



大会 — 第 40 届会议

执行委员会

议程项目 13: 审计计划 — 持续监测做法(CMA)

国际民航组织持续监测做法(CMA)审计计划的实施情况

(由国际民航组织理事会提交)

执行摘要

本工作文件提交了自大会第 39 届会议以来关于国际民航组织普遍安全监督审计计划(USOAP)和普遍安保审计计划(USAP)实施和活动的综合进度报告,两者均采用持续监测做法(CMA)。

有关 USOAP CMA 和 USAP CMA 在 2016 年至 2018 年三年期间的活动及发展情况详细信息,分别载于本工作文件的附录 A 和 B 中。

总体而言,两个审计计划的实施都按照目标,符合大会和理事会的指示,并与相关战略目标和本组织业务计划的预期产出保持一致。

行动: 请大会:

- a) 注意关于 USOAP CMA 和 USAP CMA 的实施和活动的进度报告;
- b) 敦促各国继续全面参与 USOAP CMA 和 USAP CMA; 和
- c) 鼓励各国继续支持 USOAP CMA 和 USAP CMA, 包括借调长期专家和参加相关培训课程和研讨会。

战略目标:	本工作文件涉及以下三个战略目标: 安全、空中航行能力和效率、以及安保和简化手续。
财务影响:	文件中提到的活动将根据 2020 年至 2022 年经常方案预算和、或来自预算外捐助的可用资源情况进行。
参考文件:	Doc 10115号文件: 《第十三次空中航行会议(AN-Conf/13)的报告》, 第1及第2号更正, 和第1号补篇 Doc 10082号文件: 《大会第39届会议执行委员会的报告》 Doc 10075号文件: 《大会有效决议》(截至2016年10月6日) Doc 10071号文件: 《大会第39届会议技术委员会的报告》 A40-WP/11: “关于普遍安全监督审计计划(USOAP)持续监测做法(CMA)的演变的报告” A40-WP/32: “关于审查普遍安保监督审计计划持续监测做法(USAP CMA)的范围和方法的报告”

1. 背景

1.1 普遍安全监督审计计划(USOAP)于1999年推出,自2013年1月起向持续监测做法(CMA)过渡,逐步发展为更加信息化、基于风险和注重结果的计划。为了支持 USOAP CMA 的不断演变,国际民航组织大会第39届会议建议国际民航组织对该计划的方法、流程和工具进行审查,让成员国有机会提供用户反馈意见,从而使国际民航组织能够就计划的改进加以规划(参见大会第39届会议—技术委员会报告(Doc 10071号文件))。

1.2 普遍安保审计计划(USAP)于2002年推出,于2013年开始向 USAP CMA 过渡,并于2014年底完成,从2015年起全面实施了新方法,结合持续监测和基于风险两者要素。国际民航组织大会第39届会议(参见大会第A39-18号决议附录E)要求秘书处与成员国协商,审查 USAP 的范围和方法,以确保向成员国提供关于在实地有效实施航空安保措施办法的可靠信息,并确保该方法考虑了以基于风险做法来实施航空安保措施。

1.3 本文件提供了自大会第39届会议以来 USOAP CMA 和 USAP CMA 实施和活动的综合进度报告。关于 USOAP CMA 和 USAP CMA 于2016年至2018年三年期间活动及发展的详细信息见附录A和B。国际民航组织两个审计计划确立的关键领域见附录C和D。

2. 讨论

2.1 USOAP CMA 的实施

2.1.1 附录A概述了2016年至2018年开展的 USOAP CMA 活动,包括36次审计,53次国际民航组织协调验证任务(ICVM),5次国家安全计划实施评估(SSPIA),62项场外验证活动和23次讲习班。还发布了八项强制性信息要求(MIR)。在本报告期间,共有154项 USOAP CMA 活动对各国的有效实施(EI)发生了影响。图表按审计领域和关键要素(CE)提供了总体结果。安全监督系统有效实施率最低的相关审计领域是空中航行服务(ANS)(65.8%)和机场和地面辅助设施(AGA)(61.5%),而有效实施水平最低的关键要素则是合格的技术人员(CE-4)(58%)、监督义务(CE-7)(59.2%)和解决安全问题(CE-8)(53.9%)。关于 CE-4 实施率低这一问题,继续敦促各国采取必要措施,招聘和留住具备所需经验和能力的人员,以建立和实施有效和可持续的安全监督制度。国际民航组织地区办事处和国际民航组织全球航空培训办公室(GAT)可为这些人员提供额外培训。¹ USOAP CMA 活动的展开而需完成更多数量和更复杂的任务依赖于长期和短期借调人员,以便可持续地运行当前的框架、活动和要求。

2.1.2 2016年,国际民航组织出版了新版的 USOAP CMA 规程问题(PQ)以反映国际民航组织规定的修订以及各国和国际民航组织 USOAP 团队提出的反馈意见。于2017年出版了排除与国家安全方案(SSP)具体相关方面的另一版本,这是因为国际民航组织为国家安全方案实施评估制定了具体的规程问题和方法。

¹ 关于技术援助方案的进一步信息,包括国际民航组织在本三年期提供的培训情况,将单独列于 A40-WP/4 号文件,题为“A40-WP/4 号文件下提交的关于国际民航组织技术援助方案报告的信息”,见于 <http://www.icao.int/Meetings/a40/Pages/documentation-reference-documents.aspx> 和国际民航组织2018年培训数字,见于 <https://www.icao.int/training/Documents/GAT-Statistic%20Abstract-%20Report-2018-FINAL-Web.pdf>。

2.1.3 国家安全方案实施评估是作为USOAP CMA活动制定的，旨在处理附件19 — 安全管理第1次修订的推出以及《安全管理手册》(SMM)第四版(Doc 9859号文件)的出版。在筹备阶段(2015年9月至2018年4月)期间，在自愿、保密和成本回收的基础上进行了六个国家安全方案实施评估。2018年6月，出版并使用了一套新的国家安全方案规程问题，其中反映了附件19第1次修订、《安全管理手册》以及整个国家安全方案实施评估筹备阶段的经验教训，并于2018年11月首次在自愿但非保密的基础上进行国家安全方案实施评估时加以使用。

2.1.4 由于各国越来越多地要求国际民航组织确认其在解决其安全缺陷方面取得的进展，从而提高其有效实施(EI)成绩，国际民航组织据此开展了异地核实活动，并推出了新类型的活动以核实各国在处理需要现场审查的规程问题方面所取得的进展。由国际民航组织认定合格的技术专家更积极地参与、并由安全和空中航行监督审计(OAS)科后续在总部对其初步评估予以核实，从而支持了这些活动。

2.1.5 国际民航组织还利用强制性信息要求机制要求八个国家为USOAP CMA的审查和核实提供信息或文件，特别是当内部和/或外部利害攸关方对国家安全监督系统的各个方面提出疑虑时。这八项强制性信息要求中七项已圆满结束。各国若对强制性信息要求没有做出令人满意的回应，可能导致国际民航组织对其发布规程问题调查结果、甚至是重大安全关切(SSC)。

2.1.6 2018年，国际民航组织监测和援助审查委员会(MARB)建立了一项新进程，用于持续监测已解决重大安全关切但缺乏可持续能力建设的国家、以及加强向监测和援助审查委员会提供关于这些国家的信息。

2.1.7 2017年，国际民航组织出版了《安全监督手册》第三版(Doc 9734号文件)的A部分 — 国家安全监督系统的建立和管理，以进一步协助各国建立和实施其安全监督系统。该版本在ICAO-NET(<https://portal.icao.int/icao-net/Pages/Doc9734.aspx>)上提供，推出的最新内容反映了附件19第1次修订的通过、吸取的经验教训和各国及利害攸关方反馈所带来的改进。

2.1.8 在上一个三年期内，国际民航组织举办了三次USOAP CMA标准化培训会议，2016年举办两次，2018年6月举办了一次。这些会议使参与USOAP CMA活动的国际民航组织工作人员能够及时了解计划方法、流程和工具的最新进展和改进，从而在USOAP CMA活动的筹备、实施和报告方面实现更高的效率、成效和标准化。

2.1.9 USOAP CMA 在线框架(OLF(<https://icao.int/usoap>))仍然是国际民航组织监测、评估和报告各国安全监督相关信息和文件、跟踪 CMA 活动和“实时”管理 USOAP CMA 数据的主要平台。这也是电子申报差异(EFOD)模块的主机，其中存储了附件的数字化版本，允许各国通知与国际民航组织规定之间的任何差异。在线框架也是 iSTARS / SPACE 平台中使用的所有监测和监督数据出处。

2.1.10 在线框架的成功使得 USOAP 得以使用从 USOAP 中得出的方法、程序和工具，用于监督世界粮食计划署(WFP)的航空活动。

2.1.11 2017年9月，针对基于风险做法的实施，对其流程和程序彻底进行了侧重审查和更新后，USOAP 在无调查结果下成功完成了 ISO 9001: 2015 标准的过渡审计。2018年实施了新的机制以加强风险管理方法，提高风险缓解的有效性和及时性。国际民航组织通过 USOAP CMA 质量管理体系(QMS)收集的数据表明，对2016年至2018年期间开展的CMA活动提供反馈的国家，总体满意度超过90%。

2.1.12 USOAP 于 2006 年引入了重大安全关切机制。在报告期间，在一个国家发现了新的重大安全关切，而九个国家解决了国际民航组织查明的重大安全关切。截至 2018 年 12 月 31 日，在全球范围共有五个国家尚未解决五项重大安全关切。

2.1.13 在理事会审议了第 39 届大会决议和决定之后，秘书处为 USOAP CMA 结构审查(GEUSR) 成立了一个专家组，对 USOAP CMA 进行独立审查，其中考虑到国际民航组织安全战略的不断演变、各国在实施附件 19 方面取得的进展，特别是国家安全方案要求方面。

2.1.14 GEUSR 专家组制定了 37 项建议，提交理事会并得到理事会批准(C-DEC 214/5), 此后在第十三次空中航行会议(AN-Conf/13)上一致通过。AN-Conf/13 还呼吁国际民航组织加速实施某些 GEUSR 的建议，并在国际民航组织第 40 届大会之前设立一个研究小组，除了落实 USOAP CMA 结构审查专家小组的建议外进一步发展 USOAP CMA，以研究制定相关方法来避免重复工作，提升协同效应，进而增强 USOAP CMA 的效率，同时维持保障措施，保证该方案实施的独立性、普遍性、标准化和全球认可度。根据国际民航组织理事会的指示，秘书处制定了一项行动计划，以处理 GEUSR 的建议，并考虑到理事会对某些内容部分的审慎态度。有关 USOAP CMA 演变，包括 GEUSR 的建议、其行动计划、以及根据第 13 次空中航行会议成果应采取的步骤，和为支持实施两个小组的意见应作的组织结构性改进，见一份单独就此专题的工作文件(参见 A40-WP/11 号文件)。

2.2 USAP CMA 的实施

2.2.1 与第二轮审计相比，USAP CMA 最重要的变化之一就是能够获取与涉及监督系统所有相关关键要素有关标准的具体数据。这使得 USAP CMA 能够针对需要进行能力建设的领域提供详细的国家、地区和全球评估。第二个主要变化则是对与预防性安保措施相关各项标准的运行实施与要求分别记录，从而使 USAP CMA 能够准确地报告各国、地区和全球层面的运行合规性。

2.2.2 与第二轮审计相比，USAP CMA 的另一个重大变化是能够更新审计结果以反映各国的改进，或在现有结果不再准确体现当地现实时能够反映情况。为此，USAP CMA 现已开始根据风险评估及其具体需求对各国进行有针对性的审计。

2.2.3 在 USAP CMA 的前三年，对该方法进行了多项润饰和改进，使其更好地配合成员国的需求并提高审计结果的准确性。这些改进包括：

- a) 从以活动为核心的做法、包括对预定航班和运行的观测，转变为以审计领域为核心的做法，并使得评估的具体航班和运行的可预测性降低；和
- b) 考虑到审计期间评估的运行观测与相关培训和质量控制活动之间的相互关系。

2.2.4 该审计计划面临的具体挑战是附件17 —《保安 — 保护国际民用航空免遭非法干扰行为》以及附件9 — 简化手续中的安保相关标准修订频繁。随着每次附件新修订的引入，USAP-CMA 规程问题就需要仔细修改，以确保审计员能够全面处理所有新的和经修订的标准。秘书处就每套新开发的规程问题与USAP秘书处研究组(SSG)进行了磋商。规程问题的目标是无论国家采用法规式或基于风险和强调结果的做法，均能确保对保证标准可持续实施的所有必要方面加以涵盖。这确保了无论其范围如何，所有制度都得到同等评估。

2.2.5 评估和内部审计办公室 (EAO)在其2018年航空保安审计科内部审计 (IA / 2018/4) 中强调了USAP面临的另外两个挑战。其一是, 2016年和2017年超过30%的已规划的审计未能得以开展, 主要是因为成员国要求推迟审计。在这方面, 秘书处时常告诫各国避免推迟已规划的审计, 且相关案文将列入关于USAP的大会决议。第二个问题是五个USAP-CMA审计团队负责人中有两个是借调人员。各国还应考虑如何最好地将审计计划中的所有团队负责人职位正常化。

2.2.6 审计计划的另一个进一步关切涉及使用相关规程问题对经审计标准进行解释的标准化。为了处理这一问题, 在2017年修订了审计员培训课程, 纳入了一个关于标准解释的详细模块, 并于每次审计的准备日提供复训。此外, 在规程问题中还定期增加供审计员使用的附加说明和指导, 以帮助确保审计过程中的一致性。最后, 为帮助确保标准化, 在报告技术审查进程中也予以不断注意。在这方面, USAP秘书处研究组正在更加密切地探讨这一题目, 以查明进一步加强该计划的其他战略。

2.2.7 根据第二次高级别航空安保会议 (HLCAS/2) 的建议, 秘书处协同USAP秘书处研究组完成了全面和基本的USAP CMA审查。该项审查、其建议、为处理这些建议而制定的行动计划、以及基于HLCAS/2结果的USAP CMA演变等其他相关信息, 均在一份单独的专门工作文件中加以处理 (参见A40-WP/32号文件)。经批准的建议将在今后三年期实施。

2.2.8 附录B概述了在报告期间(2016年1月1日至2018年12月31日)开展的USAP-CMA活动, 包括审计、核实任务、区域研讨会和审计员培训课程等。在该报告期间, 共有79次USAP-CMA活动, 对国家监督指标发挥了影响。这些图表提供了总体监督和合规指标。有效实施水平最低的关键要素是CE-7, 质量控制义务 (54.98%) 和CE-8, 解决安保关切 (63.31%), 而合规水平最低的审计领域则是质量控制职能 (70.16%) 和货物、餐饮和邮件安保 (74.79%)。

2.2.9 2010年为USAP审计引入了重大安保关切机制, 但一些国家在该机制推出前, 已于第二轮审计中接受了审计。对其中许多国家已给予优先进行USAP-CMA审计的考虑。据此, 已查明了许多重大安保关切。在本报告所述期间, 在五个国家查明了新的重大安保关切, 有三个国家则进而解决了其重大安保关切。截至2018年12月31日, 全球共有五个国家仍未解决13项重大安保关切。

3. 结论

3.1 国际民航组织的安全和安保审计计划在成员国的航空安全和安保监督能力及其系统的可持续性进行客观和独立评估方面, 发挥着至关重要的作用。审计计划还以建议的形式提供急需的援助, 以指导各国努力改进安全和安保系统。在这方面, 各国继续参与审计计划彰显了全球航空界致力继续改进和充分落实国际民航组织的标准。

3.2 除了向各国提供直接援助外, USAP CMA和USAP CMA还向其他国家和组织提供重要信息, 以帮助确定援助活动和制定航空政策。此外, 审计计划继续在查明和减缓对国际民用航空带来风险的重大缺陷方面发挥核心作用。尽管如此, 两个审计计划的结果都表明, 一些国家在履行《国家民用航空公约》及其附件规定的义务方面仍有困难, 需要国际民航组织及其合作伙伴继续提供监测和协助。

APPENDIX A
DETAILED INFORMATION ON USOAP CMA ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE TRIENNIUM 2016 TO 2018

1. Table 1 below provides detailed information on USOAP CMA activities and developments in the triennium 2016 to 2018. All activity results, except those for the SSPIAs, are available on the USOAP CMA online framework at: <https://www.icao.int/usoap>.

Activity	Conducted	Comments
1. On-site USOAP CMA Activities		
1.1	<i>USOAP CMA Audits</i>	
Determine States' capabilities for safety oversight by assessing the effective implementation of the critical elements of a State safety oversight system.	<p>All audits are listed in chronological order.</p> <p>2016: 12 audits were conducted in the following: Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Kuwait, Ukraine, Malaysia, Senegal, Morocco, Tajikistan, Honduras, Israel, Cambodia and New Zealand.</p> <p>2017: 11 audits were conducted in the following: Ukraine, Australia, Uzbekistan, South Africa, Colombia, Germany, Honduras, Lebanon, Bahamas, India and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).</p> <p>2018: 13 audits were conducted in the following: Denmark, Brazil, Bulgaria, Botswana, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Gambia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Poland, Qatar, Mauritania, Cambodia and Myanmar.</p>	Total number of audits conducted during the triennium: 36

Activity	Conducted	Comments
1.2	<i>ICAO Coordinated Validation Missions (ICVMs)</i>	
	<p>Assess the status of corrective actions taken by the State to address previously identified findings and determine whether or not the State has satisfactorily resolved deficiencies, including any Significant Safety Concerns (SSCs).</p>	<p>All ICVMS are listed in chronological order.</p> <p>2016: 17 ICVMS were conducted in the following: Uruguay, Zambia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Lebanon, Togo, Jamaica, Viet Nam, Paraguay, Bolivia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Sweden, Egypt, Cyprus, Guyana, Guinea and Equatorial Guinea</p> <p>2017: 21 ICVMS were conducted in the following: Equatorial Guinea (cost-recovery), Costa Rica, France, Angola, Chile, United Republic of Tanzania, Jordan, Philippines, Trinidad and Tobago, Nepal, Rwanda, Mongolia, Finland, Bangladesh, Panama, Thailand, Australia, Indonesia, Burkina Faso, Kuwait, and Portugal.</p> <p>2018: 15 ICVMS were conducted in the following: Madagascar, Guatemala, Papua New Guinea, Georgia, Seychelles, Bahrain, Norway, Cabo Verde, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Peru, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of the Congo, India and Malawi.</p>
1.3	<i>State Safety Programme Implementation Assessments (SSPIA)</i>	
	<p>Assess the progress made by States in SSP implementation.</p>	<p>All SSPIAs are listed in chronological order.</p> <p>A total of 5 SSPIAs were conducted in this triennium: United Arab Emirates¹, France¹, China¹, Singapore¹ and Finland².</p> <p>¹The SSPIAs conducted in these States were on a confidential, voluntary and cost-recovery basis. Results were only made available to the States concerned.</p> <p>²This SSPIA was the first one to be performed on a voluntary and non-confidential basis.</p>

Activity	Conducted	Comments
2. Off-site USOAP CMA Activities		
2.1 <i>Off-site Validation Activities</i>		
<p>Assess the status of corrective actions taken by the State to address previously identified findings and determine whether or not the State has satisfactorily resolved deficiencies, without conducting an ICVM.</p>	<p>All off-site validation activities are listed in chronological order.</p> <p>2016: 19 off-site validations were conducted in the following: Namibia, Nepal, Germany, Vanuatu, France, Hungary, Paraguay, Indonesia, Australia, Finland, Dominican Republic, Liberia, Togo, Jamaica, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Ireland, Serbia and Congo.</p> <p>2017: 23 off-site validations were conducted in the following: Malta, Gabon, Belgium, United Republic of Tanzania, Hungary, Dominican Republic, Chad, Denmark, Lithuania, Equatorial Guinea, Benin, Turkey, Philippines, Mozambique, Fiji, Nicaragua, Chad, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, Norway, Nicaragua, Bulgaria and Italy.</p> <p>2018: 20 off-site validations were conducted in the following: Rwanda, South Africa, Uruguay, Chile, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Ethiopia¹, Mozambique, Malta¹, Slovenia, Bolivia, Senegal, Estonia¹, Greece, Spain, Papua New Guinea, Hungary</p>	<p>Total number of off-site validation activities conducted during the triennium: 62</p> <p>¹ Two off-site validation activities were conducted each for Estonia, Ethiopia and Malta.</p>
2.2 <i>Mandatory Information Requests (MIRs)</i>		
<p>Request information or documentation needed for USOAP CMA assessment and validation.</p>	<p>All MIRs issued are listed in chronological order.</p> <p>2016: 3 MIRs were issued to Vanuatu, Liberia and Thailand.</p> <p>2017: 2 MIRs were issued to Senegal and Bolivia.</p> <p>2018: 3 MIRs were issued to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, EASA and the Central African Republic.</p>	<p>Total number of MIRs issued during the triennium: 8</p>

Activity	Conducted	Comments
3. Training		
3.1	<i>Training of Auditor and Subject Matter Expert Nominees</i>	
	<p>Manage the USOAP CMA computer-based training (CBT) as a tool for the selection and training of potential auditors and subject matter experts of the USOAP CMA.</p> <p>63 nominees qualified for training of auditors and subject matter experts and were enrolled in the USOAP CMA CBT in 2016 to 2018.</p> <p>Since the launch of the CBT in 2011, 435 participants from 73 States and 8 international/regional organizations have completed the CBT.</p> <p>The USOAP CMA roster now includes a total of 114 qualified USOAP auditors.</p>	<p>States and recognized organizations are invited to nominate experts for secondment to ICAO as auditors and subject matter experts, on a long- or short-term basis, in support of the USOAP CMA.</p> <p>During the 2016 – 2018 triennium, France, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Singapore provided long-term secondments to support the USOAP CMA.</p>
3.2	<i>Familiarization Training for State Employees</i>	
	<p>Provide training to States' National Continuous Monitoring Coordinators (NCCMs) and familiarize States' safety oversight employees with USOAP CMA methodology and activities.</p> <p>Since the launch of the CBT in 2011, 1,336 participants from 116 States and 15 international/regional organizations have taken the CBT for NCCM and familiarization training.</p>	<p>NCCM and familiarization training allows States to enhance the knowledge and competency of their aviation safety personnel regarding USOAP CMA, particularly in preparing for an upcoming USOAP CMA activity.</p>

	Activity	Conducted	Comments
3.3	Workshops		
	Assist States in their participation in USOAP CMA and, particularly, preparation for an upcoming USOAP CMA activity.	<p>In the triennium 2016 – 2018, 23 workshops were conducted, with 719 participants from 102 States and 7 international/regional organizations.</p> <p>8 regional workshops were budgeted and conducted by ICAO, covering all 7 Regional Offices (APAC was visited twice).</p> <p>15 workshops were conducted on a cost-recovery basis in the following (listed in chronological order): Turkey; Qatar; Jordan; Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority (ECCAA); Republic of Korea¹; Kenya, Guyana, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), South Africa, and Canada.</p>	¹ Three cost-recovery workshops were held in the Republic of Korea.

GRAPHIC SUMMARY

2. Figures A-1 and A-2 provide a graphic summary of the USOAP CMA status at the global level by audit area and by Critical Element, respectively.
3. Since the inception of USOAP, 185 Member States have received a USOAP audit. The current average EI score at the global level is 66.30 per cent. Out of the 185 audited Member States, 129 have an EI of 60 per cent or higher.




Figure A-1. Average global level of effective implementation (EI) by Audit Area




Figure A-2. Average global level of effective implementation (EI) by Critical Element

APPENDIX B

DETAILED INFORMATION ON USAP-CMA ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TRIENNIUM 2016 TO 2018

1. The table below provides details on the USAPCMA activities and developments from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2018.

Activity	Conducted	Comments
1. USAP CMA Activities		
1.1 <i>USAP CMA Audits</i>		
Determine States' capabilities for security oversight by assessing the effective implementation of the critical elements of a State's aviation security and oversight systems.	<p>2016: 24 audits (3 documentation-based) were conducted in 2016: Albania, Australia, Bahamas, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Congo, Cyprus*, Estonia*, Guyana, Hungary*, Niger, Oman, Paraguay, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Suriname, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)</p> <p>2017: 26 audits (7 documentation-based) were conducted in 2017: Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chad, China*, Colombia, Croatia*, Czechia*, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia†, Italy*, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia*, Mexico, Poland*, Qatar, Sao Tome and Principe†, Slovakia*, Thailand, Togo, Uganda and Zambia</p> <p>2018: 29 audits (4 documentation-based) were conducted in 2018: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon†, Chile, Denmark*, Djibouti, Gambia, Germany*, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras†, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic,</p>	Audits include documentation-based audits, as well as full and limited scope on-site audits.

* Documentation-based audit

† Limited scope audit

Activity		Conducted	Comments
		Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands*, Philippines, Romania*, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal and Turkmenistan.	
1.2	Validation Missions		
	Gather evidence to assist the ICAO SSeC validation committee to determine whether or not the State has satisfactorily mitigated or resolved Significant Security Concerns (SSeCs).	2016: 3 on-site validations missions 2017: 3 on-site validation missions 2018: 1 remote validation mission	
1.3	Other		
	Participate as observers in European Commission (EC) airport inspections and appropriate authority inspections.	2016: One airport inspection 2017: One airport inspection 2018: One appropriate authority inspection	
2. Training			
2.1	Auditor Training Courses		
	Provide training for potential USAP-CMA auditors in all three audit languages.	2 auditor training courses were conducted between 2016 and 2018, resulting in the successful certification of 25 new USAP-CMA auditors and the re-certification of 3 auditors. The USAP-CMA roster now includes a total of 151 certified USAP-CMA auditors.	States and recognized organizations are requested to nominate experts for secondment to ICAO as auditors and subject matter experts, on a long- or short-term basis, in support of the USAP-CMA. During the 2016 – 2018 triennium, France and the United States have provided long-term secondments to support the USAP-CMA.
2.2	Regional Seminars		
	Provide training to States' National Coordinators (NCs) and familiarize States'	Since 2016, 7 regional USAP CMA seminars have been conducted, covering the APAC, ESAF (2), EUR/NAT (2), MID, and WACAF ICAO regions, with	NC and familiarization training allows States to enhance the knowledge and competency of their

Activity	Conducted	Comments
security oversight employees with the USAP-CMA methodology and activities.	a total of 281 participants. Since the launch of the USAP CMA, a total of 653 participants have taken part in this training in all ICAO regions.	aviation security personnel regarding the USAP CMA, particularly for preparing for a scheduled USAP CMA activity. Note: Three additional seminars in the APAC, NACC and SAM Regions planned in 2019.

2. The graphs below provide a summary of the global level of sustainability of a State’s aviation security oversight systems, by Critical Element. This global average is the combined result from the xx USAP-CMA audits conducted to date and the second cycle audit results for the States that have yet to receive a USAP-CMA audit.
3. The current average EI score at the global level is xx.xx per cent. Out of the xx audited Member States, xx have an EI of 65 per cent or higher.

Figure

Figure B-1. Average global level of sustainability of a State’s aviation security oversight systems, by Critical Element

Figure 2

Figure B-2. Average level of compliance by audit area

APPENDIX C

CRITICAL ASPECTS IDENTIFIED BY THE USOAP CMA IN THE TRIENNIUM 2016 TO 2018

This appendix outlines a number of critical deficiencies related to safety oversight and accident/incident investigation, for which USOAP CMA activities have identified that most States continue to face challenges. Additional information is available at the USOAP report 2016-2018 (https://www.icao.int/safety/CMAForum/Documents/USOAP_REPORT_2016-2018.pdf). Solutions available through ICAO to address these challenges are presented in A40-WP/4-EX/1.

1. PRIMARY AVIATION LEGISLATION AND SPECIFIC OPERATING REGULATIONS (LEG)

1.1 More than half of States lack comprehensive and appropriate procedures to timely amend their regulatory schemes and bring them into full accord with the Annexes to the Chicago Convention. A significant number of States that ratified Article 83 *bis* do not have an adequate legal framework for the transfer of functions and duties or its recognition. Other critical deficiencies for States in this area are the identification of differences and significant differences between the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and States' regulations and practices for notification to ICAO and/or publication in the aeronautical information publication (AIP). An important number of States face challenges in granting exemptions supported by an appropriate legal basis or being fully compliant with national regulations and procedures. States also have difficulties in establishing a framework to enable an effective enforcement of primary aviation legislation and specific operating regulations.

2. CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ORG)

2.1 An important number of States have yet to clearly define the functions and responsibilities related to safety oversight and accident and incident investigation aiming at avoiding overlaps and establishing proper coordination between relevant authorities. A significant number of States do not ensure that their civil aviation or accident investigation authorities recruit and retain sufficient qualified technical personnel to perform their functions and responsibilities. Likewise, many States have not effectively provided training to their inspectors and/or investigators. The lack of or insufficient number of qualified inspectors remains the main obstacle to the implementation of an effective State safety oversight system.

3. PERSONNEL LICENSING AND TRAINING (PEL)

3.1 More than half of States have not appropriately implemented a training programme for personnel licensing staff and other technical personnel. In addition, an important number of States have not implemented procedures for granting licences and have not effectively implemented a system for the supervision of training programmes related to the first issuance of licences. Finally, States continue to face challenges in effectively implementing a system for the supervision and control of flight as well as

practical test delivery, which ensures consistency and reliability of testing by the designated flight and practical examiners.

4. AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS (OPS)

4.1 A third of States have not implemented a thoroughly documented air operator certification (AOC) process and/or have not yet established or properly implemented procedures for the issuance of approvals and authorizations contained in the operations specifications associated with the AOC. A significant number of States have not established and implemented a comprehensive surveillance programme to verify that all AOC holders comply, on a continuing basis, with applicable requirements. In similar numbers, States do not verify that foreign operators comply with applicable international requirements and the provision of their AOCs and associated specifications. Almost half of States have not implemented a system to document, record progress and resolution of deficiencies detected from the surveillance of air operators. A significant number of States lack main elements of an effective system to oversee the transport of dangerous goods.

5. AIRWORTHINESS OF AIRCRAFT (AIR)

5.1 Establishing or implementing surveillance programmes for AOC holders and/or approved maintenance organizations continues to be a common deficiency in almost half of States. Likewise, many States have not effectively conducted ongoing surveillance of air operators' reliability programmes and have deficiencies in taking appropriate actions resulting from reliability monitoring. A large number of audited States do not ensure that operations derived-equipment, which are not part of the type certification of aircraft, are appropriately installed and maintained. An important number of States do not have an effective tracking system for deficiencies identified during surveillance activities and their timely resolution. Similarly, many States that have delegated certain safety oversight tasks do not carry out effective surveillance of their performance.

6. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION (AIG)

6.1 More than half of States do not have or have not implemented a comprehensive investigation manual, checklists or associated guidance to provide investigators with detailed, customized and practical procedures to perform all investigation related tasks. A significant number of States lack procedures and guidance for the issuance and recording of safety recommendations as well as for the monitoring of the progress of corresponding safety actions. More than half of States have not established mechanisms to ensure the cooperation between aircraft accident investigators and judicial authorities, while ensuring the separation between the two types of investigations. Finally, a large number of audited States have not established or effectively implemented comprehensive training programmes and training plans.

7. AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES (ANS)

7.1 Many States do not effectively conduct surveillance over the service providers of instrument flight procedure design, search and rescue, cartography and aeronautical information. A significant number of States have not implemented a system to take appropriate and timely actions,

including enforcement measures, to resolve identified safety issues in the aforementioned areas. A similar number of States do not ensure that safety reviews are conducted regularly by the air traffic services providers. More than half of States have not established or implemented a comprehensive training strategy supported by sufficient financial resources, resulting in insufficient training programmes to ensure that the ANS inspectors acquire and maintain the necessary competencies to effectively perform the related safety oversight functions. Only half of States have documented processes to ensure that the inspectors have satisfactorily completed an on-the-job training before being assigned to perform their tasks and responsibilities.

8. **AERODROMES AND GROUND AIDS (AGA)**

8.1 Many States have not established a process for the certification of aerodromes and more than half of States have not yet fully implemented the certification requirements. A significant number of States have not developed or implemented a formal surveillance programme for the continuing supervision of the operations conducted by aerodrome operators. Many States have not established a process to validate the use of aeronautical studies or risk assessments to justify an application for an exemption or exception as well as its continuous need. A large number of audited States do not have a quality system in place to verify the accuracy and compliance of aerodrome data with the regulations and to ensure that the accuracy, integrity and protection requirements for aeronautical data reported by the aerodrome operator are met throughout the data transfer process.

APPENDIX D

CRITICAL AREAS IDENTIFIED BY THE USAP-CMA IN THE TRIENNIUM 2016 TO 2018

This appendix outlines a number of critical deficiencies related to aviation security and oversight systems with which most States continue to face challenges, as identified by USAP-CMA audits. Additional information on these critical areas is available in the annual USAP-CMA Analysis of Audit Results booklet on the USAP secure website. Solutions available through ICAO to address these challenges are presented in A40-WP/4-EX/1.

1. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND THE NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEM (LEG)

1.1 States' national documentation does not always accurately reflect or reference aviation security requirements and measures in effect in audited States, nor does it establish sufficient guidance to ensure the efficient, effective and consistent application of aviation security policies and requirements. Moreover, the lack of qualified national aviation security inspectors, possessing sufficient legal authority and enforcement powers, remains a significant obstacle to the implementation of an effective State aviation security oversight systems. A majority of audited States do not have an appropriate risk assessment methodology or a regularly functioning National Civil Aviation Security Committee.

2. TRAINING OF AVIATION SECURITY PERSONNEL (TRG)

2.1 A large number of audited States do not ensure the development or the implementation of an effective training programme for national aviation security inspectors and almost half of National Civil Aviation Security Training Programmes (NCASTP) lack sufficient detail regarding training requirements for all aviation security personnel. Furthermore, many States have not implemented a system: to ensure that all relevant entities have established training programmes for their staff; to identify training needs; and to ensure that initial, on-the-job and recurrent training is completed as required. A considerable number of audited States have not developed terms and conditions for the certification of aviation security screeners and instructors.

3. QUALITY CONTROL FUNCTIONS (QCF)

3.1 The audit programme has identified that many States have not developed sufficient guidance material, such as audit/inspection checklists and test protocols, for the use of their national aviation security inspectors. In addition, a majority of States do not use an appropriate risk assessment methodology to determine priorities and frequency of national quality control activities. Many operational aspects of aviation security are not effectively and regularly monitored for compliance with national requirements, and many entities with aviation security responsibilities are not systematically subjected to oversight. These deficiencies are compounded by the fact that many audited States fail to keep accurate records and to effectively resolve deficiencies identified through their quality control systems.

4. **AIRPORT OPERATIONS (OPS)**

4.1 A majority of audited States have not implemented a process to ensure that airport security programmes (ASPs) meet the requirements of their National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP). Airport-level coordination and oversight are often ineffective and only less than half of audited States ensure that internal quality control programmes are implemented. Airport personnel identification and vehicle pass systems are another area where deficiencies are frequently identified. A majority of States are also unable to establish minimum detection settings for security screening equipment, including specifications of performance test pieces, and to ensure that regular maintenance and performance testing are consistently and effectively implemented for such equipment.

4.2 With regard to the operational implementation of security measures, frequently identified deficiencies include screening and security controls of persons other than passengers, items carried and vehicles being granted access to security restricted areas. In addition, a sizeable minority of States do not ensure that landside areas have been clearly identified at each airport serving civil aviation and that relevant security measures are established in accordance with a risk assessment.

5. **AIRCRAFT AND IN-FLIGHT SECURITY (IFS)**

5.1 The most frequent deficiency observed in States regarding aircraft and in-flight security is the lack of a process to ensure that aircraft operators establish and maintain written aircraft operator security programmes (AOSPs) that meet the requirements of the NCASP. With regard to aircraft checks and searches, over half of audited States have not completed risk assessments to determine whether an aircraft security check or a search should be conducted, and such activities are often not consistently and effectively implemented.

6. **PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SECURITY (PAX)**

6.1 Just over half of audited States have not ensured that relevant airport entities have developed sufficiently detailed procedures for the screening of originating passengers, their cabin and hold baggage. In practice, the audits have also identified frequent deficiencies with regard to the operational implementation of measures for the screening of originating passengers, and their cabin and hold baggage.

7. **CARGO, CATERING AND MAIL SECURITY (CGO)**

7.1 Many audited States have not developed detailed performance standards for the application of security controls to cargo and mail, including guidelines on appropriate methods of screening depending on the nature of consignments and on the issuance of consignment security declarations. Similar deficiencies have been identified with regard to airport-level entities in many States, which also do not consistently and effectively implement security measures for cargo and mail and protect such consignments from unauthorized interference from the point security controls have been applied until departure of the aircraft. Moreover, in practice many States do not systematically implement procedures for high-risk cargo and mail.

8. RESPONSE TO ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE (AUI)

8.1 A large number of audited States do not ensure that airport-level contingency plans adequately address the management of responses to various acts of unlawful interference, including notification procedures and minimum response times for entities responsible for dealing with such acts. Similarly, regular exercises and evaluations to determine weaknesses in the contingency plans are not always carried out. A considerable number of States have also not ensured that air traffic service providers operating in their territories have established security provisions appropriate to meet the requirements of their NCASP.

9. FACILITATION (FAL)

9.1 Approximately half of all audited States have not established a National Air Transport Facilitation Programme and a majority of such States have not established national or airport level coordinating bodies. A quarter of States have not developed sufficient guidelines for the reporting of Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) and a minority of States do not always report this information to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) for inclusion in its SLTD database.