



ASSEMBLY — 39TH SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Agenda Item 16: Aviation Security — Policy

DEVELOPMENT AND UPDATING OF STANDARDS AND GUIDANCE MATERIAL ON NEW AND EMERGING THREATS

(Presented by the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC)
on behalf of African States²)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This working paper addresses the new and emerging threats against civil aviation, with a special emphasis on insider threats and landside attacks, which need to be proactively mitigated in order to restore confidence of the general public with regards to safe and secure global air transportation. The afore mentioned can be achieved through the enhancement of Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and updating of the relevant guidance material (ICAO Doc 8973).

Action: The Assembly is invited to:

- urge the Council to accelerate the adoption of new aviation security Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) relating to the mitigation of new and emerging threats including landside security and insider threats;
- urge the Council to develop or update relevant guidance material; and
- request ICAO to develop capacity building to mitigate these threats.

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This working paper relates to Strategic Objective C — <i>Security and Facilitation</i> .
<i>Financial implications:</i>	
<i>References:</i>	AVSECP/26-WP/40, AVSECP/27-WP/35 Annex 17, Recommended Practices 4.8.1 and 4.8.2 Annex 17, Standards 4.2.4 and 3.4.1 ICAO State letter Ref.AS 8/2.1-16/58 Confidential Assembly Resolution A38-15

¹ English and French versions provided by AFCAC.

² Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The new and emerging threats against civil aviation require proactive mitigation measures that match the risk posed. These include the development of Standards and updating of the corresponding guidance materials in a timely manner having known that terrorists often tend to move ahead to circumvent security measures in place.

1.2 The advent of attacks targeting people congregated in airport landside areas by terrorists and their sympathisers, which is spreading across the globe, is very worrisome. With the current security measures in place, this type of attack is relatively easy to perpetuate, as it does not require rigorous level of planning associated with attacks on aircraft because of the need to defeat airport and aircraft search procedures in place.

1.3 It is also worth noting that, though background checks are mandatory, recent acts of sabotage against aircraft appear to have been linked to insiders. This could have been as a result of poor or lack of continuous vetting; AFCAC has noted the lack of uniformity in the manner, frequency and extent to which background checks are conducted. This could be a result of lack of understanding on the part of the authorities which have the responsibility for carrying these out in the States.

1.4 It should be noted that in many States, background checks are implemented in line with the provisions of Annex 17. However, there is a need to enhance the current process in order to address the new and emerging threats posed by insiders.

2. RECENT ATTACKS AT AIRPORTS

2.1 It can be recalled that there was a recent attack at Istanbul Ataturk International Airport, Turkey on 28 June 2016, where three gunmen armed with rifles attacked the airport and detonated suicide vests when confronted by police officers, leading to 41 people being killed and 239 wounded in the gun and bombing attacks.

2.2 Similarly, there was an incident that occurred at the Zaventem Airport in Brussels in March 2016, where a bomb triggered by terrorists at the check-in area killed 10 people within the airport while other people were killed by another bomb at a metro station bringing the total of people killed to about 32.

2.3 The attack that also occurred at Domodedovo International Airport in Moscow on 24 January 2011 was on the landside, causing the death of 36 persons and 130 injured. Some of these disasters could have been averted, or casualties minimised, through proper protection of the landside areas of the airport.

2.4 In recent years, many aviation security incidents have been reported to have a high probability of linkage with insider threats, including the Mogadishu incident that occurred on 2 February 2016, in which it was alleged that two airport workers were involved in facilitating the passage of a laptop containing explosives on Daallo Airlines. One passenger went missing after being sucked out of the aircraft following rapid decompression, while two other passengers suffered minor injuries.

2.5 It should be noted that insider threats are not limited to airports in specific regions.

3. **PROGRESS MADE**

3.1 The existing Annex 17 Recommended Practices on Landside Security have been elevated to Standards (Annex 17 Recommended Practice 4.8.1 which states that “*Each Contracting State should ensure that security measures in landside areas are established to mitigate the risk of and to prevent possible acts of unlawful interference in accordance with a national and local risk assessment carried out by the relevant authorities.*”). There is, however a need for the implementation of these standards to be expedited to ensure adequate mitigation against the threat posed by the vulnerability of the landside areas of airports.

3.2 The Council at the third meeting of its 208th Session on 18 May 2016, based on the recommendations of the ICAO Aviation Security Panel (AVSECP), considered proposals for Amendment 15 to Annex 17. It is necessary that these amendments are implemented in a timely manner in order to enable the review of existing and development of new guidance material, as appropriate, in the ICAO *Aviation Security Manual* (Doc 8973) in such a way that incorporates and aligns aviation security procedures for best practices by Members States especially in addressing the threats.

3.3 The updating of the existing relevant documents in line with the anticipated new amendments will be a necessary tool for States as well as for the updating of technical assistance being provided by ICAO and donor partners, and many others to address the need for proactive mitigating measures by States against the New and Emerging Threats including the landside security problems.

4. **CAPACITY BUILDING**

4.1 Pre-attack intelligence gathering through reconnaissance and research will identify and evaluate potential threat and their consequences, but the lack of required risk management tools to assist in developing effective risk management is prevalent in most States.

4.2 It is particularly in the area of supplementary checks, or vetting, that AFCAC believes that capacity building would benefit most States.

4.3 Although ICAO has developed a *Risk Context Statement* as a guide for threat and risk assessments which serves as the current tool in addition to the Risk Management Workshop organized by ICAO and other donor States, there is still a need for more such seminars or workshops to train trainers who will assist in the development of threat and risk assessments designed to curb the threats.

— END —