



ASSEMBLY — 39TH SESSION

TECHNICAL COMMISSION

Agenda Item 33: Aviation safety and air navigation monitoring and analysis

ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT THE RISKS TO CIVIL AVIATION ARISING FROM FLYING OVER OR NEARBY CONFLICT ZONES

(Presented by Slovakia on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its Member States¹ and the other Member States of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)², by European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) and by Australia and Malaysia)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper presents information on actions taken to manage the risks to civil aviation arising from conflict zones. It provides references to the actions taken by ICAO on conflict zones, the safety recommendations from the Final Accident Investigation Report on MH17; and information about a regional approach, with Europe as example, for efforts of sharing and dissemination of information at regional level.

This paper complements A39-WP/108 on Conflict Zones.

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This paper relates to the Safety, Air Navigation Capacity and Efficiency, Security and Facilitation Strategic Objectives.
<i>Financial implications:</i>	N/A
<i>References:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• A39-WP/108 on Conflict Zones• ICAO Convention; Annexes 2, 6, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19• the United Nations Security Council resolution 2166 (2014)• ICAO State Letter AN 13/4.2-14/59; 24 July 2014• Council WP/14220 report from the senior-level task force on risks to civil aviation arising from conflict zones; 14 September 2014• Council WP/14223 Resolution of the Council on Malaysia airlines flight MH17, destroyed over eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014• 2015 High-level Safety Conference (HLSC); 2 to 5 February 2015 (ICAO SecGen HLSC/15-WP/33)• C-WP/14378 Progress report on the coordinated work programme recommended by the task force on risks to civil aviation arising from conflict zones (TF RCZ); 10 February 2016• Final Accident Investigation Report Dutch Safety Board on MH17 of 13 October 2015 (www.safetyboard.nl)

¹ Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom

² Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This paper provides:

- a) references to the actions taken by ICAO on conflict zones;
- b) the safety recommendations from the Final Accident Investigation Report on MH17; and
- c) information about a regional approach, with Europe as example, for efforts of sharing and dissemination of information at regional level.

1.2 ICAO has taken several initiatives related to conflict zones after the accident with MH17 on 17 July 2014 (see also paragraph 2.1). The ICAO Secretary General established the Task Force on Risks to Civil Aviation arising from Conflict Zones (TF-RCZ) that developed a work programme with 12 actions, which was approved in principle by the Council during its 203rd Session (C-DEC 203/1) on 27 October 2014 (see Appendix A). This work already undertaken and planned by ICAO is acknowledged and appreciated.

1.3 The actions of ICAO had already been initiated when the Final Accident Investigation Report on MH17 (including its safety recommendations) on conflict zones was published by the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) on 13 October 2015 (see Appendix B). The safety recommendations on conflict zones from the Final Accident Investigation Report are addressing respectively all States, ICAO and operators.

1.4 This paper also provides background information on a regional approach for sharing and disseminating relevant information on conflict zones, complementary to a global approach.

2. ACTIONS TAKEN ON CONFLICT ZONES AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, NOTABLY BY ICAO

2.1 Several actions to address safety of flight over or near conflict zones have been taken by ICAO:

- ICAO established a Task force on Risks to Civil Aviation arising from Conflict Zones (TF-RCZ). This TF developed a work programme;
- On 24 July 2014, ICAO issued State Letter AN 13/4.2-14/59;
- In response to the accident, ICAO hosted a special high-level meeting with the directors general of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), Airports Council International (ACI) and the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO) on 29 July 2014;
- Council Working Paper C-WP/14223, submitted by Malaysia and co-sponsored by all 36 Council Members, called for a resolution;
- The 2015 High-Level Safety Conference (HLSC), held from 2 to 5 February, adopted conclusions and recommendations related to conflict zones;
- During its 204th Session in March 2015, the ICAO Council approved an interim procedure to disseminate information on risks to civil aviation arising from conflict

zones. This resulted in ICAO establishing in April 2015 the Conflict Zone Information Repository (CZIR); a centralized web-based repository of risks over or near conflict zones, as recommended by the HLSC. This was also reflected in State letter SMM 1/4-15/16; and

- The President of the ICAO Council established in April 2015 the Repository Review Group (RRG) to periodically review the implementation and progress of the CZIR. The Council reviewed the repository on 17 June 2016, deciding to explore alternative options for dissemination of information on conflict zones.

2.2 The work of ICAO and the accident investigation was also supported by the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2166 (2014) during its 7221st meeting held on 21 July 2014.

3. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FINAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT ON MH17 AND ADDITIONAL ACTIONS PROPOSED TO ICAO

3.1 For the accident investigation, cooperation was established between the Netherlands and Australia, Malaysia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and the Russian Federation. Appendix B of this paper contains all the recommendations of the accident investigation report on MH17 released by the independent Dutch Safety Board. It is noted that, while Australia, Malaysia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and the Russian Federation cooperated with the Annex 13 safety investigation, although the report and the recommendations can be attributed to the Dutch Safety Board alone. It is important however, that all States give further consideration to the MH17 report. The recommendations refer to conflict zones in general and propose to implement improvements at three levels:

- a) **Airspace management in conflict zones, in particular on the following topics:**
 - 1) The timely closure or restriction of the use of the airspace;
 - 2) Providing information to third parties as quickly as possible in the event of an armed conflict with possible risks for civil aviation;
 - 3) Coordination between civil and military air navigation service providers during an armed conflict allowing the State to fulfil its responsibility for the safety of civil aviation in the airspace.
- b) **Risk assessment**
 - 1) Provision of information
 - 2) Risk assessment
- c) **Operator accountability**

3.2 This information paper refers to the safety recommendations of the Final Accident Investigation Report in respect of the ICAO work programme. Those recommendations pertain to the revision of SARPs, where necessary (see Appendix C). The table below juxtaposes the recommendations with the existing ICAO work programme on conflict zones (established before the Report was published) and displays the potential link with ICAO Annexes.

Table: Relation between the recommendations of the accident investigation report on MH17, the actions of the ICAO work programme related to conflict zones and the ICAO annexes.

Recommendations of the accident investigation report		Link with the actions of the ICAO work programme on conflict zones	Potential link with ICAO Annexes
airspace management in conflict zones	1	1	2, 15
	2	12	(11), 15
	3	2	Convention and Annexes 2, 11, 15, 17, 19
	4	1, 8, 12	Convention and 2
Risk assessment	5	1, 2, 4	11, 15
	6	3, 4, 10	17, 19
	7	9	19
	8	4, 9	6, (8), 19
	9	7; 12	15
operator accountability	10	7	15
	11	7	19

3.3 States must ensure the safety of their airspace. Airspace management in conflict zones and civil-military cooperation within States regarding the availability of the airspace are principal responsibilities of States.

3.4 Moreover, the availability of threat information is vital for the State and operators' risk assessment. This subject is addressed for operators in Annex 6, for State safety in Annex 19 as well as in Annex 17 for operators and States from an aviation security perspective. Similar to other risks in flight operations, conflict zones should be part of the risk assessment during flight preparation. Operators are accountable vis-à-vis the public and their passengers and must take their responsibilities for the safe planning of flights. In addition, dissemination of information is another State and service provider responsibility, not only related to States' responsibilities for airspace, but also for provisions related to Aeronautical Information (Annex 15).

3.5 Risk assessments are an essential part of airlines flight planning. IATA and ICAO are cooperating, notably on the issue of including the work on risk assessment for conflict zones in the IOSA Standards. IATA has an important role in specifying the formulation of the needs of airlines for adequate information and discussing with States and ICAO.

3.6 The Council (session 207/6; C-WP/14378) discussed on 26 February 2016 the progress of the work programme recommended by the TF-RCZ and encouraged continuation of this work with a holistic and coordinated approach. It also emphasized the importance of coordinating all elements of the work programme and ensuring that interested parties be kept informed on progress. The Council requested the Secretary General to consider means by which to advance some of the completion timelines and to report periodically on the further implementation of outstanding items on the TF-RCZ work programme.

4. A REGIONAL APPROACH FOR EFFORTS ON REGIONAL SHARING AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION, WITH EUROPE AS EXAMPLE

4.1 States can also inform other States directly when they have relevant information about threats within foreign airspace, which is being advocated by ICAO is advocating.

4.2 In Europe, an initiative has been started by the European Union (EU) to implement a system of collecting and sharing of information at regional level, based on a High Level Task Force Report on Conflict Zones (see link below for the recommendations of the report)³. One of the considerations is that operators have expressed a need for a consolidated picture of the safety/security situation. A level playing field for all operators is required to protect all passengers. Despite the fact that operators have different resources available to them, all operators and passengers should have access to the best available information. One of the main identified areas for improvement at European level is the need for availability, in a timely manner, of all the information required to define a common risk picture, to support National Authorities and operators in their own decision making processes. Sharing information between States may help to validate information and also helps States, with limited capacity to collect information about all conflict zones, to get a better understanding of specific threats.

4.3 The High Level Task Force Report on Conflict Zones contains the following recommendations:

- a) State actions: EU Member States are recommended to set up national systems for addressing Risks to Civil Aviation from Conflict Zones in which relevant information is shared with operators. In addition, EU Member States should cooperate in sharing conflict zone information with the view to enable the development of common EU risk assessments and to enable the timely sharing of information on rapidly emerging new threats.
- b) EASA actions: EASA should put in place a process allowing the publication of information and recommendations related to conflict zone risks, based on common EU risk assessments, or based on threat information. This should be done in close coordination with Member States, taking into account the needs for both consultation and for timely dissemination including for emergency cases.
- c) Intelligence Agencies actions: Within the boundaries of a States' legal structure, the intelligence agencies should support national systems for addressing risks arising from conflict zones and should support the State's contribution to the sharing of information at EU level on rapidly emerging new threats.
- d) European Commission actions: The European Commission (the executive body of the EU) should facilitate the exchange of risk analysis and the development of common EU risk assessments, with the support from Member States, European Commission services, EASA and other EU institutions such as the European External Action Service (EEAS).
- e) Operator actions: Operators should make use of available information and recommendations on conflict zones, and incorporate this information into their risk assessment or decision making processes. They should furthermore share their own risk assessment information with their national authorities, and they are encouraged to share this information with the RCZ Network, and EASA.

4.4 The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is setting up an alerting system on risks to civil aviation flights over conflict zones . Based on a coordinated risk assessment of the EU Member States and their approval, and considering the position of airlines and of the European Network Manager, EASA published a Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB). The final information bulletin is available on the EASA website and specifies the affected area and contains further information from the States regarding a particular conflict zone.

³ https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/208599_EASA_CONFLICT_ZONE_CHAIRMAN_REPORT_no_B_update.pdf

4.5 The European Network Manager, whose functions are currently carried out by EUROCONTROL, also publishes information on its online portal, showing for a specific region all EASA CZIBs, together with NOTAMs and other information issued by the EU Member States and third countries. The role of the Network Manager is also to provide a platform at regional level to find alternative routes and airspace capacity. This is a best practice, referring to action 11 of the ICAO work programme on conflict zones.

4.6 Aviation is a global business and passengers fly all over the world. Other States and regions are invited to initiate similar activities for cooperation and to share their information with ICAO.

APPENDIX A
WORK PROGRAMME RECOMMENDED BY THE
TASK FORCE ON THE RISKS TO CIVIL AVIATION ARISING FROM CONFLICT ZONES
(C-WP/14378 - 10 FEBRUARY 2016)

	Expected outcome	Scope
1	Development of processes, including types of reliable, timely and relevant information that States require to effectively discharge their responsibilities in sovereign or delegated airspace and for the operation of their own operators outside of that airspace.	States responsibilities
2	Consolidation of available information as it relates to conflict zones in a centralized system accessible to all relevant stakeholders, including States and industry.	Dissemination of information: centralized system
3	Development of best guidance for conducting risk assessments for civil aircraft operations conducted over or near conflict zones, including consideration of how efforts can be assisted through cooperation on a regional basis, as appropriate; and the sharing of the results of these assessments with industry players in their States and regions.	Risk assessment
4	Development of modalities for the timely exchange of these risk assessments and supporting information with other States or with industry players from other regions; and recommendations as to whether this is best done bilaterally, regionally, through industry groupings, or via ICAO.	Dissemination of information
5	Identification of specific types of information, required from States by airspace users, ANSPs and airports relevant to civil aircraft operations over or near conflict zones.	Specifying information
6	Improvement of processes to share operationally derived risk information taking into consideration ways in which safety occurrences are currently shared.	risk assessment
7	In order to enhance transparency, develop best practices on the provision of information to passengers and flight crew regarding the use of airspace over or near conflict zones.	Information to passengers and flight crew
8	Reinforcing and clarifying the responsibilities of States under the framework of the Chicago Convention system for safe operations in their sovereign and delegated airspace and for the operation of their own operators outside of that airspace.	States responsibilities
9	Consistent with the agreed outcomes, modifications to aviation safety and security auditing and assessment programmes so as to ensure that accountabilities, including those related to contingency planning, are properly discharged.	Safety and security oversight
10	Development of a set of possible changes to ICAO Annexes, guidance and/or other materials so as to give effect to the recommendations made on enhancements of risk assessments for civil aircraft operations near or over conflict zones.	Risk assessment
11	Building on the current provisions and guidance on contingency planning, expand so as to enable States to meet air traffic services needs of changes in traffic flows.	Contingency planning related to traffic flows
12	Recommendations for ICAO, States and industry action to support the agreed outcomes, including recommendations to ensure effective implementation of any new SARP, supported by the provision of assistance when necessary.	States responsibilities; SARPS and other provisions

APPENDIX B

**DUTCH SAFETY BOARD - SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
FINAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT ON MH17**

The accident investigation report was published on 13 October 2015 by the Dutch Safety Board (DSB). The report contains recommendations at three levels. The first level concerns the management of the airspace in States dealing with an armed conflict within their territory. The second level concerns the manner in which States and operators assess the risks of flying over conflict zones. The third level concerns the accountability of operators regarding their choice of whether or not to fly over conflict zones.

The recommendations of the accident investigation report propose to look at amendments to the Chicago Convention and in Standards and Recommended Practices (DSB report page 272). To this end, the report makes the following recommendations:

Level 1		<i>Airspace management in conflict areas</i>
1	ICAO	Incorporate in Standards that states dealing with an armed conflict in their territory shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation. Provide clear definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zone and armed conflict.
2	ICAO	Ask states dealing with an armed conflict for additional information if published aeronautical or other publications give cause to do so; offer assistance and consider issuing a State Letter if, in the opinion of ICAO, states do not sufficiently fulfil their responsibility for the safety of the airspace for civil aviation.
3	ICAO	Update Standards and Recommended Practices related to the consequences of armed conflicts for civil aviation, and convert the relevant Recommended Practices into Standards as much as possible so that States will be able to take unambiguous measures if the safety of civil aviation may be at issue.
4	ICAO Member States	Ensure that States' responsibilities related to the safety of their airspace are stricter defined in the Chicago Convention and the underlying Standards and Recommended Practices, so that it is clear in which cases the airspace should be closed. The States most closely involved in the investigation into the crash of flight MH17 could initiate this.
Level 2		<i>Risk assessment</i>
5	ICAO and IATA	Encourage states and operators who have relevant information about threats within a foreign airspace to make this available in a timely manner to others who have an interest in it in connection with aviation safety. Ensure that the relevant paragraphs in the ICAO Annexes concerned are extended and made stricter.
6	ICAO	Amend relevant Standards so that risk assessments shall also cover threats to civil aviation in the airspace at cruising level, especially when overflying conflict zones. Risk increasing and uncertain factors need to be included in these risk assessments in accordance with the proposals made by the ICAO Working Group on Threat and Risk.
7	IATA	Ensure that the Standards regarding risk assessment are also reflected in the IATA Operational Safety Audits (IOSA).
8	States	Ensure that operators are required through national regulations to make risk

	(State of operator)	assessments of overflying conflict zones. Risk increasing and uncertain factors need to be included in these assessments in accordance with the proposals made by the ICAO Working Group on Threat and Risk.
9	ICAO and IATA	In addition to actions already taken, such as the website (ICAO Conflict Zone Information Repository) with notifications about conflict zones, a platform for exchanging experiences and good practices regarding assessing the risks related to the overflying of conflict zones is to be initiated.
Level 3		<i>Operator accountability</i>
10	IATA	Ensure that IATA member airlines agree on how to publish clear information to potential passengers about flight routes over conflict zones and on making operators accountable for that information.
11	Operators	Provide public accountability for flight routes chosen, at least once a year.

In addition, the report also recommended to the Dutch aviation authorities to take initiatives at international level to incorporate the registration of the nationality of airline passengers in the international regulations. In the meantime, airlines are encouraged to register the nationality of each passenger travelling from a Dutch airport before departure, in the system that provides passenger information in case of an accident.

APPENDIX C

RELATION BETWEEN THE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONFLICT ZONES OF THE FINAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT OF THE DUTCH SAFETY BOARD AND ICAO ANNEXES

Below is an overview of the possible links between the accident investigation report's recommendations on airspace management in conflict areas, on availability of threat information and on operator accountability, and the ICAO Annexes.

- States' responsibilities regarding their airspace related to the Convention and Annexes 2, 11 and 13:

Annex 2: Rules of the Air:

This annex is addressing the principle responsibilities of states regarding safety of airspace and regularity of air traffic. ICAO is addressing States in general. This Annex and related guidance material also deals with coordination between civil and military air navigation service providers during an armed conflict that the state can fulfil its responsibility for the safety of civil aviation in the airspace. Recommendation 4 of the report asks for enhancing the responsibilities for closure of airspace and recommendation 1 ask for dissemination of information in the case of conflict, while recommendation 3 asks for standards for measures if the safety of civil aviation is at issue. It should be considered to reflect this it in Annex 2.

The investigation report and the ICAO State Letter AN 13/4.2-14/59 (24 July 2014) also emphasized the importance of coordination between civil and military authorities within States. The ICAO Manual concerning safety measures relating to military activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft operations (Doc 9985 AN/49) and other relevant guidance material should be updated. This action is included in the ICAO Work Programme. This subject is also linked with civil-military coordination of service providers, relevant for Annex 11.

ICAO refers to better coordination between civil and military air navigation service providers that the state can fulfil its responsibility for the safety of civil aviation in the airspace. ICAO is addressing States in general. This was also reflected in the State Letter AN 13/4.2-14/59 issued 24 July 2014. The action in the ICAO work programme to update, as necessary, Doc 9554, the Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations is supported. This is also linked with Annex 11. In the guidance material ICAO does not take into account so far the modern challenges and new forms of armed conflict.

Recommendation 1 of the Final Accident Investigation report is also asking for providing clear definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zones and armed conflict. This relates to the Annexes 2, 11 and 15.

Annex 11: Air Traffic Services:

The investigation report shows that there are different opinions on how to implement the obligations for States. The meaning of the Standard should be clarified, as States should preserve all possible information, that was obtained in relation to tasks for air navigation services, that might be relevant for an accident investigation, as long as the accident investigation report has not been finalised and concluded. The comments made by Annex 2 on civil-military coordination of service providers are also relevant for Annex 11.

Annex 13: Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation:

Taking into account the experience of Ukraine and the Netherlands regarding the delegation of the MH17 accident investigation it is proposed to better specify the responsibilities of a State of occurrence of an accident and the State to which the conduct of the investigation is delegated.

Under the Chicago Convention, States maintain sovereign authority over their airspace. By ratifying the Convention, States have also taken responsibilities towards ICAO and towards other member States for enhancing safety in situations of the closure of airspace. Following recommendation 4, States' responsibilities for the safety of their airspace could be stricter defined and could get a more prominent place within the ICAO legal framework. The accident investigation report also provides a consideration to give clarity in which cases airspace should be closed, in the main text of the Convention. In relation to the issue of the application of ICAO treaties relating to conflict zones, the Council noted (C-DEC 207/7) that this had been considered by the Legal Committee but was not at this stage incorporated in its General Work Programme. In this connection, it was understood that should there be developments arising from the current work being undertaken by the Secretariat in this area, then this issue would be reconsidered (see recommendation 3 and 4 of the Final Accident Investigation Report)

- On the subject of availability of threat information in relation to risk assessment, related to Annexes 6, 17 and 19:

Risk assessment is essential for planning safe flights. Special attention should be paid to risks related to conflict zones, as these will be from another nature than other risks. Airlines should be aware and guided how to make these assessment. States have a responsibility to oversee the activities of an airline to make a proper assessment. This type of responsibilities is addressed in Annexes 6, 17 and 19.

Annex 6: Operation of Aircraft:

Recommendation 8 of the report deals with risk assessments by operators; especially when overflying conflict zones. In addition to Annex 19 - States' responsibilities – it is also needed to address the responsibilities of operators for an adequate risk assessment when dealing with conflict zones in Annex 6, as this Annex addresses inter alia the responsibilities of airlines for a safe operation.

Annex 17: Security:

The recommendations on risk assessment, in particular recommendation 3, 6 and item 10 of the ICAO work programme, should also be addressed in the context of this Annex. The risk assessment and sharing of information about conflict zones is already under discussion in the Security Panel.

Annex 19: Safety Management:

- a) With a view on recommendations 6, 7 and 11 it is very important to address risk assessment in State Safety Programs, to execute this in Safety Management Systems (SMS) and to investigate criteria to certify the SMS. Action 10 of the ICAO work programme also acknowledges that.
- b) In addition, activities regarding risk assessment for conflict zones should also be included in the ICAO oversight and continuous monitoring approach as an issue with special attention. This is also subject of action 9 of the ICAO work programme.

Annex 15: Aeronautical Information Services:

The recommendations 2 and 5, related to dissemination of information, lead to addressing in more detail the responsibilities of States for their airspace and the related air navigation services when dealing with information dissemination related to the safety of their or foreign airspace in the case of armed conflict. This is also related to Annexes 2, 11 and 17.

In light of recommendations 1, 2, 5, 9 and 10, Annex 15 should be updated regarding the type of information and type of documents to be used to distribute information about conflict zones to airspace users and to ICAO.

Information about conflict zones, including the mechanism of dissemination of information, should be disseminated to airspace users and States and relevant principles should be embedded in ICAO SARP's.

- Passenger information

Annex 9: Facilitation:

The recommendation to register the nationality of airline passengers was made, as more information on passengers helps to identify a passenger and to find the family who needs to be informed before a publication of the casualties. Annex 9 is the right place to formulate the obligation to add more information on the passenger manifest, i.e. nationality.

- ICAO Panels work in progress

In parallel to the issues addressed above, papers have been submitted by the Netherlands to the relevant panel meetings. This includes the:

- *Aviation Security Panel (AVSEC) (14 to 18 March 2016) (scope: Annex 17):*
AVSECP/27-WP/38 addressed the risk assessment and sharing of information about conflict zones. This is now on the work programme of the Security Panel.
- *Facilitation Panel (FALP) (4-7 April 2016) (scope Annex 9):*
FALP/9-WP/5 addressed the issue of nationality of passengers, while WP/6 and WP/11 dealt with exchange of information of passengers. The Panel has recommended making a standard for Advanced Passenger information.
- *Accident Investigation Panel (AIGP) (14-17 June 2016) (scope Annex 13):*
WPs have been developed to address the issues of availability of information relevant for accident investigation and about the responsibilities of States when the accident investigation is delegated to another State.
- *Safety Management Panel (SMP) (2nd Working Group Meeting February 2016, preparing panel meeting 11-15 July 2016) (Scope Annex 19):*
A WP has been submitted addressing risk assessment.