS/TF/8 (December 2002), it was agreed that a further safety assessment for RNP 10 operations in the revised South China Sea ATS route structure based on the actual traffic movement should be conducted. Accordingly, SEACG/11 (May 2004) agreed to update the safety assessment and also noted that RASMAG/1 had identified a need for a safety monitoring group to be

responsible for safety assessment activities, and that there would be a need to designate such a safety organization for the SCS area.

2.1.25 SEACG/12 (May 2005) noted the delays in updating the safety assessment, acknowledging that as no updated safety assessment had been undertaken since before the implementation of the route system in November 2001, a review of the safety assessment was long overdue. SEACG/12 noted the very limited number of parties that could undertake this complex assessment work and requested the assistance of RASMAG in solving the issue.

2.1.26 RASMAG/3 agreed that, with three parties Australia, Japan and Thailand (MAAR) potentially able to undertake the services on behalf of affected States, it was likely that the next RASMAG meeting scheduled in October 2005 would be in a position to be updated as to the capabilities of each party and make decisions accordingly.

2.1.27 The Regional Office noted that the selection of a person or agency that was able to conduct the safety assessment was step one of a two step process. The second step required the provision of suitable data on which to base the safety assessment and this would require affected South China Sea States to undertake traffic sample data collection in accordance with the parameters specified by the party that would be completing the safety assessment work. Although the safety assessment was already long overdue, the meeting considered that it was appropriate that RASMAG be involved in the process and, as the selection of the party to undertake the safety assessment would be addressed at the October meeting of RASMAG, collection of suitable traffic sample data could be accomplished in December in accordance with the standardized sampling period established by RASMAG.

Delay to the Review of FLOS in the WPAC/SCS Area

2.1.28 The meeting was informed that during the review by RVSM/TF/22 (September 2004) of the regional flight level orientation schemes (FLOS) issues, States agreed to a work programme aimed at reviewing and amending the modified single alternate FLOS presently in use in the WPAC/SCS areas. This became necessary due to difficulties being experienced with transition procedures at the interface with the modified single alternate FLOS arrangements in use in the WPAC/SCS area after implementation of RVSM in the Bay of Bengal and Beyond area in November 2003 using a single alternate FLOS

2.1.29 In spite of frequent reminders by MAAR and a State letter issued by the Regional Office, several States responsible for significant portions of the airspace in the WPAC/SCS area failed to submit the required data in time for MAAR to complete the safety assessment in time for the FLOS review meeting scheduled April 2005. In the absence of the MAAR safety assessment, no change to the existing FLOS arrangements could be authorized and the April 2005 FLOS review meeting was postponed. The earliest date at which the meeting could be scheduled was April 2006.

2.1.30 RASMAG/3 recognized that the non provision of safety data by some States and consequent delay to completing the safety assessment would lead to a deferment of at least 12 months in the implementation of any proposed changes to the SCS FLOS.

2.1.31 In recalling the large number of LHDs occurring in the WPAC/SCS, the meeting expressed very strong concerns that arrangements agreed at RVSM/TF/22 were expected to assist in reducing the numbers of LHDs and therefore should be progressed with the minimum of delay.

Non Submission by States of Safety Related Data

2.1.32 RASMAG/2 (October 2004) was concerned that some States had failed to fulfill their obligations towards ICAO safety requirements for ongoing operation of RVSM, noting a number of disturbing issues that had been identified by MAAR and PARMO that required urgent follow up:

- a) missing traffic sample data;
- b) missing large height deviation reports;
- c) incomplete and non-reporting of State RVSM approvals registry data; and
- d) incomplete information on follow-up monitoring of aircraft height-keeping performance in accordance with the minimum monitoring requirements.

2.1.33 On the recommendation of RASMAG/2, the Regional Office issued a letter during early December 2004 to 13 States of the Asia/Pacific Region who had not submitted data required to MAAR and PARMO, and requested immediate submission of safety data. Whilst many States provided safety data in response to the letter, some States have still not provided data.

2.1.34 In accordance with the concerns raised by RASMAG/2 in respect of the non provision of data by States, the Regional Office had presented a discussion paper during the 41st Conference of the Director Generals of Civil Aviation of the Asia/Pacific Region held in Hong Kong, China during November 2004. In respect of this discussion paper, RASMAG/3 noted that the Report of the 41st DGCA's Conference recorded the concerns that had been raised by RASMAG under Action Item 41/6:

DGCA Action Item 41/6

Recognizing the ICAO provisions on implementing Safety Management Systems, the Conference urged all Administrations in the Asia/Pacific Region to fully support the APANPIRG Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring Advisory Group (RASMAG)

Action on Safety Deficiencies

2.1.35 The Regional Office informed RASMAG/3 that the follow up actions continually undertaken by the Regional Office and regional RMAs in an effort to ensure States provided suitable safety data in respect of their safety monitoring responsibilities under Annex 11 were excessive and could not be sustained.

2.1.36 RASMAG/3 had also expressed significant concern in respect of the non-provision of data, drafting the following statement for consideration by APANPIRG/16:

RASMAG is aware that despite efforts to encourage States to provide data to enable the assessment of mandated safety targets for the implementation of reduced separation minima, some States have not met their responsibilities.

RASMAG considers that the failure of some States to provide monitoring data as required in accordance with Annex 11 provisions and Regional Supplementary Procedures (Doc 7030), has led to an inability to update

required safety assessments. This leads to a lack of confidence in the safety of the operating system, in particular with respect to reduced separation applications i.e. an inability to demonstrate whether target levels of safety are being achieved.

2.1.37 The meeting considered the draft conclusions proposed by RASMAG in this respect and agreed to the following:

Conclusion 16/5 – No implementation of reduced separation unless compliant with Annex 11

That, recognizing that some States had not adequately complied with safety management provisions, the Regional Office advise States of the Asia/Pacific Region that further regional implementation of reduced separation minima should only proceed in circumstances where implementing States can demonstrate an ability to comply with Annex 11, Chapter 2, safety management provisions for the continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the safety level achieved.

Conclusion 16/6 – Non Provision of safety related data by States

That the Regional Office advise that States not providing safety related data to approved regional safety monitoring agencies, including RMAs, in accordance with the requirements of safety monitoring agencies will be included in the APANPIRG List of Deficiencies in the ATM/AIS/SAR fields.

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Implementation of 30 NM Lateral and Longitudinal Separation

2.1.93 On 20 January 2005, following satisfactory completion of the safety review, 30 NM lateral and 30 NM longitudinal separation minima (30/30) based on RNP 4 and ADS-C were introduced by the States concerned across the Honiara FIR (Solomon Islands); Nauru FIR (Republic of Nauru); and the Tasman Sea area, which includes portions of the Brisbane FIR (Australia); Nadi FIR (Fiji); and Auckland FIR (New Zealand). ATM/AIS/SAR/SG/15 was informed of the planning and implementation activities for 30/30 that had been carried out by the Informal South Pacific ATS Coordination Group (ISPACG) through its 30/30 Working Group.

2.1.96 In putting into effect the relevant ICAO SARPs and guidance material, there were important lessons to be learnt from the methodology and implementation planning processes developed by ISPACG, especially in regard to the safety management practices adopted. In light of the foregoing, APANPIRG/16 adopted the following Conclusion:

Conclusion 16/12 – Implementation of 30/30 NM Separation Minima

That, recognizing the comprehensive planning and implementation processes, especially in regard to safety management practices, adopted by ISPACG to implement 30 NM lateral and 30 NM longitudinal separation minima in specific airspace in the Pacific Region, States be advised by letter from the Regional Office to use this as a model in implementing reduced separation applications.

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South-East Asia - ATS Safety Management SIP

2.1.111 The meeting was informed regarding a SIP approved by the Council of ICAO that had been undertaken by the Regional Office during August 2005 to Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Viet Nam, with a focus on ATS safety management. A similar SIP conducted in 2004 had covered a number of States in the Bay of Bengal area and included consideration of operational safety matters.

2.1.112 The main objective of the SIP was to ensure that all concerned States had established appropriate mechanisms to ensure the safe implementation and operation of RVSM and reduced horizontal separation in accordance with Annex 11 provisions, and to assist States as necessary to draw up an action plan with a view to meeting their obligations thereto.

2.1.113 The mission, in its discussions with the States concerned, noted that the ICAO recommended safety management systems had not been fully implemented by any of the four States visited and they were at various stages of developing their strategy and implementing changes to their existing safety management practices. The mission considered that, had systematic and appropriate safety programmes been in place, significant safety benefits would have been achieved. However, in most cases, the State civil aviation authorities lacked funding, human resources and expertise to develop and operate ICAO compliant safety management systems.

2.1.114 There was in general, a need for close cooperation between non-government ATS providers and State civil aviation authorities to combine their resources and work closely together to put in place common safety management systems. In all the States, the civil aviation regulations required amending and these were at various stages of development. None of the States had met the ICAO requirement to establish acceptable levels of safety for the provision of ATS within airspace and at aerodromes since the applicability date of 27 November 2003. To achieve this, the States would require further guidance and assistance. In this regard, a lack of published ICAO guidance material was making it difficult for States to overcome this problem as they were required to follow ICAO provisions and guidance. Some States had taken action to contact other administrations to seek assistance.

2.1.115 The SIP mission reported that the pending USOAP audits were a strong motivation to progress this matter and all States were keen to demonstrate that they had established ICAO compliant safety management programmes. The situation would be improved if a concerted effort were made to provide more training and information through ICAO workshops and seminars. Also, States who have the expertise and operate ICAO compliant safety management systems should be encouraged to consider ways to provide assistance to those States with the greatest need. This matter should be considered in depth by the APANPIRG contributory bodies.

2.1.116 In light of the above, the following conclusions were formulated:

Conclusion 16/18 — Assistance to States to develop safety management systems

That, recognizing that many States in the Asia/Pacific Region require assistance to implement safety management programmes in accordance with Annex 11, States with expertise in implementing and operating ICAO compliant safety management systems inform ICAO by end of 2005 of their willingness to participate in a series of seminars/workshops to be arranged by ICAO during 2006-2007 to assist States.

Conclusion 16/19 – Study of States’ preparedness to implement safety management systems

That, a study of States’ preparedness to implement ICAO safety management systems in accordance with Annex 11 be undertaken by the Asia/Pacific Regional Office in conjunction with the ATS coordination groups and RASMAG by the first quarter of 2006, and a plan of action developed to be reported to APANPIRG/17 in September 2006.

Guidance Material for the End-to-End Monitoring of Data Link Systems

2.1.117 The meeting reviewed the *Guidance Material for End-to-End Safety and Performance Monitoring of Air Traffic Service (ATS) Data Link Systems in the Asia/Pacific Region* that had been prepared by RASMAG. The guidance material was intended to provide a set of working principles for ATS data link system performance monitoring that would be applied by all States implementing these systems, as well as providing detailed guidance on the requirements for establishing and operating a FANS-1/A Interoperability/Implementation Team (FIT) and Central Reporting Agency (CRA).

2.1.118 In its review of the material, ATM/AIS/SAR/SG/15 had noted that the draft guidance material had also been reviewed by the FIT-BOB, FIT-SEA, IPACG and ISPACG forums and enhancements had been incorporated based on the experience of these groups. Noting the maturity of the material, ATM/AIS/SAR/SG/15 submitted it to APANPIRG/16 for adoption as regional guidance material.

2.1.119 After reviewing the *Guidance Material* and noting the history of its development under the auspices of RASMAG, including the reviews that had been undertaken by the specialist FIT Groups and ATM/AIS/SAR/SG/15, the meeting adopted the following Conclusion:

Conclusion 16/20 – Guidance Material for End-to-End Safety and Performance Monitoring of Air Traffic Service (ATS) Data Link Systems in the Asia/Pacific Region

That the *Guidance Material for End-to-End Safety and Performance Monitoring of Air Traffic Service (ATS) Data Link Systems in the Asia/Pacific Region*, as shown in **Appendix B** to the Report on Agenda Item 2.1, be circulated as regional guidance material by the Regional Office, in accordance with established procedures.

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The Fuel Crisis and the Urgent Need to Implement Fuel Saving Measures

2.4.16 The meeting noted with concern that in spite of international passenger and cargo traffic growth exceeding expectations, the extraordinarily high level of oil prices threatened the airline industry with yet another year of losses. Consequently, the meeting discussed the areas where ATS Providers and State ATS Authorities could assist in developing more efficient systems that would contribute to airlines internal fuel efficiency strategies.

2.4.18 The meeting was aware that many areas, such as route structure, arrival/departure procedures, air traffic control and airport capacity and layout directly impact the fuel consumption. In 2004, IATA had launched a Fuel Action Campaign, aimed at reviewing every aspect of air transport operations.

2.4.19 The meeting recognized that the steady growth in the global demand for oil has resulted in new records high's in the cost of fuel. This new era of high fuel costs should not be viewed as a single crisis situation but should be treated from a long-term strategic perspective to gain efficiencies on a continuous basis. The meeting also called on states and industries to be forthcoming in supporting this task in terms of aviation expertise and any other assistance that may be required. The meeting therefore called upon aviation and airspace planners to work together proactively rather than reactively so as to maximize the efficiencies of aircraft movement. Furthermore, the meeting called upon ICAO to arrange a workshop that focuses on best practices for achieving fuel efficiencies and accordingly developed the following conclusion.

Conclusion 16/57 – Workshop on Fuel Savings Measures

That, ICAO consider arranging a workshop for Asia/Pacific States in 2006 that focuses on best practices for achieving fuel efficiencies in airport, TMA and en-route environment.

Secretariat Note: *This workshop has been scheduled on 22-24 February 2006, at the Regional Office, Bangkok*

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Safety Contact Point

4.8.15 The meeting recognized that ICAO had placed considerable priority on identifying and rectifying deficiencies and strongly supported the sharing of safety data. With the expansion of the USOAP this year in the Asia/Pacific Region and in view of the persistence of operational deficiencies as reported by IATA, the meeting agreed that a renewed effort should be made by States to take proactive action in tackling such deficiencies. An important step in this process would be to provide to the Regional Office a contact address and person who would respond in a timely and effective manner in addressing operational deficiencies notified by operators. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to the following Conclusion:

Conclusion 16/62 – State focal point for safety-related activities

That, Asia/Pacific States notify to the Regional Office by the first quarter of 2006 a responsible contact officer or position to act as a focal point for safety related activities and in particular for the submission and coordination of ATS incident reports.

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