



WORKING PAPER

ASSEMBLY — 39TH SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Agenda Item 16: Aviation Security – Policy

**CULTURE OF SECURITY – ASSESSING IMPLEMENTATION
OF NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAMS**

(Presented by the United States)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 39th Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the proposal for the development of the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) offer opportunities to more clearly define ICAO's security agenda and strategic approach to assist Member States in effectively deterring, detecting, and disrupting threats to civil aviation. ICAO Member States have the responsibility to meet ICAO security standards and, in doing so, must continuously assess systems to ensure appropriate and effective implementation of security measures. Providing States with the tools necessary to internally assess implementation of the measures within their National Civil Aviation Security Programs (NCASP) and drive improvements should be paramount to ICAO's security priorities for the next triennium. In addition to relying on ICAO's Universal Security Audit Programme-Continuous Monitoring Approach (USAP - CMA) audit results and other assessments carried out via bilateral and industry engagement, States should build their knowledge and capacity to perform self-assessments and utilize the information to address systemic deficiencies and vulnerabilities. By doing so, States can become more nimble in addressing evolving threats, which will strengthen the current baseline for global aviation security.

Action: The Assembly is invited to:

- a) call upon States to take additional steps, where necessary, to comply with and appropriately implement Annex 17 – *Security Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)*;
- b) direct the Secretariat to emphasize in strategic plans such as the GASeP the importance of conducting self-assessments for aviation security;
- c) direct the Secretariat to allocate appropriate resources for the enhancement of existing guidance material and development of training tools on the conduct of aviation security self-assessments;
- d) direct the Aviation Security Panel to review where tools and supporting documentation may be refined or included to provide States with appropriate guidance and support on self-assessments;
- e) encourage States to foster a culture of aviation security through inclusion of relevant State agencies and stakeholders in the development, implementation, and sustainment of NCASPs;
- f) call upon States to share best practices in the area of self-assessments to provide the basis for future work within ICAO, and note the experience and actions in paragraph 2.4 as such best practices to be contributed for any future work; and
- g) direct the Secretariat to continue to refine the USAP-CMA process using best practices and lessons learned from Member States' aviation security auditing programs.

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This working paper relates to the Strategic Objective C – <i>Security and Facilitation</i> .
<i>Financial implications:</i>	This paper has no significant financial implications.
<i>References:</i>	None

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Civil aviation faces threats that are increasingly evolving, decentralized, and complex. Terrorism and terrorist-inspired attacks have been directed at the global aviation system with more groups and individuals demonstrating both intent and capability. Through Annex 17 – *Security* and the security components of Annex 9 – *Facilitation*, ICAO has established global aviation security SARPs. Continuously evaluating, updating, and strengthening these SARPs are critical actions that contribute to raising the global security baseline. However, these SARPs are only as strong as their operational implementation – increasing policy requirements will not impact security unless implementation is addressed.

1.2 It is the responsibility of Member States to meet this baseline and adequately implement security measures that meet the intent of the SARPs. Implementation must be assessed via continued evaluation of the effectiveness of the measures by States. In order to assure the safest possible environment for the travelling public, air crews, and other aviation workers, States must sustainably and consistently maintain their sovereign, yet interconnected, security systems.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 Chapter 3.4 of Annex 17– *Security* requires that States must establish a National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Program (NCASQCP) in order to ensure that security measures are appropriately implemented. States must ensure that security measures and processes are regularly reviewed under a compliance regime. Such a regime may include inspections, tests, or other forms of monitoring. Chapter 7 of the Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973) further outlines how States might set up a NCASQCP. Topics covered include structure, oversight, types of monitoring activities, scope, and corrective actions. Recent work under the ICAO Aviation Security Panel of Experts via its Working Group on Guidance Material expounded upon reference material for States in performing both overt and covert tests as a part of the NCASQCP.

2.2 Annex 17 – *Security* directs States to ensure that persons performing security measures possess the proper competencies required to perform security tasks associated with their jobs. Doc 8973 includes an overview of training as well as sections on security culture and how States might work toward instilling such a culture across aviation systems. These are important aspects of an aviation security system and integral components to a State’s NCASP. An integral part of the culture of security that States should strive toward includes continuous improvement across the system through ongoing assessments of the implementation of security measures.

2.3 Issues involving non-compliance with ICAO requirements that create vulnerabilities within an aviation security system may be systemic in nature. Measures found to be inadequately implemented are not always resolved with quick fixes, on-the-spot training, or other timely corrective actions. Sometimes it is necessary to look deeper at compliance data and results and perform root cause analyses in order to more effectively determine the cause of deficiencies and develop an appropriate plan for addressing system vulnerabilities. Analysis of information gained through compliance activities can enable a State to identify underlying issues not readily apparent during an inspection, test, or other form of monitoring. Rather, by looking for trends in data on vulnerabilities, root causes become more evident. While immediate corrective action is necessary, further data analysis can enable a State, regulator, or operator to identify more effective and efficient methods to address a deficiency and rectify systemic issues.

2.4 In the United States, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has undertaken efforts to utilize root cause analysis to determine where approaches to implementation should be addressed at a foundational level. Utilizing commonly accepted analytical frameworks, tailored for use in the aviation security environment, TSA has been able to identify critical elements of the U.S. security system which enables strategic focus. Such an approach requires identification of vulnerabilities. The root cause analysis then includes identification of potential causes for such vulnerabilities. Brainstorming possible scenarios and performing deeper analysis on these potential scenarios and problem statements may lead to the identification of factors not immediately evident. In turn, more impactful solutions may be identified to strengthen system performance. As part of this collaborative approach, TSA seeks to contribute key lessons learned to the appropriate ICAO forums and encourages other States with similar practices to do the same.

2.5 The United States, through the TSA Administrator, committed to ICAO at the 207th ICAO Council in February 2016 that it would share information on the U.S. experience in this area. It was noted in the address to Council that the elements on which TSA has focused as a result of systems analyses include leadership, technology, workforce performance, environmental influences, operating procedures, and system design. While these elements may be applicable across the global aviation system, States may use such analytical techniques to determine the specific foundational areas of focus for their own security systems. The main point in such activities is to determine what the foundational elements of a State's security system are in order to analyze and ensure that the system and its measures are adequately designed, resourced, and implemented to meet the mission of protecting civil aviation from acts of unlawful interference.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1 Appropriate compliance activities and the implementation of a strong NCASQCP are integral to a State's ability to adequately implement the security SARPs in Annex 17 – *Security* and Annex 9 – *Facilitation*. Implementation is the key to strengthening the global baseline for aviation security. The development and addition of new SARPs will not be effective if implementation of current requirements is lacking. Therefore, a security priority during the next triennium should focus on refining and building upon the tools available to States for implementation of SARPs and assessments of security systems.

3.2 Such tools can include information and best practices on how to improve self-assessments as part of NCASQCPs within the NCASP. Root cause analysis of compliance data may indicate that issues with implementation are systemic and require attention at a foundational level. While ICAO tools currently provide quality information and overviews on how to build an NCASQCP, States may benefit from further information, assistance, and the sharing of best practices on how to further analyze compliance activities and strengthen security systems.

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