



International Civil Aviation Organization

MIDANPIRG/23 and RASG-MID/13 Meeting

(Cairo, Egypt, 14 - 18 June 2026)

Agenda Item 4.2: Outcomes of the SEIG/7 Meeting

OUTCOMES OF THE SEIG/7MEETING

(Presented by the Secretariat)

SUMMARY

This paper presents the outcome of the SEIG/7 meeting, the implementation progress on the Safety Enhancement initiatives' (SEIs) included in the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition and the MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition. It also covers an update on the NASP and SSP.

Action by the meeting is at paragraph 3.

REFERENCES

- SEIG/7 Report
- MIDANPIRG/22-RASG-MID/12 Report

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Seventh meeting of the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG/7) was held in Amman, Jordan, 12-16 October 2025. The meeting was attended by a total of twenty-six (26) participants from six (6) States (Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and UAE), two (2) Organizations (ACAO, ICAO).

1.2 The meetings and the Workshop were attended by a total of fifty-seven (57) participants from ten (10) States (Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen), Three (3) organizations (ACAO, IATA, and ICAO).

1.3 The meeting may wish to note that Dr. Mohammad M. Hushki, Director Compliance Monitoring & NCMC of Jordan, Jordan Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission (CARC), and Mrs. Rawya Nasser Al-Adawi, Action Director General of Civil Aviation Regulations, Oman Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), were unanimously elected as the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson of the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG), respectively

2. DISCUSSION

Assembly 42nd Outcomes.

2.1 The SEIG/7 meeting noted with appreciation the outcomes of the ICAO Assembly 42nd Session, held in Montréal, Canada, 23 September to 3 October 2025, presented by the secretariat.

2.2 The meeting noted the endorsement of the 2026-2028 edition of the GASP by the Assembly, as well as the need for ICAO to provide the necessary support to Member States to develop and implement national aviation safety plans, in line with the latest edition of the GASP. The meeting was also informed that the GASP-SG would consider proposals raised during A42, for the next edition of the GASP and related guidance materials, mainly: the inclusion of mechanisms to enhance data-driven safety planning, by identifying precursor events to the global high-risk categories of occurrences, as well as operational safety risks associated with climate.

2.3 The meeting noted discussions on fatigue management, mainly the effects of the digital transformation of the modern flight deck as a contributing factor to cognitive fatigue and information overload of pilots, and the need to apply human-centered design principles in flight deck design, along with training for skills to manage complex digital information effectively, as a mitigation to these risks. The meeting also noted discussions on the need for ICAO to develop guidance, training, and regulatory provisions on fatigue risk in aviation maintenance.

2.4 The meeting noted that the UAE and Saudi Arabia, in coordination with the MID Office, IFALPA, and IATA, will be developing a Regional Safety Advisory (RSA) on fatigue risk in aviation maintenance, in line with the A42 Resolution.

2.5 The meeting was briefed on discussion related to raising the age limit for pilots and noted that the Assembly committed to continue actively studying the effects of advancing age on flight safety and agreed that any decision to raise the pilot age limit to 67 years should be based on a thorough analysis of relevant data to be collected, and considerations of safety.

2.6 The meeting noted discussions on global navigation satellite system (GNSS) radio frequency interference (RFI) and its significant impact on aviation safety, security, and efficiency. With the endorsement of amendments to relevant Assembly resolutions on this subject, it was noted that the Assembly requested States' active engagement to ensure that resilient communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) capabilities remain available to maintain aviation safety.

2.7 With regard to the implementation and evolution of the ICAO Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) audit programmes, the meeting noted the discussions at A42 which concluded that ICAO's safety oversight and aviation security audit programmes should be further enhanced to better suit the needs of all Member States.

2.8 The meeting was also briefed on other A42 outcomes, including those related to remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and advanced air mobility (AAM), and the expedited development and implementation of measures to facilitate legally compliant and safe UAS operations over the high seas; the important role of regional cooperation mechanisms to assist States with limited aviation capacity and resources.

Update on the Implementation Progress of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs)

2.9 The Middle East Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) 2023-2025 Edition at **Appendix A** presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety in the MID Region, to strengthen Member States' Safety Oversight System, and risk-based approach to managing safety and support effective implementation of States' Safety Programmes (SSP) and Safety Management System (SMS) including the development of NASPs.

2.10 The tenth meeting of the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Middle East (RASG-MID/10) was held in Muscat, Oman, 14-17 May 2023; reviewed and endorsed the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition including 24 Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and 62 safety actions through RASG-MID Conclusion 10/7.

2.11 The SEIG/7 meeting reviewed and updated the SEIs and their respective safety actions and noted with appreciation that 49 safety actions out of 62 (Approx 80%) have been completed and implemented as at **Appendix B** and agreed to its presentation to the RASG-MID/13 meeting for endorsement.

2.12 The meeting noted with appreciation the update on the implementation progress of the SEIs conducted by the Secretariat in coordination with all stakeholders.

SEIs Guidance Material Development

2.13 The SEIG/7 meeting noted with appreciation the guidance material presented by Qatar on the issuance of temporary exemption.

2.14 The issuance of temporary exemptions became critical during recent global disruptions such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

2.15 It outlines principles, processes, and risk-based methodologies for granting temporary deviations from ICAO SARPs while maintaining safety and compliance obligations.

2.16 The meeting invited States and organizations to submit any comment, if any, before the RASG-MID/13 meeting to finalize the guidance material in coordination with the Chairman, Qatar, and the ICAO MID Office, and agreed to its presentation to the RASG-MID/13 meeting for endorsement.

2.17 The meeting also noted key challenges identified including: limited technical expertise; inadequate data governance systems; regulatory fragmentation; and emergent risks associated with algorithmic bias and system interoperability.

2.18 The SEIG/7 meeting noted with appreciation the guidance material presented by Qatar on remote safety oversight.

2.19 The COVID-19 pandemic and other global disruptions highlighted the need for innovative approaches to safety oversight. Remote oversight emerged as a practical and effective method for maintaining regulatory compliance and safety performance when on-site activities were limited.

2.20 The guidance manual on remote safety oversight provides a framework for planning, conducting, and monitoring remote safety oversight activities.

2.21 The meeting invited States and organizations to submit any comment, if any, before the RASG-MID/13 meeting to finalize the guidance material in coordination with the Chairman, Qatar, and the ICAO MID Office, and agreed to its presentation to the RASG-MID/13 meeting for endorsement.

2.22 The SEIG/7 meeting noted with appreciation the guidance material presented by Qatar on Judicial Enforcement for Aviation Inspectors.

2.23 It provides a standardized approach to differentiate administrative and judicial enforcement, align with ICAO provisions.

2.24 The meeting invited States and organizations to submit any comment, if any, before the RASG-MID/13 meeting to finalize the guidance material in coordination with the Chairman, Qatar, and the ICAO MID Office, and agreed to its presentation to the RASG-MID/13 meeting for endorsement.

Progress update on 2026-2028 GASP and states progress on NASP development

2.25 The SEIG/7 meeting was briefed on the process undertaken by ICAO, through the GASP Study Group (GASP-SG), to develop the final version of the 2026-2028 edition of the GASP, presented for endorsement at the 42nd Session of the ICAO Assembly (A42).

2.26 The meeting was informed of the global safety issues presented in the GASP, including the main findings related to global operational safety risks and organizational challenges, and took note of the 2026-2028 GASP goals and targets.

2.27 The meeting was briefed on all the GASP-related documents and tools, which were being revised to coincide with the latest edition of the GASP, as well as the next steps to assist States in developing or revising their national aviation safety plans and actions by ICAO to address feedback on the GASP, received during A42.

2.28 The meeting commended and expressed appreciation for the work accomplished by the GASP-SG and ICAO.

MID States Progress on NASPs Development

2.29 The meeting recalled that ICAO issued States Letter to States on “the sharing/submission of the National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP)” through State Letter Ref.: ME 4 – 25/159 Dated 7 July 2025. So far, nine (9) States developed their NASPs and shared approved copies with the ICAO MID Office. Eight (8) have published their NASPs on the ICAO website (Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE).

2.30 In line with the Safety Strategic Objective of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 2026-2028 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. The purpose of the GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, associated with accidents by guiding the harmonized development and implementation of regional and national aviation safety plans. States, regions, and industry facilitate the implementation of the strategy presented in the GASP through RASPs and NASPs.

2.31 The States’ NASP should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety issues. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate).

2.32 The meeting noted that the GASP 2026-2028 Target 5.2 calls for all States to publish an updated NASP, taking into consideration the 2026–2028 edition of GASP and their corresponding RASP, by 2027.

2.33 The meeting was apprised of, and expressed appreciation to, States for sharing their safety strategies and challenges related to the development of their NASPs.

2.34 The meeting noted the Challenges faced by States in developing their NASPs.

2.35 The meeting also recalled that the GASP 2023-2025 Target 3.2 calls for all States to publish a NASP by 2024.

2.36 The meeting also noted the challenges faced by States in developing their NASPs.

- Capacity building and training;
- Senior management commitment

- Limited resources including financial
- Limited qualified personnel;
- Safety data and safety information collection and analysis;
- Emerging of new technologies including UTM-ATM integration sandbox;
- Limited collaboration, coordination, and communication amongst stakeholders including industry involvement from beginning;
- Limited guidance to develop a robust safety risk management framework and processes; and
- Geopolitical situation in the region.

2.37 The SEIG/7 meeting recognized the challenges facing the States on the development of NASP. In this respect, the meeting was informed about the MID Regional Office conducting Assistance Missions dedicated to NASP to support States with NASP development. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to its presentation to the RASG-MID/13 meeting for endorsement.

MID RASP 2026-2028 Edition

2.38 The meeting noted with appreciation the development of RASP-MID 2026-2028 Edition including the Safety Enhancement initiatives (SEIs) and the MID Region Safety Performance Measurement and Monitoring (SPMM).

2.39 The Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.

2.40 The MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety at the regional level. It constitutes the regional safety plan for the MID Region, setting out the strategic priorities, main risks affecting the regional aviation system, and the necessary actions to mitigate those risks to further improve aviation safety.

2.41 The MID-RASP Edition 2026-2028 aims to enhance the MID Region's commitment to improving safety oversight capabilities, reducing operational risks, and establishing effective State Safety Programmes (SSP). It serves as a key framework for raising awareness of safety risks and their consequences among States, industry, and stakeholders. The MID-RASP encourages the allocation of financial, human, and technical resources to improve safety management, oversight, and operational performance. Additionally, it facilitates information sharing among relevant stakeholders to support timely action and collaborative problem-solving.

2.42 In respect of the Turbulence Encounter (TURB) occurrence category, the meeting was of the opinion that additional safety information should be collected to address the issue at the regional level. Accordingly, the meeting agreed that:

- IATA will explore the possibility of sharing the safety data analysis related to the TURB occurrence category to the ASRG;
- States be urged to share safety information and analysis related to TURB category with the ASRG for further processing; and
- A workshop on TURB occurrence data analysis will be organized to develop recommendations and identify appropriate safety actions for the next course of action

2.43 The meeting commended and expressed appreciation for the work accomplished by ICAO MID Office in developing the MID-RASP 2026-2208.

2.44 Therefore, to address regional operational risks, regional organizational issues, and emerging issues; 18 Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and 58 safety actions have been identified,

developed and proposed. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to its presentation to the RASG-MID/13 meeting for endorsement.

State Safety Programme (SSP)

2.45 The SEIG/7 meeting noted that States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to implement effective SSPs. As per Annex 19, States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The SMS enables service providers to capture and transmit safety information, which contributes to safety risk management. An SSP requires the implementation of a risk-based approach to measure and monitor the safety performance of the State's civil aviation system and the progress towards achieving the State's safety objectives. In this context, the role of the State evolves to include the establishment and achievement of safety performance targets, as well as effective oversight of its service providers' SMS.

2.46 The meeting noted that the GASP 2026-2028 Edition Goal 3 is aimed at States individually and calls for the establishment and management of State safety programmes (SSPs), in accordance with Annex 19 – Safety Management.

2.47 The meeting also noted that the GASP 2026-2028 Edition Goal 3 Target 3.1 calls for all States to assess the level of implementation of their SSP, by 2026.

2.48 The meeting was informed that the GASP 2026-2028 Edition Goal 3 Target 3.2 calls for all States to establish an SSP, by 2028

2.49 The meeting noted with appreciation the updated status of Annex 19, Amendment 2 including the State safety policy, objectives, and resources (SSP Component 1), State safety risk management (SSP Component 2), State safety assurance (SSP Component 3), and State safety promotion (SSP Component 4).

2.50 The meeting was provide with a detailed workshop related to the guidance on the development of Safety Intelligence including an overview on Safety Intelligence, establishment of Safety Data of Collection and Processing System (SDCPS), Governance and Management of Safety Data and Safety Information, Safety Data And Safety Information Analysis, Use of Analysis Results For Decision Making, and Sharing and Exchange of Safety Information and Safety Intelligence.

2.51 The meeting also noted with appreciation and update on the surveillance obligation as stipulated in Annex 19 Amendment 2, as well as the holistic approach for SMS assessment.

2.52 The meeting also noted that the newly revised ICAO SSP PQs draft have been published on the OLF, and the SSPIA has been integrated into the USOAP Programme. The meeting also appreciated the detailed guidance provided on the way to comply with SSP PQs.

2.53 The meeting commended and expressed its appreciation to the ICAO MID Office for its valuable efforts in supporting States in the development of their SSPs through various capacity-building activities.

2.54 The meeting was apprised and thanked Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE for sharing their experiences and challenges related to the development of SSP.

2.55 The meeting noted the challenges faced by States in developing their SSP.

- Legislation amendments;
- Capacity building and training;
- Limited human and financial resources;
- Limited guidance to establish and develop a Safety data and safety information collection and analysis;

- Limited collaboration, coordination, and communication amongst SSP stakeholders;
- Limited guidance to develop a robust safety risk management framework and processes;
- Transition from a prescriptive approach to a more risk-based and performance-based approach; and
- Geopolitical situation in the region

2.56 The meeting recognized the challenges facing the States on the development of SSP and the preparation for the upcoming SSP assessment. In this respect, the meeting was apprised about MID Regional Office to conduct Assistance Missions dedicated to SSP to support States with SSP development. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to its presentation to the RASG-MID/13 meeting for endorsement.

3. ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

- a) review and endorse the implementation progress of SEIs at **Appendix B** and agree to the following Draft Conclusion:

Why	To update the implementation the SEIs.
What	To endorse the implementation progress of SEIs
Who	RASG-MID/13
When	June 2026

***RASG-MID DRAFT CONCLUSION 13/XX: IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS ON
THE SAFETY ENHANCEMENT
INITIATIVE (SEI)***

That,

- a. *The implementation progress of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and safety actions included in the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition at **Appendix B** is endorsed; and*
- b) agree to the following Draft Conclusion related to the issuance of temporary exemptions guidance material.

Why	To consider issuance of temporary exemptions guidance material.
What	To endorse the issuance of temporary exemptions guidance material.
Who	RASG-MID/13
When	June 2026

RASG-MID DRAFT CONCLUSION 13/XX: ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY EXEMPTIONS GUIDANCE MATERIAL

That the guidance material on the issuance of temporary exemptions at Appendix C is endorsed.

- c) agree to the following Draft Conclusion related to the remote safety oversight guidance material

Why	To consider the remote safety oversight guidance material
What	To endorse the remote safety oversight guidance material
Who	RASG-MID/13
When	June 2026

RASG-MID DRAFT CONCLUSION 13/XX: REMOTE SAFETY OVERSIGHT GUIDANCE MATERIAL

That the guidance material on the remote safety oversight at Appendix D is endorsed.

- d) Agree to the following Draft Conclusion related to the judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors guidance material

Why	To consider the judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors guidance material
What	To endorse the judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors guidance material
Who	RASG-MID/13
When	June 2026

RASG-MID DRAFT CONCLUSION 13/XX: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT FOR AVIATION INSPECTORS GUIDANCE MATERIAL

That the guidance material on the judicial Enforcement for Aviation Inspectors at Appendix E is endorsed.

- e) agree to the following Draft Conclusion related to the National Aviation Safety Plans (NASPs):

WHY	To establish NASPs in the MID States
What	Development of NASPs

Who	RASG-MID/13
When	June 2026

RASG-MID DRAFT CONCLUSION 13/XX: DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (NASP) IN MID STATES

That, States be:

- a. *urged to develop and implement the NASP in line with the GASP and MID-RASP, if not yet done so;*
 - b. *encouraged to share the latest version of their NASPs with ICAO HQ and ICAO Regional MID office for posting on the GASP public website;*
 - c. *encouraged to continue to use existing ICAO guidance material and tools to implement their NASPs;*
 - d. *encouraged to request assistance from the ICAO MID Regional Office related to the development of their NASPs including the conduct of assistance missions and/or customized NASP Workshop for each State; and*
 - e. *encouraged to share their experiences related to the development of their NASPs during the SEIG meetings and/or Regional NASP Workshop to be organized by the ICAO MID Regional Office in 2026.*
- f) agree to the following Draft Conclusion related to the MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition

WHY	To develop MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition
What	Development of MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition
Who	RASG-MID/13
When	June 2026

RASG-MID DRAFT CONCLUSION 13/XX: MID-RASP 2026-2028 EDITION

That,

- a) *the MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition including the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and the MID region Safety performance Measurement and Monitoring (SPMM) at Appendix F is endorsed; and*
 - b) *urge States, international organizations, and industry to support the MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition activities including the implementation of SEIs and safety actions*
- g) agree to the following Draft Conclusion related to the State Safety Programme

(SSP):

WHY	To support MID States with SSP development and implementation.
What	Development of SSP
Who	RASG-MID/13
When	June 2026

RASG-MID DRAFT CONCLUSION 13/XX: DEVELOPMENT OF SSP IN MID STATES

That, States be:

- a) *urged to prioritize the timely establishment, implementation, and maintenance of State Safety Programmes (SSPs) and to strengthen Safety Management System (SMS) adoption across all aviation service providers, ensuring alignment with ICAO Annex 19 standards;*
- b) *encouraged to request assistance from the ICAO MID Regional Office related to the development and implementation of their SSPs including the conduct of:*
 - i. *Targeted SSP technical assistance missions to prepare States for upcoming ICAO SSP assessments*
 - ii. *Tailored SSP implementation Workshops*
 - iii. *State Safety Risk Management framework workshops to enhance risk-based decision-making capabilities.*
- c) *Invited to share lessons learned, challenges, and successes in SSP development during SEIG meetings, fostering peer-to-peer knowledge exchange and regional collaboration; and*
- d) *encouraged to share their latest version of SSP manuals with ICAO MID Office.*



ICAO MID

SAFETY

MID-RASP

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN



Second Edition

2023-2025

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (MID-RASP)



| ICAO

SECOND EDITION 2023–2025

Executive Summary

The Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. The purpose of the GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, by guiding the development of a harmonized aviation safety strategy.

The GASP promotes the effective implementation of a State safety Programme (SSP) including National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP), a State's safety oversight system, and a risk-based approach to managing safety as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry.

The vision of the GASP is to achieve and maintain the aspirational safety goal of zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond, which is consistent with the United Nations' *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. The plan's mission is to continually enhance international aviation safety performance and resilience by providing a collaborative framework for States, regions and industry.

The Middle East Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) 2023-2025 Edition considers and supports the objectives and priorities of GASP 2023-2025 Edition. MID-RASP also emphasizes the importance of identifying and mitigating risks at MID region level. In addition, MID-RASP is to create a common focus on regional aviation safety issues as a continuation of the MID region work to improve aviation safety and to comply with ICAO standards and supports MID States and industry in implementing the GASP 2023-2025 Edition.

Furthermore, the States national aviation safety plan (NASPs) should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety concerns. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate) and with other efforts aimed at enhancing aviation safety.

MID-RASP provides a three-year plan for States in MID Region to strengthen its safety oversight capability and implement an effective safety management. This relates to the continuous reduction of regional operational risks and improvement in States' safety oversight and safety management capabilities. It adopts a risk-based approach to managing safety at regional-level through a coordinated approach and collaboration between States in the region, regional organizations and industry.

The RASG-MD is the governing body responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the MID-RASP, in collaboration with the ICAO MID Office, international and regional organizations and with the aviation industry. The MID-RASP is to be reviewed by the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG) every year mainly to include new identified Safety Enhancement initiatives' (SEIs), review the existing SEIs, as well as their respective actions.

The MID Region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level is to address the region's operational risks and other safety issues in a timely manner. Therefore, the MID-RASP strategic approach would focus on organizational challenges/issues, regional operational safety risks, and emerging risks as indicated below.

- a. Organizational challenges/issues including the States 'safety oversight, safety management, aircraft accident and incident investigation, human factors and competence of personnel, and Cybersecurity.
- b. Regional operational safety risks, the focus would be on Regional high risks categories (R-HRC) identified in the GASP 2023-2025 Edition mainly the LOCI-I, CFIT, RE, RI, and MAC; and
- c. Emerging risks, the focus would be on COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, Civil drones (Unmanned Aircraft Systems), GNSS outages, impact of security on safety, and 5G interference with Radar Altimeter frequency band.

MID Region safety indicators and targets were aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP goals and regional specific objectives and priorities. The RASG-MID would use the indicators listed in the MID Region Safety Performance Measurement & Monitoring (SPMM) to measure safety performance and monitor each regional safety target. Moreover, the RASG-MID would continuously monitor the implementation of the SEIs listed in the MID-RASP and measure safety performance of the regional civil aviation system, to ensure the intended results are achieved, using the MID Region SPMM.

The MID Region SPMM includes six (6) Goals in line with GASP 2023-2025 Edition. For each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM, identified SEI(s) be mapped to it including their respective actions. Thus, to address regional operational risks, organizational issues, and emerging risks; 24 SEIs and 61 safety actions have been identified, developed and proposed.

The MID-RASP provides guidance on how States should identify which top risks and key safety issues mentioned in the GASP and MID-RASP apply to their national context and then to be included in their NASPs. States should also add other safety issues which are unique to their operational context. Several MID-RASP SEIs which are intended for implementation by States at the national level are recommended for inclusion in their NASPs.

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Appendices:

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- Appendix B:** Identified safety issues as indicated in the 11th ASR
- Appendix C:** MID Region-Safety Performance Measurement &Monitoring (SPMM)
- Appendix D:** Safety Actions- List of consolidated SEIs for follow up
- Appendix E:** SEIs identified in MID-RASP and recommended to States for inclusion in their NASPs
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PART-I. PLANNING

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objectives and Principles

The MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) presents the **strategic direction** for the **management of aviation safety** at the regional level. It constitutes the regional safety plan for MID Region, setting out the strategic priorities, main risks affecting the regional aviation system and the necessary actions to mitigate those risks to further improve aviation safety.

The purpose of this MID-RASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of accidents, through the development and implementation of regional SEIs. A safe aviation system contributes to the economic development of MID Region, the States which comprise it, and their industries. In addition, MID-RASP is to create a common focus on regional aviation safety issues as a continuation of the MID Region work to improve aviation safety and to comply with ICAO standards. This approach complements the existing system of developing safety regulations, complying with them and investigating accidents and serious incidents when they occur.

The MID-RASP promotes the effective implementation of a State safety Programme (SSP) and Safety Management System (SMS) including National Aviation Safety plan (NASP), State's safety oversight system, and a risk-based approach to managing safety as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between States, international organization, and industry. All stakeholders are encouraged to support and implement the MID-RASP as the regional strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.

The MID RASP allows the region to define the strategy for improving safety within a specified timeframe, through defined Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs).

The MID-RASP establishes the first layer of priorities which is further complemented at national level by national safety plans and Programmes. It builds a network for action; thus, coordination and close collaboration are key to keeping it up to date and effective.

The MID-RASP Edition 2023-2025 covers the three-year period between 2023 and 2025 and will be updated on a yearly basis, as required, to cover subsequent three years' periods. It is a rolling 3-year plan.

The planning activity would be followed up by a reporting activity, in which progress on the actions is evaluated and also documented. This feedback loop ensures that the process to manage risks continuously improves and may contribute to the identification of new safety issues.

MID Region is committed to enhancing aviation safety, to the resourcing of supporting activities and to increasing collaboration at the regional level.

1.2 Relationship between MID-RASP and GASP and other Plans

Aviation's contribution towards the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and in order to maximize the benefits of aviation, the priorities of the aviation sector should be integrated and reflected in State's economic and social development planning with an appropriately balanced development of transport modes, including multi-modal and urban planning initiatives. In addition, recognizing that air transport is a catalyst for sustainable development and that it represents an essential lifeline for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and especially for Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs).

ICAO Business Plan takes into consideration all of the work mandated to be undertaken by ICAO, regardless of source of funding. The Business Plan sets out the Strategic Objectives and priorities to guide the activities of the Organization to support Members States in their attainment of a safe, secure, efficient, economically viable and environmentally responsible air transport network.

ICAO's global plans are essential in supporting safe, secure, efficient, economically viable and environmentally responsible air transportation. They provide a means to advance ICAO's Strategic Objectives. The ICAO global plans include: the GASP, the GANP and the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP).

The GASP presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. The purpose of the GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, by guiding the development of a harmonized aviation safety.

The purpose of the Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP) is to drive the evolution of the global air navigation system to meet the ever-growing expectations of all sectors in the aviation community by equitably accommodating all airspace user operations in a safe, secure and cost-effective manner while reducing the aviation environmental impact. To this end, the GANP provides a series of operational improvements to increase capacity, efficiency, predictability and flexibility, while ensuring interoperability of systems and harmonization of procedures. The implementation of the GANP is enabled by promoting the effective implementation of safety oversight and a safety management approach to oversight, including SRM to permit innovation in a managed way.

The GASP complements the GANP by providing States and industry with the tools to implement a safety management approach through their SSP and SMS. The GANP, through the evolution of the system described in the conceptual roadmap and the operational improvements detailed in the technical frameworks, supports the goals within the GASP and the GASeP by enhancing safety and security of the air navigation system as reflected in the performance ambitions.

The GASP goals and targets support the GASeP by providing best practices and models that can be as effective in managing security as they are in safety management. These include effective oversight, organizational culture, risk management and assurance processes. The GASeP in turn supports the GASP's vision of zero fatalities.

MID-RASP considers and supports the objectives and priorities of GASP. The purpose of GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of accidents, by guiding the development of a harmonized aviation safety strategy and the development and implementation of regional and national aviation safety plans. A safe aviation system contributes to the economic development of States and their industries. The GASP promotes the effective implementation of SSP and SMS including NASP, a State's safety oversight system, and a risk-based approach to managing safety as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry. One of the GASP goals is for States to improve their effective safety oversight capabilities and to progress in the implementation of SSPs including NASPs. Thus, GASP calls for States to put in place robust and sustainable safety oversight systems that should progressively evolve into more sophisticated means of managing safety.

Assembly Resolution A40-1 also calls for each State to develop and implement a national aviation safety plan (NASP), in line with the GASP goals, targets and the global high-risk categories of occurrences (G-HRCs). The NASP should also be developed having close regard for the RASP, while acknowledging that each State may have its own, specific safety issues and priorities, including addressing significant safety concerns (SSCs).

In addition, to addressing systemic safety, GASP addresses Global high-risk categories (G-HRC) of occurrences, which are deemed global safety priorities. These categories were determined based on actual fatalities from past accidents, high fatality risk per accident or the number of accidents and incidents. The following G-HRCs have been identified for the 2023-2025 edition of the GASP: controlled flight into terrain (CFIT); Loss of control in flight (LOC-I); Mid-air collision (MAC); runway excursion (RE); and runway incursion (RI). The GASP G-HRCs are addressed in MID-RASP.

The MID-RASP considers the objectives and priorities of the GASP to enhance the level of safety in aviation and to better prepare the Member States for the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) audits and State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment (SSPIA) of their SSPs.


This MID-RASP edition 2023-2025 provides references to corresponding GASP 2023-2025 Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs); covering organizational challenges, Regional operational risks, and emerging risks.

The 2023-2025 Edition of the GASP would set forth ICAO's Safety Strategy in support of the prioritization and continuous improvement of aviation. The plan guides the implementation of regional and national aviation safety plans.

The 2023-2025 Edition of the GASP includes a new set of goals, targets and indicators, in line with the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In respect of MID Region SPMM, the GASP provides the global strategic direction while the MID Region SPMM provides regional specific goals and support the region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level. Consequently, MID region safety indicators and targets were aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP goals and targets as relevant in the MID Region. Furthermore, the RASG-MID would continuously monitor the implementation of the identified SEIs in the MID-RASP and measure safety performance of the regional civil aviation system, to ensure the intended targets are achieved, using the MID Region safety performance measurement & monitoring to this plan. Moreover, MID safety performance measurement & monitoring Goals support the region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level. Therefore, for each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM identified SEI(s) is mapped to it including their respective actions.

The MID Region SPMM is included as an appendix and became an integral part of MID-RASP.



Graph 1: Relationship between MID-RASP and other Plans

2. HOW MID-RASP IS STRUCTURED

This MID-RASP presents the regional strategy for enhancing aviation safety for a period of three years. It is comprised of two parts and 7 chapters. The 2023-2025 MID- RASP Edition comprises two distinct parts:

- **Part I. Planning** provides an introduction, describes how the MID-RASP is developed and monitored and includes the safety priorities. It consists of **Chapters 1 to 5**.
- **Part II. Implementation** contains the safety performance measurement & monitoring and the detailed list of MID-RASP safety actions. It consists of **Chapters 6 and 7**.
- Both parts are supported by a number of appendices providing further details or assisting the reader.

Part-I. Planning

Part I provides an introductory explaining the main objective of this MID-RASP. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 explain how MID-RASP is structured, developed, monitored and presents the structure of the document. Chapter 5 presents safety priorities and the key actions taken as indicated below:

- 5.1 Organizational Challenges/issues
- 5.2 Regional operational safety risks
- 5.3 Emerging risks

Part-II. Implementation

Part II contains the safety performance measurement and monitoring and the detailed list of MID-RASP safety actions. It consists of Chapters 6 and 7.

Chapter 6 presents the MID Region safety indicators and targets.

In respect of **chapter 7**, it facilitates the identification of SEIs and their respective actions relevant for each Goal identified in the MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring as follows:

- Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks;
- Goal 2: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities;
- Goal 3: Implement effective State safety Programmes (SSPs);
- Goal 4: Increase collaboration at the regional level;
- Goal 5: Expand the use of industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks ;
and
- Goal 6: Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations.

The MID Region SPMM includes six (6) Goals in line with GASP 2023-2025 Edition. For each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM, identified SEI(s) is mapped to it including their respective actions and the following information is provided:

Goal: Goal supports the region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level.

- **Name:** Goal #Number - SEI# Number: Description of the SEI
- **Target(s)/Metrics.** Targets which serve to fulfil their respective Regional Goal
- **Rationale** behind the safety issue (why it has been identified as an issue)
- **What it is to be achieved** (objective)
- **How we intend to monitor improvement** in the future
- **How we intend to achieve** the objective; here, the various actions contributing to mitigate

- the identified risk in that area are described
- **Actions:** The tasks required for the implementation of the SEI. The actions support the SEI and Targets of the Regional Goal
 - **References:**
 - Indicates key existing global documents from which the SEI is adopted, if applicable.

Stakeholders: The entities/ stakeholders in the MID region, to which the Actions are addressed

Example Action 1: Description of the Action to be taken

Subtask(s) if needed to be added

Owner(s): Appointed Group/State(s)/Organization(s) to further develop details for implementation of the respective Action.

Priority: Low, Medium, High

Completion Date: The date in which the respective Action is expected to be implemented.

Status: new, ongoing, on hold, completed. (Provide also updated progress if any)

Example Action 2: Description of the Action to be taken

Subtask(s) if needed to be added

Owner(s): Appointed Group/State(s)/Organization(s) to further develop details for implementation of the respective Action

Priority: Low, Medium, High

Completion Date: The year(s) in which the respective Action is expected to be implemented

Status: new, ongoing, on hold, completed. (Provide also updated progress if any)

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)

TIMELINE

Description of the Result to be achieved

The year in which the respective Target is expected to be achieved

3. HOW MID-RASP IS DEVELOPED AND MONITORED

The RASG-MD is the governing body responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the MID-RASP, in collaboration with the ICAO MID Office, international and regional organizations and with the aviation industry. The MID-RASP was developed in consultation with States, regional organizations, and other stakeholders in the region, and in alignment with the 2023-2025 of the GASP. If required, RASG-MID would seek the support of MIDANPIRG and RASFG-MID, other sub-groups, States, regional organizations, and industry to ensure the timely implementation of SEIs to address safety deficiencies and mitigate risks. Through close monitoring of the SEIs, SEIG would make adjustments to the MID-RASP and its initiatives, if needed, and update the MID-RASP document accordingly.

Furthermore, the MID-RASP is to be reviewed by SEIG every year mainly to include new identified SEIs, review the existing SEIs, and their respective actions. In addition, the MID-RASP is to be updated/endorsed by RASG-MID at least every three years and as deemed necessary.

The SEIG is established to assist RASG-MID to develop and monitor the implementation of SEIs as at **Appendix A** related to identified regional operational risks, organizational challenges, and emerged risks. In addition, the SEIG takes the lead and ensures that SEIs are implemented in a timely, effective and efficient manner in coordination with RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, and RASFG-MID groups and sub-groups (ASRG, ASPIG, AIIG, ATM-SG,..etc), States, regional organizations, and industry.

As a first step towards establishing this system and to facilitate MID-RASP implementation, it is necessary to enhance the communication and flow of safety data and information, as well as coordination processes, among RASG-MID and its subsidiaries, States, and regional organizations. There is also the need to continue to enhance collaboration with MIDANPIRG through coordinated processes to sustain the collection and sharing of regional air traffic management (ATM) data and the sharing and resolution of safety issues. This, in turn, would support the implementation of Aviation System Block Upgrade (ASBUs) and ensure that their implementation accounts for and properly manages existing and emerging risks, e.g. approaches with vertical guidance (APV) to mitigate risks associated with CFIT and runway excursions.

The MID-RASP was developed with the aim of addressing the MID region's operational and other safety issues in a timely manner, and as applicable. It is expected that this approach would facilitate MID States' support and participation in the implementation of these SEIs and their respective actions at both the regional and national levels. The three-year period of the MID-RASP, i.e. 2023 to 2025, was selected to coincide with the GASP review period of the same duration, to ensure continued alignment with the latest global plans.

States should ensure that a NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. The MID-RASP provides the identified safety priorities in the region and States should identify which top risks and key issues mentioned in the GASP and MID-RASP which apply to their national context and identify suitable mitigations actions within their NASP. States should also add/consider other safety issues which are unique to their operational context. Furthermore, States to establish a NASP taking into account the GASP and MID-RASP; and based on their operational safety needs.

The key contents of the MID-RASP were developed using an eight-step process recommended by the GASP to develop RASPs and NASPs, similar to the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) continuous improvement cycle, as follows:

- Step 1: Conduct self-evaluation;
- Step 2: Identify hazards and safety deficiencies;
- Step 3: Develop list of prioritized regional safety issues;
- Step 4 – Define goals, indicators, and targets
- Step 5: Perform gap analysis to identify SEIs;
- Step 6: Develop a list of prioritized SEIs;
- Step 7: Develop a Regional aviation safety plan; and
- Step 8: Monitor implementation

The MID-RASP has been developed in congruence with the GASP, and supports the GASP aspirational goal of zero fatalities by 2030 and its objectives, goals, targets and indicators.

- a. The MID-RASP structure adheres closely to GASP;
- b. A comprehensive gap analysis was undertaken to identify the existing gaps between the existing work by RASG-MID, and subsequently also compared with ICAO Manual: Doc 10131, 'Manual on the Development of Regional and National Aviation Safety Plans;
- c. The MID Region SPM is aligned with GASP 2023-2025 Edition, retained and included as an Appendix in the MID-RASP; and
- d. MID-RASP SEIs were selected taking into consideration relevant SEIs for the region in line with GASP 2023-2025 Edition as well as relevant work plan items of DCGA, RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, and RASFG-MID meetings. Moreover, GASP SEIs for States and Industry (domestic) were not considered as these are more suitable to be included in the NASPs of the MID States.

The MID-RASP supersedes the previous work of the RASG-MID subsidiary bodies (RAST and SST) initiatives to elevate the commitment of the MID Region to improve its safety oversight capability, which relates to the continuous reduction of regional operational risks and improvement in safety

oversight capabilities and safety management of States. In particular, the MID-RASP serves to raise awareness of safety risks and consequences, to States, industry and relevant stakeholders to commit and provide resources including financial, staffing and technical expertise, to making improvements in safety management, oversight capability and operational safety performance. It also provides a basis to facilitate information sharing between relevant stakeholders who can take actions or provide support to address issues.

At the regional level, the MID-RASP commits RASG-MID to continue the following efforts as indicated below:

- a. Focus on the update and the development of the new regional SEIs to address the Regional High-Risk Categories (R-HRCs) of LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RI and RE, and other priorities;
- b. Support States to strengthen safety oversight capabilities
- c. Assist States in the development and implementation of SSP and SMS including the development of NASPs;
- d. Promote regional government and industry collaboration for sharing safety information and best practices in safety management;
- e. Promote the effective implementation of AGA, with a focus on implementation of Aerodrome Certification including the SMS, runway safety Programmes including the establishment of Runway Safety Teams (RSTs) and Global reporting Format methodology (GRF);
- f. Support States in the development of Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) national regulations;
- g. Support States on COVID-19 pandemic activities to enable a safe and secure return to operations, the GNSS interference, the impact of security on safety, manage Cybersecurity risks; and 5G interference with Radar Altimeter frequency band.
- h. Support States to establish and activate the MENA RSOO;
- i. Provide continuous support for the MENA ARCM activities.
- j. Continue implementation support to States and industry, including the development of improved guidance materials as well as the organization of workshops and training to provide assistance and guidance to MID States; and
- k. Put in place a structure for the collection, analysis and sharing of safety and operational data in the region to support a comprehensive approach to risk management, and facilitate initiatives to develop regional data collection, and analysis.

States and industry are committed to the following efforts:

- a. Implement, as appropriate, the GASP SEIs and MID-RASP SEIs and their respective actions in strategic and timely manner;
- b. (For any States with SSCs), accord priority to the resolution of any SSCs identified by the ICAO USOAP CMA Programme. These should draw on the necessary resources available, including technical assistance from other States and Regional Programmes to resolve the SSCs promptly;
- c. Accord priority to the implementation of SSP and SMS;
- d. Use data-driven methodologies to identify R-HRCs and their safety issues, and implement collaborative solutions to reduce accident rates and fatalities in the Region, and likewise accord priority to the implementation of respective SEIs; and
- e. Consider various options to leverage ICAO-recognized industry assessment Programmes such as the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO), IATA Standard Safety Assessment Programme (ISSA), and ACI APEX Programme. These options range from recognition of such Programmes to encouraging registration by all applicable operators as a means to strengthen their safety management and compliance.

4. OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

4.1 Worldwide Perspective

After the year 2020 when the global economy experienced the worst crisis since the Great Depression as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the activity in 2021 rapidly recovered and the prospects for the following years are that this trend will continue. However, it is too soon to draw firm conclusions, considering the uncertainties on the evolution of certain threats (not only the pandemic, but also climate change, increasing public debts and geopolitical changes).

According to the last general IMF forecast available at (<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/10/12/world-economic-outlook-october-2021>), GDP fell by 3.3 % in 2020 and is expected to rebound by 5.9 % in 2021, to continue with a growth rate of 4.9 % in 2022. Behind these global figures quite diverse situations are found in national economies due to differences in the pace of vaccine roll-out and the capability of States to offer financial support. The pandemic also affected the job market, the employment conditions and other socio-economic factors. From a worldwide perspective, according to the International Labour Office, the unemployment rate grew by 1.1 point to 6.5 % in 2020, compared to 5.4 % in 2019, and will only slowly decrease to an expected 6.3 % in 2021 and 5.7 % in 2022. (https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-/dgreports/-/dcomm/-/publ/documents/publication/wcms_795453.pdf). *Table 1.2 Employment-to-population ratio, unemployment rate.*

From a worldwide aviation perspective, large aeroplane commercial passenger flights, constituting the bulk of the aviation activity, showed an unprecedented drop in 2020 and started to recover in 2021. The closure of borders fundamentally contributed to this drop in traffic, hitting airline international traffic far more than domestic traffic. If the current positive trend of pandemic recovery continues, the domestic traffic in terms of number of airlines' commercial passengers would recover in 2022 in comparison with the 2019 level. International traffic would only recover in 2024.

4.2 Middle East Perspective

The Middle East Region has been, for years, at the forefront of aviation growth and reshaping the global long-haul markets by elevating its hub position for connecting Europe and Asia-Pacific, in line with the west to east shift of the geographical centre of gravity of air transport operations. Growth of the Region started to undergo a significant transition and slow down recently. Air transport supports 2.4 million jobs and USD 130 billion in GDP in the Middle East.

With the further movement of the air transport centre of gravity from West to East, the geographic position of the Gulf hubs will continue to offer a strategic advantage to several airlines in the Region. According to ICAO long-term traffic forecasts, total passenger traffic of the Middle East Region is expected to grow by around 4.6 per cent annually up to 2045, the second fastest growth among all Regions after Asia and Pacific. The Middle East is expected to be the fastest growing Region in terms of freight traffic growth, and is projected to grow at 5.4 per cent annually up to 2045. This increase will, in turn, drive growth in the economic output and jobs that are supported by air transport in the next decade. By 2036, it is forecasted that the impact of air transport and the tourism it facilitates in the Middle East will have grown to support 4.3 million jobs (78 per cent more than in 2016) and a USD 345 billion contribution to GDP (an increase of 166 per cent).

The Middle East has to contend with situations unique to the Region such as fluctuating oil revenues, regional conflict and overcrowded air space. In addition, airlines in this Region are now facing challenges to their business models.

The growth of air transport requires a high-performing aviation system including airlines, airports and ATM. The overall efficiency of the ATM system commensurate with the level of predicted traffic growth should be increased through improved airspace design and organization. Furthermore, this

Region is in need of political commitment to market liberalization. Although the Middle East is home to some of the world's largest hub airports, the relations between States are still mostly bound by bilateral air services agreements that limit market access to each other. (Source: *Aviation Benefits Report-2019*).

The economic and social situation in the Middle East is similar to the world outlook provided above. The COVID-19 pandemic has battered world-wide aviation in a way that could never have been imagined and we are still trying to assess the full extent of the impact that it will have on civil aviation in the longer term. While the pandemic is not yet over, there are signs at last that vaccination offers a viable way to reduce levels of infection and a basis to realistically plan for a full reopening. Throughout the pandemic, the ICAO MID Office has continued to work collaboratively with all stakeholders to ensure that the industry is equipped to resume the flight operations.

In addition, the MID-RPTF mechanisms continued to serve as a platform for coordination and cooperation amongst all stakeholders to support States with the implementation of the CART and HLCC recommendations as well as the recovery of aviation industry in the MID Region during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak.

During 2021 the reduction in airline passenger flights due to COVID-19 continued, subsequently resulting also in lack of capacity to transport cargo in that aircraft. The same can be stated for the complexity of operations, ranging from quarantine measures imposed on flight crews, disruption in training and scheduling, and the need to transport cargo in the cabin.

Airlines continued to have a large portion of their aircraft grounded, leaving flight and cabin crew members with uncertainty about the return to normal operations.

However, the recovery during the summer of 2021 was faster than expected. This was a positive development but led to difficulties for operators to cope with the increased demand, adding complexity in the return to service of aircraft and flight crews.

Over the last five years, the global scheduled commercial international operations accounted for approximately 24.96 million departures in 2021, compared to 36.3 million departures in 2017. The MID Region shows a decrease in traffic volumes during 2021. Total scheduled commercial departures in 2021 accounted for approximately 806,274 estimated departures compared to 1.37 million departures in 2017. In terms of aircraft accidents, the MID Region had no accident during the year 2021. The 5-year average accident rate for 2017-2021 is 2.21, which is slightly below the global average rate (2.41) for the same period. The MID Region accident rate in 2020 is higher than the global accident rate, which is 2.14 accidents per million departures.

The MID Region had no fatal accident in 2021. However, the 5-year average fatal accident rate for 2017-2021 is 0.42, which is almost similar to the global average rate (0.41) for the same period. The MID Region had no fatal accidents in 2017, 2019, and 2021. However, two fatal accidents occurred in 2018 and 2020. The 2018 accident caused 66 fatalities and the year 2020 caused 176 fatalities.

In terms of Safety Management, the average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 76, 1%. Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top SEIs. In connection with this, the RASG-MID/9 endorsed the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT) handbook to support MID States in the implementation of the SSP in an effective and efficient way.

Common challenges in MID Region include:

- a. The political/security situation in some States, the cross-national variation in Aviation development as well as the relatively small accreditation area, impede the provision of Technical assistance, implementation of Regional projects and the achievement of the Regional safety, air navigation and Security targets;

- b. The drastic reduction in traffic volumes due to the COVID-19 crisis and the new risks induced by its impacts;
- c. The lack of financial and human resources in some States, combined with the complexity of administrative arrangements for the approval of duty travel, political sensitivities, etc., affected the level of attendance to the activities organized by the ICAO MID Office as well as States' support to the MIDANPIRG, RASG-MID and the MID-RASFG Work Programmes and their subsidiary bodies;
- d. Low level of reporting by States (inputs to the MID-Air Navigation Report and MID Annual Safety Report, incidents, national plans, success stories, replies to State Letters, etc; and
- e. Resources constraints (financial and technical personnel) in the Regional Office, combined with a high rotation rate vs. necessary time for new staff/comers to cope with the way of doing business in ICAO considering the MID Region-specific challenges.

5. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

The MID-RASP presents the safety priorities that were developed based on the ICAO GASP's including organizational challenges, operational safety risks, and emerging risks as well as region-specific issues identified by a safety risk assessment and published in MID Region Annual Safety Reports and RASG-MID activities. Additionally, the MID region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level is to address the region's operational issues and other safety issues in a timely manner. Therefore, the MID-RASP strategic approach would focus on organizational challenges/issues, regional operational safety risks, and emerging risks as indicated in graph 2 below.

- a. Organizational challenges/issues including the States 'safety oversight, safety management, aircraft accident and incident investigation, Human factors and competence of personnel, and Cybersecurity. In terms of human factors and competence of personnel, as new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. It is equally important for aviation personnel to take advantage of the safety opportunities presented by new technologies;
- b. In respect of regional operational safety risks, the focus would be on R-HRC identified in the GASP 2023-2025 Edition mainly the LOC-I, CFIT, RE, RI, and MAC; and
- c. Regarding the emerging risks, the focus would be on the COVID-19 crisis and the new risks induced by its impacts, Civil drones (Unmanned Aircraft Systems), Management of security risks with safety impact, and GNSS interference, and 5G interference with Radar altimeter band frequency.



Graph 2: Safety Priorities

Therefore, the MID-RASP adopts three focus areas approach:

First focus area involves enhancing existing regional mechanisms to strengthen effective safety oversight capabilities and improve the implementation of effective safety management, in particular to:

- Draft the MID-RASP 2023-20225 Edition and consider inputs from MID Annual Safety Report (MID ASR), MID Region safety management Roadmap, Runway Safety Go-Team; RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, and RASFG-MID.
- enhance coordination and communication with regional organizations including ACAO, ACI, CANSO, IATA, and other regional mechanisms, MENA ARCM, especially MENA RSOO once activated;
- improve the scheduling and streamline the number of regional safety-related events including workshops, trainings, seminars; and
- improve communication and sharing of safety information between States, international organizations, and industry.

In addition to the varying levels of safety oversight capabilities in the MID Region, other regional safety issues and activities have been identified and selected for inclusion in the MID-RASP. These were derived from the RASG-MID reports, analysis of USOAP data, accident and incident investigation reports, safety oversight activities over recent years from MID States, as indicated below:

- Improve Regional Cooperation for the provision of Accident & Incident Investigation;
- Improve implementation of ELP requirements;
- Sharing of Safety Recommendations related to Accidents and Serious Incidents;
- Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods;
- Need to manage the cybersecurity risks; and
- 5G interference with Radio altimeter frequency band.

Second focus area involves addressing effectively regional operational safety risks including specific operational risks stemming from the crisis as the vision of the GASP is to achieve and maintain the goal

of zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond.

Third focus area involves addressing the emerging safety risks that might impact safety in the future including recovering from the COVID-19 crisis without adversely affecting the high level of safety performance GNSS outages/vulnerability, civil drones to ensure safe operation of unmanned aircraft system (UAS), impact of security on safety, and 5G interference with Radar Altimeter frequency band. Additionally, for emerging risks, SEIs/safety actions would be developed and covered under the focus areas (organizational challenges and Regional operational safety risks).

5.1 Organizational Challenges/Issues

Organizational challenges are systemic issues which take into consideration the impact of organizational culture, and policies and procedures on the effectiveness of safety risk controls. Organizations include entities in a State, such as the civil aviation authorities (CAAs) and service providers, such as operators of aeroplanes, ATS providers and operators of aerodromes. Organizations should identify hazards in systemic issues and mitigate the associated risks to manage safety. A State's responsibilities for the management of safety comprise both safety oversight and safety management, collectively implemented through an SSP.

It is crucial that States' safety oversight capabilities and safety management, and aviation infrastructure should keep pace with these regional safety issues.

Therefore, for the triennium of 2023-2025, the MID Region should continue to focus its efforts in addressing the following top Regional organizational issues:

- a. Lower USOAP EI scores, especially States with EI below 60% as well as AIG, ANS, AGA, and OPS areas;
- b. Slow pace of SSP development & implementation including the NASP development, as well as understanding of newer safety management and performance based concepts;
- c. Slow pace of SMS acceptance and surveillance;
- d. Slow pace of developing Risk Management framework to support decision-making and deploy the resources needed to mitigate risks effectively;
- e. Improve Regional Cooperation for the Provision of Accident & Incident Investigation;
- f. Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods;
- g. Support States related to Human factors and Competence of Personnel
- h. Support States to manage the cybersecurity risks;
- i. Management of security risks with safety impact;
- j. Slow pace of implementation of RASG-MID conclusion/ MID-RASP SEIs/safety actions and tools to mitigate identified safety risks and safety deficiencies;
- k. Insufficient resources and expertise to manage and collect safety data and safety information on a State level, and no formal mechanisms in place that allow for the sharing and benchmarking of information at the Regional level; and
- l. Increasing risks associated with airspace structure including ATS networks and associated airspaces to accommodate the traffic flow in safe and efficient manner.

5.1.1 Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Safety oversight is defined as a function by means of which States ensure effective implementation of the safety-related SARPs and associated procedures contained in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and related ICAO documents. States have overall safety oversight responsibilities, which emphasize a State's commitment to safety in respect of the State's aviation activity. An individual State's responsibility for safety oversight is the foundation upon which a safe global air transport system is built. States that experience difficulties in carrying out safety oversight functions can impact the state of International Civil Aviation.

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that States inability to effectively oversee aviation operations which remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is 74, 67 %, which is above the world average 68.68 % (as of 29 May 2022). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%.

All eight areas have an EI above 60%. However, the areas of AIG, AGA and ANS still need more improvement. Regarding the Critical Elements (CEs), CE4 (Qualified technical personnel) improved and is above 60% (62.39%) EI, whereas CE8 (resolution of safety issues) is the only one below EI 60% (58. 89%) EI.

Moreover, the effective implementation in certification, surveillance, and resolution of safety concerns need to be improved.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Conducted technical assistance and NCLB mission activities to States
b. Capacity building activities
c. Developed and implemented a specific NCLB plan of actions for prioritized States according to established criteria
d. Established MENA RSOO to assist States and start operations

5.1.2 Improve Regional Cooperation for the Provision of Accident & Incident Investigation

In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is 74.67 %, which is above the world average 68.68 % (as of 29 May 2022). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%. Regarding the Critical Elements (CEs), CE4 (Qualified technical personnel) improved and is above 60% (60.08%) EI, whereas CE8 (resolution of safety issues) is the only one below EI 60% (59. 47%) EI. All eight areas have an EI above 60%. However, the area of AIG still need more improvement.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. AIG Strategy in the Provision of AIG Functions endorsed by the DGCA-MID/4
b. MENA AIG Regional Cooperation Mechanism (ARCM) endorsed by the DGCA meeting in Kuwait
c. Organized AIG capacity building activities
d. Draft MENA ARCM implementation action plan endorsed by the RSC/7
e. MENA ARCM Establishment and Activation

5.1.3 Sharing of Safety Recommendations related to Accidents and Serious Incidents

- a. The Safety recommendations are the utmost results of investigation or safety studies conducted by States. In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13, a State shall send to ICAO a copy of the Final Report on its investigations into accidents and serious incidents involving aircraft of a maximum mass of over 5,700 kgs.
- b. A safety recommendation is defined as a proposal by an accident investigation authority, based on information derived from an investigation. The intended purpose of a safety recommendation is the prevention of accidents or incidents, and the reduction of the consequences of such occurrences.

Key Actions completed/planned

- | |
|---|
| a. Establishment of an Ad-hoc Action Group championed by Saudi Arabia and UAE |
| b. The Questionnaire on establishing safety recommendations platform developed and circulated to MENA ARCM Member States. The questionnaire analysis has been shared with MENA ARCM/2 meeting |

5.1.4 Improve Implementation of ELP Requirements

The decision to address language proficiency requirements (LPRs) for pilots and air traffic controllers was first made by the 32nd Session of the ICAO Assembly in September 1998 as a direct response to several fatal accidents, including one that cost the lives of 349 persons, as well as to previous fatal accidents in which the lack of proficiency in English was identified as a contributing factor. The intent was to improve the level of language proficiency in aviation worldwide and reduce the communication breakdowns caused by a lack of language skills. LPRs have now moved beyond implementation (Assembly Resolution A38-8 refers), entering a phase of post implementation.

Key Actions completed/planned

- | |
|---|
| a. Development and dissemination the Questionnaire on ELP |
| b. Analysis of the survey results and was reviewed by the RSC/7 |

5.1.5 Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods

The data analysis results of the USOAP-CMA OPS area showed that Dangerous Goods is one of the unsatisfactory PQs in operations for some states in the region. The identified issues highlighted in the analysis report as indicated below:

- a. States have not implemented an effective system for safety oversight of the various entities involved in the transport of dangerous goods, including shippers, packers, cargo handling companies and air operators. Regarding the latter, some States, the authorities have not effectively reviewed the dangerous goods procedures of air operators, contained in the operations and ground handling manuals, mostly due to a lack of qualified dangerous goods inspectors.
- b. Some States have not kept records relating to dangerous goods-related approvals; and
- c. In addition, in some States, dangerous goods inspector procedures have not been established and implemented.

Safety actions have been planned to be taken during the year 2020 and 2021. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic some of the ICAO MID Office work Programme activities have been postponed for 2022 including Dangerous Goods workshop.

Key Actions completed/planned

- | |
|---|
| a. Dangerous Goods webinar |
| b. Dangerous Goods Capacity building activities |

5.1.6 Improve the Safety Management

Despite the fact that the last years have clearly brought continued improvements in safety across every operational domain, the latest accidents and serious incidents and the massive worldwide impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the aviation system underline the complex nature of aviation safety and the significance of addressing human and organizational factor aspects.

Effective safety management including robust risk management policies and processes are essential in dealing with the multiple impacts of the pandemic on the aviation system, both at authority and organization level. This is supported by ICAO Annex 19 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation and when applicable, by flight data monitoring (FDM) requirements.

Therefore, States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to fully implement SSPs according to Annex 19, States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The SMS enables service providers to capture and transmit safety information which contributes to safety risk management. In this context, the role of the State evolves to include the establishment and achievement of safety performance targets as well as effective oversight of its service providers' SMS. Individual States should provide safety information derived from their SSPs to their respective RASGs to contribute to Regional safety risk management activities. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 76, 18%.

An SSP requires increased collaboration across operational domains to identify hazards and manage risks. Aviation authorities and organizations should anticipate new emerging threats and associated challenges by developing SRM principles.

Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). In connection with this, the RSC/7 endorsed the safety management Roadmap and established the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT). Furthermore, the RASG-MID/9 endorsed the SMIT handbook to support MID States in the implementation of the SSP in an effective and efficient way

ICAO launched SSP Implementation Assessments (SSPIAs) phase 2 under the USOAP CMA. The assessments are based on a qualitative assessment of a State's progress in implementing a State Safety Programme (SSP), using SSP-related PQs.

The PQs are reflective of Annex 19- Safety Management and the Safety Management Manual (Doc 9859).

Unlike the USOAP CMA's audit activities, SSPIAs are linked to applicable SSP components rather than critical elements (CEs). The SSP components are:

1. State safety policy, objectives and resources;
2. State safety risk management;
3. State safety assurance; and
4. State safety promotion

The SSP assessment covers 8 areas as indicated below:

1. SSP general aspects (GEN);
2. safety data analysis general aspects (SDA);
3. personnel licensing and training (PEL);
4. aircraft operations (OPS);
5. airworthiness of aircraft (AIR), approved maintenance organization (AMO) aspects only;
6. air navigation services(ANS), air traffic services provider (ATSP) aspects only;
7. aerodromes and ground aids (AGA); and
8. aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG).

In 2020, ICAO developed guidance supporting the determination of maturity levels for each SSP-related PQ. The SSP-related PQs, complemented by the maturity level matrices for each of the SSP audit areas, are available in the CMA Library of the USOAP CMA Online Framework (OLF) at www.soa.icao.int (restricted access). These matrices describe the level of progress for each element of the SSP, which can be described as:

- Not present and not planned;
- Not present but being worked on;
- Present; or
- Present and effective.

ICAO will use the SSP maturity level matrices for the scheduled SSPIAs under Phase 2, which will begin in 2021. This phase of assessments will utilize the maturity level matrices to provide a more detailed, quantitative measurement of a State's progress in the implementation and maintenance of its SSP. Two assessment missions have been planned for the year 2022.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Conducted continuously SSP/SMS capacity building activities
b. Development of the MID Region Safety Management Implementation Roadmap
c. Establishment of the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT) and SMIT Handbook endorsed by RASG-MID/9
d. Establishment the MENA RSOO to support States in the expeditious implementation of SSP
e. Guidance material development
f. Technical Assistance missions

5.1.7 Certification of International Aerodromes

All eight areas have an EI above 60%. In respect of the Critical Elements (CEs), CE4 (Qualified technical personnel) improved and is above 60% (60.08%) EI, whereas CE8 (resolution of safety issues) is the only one below EI 60% (59.47%) EI. However, the areas of AGA still need more improvement.

Key Actions completed/ planned
a. Conducted Aerodrome Safety Management Workshops
b. Wildlife hazard Management and Control Workshop
c. RSA on Wildlife Management and Control Regulatory Framework & Guidance Material.
d. Certification of Annex 14 training courses
e. GRF training courses

5.1.8 Establishment of Runway Safety Teams at International Airports

All eight areas have an EI above 60%. In terms of the Critical Elements (CEs), CE4 (Qualified technical personnel) improved and is above 60% (60.08%) EI, whereas CE8 (resolution of safety issues) is the only one below EI 60% (59.47%) EI. However, the areas of AGA still need more improvement

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Runway Safety Go-Team Missions
b. Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through capacity building activities

5.1.9 Human Factors and Competence of Personnel

As the aviation system changes, it is imperative to ensure that human factors and the impact on human performance are taken into account, both at service provider and regulatory levels.

Human factors and human performance are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably. While both human factors and human performance examine the capabilities, limitations and tendencies of human beings, they have different emphases:

- Human Factors (HF) – this term focusses on why human beings function in the way that they do. The term incorporates both mental processes and physical ones, and the

- interdependency between the two.
- Human Performance (HP) – the output of human factors is human performance. This term focusses on how people do the things that they do.

As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. CRM has been identified in the MID ASR as most important human factors issue in the domain of commercial air transport and safety actions would be identified and developed. In addition, Team Resource Management (TRM) was introduced into ATC following the success achieved with Crew Resource Management (CRM) in the airline community enhancing teamwork practices. The practice is applied within virtually every airline with training given to pilots and other operational staff. Within the last decade in ATM there have been numerous advances in widespread acceptance of SMS under the guidance of ICAO. ICAO has now mandated the use of SMS Manual Doc 9859 to standardize the approach to safety. TRM as defined by ICAO is an integral component of SMS under human factor

Key Actions completed/planned
a. CRM and TRM workshops/webinars
b. FRMS workshops/webinars

5.1.10 Cybersecurity Resilience

The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalization. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardized manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organizations with malicious intent.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Cybersecurity symposium/workshops
b. Development of MID Region Cybersecurity Action Plan

5.2 Regional Operational Safety Risks

Operational safety risks arise during the delivery of a service or the conduct of an activity (e.g. operation of an aircraft, airports or of air traffic control). Operational interactions between people and technology, as well as the operational context in which aviation activities are carried out are taken into consideration to identify expected performance limitations and hazards. The RASG-MID utilizes available safety data and information to determine the region's operational safety risks which include G-HRCs and additional regional operational safety risks.

5.2.1 Address Operational Safety Risks in Commercial Air Transport (CAT) Aeroplane Operations above 5,700 kgs

In terms of an aircraft accident, the MID Region had no accident during the year 2021. The 5-year average accident rate for 2017-2021 is 2.21, which is slightly below the global average rate (2.41) for the same period. The MID Region accident rate in 2020 is higher than the global accident rate, which is 2.14 accidents per million departures.

The MID Region had no fatal accident in 2021. However, the 5-year average fatal accident rate for 2017-2021 is 0.42, which is almost similar to the global average rate (0.41) for the same period. The MID Region had no fatal accidents in 2017, 2019, and 2021. However, two fatal accidents occurred in 2018 and 2020. The 2018 accident caused 66 fatalities and the year 2020 caused 176 fatalities.

The GASP 2023-2025 Edition identifies the G-HRCs as LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RE and RI. In the MID Region in 2017-2021 the topmost frequent accidents related to the loss of control-inflight and runway safety, which includes RE and ARC during Landing. In terms of fatality risk, the fatal accidents for the period 2017- 2021 were attributed to LOC-I.

Therefore, for the triennium of 2023-2025, the MID Region should continue to focus its efforts on mitigating and minimizing occurrences related to the R-HRCs for this time period, namely:

1. Loss of Control-In Flight (LOC-I);
2. Runway Safety (RS); mainly (RE and ARC during landing);
3. Runway Incursion (RI);
4. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT); and
5. Mid-Air Collision (MAC).

MAC is established as a top risk for the MID region based on the existing data driven approach used to determine the R-HRCs though there is no fatal accident during the last five years. Therefore, there is a need for the MID region to build up its capability to collect and analyze safety data pertaining to MAC.

In addition, safety issues have been identified in the MID ASR and need to be considered by the States while developing their NASP as well as the industry as indicated at **Appendix B**.

5.2.2 Aircraft Upset in Flight (Loss of Control-Inflight)

Aircraft upset or loss of control inflight is the most common accident outcome for fatal accidents in CAT aero plane operations. It includes uncontrolled collisions with terrain, but also occurrences where the aircraft deviated from the intended flight path or intended aircraft flight parameters, regardless of whether the flight crew realized the deviation and whether it was possible to recover or not. It also includes the triggering of stall warning and envelope protections. During 2017-2021 aircraft upset, or loss of control contributed to one fatal accident involving MID Region aeroplane.

Key Actions completed/Planned
a. Organized and promoted training provisions on recovery from upset scenarios (UPRT workshops)
b. Assistance to States to implement the SSP/SMS through workshops/trainings
c. Development and publication of RSAs related to the LOC-I Airplane States Awareness (ASA) – Low Speed Alerting Standard Operating Procedures Effectiveness and Adherence Airplane States Awareness (ASA) –Training –Flight Crew training (Approach to stall & Up set recovery) Verification and Validation
d. Construction, approval and implementation of RNAV(GNSS) / RNP-AR procedures to all runways not currently served by precision approach procedure
e. Develop guidance material/share best practices on Ground Handling Service Provider Certification Process
f. Guidance material on flight crew proficiency
g. Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation

5.2.3 Runway Excursion

Runway excursion covers materialized runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties in maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off-centred or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during

landing. During the period 2017-2021, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flight.

Key Actions completed/planned	
a.	Conduct of assistance missions by the Runway Safety Go-Team (RST)
b.	Establishment of a MID-FPP to support states on the effective implementation of the PBN procedures
c.	Promoted operational improvements and safety enhancements associated with the implementation of ASBU modules, e.g. PBN, CDO. Implementation of Performance-Based Navigation (PBN); particularly Approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV)
d.	Assistance to States to implement the SSP/SMS
e.	RSA on Wildlife Management and Control Regulatory Framework & Guidance Material
f.	Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through Webinar/ Workshops/Training
g.	Guidance material on un-Stabilized Approach
h.	MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Implementation.

5.2.4 Runway Incursion (RI)

A Runway Incursions refers to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection. Their accident outcome is runway collisions. While there were no fatal accidents or accidents involving MID States operators in the last years involving runway collision, the risk of the reported occurrence demonstrated to be very real. In addition to this, MID States should provide further data analysis regarding runway incursion to identify the root causes and associated safety issues.

Key Actions completed/planned	
a.	Conduct of assistance missions by the Runway Safety Go-Team (RST)
b.	Assistance to States to implement the SSP/SMS

5.2.5 Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences, which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc. There was no fatal accident involving MID States operators during this period. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States and in other parts of the world that make it an area of concern. However, additional data is needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

Key Actions completed/planned	
a.	Establishment of MID-FPP to support states on the effective implementation of the PBN procedures
b.	Promoted operational improvements and safety enhancements associated with the implementation of ASBU modules; e.g., PBN, CDO, CCO. Implementation of Performance-Based Navigation (PBN); particularly Approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV)
c.	Assistance to States to implement PBN routes for en-route and terminal airspace through meeting and workshops/seminars
d.	Assistance to States to implement the SSP/SMS

e. Development and publication of RSAs
f. Construction, approval and implementation of RNAV (GNSS) / RNP-AR procedures to all runways not currently served by precision approach procedure
g. Guidance for designing RNP Approach

5.2.6 Mid-Air Collision (MAC)

Refers to the potential collision of two aircraft in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine TCAS resolution advisories or airspace infringements. Although there have been no aero-plane mid-air collision accidents in recent years within the MID States. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating in Gulf area over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation. This is one specific safety issue that is a main priority in this key risk area. However, additional data is needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Assistance to States to implement the SSP/SMS
b. Establishment of Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) Group to carry out further analyses of the reported NMAC incidents and provide feedback to the ATM SG and ASRG.
c. Conduct workshop to implement Civil-Military cooperation
d. Conduct seminar on raising awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas

5.3 Emerging Risks

Emerging safety issues are risks that might impact Safety in the future. These may include a possible new technology, a potential public policy, a new concept, a business model or idea that, while perhaps an outlier today, could mature and develop into a critical mainstream issue in the future or become a major trend in its own right. Therefore, for the triennium of 2023-2025, the MID Region should continue to focus its efforts on mitigating and minimizing the safety impact of emerging risks for this time period, namely:

- a. Support States on establishing the UAS regulatory framework.
- b. Decrease the GNSS interference impact.
- c. support on maintaining collectively the pre-pandemic high aviation safety level throughout the recovery phase and improving safety post-recovery due to the drastic reduction in traffic volumes due to the COVID-19 crisis and the new risks induced by its impacts.
- d. Management of security risks with safety impact.
- e. 5G interference with Radio Altimeter frequency band.

The emerging risks SEIs and safety actions will be covered under organizational issues and operational safety risk SEIs.

5.3.1 GNSS interference

GNSS interference, including intentional and unintentional signal interference, has been identified as a major safety issue.

Flight Data Exchange analysis showed that the majority of GPS Signal Lost was detected within or in vicinity of Turkish airspace (Ankara FIR and Istanbul FIR), and in Eastern Mediterranean area. Compared to previous analysis, the identified hot spots have been expanded into entire Anatolian peninsula, including Istanbul FIR.

The GNSS interference SEI /safety actions covered under CFIT SEI.

Key Actions completed/t planned
a. RSA on GNSS vulnerability has been developed and published
b. Safety data analysis shared by IATA
c. Raise awareness on the potential impact of GNSS interference on the aviation during the Civil-Mil Workshop
d. Urge States to follow the reporting procedure agreed by MIDANPIRG Conclusion 19/4 when needed

5.3.2 COVID-19 Pandemic Outbreak- Safe return to operations

It was noted that the rapidly evolving COVID-19 crisis heavily affected all aspects of civil aviation. The urgent need to coordinate all efforts to reduce the risks of the spread of COVID-19 by air transport and to protect the health of air travellers and aviation personnel, while maintaining essential aviation transport operations and ensuring an orderly return to normal operations in due course was underlined. The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in an extreme reduction in operations that began in late March 2020. Recovering from this crisis without adversely affecting the high level of safety performance is proposed as a strategic priority.

In addition to the specific operational risks stemming from the crisis, there are currently a substantial number of exemptions and extensions granted; however, the use of flexibility provisions is diminishing. The aviation safety issues arising as a result of the pandemic have been identified and those safety issues that were considered to constitute the highest risk to the aviation system were assessed and resulted in a number of safety interventions and the publication of guidance material including ICAO CART documents to support stakeholders with the management of the specific risks posed by the crisis. The UAS SEIs /safety actions covered under MAC SEI.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Establishment of MID Region Recovery Plan Task Force (MID-RPTF) to assist in developing regional restart and recovery planning
b. MID-RPTF activities
c. Conduct of teleconferences with DGCA and Regional international organization
d. Development of MID CART Regional Implementation Roadmap
e. Continuous communication and coordination with MID States;
f. Development of a COVID-19 web page to communicate to States and all stakeholders the guidance material issued by ICAO, WHO, international organizations, States best practices and
g. Deployment of iPacks
h. Capacity building activities

5.3.3 Ensure the safe operations of UAS (drones)

The number of drones at the global level has increased. Available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. The civil aviation authority is responsible for, inter alia, ensuring aviation safety and protecting the public from aviation hazards. Operators of aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, are likewise responsible for operating safely. The rapid rise of UAS raises new challenges that were not considered in historic aviation regulatory frameworks. Before devising any regulatory framework for UAS operations, the regulator should understand and assess the UAS situation in its State.

UA operations will involve stakeholders' familiar with aviation as well as many who are not. It is important to include these stakeholders from the beginning when developing the UAS regulations. Their early involvement will ensure that the regulations appropriately address the needs of these groups while also serving to educate them on expectations and what is feasible.

Therefore, safety actions would be developed to support States to develop their national regulations in order to ensure safe operation of UAS.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. UAS iPack deployment
b. Drones symposium
c. Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework

5.3.4 Management of security risks with safety impact

The crash of flight MH17 immediately raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. Similar events had occurred in the MID region. Thus, military or terrorist conflicts may occur in any State at any time and pose risks to civil aviation. This is why it's important for governments, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civilian flights.

Furthermore, flying over or nearby conflict zones is related to both security and safety management and requires an integrated risk management process, as proposed by ICAO in the second edition of the Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones (Doc 10084) as an activity for further development. Several steps have to be taken, as part of the continuous risk assessment cycle including: the collection of information and intelligence; the subsequent threat analysis; the security risk assessment; the hazard identification; the safety risk assessment; the determination of the acceptable risk level and lastly information sharing. Each mitigating action should be accompanied with the identification of (new) hazards as a result of unintended consequences of the risk assessment mitigating actions.

The crash of flight MH17 shows, safety and security are intertwined. To manage the risks related to flying over conflict zones and other risks at the interface of safety and security as good as possible, closer cooperation between both worlds is necessary.

Key Actions taken/planned
a- Circulate ICAO Doc 10084 Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones
b- Organize seminar/Symposium to exchange experiences and good practices on assessing the risks and sharing of information related to the overflying of conflict zones in coordination with RASFG-MID and MIDANPIRG
c- Encourage States to issue NOTAMs to share threats information emanated from conflict zones within their airspaces.

5.3.5 5G Operation on Radio Altimeter

Radar altimeters (RA), operating at 4.2-4.4 GHz, are the only sensors onboard a civil aircraft which provide a direct measurement of the clearance height of the aircraft over the terrain or other obstacles (i.e. the Above Ground Level - AGL - information).

The RA systems' input is required and used by many aircraft systems when AGL is below 2500 ft. Any failures or interruptions of these sensors can therefore lead to incidents with catastrophic outcome, potentially resulting in multiple fatalities. The radar altimeters also play a crucial role in providing

situational awareness to the flight crew. The measurements from the radar altimeters are also used by Automatic Flight Guidance and Control Systems (AFGCS) during instrument approaches, and to control the display of information from other systems, such as Predictive Wind Shear (PWS), the Engine-Indicating and Crew-Alerting System (EICAS), and Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) systems, to the flight crew.

There is a major risk that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band will cause harmful interference to radar altimeters on all types of civil aircraft- including commercial transport airplanes; business, regional, and general aviation airplanes; and both transport and general aviation helicopters. If there is no proper mitigation, this risk has the potential for broad impacts to aviation operations in the United States as well as in other regions where the 5G network is being implemented next to the 4.2-4.4 GHz frequency band.

List of potential equipment failures:

Auto land functions, EICAS/ECAM, False or missing GPWS alert, Unreliable instrument Indications, and Abnormal behaviors in Automatic Flight Systems.

The 5G interference with Radar Altimeter SEIs/safety actions covered under CFIT SEI.

Key Actions taken/planned
a- Develop a guidance material on safeguarding measures to protect Radio Altimeter from potential harmful interference from 5G Operation
b- Conduct a Webinar addressing the matter to raise awareness and promote the guidance material developed by the RADALT AG.

PART-II. IMPLEMENTATION

6. SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 Safety Monitoring and Implementation

This section presents an outline of the safety performance indicators reflecting the MID Region safety strategic priorities in the area of safety. The RASG-MID would use the indicators listed in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C** to measure safety performance and monitor each regional safety target. Furthermore, the MID Region SPMM includes six (6) Goals in line with GASP 2023-2025 Edition.

The RASG-MID would continuously monitor the implementation of the identified SEIs in the MID-RASP and measure safety performance of the regional civil aviation system, to ensure the intended targets are achieved, using the MID Region SPMM to this plan. Therefore, for each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM, identified SEI(s) be mapped to it including their respective actions.

MID region safety indicators and targets were aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP goals and targets as relevant in the MID Region. A MID Region Annual safety report would be annually published to provide stakeholders with relevant up-to-date information on the progress made in achieving the regional safety goals and targets, as well as the implementation status/progress of the SEIs.

In the event that the regional safety goals and targets are not met, the causes would be addressed and presented to stakeholders. If RASG-MID identifies critical operational safety risks, reasonable measures would be taken to mitigate them as soon as practicable, possibly leading to an earlier revision of the MID-RASP by SEIG.

The monitoring of safety performance and its enhancement is achieved through identification of relevant Goals and Safety Indicators, taking into consideration the GASP 2023-2025 and regional specific objectives and priorities, as well as the adoption and attainment of Safety Targets with a specific timeframe.

The MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring includes the following Goals:

Aspirational Goal: Zero fatality by 2030, the GASP aspirational goal of ‘zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond’.

Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks: This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 1. This is aligned with the high-level ICAO safety metrics, thereby facilitating comparison of MID Region performance with global averages. Indicators related to risk areas are identified through the MID Region risk assessment methodology and described in the MID Region ASR. These ‘operational’ safety indicators would continue to be monitored through the MID Region ASR.

Goal 2: Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities: This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2. The Monitoring will be based on the available data published through USOAP-CMA (OLF) and iSTARS. The Regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) in the MID Region (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is 74.67 %, which is above the world average 68.68% (as of 29 May 2022). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%. The objective is aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP requiring all States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI) of the critical elements (CEs) of the State’s safety oversight system (with focus on priority PQs) as follows: a) by 2024 -75 per cent; b) by 2026 – 85 per cent EI score; c) by 2030 EI Score – 95 per cent EI score.

Goal 3: Implement effective State safety Programmes (SSPs): This is related to 2023-2025 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through ICAO iSTARS and USOAP-CMA (OLF). Feedback provided by Member States and Regional organizations would also be considered.

MID Office will in addition collect relevant documentation and information from States (SSP and NASP). The objective is aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP requiring all States to implement the foundation of an SSP by 2023, all States to publish a national aviation safety plan (NASP) by 2024, all States to work towards an effective SSP with maturity levels – Present by 2025, and Present and Effective by 2028.

Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level: This is related to 2023-2025 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through ICAO iSTARS and USOAP-CMA (OLF). Feedback provided by Member States would be also considered. The objective is aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP requiring all States to achieve a positive safety oversight margin, and an effective SSP, to actively lead RASGs' safety risk management activities, by 2025.

Goal 5: Expand the use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks: This is related to 2023-2025 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be collected from IATA and other international and regional organizations. Feedback provided by Member States would also be considered. The objective is aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP requiring all States that do not expect to meet GASP Goals 2 and 3 to seek assistance to strengthen their safety oversight capabilities or facilitate SSP implementation, all States to contribute information on operational safety risks, including SSP safety performance indicators regional aviation safety group (RASG) by 2025, and all regions to publish an updated regional aviation safety plan (RASP), in line with the 2023–2025 edition of GASP by 2023.

Goal 6: Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations: This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 6. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through ICAO iSTARS. Feedback provided by Member States would also be considered. The objective is aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP requiring all States to implement the air navigation and airport core infrastructure including aerodrome safety by 2025.

6.2 Communication of Progress to RASG-MID and Regional Stakeholders

A MID Region Annual safety report would be annually published to provide stakeholders with relevant up-to-date information on the progress made in achieving the regional safety goals and targets, as well as the implementation status of the SEIs. In addition, the abovementioned information would culminate in a report on progress of implementation of the MID-RASP SEIs and their respective actions as well as in achieving the regional safety goals and targets; would be presented at every SEIG and RASG-MID meetings as well as safety seminars. The progress report should cover at least the following aspects:

- a. Brief overview of the overall implementation of the MID-RASP;
- b. Analysis on delay/ challenges encountered in implementation of SEIs and their respective actions; and
- c. If regional safety goals and targets are not met, causes would be addressed and presented to relevant stakeholders.

7 SAFETY ACTIONS

This chapter addresses system-wide problems that affect aviation as a whole including the SEIs and their respective actions. In most scenarios, these problems are related to organizational processes and procedures, regional operational safety risks, and emerging risks. The safety actions in this chapter are driven principally by the need to maintain or increase the current level of safety in the aviation sector for the region.

This chapter also facilitates the identification of SEIs and their respective actions relevant for each Goal established in the MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring as follows:

- **Goal 1:** Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks.
- **Goal 2:** strengthen States safety oversight capabilities.
- **Goal 3:** Implementation of effective State safety Programmes.
- **Goal 4:** Increase collaboration at the regional level.
- **Goal 5:** Expand the use of industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks.
- **Goal 6:** Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations.

7.1 Organizational Challenges/issues

7.1.1 Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

The States safety oversight capabilities remains an issue mainly for AIG, AGA, ANS, and OPS areas. The lack of effective oversight remains an issue and the difficulties experienced by some authorities in properly discharging their oversight responsibilities is a concern also in the light of the size, scope and complexity of the aviation industry that some of them oversee.

Furthermore, while a number of CAAs have reached a suitable and stable level of maturity, certain continue to underperform and/or struggle in achieving sustainable improvements. Most notably, while progress has been noted in the implementation of Authorities' management systems, effective oversight of undertakings' safety management systems continues to be an area of concern in several domains.

7.1.1.1 G2-SEI-01: Strengthening States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

The CEs are essentially the safety defense tools of the State Safety Oversight system needed for the effective and sustainable implementation of a safety-related policy and associated procedures. The effective implementation of the CEs is an indication of a State's capability for safety oversight. States must establish CE-1 through CE-5 prior to the implementation of CE-6 through CE-8 in order to provide effective safety oversight and safety management. An individual State's responsibility for safety oversight is the foundation upon which a safe global air transport system is built. States that experience difficulties in carrying out safety oversight functions can impact the state of International Civil Aviation.

States should work to continually improve their effective implementation of the eight CEs of the State's safety oversight system in all relevant areas, as appropriate to their aviation system complexity. Through collaborative efforts, the level of effective implementation of the CEs of a State's safety oversight system can increase, particularly in those States where a State faces shortages of human, financial or technical resources.

The below elements are considered enablers of a robust safety oversight system, expected to be in place according to the requirements in force:

1. ability and determination to conduct effective oversight;
2. ability to identify risks through a process to collect and analyze data;
3. ability to mitigate the identified risks in an effective way, implying measurement of performance and leading to continuous improvement;
4. willingness and possibility to exchange information and cooperate with other CAAs;
5. ability to ensure the availability of adequate personnel, where 'adequate' includes the notion of sufficient training and proper qualification; and
6. focus on the implementation of effective management systems in industry, wherever required by the regulations in force.

What we want to achieve:

A robust oversight system across MID Region, where each CAA is able to properly discharge its oversight responsibilities, with particular care to exchange of information and cooperation with other

CAAs and to the implementation of management systems in all organizations, as well as to ensure the availability of adequate personnel in CAAs. In addition, to Support MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities and increase progressively the USOAP-CMA EI results.

How we monitor improvement:

Significant increase of the number of States with an EI above 60% and implementing risk-based oversight.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4-A5-A6-A7
A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs,
A2- Conduct technical assistance activities and NCLB missions to States with a focus on ANS, AGA, AIG, and OPS areas.
A3- Develop and implement a specific NCLB plan of actions for prioritized States
A4- Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection) (Action addressed under G6-SEI-01 A5)
A5- Develop guidance material to assist MID Region States in the issuance of exemptions related to temporary deviations from standards
A6- Develop guidance material to support States for the conduct of remote surveillance
A7- Develop guidance material on the enhancement of understanding the concept of judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 "Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities"

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-4 & GASP SEI-10: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.
- GASP SEI-5: Provision of the Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to complete, submit and update all relevant documents and records.

Phase 2 — Implementation of a Safety Oversight System

- GASP SEI-6: Continued implementation of and compliance with ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-8: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.
- GASP SEI-9: Continued provision of the primary source of Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to update all relevant documents and records as progress is made.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, and industry

Action 1: Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs

Owner: ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: Conduct technical assistance and NCLB missions to States with focus on ANS, AGA, AIG, and OPS areas

Owner: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 3: Develop and implement a specific NCLB plan of actions for prioritized States

Owner: ICAO and concerned States

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 4: Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection) (Action addressed under G6-SEI-01 A5)

Owner: Qatar and ICAO

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

A5- Develop guidance material to assist MID Region States in the issuance of exemptions related to temporary deviations from standards

Owner: Qatar supported by Iran, Sudan, UAE, and IATA

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

A6- Develop guidance material to support States for the conduct of remote surveillance

Owner: Qatar supported by Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, and ACAO

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

A7- Develop guidance material on the enhancement of understanding the concept of judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors

Owner: Qatar supported by Saudi Arabia and UAE

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
MID States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI)	2025

7.1.1.2 G2-SEI-02: Improve Regional Cooperation for the Provision of Accident & Incident Investigation

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

States should work to continually improve their effective implementation of the CEs of the State's safety oversight system in the area of AIG. Through collaborative efforts and joining the MENA ARCM, the level of effective implementation of the CEs of a State's AIG can increase, particularly in those States where a State faces shortages of human, financial or technical resources.

What we want to achieve:

MID Region States to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities and increase progressively the USOAP-CMA EI results in the area of AIG.

How we monitor improvement:

Increase of the number of States with an EI above 60% for AIG area and then establishing an independent aircraft accident and incident investigation authority.

How we want to achieve it:

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Support of MENA ARCM activities
A2- Conduct AIG Capacity Building Activities.

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 "Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities"

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI-2: Establishment of an independent regional accident and incident investigation process, consistent with Annex 13.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-4: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, international organization, and industry

Action 1: Support of MENA ARCM activities

Owner: ICAO, ACAO, and MENA ARCM Member States

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: Conduct AIG Capacity Building Activities

Owner: ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)

Timeline

MID States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI) especially the area of AIG 2025

7.1.1.3 G2-SEI-03: Sharing of Safety Recommendations related to Accidents and Serious Incidents

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

States should work to continually improve their effective implementation of the CEs of the State's safety oversight system in the area of AIG. Through collaborative efforts, the level of effective implementation of the CEs of a State's AIG can increase, particularly in those States where a State faces shortages of human, financial or technical resources.

What we want to achieve:

MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities and increase progressively the USOAP-CMA EI results in the area of AIG. In addition, the prevention of accidents or incidents, and the reduction of the consequences of such occurrences.

How we monitor improvement:

Increase of the number of States with an EI above 60% for AIG area and establishing an independent aircraft accident and incident investigation authority.

How we want to achieve it:

Action: A1

A1- Establishing a Platform for Sharing Safety Recommendations for MENA ARCM Member States

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 "Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities"

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities
- GASP SEI-4: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, and international organization

Action 1: Development of platform on sharing safety recommendations

Owner: ICAO, ACAO, and MENA ARCM Member

Priority: Low

Completion date: 2025

Status: On-hold

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Improve MID States the effective implementation (EI) in the area of AIG	2025

7.1.1.4 G2-SEI-04: Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

States should work to continually improve their effective implementation of the eight CEs of the State's safety oversight system in the area of OPS.

What we want to achieve:

States to implement an effective system for safety oversight of the various entities involved in the transport of dangerous goods. In addition, MID Region States' to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities and increase progressively the USOAP-CMA EI results in the area of OPS and enhance the state oversight on Dangerous Goods

How we monitor improvement:

Increase of the number of States with an EI above 60% for OPS area and then to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1

A1- Conduct Dangerous Goods (DG) capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fires/smoke risks in cabin

A2- Develop guidance material on carriage and transport of Lithium batteries

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 "Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities" and ICAO Annex 18 "Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air".

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level

Phase 2 — Implementation of a Safety Oversight System

GASP SEI-6: Continued implementation of and compliance with ICAO SARPs at the Regional level

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, international organizations, and industry

Action 1- Conduct Dangerous Goods (DG) capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fires/smoke risks in cabin

Owner: ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry.

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: Develop guidance material on carriage and transport of Lithium batteries

Owner: IATA

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
MID States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI) especially the area of OPS	2025

7.1.1.5 G2-SEI-05: Human factors and Competence of Personnel

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

Human factors and competence of personnel are strategic priorities in the region. Human factors and the impact on human performance, as well as medical fitness are strategic priorities. As new technologies and/or operating concepts emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to properly address human factors and human performance, in terms of both limitations and its contribution to delivering safety, as part of the safety management implementation. CRM has been identified in the MID ASR as most important human factors issue in the domain of commercial air transport Aeroplanes above 5700 kgs. The safety actions related to competence of personnel mainly English language proficiency would be further developed in the future.

The main objectives of TRM for operational staff are the development of attitudes and behaviour, which will contribute to enhanced teamwork skills and performance in order to reduce teamwork failures as contributory factors in ATM related incidents and accidents. The benefits of TRM are considered to be enhanced Threat and Error Management capabilities, continuity and stability of teamwork, task efficiency, sense of working as a part of a larger and more efficient team, increased job satisfaction; and improved use of staff resources.

In addition, the safety action identified currently related to aviation personnel is also focusing on fatigue risk management (FRMS) by COVID-19 to mitigate safety issues in all domains such as personal readiness, flight crew perception or crew resource management (CRM) and communication, which play a role in improving safety across all aviation domains.

What we want to achieve:

Ensure continuous improvement in safety management activities as related to human factors and human performance.

How we monitor improvement:

Improvement in aviation personnel competence at all levels and then to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4
A1- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). (Action addressed under G1-SEI-04:CFIT)
A2- Conduct Crew Resource Management capacity building activities
A3- Organize Team Resource Management capacity building activities.
A4- FRMS capacity building activities

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 "Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities". ICAO Human Performance Manual (ICAO Doc 10151) and ICAO Safety Management Manual (ICAO Doc 9859).

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations

Action 2: Organize Crew Resource Management capacity building activities

Owner: ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry.

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2023

Status: ongoing

Action 3: Organize Team Resource Management capacity building activities

Owner: ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2023

Status: ongoing

Action 4: FRMS capacity building activities

Owner: ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
MID States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI) and mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2025

7.1.1.6 G2-SEI-06: Management of security risks with safety impact

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating the security related safety risks. The safety action in this area also include the mitigation of the risks posed by flying over zones where an armed conflict exists. Managing the impact of security on safety is a strategic priority in MID region.

What we want to achieve:

Increase safety by managing the impact of security on safety and mitigating related safety risks.

How we monitor improvement:

Continuous assessment and mitigation of security threats.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1

Action 1- Organize seminar/Symposium/workshop to exchange experiences and good practices on assessing the risks and sharing of information related to the overflying of conflict zones in coordination with RASFG-MID and MIDANPIRG

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities”. ICAO Annex 17.

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry

Action 1- Organize seminar/Symposium/workshop to exchange experiences and good practices on assessing risks and sharing of information related to the overflying of conflict zones in coordination with RASFG-MID and MIDANPIRG

Owner: ICAO
Priority: High
Completion date: 2023
Status: Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2025

7.1.1.7 G2-SEI-07: Managing cybersecurity risks

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating the cybersecurity related safety risks. Assess the safety impact of cybersecurity threats to aviation users, support the development of mitigations and specific Training actions, identify and mitigate the vulnerabilities of aviation products and identify the required changes to aviation standards.

What we want to achieve:

Increase safety by managing the impact of cybersecurity on safety and mitigating related safety risks.

How we monitor improvement:

Continuous assessment and mitigation of cybersecurity threats.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2-A3

A1- Develop a Regional Action Plan to bridge the gap between ICAO Cyber Security Action plan and the implementation level of Cyber Resilience in the MID Region

A2- Conduct activities on Cyber Security and Resilience- (Jointly ANS and AVSEC)

A3- Develop a MID Region Cybersecurity Action Plan.

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities”. ICAO Annex 17.

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System**Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework**

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry

Action 1- Develop a Regional Action Plan to bridge the gap between ICAO Cyber Security Action plan and the implementation level of Cyber Resilience in the MID Region

Owner: ANS Cyber SeC Action group

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

Action 2- Conduct activities on Cyber Security and Resilience

Owner: ICAO

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

Action 3: Develop a MID Region Cybersecurity Action Plan

Owner: Cybersecurity Security Ad-hoc Group

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2025

7.1.1.8 G2-SEI-08: Impact of COVID-19 pandemic- Safe return to operations

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

States should manage a dedicated safety promotion campaign in support of safe return to operations. The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating the COVID-19 pandemic related safety risks. The safety action in this area would focus on continuous support to the MID-RPTF and sharing of guidance material/best practices to mitigate the risks stemmed from the pandemic.

What we want to achieve:

Increase safety by managing the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on safety and mitigating related safety risks.

How we monitor improvement:

Continuous assessment and mitigation of COVID-19 pandemic induced safety risks.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Continued support to the aviation industry through MID-RPTF meetings/Activities, as needed
A2- Sharing of guidance material/best practices

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities”.

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry	
Action 1- Continued support to the aviation industry through MID-RPTF Activities, as needed	
Owner:	States, international organizations, and industry
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Sharing of guidance material/best practices	
Owner:	States, international organizations, and industry
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2025

Status:	Ongoing
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
mitigate contributing factors/safety issues to accidents and incidents	2025

7.1.2 Goal 3: Implementation of Effective States Safety Programme (SSP)

7.1.2.1 G3-SEI-01: Implement an effective Safety Management

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

Management of safety in a systematic and proactive way enables authorities and organizations to set up management systems that take into consideration potential hazards and associated risks before aviation accidents occur. This global move is at the core of ICAO Annex 19. This safety area would enable further work to improve reporting processes, occurrence investigation at organizational level, and also the continued development of integrated data collection taxonomies.

What we want to achieve:

MID Region States to implement SSP and consequently their services providers to implement SMS. In addition, work with authorities and organizations to implement safety management.

How we monitor improvement:

ICAO Annex 19 framework requiring safety management is in place across all aviation domains, and organizations and authorities are able to demonstrate compliance.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

States to give priority to the work on SSPs

In the implementation and maintenance of the SSP, States should in particular:

- ensure effective implementation of the Annex 19 Requirements and address deficiencies in oversight capabilities, as a prerequisite for effective SSP implementation;
- ensure effective coordination between State authorities having a role in safety management;
- ensure that inspectors have the right competencies to support the evolution towards risk- and performance based oversight;
- ensure that policies and procedures are in place for risk- and performance based oversight, including a description of how an SMS is accepted and regularly monitored;
- establish policies and procedures for safety data collection, analysis, exchange and protection;
- establish a process to determine safety performance indicators at State level addressing outcomes and processes;
- ensure that an approved SSP document is made available and shared with other States; and
- ensure that the SSP is regularly reviewed and that SSP effectiveness is regularly assessed;
- ensure that the specific safety risks induced by COVID-19 be assessed and be included in the State risk picture.

SMS Assessment

States should make use of the available tools to support risk- and performance-based oversight. States also should regularly monitor status of compliance with SMS requirements of their industry.

SMS international cooperation

States should promote the common understanding of safety management and human factors principles and requirements in different countries, share lessons learned and encourage progress and harmonization, through active participation in the RASG-MID and other safety groups and fora.

FDM precursors of main operational safety risks

States in partnership with industry, other regional and international organizations should complete the good practice documentation which supports the inclusion of main operational safety risks such as RE, RI, LOC-I, CFIT and MAC into operators' FDM Programmes.

States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes

States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of:

- promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM,
- fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture,
- encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of REs, MACs, CFIT and LOC-I, or other issues identified by the SSP

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Conduct SSP/SMS capacity building activities
A2- Conduct technical assistance missions by SMIT

References: ICAO Annex 19 and GASP 2023-2025 Goal 3 "Implement effective State Safety Programmes"

Component 2 — State Safety Programme

- GASP SEI-10: Start of promotion of SSP implementation at the regional level.
- GASP SEI-11: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes for SSP implementation.
- GASP SEI-12: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to support SSP implementation.
- GASP SEI-13: Start of SSP implementation at the national level.
- GASP SEI-14: Regional allocation of resources to support continued development of the proactive use of risk modelling capabilities.
- GASP SEI-15: Regional collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to support the proactive use of risk modelling.
- GASP SEI-16: Advancement of safety risk management at the regional level.

Component 2 — State Safety Programme

GASP SEI-7: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to complete SSP implementation

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1- Conduct SSP/SMS training courses and workshops	
Owner:	ICAO, supported by organizations, and industry
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing
Action 2- Conduct technical assistance missions by SMIT	

Owner:	ICAO and SMIT Team
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
MID States to implement the foundation of an SSP	2023
MID States to implement an effective SSP	2025

7.1.2.2 G3-SEI-02: NASP Development & Implementation

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

States should ensure that a NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. The MID-RASP provides the identified safety priorities in the Region and States should identify which top risks and key issues mentioned in the GASP and MID-RASP; which apply to their national context, and identify suitable mitigation actions within their NASP. States should also add/consider others which are unique to their operational context.

What we want to achieve:

MID Region States to develop NASP. Successful implementation of the NASP actions would require the commitment of resources from stakeholders within State, availability of data to effectively monitor the achievement of NASP Targets, and proper project governance. In addition to the actions, NASP shall also consider how to measure their effectiveness.

How we monitor improvement:

ICAO GASP requiring States to develop NASP and region to develop RASP.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

States to establish and maintain a National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP)

States should ensure that a NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. NASP should:

- describe how the plan is developed and endorsed, including collaboration with different entities within the State, with industry and other stakeholders;
- include safety objectives, goals, indicators and targets in line with in line with GASP as well as regional safety plan;
- identify the main safety risks at national level in addition to the ones identified in MID-RASP as applicable to the State;
- include series of SEIs to address safety issues; and
- Reflect the GASP and MID-RASP SEIs as applicable to the State.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Conduct NASPs workshops & technical assistance missions
A2- NASP iPacks deployment

References: ICAO Annex 19 and GASP 2023-2025 Goal 3 “Implement effective State Safety Programmes”

Component 2 — State Safety Programme

- GASP SEI-10: Start of promotion of SSP implementation at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-11: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes for SSP implementation.
- GASP SEI-12: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to support SSP implementation.
- GASP SEI-13: Start of SSP implementation at the national level.
- GASP SEI-14: Regional allocation of resources to support continued development of the proactive use of risk modelling capabilities.
- GASP SEI-15: Regional collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to support the proactive use of risk modelling.
- GASP SEI-16: Advancement of safety risk management at the Regional level.

Component 2 — State Safety Programme

GASP SEI-7: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to complete SSP implementation

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1- Conduct NASPs workshops & technical assistance missions	
Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2- NASP iPacks deployment	
Owner:	ICAO and States
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
MID States to develop and implement NASP	2025

7.1.3 Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level

7.1.3.1 G4-SEI-01: Development and Implementation of MID-RASP

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale: The RASG-MD is the governing body responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the MID-RASP, in collaboration with the ICAO MID Office, international and regional organizations and with the aviation industry. The MID-RASP is to be reviewed by the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG) every year mainly to include new identified Safety Enhancement initiatives' (SEIs), review the existing SEIs, as well as their respective actions.

What we want to achieve:

States, international organization, and industry to increase collaboration at the regional level so that to enhance safety.

How we monitor improvement:

MID region to publish an updated regional aviation safety plan (MID-RASP), in line with the 2023–2025 edition of GASP.

How we want to achieve it: This SEIs included in MID-RASP to be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

References: GASP 2023-2025 Goal 4 “Increase collaboration at the Regional level”

Action: A1

A1- Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System**Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework**

- GASP SEI- SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-5: Provision of the Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to complete, submit and update all relevant documents and records.

Phase 2 — Implementation of a Safety Oversight System

GASP SEI-9: Continued provision of the primary source of Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to update all relevant documents and records as progress is made.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, RASFG-MID, States, International organizations, and industry.

Action 1: Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition

Owner: SEIG

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
To manage and enhance safety at the regional	2025

7.1.3.2 G4-SEI-02: Enhance collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale: cooperation and collaboration among all stakeholders through conducting MID RCM meetings and agreeing on joint activities to avoid duplication of effort.

What we want to achieve:

States, international organizations, and industry to increase collaboration at the regional level so that to enhance safety.

How we monitor improvement: Reinforce efficient and effective cooperation and collaboration with all stakeholders, avoiding duplication and optimizing the allocation of resources at the regional level.

How we want to achieve it: Joint Programme activities

References: GASP 2023-2025 Goal 4 “Increase collaboration at the Regional level”

Actions: A1-A2

A1- Develop and agree on joint work activities through MID-RCM meetings
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A2- Support the establishment of MENA RSOO and its activities
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Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI- SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-5: Provision of the Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to complete, submit and update all relevant documents and records.

Phase 2 — Implementation of a Safety Oversight System

GASP SEI-9: Continued provision of the primary source of Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to update all relevant documents and records as progress is made.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, RASFG-MID, States, international organizations, and industry.

Action 1: Develop and agree on joint work activities through MID RCMs

Owner: ICAO, States, international organizations, industry

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

Action 2: Support the establishment of MENA RSOO and its activities

Owner: ICAO and States

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
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To increase States USOAP EI and SSP level of maturity.	2025
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7.2.1 Goal 5: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks

7.1.4.1 G5-SEI-01: Promote the Use of industry Programmes

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

What we want to achieve:

Work with authorities and organizations to increase the number of service providers participating in the corresponding ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes.

How we monitor improvement:

Increase the number of service providers participating in the corresponding ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes. The RASG-MID, IATA, and ACI will give feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it:

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Encourage IATA’s IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion
A2- Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme

References: This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 5 “Expand the use of industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks”

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

GASP SEI-1 — Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Encourage IATA’s IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	
Owner:	IATA
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	
Owner:	ICAO and ACI
Priority:	medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Increase the number of service providers participating in ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes and maintain recurrent APEX Missions in the region:	2025

7.2.1 Goal 6: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations

7.1.1.1 G6-SEI-01: Certification of International Aerodromes

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region safety strategy at Appendix C.

Rationale:

Many International Airports are yet to be fully certified and many that are certified are facing challenges to apply the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) as laid out in ICAO Annex 14- Aerodromes and the ICAO Manual on Certification of Aerodromes (Doc 9774).

What we want to achieve:

MID Region States to improve international aerodromes infrastructures and ensure continuous improvement.

How we monitor improvement:

The number of certified international airports. The RASG-MID, members States, and partners would provide feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions:	A1-A2-A3-A4-A5-A6
A1-	Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through Workshops/Trainings
A2-	Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to aerodromes certification through Workshops/Training
A3 –	Deployment of iPack on Aerodrome Re-Start
A4 -	Support States in implementing aerodrome oversight/inspection mechanism through capacity building activities on Aerodrome Oversight
A5 –	Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course + OJT)
A6 –	Conduct a Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP. This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 6 “Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations”

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-4: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, International organizations

Action 1: Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through capacity building activities

Owner: ICAO and ACI.

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to aerodromes certification through capacity building activities

Owner: ICAO and ACI

Priority:	High
Completion date:	2025
Status	ongoing
Action 3: Deployment of iPack on Aerodrome Re-Start	
Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
A4: Support States in implementing aerodrome oversight/inspection mechanism through capacity building activities on Aerodrome Oversight	
Owner:	ICAO and FAA
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
A5: Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course + OJT)	
Owner:	TBD
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
A6: Conduct a Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities	
Owner:	ICAO, ACAO, WBA
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Increase the number of Certificated International Aerodromes	2025

7.1.5.2 G6-SEI-02: Establish Runway Safety Team (RST) at International Aerodromes

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

Many States have difficulties on the development of the Runway Safety Programme and the establishment of Runway Safety Teams (RSTs) at airports as an effective means to reduce runway related accidents and incidents.

What we want to achieve:

MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to establish an effective RSTs at their aerodromes which would significantly reduce the runway safety related risks.

How we monitor improvement:

Number of the RSTs established at international aerodromes and number of the RST missions

conducted. The RASG-MID, members States, and partners will give feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions:	A1-A2
A1-	Conduct of assistance missions by the Runway Safety Go-Team (RST)
A2-	Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through capacity building activities: (Action addressed under G1-SEI-02: Runway Excursion)

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP. This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 6 “Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations”.

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-4: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Conduct of assistance missions by the Runway Safety Go-Team (RST)

Owner: ICAO, RSP (Runway Safety Programme Partners)

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through capacity building. (Action addressed under G1-SEI-02: Runway Excursion)

Owner: ICAO, ACI and Aircraft Manufactures

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Increase the number of establishment RST at international aerodromes	2025

7.2 Regional Operational Safety Risks

7.2.1 Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction in Operational Risks

7.2.1.1 G1-SEI-01: Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region safety strategy at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime which is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always, at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight

crew involved. Prevention of loss of control is a strategic priority. In addition, Aircraft upset or loss of control is the key risk area with the highest risk related to fatal accidents in CAT aeroplane operations having a maximum take-off weight above 5700 kg. It includes uncontrolled collisions with terrain, but also occurrences where the aircraft deviated from the intended flight path or intended aircraft flight parameters, regardless of whether the flight crew realized the deviation and whether it was possible to recover or not. It also includes the triggering of stall warning and envelope protections.

During 2017-2021 Aircraft upset or Loss of control contributed to one accident and counted for around 27% of fatalities. During the year 2018, the LOC-I occurred during En-route phase of flight.

What we want to achieve:

Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of loss of control.

How we monitor improvement:

Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it:

States should set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of LOC-I, or other issues identified by the SSP.

States to include LOC-I in national SSPs: LOC-I should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Actions:	A1-A2-A3
A1-	Guidance material on flight crew proficiency
A2-	Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation
A3-	Conduct Upset Recovery Workshops/Webinars
A4-	Develop guidancematreial on the air cargo safety

References:

- GASP 2023-2025 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks”.
- GASP SEIs (States, Region, and industry) – Mitigate contributing factors to LOC-I accidents and incidents.

Stakeholders:	RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations/associations
Action 1: Guidance material on flight crew proficiency	
Owner	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation	
Owner:	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers. Supported by KSA

Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing
Action 3: Conduct Upset Recovery workshop/Webinar	
Owner:	ICAO, IATA, Industry.
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
A4- Develop guidance material on the air cargo safety	
Owner:	Oman
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Mitigate contributing factors to LOC-I accidents and incidents	2025

7.2.1.2 G1-SEI-02: Runway Safety- Runway Excursion

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

Runway excursion covers materialized runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties in maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off-centred or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during landing. During 2017-2020, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flights.

What we want to achieve:

Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of RE.

How we monitor improvement:

Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it:

States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of REs.

States to include Runway Excursions in national SSPs: REs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs in close cooperation with the aircraft operators, air traffic control, and airport operators. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their

effectiveness.

Actions:	A1-A2
A1-	Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities
A2-	MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Implementation

References:

- GASP 2023-2025 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks”.
- GASP SEIs (States, Region, and industry) – Mitigate contributing factors to RE accidents and incidents.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations/associations

Action 1: Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities (Reference: G3-SEI-02)

Owner: ICAO, ACI, and Aircraft Manufactures

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Implementation

Owner: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2025

Status: ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Mitigate contributing factors to RE accidents and incidents	2025

7.2.1.3 G1-SEI-03: Runway Safety- Runway Incursion

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

Collision on runway covers collisions between an aircraft and another object (other aircraft, vehicles, etc.) or person that occur on a runway of an aerodrome or other predesignated landing area; it does not include collisions with birds or wildlife. While there were no fatal accident or accident involving MID States operators in the last years involving runway collision, the risk of the reported occurrence demonstrated to be very real.

What we want to achieve:

Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of RI.

How we monitor improvement:

Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it:

States to include Runway Incursions in national SSPs: RIs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs in close cooperation with the aircraft operators, air traffic control, and airport operators. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Action:	A1
A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities on the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) Implementation	

References:

- GASP 2023/2025 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks”.
- GASP SEIs (States, Region, and industry) – Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Conduct Capacity Building Activities on the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) Implementation	
Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents	2025

7.2.1.4 G1-SEI-4: Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

7.2.1.4.1 G1-SEI-4A1- Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences, which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc. There was no fatal accident involving MID States operators during this period. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States and in other parts of the world that make it an area of concern.

What we want to achieve:

Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of CFIT.

How we monitor improvement:

Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it:

States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of CFIT

or other issues identified by the SSP.

States to include CFITs in national SSPs: CFIT should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Actions: A1-A2-A3
A1- Advisory Circular: Instrument Approach Procedures Using Continuous Descent Final Approach Techniques
A2- Guidance for designing RNP Approach
A3- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)

References:

- GASP 2023-2025 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks”.
- GASP SEIs (States, Region, and industry) – Mitigate contributing factors to CFIT accidents and incidents.

Stakeholders: ICAO, RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Advisory Circular: Guidance for Operators on Training Programme on the use of GPWS	
Owner:	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing
Action 2- Guidance for designing RNP Approach	
Owner:	ICAO AND MID-FPP
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
Action 3: Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)	
Owner:	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Mitigate contributing factors to CFIT accidents and incidents	2025

7.2.1.4.2 G1-SEI-4A2- 5G Operation on Radio Altimeter

Stakeholders: ICAO, RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, RASFG-MID States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Develop a guidance material on safeguarding measures to protect Radio Altimeter from potential harmful interference from 5G Operation	
Owner:	Radio Altimeter action group (RADALT AG)

Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New

Action 2: Conduct a Webinar addressing the matter to raise awareness and promote the guidance material developed by the RADALT AG

Owner:	ICAO and RADALT AG
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Mitigate contributing factors to CFIT accidents and incidents including LOC-I	2025

7.2.1.5 G1-SEI-05: Airborne Conflict (Mid-Air Collisions)

7.2.1.5.1 G1-SEI-05A1: Loss of separation/TCAS RA

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:

Airborne collision includes all occurrences involving actual or potential airborne collisions between aircraft, while both aircraft are airborne, and between aircraft and other airborne objects. This also includes all separation-related occurrences caused by either air traffic control (ATC) or cockpit crew, AIRPROX reports and genuine ACAS alerts. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine TCAS resolution advisories or airspace infringements.

Although there have been no aeroplane mid-air collision accident in recent years within the MID States, this risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating in Gulf area over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation. This is one specific safety issue that is a main priority in this key risk area.

States must have due regard for the safety of civil aircraft and must have established respective regulations for national State aircraft.

Some States had reported an increase in incidents involving close encounters between civil and military aircraft and more particularly an increase in non-cooperative international military traffic over the high-sea waters. The States could consider the following recommendations:

1. Fully apply the ICAO Manual on Civil-Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management (Doc 10088);
2. Closely coordinate to develop, harmonize and publish operational requirements and instructions for State aircraft to ensure that 'due regard' for civil aircraft is always maintained;
3. Support the development and harmonization of civil/military coordination procedures for ATM at MID Region level and beyond if possible; and
4. Report relevant occurrences.

What we want to achieve:

Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of MAC.

How we monitor improvement:

Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region Annual Safety Report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it:

States to include MACs in national SSPs: MACs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

States to reinforce the appropriate reactions of flight crew in response to an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) resolution advisories (RA), which would help to mitigate the risk of mid-air collisions by providing safety promotion material and clear messages to pilots on the need to follow the instructions of the ACAS in high-risk situations.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Conduct workshop to implement Civil-Military cooperation
A2- Conduct seminar on raising awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas

References:

- GASP 2023-2025 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks”.
- GASP SEIs (States, Region, and industry) – Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and incidents.
- ICAO Doc 10088 ‘Manual on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management’

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Conduct workshop to implement Civil-Military cooperation

Owner: ICAO, IATA, and States

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: Conduct seminar on raising awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas

Owner: ICAO and States

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and NMAC incidents	2025

7.2.1.5.2 G1-SEI-05A2: GNSS Interference

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Raise awareness on the potential impact of GNSS interference on the aviation during the Civil-Mil Workshop.

Owner: ICAO and IATA

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: New

Action 2: Urge States to follow the reporting procedure agreed by MIDANPIRG Conclusion 19/4 when needed.

Owner: ICAO

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and NMAC incidents	2025

7.2.1.5.3 G1-SEI-05A3: Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (drones)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at Appendix C.

Rationale:

The civilian use of UAS has markedly increased in recent years. Research and development into the civilian applications of unmanned aircraft (UA) is a dynamic and rapidly evolving area. Control and guidance systems are now available that enable these aircraft to perform a variety of tasks that were previously unachievable, unreasonably expensive, or involved too much personal risk. As a result, UA have an increasing presence in controlled and uncontrolled airspace. In addition, available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. In connection with this, some States in the region developed their national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. However, there are currently some States in the region are unable to develop their national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. Therefore, guidance material to be developed to assist states' CAA personnel in the implementation and oversight of UAS operations and to mitigate the risk of the MAC. When available, the guidance material would serve as an example for consideration by MID States to create, add, or amend, future or existing national UAS guidance material by the respective CAA.

What we want to achieve:

MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to develop national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS and to create growth while maintaining a high and uniform level of safety.

How we monitor improvement:

Increase of number of states established national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. The RASG-MID, members States, and partners would give feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs

Actions:	A1-A2-A3
A1-	UAS iPack deployment
A2-	Organize symposium

A3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP. This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 1. “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks”

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: UAS iPack Deployment

Owner: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

Action 2: Organize symposium related to drones (UAS)

Owner: ICAO, ACAO. Supported by FAA

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2023

Status: Ongoing

Action 3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework

Owner: ICAO and States

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2023

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Ensure the safe operations of UAS to mitigate the risk of MID-Air Collision (MAC).	2025

7.2.1.5.2 G1-SEI-05A2: GNSS Interference

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Raise awareness on the potential impact of GNSS interference on the aviation during the Civil-Mil Workshop.

Owner: ICAO and IATA

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: New

Action 2: Urge States to follow the reporting procedure agreed by MIDANPIRG Conclusion

19/4 when needed.

Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and NMAC incidents	2025

7.2.1.5.3- G1-SEI-05A3: Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (drones)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at Appendix C.

Rationale:

The civilian use of UAS has markedly increased in recent years. Research and development into the civilian applications of unmanned aircraft (UA) is a dynamic and rapidly evolving area. Control and guidance systems are now available that enable these aircraft to perform a variety of tasks that were previously unachievable, unreasonably expensive, or involved too much personal risk. As a result, UA have an increasing presence in controlled and uncontrolled airspace. In addition, available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. In connection with this, some States in the region developed their national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. However, there are currently some States in the region are unable to develop their national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. Therefore, guidance material to be developed to assist states' CAA personnel in the implementation and oversight of UAS operations and to mitigate the risk of the MAC.

When available, the guidance material would serve as an example for consideration by MID States to create, add, or amend, future or existing national UAS guidance material by the respective CAA.

What we want to achieve:

MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to develop national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS and to create growth while maintaining a high and uniform level of safety.

How we monitor improvement:

Increase of number of states established national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. The RASG-MID, members States, and partners would give feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs

Actions:	A1-A2-A3
A1-	UAS iPack deployment
A2-	Organize symposium
A3-	Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP. This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 1. "Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks"

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: UAS iPack Deployment

Owner: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

Action 2: Organize symposium related to drones (UAS)

Owner: ICAO, ACAO. Supported by FAA

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2023

Status: Ongoing

Action 3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework

Owner: ICAO and States

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2023

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Ensure the safe operations of UAS to mitigate the risk of MID Air Collision (MAC)	2025

7.2.1.5.4 G1-SEI-05A4: Expansion of ATS route Networks

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Conduct gap analysis to identify current ATS route networks gaps

Owner: ICAO and States

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: New

Action 2: Establishment of parallel unidirectional ATS routes (De-confliction)

Owner: ICAO and States

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
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Appendix A- SEIG TORs

SAFETY ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVE GROUP

(SEIG)

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. PURPOSE OF THE SEIG TO:

- 1.1 Support the RASG-MID in the development/update of the MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) and the monitoring of the implementation of Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) related to identified safety issues.
- 1.2 Assist in the development, implementation and review of SEIs to reduce aviation safety risks. These SEIs could be established based on the analysis of regional data, based on ICAO initiatives or the initiatives of other relevant organizations or based on the risks and issues identified through the USOAP audits process.
- 1.3 Recommend safety mitigations to the RASG-MID related to identified safety issues which would reduce aviation risks.

1.4 In order to meet its Terms of Reference, the SEIG shall:

- a. follow-up the updates of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and support the development, update and implementation of the MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) at the regional level and provide feedback to the RASG-MID;
- b. identify and develop the SEIs, which are aligned with the regional priorities and targets, for implementation within the MID Region. The focus of these SEIs is to effectively and economically mitigate the safety risks identified by the ASRG;
- c. identify difficulties, challenges and deficiencies related to the implementation of each SEI and propose mitigation measures;
- d. identify assistance Programmes such as, but not limited to, workshops, seminars and capacity building activities to improve the level of implementation of the approved SEIs by the RASG-MID;
- e. share expertise and experience and provide recommended actions for each SEI, in a prioritized manner based on best practices;
- f. monitor the status of achieving related safety objectives and targets included in the MID Region Safety Strategy;
- g. identify areas of concern to aviation safety that may be unique to the region, and develop data and mitigations to address those concerns;
- h. work closely with States and stakeholders to ensure that SEIs and mitigation measures are implemented through a coordinated effort;
- i. propose input to the RASG-MID for the development of the RASG-MID Annual Work Programme; and

- j. Coordinate with relevant RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG and MID-RASFG subsidiary bodies issues with common interest.

2. COMPOSITION

The SEIG is composed of Members designated by the MID States and Partners.

3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

- SEIG Chairpersons: – Coordinate SEIG activities and provide overall guidance and leadership;
- ICAO: Support; and
- Partners: collaborate in the development of materials as requested by the SEIG, and provide technical expertise and support, as required.

4. MEETINGS ARRANGEMENTS

- The Chairperson, in close co-operation with the Secretary, shall make all necessary arrangements for the most efficient working of the SEIG. The SEIG shall at all times conduct its activities in the most efficient manner possible with a minimum of formality and paper work (paperless meetings). Permanent contact shall be maintained between the Chairperson, Secretary and Members of the SEIG to advance the work. Best advantage should be taken of modern communications facilities, particularly video-conferencing (Virtual Meetings) and e-mails.
- Face-to-face meetings will be conducted when it is necessary to do so.

Appendix B- Identified safety issues as indicated in the 11th MID ASR

Potential Accident Outcome							
Safety Issues	CFIT	LOC-I	MAC	GCOL	RE/ARC	Injury Damage inflight	Injury Damage on Ground
Monitoring of flight paremeters and automation modes	x	x			x		
Adverse Convective weather	x	x			x	x	
Un-stabilized Approach		x			x		x
Flight planning and preparation	x	x	x	x	x		
Crew Resource Management	x	x	x	x	x		
Handling of technical failure	x	x		x	x		x
Handling and execution of GOA	x	x			x		
Loss of separation in flight/ and/or airspace/TCAS RA			x			x	
Experience, training and competence of Flight Crews	x	x	x		x		
Deconfliction between IFR and VFR traffic			x				
Inappropriate flight control inputs		x			x		
Fatigue	x	x					
Entry of aircraft performance data		x					
Contained engine Failure/Power Plant Malfunctions		x			x	x	
Birdstrike/Engine Bird ingestion		x			x		
Fire/Smoke-non impact		x				x	
Wake Vortex		x				x	
Deviation from pitch or roll attitude	x	x			x		
Security Risks with impact on Safety		x					
Tail/Cross wind/Winds hear		x			x		x

Potential Accident Outcome							
Safety Issues	CFIT	LOC-I	MAC	GCOL	RE/ARC	Injury Damage inflight	Injury Damage on Ground
Runway Incursion				X	X		X
Maintenance events	X	X				X	
Contaminated runway/Poor braking action					X		X
Clear Air Turbulence (CAT) and Mountain Waves		X				X	

Appendix C-MID Region-Safety Performance Measurement &Monitoring (SPMM)

Aspirational Goal: Zero Fatality by 2030

Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
Number of accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of accidents to be in line with the global average rate	2025
Number of fatal accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of fatal accidents to be in line with the global average rate	2025
Number of fatalities per million departures	Number of fatalities per billion passengers carried (fatality rate) to be in line with the global average rate	2025
Number of Runway Excursion accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of Runway Excursion accidents to be below the global average rate	2025
Number of Runway Incursion accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of Runway Incursion accidents to be below the global average rate	2025
Number of LOC-I related accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of LOC-I related accidents to be below the global rate	2025
Number of CFIT related accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of CFIT related accidents to be below the global rate	2025
Number of Mid Air Collision (accidents)	Regional average Mid Air Collision accident	2025

Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
USOAP-CMA Effective Implementation (EI) results: a. Regional average EI b. Number of audited States with an overall EI over 60% c. Regional average EI by area d. Regional average EI by CE e. Regional average EI of PPQs	a. Regional average EI to be above 80% : b. All MID audited States to be above 60% EI c. Regional average EI for each area to be above 70% d. Regional average EI for each CE to be above 70% e. Regional average EI PPQs above 75% :	a. 2023-2025 b. 2023-2025 c. 2023-2025 d. 2023-2025 e. 2023-2025

Goal 3: Implement effective State safety Programmes (SSPs)

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
Regional Average SSP Foundation	85%	2023- 2025
Number of States having an SSP that is present*	At least 4 States	2023- 2025
Number of States that have developed and published a national aviation safety plan (NASP)	All States	2023- 2025
Number of States that require applicable service providers under their authority to implement an SMS	All States	2023- 2025

*: The term “present” is based on the maturity levels established in the ICAO SSP Implementation Assessment (SSPIA).

Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
Percentage of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs)/Safety Actions completed	80%	2023-2025
Number of States seeking/receiving assistance, to strengthen their Safety Oversight capabilities through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	States with SSC as a first priority All States as a second priority having EI below 80%	2023-2025
Number of States seeking assistance to facilitate SSP & NASP implementation through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	All States	2023-2025
Number of States sharing safety information including operational safety risks and emerging issues to support the development of MID ASR	All States	2023-2025

Goal 5: Expand the use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
Use of the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), to complement safety oversight activities.	a. Maintain at least 60% of eligible MID airlines to be certified IATA-IOSA at all times. b. All MID States with an EI of at least 60% use the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) to complement their safety oversight activities.	a. 2023-2025 b. 2023- 2025
Use of the IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) certification, as a percentage of all Ground Handling service providers	The IATA Ground Handling Manual (IGOM) endorsed as a reference for ground handling safety standards by all MID States. Pursue at least 25% increase in ISAGO registration	2023-2025
Coordinate the ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	At least 2 ACI APEX in Safety to be conducted for 2 Airports of the Region per year	2023-2025
Number of States that have established Safety data collection and processing system (SDCPS)	At least 12 States	2023-2025
Number of MID RASP developed in consultation with industry	MID-RASP 2023-2025	2023

Goal 6: Ensure Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
Percentage of Certified International Aerodromes*	65%	2023-2025
Percentage of Runway Safety Team (RST) effectively implemented at International Aerodromes*	80%	2023-2025
Percentage of Global reporting Format (GRF) Plans implemented for International Aerodromes*	75%	2023-2025

*: International Aerodromes included in the MID ANP (Aerodromes Operations: AOP Table I-I)

Appendix D: Safety Actions- Consolidated List of SEIs with their respective Actions for follow up- Draft

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
Regional Operational Safety Risks					
Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction in Operational Risks					
G1-SEI-01:	Aircraft Upset in Flight (LOC-I)	A1- Guidance material on flight crew proficiency	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers/industry	To be supported by Airbus	2025
		A2- Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers/industry.	To be supported by Airbus	2025
		A3- Conduct Upset Recovery capacity building activities	UPRT Workshop. Airbus, ICAO, Kuwait		2025
		A4- Develop guidance material on the air cargo safety	Oman		2025
G1-SEI-02:	Runway Safety- Runway Excursion	A1- Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI		2025
		A2- MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Implementation.	ICAO		2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
G1-SEI-03:	Runway Safety- Runway Incursion	A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities on the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) Implementation	ICAO	To be supported by Euro-Control, FAA	2023
G1-SEI-04A1:	Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)	A1- Advisory Circular: Instrument Approach Procedures Using Continuous Descent Final Approach Techniques.	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers		2025
		A2- Guidance for designing RNP Approach	ICAO and MID FPP		2025
		A3- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers		2025
G1-SEI-04A2	5G Operations on Radar Altimeter	A1- Develop a guidance material on safeguarding measures to protect Radio Altimeter from potential harmful interference from 5G Operation	Radio Altimeter Action Group (RADALT AG)	To be supported by Boeing	2025
		A2- Conduct a Webinar addressing the matter to raise awareness and promote the guidance material developed by the RADALT AG	ICAO and RADALT AG	To be supported by Airbus & Boeing	2025
G1-SEI-05B1:	MAC- Loss of Separation	A1- Conduct workshop to implement Civil-Military cooperation	ICAO, States, and International Organizations		2025
		A2- Conduct seminar on raising awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas	ICAO, States, and international organizations		2025
G1-SEI-05B2:	GNSS Interference	A1: Raise awareness on the potential impact of GNSS interference on the aviation during the Civil-Mil Workshop	ICAO and IATA		2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		A2- Urge States to follow the reporting procedure agreed by MIDANPIRG Conclusion 19/4 when needed	ICAO		2025
G1-SEI-05B3:	Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (Drones)	A1- UAS iPack deployment	ICAO and States		2025
		A2- Organize symposium on Drones related subjects	ICAO and ACAO	Supported FAA and Boeing	2023
		A3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework	ICAO and States		2025
G1-SEI-05B4:	Expansion of ATS route Networks	A1- Conduct gap analysis to identify current ATS route networks gaps	ICAO and States		2025
		A2- Establishment of parallel unidirectional ATS routes (De-confliction)	ICAO and States		2025
Organizational Challenges/issues					
Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities					
G2-SEI-01:	Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities	A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry	"Inspectors training" to be Supported by Airbus.	2025
		A2- Conduct technical assistance and NCLB missions to States , with focus on states with EI<80% as well as ANS, AIG, AGA, and OPS areas	ICAO and States		2025
		A3- Develop and implement a specific NCLB plan of actions.	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry		2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		A4 - Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection) (Action addressed under G6-SEI-01 A5)	States (Qatar) and ICAO		2025
		A5 - Develop guidance material to assist MID Region States in the issuance of exemptions related to temporary deviations from standards	Qatar	supported by Iran, Sudan, UAE, ACAO, and IATA	2025
		A6 - Develop guidance material to support States for the conduct of remote surveillance	Qatar	supported by Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, and ACAO	2025
		A7 - Develop guidance material on the enhancement of understanding the concept of judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors	Qatar	supported by Saudi Arabia and UAE	2025
G2-SEI-03:	Sharing of Safety Recommendations related to Accidents and Serious Incidents	A1 - Establishing a Platform for Sharing Safety Recommendations for MENA ARCM Member States	ICAO, ACAO, and MENA ARCM Member States	On-hold	2025
G2-SEI-04:	Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods	A1 - Dangerous Goods (DG) capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fire/smoke risk in cabin	ICAO, States, International Organizations, And Industry		2025
		A2 - Develop guidance material on carriage and transport of Lithium batteries	IATA, States, International Organizations, And Industry		2025
G2-SEI-05:	Human factors and Competence of Personnel	A1 - Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). (Action addressed under G1-SEI-04: CFIT).	IATA and Industry		2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		A2- Organize Crew Resource Management Capacity building activities	ICAO & Jordan, States, International Organizations, and Industry	CBTA and EBT to be supported by Airbus and FAA	2025
		A3- Organize Team Resource Management Capacity building activities	ICAO & Jordan States, International Organizations, and Industry	FAA	2025
		A4- Conduct Fatigue Risk Management and Mental Health Best Practices Capacity building activities	ICAO & Jordan States, International Organizations, and Industry	To be supported by Airbus	20225
G2-SEI-06:	Impact of security on safety	A1- Organize seminar/Symposium/Workshop to exchange experiences and good practices on assessing the risks and sharing of information related to the overflying of conflict zones in coordination with RASFG-MID and MIDANPIRG.	ICAO		2025
		A2- Risk management on conflict zone workshop	ICAO/ACAO		2023
G2-SEI-07:	Managing cybersecurity risks	A1- Develop a Regional Action Plan to bridge the gap between ICAO Cyber Security Action plan and the implementation level of Cyber Resilience in the MID Region	ANS Cyber SeC Action Group		2025
		A2- Conduct activities on Cyber Security and Resilience- (Jointly ANS and AVSEC)	ICAO	To be supported by Boeing	2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		A3- Develop a MID Region Cybersecurity Action Plan	Cybersecurity Security Ad-hoc Group		2025
G2-SEI-08:	Impact of COVID-19 pandemic- Safe return to operations	A1- Continued support to the aviation industry through MID-RPTF meetings/Activities, as needed	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry		2025
		A2- Sharing of guidance material/best practices	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry	To be support by Airbus	2025
Goal 3: Implementation of Effective States Safety Programme (SSP)					
G3-SEI-01:	Implement an effective Safety Management	A1- Conduct ICAO SSP/SMS Capacity building activities	SSP workshops for States. SMS & Flight Data analysis workshop for airlines. Airbus, ACAO and ICAO. 2023		2025
		A2- Conduct Technical Assistance missions by SMIT	ICAO and States		2025
G3-SEI-02:	NASP Development & Implementation	A1- Conduct NASPs workshops & technical assistance missions	ICAO		2025
		A2- NASP iPacks deployment	ICAO		2025
Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level					
G4-SEI-01:	Development and Implementation of	A1- Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition	ICAO & SEIG		2023

	MID-RASP				
G4-SEI-02:	Enhance collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry	A1- Develop and agree on joint work activities through MID-RCM meetings	ICAO, States, Regional Groups, International Organizations, and Industry		2025
		A2- Support the establishment of MENA RSOO and its activities	ICAO and States		2025

Goal 5: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes and Safety Information Sharing Networks

G5-SEI-01:	Promote the Use of industry Programmes	A1- Encourage IATA's IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	IATA		2025
		A2- Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	ICAO and ACI		2025

Goal 6: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations

G6-SEI-01:	Certification of International Aerodromes	A1- Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI		2025
		A2- Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to Aerodromes Certification through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI		2025
		A3 - Deployment of iPack on Aerodrome Re-Start	ICAO and States		2025
		A4 - Support States in implementing aerodrome oversight/inspection mechanism through capacity building activities on Aerodrome Oversight	ICAO	Supported by FAA	2025
		A5 - Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors	States (Qatar) and ICAO		2025

		(Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection)			
		A6 – Conduct a Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities	ICAO, ACAO, WBA	Supported by International Organizations	2025
G6-SEI-02:	Establish Runway Safety Team (RST) at International Aerodromes	A1- Conduct Runway Safety Go-Team (RST) assistance missions	ICAO	Supported RSP (Runway Safety Programme Partners)	2025
		A2: Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through capacity building activities: (Action addressed under G1-SEI-02: Runway Excursion).	ICAO and ACI		2025

Appendix E:

SEIs identified in MID-RASP may be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs, as appropriate

SEI Code	SEI name
Organizational Challenges	
Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities	
G2-SEI-01:	Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities
G2-SEI-04:	Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods
G2-SEI-05:	Human factors and Competence of Personnel
G2-SEI-06:	Impact of security on safety
G2-SEI-07:	Managing cybersecurity risks
G2-SEI-08:	Impact of COVID-19 pandemic- Safe return to operations
Goal 3: Implementation of Effective States Safety Programme (SSP)	
G3-SEI-01:	Implement safety management
G3-SEI-02:	NASP Development & Implementation
Goal 6: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations	
G6-SEI-01:	Certification of International Aerodromes
G6-SEI-02:	Establish Runway Safety Team (RST) at International Aerodromes
Regional Operational Safety Risks	
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction in Operational Risks	
G1-SEI-01:	Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)
G1-SEI-02:	Runway Excursion (RE)
G1-SEI-03:	Runway Incursion (RI)
G1-SEI-4A1:	Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)
G1-SEI-04A2:	5G operations on Radar Altimeter
G1-SEI-05A1:	MAC- Loss of separation/TCAS RA
G1-SEI-05A2:	GNSS Interference
G1-SEI-05A3:	Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (drones)

Appendix F: Definitions

Accident Investigation Authority. The authority designated by a State as responsible for aircraft accident and incident investigations within the context of Annex 13.

Audit Area. One of eight audit areas pertaining to the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP), i.e. primary aviation legislation and civil aviation regulations (LEG), civil aviation organization (ORG); personnel licensing and training (PEL); aircraft operations (OPS); airworthiness of aircraft (AIR); aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG); air navigation services (ANS); and aerodromes and ground aids (AGA).

Contributing Factors. Actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which, if eliminated, avoided or absent, would have reduced the probability of the accident or incident occurring, or mitigated the severity of the consequences of the accident or incident. the identification of contributing factors does not imply the assignment of fault or the determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability.

Critical Elements (CEs). The critical elements of a safety oversight system encompass the whole spectrum of civil aviation activities. They are the building blocks upon which an effective safety oversight system is based. The level of effective implementation of the CEs is an indication of a State's capability for safety oversight.

Effective Implementation (EI). A measure of the State's safety oversight capability, calculated for each critical element, each audit area or as an overall measure. The EI is expressed as a percentage.

Operator. The person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft operation.

Safety. The state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.

Safety Audit. A USOAP CMA audit that a State requests and pays for (on a cost recovery basis). The State determines the scope and date of a safety audit. Also see definition of audit.

Safety Data. A defined set of facts or set of safety values collected from various aviation related sources, which is used to maintain or improve safety.

Note: such safety data is collected from proactive or reactive safety-related activities, including but not limited to:

- a. accident or incident investigations;
- b. safety reporting;
- c. continuing airworthiness reporting;
- d. operational performance monitoring;
- e. inspections, audits, surveys; or
- f. safety studies and reviews.

Safety Enhancement: initiative (SEI). One or more actions to eliminate or mitigate risks associated with contributing factors to a safety occurrence or to address an identified safety deficiency. There are two main types of SEIs to address safety risks and issues at the Regional level.

Safety Information. Safety data processed, organized or analyzed in a given context so as to make it useful for safety management purposes.

Safety Management System (SMS). A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures.

Safety Oversight. A function performed by a State to ensure that individuals and organizations performing an aviation activity comply with safety-related national laws and regulations.

Safety Performance. A State or a service provider's safety achievement as defined by its safety performance targets and safety performance indicators.

Safety Performance Indicator. A data-based parameter used for monitoring and assessing safety performance.

Safety Performance Target. The State or service provider's planned or intended target for a safety performance indicator over a given period that aligns with the safety objectives.

Safety Risk. The predicted probability and severity of the consequences or outcomes of a hazard.

Significant Safety Concern (SSC). Occurs when the State allows the holder of an authorization or approval to exercise the privileges attached to it, although the minimum requirements established by the State and by the Standards set forth in the Annexes to the Convention are not met, resulting in an immediate safety risk to International Civil Aviation.

State Safety Programme (SSP). An integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety.

Appendix G: Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIIA:	Accident and Incident Investigation Authority
ACI:	Airports Council International
ADRM:	Aerodrome
AGA:	Aerodrome and Ground Aids
AIG:	Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
ALAR:	Approach and Landing Reduction
ANS:	Air Navigation Services
ANSP:	Air Navigation Service Provider
APV:	Approaches with Vertical Guidance
ARC:	Abnormal Runway Contact
ASBU:	Aviation System Block Upgrade
ASR:	Annual Safety Report
ATM:	Air Traffic Management
ATS:	Air Traffic Services
BIRD:	Bird Strike
CAA:	Civil Aviation Authority
CASI:	Civil Aviation Safety Inspectors
CAST:	Commercial Aviation Safety Team
CE:	Critical Element
CFIT:	Controlled Flight into Terrain
CICTT:	CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team
CMA:	Continuous Monitoring Approach
CRM:	Crew Resource Management
CAST:	US Commercial Aviation Safety Team
DGCA:	Conference of Directors General of Civil Aviation
EI:	Effective Implementation
FDAP:	Flight Data Analysis Programme
FIR:	Flight Information Region
F-NI:	Fire/ Smoke (Non-Impact)
GADSS:	Global Aeronautical Distress and Safety System
GANP:	Global Air Navigation Plan
GASeP:	Global Aviation Security Plan
GASOS:	Global Aviation Safety Oversight System
GASP:	Global Aviation Safety Plan
GASP-SG:	Global Aviation Safety Plan Study Group
GEN:	General Aspects
GPWS:	Ground Proximity Warning System
G- HRC:	Global-High Risk Categories of Occurrences
IATA:	International Air Transport Association
ICAO:	International Civil Aviation Organization
IFALPA:	International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations
IOSA:	IATA Operational Safety Audit
ISAGO:	IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations
iSTARS:	Integrated Safety Trend Analysis and Reporting System
LOC-I:	Loss of Control In-flight
MAC:	AIRPROX/ TCAS alert/ loss of separation/ near miss collisions/ mid-air collisions
MTOW:	Maximum Take-Off Weight

NASP:	National Aviation Safety Plan
NCLB:	No Country Left Behind
NDP:	National Development Plan
OAG:	Official Airline Guide
OPS:	Flight Operations (USOAP Audit Area)
ORG:	Civil Aviation Organization (USOAP Audit Area)
PDCA:	Plan-Do-Check-Act methodology
RAMP:	Ground Handling
RASG:	Regional Aviation Safety Group
RASP:	Regional Aviation Safety Plan
RE:	Runway Excursion (departure or landing)
RI:	Runway Incursion
RS:	Runway Safety
RSOO:	Regional Safety Oversight Organization
RST:	Runway Safety Team
RTC:	ICAO Regional Training Centre of Excellence
SAFE:	ICAO Safety Fund
SARPs:	Standards and Recommended Practices
SCF-NP:	System/Component Failure or Malfunction – Non-power plant
SCF-PP:	System/Component Failure or Malfunction - Power plant
SDCPS:	Safety Data Collection and Processing System
SEI:	Safety Enhancement Initiatives
SISG:	ICAO's Safety Indicator Study Group
SMS:	Safety Management Systems
SPI:	Safety Performance Indicator
SSC:	Significant Safety Concern
SSO:	State Safety Oversight
SSP:	State Safety Programme
SRP:	Safety Reporting and Programme
TCAS:	Traffic Collision and Avoidance System
TOR:	Terms of Reference
UAS:	Unmanned Aircraft Systems
UNK:	Unknown or Undetermined
UPRT:	Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
USOAP:	Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme
USOS:	Undershoot/ Overshoot

-END-

CREDITS

The RASG-MID thanks **Mr. Mohamed Chakib** for developing the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition.



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A world map is centered on the page, set against a background of a bright blue sky with scattered white clouds. The map shows the continents in a light, semi-transparent style.

Consolidated List of SEIs with their respective Safety Actions

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
Regional Operational Safety Risks					
Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction in Operational Risks					
G1-SEI-01:	Aircraft Upset in Flight (LOC-I)	A1- Guidance material on flight crew proficiency	IATA to be supported by Airbus	Planned 2026	2023- 2025
		A2- Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation	IATA to be supported by Airbus	Planned 2026	2023- 2025
		A3- Conduct Upset Recovery capacity building activities	UPRT Workshop. Airbus, ICAO, Kuwait	Regional ICAO UPRT Workshop (jointly involving Airbus, ICAO, Kuwait) conducted in Kuwait 7-11 May 2023. /UPRT webinar conducted 2024. Completed	2023-2025
		A4- Develop guidance material on the air cargo safety	Oman	To be presented to RASG-MID/13 for endorsement. Completed	2023-2025
G1-SEI-02:	Runway Safety- Runway Excursion	A1- Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI	Completed for 2023/ continuous for 2024/2025	2023-2025
		A2- MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Implementation.	ICAO	Completed for 2023/ continuous for 2024/2025	2023-2025
G1-SEI-03:	Runway Safety- Runway Incursion	A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities on the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS)	ICAO To be supported by Euro-Control, FAA	Completed Conducted February 2023	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		Implementation			
G1-SEI-04A1:	Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)	A1- Advisory Circular: Instrument Approach Procedures Using Continuous Descent Final Approach Techniques.	IATA is supported by aircraft manufacturers	Planned 2026	2023-2025
		A2- Guidance for designing RNP Approach	ICAO and MID FPP	Completed. circulated	2023-2025
		A3- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)	IATA supported by Aircraft manufacturers	Planned for 2026	2023-2025
		A4- Awareness Material on the vulnerabilities of BARO-VNAV approaches and mitigation actions	ICAO	Circulated to all States 2024. Completed.	2023-2025
G1-SEI-04A2	5G Operations on Radar Altimeter	A1- Develop a guidance material on safeguarding measures to protect Radio Altimeter from potential harmful interference from 5G Operation	Radio Altimeter Action Group (RADALT AG) To be supported by Boeing	Completed Publication of the guidance material: MID DOC 15 edition 1.0 in May 2023.	2023-2025
		A2- Conduct a Webinar addressing the matter to raise awareness and promote the guidance material developed by the RADALT AG	ICAO and RADALT AG To be supported by Airbus & Boeing	Completed The webinar has been conducted.	2023-2025
G1-SEI-05B1:	MAC- Loss of Separation	A1- Conduct workshop to implement Civil-Military cooperation.	ICAO supported by States and International Organizations	At national level, workshop has been conducted in Iran in 2022 and follow up meeting was conducted in Aug 2023. In this respect the action plan has been developed and agreed. Completed	2023-2025
		A2- Conduct seminar on raising awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas	ICAO supported by States, and international organizations	To be planned for 2025	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
G1-SEI-05B2:	GNSS Interference & Spoofing	A1: Raise awareness on the potential impact of GNSS interference on the aviation during the Civil-Mil Workshop	ICAO and IATA	The CMC Workshop is planned for July 2025. Postponed for 2026 due to security situation	2023-2025
		A2- Urge States to follow the reporting procedure agreed by MIDANPIRG Conclusion 19/4 when needed	ICAO	SL has been issued. Completed	2023-2025
		A3- Capacity Building on GNSS operations and GNSS RFI	ICAO and ACAA	Regional GNSS Workshop Completed. GNSS symposium planned for 2025	2023-2025
G1-SEI-05B3:	Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (Drones)	A1- UAS iPack deployment	ICAO and States	If requested by States Completed	2023-2025
		A2- Organize symposium on Drones related subjects	ICAO and ACAA supported by FAA and Boeing	ACAA organized Drones symposium in Morocco during the period 4-5 October 2023. Completed/Continuous for 2025.	2023-2025
		A3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework	ICAO and States	To be circulated during 2025 in coordination with ICAO HQ. pending HQ Confirmation	2023-2025
		A4- Develop an AAM study	UAE	UAE presented WP during SEIG/6 meeting. Completed.	2023-2025
G1-SEI-05B4:	Expansion of ATS route Networks	A1- Conduct gap analysis to identify current ATS route networks gaps	ICAO and States	The required data and information have been gathered, and the dashboard was deployed. Completed.	2023-2025
		A2- Establishment of parallel unidirectional ATS routes (De-confliction)	ICAO and States	Establishment of the parallel airway at interface of Kuwait and Iraq is on process. In addition, Iran requested to establish new parallel ATS route between Iran and Iraq to accommodate regional traffic in the most safe and efficient manner. Completed.	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
Organizational Challenges/issues					
Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities					
<p>G2-SEI-01:</p>	<p>Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities</p>	<p>A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs</p>	<p>ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry.</p>	<p>USOAP workshops conducted 2023, 2024, and 2025.</p> <p>ACAO and Singapore CAA: an AOC certification & Flight Inspectors course conducted in Amman the 29 -2 Jun 2023. Completed/continuous for 2024.</p> <p>ICAO & GCAA Symposium: “The Future of Aviation safety and Aircraft Accident Investigation” in Dubai, during 3 to 4 May 2023.</p> <p>“The Prevention of Aircraft Accidents and Incidents through the Collection & Analysis of Safety Data & Information” Workshop held in Rabat, Morocco from 11 to 12 July 2023.</p> <p>Conference on “Assistance to Aircraft Accident Victims and their Families” (AAAVF 2024) conducted 8-9 May 2024.</p> <p>Aviation Safety and Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation Symposium planned to be conducted this year in Abu Dhabi.</p> <p>ACAO and Singapore CAA conducted a course on resolution of safety issues CE8 in Amman the 19 -23 Jan 2025</p>	<p>2023-2025</p>

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		A2- Conduct technical assistance and NCLB missions to States , with focus on states with EI<80% as well as ANS, AIG, AGA, and OPS areas	ICAO and States	TAs conducted 2023 (Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Sudan, Libya). ANS Technical assistance to Kuwait, Sudan, Jordan and Lebanon conducted. Completed. NCLB Missions conducted for Egypt and Kuwait 2024 and 2025.	2023-2025
		A4 - Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection) (Action addressed under G6-SEI-01 A5)	States (Qatar) and ICAO	Conducted February 2023. Completed.	2023-2025
		A5- Develop guidance material to assist MID Region States in the issuance of exemptions related to temporary deviations from standards	Qatar supported by Iran, Sudan, UAE, ACAA, and IATA	Completed To be endorsed during RASG-MID/13	2023-2025
		A6- Develop guidance material to support States for the conduct of remote surveillance	Qatar supported by Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, and ACAA	Completed To be endorsed during RASG-MID/13	2023-2025
		A7- Develop guidance material on the enhancement of understanding the concept of judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors	Qatar supported by Saudi Arabia and UAE	Completed To be endorsed during RASG-MID/13	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
G2-SEI-03:	Establishment of MENA ARCM Database	A1- Establishing a Platform for Sharing data for MENA ARCM Member States	ICAO, ACAO, and MENA ARCM Member States	ACAO has established a share folder as an initial step for sharing information. Completed	2023-2025
G2-SEI-04:	Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods	A1- Dangerous Goods (DG) capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fire/smoke risk in cabin	ICAO, States, International Organizations, IATA, And Industry	Planned 2026	2023-2025
		A2- Develop guidance material on carriage and transport of Lithium batteries	IATA is supported by States, International Organizations, And Industry	Guidance material endorsed by RASG-MID/11 and circulated. Completed.	2023-2025
G2-SEI-05:	Human factors and Competence of Personnel	A1- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). (Action addressed under G1-SEI-04: CFIT).	IATA	Planned for 2026	2023-2025
		A2- Organize CBAT/EBT, Crew Resource Management Capacity building activities	ACAO, ICAO &Airbus,	. CBTA/EBT workshop conducted 25-26 Sep 2024. Completed.	2023-2025
		A3- Organize Team Resource Management Capacity building activities	ACAO, ICAO &Airbus	Planned for 2026	2023-2025
		A4- Conduct Fatigue Risk Management and Mental Health Best Practices Capacity building activities	ACAO, ICAO &Airbus	Webinar conducted 23 Sep 2024. Completed	2023-2025
		A5. Data analysis and Artificial intelligence study	UAE	Completed	
G2-SEI-06:	Impact of security on safety	A1- Organize seminar/Symposium/Workshop to exchange experiences and good	ICAO	Planned 2026	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		practices on assessing the risks and sharing of information related to the overflying of conflict zones in coordination with RASFG-MID and MIDANPIRG.			
		A2- Risk management on conflict zone workshop	ICAO/ACAO	Completed. Conducted in Cairo June	2023-2025
G2-SEI-07:	Managing cybersecurity risks	A1- Develop a Regional Action Plan to bridge the gap between ICAO Cyber Security Action plan and the implementation level of Cyber Resilience in the MID Region	ANS Cyber SeC Action Group ACAO AFCAC ECAC	Completed. Conducted 3rd ed of Interregional Seminar on « Innovation & Cybersecurity » in Casablanca/ Morocco, 17- 19 July 2024	2023-2025
		A2- Conduct activities on Cyber Security and Resilience- (Jointly ANS and AVSEC)	ICAO supported by Boeing	Completed conducted Nov 2023	2023-2025
		A3- Develop a MID Region Cybersecurity Action Plan	Cybersecurity Security Ad-hoc Group	Completed	2023-2025
G2-SEI-08:	Impact of COVID-19 pandemic- Safe return to operations	A1- Continued support to the aviation industry through MID-RPTF meetings/Activities, as needed	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry	Completed Aviation medicine workshop conducted Feb 2023	2023-2025
		A2- Sharing of guidance material/best practices	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry	Completed.	2023-2025

Goal 3: Implementation of Effective States Safety Programme (SSP)

G3-SEI-01:	Implement effective Safety Management	A1- Conduct ICAO SSP/SMS Capacity building activities	SSP workshops for States. 2023 SMS & Flight Data analysis workshop for airlines. ACAO, Airbus and ICAO. ACAO, ICAO & MENA RSOO States	SSP training course and SSP workshop conducted. (Kuwait & Oman) 2023 SRM Workshop conducted 2024. SMS & Flight Data analysis workshop for airlines Conducted Nov 2023. Completed/Continuous for 2024. SSP workshops provided for UAE & Jordan. SRM workshop for Jordan Completed	2023-2025
		A2- Conduct SSP Technical Assistance missions	ICAO and States	Conducted to Egypt Jan2025 Completed	2023-2025
G3-SEI-02:	NASP Development & Implementation	A1- Conduct NASPs workshops & technical assistance missions	ICAO. 2023	Workshop conducted in Kuwait and Qatar 2023 & 2024. Completed/Continuous for 2025. To be conducted Back-to-back with RASG-MID/12 meeting	2023-2025
		A2- NASP iPacks deployment	ICAO	If requested by states. Completed	2023-2025

Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level

G4-SEI-01:	Development and Implementation of	A1- Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition	SEIG	Published May 2023. Completed	2023-2025
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	MID-RASP				
G4-SEI-02:	Enhance collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry	A1- Develop and agree on joint work activities through MID-RCM meetings	ICAO, States, Regional Groups, International Organizations, and Industry	Completed Conducted Oct 2023	2023-2025
		A2- Support the establishment of MENA RSOO and its activities	ACAO, ICAO and States	States Signed the RSOO MoU on Dec 2023 and RSOO started its operations. Completed.	2023-2025

Goal 5: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes and Safety Information Sharing Networks

G5-SEI-01:	Promoting the Use of industry Programmes	A1- Encourage IATA's IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	IATA	Completed	2023-2025
		A2- Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	ICAO and ACI	Completed	2023-2025

Goal 6: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations

G6-SEI-01:	Certification of International Aerodromes	A1- Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI	Four (04) activities have coordinated with ACI for 2024 (Implementation Status: Completed)	2023-2025
		A2- Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to Aerodromes Certification through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI	Planned activity for 2025	2023-2025
		A3 - Deployment of iPack on Aerodrome Re-Start	ICAO and States	If requested by states Completed	2023-2025

		A4 - Support States in implementing aerodrome oversight/inspection mechanism through capacity building activities on Aerodrome Oversight	ICAO Supported by FAA	Planned activity for 2025	2023-2025
		A5 – Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection)	States (Qatar) and ICAO	Conducted February 2023. Completed.	2023-2025
		A6 – Conduct a Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities	ICAO, ACAO, WBA	Symposium planned Dec 2025 Completed	2023-2025
		A7- Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for States CAAs and airports regarding the introduction of ACR/PCR SARPS	ACAO, ICAO	Conduct an ICAO ACAO WS on ACR/PCR and SMS implementation, in rabat the 5 & 6 Jun 2024. Completed.	
G6-SEI-02:	Establish Runway Safety Team (RST) at International Aerodromes	A1- Conduct Runway Safety Go-Team (RST) assistance missions	ICAO. Supported RSP (Runway Safety Programme Partners)	Planned for 2025	2023-2025
		A2: Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through capacity building activities: (Action addressed under G1-SEI-02: Runway Excursion).	ICAO and ACI	Completed for 2023/ continuous for 2025	2023-2025



INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

**AVIATION TEMPORARY EXEMPTIONS GUIDANCE MATERIAL
FOR MID REGION STATES**

Compiled by the ICAO MID Regional Office	
Version 1.0	1 November 2025

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Example Checklist: Exemption Issuance Process

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Sample Exemption Application Form

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Sample Exemption Approval Letter

1. Introduction and Purpose and Scope

- 1.1 Over the past decades, international civil aviation has achieved a high degree of safety harmonization, thanks in large part to risk-based decision-making and robust cooperation among stakeholders. However, new challenges (e.g. global health crises, technological changes) require even greater cooperation and harmonization to maintain safety performance. One such challenge is the consistent management of aviation exemptions – instances where States allow temporary deviations from ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) under controlled conditions.
- 1.2 The HLCC 2021 Safety Stream reviewed a proposal by Qatar (on behalf of Arab Civil Aviation Organization Member States) urging additional guidance for States when considering exemptions. It was noted that ICAO’s Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) data showed a high rate of unsatisfactory Protocol Questions (PQs) related to exemptions, indicating that many States lack the basic capabilities or structured processes to properly assess and grant exemptions. In other words, audits found that numerous States did not have a formal or adequate system in place for managing exemptions, underscoring the need for a harmonized approach.
- 1.3 This guidance material provides MID Region States with an ICAO-aligned framework for the issuance of aviation regulatory exemptions. In extraordinary circumstances such as public health emergencies, natural disasters, conflicts, or operational exigencies (as experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic), Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) may need to grant temporary exemptions to certain aviation requirements to maintain continuity of operations. This document outlines the principles, processes, and tools to ensure that any such exemptions are granted only, when necessary, in a controlled manner that upholds safety and aligns with ICAO’s standards and recommended practices (SARPs).
- 1.4 The guidance is intended for use by regulators and policymakers in the MID Region to promote consistency and transparency in how exemptions are handled across different States. It covers the entire exemption lifecycle from initial request and evaluation through issuance, oversight of compliance with conditions, and eventual expiration or renewal of the exemption.
- 1.5 The need for a harmonized approach to aviation exemptions became evident during recent crises that disrupted normal regulatory compliance. The COVID-19 pandemic, for example, forced many States to allow deviations from training and medical requirements when travel restrictions and lockdowns made compliance impractical. In response, ICAO introduced the COVID-19 Contingency Related Differences (CCRD) and Targeted Exemptions (TE) system in 2020-2021 as a globally coordinated mechanism for States to notify temporary exemptions to certain Standards. While the specific pandemic-related processes (such as the TE online portal) were time-bound, the broader lesson is clear: States should have a robust framework in place to evaluate and issue exemptions before unforeseen events occur. By learning from these experiences and ICAO guidance (e.g. references in ICAO Doc 9734 Part A and Doc

9859 on managing regulatory compliance in crises), MID Region CAAs can strengthen their preparedness for granting exemptions without compromising aviation safety or international obligations.

- 1.6 This manual is organized to mirror a structured approach, beginning with foundational principles (Section 2) and preparedness (Section 3), then detailing a step-by-step process for handling exemption requests (Sections 4 and 5), followed by post-issuance oversight (Section 6). Best practices and a concluding remark are provided in Sections 7 and 8. Several annexes (appendices) offer practical tools, including a checklist for the exemption issuance process and sample templates (application forms, risk assessment matrix, exemption letter, and notification formats). States are encouraged to adapt these templates to their national contexts. The goal is to ensure that any exemption granted by a MID State's CAA is justified, safe, transparent, and time-bound, and recognized and communicated appropriately within the international aviation system.

2. Framework for Aviation Exemptions

- 2.1 Alignment with ICAO Standards: Any State-issued exemption must be embedded within the broader obligation to comply with ICAO SARPs under the Chicago Convention. States remain responsible for safety oversight (ICAO Critical Element 7) and for resolving safety issues (Critical Element 8) even when granting regulatory relief. In practice, this means that before granting an exemption, the CAA should verify whether doing so would result in non-compliance with an ICAO Standard. If it would, the State must be prepared to notify a difference to ICAO under Article 38 of the Convention. All exemptions should be consistent with the intent of the relevant ICAO Annex provisions – granting relief only to the extent necessary and with mitigations to achieve an equivalent level of safety. By aligning the national exemption process with ICAO's expectations, MID States ensure that safety is not compromised and that international transparency is maintained. (For example, if a State grants an exemption allowing flight crew to extend the interval of proficiency checks beyond the limit in Annex 1, that difference should be filed with ICAO through the EFOD system or appropriate channel and shared with other States as needed.)
- 2.2 Principles for Granting Exemptions: Exemptions are policy tools of last resort. They are intended for use under exceptional conditions where strict compliance with a requirement is impractical or contrary to the public interest, and where an equivalent level of safety can be achieved through alternative means. Key guiding principles include:
 - **Necessity and Justification:** The applicant (airline, organization, or individual) must demonstrate a clear operational necessity for the exemption. Convenience or cost savings alone are not sufficient justification. The CAA should be convinced that without the exemption, there would be a significant disruption or an inability to carry out vital aviation activities.

- **Safety Equivalence:** There must be evidence-based assurance that granting the exemption will not degrade safety. Typically, this is shown via a safety risk assessment (see Section 4.3) that identifies hazards introduced by deviating from the rule and implements mitigations to control risk to an acceptable level. The alternative measures proposed should aim to provide a level of safety equivalent to full compliance with the original requirement.
- **Temporariness and Scope:** Exemptions should be temporary in nature and limited in scope. They are not a mechanism to permanently bypass regulations. Each exemption should have a defined effective period and should apply only to specific entities, operations, or products as needed. Open-ended or broadly generalized exemptions are to be avoided. If a long-term regulatory alleviation is needed, the proper course is to amend the regulation or pursue differences at the international level, not to continually extend exemptions.
- **Public Interest and Benefit:** The CAA should weigh the public interest benefits of granting the exemption (e.g. sustaining critical air services, enabling humanitarian flights, facilitating economic recovery) against any potential negative impact. Exemptions should support the continued safe operation of aviation activities that benefit the public or industry, especially in emergency or unusual situations.
- **No Undue Advantage:** The exemption process should ensure fairness. An exemption must not grant an unfair competitive advantage. If multiple entities face the same challenge, the CAA should be prepared to handle similar requests in a consistent manner. Clear criteria help avoid perceptions of favoritism or lowering standards selectively.

2.3 **Scope of Application:** This guidance applies to exemptions from national civil aviation requirements (regulations, rules, or implementing standards issued by the State). Such requirements may be derived from ICAO SARPs or from additional State regulations. The types of requirements that might warrant exemptions include:

- **Personnel Licensing and Training requirements:** e.g. extending the validity of licenses, medical certificates, or training/check intervals under strict conditions (as many CAAs did during COVID-19 for pilot proficiency and medicals).
- **Aircraft Operations and Airworthiness requirements:** e.g. authorizing a ferry flight with an overdue maintenance item under specified limitations, or permitting operation in certain airspace with temporarily inoperative equipment when normally prohibited by regulations.
- **Airport and ANS regulations:** e.g. temporary deviation from an airport operating standard or an air traffic service requirement due to infrastructure issues or emergencies, provided safety is maintained by other measures.

- Any other safety requirements where rigid adherence is temporarily impractical but equivalent safety can be assured.

However, not all rules are subject to exemption. Safety-critical standards should rarely be exempted unless there is absolutely no alternative and the case is compelling. For example, basic aircraft airworthiness criteria or critical operational procedures should not be compromised. Each State should define which provisions cannot be exempted (or set high approval thresholds for them) in its policy. Additionally, if an exemption request involves multiple domains (e.g., personnel licensing and ops specs deviations together), the CAA should ensure a coordinated evaluation across all affected departments.

2.4 Not a Substitute for Compliance: Exemptions are a contingency tool, not a substitute for effective compliance or timely regulatory updates. MID States are cautioned not to use exemptions as a loophole to avoid implementing requirements or as a long-term solution for outdated regulations. Whenever an exemption is granted, it should trigger a later review: Why was exemption necessary? If it was due to an impractical or overly stringent rule, the State may consider amending that regulation through the normal rulemaking process. Likewise, operators should not rely on repeated exemptions in lieu of compliance; they are expected to have robust planning to meet regulatory obligations. In essence, the use of exemptions should reinforce the regulatory system's flexibility in extraordinary situations while preserving its integrity. Continuous or careless use of exemptions could erode safety or international trust, so they must remain the exception rather than the norm. Once conditions permit or the underlying issue is resolved, the goal is always to return to full compliance or to implement permanent regulatory solutions if needed, rather than extending exemptions indefinitely.

3. *Regulatory and Organizational Preparedness*

3.1 The CAA's authority to grant exemptions should be clearly established in the State's civil aviation law or regulations. Typically, there will be a provision empowering the CAA (or a designated senior official, such as the Director General of Civil Aviation) to exempt compliance with specific requirements under defined conditions. States should review their primary aviation legislation and operating regulations to ensure that:

- The scope of allowable exemptions is defined (which regulations can be exempted and which cannot, or any general criteria mandated by law).
- The law requires that an exemption may only be granted if it is in public interest and will not compromise safety (some States explicitly write these criteria into the legal text).

- The law or a policy document outlines the procedure for granting an exemption (application, review, record, etc.), or empowers the CAA to establish such procedure via guidance material (like this document). If necessary, States should update their regulations to address any gaps – for instance, adding a regulation that says “The Authority may exempt compliance with a requirement of these regulations in individual cases, subject to such conditions as the Authority deems necessary in the interest of safety.” All exemptions granted should cite the specific legal provision that authorizes the CAA to do so. This legal clarity protects both the State and the operator, ensuring that the exemption is enforceable and recognized under the law.

3.2 State Policy and Evaluation Criteria: Beyond the bare legal authority, CAAs need a clear internal policy or written procedures on how to evaluate and decide on exemption requests. This internal guidance (often an inspector handbook or a policy manual) should cover:

- **Standard Criteria:** A set of criteria that must be met for any exemption to be approved (e.g., “no acceptable alternative means of compliance available,” “meets equivalent safety through mitigation,” “limited duration,” etc.). These criteria create consistency. For instance, the policy may state that safety risk assessment demonstrating an acceptable level of safety is mandatory for approval.
- **Approval Levels:** Define who within the CAA can approve exemptions. Minor technical exemptions might be approvable at the department head level, whereas major exemptions (especially those affecting international standards or multiple organizations) might require Director General or even Ministerial approval. Clear delegation of authority avoids confusion during urgent situations.
- **Process Steps:** Lay out the steps the CAA will follow when an application is received (screening, assignment to technical experts, review meetings, safety analysis, decision, documentation). A flowchart or checklist (like Appendix 1 of this guidance) can be part of the policy.
- **Documentation and Justification:** Emphasize that every exemption decision must be fully documented, including the justification for granting or denying, the analysis performed, and any special conditions imposed. This creates an auditable trail and knowledge base for future cases.
- **Consistency and Precedents:** The policy should task a focal point (e.g., a regulatory standards department) with maintaining a log of all exemptions granted, to monitor trends and ensure consistency. If a similar request was handled in the past, the CAA should apply a consistent approach unless circumstances have changed.

By formalizing such a policy aligned with ICAO guidance (e.g. drawing from principles in ICAO Doc 9734 Part A, Chapter 3 on compliance and enforcement), States ensure that inspectors and decision-makers have a common understanding of how to handle exemptions. This reduces subjectivity and promotes transparency and fairness in the exemption process.

3.3 Industry Communication and Transparency: It is important that the aviation industry (airlines, service providers, license holders) clearly understands the State's expectations regarding exemptions. The CAA should communicate to industry stakeholders that:

- Exemptions are exceptional: Through advisories or guidance to industry, emphasize that organizations must plan to comply with all regulations and should not assume that exemptions will be granted. Good safety management includes contingency planning that does not solely rely on regulatory relief.
- Application Process: Provide accessible information on how to apply for an exemption, including any standard application form (such as the template in Appendix 2) and the required lead time. For example, a State might publish a notice that all exemption applications should be submitted at least 60 or 90 days in advance of the needed effective date, except for unforeseen emergency cases.
- Information Required: Inform applicants that comprehensive justification and supporting evidence (safety risk assessments, impact analysis, etc.) must accompany any request. If the CAA has published guidance material or a checklist for industry on preparing exemption requests, reference it. This sets the expectation that frivolous or poorly substantiated requests will not be entertained.
- Transparency of Outcomes: States may consider publishing summaries of exemptions granted (while respecting any confidential operational details) so that industry peers and the public are aware of significant deviations. Some CAAs issue Exemption Bulletins or include exemptions in their official gazette or website. Transparency helps maintain trust that exemptions are being used responsibly and not to give unfair advantage.

Open communication ensures that when a genuine need for an exemption arises, the applicant knows how to proceed and the CAA receives better-quality submissions, thereby speeding up the evaluation. It also deters misuse of the exemption process by making it clear that requests will undergo rigorous scrutiny.

3.4 International Notification Obligations: A critical aspect of preparedness is having a mechanism to fulfill international obligations when an exemption affects compliance with ICAO Standards. Each CAA should coordinate internally (e.g., between the

technical department handling the exemption and the department or National Continuous Monitoring Coordinator responsible for ICAO compliance) to ensure that:

- **Difference Notification:** If an exemption result in a temporary difference from an ICAO Standard, the State is ready to notify ICAO. This could be via the Electronic Filing of Differences (EFOD) system or a formal letter, depending on ICAO requirements. Appendix 5 of this document provides a sample format for notifying ICAO of a difference due to an exemption. Timely notification keeps the ICAO registry up to date and informs other States of potential impact (for instance, if a neighboring State’s inspectors know that pilots from your State might have extended medical validity, they can take that into account).
- **Mutual Recognition and Coordination:** If the exemption involves cross-border operations, the CAA should communicate with other affected States or regional bodies. For example, if a MID State grants an exemption that allows its airline to operate in another region under alleviated requirements, it is prudent to notify the Civil Aviation Authorities of those destination States. This could be done via a formal letter or through regional coordination groups (like the MID Region Safety or Operations group). Standardized notification formats (see Appendix 5) help streamline this communication.
- **Publication in Aeronautical Information (if needed):** In some cases, if the exemption could impact foreign operators or flight planning (e.g., an exemption related to airport operational standards or airspace procedures), it may need to be promulgated via NOTAM or AIP Supplement so that all users are informed. The CAA’s procedure should include liaising with the AIS office to issue such notifications when relevant.

By predefining these steps, States ensure that granting an exemption does not inadvertently put them in breach of international responsibilities. Instead, even when using flexibility, they remain aligned with the cooperative spirit of ICAO standards and avoid surprises to other States.

3.5 Resource and Responsibility Allocation: Handling exemption requests can be complex and time-sensitive, especially in emergencies. CAAs should allocate adequate resources and define responsibilities in advance:

- **Dedicated Team or Focal Points:** Identify a unit or individuals responsible for managing exemption applications. For example, a Regulatory Affairs or Standards section might act as the coordinator, logging incoming requests and convening the appropriate technical experts to evaluate each case. This focal point ensures consistency and that timelines are tracked.

- **Technical Expertise:** Depending on the subject of the exemption, different technical inspectors or engineers will need to be involved (flight operations inspectors for ops matters, airworthiness engineers for technical waivers, medical assessors for licensing exemptions, etc.). The CAA should maintain a roster or protocol for quickly assembling a multidisciplinary review team. Complex cases might require input from multiple departments (e.g., an exemption for extended twin-engine operations might involve both airworthiness and operations specialists).
- **Risk Assessment Capability:** Ensure the CAA staff are equipped to perform or evaluate safety risk assessments. This may involve having risk analysis tools or templates (see Appendix 3 for a generic risk assessment template), as well as training staff in risk-based decision making (see 3.6 Training). In some cases, the CAA might establish a safety risk panel that can be convened to collectively examine higher-risk exemption proposals.
- **Administrative Support:** Given that exemptions often involve formal letters, records, and possibly legal orders, administrative support is needed to prepare documents correctly and maintain the exemption register. The CAA's secretariat or legal office might help draft the official exemption instrument text to ensure it's unambiguous and legally sound.
- **Emergency Procedures:** Include in your planning the scenario of urgent exemption needs outside normal office hours or during crisis periods. Assigning on-call contacts or an emergency procedure (e.g., a fast-track approval by the DG with subsequent technical analysis) can be valuable. The key is to avoid panicked, ad hoc processes by having a pre-thought-out plan, even if abbreviated, for emergency cases.

3.6 Training and Competency Development: As part of preparedness, MID States should train their personnel on the exemption process. This ensures that staff at all levels understand their roles and how to uphold safety during the exemption process:

- **Inspector Guidance and Workshops:** Develop guidance material for inspectors and technical staff on evaluating exemptions (aligned with this document). Conduct workshops or briefing sessions to walk through hypothetical exemption scenarios. For example, simulate an airline requesting an exemption for extended pilot flight hours, and have the team practice evaluating it, doing a risk assessment, and drafting conditions. Such exercises build competency and confidence.
- **Risk Management Training:** Since risk assessments are central to exemption decisions, provide training (or refresher courses) in safety risk management, as per ICAO Doc 9859 (Safety Management Manual) principles. Inspectors

should be comfortable reviewing an operator's risk mitigation proposal or creating one if the operator hasn't provided a sufficient assessment.

- **Legal and Communication Training:** Ensure those drafting exemption documents or communicating decisions are familiar with the correct terminology and tone. The exemption letter (Appendix 4 provides an example) is an official legal document; errors or ambiguities in it could create enforcement problems. Training can be provided on how to write clear conditions and articulate the regulatory basis. Similarly, staff should know how to communicate with industry diplomatically – e.g., how to explain a denial of an exemption request with factual reasoning.
- **Continuous Learning:** Encourage staff to keep abreast of international best practices regarding exemptions. ICAO, EASA, and other bodies sometimes issue updated guidance or case studies (for instance, lessons from the COVID-19 Targeted Exemptions experience). By staying updated, the CAA can refine its own processes. A feedback mechanism (see Section 6.6 Post-Exemption Review) can also be part of training, wherein after each major exemption case, the team debriefs what was learned and updates procedures accordingly.

By investing in preparedness across legal, procedural, resource, and training dimensions, MID States can handle exemption needs proactively. This upfront work pays off when a request arises, as the CAA can respond swiftly but thoughtfully, rather than scrambling to invent a process on the fly. It embeds resilience in the State's safety oversight system, ensuring continuity of aviation activities even under duress, without sacrificing the rigor of oversight.

4. Process for Exemption Application and Evaluation

When an entity seeks an exemption, a structured process helps ensure thorough evaluation and consistent handling. This section (Section 4) covers the pre-issuance phase – from the moment a request is received up to the point a decision is ready to be made, but before the official exemption is issued. Following sections will cover the issuance and post-issuance phases.

4.1 Submission of Exemption Requests: The process typically starts with the **applicant** submitting a formal request to the CAA. The CAA should require that all exemption requests be made **in writing**, using an official form or letter that captures necessary details. Appendix 2 provides a *Sample Exemption Application Form* that States can adopt or tailor. Key aspects of this step include:

- **Who May Apply:** Clarify that only authorized representatives of the affected certificate holder or organization (or the individual, if it's a licensee) may submit the request. For instance, an airline's post holder or quality manager would apply on behalf of the airline, providing their contact information and accountability.

- **Content of Application:** The application must clearly identify the specific requirement from which exemption is sought (cite the exact regulation, rule, or directive number and paragraph). It should detail the scope of relief (for example, “to allow XYZ Airlines to operate aircraft with an out-of-interval navigation database for up to 5 days beyond the requirement of regulation ABC”). The applicant should specify the duration of exemption needed (start and end date) and the reason it is needed. Additionally, the applicant should attach or outline their proposed safety case/justification, including any risk assessment and mitigation strategies they will implement. All relevant supporting documents (e.g., technical analysis, contingency plans, evidence of why they cannot comply) should be included.
- **Lead Time:** Unless it’s an unforeseen emergency, applications should be submitted well in advance of the needed effective date. Many States require applications at least 30-90 days prior. This lead time should be communicated to industry (as noted in 3.3). If an application arrives late, the CAA will need to decide if it’s due to genuinely unforeseeable events or just poor planning; poor planning alone is usually not an acceptable reason for urgency (i.e., “lack of planning on your part does not constitute an emergency on our part” approach). However, emergency cases (e.g., a sudden discovery of a safety issue grounding aircraft unless an immediate exemption is given for a one-time ferry flight) should still be processed expeditiously, albeit with no compromise on necessary safety checks (see 4.5).
- **Acknowledgment:** The CAA should acknowledge receipt of the application in a timely manner. An acknowledgment letter or email typically outlines the next steps, provides a reference number for the request, and if possible, an estimate of timeline for a decision. This assures the applicant that the request is in process and sets expectations.

4.2 Preliminary Screening of Applications: Once received, the exemption request undergoes a preliminary review to ensure it is complete and within the CAA’s purview:

- **Completeness Check:** The CAA (through the designated focal point or office) should verify that the application contains all required information and documentation. If critical details are missing – for example, the applicant failed to clearly state which regulation or did not include a justification – the CAA should promptly request additional information. As a policy, incomplete applications may be put on hold or even rejected if the applicant cannot or will not furnish the necessary details. Section 6.3 of the sample application form (Appendix 2) lists the typical information required. The CAA might use a checklist internally to mark off that each required item is present.

- **Scope and Validity Check:** The screening also determines if the request is asking for something that can legally be granted. If, for instance, the exemption sought is for a requirement that by law cannot be exempted (perhaps certain safety requirements have no exemption provision), the CAA should recognize this early. Alternatively, the request might pertain to another authority's jurisdiction (e.g., something that actually requires approval from a different State's CAA or a different government agency). In such cases, the CAA should inform the applicant accordingly and not proceed down the normal process.
- **Assign to Technical Experts:** If the request passes the above checks, the coordinator assigns it to the appropriate technical department(s) for in-depth evaluation. For example, if an airline requests an exemption from a flight duty time limitation, this goes to Flight Operations inspectors; an aircraft equipment requirement exemption goes to Airworthiness; if it's about airport standards, assign to the Aerodrome Safety team, etc. For multi-faceted requests, a joint team may be formed. At this stage, set an internal timeline – for instance, the technical evaluation team should convene or report back within X days. Marking the request as urgent (if applicable) also happens now.
- **Risk Category (Optional):** Some CAAs do an initial risk categorization of the request – e.g., classify as “minor”, “moderate”, or “significant” impact – to determine the level of scrutiny needed. A request with potentially high safety impact might trigger a more formal review board or require higher approval authority (see 3.2 on Approval Levels). This triage helps allocate effort where it's most needed.

4.3 **Safety Risk Assessment:** Conducting a thorough safety risk assessment is the cornerstone of the exemption evaluation process. At this stage, the technical evaluators (with input from the applicant as needed) will analyze what safety risks arise from granting the exemption and whether those risks can be mitigated to an acceptable level. Key points in this step:

- **Identify Hazards:** Examine the exact nature of the deviation. What scenarios or hazards could arise if the normal rule is not followed? For example, if extending a pilot's license validity by one month (exemption from license renewal timeline), hazards might include pilot proficiency decay or undetected medical issues. If deferring a maintenance inspection, hazards could be component failure. List all credible failure modes or safety consequences tied to the exemption.
- **Assess Severity and Likelihood:** For each hazard scenario, assess the severity of the worst credible outcome and the likelihood of that outcome during the exemption period. Use the State's standard risk matrix (often part of its State Safety Program) or the methodology the CAA typically applies for safety assessments. The goal is to determine the risk index or level (e.g., high,

medium, low) of each hazard without additional mitigation. This establishes the baseline risk of granting the exemption as requested.

- **Mitigation Measures:** Identify and evaluate mitigations that can reduce risk. Often, the applicant will propose some mitigations in their request (e.g., additional training, more frequent checks, operating limitations). The CAA should critically assess these: Are they adequate and realistic? The CAA may require additional conditions as mitigations (for instance, “granting the exemption provided the aircraft is only used for cargo flights, not carrying passengers” or “the pilot must fly with a fully qualified co-pilot and not be pilot-in-command during the extended period”). Think creatively and cautiously about what measures would offset the safety gap introduced. This may involve consulting manufacturer guidance or other States’ practices in similar situations.
- **Residual Risk and Acceptability:** After applying the mitigations, reevaluate the risk. Does it come down to an acceptable level (typically defined by the State’s safety risk tolerability criteria)? If the residual risk is still too high, the exemption cannot be safely granted in its current form – the CAA might then consider if any further mitigations are possible or if the request must be denied. Document the final assessment of risk for the exemption. Ideally, the risk assessment process and conclusion should be captured in a formal report or template (Appendix 3 provides a format example for recording this evaluation).
- **Use of Expertise:** In complex cases, the CAA may convene a small expert panel or involve the State Safety Program’s risk management unit to peer-review the assessment. Particularly novel or high-risk proposals benefit from multiple eyes. It’s also beneficial to check if ICAO or other authorities have published any guidance on the specific topic – for example, during COVID, ICAO published safety operational measures for extending crew validity, which can be referenced as benchmarks for risk mitigations.

Throughout this step, maintain communication with the applicant. If certain mitigations are needed or if aspects of their proposal seem insufficient, the CAA can go back and ask the applicant to refine their risk mitigation plan. This iterative communication not only improves the safety outcome but also ensures the applicant is aware of possible conditions and is prepared to implement them.

4.4 Consultation and Coordination: Depending on the exemption’s complexity and impact, broader consultation may be warranted before a decision is made:

- **Internal CAA Consultation:** Within the CAA, ensure all relevant sections provide input. For example, even if the Flight Operations department is lead for a pilot licensing exemption, the Licensing office and perhaps the Medical unit should be consulted to weigh in on consequences and consistency with policies.

The legal department should review any novel exemption for compliance with law. An internal meeting or case conference can be very useful: gather all stakeholders to discuss the draft assessment and proposed decision. This also helps anticipate any enforcement or implementation issues (e.g., how to surveil compliance with exemption conditions).

- **Consultation with Applicant:** It can be beneficial to hold a technical meeting with the applicant (or at least have discussions) especially if the CAA is inclined to grant the exemption with conditions. In this meeting, the CAA can ensure the applicant understands the proposed conditions and is capable of meeting them. If the applicant finds any condition unworkable, they can discuss alternatives. This collaborative approach, while maintaining the CAA's authority, often leads to a more robust set of safety measures. It also helps the CAA gauge the applicant's commitment to safety – an applicant unwilling to engage seriously in risk discussions may not merit the exemption.
- **Regional Coordination:** In cases of exemptions that might set precedents or have regional implications, CAAs in the MID Region might coordinate with each other (through the ICAO MID Office or regional safety groups). For example, if multiple States are facing similar issues (like an inability to renew licenses due to a regional training center closure), a coordinated approach can ensure harmonization. During COVID-19, such coordination was common via ICAO regional offices to align on exemption policies. A MID State might reach out to another State that dealt with a similar request for advice or data (keeping in mind not to disclose any confidential info without permission).
- **External Consultation (if applicable):** Sometimes, consulting other stakeholders is prudent. For a maintenance-related exemption, maybe consult the aircraft manufacturer or maintenance organization for their expert view or recommended limits. If an exemption could affect airlines from other States (e.g., a change in airport requirement), consult representatives or ICAO if needed. Always consider if the exemption touches on multilateral agreements or requirements (for example, EU-based rules if a State is part of an agreement, or if an operation is code-share with a foreign carrier, etc.). Gathering input ensures no blind spots in the decision.

4.5 Timelines and Urgent Requests: The processing time for an exemption should be commensurate with its urgency and complexity. Under normal circumstances, the CAA should strive to complete evaluation and decision within a standard timeframe (e.g., 30 days) to provide predictability. However, urgent and emergency requests require flexibility:

- **Expedited Process:** If an exemption is needed on very short notice due to unforeseen events (e.g., an aircraft stranded needing a one-time flight, sudden unavailability of a required facility, etc.), the CAA may adopt an expedited review. This might involve forgoing some steps (like full team meetings) but

compensating by having key personnel focus intensively on the case for a few hours or a day. The Director General or delegated official might authorize proceeding with minimal bureaucracy, provided the safety analysis is still done. In extreme cases, a verbal preliminary approval might be given (to get an aircraft moving, for instance), but it must be followed by the written exemption document as soon as possible.

- **Justification for Urgency:** It's important that the reason for urgency is documented. As noted, poor planning by the applicant (e.g., they "forgot" to apply earlier) is generally not a valid reason to skip steps. However, a genuine emergency or last-minute event is. Documenting this ensures transparency and accountability for why a fast-track was used.
- **Adequate Assessment even if Fast:** Even under pressure, do not skip the fundamental assessment of risk. If time is extremely short, lean on expert judgement and any analogous cases or existing data. The CAA might impose very restrictive conditions as a precaution when there's little time for deeper analysis. For example, if maintenance can't be done on time due to a sudden issue and a ferry flight exemption is needed, the CAA can say: "Okay, one flight allowed by special permit, daytime only, no passengers, with specific inspections done prior to flight" – essentially layering conservatism to mitigate unknowns.
- **Record of Decision:** After handling an urgent case, conduct a quick internal review to capture any lessons (did the CAA get all info needed, were communications clear, etc.?) which can improve future responses. Also, make sure the exemption is entered into the official log even if done quickly.

4.6 Decision-Making Criteria: Once all information is gathered (from the application, risk assessment, and consultations), the CAA's decision-makers must apply consistent criteria to arrive at approval or denial. The State's established criteria (from Section 3.2) will guide this. Generally, an exemption should only be approved if:

- The situation and evidence satisfy the necessity test (it is needed to achieve an outcome in the public interest or to avoid an undue hardship that wasn't self-created).
- The safety risk is acceptable with the identified mitigations in place (i.e., equivalent safety can be maintained). This typically must be clearly demonstrated in the risk assessment.
- The exemption's duration and scope are limited to the minimum required to address the need. If the request was broader or longer than necessary, the CAA might decide to approve a narrower version (e.g., approve for 3 months instead of 6, or only for certain operations instead of all).

- The applicant has a good compliance track record (if an applicant has a history of violations or failing to meet conditions, the CAA can factor that in – a privilege like an exemption requires trust that the operator will adhere to the alternate measures).
- If applicable, the exemption would not cause the State to violate international agreements beyond what can be managed (if it does, perhaps it cannot be granted at all without higher-level coordination). Conversely, reasons to deny an exemption include: failure to demonstrate equivalent safety, insufficient justification, feasible alternatives exist (so exemption not truly needed), or the CAA lacks authority to grant it. The decision should ideally be made by the person/body at the appropriate authority level. For instance, technical staff present the case and make recommendations to the Director General or a committee if required. A clear recommendation (provides conditions or deny) should be made. Any divergent opinion among the evaluators can be noted, but ultimately the authorized decision-maker's ruling stands.

4.7 Documentation and Record-Keeping: Before moving to issuance, ensure that the entire evaluation process is well documented. Prepare an Exemption Evaluation Report or file that includes: the original application, records of all communication with the applicant, the completed risk assessment worksheet, minutes or notes from any consultation meetings, and the final recommendation/decision briefing.

- This will form the basis of the exemption document text and is kept in CAA archives. Good documentation is vital for accountability and for any future reference, especially if the exemption is renewed or if another CAA or ICAO inquires about how the decision was made. In addition, decide on a unique Exemption Reference Number or ID that will be used on the official letter and in the tracking system.
- Many CAAs number exemptions serially by year (e.g., “EX-2025-005”). Having a reference number helps link all documentation and is useful for tracking and retrieving the case later.
- By the end of the Section 4 process, the CAA should have a clear outcome of the evaluation: either to prepare an exemption for issuance (with specific conditions drafted) or to prepare a letter of denial.
- The groundwork laid here ensures that any exemption granted is solidly justified. We now move to Section 5, which deals with the execution of the issuance (the formal granting and communicating of the decision).

5. Issuance of Exemptions: Execution

This section describes how an approved exemption is formalized, communicated, and put into effect. Even after deciding in principle to grant an exemption, careful execution is important to ensure the exemption is legally valid and clearly understood by all parties.

5.1 Drafting the Exemption Instrument: The exemption is typically issued in writing as an official Exemption Letter or Order on the CAA's letterhead (see Appendix 4 for a Sample Exemption Approval Letter). Drafting this document requires precision:

- **Addressing and References:** The letter should be addressed to the applicant (e.g., the accountable manager of the airline, or the individual if applicable) and clearly reference their original request (including date of request and any reference number they provided). It should also reference the legal authority under which it's granted (for example, "Pursuant to Article X of the Civil Aviation Law and Regulation YYY-123,").
- **Grant and Scope:** A concise statement granting the exemption should be made, specifying what requirement is being exempted and to whom it applies. For instance: "The Civil Aviation Authority hereby grants XYZ Airlines an exemption from the requirement of [Regulation citation] which stipulates [the rule], to allow [describe what is allowed]." If the exemption is only for certain aircraft, personnel, routes, or operations, detail that.
- **Effective Period:** Clearly state the start date and end date of the exemption's validity. Use absolute calendar dates when possible (e.g., "effective from 01 December 2025 until 31 March 2026, inclusive"). If it's event-based (e.g., "until the aircraft reaches base for repair on its next flight"), try to also include a backstop date. If the exemption is to end on occurrence of an event, mention how that will be confirmed.
- **Conditions:** This is a critical part – list all the conditions or limitations attached to the exemption. They should be numbered or bulleted for clarity. Conditions are measures the operator must comply with to use the exemption. Examples include: additional inspections, training, reporting requirements, restrictions on operation (like VFR only, or limited altitude), carrying copies of the exemption letter on board, etc. Essentially, any mitigation from the risk assessment that needs to be mandatory should be written as a condition. Also, a general condition often included is that the operator must immediately inform the CAA of any safety incidents or significant changes related to the exemption.
- **ICAO Difference Note (if relevant):** If the exemption results in a difference from an ICAO Standard, the letter may include a statement acknowledging that and that the State will notify ICAO. However, some CAAs prefer to handle ICAO notification separately and not burden the applicant with that detail. If included, it might read: "This exemption constitutes a temporary difference from [Annex X, Chapter Y, Standard Z] which will be notified to ICAO in accordance with Article 38." This signals transparency.

- **Consequences and Miscellaneous:** Include statements such as: the exemption is granted based on the facts and mitigation presented – if those change or if the conditions are not met, the exemption may be withdrawn or becomes invalid. Also clarify that when the exemption expires, full compliance with the original requirement must resume. The letter can also note if the exemption is non-transferable (most are; it applies only to the named party).
- **Signature:** The letter must be signed by the authorized person (DG or whomever is designated). It should carry the official seal or other authentication if required by national procedures.

Ensure the draft goes through an internal review (e.g., by legal or a senior inspector) to catch any ambiguities. Wording is important – conditions especially must be enforceable and clear. For instance, saying “the operator should try to do X” is not enforceable; instead say “the operator shall do X.”

5.2 Approval by the Competent Authority: The draft exemption letter, along with the evaluation dossier, is then submitted to the competent authority for final approval and signature. Depending on the State’s setup:

- This could be the Director General of Civil Aviation or a board/committee if one is established for such decisions. The approving authority reviews the materials to ensure they are satisfied with the justification and conditions. They may ask questions or request modifications (for instance, adding a condition or shortening the duration if they feel it necessary).
- Once satisfied, they sign the exemption letter. The date of signature is usually the effective date unless otherwise specified. (If there’s a delay between signature and needed effect, the letter should clarify that it’s effective from a later date, as mentioned in 5.1).
- It’s good practice to have at least one other official witness or countersign or initial the document for record integrity, though not always required.
- After signature, the exemption is now officially granted, but not yet in effect for the applicant until communicated.

5.3 Communicating the Decision: Communication must be prompt and clear:

- **To the Applicant:** The signed exemption letter (and any certificate or official order document that accompanies it) should be transmitted to the applicant immediately. Ideally this is done via official means – a scanned signed letter emailed (for speed) followed by a hard copy delivered, or an official electronic signature system if in place. Accompany the letter with a brief cover note if

needed, thanking for their cooperation and reiterating any next steps (like compliance monitoring activities, see Section 6.1). If the exemption is denied instead, a denial letter would be sent that outlines the reasons for refusal (e.g., insufficient safety justification). In the case of denial, the applicant might be advised on what they can do (if anything) to meet requirements or if they can re-apply with different parameters.

- Within the CAA: Inform all relevant inspectors and departments about the decision. For example, if a flight ops exemption was granted, the ops inspectors overseeing that operator should have a copy and incorporate the new oversight tasks (ensuring conditions are met) in their surveillance plan. If the exemption affects other sections (air traffic, aerodromes), inform them too. Circulate internally perhaps via a memo or include in daily briefings. This ensures the whole CAA speaks with one voice and anyone interacting with the operator is aware of the special circumstances.
- Other Stakeholders: Depending on the nature of the exemption, other stakeholders might need notification. For instance, if an exemption is granted to an airline that allows something unusual that airports or ATC need to know, coordinate to inform those stakeholders. If the exemption is something that pilots will carry, the CAA might instruct the operator to brief their pilots to show the exemption letter to foreign ramp inspectors if questioned. Essentially, consider who might need to know to avoid confusion – for example, during COVID exemptions, many CAAs sent out notices to foreign embassies or CAAs about their general exemptions so that foreign authorities would honor their licenses or certs temporarily.

5.4 Stipulating Conditions and Limitations: As introduced in 5.1, conditions are a key part of the exemption. Here we emphasize how the CAA ensures they are implemented:

- Operator's Acknowledgment: It's wise to get an acknowledgment from the applicant that they understand and will comply with all conditions. This could be as simple as them signing a copy of the letter to return, or sending an email confirmation. It adds accountability.
- Embedding in Operator's System: The operator (especially if an airline or organization) should ideally integrate the exemption conditions into their operational control system. For example, if a condition is that a certain maintenance action must be done every week during the exemption period, the CAA might request the operator to show that this has been added to their maintenance planning or tracking system. This ensures the condition isn't forgotten. If a condition involves reporting or checks by pilots, the operator should issue an internal notice or bulletin to staff referencing the CAA exemption and listing what must be done. The CAA can ask to be copied on such internal instructions.

- **Limitations for Safety:** Some limitations might involve external coordination, like if an aircraft isn't technically meeting an equipage requirement for certain airspace due to an exemption, the operator might be limited to only fly in certain areas or altitudes. Those limitations must be communicated in flight plans or remarks to avoid issues. The CAA should verify that the operator has a plan for this.
- **Tracking Compliance:** Plan for how the CAA will monitor these conditions (more on that in Section 6.1). Essentially, once conditions are in place, they become additional regulatory requirements for the duration – the operator is now obligated to meet these just as they would the normal rules. It's the CAA's role to enforce them accordingly.

5.5 Dissemination and Publication: For transparency and in fulfillment of any legal or international requirements, the CAA may disseminate information about the exemption:

- **ICAO and States Notification:** If, as identified earlier, the exemption causes an ICAO difference or needs to be known by other States, the CAA should proceed with those notifications immediately after issuance. Appendix 5 gives a sample format; often this entails sending a letter to ICAO (or updating EFOD) with details like the affected standard, effective dates, and any conditions. Similarly, if notifying other specific States or airlines, send those notices out. This step keeps the international community informed and helps avoid any operational surprises (for instance, a foreign regulator might allow a flight crew with expired medical to operate into their territory if they know an official exemption is in place).
- **Domestic Publication:** Some States require that exemptions be published in an official public record, such as a government gazette or a CAA online registry. If that is the case, ensure this publication is made in accordance with the timeline (maybe within a certain number of days of issuance). Even if not required, the CAA might publish a summary on their website for significant exemptions, as part of transparency initiatives. For example, "CAA grants temporary exemption to [Operator] for [Requirement] until [Date] subject to conditions...". Of course, sensitive or proprietary info should be omitted.
- **Ops Documents Update (if needed):** If the exemption affects operational documents (like Aeronautical Information Publication, operations specifications attachments, etc.), coordinate to update those. For example, if an Ops Spec normally would contradict what's now allowed by the exemption, a temporary note might be inserted, or at least internal ops spec records should reflect that an exemption is overriding a part of it for now.

5.6 Registration and Tracking: Finally, the CAA should record the exemption in its internal tracking system:

- Exemptions Register: Enter the key details in a database or log: Reference number, who it was granted to, what rule was exempted, effective dates, and any summary note of conditions. This register helps with oversight (you can quickly see which exemptions are active and when they expire) and with reporting (some CAAs report the number and types of exemptions granted annually, as a measure of regulatory flexibility or oversight health).
- Reminders: If possible, set up reminders for the expiration date so that the responsible inspector is alerted before it lapses. Many modern systems allow flagging a date; otherwise a manual diary entry can work. This ensures timely follow-up on whether the exemption was used properly and if things reverted to normal afterwards (or if a renewal request may be coming).
- Files and Archives: Place all related documents in the official file (physical and/or electronic). Because exemptions may be scrutinized later (by audits, investigations, or ICAO USOAP reviews for compliance), having everything filed is crucial. As noted in Section 3.4 and 3.5, keep also copies of any notifications sent to ICAO or other correspondence, as these form part of the record. These records should be retained as long as required by the State's record retention policy – considering that an exemption might relate to a safety event, a long retention (indefinitely for significant cases) is recommended.

With the exemption now officially issued and disseminated, the role of the CAA shifts to monitoring and eventually closing out the exemption. Section 6 will detail the post-issuance oversight and follow-up actions to ensure that safety is maintained throughout the exemption period and beyond.

6. Post-Issuance Actions and Oversight

Granting exemption is not the end of the responsibility. The CAA must oversee compliance with the exemption's terms and assess outcomes to ensure safety is indeed maintained. This section outlines the follow-up actions after issuance and leading up to the exemption's end or renewal.

- 6.1 Monitoring Compliance with Conditions: Once the exemption is in effect, the CAA should actively monitor the operator's adherence to all imposed conditions and any emergent safety issues:

- **Inspection or Audit Activities:** Plan targeted oversight activities focusing on the exemption. For example, if a maintenance-related exemption was granted, inspectors might perform more frequent checks or require reports to verify the maintenance tasks stipulated as conditions are being done. If it's an operational exemption (e.g., extending flight time limits), the CAA could sample flight records or observe operations to ensure the operator isn't exceeding the allowance or ignoring other safeguards (like fatigue management). Essentially, treat the conditions as special regulatory requirements and enforce them through normal surveillance processes.
- **Required Reports from Operator:** Many exemptions include a condition that the operator must submit periodic reports to the CAA (for instance, weekly status reports, or a final report after the exemption period). Ensure these reports are received and reviewed. They can provide data on how the exemption is working – e.g., number of flights conducted under it, any incidents, any difficulties encountered. Promptly follow up if reports are not submitted or if they indicate any problem.
- **Incident Monitoring:** Keep an eye on any incidents, occurrences, or safety reports that occur while the exemption is in place. If, for example, an incident or hazard occurs that is directly or indirectly related to the area of exemption, this might signal the need to re-evaluate the arrangement. The operator should be required (either via regulation or a specific condition) to immediately report to the CAA any event that could be linked to the exemption (like if a pilot who was allowed to fly on an extended medical had to discontinue a flight due to illness, or if a deferred maintenance item caused a minor inflight issue).
- **Enforcement of Non-compliance:** If the operator fails to comply with any condition of the exemption, the CAA must be prepared to act. This could include revoking the exemption immediately (thus grounding the operation or requiring compliance forthwith), and potentially taking enforcement action if laws were violated. Clearly, the CAA should communicate this risk to the operator from the outset – that an exemption is not an entitlement but a conditional privilege that will be withdrawn if abused or if safety is compromised. Document any such non-compliance and actions taken.

Regular monitoring instills confidence that safety is maintained and signals to the operator that the CAA is vigilant, which in turn encourages them to diligently follow the rules of the exemption.

6.2 Follow-Up and Data Collection: Throughout the exemption period, gather data and insights that can inform both the ongoing safety assurance and any future considerations:

- **Performance Data:** Depending on the nature of the exemption, define what data would indicate success or emerging risk. For instance, if pilots are flying longer hours (exemption from flight time limits), track fatigue reports or performance

data; if maintenance intervals are extended, track any defect reports or mechanical reliability metrics; if training currency is extended, watch for any proficiency issues. The operator's safety management system (SMS) can be a source of such data, as they should also be monitoring the impact internally. Liaise with the operator's safety office to exchange relevant information.

- **Regular Check-ins:** It may be useful for the CAA to schedule periodic check-in meetings during a long exemption period (e.g., monthly for a year-long exemption). In these meetings, both the CAA and operator can discuss how the operations under exemption are progressing, and if any adjustments are needed. This keeps the dialogue open and can pre-empt issues.
- **Mid-course Corrections:** If data or monitoring shows something concerning, the CAA can implement changes even while the exemption is active. For example, if one of the mitigation measures isn't as effective as thought, the CAA could tighten a condition or add a new one. This would typically be done formally via an amendment to the exemption letter or a new letter that revises certain terms. Ensure the legal authority covers amendments. The operator should be given clear updated instructions in such cases. In extreme cases, if new information shows the situation is too unsafe to continue, consider early termination of the exemption (see 6.3).
- **Documentation of Outcomes:** Keep records of all monitoring activities and findings. If everything is going smoothly, note that. If issues are found and addressed, capture how. This documentation not only helps with any future analysis but also will be useful if the operator later seeks a renewal or another exemption – the CAA can refer back to how this one went.

6.3 Modification or Revocation: Exemptions are granted based on certain assumptions and conditions; if those change, the CAA must be ready to modify or revoke the exemption to preserve safety:

- **Triggers for Modification/Revocation:** These could include the operator not complying with conditions, an incident or hazard that arises indicating the exemption is riskier than anticipated, or external changes (for instance, if ICAO or the regional body issues new guidance that disallows such exemptions, or if a critical assumption like availability of an alternate mitigation falls through).
- **Process:** In many legal frameworks, the same authority that grants an exemption can revoke or amend it. The exemption letter itself often states “the CAA may withdraw this exemption at any time.” If deciding to revoke, ideally discuss with the operator unless urgency demands immediate action. Provide the reasons in writing through a formal revocation notice. If modifying, issue an

amended exemption letter or an addendum that clearly delineates new conditions or changes (and have it signed/issued with the same formality).

- **Safety First:** The guiding principle is if safety can no longer be assured under the exemption, it should not continue. It might be disappointing for the operator, but safety is paramount. If possible, coordinate such decisions so that the operator can transition back to compliance with minimal disruption (unless the situation is urgent). For example, you might give a short grace period like “exemption will be revoked in 48 hours” to allow safe cessation of operations if immediate stop isn’t needed. However, if the case is severe (imminent risk), immediate grounding or halt of the exempted activity is warranted.
- **Communication:** Ensure others (like ICAO or other States if they were informed of the exemption) are also informed if the exemption is revoked earlier than planned, especially if they had adjusted any of their oversight based on knowing the exemption existed. This closes the loop internationally.

6.4 **Renewal of Exemptions:** As the expiry nears, the operator might seek an extension or renewal of the exemption. The guidance here is to treat a renewal almost like a new application, but with the benefit of data from the first period

- **Advance Request:** Require the operator to apply for renewal well before the current exemption expires (if they believe they still need it). The application for renewal should include justification for why an extension is necessary and evidence that they have been complying with all conditions and trying to resolve the underlying issue. For instance, if the exemption was to allow time to obtain a spare part for compliance, and they still haven’t gotten it, they need to explain why and show efforts made. Some States explicitly ask for proof that the operator worked towards compliance during the exemption period.
- **Review of Performance:** The CAA should review how the original exemption period went. Was there full compliance? Did the mitigations work as expected? Any incidents or concerns? Use this performance record to judge if a renewal is acceptable and under what terms. If there were minor issues, perhaps a renewal is only granted with stricter conditions or for a shorter period. If performance was good and the situation still justifies an exemption, a renewal might be granted but, again, generally one short additional period – continuous renewals are a red flag that something else should be done (like a regulation change or alternative solution).
- **Updated Risk Assessment:** Circumstances might have changed since the first issuance. Update the risk assessment for the new period. For example, seasonal

changes or different operational tempo might affect risk. The CAA should ensure that the justification and mitigations are still valid for the extension. If any new hazards have emerged or new mitigations are available, incorporate them.

- **Approval and Documentation:** If renewal is approved, issue a new exemption letter (or a continuation letter) with new effective dates and any revised conditions. Ensure it references the original exemption and states it supersedes or extends it. Notify ICAO/others again if needed (especially if the initial notification had an end date – they need to know it’s extended). Add the renewal info to the tracking register. If renewal is not granted, communicate that with enough lead time for the operator to comply with the original requirement by the expiry.

6.5 Expiry and Return to Compliance: Once an exemption reaches its end date (and if not renewed), the operator must revert to full compliance with the normal regulation. The CAA should confirm this happens smoothly:

- **Operator Confirmation:** The operator should confirm in writing (or the CAA should verify via inspection) that by the day after expiry, they have resumed compliance. For example, if an aircraft had an exemption to fly past an inspection deadline, it should stop flying until inspected once the exemption expires; if crew were allowed an extended license validity, they should stop exercising privileges if not formally renewed by expiry, etc. The CAA might schedule an audit or check shortly after expiry to ensure the operation has normalized as required.
- **Grace Periods:** Generally, there is no grace beyond the exemption validity. A good practice is to remind the operator a few weeks in advance of the pending expiry (if they haven’t sought renewal) to avoid any “oops we forgot” situations. Many CAAs send a notice like “Exemption #XXX will expire on [Date]. Please ensure all operations are in compliance thereafter. If you anticipate any issues, contact us immediately.”
- **Closing the File:** After expiry and confirmation of compliance, formally close out the exemption case. Note in the records that the exemption was concluded and whether everything was in order. If the exemption was used as a bridge to a more permanent solution (e.g., regulation amendment or implementation of a new system), you might note that outcome as well.

6.6 Post-Exemption Review: It is beneficial for the CAA to conduct a retrospective analysis of each significant exemption. This is about learning and continuous improvement:

- **Effectiveness Evaluation:** Did the exemption achieve its intended purpose (e.g., allow continuity of operations) without adverse effect? Were the mitigations sufficient? If there were any incidents or close calls, analyze them. Also consider operational feedback: did the operator find the conditions reasonable and effective, or were there unforeseen difficulties in applying them (which could point to areas to refine future conditions)?
- **Regulatory Implications:** The CAA should reflect on whether the need for the exemption indicates any change needed in the regulatory framework. Perhaps the rule from which the exemption was granted is overly rigid or outdated, and the State might consider updating it for the long term. Or maybe the exemption was very specific to a one-time event and no change is needed. This strategic view ensures the regulatory system evolves. For example, if multiple operators keep asking for the same type of exemption, that's a strong signal that the regulation might need revision or more flexible built-in criteria.
- **Document Lessons:** If any lessons were learned (e.g., about communication, risk assessment, or a particular domain of operations), document them in an internal report or debrief. Share insights with other inspectors. Possibly update the official exemption guidance or checklist (Appendix 1) if you found a step that could be improved.
- **Reporting:** Consider including the summary of exemptions and their outcomes in the State's safety oversight reports or State Safety Program annual report. It provides transparency and can help identify trends. If required, report the summary to ICAO or regional bodies if they have queries on how States managed extraordinary situations.

6.7 Records Management: Throughout and after the exemption process, maintain meticulous records:

- Ensure the exemption file (physical or digital) has all pertinent documents, from the initial application to the final review notes. As mentioned earlier, keep records according to State policy, but given the potential significance of exemptions, long-term retention is recommended.
- Update the central database or register to mark the exemption as closed (and whether it was utilized successfully, renewed, or revoked).

- If the exemption involved notifying ICAO of a difference, remember to also notify ICAO when the difference no longer applies (i.e., the State is back in compliance). This closure of the loop is important to keep the international repository accurate. For example, if a difference was filed due to the exemption, file a follow-up difference notice or use the EFOD to indicate compliance restored as of X date.

By diligently following up and closing out exemptions, the CAA demonstrates its commitment to ensuring that short-term alleviations do not lead to long-term degradation of safety or compliance. The post-issuance oversight, combined with the upfront rigor, completes the lifecycle ensuring that exemptions remain a positive safety tool rather than a gap in the system.

7. Best Practices for Effective Exemption Management

7.1 Drawing on experiences from the MID Region and globally, the following best practices can enhance the effectiveness of a state's exemption process:

- **Institutionalize the Process:** Treat the exemption issuance process as an integral part of the State Safety Oversight system, not an ad-hoc reaction. Document it in your procedures, and make sure it's understood by all relevant staff. A well-defined process reduces errors, delays, and inconsistency.
- **Maintain a Central Registry and Analyze Trends:** By keeping a central log of all exemptions, a CAA can periodically analyze the data to see if there are common themes. If many exemptions pertain to one regulation, that regulation might need updating. Trend analysis can also reveal if any operators are frequent requesters – perhaps indicating deeper compliance issues that need to be addressed through assistance or enforcement.
- **Ensure Equivalence of Safety:** Always remind stakeholders (internally and externally) that safety is non-negotiable. An exemption should never result in a situation less safe than full compliance. Use of recognized tools like Safety Risk Management, and referencing ICAO's safety management principles, will support this. When in doubt, err on the side of caution – it's better to deny or restrict an exemption than to allow a potential unsafe condition.
- **Promote Transparency and Confidence:** The more transparent the exemption process, the more confidence it will instill. Publish your policies, share non-sensitive details of exemptions granted, and be open about the rationale. This not only builds trust with industry and the public, but also with international partners. Other States are more likely to accept the implications of your exemption (such as allowing your airline to operate under it in their airspace) if they see you have a robust system, as opposed to if they suspect leniency or arbitrariness.

- **Leverage Regional Collaboration:** The MID Region, under ICAO’s coordination, offers forums for sharing practices. States can develop common criteria or checklists for certain types of exemptions (for example, many States worked together on COVID-related exemptions to harmonize their conditions). Consider entering into agreements or understandings with neighboring States for mutual recognition of exemptions in areas like pilot licensing or aircraft ferry flights, when appropriate. This can be particularly useful for States with similar regulatory frameworks or shared operators.
- **Regular Training and Scenario Drills:** Continuously train staff on new scenarios. As aviation evolves (e.g., introduction of new technologies, new kinds of operations like drones), think ahead about what exemptions might be requested and prepare accordingly. Running internal drills – “tabletop exercises” of hypothetical exemption requests – can reveal gaps in preparedness and keep the team sharp.
- **Balance Flexibility and Rigor:** A successful exemption system strikes a balance: it offers flexibility to deal with real-world challenges (showing the regulator is not inflexible or oblivious to operational realities), but it enforces rigor in requiring safety justification and compliance with conditions. Both aspects are important. Being overly rigid (never granting any exemption even when safe to do so) can stifle operations in crises; being too lax can degrade safety. Aim for a balanced, risk-based approach as espoused by ICAO.
- **Document and Share Lessons Learned:** After major events (like a pandemic or other crisis that led to widespread exemptions), compile a lessons learned report. ICAO and regional bodies often solicit such feedback to improve global guidance. By contributing your State’s experiences, you help build a global knowledge base and possibly improve SARPs or future crisis response strategies. Internally, revise your guidance material (like this one) as needed to incorporate what was learned.

8. Final Comments

8.1 Aviation is a dynamic industry, and regulators must be equipped to address situations that fall outside the norm. The issuance of exemptions is one such tool – allowing temporary deviation from standard requirements when it is absolutely needed to maintain operations or adapt to unforeseen challenges. For the MID Region States, adopting a standardized, ICAO-aligned approach to exemptions is essential for maintaining safety and mutual trust. This guidance material has laid out a comprehensive structure and practical tools to assist CAAs in that endeavor.

8.2 It is important to reiterate that exemptions should be granted sparingly and judiciously. The processes and precautions described in this document underscore that exemptions are far from a relaxation of oversight; on the contrary, they demand even greater

diligence and responsibility from the regulator and the operator alike. When done correctly, an exemption can uphold safety and enable continuity – for example, keeping vital air services running during a crisis – which ultimately serves the public good and the aviation sector’s sustainability. When done poorly, however, exemptions can undermine regulatory credibility and safety outcomes.

8.3 MID States are encouraged to collaborate, share information on exemptions granted, and support each other through ICAO MID and other platforms. A harmonized regional stance, especially on common issues, prevents confusion and promotes higher safety standards. As we move forward, the lessons from recent global events should not be forgotten: being prepared with flexible yet safe regulatory solutions is now a core part of aviation safety oversight.

8.4 By institutionalizing the principles, process, and practices outlined here, the civil aviation authorities in the MID Region will be well-prepared to manage any future need for exemptions in a manner that is transparent, consistent, and above all, safe. The ICAO MID Office stands ready to assist States in implementing this guidance and facilitating information exchange to ensure that the MID Region continues to exemplify the highest commitment to aviation safety, even in the face of adversity.

9. Sources:

- ICAO Doc 9734, Safety Oversight Manual, Part A – Chapter 3 (establishing regulatory policies, including use of flexibility tools)
- ICAO Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual (principles of safety risk management applied to regulatory processes)
- Chicago Convention (Doc 7300), Article 38 (State obligations to notify differences from international standards) and related ICAO guidance on filing of differences
- Lessons Learned from COVID-19 Contingency Coordination (ICAO State letters AN 11/55 and Targeted Exemptions repository usage in 2020-2021)
- Sample State Regulations and Manuals (e.g., Oman CAA Exemptions Procedure Manual, EASA Guidance on Targeted Exemptions) – used for benchmarking best practices in exemption evaluation and documentation.

Appendix 1

Example Checklist: Exemption Issuance Process

To assist CAAs and inspectors, below is an example step-by-step checklist for processing an exemption request. This checklist can be used as a reference to ensure all critical actions are completed during the evaluation and issuance of an exemption.

Step	Action/Requirement	Status (√/X/N/A)	Remarks
1. Application Received	Exemption request letter/form received from applicant; logged with reference number.	√	(Date received, reference)
2. Initial Completeness Check	Application reviewed for all required information (rule citation, justification, duration, risk assessment, etc.).	√	(If incomplete, info requested on [date])
3. Acceptability Screening	Confirm request falls within CAA authority and is not for a non-exemptible requirement.	√	(If not, inform applicant/redirect)
4. Acknowledgment Sent	Acknowledge receipt to applicant, outline expected timeline or additional info needed.	√	(Sent via email/letter on [date])
5. Assign Technical Team	Relevant technical experts/inspectors assigned to evaluate (ops, airworthiness, etc. as needed).	√	(Team leader: [Name])
6. Risk Assessment Performed	Hazard identification and safety risk assessment completed (with mitigations identified).	√	(Risk assessment doc ref no.)

Step	Action/Requirement	Status (✓/✗/N/A)	Remarks
7. Internal Consultation	Multi-department review/meeting held for consensus and input (including legal if needed).	✓	(Meeting date, key points)
8. Draft Decision Prepared	Draft determination made (approve or deny) with rationale. If approving, conditions drafted.	✓	(Draft exemption text ready)
9. Management Approval	Decision elevated to appropriate authority (DG or committee) for review and sign-off.	✓	(Approved/Denied on [date])
10. Exemption Document Issued	Official exemption letter/order signed and issued to applicant with all conditions.	✓	(Letter ref no., date sent)
11. ICAO/External Notification	If required, notify ICAO of difference and/or other States of the exemption.	✓	(State letter or EFOD updated on [date])
12. Update CAA Records	Log the exemption in registry, set reminder for monitoring and expiry.	✓	(Registry entry no., files archived)
13. Monitor Compliance	Oversight plan in place to monitor operator's compliance with conditions during exemption period.	✓	(Inspector assigned for follow-up)
14. Post-Exemption Review	After expiry, review outcomes and lessons. Operator back in compliance or exemption renewed properly.	✓	(Review done on [date])

Appendix 2

Sample Exemption Application Form

(This sample form can be provided to operators or individuals to standardize the exemption request submissions. The form ensures all necessary information is captured for the CAA’s review.)

Civil Aviation Authority – Application for Exemption

1. Applicant Information:

- **Name of Applicant/Organization:**
- **CAA Certificate/License No.:** (if applicable)
- **Contact Person:** **Title/Position:**
- **Contact Details:** Tel Email Address
.....

2. Regulatory Requirement for which Exemption is Sought:

- **Reference of Regulation/Rule:** (cite exact paragraph or provision)
- **Title/Description of Requirement:**
.....

(Example: CAR Ops 5.123 – requirement for pilots to complete a proficiency check every 6 months.)

3. Details of the Proposed Exemption:

- **Requested Relief:** Describe exactly what compliance requirement is to be exempted and the proposed extent of the exemption.
(Example: “To allow a 2-month extension beyond the 6-month proficiency check requirement for pilots of XYZ Airlines.”)
- **Individuals/Operations Affected:** Specify who or what will be covered by the exemption (aircraft, routes, personnel, etc.).
(Example: “This exemption would apply to 50 pilots of XYZ Airlines operating the ABC-123 aircraft type.”)

4. Reason and Justification:

- **Operational Justification:** Explain why this exemption is necessary. What circumstances prevent compliance?

(Example: “Due to unforeseen closure of the training simulator center as a result of natural disaster, pilots cannot complete proficiency checks by the due date.”)

- **Impact if Not Granted:** Briefly describe the consequences if the exemption is not approved.

(Example: “If not granted, 50 pilots will be grounded, significantly disrupting the airline’s scheduled operations and connectivity for remote regions.”)

5. Safety Risk Assessment: *(Attach separate risk assessment document if needed)*

- **Hazards Identified:**

.....

(Example: Pilots’ skills may degrade without recurrent check on schedule.)

- **Mitigations Proposed:**

(Example: All affected pilots will undergo extended ground refresher training and supervised line flying; no pilot will exceed 8 months without a proficiency check.)

- **Safety Statement:** Explain how an acceptable level of safety will be maintained.

(Example: “With the proposed mitigations, we assess that operational risk remains low and safety is not compromised during the extension period.”)

6. Duration of Exemption:

- **Requested Start Date:** **Requested End Date:**

(Provide specific dates or event-based duration. Example: from 01-July-2025 to 30-Sep-2025.)

- **Is this a one-time exemption or are you planning to apply for renewal if needed?**

7. ICAO Standards Impact: *(For international operations)*

- Does the exemption contravene any ICAO Standard in Annexes (yes/no)?

.....

- If yes, identify the ICAO Standard and Annex involved:

.....

- Have you notified or coordinated with any other State or entity about this potential difference?

(This helps the CAA in determining notification needs.)

8. Previous or Related Exemptions:

- Have you or your organization previously been granted a similar exemption? (yes/no)

- If yes, provide reference number or details:

.....

- If this is a renewal of a current exemption, list the current exemption reference:

9. Applicant's Attestation:

I hereby certify that the information provided above and in attached documents is true and complete to the best of my knowledge. I understand the safety obligations associated with the granting of an exemption and commit to implementing any conditions imposed by the CAA to ensure safety.

- **Name:**
- **Position:**
- **Date:**
- **Signature:**

Attachments Checklist: (to be filled by applicant)

- Detailed Safety Risk Assessment document
- Supporting evidence (e.g., maintenance reports, training records, third-party letters, etc.)
- Copy of relevant current certificate or license (if needed for context)
- Any other pertinent documentation:

For CAA Use: (Leave this section for authority's processing notes)

- Date Application Received:
- Application Complete? Yes/No (If no, date additional info requested:))
- Assigned Evaluation Team/Inspector:
- Decision: **Approved / Denied**
- Exemption Ref No.: Date of Decision:

(End of Form)

Appendix 3

Risk Assessment Template for Exemption Evaluation

(This template is intended for CAA inspectors or safety risk managers to systematically evaluate the safety impact of a proposed exemption. It ensures all factors are considered and documented.)

A. Overview of Exemption Request:

- Exemption Reference (if assigned):
- Applicant/Organization:
- Rule from which Exemption is Sought:
- Brief Description of Proposed Exemption:
- Duration: From to (or event:))

B. Hazard Identification:

List the potential hazards or failure modes introduced by the exemption. Consider what could go wrong because the normal requirement is not met. For each hazard, identify the consequence in the worst-case scenario. For example:

- Hazard 1:
 - Potential Consequence:
- Hazard 2:
 - Potential Consequence:
- Hazard 3:
 - Potential Consequence:

(Add more as needed)

C. Initial Risk Analysis (Without Mitigations):

For each hazard identified, assess:

- **Likelihood (Probability)** of the hazard leading to an occurrence under exemption conditions. *(Use qualitative terms: Frequent, Occasional, Remote, etc., or numerical if available.)*
- **Severity** of the consequence if it occurs. *(Use standard severity classes: e.g., Catastrophic, Major, Minor, etc.)*

- **Initial Risk Level:** Determine the risk level or index from the combination of likelihood and severity (using the State’s risk matrix or methodology). Indicate if it falls in Acceptable, Tolerable (with mitigation), or Unacceptable region prior to mitigation.

For example:

- Hazard 1: Likelihood – *Occasional*; Severity – *Major*; **Initial Risk: Medium-High (Tolerable only with mitigation)**
- Hazard 2: Likelihood – *Remote*; Severity – *Catastrophic*; **Initial Risk: High (Unacceptable)**
- Hazard 3: Likelihood – *Occasional*; Severity – *Minor*; **Initial Risk: Low (Acceptable)**

(These are illustrative. Conduct actual assessment based on evidence or expert judgment.)

D. Mitigation Measures:

List the safety measures that will be in place to reduce the risk of each hazard. Mitigations can be proposed by the applicant or added by the CAA. They might include operational restrictions, additional inspections, backup systems, increased monitoring, etc. For clarity, map each mitigation to the hazard(s) it addresses:

- Mitigation 1:
 - Addresses Hazard(s) #:
- Mitigation 2:
 - Addresses Hazard(s) #:
- Mitigation 3:
 - Addresses Hazard(s) #:

(Ensure all high/tolerable risks have at least one mitigation. Some mitigations may cover multiple hazards.)

E. Residual Risk Analysis (With Mitigations):

Re-assess the Likelihood and Severity for each hazard after implementing the above Mitigations:

- Hazard 1: New Likelihood – *Remote*; Severity – *Major*; **Residual Risk: Medium (Tolerable)**
- Hazard 2: New Likelihood – *Extremely Improbable*; Severity – *Catastrophic*; **Residual Risk: Medium (Tolerable)**

- Hazard 3: (if unchanged, copy as is) Likelihood – *Occasional*; Severity – *Minor*;
Residual Risk: Low (Acceptable)

Evaluate if the **Residual Risk Level is acceptable** per State’s criteria. (Typically, high risks must be reduced; medium may be tolerated with management decision; low are acceptable.) In this example, assume Hazard 1 and 2 have been reduced to a tolerable level with strong oversight, and Hazard 3 was already acceptable.

F. Additional Considerations:

- **Cumulative or Interactive Effects:** Consider if multiple exemptions or other concurrent issues could compound risk. (*Example: Pilot’s training interval extended and aircraft maintenance check extended at same time – combined effect on safety.*)
- **Impact on Other Parties:** Does the exemption pose any risk to others (e.g., other operators, general public) beyond the applicant’s operation? If so, addressed by mitigation?
- **Human Factors and Organizational Factors:** Any concern about human performance or organizational capability that could affect the outcome (e.g., reliance on pilot judgment, workload issues, company’s SMS robustness)?
.....

G. Risk Assessment Conclusion:

- Given the above analysis, is the risk of granting the exemption **acceptable with the identified mitigations** in place? **Yes / No**
- Summary Statement:
(*e.g., “With the conditions proposed (extra training, limited operations, monitoring), the operational safety risk is reduced to an acceptable level for the duration of the exemption. It is concluded that the exemption can be granted without compromising safety.”*)
- If no, state reasons and what would be required to achieve acceptability (or conclude exemption cannot be granted safely).

H. Recommended Conditions for Exemption:

Based on the mitigation measures and any other regulatory considerations, list the conditions that should be imposed if the exemption is approved. These should correlate with the mitigations:

1.
2.
3.

(These conditions will be inserted into the exemption letter. E.g., "Aircraft XYZ shall only be operated on daytime cargo flights under VFR during the exemption period.")

I. Evaluation Team Sign-off:

- Lead Evaluator: _____ (Name, Position) – **Date:** ____ – **Signature:** ____
- Other Team Members: [Names/Initials]
- Reviewed/Concurred by (Supervisor/Manager): _____ – **Date:** ____

(The sign-off signifies that the risk assessment has been completed and reviewed as per CAA procedures.)

Appendix 4

Sample Exemption Approval Letter

(This is a generic template of an exemption approval letter from a Civil Aviation Authority to an applicant. It should be adapted to the State's official format and specific case details.)

[On Official CAA Letterhead]

Ref: CAA/EXEMPT/2025-xx (e.g., reference number of exemption)

Date: 15 November 2025

To: Mr. ABC XYZ, Director of Operations

XYZ Airlines

P.O. Box 12345, [City], [State]

Subject: Exemption Approval – [Brief Description, e.g., Extension of Pilot Proficiency Check Interval]

Dear Mr. XYZ,

1. Introduction:

We refer to your application dated 10 October 2025, in which **XYZ Airlines** requested an exemption from **[Regulation YYY-123, Paragraph 4.5]**, which requires that flight crew proficiency checks be conducted every 6 months. Your request was to allow an extension of this interval to 8 months for certain pilots, due to the temporary closure of the ABC Training Simulator Center.

2. Authority:

Under the powers granted to the Civil Aviation Authority of [State] by **Section 10 of the Civil Aviation Act and Part 1.2 of the [State Aviation Regulations]**, the CAA may grant exemptions to regulatory requirements on a case-by-case basis, provided such action is in the public interest and does not compromise safety.

3. Approval:

After careful review of your application, including the safety risk assessment and mitigation measures proposed, the CAA has decided to **grant the requested exemption**. This exemption allows XYZ Airlines to operate specified flights with pilots who are overdue for proficiency check, subject to the conditions below.

4. Details of Exemption:

- **Regulation Exempted:** [State Aviation Regulation YYY-123, Paragraph 4.5], which prescribes a 6-month interval for flight crew proficiency checks.
- **Nature of Exemption:** Authorizes an extension of the proficiency check interval up to a maximum of **8 months** for eligible pilots under conditions stipulated herein.
- **Effective Period:** This exemption is effective from **01 December 2025** until **31 March 2026**. Unless renewed, it will automatically expire at 23:59 LT on 31 March 2026, after which all pilots must fully comply with the 6-month proficiency check requirement.
- **Applicability:** This exemption applies only to **flight crew of XYZ Airlines who held valid proficiency checks as of 01 September 2025** that have since lapsed or will lapse before they can complete recheck due to simulator unavailability. It is not transferable to any other airline or personnel.

5. Conditions:

XYZ Airlines is required to comply with the following conditions as part of this exemption approval:

- Additional Training:** Prior to operating beyond the normal 6-month limit, each affected pilot shall undergo a structured refresher training program. This program (as described in your letter) must include at least 4 hours of classroom/theoretical training and 2 supervised line flights in a non-command role. Documentation of completion for each pilot must be retained and made available to the CAA on request.
- Operational Limitation:** Pilots operating under this exemption shall **not serve as Pilot-in-Command (PIC)** on any flight beyond 6 months since their last proficiency check. They may operate in the co-pilot role only. A currently qualified PIC (within 6-month proficiency) must be on board as the commander for all flights where an exempted pilot is part of the crew.
- Route Restrictions:** Exempted pilots shall only operate on domestic routes within [State] or routes to [Neighboring State] (as specified in your request). They are not permitted to operate to any other international destinations under this exemption unless specifically approved by the CAA.
- Monitoring and Reports:** XYZ Airlines shall closely monitor the performance of pilots flying under this exemption. Any abnormal events, safety concerns, or pilot proficiency issues must be reported to the CAA immediately. Additionally, XYZ Airlines must submit a **brief report every 30 days** during the exemption period summarizing how many flights were conducted under this exemption, and confirming that conditions were met on each flight. The first report is due by 01 January 2026.

e. **Simulator Scheduling:** XYZ Airlines must provide the CAA with evidence by 31 January 2026 that all affected pilots have been scheduled for proficiency checks at the earliest possible date once the ABC Simulator Center resumes operation (or an alternate training arrangement is made).

f. **Safety Standards:** All other operational and safety regulations remain in effect. This exemption in no way waives compliance with any requirement except the specific proficiency check interval stated. Pilots must continue to meet all other fitness for duty requirements (rest, medical fitness, etc.).

6. ICAO Compliance:

It is acknowledged that by extending pilot proficiency beyond 6 months, [State] is temporarily not in full compliance with ICAO Annex 1, Chapter 3, Standard 3.7.3 (which implies recurrent training proficiency within a given period). The CAA will file a difference with ICAO for the duration of this exemption, in accordance with Article 38 of the Chicago Convention, and notify concerned States as necessary.

7. Rights and Limitations:

The CAA reserves the right to **revoke or modify** this exemption at any time prior to 31 March 2026 if it is deemed in the interest of safety or if XYZ Airlines fails to adhere strictly to the conditions herein. Should the circumstances that necessitated this exemption abate (e.g., simulator training opportunities become available sooner), the CAA expects XYZ Airlines to promptly return to normal compliance and cease use of the exemption.

This exemption is a temporary measure granted based on the specific facts and mitigation strategies presented. It reflects the CAA's commitment to supporting continued operations during challenging circumstances **while maintaining an acceptable level of safety**. The CAA appreciates XYZ Airlines' proactive safety risk management in this process.

8. Conclusion:

Please signify your agreement to the terms and conditions of this exemption by countersigning and returning a copy of this letter (or by a written confirmation of acceptance via email). By using this exemption, XYZ Airlines and its pilots agree to comply with all stated conditions. We look forward to your continued cooperation.

For any questions regarding this exemption, you may contact [CAA focal point name] at [contact info].

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Name of DG/Authorized Officer]

Director General (or appropriate title)

[Civil Aviation Authority of State]

Countersignature (Applicant):

I, **[Name]**, on behalf of **XYZ Airlines**, acknowledge and agree to the above terms and conditions.

Signature: _____ Date: _____

(End of Exemption Letter Template)



INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

**REMOTE SAFETY OVERSIGHT GUIDANCE MATERIAL FOR MID REGION
STATES**

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Example Checklist: Remote Audit Preparation

1. Introduction and Purpose and Scope

- 1.1 The COVID-19 pandemic and other crises have challenged the traditional model of on-site aviation safety oversight. Travel restrictions, health risks, civil unrest, natural disasters, and resource constraints can impede the ability of civil aviation authorities (CAAs) to conduct in-person inspections.
- 1.2 To ensure continuous regulatory compliance by airlines, maintenance organizations, airports, and other service providers under such adverse conditions, CAAs must leverage remote surveillance techniques. Remote safety oversight (also referred to as remote or virtual audits/inspections) involves using technology to perform oversight activities from off-site locations.
- 1.3 This guidance manual provides an ICAO-aligned framework and procedures for MID Region States to conduct safety oversight remotely, consistent with ICAO principles and terminology as found in Doc 9859 (Safety Management Manual), Doc 9734 (Safety Oversight Manual, Part A), and Doc 8335 (Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance).
- 1.4 It incorporates lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic and best practices from the MID Region and global authorities. Importantly, remote oversight is a supplementary tool, not a replacement for on-site inspections. On-site visits provide invaluable first-hand observations of operations and safety culture that are harder to capture through a computer screen. Remote surveillance should therefore be used as a contingency or enhancement measure to maintain oversight continuity when physical inspections are impractical, while planning for eventual on-site verification of critical items.

2. Framework for Remote Safety Oversight

- 2.1 Alignment with ICAO Standards: Remote safety oversight must be embedded within the State's overall safety oversight system, upholding ICAO's Critical Elements of safety oversight (per Doc 9734) and the State Safety Programme (per Doc 9859). This means that even when using virtual means, States remain responsible for ensuring effective surveillance (Critical Element 7) and timely resolution of safety issues (Critical Element 8). The framework outlined here is consistent with ICAO guidance and terminology, so that MID States implement remote oversight in harmony with global standards. The approach also draws on ICAO's call for resilience and innovation in oversight post-COVID-19.
- 2.2 Principles of Remote Oversight: Remote oversight is intended for use under specific conditions such as pandemics (e.g. COVID-19), public health emergencies, periods of civil unrest or conflict, natural disasters, or significant financial/resource constraints that make travel difficult. Under these circumstances, remote surveillance serves as a mitigation strategy to continue essential oversight activities. However, it should be

guided by a risk-based approach – regulators must determine when and where remote methods are suitable. Not all oversight tasks are ideal for remote execution; complexity and safety-critical aspects must be considered. For example, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) cautions that remote technology has limitations and that inspectors should apply careful consideration and risk management when deciding to use it. Highly complex or sensitive inspections (such as detailed interior inspections or tests of novel systems) may still require on-site presence. Simpler or routine tasks, by contrast, can often be performed virtually with proper planning. Each CAA should integrate remote options into its Safety Risk Management process – assessing the risks of not performing oversight versus the potential limitations of doing it remotely.

2.3 Scope of Application: Remote safety oversight techniques can be applied across various domains of aviation oversight, including:

- **Certification and Approvals:** Conducting certain phases of certification remotely (document evaluations, remote demonstration of procedures, etc.). For instance, FAA policy now allows real-time video for some prototype conformity inspections, engineering tests, production conformity inspections, and even airworthiness certificate approvals under defined conditions.
- **Surveillance and Auditing:** Performing scheduled audits or inspections of airlines (AOC holders), maintenance organizations (AMOs), training organizations, and airports through virtual meetings, document portals, and live video facility tours.
- **Continued Compliance Monitoring:** Using remote means for follow-up on corrective actions, oversight of foreign operators, or interim surveillance when on-site visits are postponed.

Crucially, remote oversight should be institutionalized as part of the State’s oversight system, not merely an ad-hoc pandemic workaround. A clear policy and framework gives inspectors and service providers certainty on how and when remote audits will be used. Many States worldwide are moving in this direction – for example, the East African Community’s aviation oversight agency (CASSOA) has issued guidelines for the conduct of remote oversight activities as part of COVID-19 measures. The MID States are encouraged to establish similar guidance within their regulatory framework.

2.4 No Replacement for On-Site Oversight: Even as remote surveillance becomes a permanent tool in the safety oversight toolkit, MID States should remember that it does not eliminate the need for physical inspections. Remote audits and inspections are considered complementary methods to ensure continuous oversight when on-site access is not possible. They can also serve as a prelude or follow-up to on-site visits (for example, conducting a remote documentation audit before a targeted on-site inspection). Once conditions permit, CAAs should schedule on-site visits especially for areas that could not be effectively evaluated remotely (e.g. observations of live

operations, hands-on checks of aircraft or equipment, on-the-ground safety culture assessments). Maintaining this balance ensures that the effectiveness of oversight is not compromised by exclusive reliance on virtual means.

3. Regulatory and Organizational Preparedness

For remote oversight to be effective, States need to ensure their **regulations and internal procedures** explicitly support and govern its use. This section addresses the first main component: **regulations/special procedures for remote oversight**.

- 3.1 **Legal and Regulatory Framework:** Review national civil aviation regulations and guidance material to identify any barriers to remote oversight. In general, regulations do not need to change the **safety standards** themselves, but CAAs may need to clarify that required audits, inspections, and tests **can be conducted via audio/video or electronic means**. For example, a regulation might state that an inspection shall be conducted by an inspector “**at a time and place acceptable to the Authority**” – this could be interpreted to include virtual settings if properly documented. If necessary, promulgate **temporary exemptions or guidance** to permit remote inspections under emergency conditions (as many regulators did during COVID-19). Ultimately, incorporate permanent provisions or acceptable means of compliance for remote surveillance into the State’s regulatory framework or inspector handbooks (aligned with ICAO Doc 8335 guidance on surveillance procedures)
- 3.2 **State Oversight Policy and Inspector Guidance:** Develop **formal procedures or an inspector bulletin** on how to plan, perform, and document remote oversight activities. This should cover all phases (planning, execution, reporting) and define the use of technology (e.g. approved communication platforms). Align this guidance with ICAO Doc 9734 Part A principles by ensuring that remote activities meet the intent of **continuous surveillance**. The guidance should also delineate which activities are **not suitable for remote execution** (for instance, initial certification of a new airline may require in-person evaluation of operations and facilities). By providing inspectors with a clear policy, States ensure consistency and transparency in the use of remote methods.
- 3.3 **Agreement with Industry and Acceptance of Results:** It is important to communicate expectations to the aviation industry. **Service providers should be** informed that remote audits/inspections carry the same authority as on-site visits, and that they are expected to provide access to personnel, documentation, and areas via virtual means as requested by the CAA. States may consider requiring organizations to **facilitate remote oversight** – for example, by stipulating in approval conditions that the certificate holder must accommodate remote inspections upon request and maintain the necessary technological capability. Additionally, the CAA should determine the **status of remote findings**: for example, non-compliances identified remotely are just as enforceable as those found on-site. If any legal constraints exist (such as rules about

inspector presence for certain sign-offs), address these through legal interpretations or amendments.

3.4 Confidentiality and Security Measures: Remote oversight often involves digital exchange of sensitive documents (e.g. operations manuals, training records) and live video of facilities. CAAs must institute **security protocols** to protect this information. Use secure file transfer methods or encrypted platforms when reviewing documents. Establish whether remote sessions will be recorded and how those recordings are stored or disposed of, in line with privacy laws and records retention policies. Both inspectors and the regulated entities should be aware of and agree to these protocols in advance. This builds trust that remote oversight will not compromise proprietary or personal data.

3.5 Resource and Infrastructure Requirements: Ensure the CAA has the needed tools: reliable high-speed internet, secure videoconferencing software, VPN access to CAA networks, and possibly specialized equipment (for example, tablets or smart glasses for inspectors, if using advanced remote inspection tools). If resources allow, consider setting up a dedicated **“remote inspection station”** at CAA offices – equipped with multiple screens, good audio/video hardware, and backup power/internet – to facilitate smooth virtual inspections. Likewise, encourage or require the organizations being inspected to prepare the necessary equipment on their side (such as a portable camera or mobile device to carry around for a virtual facility tour).

3.6 Training and Competency: Train CAA inspectors in both the technical and soft skills required for effective remote oversight. This includes proficiency with the chosen video conferencing and document-sharing tools, knowledge of cybersecurity/hardware setup, as well as techniques for remote communication (interviewing skills when face-to-face via video, methods to request evidence without physical presence, etc.). Inspectors may initially shadow or pair up for remote audits to gain experience. Incorporate these competencies into the CAA’s inspector training program, in line with the competency frameworks of Doc 8335 and related ICAO guidance.

By establishing a robust regulatory and organizational foundation, MID States create an environment where remote surveillance is conducted in a controlled, standardized manner. With the framework in place, we now turn to the **operational procedures** for planning and conducting remote audits and inspections

4. Planning and Preparation for Remote Oversight

Thorough planning is key to a successful remote audit or inspection. This section outlines step-by-step procedures for the **pre-inspection phase**, ensuring that both the CAA team and the organization to be inspected are ready.

4.1 Determine Oversight Scope and Feasibility: The CAA (team leader or supervisor) should first decide **what activities will be included in the remote oversight**. Define

the objectives, scope (e.g. which functional areas or departments to cover), and the type of oversight (audit, routine inspection, spot check, etc.). Critically, perform a **risk assessment** to confirm that doing these tasks remotely is appropriate. Consider the complexity of the operation and the criticality of the areas to inspect. For instance, reviewing documents or conducting interviews can often be done remotely with low risk, whereas inspecting intricate equipment or observing operations might have higher risk if done virtually. If the risk assessment indicates certain elements cannot be adequately assessed off-site, plan to **exclude** those from the remote scope (and address them later on-site), or ensure additional mitigations (such as using multiple camera angles or having a local delegate on-site if possible).

- 4.2 **Notification and Agreement with the Service Provider:** Once scope is set, notify the organization well in advance that a remote oversight activity will take place. Provide an **official letter or email** outlining: the purpose of the audit/inspection, the proposed dates and schedule, the list of areas or functions to be reviewed, and the format (virtual meetings, document submissions, live video inspections). Clearly state any **information or documents to be submitted beforehand**. For example, request electronic copies of manuals, training records, maintenance logs, or specific evidence (like internal audit reports, safety performance data) at least a certain number of days prior to the remote audit. Also confirm that the organization has (or will set up) the required technology on their side. Encourage them to designate a **primary focal point** to coordinate logistics, and to test the chosen video conferencing platform with the CAA team before the audit. Early communication ensures the auditee understands the process and can prepare, which improves the effectiveness of the remote surveillance
- 4.3 **Assemble the CAA Inspection/Audit Team:** Determine how many inspectors and what specialties are needed (operations, airworthiness, ATM, etc., depending on the scope). In a remote setting, it can be practical to include specialists from different locations since travel is not required – for example, a regional expert could join virtually if needed, improving resource utilization. Assign roles such as **Team Leader** (to lead meetings and be main liaison) and **Technical Members** (each responsible for specific checklist items or subject areas). Ensure every team member has access to the schedule, the documents submitted by the organization, and the tech tools. Conduct an **internal pre-briefing** among the team to discuss the plan, assign responsibilities (e.g., who will lead which interview, who will observe which procedures on camera), and go over contingency plans for tech failures.
- 4.4 **Review of Documentation (Pre-audit):** Prior to any live virtual sessions, inspectors should review the documents provided by the organization. This is analogous to the on-site document review but done in advance. Each assigned inspector reviews their relevant documents (e.g. the ops inspector reviews the operations manual sections, the airworthiness inspector reviews maintenance records, etc.) and notes any findings or clarification points. Sharing documents securely is vital – use a pre-agreed method (secure email, cloud drive, or the CAA’s portal). Inspectors may compile a **document review checklist** to ensure they cover all required items remotely. Any critical missing documents should be requested before the inspection date. This pre-review maximizes

efficiency, allowing the live remote sessions to focus on clarifications, verification, and interactive examination rather than reading paperwork on the fly.

4.5 Technology Setup and Testing: Well before the inspection date, the CAA team and the organization’s team should conduct a **technology test**. This includes verifying the video conferencing platform works on both ends (with sufficient audio quality, video clarity, and screen-sharing capabilities), and that any firewalls or permissions are sorted out. If the plan includes live streaming from a hangar or aircraft, test the connectivity in those locations – signal strength and camera functionality (possibly using a mobile device or wearable camera). Agree on a backup communication method, such as a phone teleconference line or instant messaging, in case the primary video link fails. The CAA team should prepare any tools they will use, such as an electronic checklist or shared online document to log findings in real time. During testing, also familiarize the auditee with how the process will flow: for example, show them how the inspector might ask to point the camera at certain items, or how to use screen-share for demonstrating an electronic system. Smooth technology operation is fundamental to avoiding delays and frustration during the actual remote oversight.

4.6 Time Zone and Scheduling Considerations: If the oversight involves parties in different time zones (e.g., a MID State CAA inspecting a foreign operator remotely), ensure the schedule is reasonable for all. Plan the daily agenda with shorter sessions if needed, since remote work can be more tiring. Build in buffer time in case of technical issues or overruns. Circulate a **detailed schedule** to the auditee, indicating timing for the opening meeting, document discussions, specific interviews (with names of people needed), any live demonstrations (with the area/equipment to be shown), breaks, and the closing meeting. This level of detail helps the organization arrange for the right personnel to be available (e.g., the accountable manager, safety manager, maintenance chief, pilots or engineers for interviews, etc.) at the right times, even in a virtual environment.

By rigorously preparing in these steps, the CAA sets the stage for an effective remote oversight activity. Next, we detail how to execute the audit/inspection itself – covering document review, interviews, virtual tours, and meetings in a remote context.

5. Conducting Remote Audits and Inspections: Execution

Once planning is complete, the CAA team will carry out the remote surveillance in several phases. The three main components of remote oversight – **digital document review, virtual inspection, and associated regulatory procedures** – come together during execution. The following sub-sections provide guidance on each aspect of the audit/inspection process.

5.1 Opening Meeting (Virtual); Just as in an on-site audit, the process begins with an **Opening Meeting**. This meeting is held via video conference with the CAA team and the organization’s key personnel. Best practices for the opening meeting include:

- **Introduction:** The Team Leader introduces all CAA participants (name, role) and requests the organization's representatives to introduce themselves (accountable executive, heads of departments, escorts for the virtual tour, etc.). This helps establish a professional atmosphere despite the remote setting.
- **Purpose and Scope:** Clearly restate the **purpose of the audit/inspection and the scope** of activities to be covered. Even though this was communicated in advance, reiterating it ensures everyone has a common understanding at the outset. Emphasize that this is a regulatory oversight activity carried out remotely due to current conditions (mentioning, for example, the travel restrictions or other reason, if applicable).
- **Outline of Method and Schedule:** Explain how the remote inspection will be conducted. Describe the planned activities (document reviews, interviews, live video inspections) and the schedule for each. Mention the platforms being used (We will remain on this Microsoft Teams call for the interviews, then switch to a mobile video feed for the hangar tour at 1300 local time). Ensure that all participants are clear on **when and how each part will occur**. Also remind participants of any **ground rules**: for instance, ask everyone to mute when not speaking to avoid background noise, or request that no one record the session unless agreed.
- **Technical Checks:** Confirm that all parties can see and hear each other well. Address any last-minute technical glitches now. Also verify that any screen-sharing needed (for example, to show a specific document or the inspection checklist) is working.
- **Questions and Consent:** Provide an opportunity for the organization to ask questions about the process. Confirm that they are ready to proceed and agree to the approach. This is also a good time to handle any administrative points (e.g., confirming the list of documents received, ensuring required personnel are available as scheduled, and agreeing on what will happen if connectivity is lost). If the CAA plans to record any part of the remote session (audio/video), obtain consent and explain that it will be used only for official purposes. In many cases, formal recording is not necessary; detailed note-taking suffices, but if used, consent is important.

By the end of the opening meeting, both the CAA and organization should be aligned on the plan and comfortable with the virtual format. The inspectors should project approachability and clarity, setting a collaborative tone similar to an on-site audit, while maintaining authority as regulators.

5.2 Remote Documentation Review: Following the opening, the team typically proceeds with documentation review discussions, which leverage the digital document audit that was conducted pre-inspection. In a remote audit, document review may happen in a couple of ways:

- **Offline Review with Follow:** As noted, inspectors usually review the documents provided ahead of time. During the remote audit, they then schedule sessions to **discuss their observations or ask follow-up questions**. For example, an inspector might say: (I reviewed your maintenance training records that were submitted. I have a question about the recurrent training interval for your technicians – could you clarify how you ensure they meet the requirements?) The organization’s personnel can then explain or provide additional evidence in real-time (perhaps by screen-sharing their training database to demonstrate compliance). This interactive Q&A helps validate the documents’ content.
- **Live Screen-Sharing of Electronic Records:** If the organization uses electronic management systems (for safety reporting, maintenance tracking, etc.), the inspector may ask them to share their screen and navigate through specific records live. This is akin to an on-site auditor asking to pull a random record from a filing cabinet – except done via the company’s information system. The inspector can direct the company representative: “Please open the aircraft maintenance log for tail number XYZ and show the last inspection entry.” The ability to **see the data in real time** provides assurance that the information is current and unaltered. It also allows the inspector to request spontaneous samples (let’s open the training file for employee “name”) to mimic the sampling in an onsite audit.
- **Use of Digital Audit Tools:** Some CAAs or organizations might have specialized audit software or shared platforms. If available, the inspector can use these to collaboratively review documents. For instance, a cloud-based checklist could allow the inspector to tick off items as evidence is seen, and even attach screenshots or files as supporting evidence directly into the audit record.

During remote document review, **attention to detail** is crucial. The inspector should verify that documents are the latest version (remote oversight often relies on electronic manuals to ensure the revision status is current). They should also assess whether the documents were likely prepared **specifically for the audit** or are part of routine records. In remote settings, there’s a slight risk that an organization might try to curate or edit documents before sending; inspectors can counter this by asking for very recent records or cross-checking dates and signatures. If any document seems questionable, the inspector can ask to see a broader context or more samples.

Keep a clear **audit trail** of what has been reviewed. This can be done by referencing document numbers or titles in the checklist and noting any discrepancies or conformities. If an issue is found (an out-of-date procedure or missing training record), the inspector flags it for the report and possibly asks the organization for immediate clarification or corrective action even during the audit.

5.3 Remote Interviews and Discussions: Interviewing personnel is a key part of oversight to assess competence, understanding of responsibilities, and the safety culture. In a remote context, interviews are typically done via video call. To conduct effective **remote interviews**:

- **Plan Interview Sessions Separately:** It often works best to schedule separate video call segments for different groups or individuals (one session for management interview, one for frontline staff, one for safety officers). This ensures the right people are present and reduces distractions. One advantage of remote interviews is that you might more easily involve individuals who are geographically dispersed (for example, a pilot/ATCO/Engineer currently in another city could join the call without travelling).
- **Build Rapport and Observe Cues:** Start each interview by putting the person at ease a few informal remarks can help overcome the lack of in-person connection. Maintain eye contact via the camera and observe body language as much as the medium allows. It's harder to read a room through video, but noticing tone of voice and facial expressions is still possible. Ensure the interviewee's camera is on and that they are alone or in an appropriate setting (to avoid coaching or undue influence off camera).
- **Use Open-Ended Questions:** As with on-site interviews, ask open questions that require more than yes/no answers. For example: "Can you walk me through how you would handle an aircraft grounding due to a mechanical issue under your maintenance control program?" The goal is to gauge their knowledge and how they apply procedures. Listen actively and follow up with deeper questions or hypothetical scenarios to test understanding. In a remote format, it may be helpful to ask questions in smaller parts and confirm understanding frequently (since slight audio delays or dropouts can occur).
- **Ensure Inclusivity:** If you interview a group via teleconference (say, several maintenance technicians together), manage the discussion so that all

have a chance to speak. Call on quiet participants for input, because in virtual meetings some people might hold back. This is analogous to moving around the table in an in-person meeting.

- **Confidentiality and Openness:** Sometimes in on-site audits, private one-on-one discussions are held (an inspector might privately ask an employee about safety concerns). In a virtual environment, achieve this by scheduling separate calls if needed. Make sure interviewees know they can speak freely; no one else should be in the room with them unless it's part of the planned group interview. If sensitive issues come up, the inspector can take note and follow up later by phone if more discretion is required.
- **Assessing Safety Culture Remotely:** While challenging, inspectors should ask questions that give a window into the organization's safety culture and leadership commitment. For example: "How has management supported you in resolving any safety issues you've reported remotely during the pandemic?" or "Can you give an example of a safety improvement made recently and how it was communicated?" The richness of these answers, even over video, can help the inspector sense whether there is an open reporting culture and proactive safety management (which aligns with ICAO Doc 9859's safety management principles).

Throughout remote interviews, maintain a polite and professional tone, but also direct the conversation to cover all necessary points (using a questionnaire or checklist as a guide). Take detailed notes. If an answer raises a concern, the inspector can request evidence (You mentioned a new procedure was issued; could you share that on screen or send it to me?) or flag it as a finding. Remember that technical glitches can interrupt if something is not heard clearly, ask them to repeat rather than assume. The goal is to extract the same quality of information as an in person interview, acknowledging the medium's constraints.

5.4 Virtual On-Site Inspection (Facility and Operations Tour) : One of the most challenging components of remote oversight is the **virtual inspection of physical facilities, equipment, or live operations**. This is where technology stands in for the inspector's own eyes on-site. To perform a virtual inspection effectively:

- **Assign a Camera Operator:** The organization should have a designated person (or persons) on the ground to walk through the facility with a camera (often a smartphone or tablet with a good camera and internet connection). This person serves as the “eyes and hands” of the inspector, following instructions on where to go and what to show. It is critical that this person is competent and cooperative – typically an experienced staff member who knows the facility layout and can respond to requests (e.g., an QA manager or safety officer).
- **Use Real-Time Video Tours:** Via the live video call, the inspector will direct the camera operator. For example, during an aircraft maintenance hangar inspection, the inspector might say: “Please pan slowly across the tool calibration board... hold there, zoom in on that calibration sticker... what is the date on that? Okay, thank you. Now let’s move to the aircraft – show me the open panel on the left wing.” This approach attempts to mirror what the inspector would do on-site: looking at equipment, checking labels, observing activities. The camera operator should keep communication open (“Now we are walking into the engine shop...”) and respond to directions promptly. The inspector can take screenshots if needed to capture specific evidence shown on video.
- **Structured and Unstructured Observations:** Plan an itinerary for the virtual tour (a list of areas to visit, such as the ops control center, maintenance hangar, training classroom, etc.), but also allow some **unscripted** exploration. For instance, the inspector might see something on camera and ask to take a closer look, or spontaneously request, “Let’s open that cabinet,” similar to how an on-site inspector might perform a spot check. This helps reduce the chance that the organization only shows “pre-prepared” clean areas. It’s a good practice to ask the operator to show today’s activities: e.g., if a flight dispatch briefing is happening or maintenance task being carried out, have them go there and stream a portion of it. Observing actual operations remotely provides insight into real-time compliance and safety practices.
- **Multiple Camera Angles:** If possible, use multiple devices or cameras. Some advanced uses include fixed cameras (CCTV) that can be accessed remotely. If the airport or facility has CCTV covering critical areas, the CAA might ask for temporary remote access to those feeds, or to have someone show the CCTV view via screen-share. Alternatively, multiple staff with cameras could join the call from different locations (for example, one in the cockpit of a training simulator, another on the ramp). The inspector can

switch between feeds. While this requires more coordination, it can significantly broaden the coverage of the virtual inspection.

- **Limitations Acknowledgement:** Certain things simply cannot be checked remotely with high fidelity – for example, an inspector cannot physically tug on a component to see if it’s secured, or smell if there are fuel fumes, etc. Acknowledge these limitations and focus on what can be done: visual verification and asking the operator on-site to do actions (like open a panel, measure something on camera, etc.). The FAA’s experience has noted that some engineering inspections (like complex interior checks) have been challenging to do by video. Inspectors should identify any critical items they could not verify remotely and document them for future on-site follow-up. In some cases, an organization’s internal inspection reports or third-party audit results can be used to augment the virtual inspection (for example, if you couldn’t inspect a remote airport, perhaps use recent IOSA audit observations as indirect evidence).
- **Safety during Virtual Tours:** The on-site camera operator must still maintain their own safety and compliance during the tour. Instruct them that if any safety rule would be violated by taking the camera somewhere (e.g., entering a secure area without clearance, or walking under a jacked aircraft without proper gear), they must not do so. The inspector should schedule high-risk area tours (like an airside apron tour) only if it’s safe and permissible, possibly requiring the operator to use proper personal protective equipment and have another person assist for lookout.

Throughout the virtual inspection, the inspector should be diligently taking notes of observations just as if present. If any discrepancy or finding is noted (say, an expired fire extinguisher observed on camera, or an unsafe practice glimpsed), make a record and possibly take a screenshot as evidence. **Communication is constant:** the inspector narrates what they want to see; the camera operator confirms and shows it; the inspector then might ask the organization’s accompanying subject-matter expert (if present on the call) to explain something seen. For example: “I notice in the engine shop the chemical storage cabinet is open – can you tell me what your procedure is for securing it and who is responsible?”.

Finally, consider concluding the live tour with a brief recap while still connected, to ensure nothing was missed. The team leader can ask each inspector if they have any final areas they want to see via video before closing that part of the audit.

5.5 Closing Meeting (Virtual)

After the document reviews, interviews, and virtual facility tour are completed, the remote oversight activity should conclude with a **Closing Meeting** via video conference. The closing meeting allows the CAA team to present their findings and for both sides to clarify the results. Key points for the closing meeting:

- **Attendance:** Ideally, have the same attendees as the opening (management and concerned personnel), plus any additional individuals the organization wants to include to hear the results (e.g., the CEO or Accountable Manager if they didn't attend the whole audit). Ensure the CAA team is all present and that a lead spokesperson (usually the Team Leader) is designated.
- **Thank and Acknowledge:** The Team Leader should begin by thanking the participants for their cooperation and adaptability in conducting the oversight remotely. Acknowledge any challenges that were overcome (e.g., "We appreciate your team's efforts in facilitating the virtual tour and the prompt provision of documents."). This sets a constructive tone for feedback.
- **Summary of Activities:** Provide a brief summary of what was accomplished during the remote inspection: "Over the past two days we reviewed [X number] of documents, interviewed [Y] personnel, and virtually inspected [facilities A, B, C]." This recap shows the breadth of oversight covered and serves as a lead-in to findings.
- **Presentation of Findings:** Present the **findings** identified, both positive (conformities and good practices) and negative (non-compliances or concerns). It's often helpful to share your screen with a summary document or slide listing the findings for clarity. Each finding should be explained clearly, referencing evidence. For example: "Finding 1: The training program documentation does not show evidence of simulator training for all pilots as required by regulation X **【document reference】** . We noted 3 out of 15 pilot records sampled were missing simulator session logs." In a remote context, since everything reviewed is digital, you can precisely cite the file or record observed. Ensure to categorize findings by severity if your CAA uses levels (e.g., Level 1 – significant safety issue, Level 2 – minor). Also mention any **positive observations** (e.g., "The

introduction of an electronic safety reporting system is noted as a good practice that can enhance your SMS”).

- **Clarifications and Reactions:** After presenting all findings, give the organization an opportunity to ask for clarifications or provide additional input. They might wish to explain certain circumstances or even present additional evidence on the spot. The remote setting allows them, for instance, to quickly share a file to dispute a finding if they believe something was misunderstood. The CAA team should be open to reviewing any such extra evidence if time permits, but without diluting the objectivity of the audit. Any disputes that cannot be resolved immediately can be noted for further analysis.
- **Next Steps and Corrective Actions:** Outline the next steps. Inform the organization that a formal **audit/inspection report** will be issued (typically within a certain timeframe, e.g., 2 weeks). Explain the process for them to respond to findings – they may need to submit a **corrective action plan (CAP)** for each finding, with deadlines, even though the audit was remote the process for closure remains the same as usual. If any **immediate safety risks** were found, detail what immediate mitigation or enforcement action is required (for example, if a serious issue was discovered, the CAA might require operations to be curtailed or specific fixes done immediately – handle this just as you would on-site).
- **On-Site Follow-up (if applicable):** It’s good to mention whether an on-site follow-up is expected. For instance: “As discussed, due to the limitations of remote viewing, we plan to conduct a brief on-site validation of maintenance facilities within the next 6 months, once travel is feasible, to verify areas we could not fully observe remotely. This will primarily cover [XYZ].” This reassures both parties that any gaps in the remote process will be eventually closed.
- **Closing Remarks:** Conclude the meeting by thanking everyone again for their participation. Emphasize that the cooperation shown during the remote oversight reflects a mutual commitment to safety. Encourage the organization to continue addressing the findings earnestly and note that the CAA is available for any clarification during the corrective action process. End on a positive note, highlighting that despite the remote execution, the oversight was successful in identifying areas to improve and confirming areas of compliance.

After ending the call, the CAA team should internally debrief (perhaps immediately on a separate call) to discuss how the remote audit went and ensure alignment on the findings recorded. This internal debrief can feed into improving future remote oversight activities.

6. Post-Oversight Reporting and Follow-Up

The remote oversight process doesn't end with the closing meeting. Proper documentation and follow-up are crucial to ensure the oversight achieves its purpose of enhancing safety.

- 6.1 Report Preparation:** The CAA team will prepare a **formal report** just like for any audit/inspection. The report should clearly state that the oversight was conducted remotely (including the dates, methods used, and any limitations noted). Document all findings with evidence references (e.g., specific document names or screenshots from the virtual tour if applicable). Also include positive notes or compliance confirmations. It's important the report stands up to scrutiny, as it may be reviewed in future audits (e.g., ICAO USOAP) to demonstrate the State continued its oversight duties via remote means. Ensure the report writing follows the CAA's standard format (Doc 8335 provides guidance on reporting), and have it peer-reviewed if required by internal quality processes.
- 6.2 Distribution:** Send the finalized report to the organization within the agreed timeframe. In a remote context, this will typically be via email or through an online portal. Request an acknowledgment of receipt. It might be prudent to also schedule a quick follow-up call to walk the organization through any complex findings in the report, especially if some detail was not fully discussed in the closing meeting due to time.
- 6.3 Corrective Action Plans:** Require the organization to submit their proposed **corrective action plan** (CAP) for each finding by a certain deadline. The CAP should detail how they will address the non-compliance or deficiency, who is responsible, and the timeline. Encourage the organization to include systemic fixes (not just addressing the single instance) to improve their processes, in line with safety management principles (e.g., root cause analysis for significant issues). The CAA inspectors will review these CAPs remotely and either approve them or request improvement, as per normal oversight practices.
- 6.4 Follow-Up Activities:** Monitor the implementation of corrective actions. This can often be done remotely as well – for example, if a finding was missing training records, the follow-up might be the CAA verifying via email that new records are now in place or an updated procedure was provided. For more serious findings, the CAA might schedule another **remote check** or even an on-site verification

when possible. All follow-up actions should be tracked to closure in the CAA's oversight system.

6.5 On-Site Validation (if needed): As mentioned in the closing meeting, plan any on-site validation that was deemed necessary. When conditions allow travel or access, conduct a focused inspection to verify critical items that could not be assessed remotely. The results of such on-site follow-up should reference the original remote audit to tie them together.

6.6 Records Management: Ensure all records from the remote oversight are properly archived. This includes the report, any transcripts or notes from interviews, screenshots or files obtained, and correspondence. Since this was a remote activity, there might be electronic records like chat logs or recordings – handle these per the CAA's recordkeeping rules (for instance, storing them in a secure drive for a certain retention period). These records may also serve as evidence of the State's oversight performance in internal reviews or international audits.

Evaluation and Improvement: It is highly recommended that the CAA **evaluate the remote oversight process itself** after completion. Gather feedback from the inspectors involved: What went well? What challenges were faced (technically or procedurally)? Did we cover everything we would have on-site? This reflective exercise can identify lessons learned. Similarly, consider soliciting feedback from the inspected organization about the remote process – their perspective might highlight areas to improve communication or technology for next time. Use this information to update the CAA's remote oversight procedures or training. Over time, as technology and experience grow, the process will become more refined and effective.

By diligently following up, the CAA ensures that remote surveillance achieves tangible safety outcomes (corrected deficiencies, improved compliance) and not just a checklist exercise. The end goal remains the same as traditional oversight: to enhance aviation safety and compliance in the State.

7. Best Practices for Effective Remote Oversight

Drawing on experiences around the world, this section compiles **best practices** and tips to maximize the effectiveness of remote safety oversight:

7.1 Adopt a Risk-Based Approach: Be selective and strategic in using remote oversight. Focus on areas that can be effectively evaluated with technology, and **defer or prioritize** on-site inspections for areas that cannot. Always consider the

risk context for example, a well-established operator with a strong compliance record might be a good candidate for a largely remote audit, whereas a new or poor-performing operator might warrant an earlier on-site check.

- 7.2 **Leverage Technology Smartly:** Use the best available tools and keep abreast of new solutions. Simple measures like using high-definition cameras and stable internet connections can drastically improve the quality of a virtual inspection. Some CAAs have experimented with wearable cameras (on hard hats, etc.) and even drones for remote viewing of airfield facilities. Ensure all team members are comfortable with the tools, through practice sessions. Also, **have backup options:** an alternative platform (if the primary video conference fails), extra batteries or devices for the on-site camera person, and a phone hotline as a last resort communication channel.
- 7.3 **Ensure Strong Communication:** In remote oversight, clarity in communication is paramount. Inspectors should be explicit in their requests and confirmations. For example, when asking to see a document, specify the exact title or ID; when concluding an interview, summarize key points to ensure understanding. Without physical presence, miscommunications can happen easily, so double-check that both sides have the same interpretation of any agreements or observations. Encourage an atmosphere where the auditee feels comfortable asking, “Could you please repeat that?” or informing, “We didn’t catch that detail,” so that nothing is missed or assumed.
- 7.4 **Document Everything:** Maintain an extensive paper (or digital) trail. In on-site audits, an inspector might scribble notes on a notepad; in remote audits, consider using a shared document or an inspection log that is updated in real-time. Save copies of crucial evidence (files, screenshots). This not only helps in report writing but also provides justification for the remote oversight’s outcomes, which might be scrutinized later. If using an electronic checklist tool, ensure it is backed up. Essentially, treat the data from a remote audit with the same rigor as physical evidence from an on-site audit.
- 7.5 **Focus on Human Factors:** Recognize that participating in a remote audit is as new for the auditee’s staff as it might be for the CAA. Fatigue can set in due to long video calls; schedule breaks and don’t plan excessively long days virtually – several shorter sessions may be more effective than a marathon video call. Be mindful of the stress on both inspectors and the organization’s employees: technical hiccups or the formality of virtual communication can increase anxiety. A bit of patience and flexibility goes a long way. For example, if internet connectivity is acting up, don’t rush – pause and resume when stable, or adjust by turning off video temporarily if bandwidth is low.

- 7.6 Maintain Professionalism and Authority:** Even though you may be sitting at home or office behind a webcam, the oversight activity is official. Inspectors should conduct themselves with the same professionalism as in the field. This includes dressing appropriately (at least from the waist-up on camera), being punctual in virtual meetings, and upholding protocols (introductions, briefing, debriefing) systematically. Similarly, require the auditee to treat the process seriously – they should allocate dedicated time and not treat a remote audit as a casual chat that can be multitasked amid other work.
- 7.7 Incorporate Data and Tools from Industry:** Remote oversight can be complemented by other sources of safety data. ICAO and various industry groups have suggested using **industry assessment programs as data sources** to supplement state oversight. For example, if an airline is IOSA (IATA Operational Safety Audit) registered, the CAA could review the IOSA report remotely to identify areas of concern or verify certain compliance aspects. Likewise, third-party audit results, safety performance indicators reported through the State Safety Program, or even live data (like Flight Data Monitoring summaries) could be leveraged. These can enrich the remote audit and compensate for some lack of on-site exposure.
- 7.8 Regional and International Cooperation:** One of the benefits of remote technologies is the ability to **collaborate across borders**. MID Region States can share specialists to join each other’s remote inspections as observers or advisors (with proper arrangements). This not only helps smaller CAAs access expertise but also promotes a harmonized approach. The Asia-Pacific experience during COVID-19 showed the value of assisting one another in oversight activities and sharing best practices. The MID region can emulate this by forming peer groups or using regional mechanisms (like RASG-MID Safety Enhancement Teams) to discuss remote oversight experiences. Additionally, stay informed on global developments – for instance, the FAA’s successful practices and CASSOA’s guidelines in Africa cassoa.org – and consider applying relevant aspects in the MID context.
- 7.9 Continuously Update Remote Oversight Procedures:** As technology evolves and more is learned, CAAs should regularly update their remote oversight guidance. What worked in 2021 might be superseded by better methods or tools in 2025. Treat the remote oversight framework as a **living document**. Incorporate inspector feedback, adapt to new ICAO recommendations (ICAO may issue further guidance as these practices mature), and refine criteria for when to use remote means. Over time, the goal is to embed remote oversight seamlessly into

the **routine safety oversight program**, using it to increase efficiency and coverage without compromising quality.

By following these best practices, CAA inspectors can conduct remote surveillance that is both effective and credible, yielding real safety oversight value.

8. Final Comments

- 8.1 Remote surveillance for aviation safety oversight has transitioned from an emergency improvisation into a **valuable component of modern oversight strategies**. By adhering to ICAO's principles and the guidance in this manual, MID Region States can implement remote auditing and inspection practices that uphold safety and compliance even when traditional methods are disrupted. The framework and procedures outlined – covering regulatory adjustments, meticulous planning, effective use of technology during execution, and thorough follow-up – provide a **comprehensive roadmap** for CAAs to follow
- 8.2 The overarching message is one of balance and continuous improvement: remote oversight is not a panacea, but it is a potent tool when used appropriately. It can increase efficiency (cover more ground with less cost) and ensure oversight continuity in trying times, thereby supporting the State's obligations under ICAO's safety oversight system. At the same time, CAAs must remain vigilant about the limitations and maintain on-site presence whenever necessary to capture the full picture of an aviation entity's operations and culture.
- 8.3 By developing capacity in remote surveillance, the MID region will be better equipped to handle future challenges – whether they be another pandemic, geopolitical issues, or simply the need to do more with limited resources. **Collaboration, technology, and a strong safety focus** will drive the successful integration of remote oversight. In line with global best practices and with support from ICAO, MID States can lead by example, showing how to maintain the highest standards of aviation safety oversight no matter the circumstances.

Finally, this guidance is intended to be a living document. Users are encouraged to customize it to their national context and share feedback or new best practices. The aviation world will continue to evolve, and so too should our oversight methods – always aiming to enhance safety in the skies.

9. Sources:

- ICAO SEIG/4 Working Paper on Remote Oversight (Presented by Qatar)

- FAA Policy and Industry Practice on Remote Inspections (Aviation Week, Apr 2020) aviationweek.com/ctsys.com
- CASSOA (East African Community) Guidelines for Remote Oversight cassoa.org

Appendix 1

Example Checklist: Remote Audit Preparation

To further assist CAAs and inspectors, below is a simplified example of a **Remote Audit Pre-Flight (Preparation) Checklist** that could be used as a reference:

Step	Action/Requirement	Status (√/X/N/A)	Remarks
1. Define Scope & Objectives	Confirm audit scope, areas, and regulations. Ensure suitability for remote evaluation.		
2. Risk Assessment	Assess remote feasibility (complexity, critical checks). Hybrid/on-site if risk is high.		
3. Team Assigned	Identify team members. Allocate roles (Team Leader, Ops Inspector, Airworthiness Inspector, etc.).		
4. Notify Operator	Send official audit notification (dates, scope, expectations). Ensure acknowledgment is received.		
5. Documents Requested	Send list of requested documents (manuals, records, org charts, training logs). Set submission deadline.		
6. Documents Received	Confirm receipt and accessibility of all requested documents. Follow up if pending.		
7. Pre-Review Done	Team reviews documents. Note preliminary observations/questions.		

Step	Action/Requirement	Status (√/X/N/A)	Remarks
8. Tech Platform Setup	Select primary video platform (Zoom/Teams). Create links and share with operator. Arrange backup method.		
9. Test Call Completed	Conduct audio/video test with operator. Check video quality for critical areas (e.g., hangar).		Date:
10. Schedule Finalized	Prepare detailed agenda (opening, interviews, tour, closing). Confirm with operator. Time zones checked.		
11. Inspector Equipment Check	Ensure inspectors have laptops, webcams, headsets, and templates. Quiet environment confirmed.		
12. Security Check	Agree on secure file sharing, screen sharing permissions, and recording rules.		
13. Contingency Plan	Brief team and operator on disconnection protocol (e.g., wait 10 min, then call by phone).		
14. Ready to Commence	Confirm all preparations complete. Team Leader approves audit start.		



INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

**GUIDANCE MATERIAL ON JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT FOR AVIATION INSPECTORS
FOR MID REGION STATES**

Compiled by the ICAO MID Regional Office	
Version 1.0	1 November 2025

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1. Introduction and Purpose and Scope

- 1.1 In the MID Region, civil aviation authorities (CAAs) and their inspectors play a crucial role in ensuring compliance with aviation safety regulations. While administrative actions (such as warnings, fines, or certificate suspensions) are common tools to address safety violations, certain cases require escalation to the judicial system for enforcement. Judicial enforcement involves pursuing legal action through the State's courts or judiciary to impose penalties or sanctions for serious violations of aviation laws. This guidance material has been developed specifically for MID Region States to enhance aviation inspectors' understanding of judicial enforcement mechanisms. It provides a structured framework, procedures, and best practices aligned with ICAO standards, tailored to the regional context and legal environments of MID States
- 1.2 This document's primary objective is to guide aviation safety inspectors on how and when to engage the judicial enforcement process as part of their oversight duties. It aims to ensure that serious breaches of aviation regulations, especially willful, reckless, or repeat violations are dealt with effectively through legal channels, thereby enhancing overall safety compliance. By clarifying roles, processes, and expectations, the material seeks to bolster inspectors' confidence and competence in cooperating with judicial authorities.
- 1.3 The scope of this guidance covers the end-to-end process of judicial enforcement in aviation oversight. It spans from the initial identification of violations and gathering of evidence, through the decision making to pursue legal action, up to participating in court proceedings and post-trial follow-up. It addresses various sectors of aviation (flight operations, airworthiness, licensing, aerodromes, etc.) where inspectors may encounter violations that warrant judicial action. While administrative enforcement actions remain important, this document focuses on those scenarios where inspectors must prepare cases for prosecution or legal adjudication. It is assumed that each State may adopt these guidelines in accordance with national laws and judicial structures.
- 1.4 The guidance is intended for use by regulators and policymakers in the MID Region to promote consistency and transparency in how exemptions are handled across different States. It covers the entire exemption lifecycle from initial request and evaluation through issuance, oversight of compliance with conditions, and eventual expiration or renewal of the exemption.
- 1.5 This guidance is aligned with ICAO's Safety Oversight principles and the State Safety Programme (SSP) framework. It complements existing ICAO manuals and documents, including **Doc 9734** (Safety Oversight Manual, Part A) and **Doc 8335** (Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance), which emphasize the need for effective enforcement as part of a robust safety oversight system. In particular, ICAO's Critical Element 8 on **Resolution of Safety Concerns** highlights that States must have processes to resolve safety deficiencies and **take enforcement**

action when appropriate. This material interprets those global principles for practical application by inspectors in the judicial context of MID Region States. The development of this guidance also responds to regional aviation safety goals (as noted by MIDANPIRG/RASG-MID) to strengthen enforcement capabilities of inspectors.

1.6 Ultimately, the effective use of judicial enforcement by CAAs serves two key purposes: deterrence (sending a strong message that serious violations will be met with serious consequences) and accountability (ensuring that individuals or entities who flout aviation laws are held responsible under the law). By working hand-in-hand with prosecutors and judges, aviation inspectors can help uphold aviation safety regulations and protect the traveling public. The sections that follow outline the framework and detailed procedures to achieve these aims, mirroring the structured approach of other ICAO guidance materials for consistency and ease of use.

2. Framework for Judicial Enforcement in Aviation Oversight

2.1 **Alignment with ICAO Standards:** Judicial enforcement in civil aviation must be embedded within the State's overall safety oversight system and legal framework, in harmony with ICAO standards and recommended practices. ICAO's safety oversight model calls for States not only to monitor compliance (through inspections and audits) but also to ensure the resolution of safety issues, which includes enforcement actions up to prosecution if necessary. In the MID Region context, this means CAAs should integrate judicial enforcement as a formal component of their State Safety oversight system and enforcement policies, consistent with Critical Element 7 (Surveillance) and Critical Element 8 (Resolution of Safety Concerns) of ICAO's framework. Aligning with ICAO guidance ensures that terms, processes, and outcomes of enforcement actions are internationally recognizable and defensible. For instance, when pursuing legal action for an aviation violation, inspectors and CAA legal staff should reference the relevant ICAO Standards and national regulations that have been promulgated from those standards. This alignment also helps demonstrate to international auditors (e.g. ICAO USOAP missions) that the State has an effective mechanism to address violations through legal means when warranted. Overall, embedding judicial enforcement in the regulatory system underscores a State's commitment to uphold aviation safety rules through all available avenues.

2.2 **Principles of Judicial Enforcement:** The use of judicial enforcement should be guided by key principles to ensure it is fair, effective, and contributes to aviation safety. These core principles include:

- **Legality and Due Process:** Enforcement actions must have a clear basis in national law and regulations. Inspectors should only initiate judicial proceedings for violations that are defined as offenses or non-compliances under the law. All actions must respect due process rights of the accused, including proper notification, the right to a defense, and an impartial judicial review.

- **Proportionality:** The severity of the enforcement action should be proportional to the gravity of the violation. Judicial action (which can lead to criminal penalties or significant sanctions) should be reserved for serious breaches – for example, willful violations, fraud or falsification of records, repeated non-compliance, or acts that put lives at risk. Lesser infractions or unintentional errors are typically handled with corrective actions or administrative penalties.
- **Consistency:** The CAA should apply enforcement consistently so that similar violations yield similar legal responses. This builds industry confidence that enforcement is not arbitrary. A clear enforcement policy (Section 3.2) helps ensure that inspectors make recommendations for judicial action based on standardized criteria, rather than personal discretion alone. Consistency also means coordination with prosecutors so that the legal outcomes (fines, sentences) are in line with precedent.
- **Deterrence and Compliance:** A fundamental goal of enforcement is to deter non-compliance. The prospect of facing court action and penalties should discourage regulated entities from knowingly violating rules. However, the enforcement process should also aim to bring the offender into compliance. For instance, judicial enforcement should be seen as enforcing accountability while ultimately enhancing future compliance.
- **Transparency:** The enforcement process should be as transparent as possible. Once a case is concluded, the CAA may consider sharing information (e.g., a summary of the violation and penalty) with the aviation community, as appropriate and in line with national laws, to reinforce the lessons learned. Internally, inspectors should document every step leading to judicial referral, creating a clear record of why the action was taken

By adhering to these principles, MID States can ensure that judicial enforcement actions strengthen the rule of law in aviation safety while preserving trust between Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs), operators, and service providers. Within the framework of the State Safety Oversight (SSO) system and CE-8 requirements, enforcement decisions must clearly distinguish between:

- **Non-punitive responses** to unintentional errors or voluntarily reported safety events, which support a Just Culture and encourage transparency; and
- **Judicial enforcement measures** for intentional, reckless, or repeated violations that threaten lives, property, or public order.

Inspectors must apply this distinction carefully to avoid undermining safety reporting systems or creating a climate of fear, while ensuring that deliberate non-compliance is met with firm legal action. Judicial enforcement should therefore be used neither excessively nor hesitantly:

- **Not excessively**, so as not to discourage self-disclosure and safety learning;
- **Not hesitantly**, so that serious safety breaches receive timely, proportionate, and transparent legal resolution.

This balanced approach ensures that enforcement actions serve their primary purpose: **to resolve safety concerns, prevent recurrence, and protect the traveling public**, while maintaining confidence in the State’s aviation safety oversight system

2.3 Scope of Application: Judicial enforcement in aviation can apply across various domains and scenarios where legal violations occur. Inspectors should be aware of the types of cases that typically warrant judicial action under their national framework. Examples within the scope include:

- **Serious Regulatory Violations:** Cases where an aviation service provider or individual has **knowingly or recklessly** violated safety regulations. For example, an airline continuing operations on an aircraft with known serious defects, or a maintenance organization falsifying safety-critical inspection records. Such deliberate non-compliances endanger lives and usually meet the threshold for legal prosecution.
- **Operation Without Valid Certification:** Instances of entities or personnel operating in civil aviation without the required certifications, licenses, or approvals. For example, a charter company flying passengers without an Air Operator Certificate (AOC), or an unlicensed individual presenting themselves as a certified aircraft mechanic. These situations often involve fraudulent activity and undermine the regulatory system, thus calling for judicial enforcement.
- **Interference and Obstruction:** Any acts of obstructing inspectors or investigations can fall under judicial enforcement. If an operator refuses access to facilities, hides evidence, or threatens inspectors, those acts may violate laws (such as obstructing a government official) and need to be referred for prosecution. Ensuring inspectors can carry out their duties without interference is critical to oversight.
- **Criminal Offenses in Aviation Context:** Some violations overlap with criminal law. Examples are transporting dangerous goods illegally, security breaches, or cases of corruption (e.g., bribing an inspector or issuing certificates fraudulently). Inspectors may uncover such offenses during audits or surveillance. While specialized agencies might take lead (e.g., security authorities for security violations), aviation inspectors should coordinate closely and provide expertise, with the possibility of being called as expert witnesses during judicial proceedings.
- **Environmental and Other Specialized Violations:** Certain States have laws for environmental violations (like illegal aircraft emissions or dumping of waste) or economic offenses (such as violating consumer protection in aviation). If these are under CAA oversight and violations occur, inspectors might need to coordinate with authorities to enforce these through courts.

It is important to note that not all findings or safety concerns will fall within the scope of judicial enforcement. Many safety findings are best handled through corrective action plans, safety management processes, or administrative penalties. Judicial enforcement is appropriate for the high-end, more egregious cases where the State needs to exercise its full legal authority to sanction and correct behavior. Inspectors must use their judgement (guided by State policy and legal advice) to distinguish routine compliance issues from those rising to the level of judicial action. In unclear cases, consultation with the CAA's legal counsel or enforcement office is recommended before proceeding.

2.4 **Just Culture and Enforcement Balance:** Modern aviation safety management emphasizes a “Just Culture” approach, which encourages open reporting of errors and hazards by distinguishing between acceptable (unintentional errors) and unacceptable

(negligent or intentional) behaviors. MID States are strongly encouraged to foster a just culture environment even as they implement judicial enforcement. This means that inspectors and CAA officials should not seek to punish individuals for honest mistakes or system-induced errors that are willingly reported and corrected. Such occurrences are often better addressed through training or system improvements. On the other hand, willful violations and gross negligence, the kinds of behaviors that endanger safety intentionally or through extreme carelessness deserve sanctions of appropriate severity. In practice, this balance can be achieved by integrating the enforcement program with the State's occurrence reporting systems and safety management processes. For example, if a safety incident is reported voluntarily by an operator and it truly appears to be an unintentional lapse, the CAA may favor a non-punitive resolution (like counseling or additional oversight) **instead of immediate legal action**. Conversely, if evidence shows the incident was a result of deliberate rule-breaking or concealment, then enforcement (including judicial) is triggered. Ultimately, a Just Culture approach in the MID Region means that inspectors use enforcement as a scalpel, not a sledgehammer targeting the truly unacceptable behaviors while promoting a culture of safety and learning for all others.

3. Regulatory and Organizational Preparedness

For judicial enforcement to be effective, States need to ensure that their **regulations, policies, and organizational structures** explicitly support and govern the use of legal action in oversight. This section addresses key preparatory components that MID States should have in place to empower inspectors in carrying out judicial enforcement

- 3.1 Legal and Regulatory Framework:** A solid legal foundation is the first requirement. Each State's primary aviation legislation and regulations must define the violations and offenses that can be subject to legal enforcement. Typically, the civil aviation law or act will list violations (e.g., operating without a license, violating flight rules, failure to comply with safety directives) along with associated penalties (fines, imprisonment, etc.). Inspectors should be familiar with these provisions to know under what legal authority they can initiate court action. It is advisable that CAAs conduct a review of national civil aviation laws to ensure all critical safety requirements have corresponding enforceable provisions. If any gaps exist (for example, if certain safety requirements lack defined penalties or if inspector powers to refer cases are unclear), the State should update its regulations or issue guidance to bridge those gaps.

Additionally, States may consider empowering their CAA through legal instruments to impose administrative penalties directly for minor infractions, reserving judicial actions for major cases a tiered legal approach. Ultimately, a clear and comprehensive legal framework gives inspectors the confidence that when they detect a serious violation, the law is on their side to pursue it in court. It also signals to the judiciary the intent of the State to treat aviation violations with due seriousness.

Open communication ensures that when a genuine need for an exemption arises, the applicant knows how to proceed and the CAA receives better-quality submissions, thereby speeding up the evaluation. It also deters misuse of the exemption process by making it clear that requests will undergo rigorous scrutiny.

- 3.2 State Enforcement Policy and Inspector Guidance:** Beyond laws, CAAs should establish a formal enforcement policy that delineates how enforcement actions are pursued, including the escalation to judicial proceedings. This policy (often documented in an enforcement manual or inspector handbook) should lay out the criteria for selecting enforcement paths. For example, the policy might state: “Intentional, reckless, or repeated violations must be addressed by legal enforcement action”, **whereas isolated, unintentional violations may be handled with administrative remedies.** Incorporating such criteria helps inspectors make consistent decisions. The policy should also describe the procedural steps an inspector must take internally before a case goes to court such as notifying the inspector’s supervisor, consulting the CAA’s legal counsel, and preparing an enforcement case file (as detailed in Sections 4 and 5).

In addition to policy, practical guidance materials or bulletins should be provided to inspectors. These can include checklists for evidence collection, templates for enforcement reports, and standard operating procedures for interfacing with law enforcement agencies. By providing inspectors with a clear “roadmap” for judicial enforcement, States ensure that the process is standardized and not left to ad-hoc improvisation. Moreover, having a documented process protects the CAA by showing that enforcement actions are taken methodically and fairly, reducing accusations of bias or arbitrariness.

- 3.3 Coordination with Judicial Authorities:** Effective judicial enforcement requires close coordination between the CAA (and its inspectors) and the State’s judicial apparatus – typically prosecutors, police (for criminal investigations), and the courts. MID States should strive to establish formal channels of coordination. This might be achieved through Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) or inter-agency protocols that outline how aviation cases are handled. For example, a State could have an MOU between the CAA and the national Prosecutor General’s Office specifying that aviation safety violations discovered by the CAA will be reviewed promptly for potential prosecution, and that technical support (expertise from inspectors) will be provided to prosecutors. Some States designate specific prosecutors or units to handle aviation-related cases; if feasible, this is a best practice as it builds expertise in the judiciary on aviation matters. Inspectors should be introduced to those counterparts so they know whom to contact when a violation needs referral.

Coordination also involves practical arrangements: agreeing on how evidence will be handed over (chain of custody procedures), how communication will occur during investigations, and whether joint training or workshops are held. It’s beneficial to sensitize judges and prosecutors about aviation safety and the importance of

enforcement, possibly through seminars or including them in aviation safety events. This mutual understanding can lead to more effective handling of cases. In summary, inspectors should not view judicial enforcement as entering a foreign territory alone there should be a structured partnership between the CAA and judicial authorities supporting the process.

- 3.4 Evidence Collection and Preservation:** When preparing for potential legal action, the integrity of evidence is paramount. CAAs must ensure that inspectors have clear procedures and tools for collecting, handling, and preserving evidence in a manner admissible in court. This includes both physical evidence (e.g., faulty parts, documents, printed records) and digital evidence (e-mails, electronic records, photos, videos). Inspectors should be trained to secure original documents or certified true copies, take photographs or video recordings with timestamps, and record witness statements. It's important to establish a chain of custody for all evidence, a log of who obtained it, how it was stored, and who accessed it to prevent any challenge to its authenticity in court.

Confidentiality and security measures from the oversight perspective (such as protecting sensitive safety data) should be balanced with the needs of legal evidence. If certain evidence includes personal or proprietary information, inspectors should coordinate with legal counsel on how to handle it (for instance, using sealed submissions to courts if necessary). Inspectors must also be aware of any legal requirements for obtaining evidence; in some cases, they may need a court warrant or police assistance (for example, to seize records from an operator who refuses to cooperate). The Court Evidence Checklist provided in Appendix 2 offers a reference for inspectors on what types of evidence to gather for common violations. By being thorough and methodical in evidence collection, inspectors greatly increase the likelihood of successful prosecution. Courts will base their judgments on evidence, so this aspect of preparedness cannot be overstated.

- 3.5 Resources and Legal Support:** Pursuing judicial enforcement can be resource intensive. CAAs should plan and allocate resources to support inspectors in this area. Legal support is crucial this might involve having a dedicated legal advisor or enforcement unit within the CAA that works with inspectors on case preparation. Such legal experts can help translate technical findings into legal arguments, draft charges, and liaise with prosecutors. If a CAA lacks in-house legal staff, an arrangement should be made with the State's legal authorities to provide counsel when needed. Other resources include funding for expert witnesses or technical analyses (sometimes needed to prove a violation in court), as well as travel budgets if inspectors need to attend distant courts or accompany law enforcement on follow-up actions. The CAA should ensure inspectors have access to proper equipment: for example, secure storage for evidence, tools for analyzing digital evidence (or access to a lab), and reliable means of communication with prosecutors (secure email or case management systems). Additionally, time is a resource managers should allow that inspectors involved in a court case might need to dedicate significant time to preparation and testimony, and adjust workload accordingly. By

recognizing judicial enforcement as a core part of oversight duties (and not an ad-hoc extra), CAAs in the MID Region can better support their inspectors and achieve stronger enforcement outcomes.

- 3.6 **Training and Competency:** Just as inspectors are trained in auditing, certification, and surveillance techniques, they also require training in enforcement and legal processes. MID States should incorporate modules on **enforcement procedures, evidence handling, and courtroom skills** into their inspector training programs. Key training topics might include **how to recognize which violations merit legal action**, how to document findings in a way that will hold up in court, interview techniques for witness statements, report writing for enforcement, and understanding the basics of criminal procedure (e.g., burden of proof, roles of prosecutors vs. judges).

Role-playing exercises can be valuable for example, simulating a scenario where inspectors must present a case to a mock prosecutor, or testifying in a mock trial about an inspection finding. Such exercises improve confidence and communication skills. If possible, cross-training with law enforcement (such as inviting a police investigator to explain investigative techniques, or a prosecutor to explain how they build cases) can give inspectors insight into the judicial perspective. Additionally, keeping inspectors updated on changes in laws and regulations is important; if a new law criminalizes a certain behavior (say, laser strikes on aircraft or unruly passenger behavior), inspectors should know how that intersects with their oversight work.

Finally, competency in enforcement should be evaluated periodically. Not all inspectors will routinely handle court cases (since serious violations are relatively infrequent), so CAAs might designate certain experienced inspectors as focal points for enforcement, or ensure knowledge transfer when a case occurs. In summary, continuous training and a competency framework for enforcement ensure that when the time comes for an inspector to step into a courtroom, they do so with professionalism and preparedness, representing the CAA effectively.

4. Planning and Initiation of Enforcement Actions

When an inspector identifies a potential serious violation, a systematic process should be followed to decide on and initiate judicial enforcement. Proper planning at this stage will set the foundation for a strong case. This section outlines steps from detection of a violation up to the point of formally referring a case for prosecution.

- 4.1 **Detection of Violations and Initial Investigation:** The process begins when a **violation** is discovered through oversight activities. This could happen during a routine inspection, audit, accident/incident investigation, or even via a reported complaint or whistleblower. Upon detection of a possible serious violation, the inspector must first gather initial facts and assess the situation. It is important to verify the violation to the extent possible: confirm which regulation or law has been breached and collect preliminary evidence. For example, if an inspector suspects an airline operated flights without proper crew qualifications, they should secure records of crew licenses and flight logs as an initial

step. At this stage, discretion is key the inspector may not yet inform the entity that a legal action is being considered, to avoid any tampering with evidence or heightened resistance. **However, safety considerations remain paramount;** if the violation poses an immediate safety risk, the inspector should take necessary immediate action (like grounding an aircraft through an administrative order) even as the judicial process is set in motion. Document all observations meticulously in an inspection report or violation report. This report should clearly describe what was found, when and where, and why it is a violation of specific regulations. The initial investigation phase might also involve consulting with senior inspectors or managers to ensure consensus that the issue is indeed severe. Once the inspector is satisfied that a serious violation has occurred and initial evidence is in hand, they proceed to the next step.

4.2 **Enforcement Decision Process:** With the facts gathered, the inspector (often in consultation with the CAA's enforcement committee or management) must decide whether to pursue judicial enforcement or handle the matter through other means. Many CAAs have an internal Enforcement Review Board or similar mechanism to review significant violations. Criteria for this decision should align with the State's enforcement policy (see 3.2) – typically considering factors like intent, harm, and compliance attitude. A helpful approach is to ask: Would failure to pursue this violation in court set a bad precedent or leave a serious safety risk unaddressed? If yes, judicial action is likely warranted. Another consideration is the evidence strength – do we have or can we obtain enough evidence to likely secure a conviction or penalty? If key evidence is missing and unattainable, a prosecution might fail and alternative enforcement (like certificate action) could be more effective. At this stage, inspectors should involve the CAA's legal advisors. Often a prosecutorial discretion comes into play; the case may be discussed informally with a prosecutor to gauge their interest or get advice on how to proceed. The outcome of the decision process should be documented, noting who was involved and the rationale. If the decision is not to pursue judicial enforcement, the inspector should then follow through with appropriate administrative or compliance actions to address the violation. If the decision is to proceed with judicial enforcement, the inspector moves forward with formal notification and case building. **Submission of Exemption Requests:** The process typically starts with the **applicant**

4.3 **Notification and Coordination with Authorities:** Once a decision for judicial enforcement is made, the inspector/CAA needs to formally notify the relevant authorities and coordinate the next steps. Typically, this involves:

- **Internal Notification:** The inspector notifies the CAA's higher management (if not already involved) that a case is being escalated. Some States require that the Director General of CAA or a specific Enforcement Office approve referrals to the judiciary. Ensuring internal leadership is aware prevents any surprises and allows them to allocate support.
- **Notifying Law Enforcement/Prosecutor:** Depending on the State's process, the inspector either contacts a designated prosecutor directly or goes through a law enforcement agency (such as the police or a special investigations unit). A **formal referral letter** is usually prepared (see Appendix 1 for a model). This letter outlines the facts of the case, the regulations violated, and requests that legal action be taken. It should be accompanied by

initial evidence or an offer to supply evidence. In some jurisdictions, the CAA may file a complaint or an offence report as the triggering document for the judicial process.

- **Notifying the Offender (if required):** In many cases, once a violation is being referred for legal action, the entity or individual involved should be informed that the matter is now subject to judicial proceedings. This might be done via a formal letter stating that “CAA has referred the violation of XYZ to [Prosecutor/Law Enforcement] for appropriate action.” However, the timing of this notification can be sensitive if a criminal investigation is to occur, law enforcement might advise to delay informing the accused until certain steps (like evidence seizure or interviews) are done. Inspectors should coordinate with prosecutors on when and how the violator will be notified. In administrative enforcement, an immediate notice is standard; for judicial, it might wait until an official charge or summons is ready.
- **Cross-Agency Coordination:** Some cases require informing other agencies. For example, if the violation involves smuggling or security issues, customs or security agencies should be looped in. If it involves fraud in personnel licensing, the licensing authority might need alerting to possibly suspend the license pending outcome.

Throughout this coordination, maintaining a **clear line of communication** is vital. The inspector may serve as the technical point of contact for the prosecutor, so availability and prompt response to queries is important. Conversely, the inspector should ensure that the CAA’s legal/enforcement office is receiving updates from the prosecutors on how they will proceed (e.g., will there be an investigation, charges filed, etc.). At this juncture, the case has effectively moved from the CAA’s sole domain into the joint realm of the CAA and the judicial system

4.4 Evidence Gathering and Documentation: After initiating coordination, the inspector must deepen the evidence collection to build a robust case file. While some initial evidence was gathered in step 4.1, now the effort becomes more comprehensive and formal. The **Court Evidence Checklist** (Appendix 2) should be used to ensure all relevant types of evidence are considered. Key actions in this phase:

- **Gather Additional Documents:** Collect all documentation related to the case. This could include flight records, maintenance logs, training records, communication transcripts, approval certificates, surveillance reports – anything that can substantiate the violation. Ensure documents are the original or officially certified copies when possible. Each document should be labeled or indexed for reference.
- **Witness Statements:** Identify individuals who have knowledge of the violation (witnesses). These might be CAA inspectors (including the one who found the issue and any colleagues), employees of the company (whistleblowers or those directly involved), or others. It is often useful for inspectors to take written statements or interview these witnesses. However, care must be taken: if the matter could lead to criminal charges, typically law enforcement or prosecutors might prefer to conduct official interviews under caution to ensure admissibility. Inspectors should seek guidance in some cases they can obtain initial statements, but the prosecutor might later re-interview witnesses formally. In any case, make note of all potential witnesses and the essence of their knowledge.
- **Physical Evidence:** Secure any physical items relevant to the case. For example, if a part on an aircraft was substandard or fake and led to a violation, remove and preserve that part.

Tag it as evidence. If it's too large (like an aircraft), extensive photos/videos and examination reports by experts might serve in lieu. Ensure physical evidence is stored securely (e.g., in a tamper-evident bag or secure facility).

- **Analytical Reports:** In some instances, an expert analysis or lab test might be needed (for instance, testing fuel samples if fuel quality caused an engine failure that ties to a violation). Coordinate to get those analyses done and documented. The inspector might not do this personally but should facilitate and include the expert's report in the case file.
- **Enforcement Report Preparation:** Many CAAs require the inspector to compile an **enforcement report** summarizing the case. This report is a critical document that outlines the who, what, when, where, and how of the violation, and references the evidence supporting each point. It should clearly cite the breached regulations and describe the safety impact of the violation. Essentially, it is the narrative that will help prosecutors and eventually the court understand the case. Write this report in clear, factual language, avoiding jargon or acronyms that legal readers might not know (or else include a definitions section).

As evidence is gathered, keep updating the **evidence inventory** and ensure all items are cross-referenced in the enforcement report. Good documentation at this stage increases the chances that the prosecutor will accept the case and that it will result in a successful outcome. It also demonstrates professionalism; a well-documented case file shows the judiciary that the CAA's inspectors are competent and thorough.

4.5 Preparing the Judicial Referral: With evidence in hand, the next step is formally referring or filing the case for judicial action. This involves packaging the information and evidence in a format suitable for legal proceedings. The **model judicial referral letter** in Appendix 1 provides a template for the cover letter of such a referral. Key elements of the referral package include:

- **Referral Letter:** A signed letter from the CAA (ideally from a high-ranking official like the Director of Aviation Safety or Director General, if appropriate) addressed to the prosecutorial authority. It should reference the specific case, summarize the violation (including date, location, parties involved), cite the legal provisions violated, and request that legal proceedings be initiated. It may also indicate the contact point (e.g., the inspector or enforcement officer) for further coordination.
- **Enforcement Report:** Attach the detailed enforcement report written by the inspector. This gives the full narrative and evidence list. In some jurisdictions, this might be akin to an affidavit or official statement of the inspector. Ensure it is signed and dated. If law requires it to be sworn, arrange for that formality.
- **Evidence Dossier:** All evidence items should be compiled. If feasible, provide copies of documents and photographs for the prosecutor's review, while retaining the originals in CAA custody until needed in court. For large volumes of evidence, an indexed binder or electronic file is helpful. Each piece of evidence should be clearly labeled (e.g., Exhibit 1: Copy of Aircraft Maintenance Log dated XX; Exhibit 2: Photograph of unapproved part, etc.). If evidence is held elsewhere (like a seized part in storage), note its location and availability.
- **Legal References:** Although prosecutors will know the law, it can be helpful to include a copy of the relevant regulation or law section that was violated, especially if it's an

aviation-specific rule that general prosecutors might not be familiar with. This avoids any confusion about the exact offense.

- **Suggested Charges or Actions:** Some CAAs include a suggestion on what charges or legal actions they believe are applicable (e.g., violation of Civil Aviation Act §123, which carries penalties of XYZ). This can guide the prosecutor, though the final decision lies with them.

Before sending the referral, conduct a **peer review** if possible have another inspector or a legal advisor review the package to ensure clarity and completeness. Once satisfied, deliver the referral through the officially agreed channel (physical delivery with acknowledgment, or a secure electronic submission as appropriate). After submission, maintain a copy of everything in the CAA's files. At this point, the case formally enters the judicial system's domain.

4.6 Engaging Law Enforcement (if applicable): In some cases, particularly where criminal investigation aspects are involved (fraud, intentional misconduct, etc.), law enforcement agencies will take an active role post-referral. Inspectors should be prepared to work with police or other investigators as needed. This may include accompanying officers on site visits to the entity for seizure of additional evidence, helping interpret technical aspects during interrogations, or providing subject-matter expertise to an investigative task force. It's important for inspectors to understand their role: generally, they act as **technical consultants** to the law enforcement, **rather than leading the investigation**. Ensure to hand over leadership on criminal investigative steps to those with legal authority (e.g., only police can interview a suspect in many jurisdictions). However, inspectors should remain closely involved to ensure no important technical detail is overlooked. If arrests or urgent interventions are needed (for example, preventing an unsafe flight from departing), law enforcement coordination is critical and should be done swiftly.

5. Executing Judicial Enforcement Actions: Court Proceedings

Once a case enters the judicial arena, the enforcement action moves into the prosecution and court phase. In this phase, aviation inspectors transition into a supporting role for the legal process – providing expertise, clarifications, and occasionally testimony to ensure the case is accurately presented and adjudicated. The following outlines the typical steps and the inspector's involvement during court proceedings.

5.1 Filing of Charges and Case Initiation: After reviewing the referral, the prosecutor (or relevant judicial authority) will decide on the formal initiation of the case. This usually involves filing charges or a formal complaint in court against the accused individual or organization. From the inspector's perspective, at this stage their role is to assist the prosecutor in finalizing the charges. There may be discussions where the prosecutor asks the inspector to explain technical details or verify the applicability of certain regulations. For example, prosecutors might ask: "Does this act clearly violate Civil Aviation Regulation X? Can you explain how?" The inspector should be ready to articulate the violation in layman's terms, so the prosecutor can draft the charge sheet or indictment accurately.

In some situations, additional charges might be added if new information emerges (for instance, during law enforcement investigation, they find other unrelated violations). Inspectors should offer

input on any aviation-specific charges to ensure they are grounded in regulatory facts. Once charges are filed, the case is officially before the court and a process (criminal trial or administrative court hearing, depending on the legal system) is scheduled. The accused (now defendant) will be summoned or arrested, and the legal proceedings commence. Inspectors should obtain a copy of the charge sheet and familiarize themselves with exactly what the defendant is being accused of in legal terms, as this will frame their contributions going forward.

5.2 Pre-Trial Coordination and Case Building: Between the filing of charges and the actual court hearings, there is often a pre-trial phase. During this time, the prosecution builds its case fully, and the defense may also gather their side. Inspectors can expect to be actively engaged with prosecutors in this period. Key activities include:

- **Briefings and Strategy Meetings:** Prosecutors may hold meetings with the inspector and any CAA legal representatives to outline the strategy for prosecution. They will discuss which witnesses to call, what evidence to prioritize, and how to present the technical aspects to a judge or jury. Inspectors should provide input on what they consider the strongest evidence and whether any technical demonstrations or visuals might help (for example, using a diagram of an aircraft system to show where a tampered part was found).
- **Further Evidence Requests:** The prosecution might identify gaps or request additional information. They might say, (We need proof that this regulation was communicated to the operator) requiring the inspector to fetch a copy of an earlier letter or certificate. Or they may need an expert analysis to be formally written as an expert report. The inspector should facilitate any such request promptly. In some cases, inspectors themselves might prepare supplementary statements or clarify their initial report if something was unclear.
- **Pre-Trial Hearings and Legal Motions:** There could be preliminary court sessions (e.g., bail hearings, plea hearings, or motions by the defense to dismiss or suppress evidence). Inspectors typically do not speak in these but should remain on standby to support the prosecutor with facts if needed. For instance, if a defense lawyer claims “the CAA did an illegal search,” the prosecutor might ask the inspector to detail how evidence was obtained (to show it was lawful). It’s important that inspectors maintain meticulous notes and be truthful; any hint of improper procedure can jeopardize the case.
- **Expert Witness Preparation:** If the inspector (or another technical person) will testify as an expert witness, this is the time to prepare. The prosecutor will go over potential questions to ask and what areas the testimony should cover. The inspector should also prepare to explain technical terms in simple language. It might be useful to practice answering likely cross-examination questions. An inspector’s credibility and clarity as a witness can significantly influence the case, so thorough preparation is crucial.

Additionally, ensure that all evidence is **organized and accessible** for trial. Originals of documents and evidence items should be secured and ready to be presented in court when required. The inspector may be asked to help identify and introduce evidence during the trial (e.g., Exhibit A is the logbook the inspector obtained, which shows X). A well-prepared pre-trial phase, with strong collaboration between inspector and prosecutor, lays the groundwork for a convincing presentation in court.

5.3 Court Hearings and Inspector Testimony: The case will eventually be heard in court, which could range from a single-day hearing to a complex trial spanning multiple days or weeks, depending on the complexity of the case. During the court hearings, the inspector's involvement will primarily be as a witness for the prosecution (and occasionally assisting behind the scenes). Here's what to expect:

- **Giving Testimony:** Almost certainly, the inspector who investigated the case will testify. This typically involves sitting in the witness box, swearing an oath, and answering questions posed by both the prosecution and defense (and sometimes the judge). The prosecution will start by asking the inspector to establish credentials (experience, role at CAA) and then to explain how the violation was discovered and handled. The inspector should clearly state the facts: what was observed, what evidence was gathered, and how the actions of the defendant violated specific regulations. It's important to **speak clearly and avoid technical jargon** unless immediately explained – remember, the judge or jury may not have any aviation background. For example, instead of saying “he violated ANTR Ops 1.2.3 by not having an MEL,” say “he violated the regulation that requires a Minimum Equipment List – a list of allowable equipment outages – to be on board; he did not have that, which is a legal requirement for operating the aircraft.”
- **Handling Cross-Examination:** The defense attorney will cross-examine the inspector. They may challenge the inspector's findings, the method of evidence collection, or the inspector's qualifications. It's crucial for inspectors to remain calm, honest, and precise in responses. If a mistake is alleged (e.g., Isn't it true you didn't calibrate your equipment), the inspector should clarify truthfully (e.g., “The equipment I used was a standard device; calibration is done annually by our lab and it was within its valid period). Do not get defensive or speculate on answers; if unsure, say so, and if the answer lies outside your expertise (e.g., legal interpretations), defer to that. Prosecutors may object if questions are irrelevant or hostile; trust the process and answer only what is asked, addressing the judge or jury.
- **Presenting Evidence in Court:** Inspectors may also be responsible for introducing certain pieces of evidence as part of their testimony. For instance, the prosecutor might ask, (Could you identify this document?) and the inspector will respond, “This is the maintenance log I obtained from the company on May 5th, which shows the aircraft was flown 5 times when it was under a grounding order.” Through the inspector, such documents become exhibits in court. The inspector might need to explain how they got the document and that it's authentic. Similarly, if there's physical evidence, the inspector might be asked to describe it (or even demonstrate something, if safe and feasible, like showing a fake part vs a real part).
- **Supporting Other Witnesses:** In some cases, other expert witnesses (like an aircraft engineer or a meteorologist, depending on the case) might testify. Inspectors could be called again to corroborate or clarify something that arises later in the trial. They should pay attention to the proceedings. Also, during breaks, the prosecutor might seek clarifications from the inspector if the defense brought up a technical point, so they can address it in re-examination or with another witness.

Throughout the court hearings, the inspector's professionalism reflects on the CAA. Dress appropriately (uniform or business attire as required), address the judge as “Your Honour” (or

appropriate title in the jurisdiction), and remain objective. Remember that as a witness, the inspector's duty is to **tell the truth and explain the facts** not to "win" the case at all costs. If the facts are presented clearly and truthfully, and the evidence is strong, that itself is the best contribution an inspector can make to achieving a just outcome.

5.4 Judicial Decision and Sentencing: Following the trial, the court will render a decision. If the case is proven, this could result in a conviction (in criminal cases) or a finding of violation (in administrative or civil enforcement cases), and the court will impose penalties. Penalties might include fines, imprisonment (for individuals), or other sanctions like revocation of licenses or operating permits through court order. For inspectors, once the verdict is out, their role is not yet over. They should:

- **Review the Judgment:** Read the court's decision in detail. This provides valuable feedback on how the case was viewed. The court might highlight certain evidence as crucial or might note any shortcomings. This information can help the CAA improve future enforcement efforts. Also, verify what penalties or orders were given – e.g., if the court orders a company's operations halted, the CAA must coordinate to enforce that.
- **Assist in Sentencing Input:** In some cases, especially if the defendant is found guilty, the court may ask for recommendations or impact statements before sentencing. The CAA (through the inspector or a senior official) might be invited to provide input on how serious the offense was from a safety perspective, to guide the severity of the sentence. If given this opportunity, the CAA should stress the safety implications – for instance, "The defendant's actions showed a disregard for passenger safety, and as the safety regulator we consider this a very grave violation." Such input must remain factual and avoid hyperbole, but it can help the court understand the context.
- **Public or Industry Notification:** After a judicial decision, CAAs often have the discretion to publish or circulate information about the outcome (unless restricted by the court). While this is typically done by the CAA's communications office, inspectors might provide the technical summary for a press release or notice to industry. For example, a short summary of the case and the penalty can be a deterrent lesson for others, reinforcing that regulators and courts are actively enforcing compliance. Any communication should, of course, stick to the facts of the court's findings now that the matter is adjudicated.

It's also possible the defendant may appeal the decision. If an appeal is filed, inspectors might need to repeat some of the above steps at a higher court. Prepare to support the case in appeals by keeping all documentation handy and staying in touch with the prosecutors during the appeal process.

5.5 Concluding the Case and Post-Trial Actions: Once all court proceedings (trial, sentencing, and any appeals) are concluded, the enforcement action moves into a closure phase. Inspectors and the CAA have a few important tasks at this point:

- **Enforcement of Court Orders:** Ensure that whatever the court has ordered is effectively carried out. If a fine was imposed, verify (perhaps through the judicial channels) that it was paid, or if imprisonment was ordered, that the individual is not operating in aviation during that period. Often, the CAA may need to take administrative action in parallel for instance,

if not already done, revoking a license or certificate as mandated by the court's conviction (in some cases the court might not directly order revocation, but the conviction might allow or require the CAA to revoke under its own statutes). Work with the CAA's licensing or certification departments to ensure any required followon actions (like re-exams, suspensions) are executed.

- **Closing Report:** The inspector should compile a closing report or memorandum for the CAA's records. This document would note the final outcome (e.g., "Operator X was convicted on Date Y; penalty Z imposed") and any follow-up needed. It should also record lessons learned by the inspector during the process – for internal improvement. Include references to the judgment document and file it in the enforcement database or archive.
- **Return or Disposal of Evidence:** Evidence that was collected needs proper disposition after the case. Some evidence might be returned to the owner (if appropriate and not hazardous), other evidence might need to be retained for a period in case of appeal, and some may be disposed of (especially if perishable or if the court orders destruction, such as illegal items). Coordinate with the legal authorities on this. The inspector should ensure that any aircraft or facility that was sealed or restricted during the case is addressed per the outcome (for example, if an aircraft was impounded, after the case it might be released if safe to do so).
- **Informing the Victims or Stakeholders:** If the violation had identifiable victims or safety implications (say passengers put at risk, or an incident that prompted the case), it is good practice to inform relevant stakeholders of the conclusion. For example, the CAA might brief the airline's management or the complainant who reported the issue about the outcome, to close the loop and show that due process was followed.
- **Personal Debrief and Well-Being:** Participating in court cases can be stressful for inspectors. Agencies should debrief the team involved – discussing what went well and what could be improved in future enforcement cases. Management should also acknowledge the work of the inspectors; a successful prosecution that enhances safety is a significant achievement. Inspectors, on a personal level, might use the conclusion as a time to reflect and then refocus on other oversight duties with the experience gained.

By concluding the case properly, the CAA and its inspectors ensure that the judicial enforcement action fully achieves its purpose and that the chapter is properly closed in the oversight records. The final step is to take the knowledge gained and feed it back into the continuous improvement of the State's safety oversight system, which is covered in the next section.

6. Post-Enforcement Reporting and Follow-Up

Enforcement doesn't end with a court's verdict. There are important post-enforcement activities that help integrate the outcome into the State's safety oversight and ensure lasting safety improvements. Just as with remote oversight (or any oversight activity), documentation and follow-up are crucial

in judicial enforcement cases. This section outlines what should be done after a case is closed to wrap up administratively and to learn from the experience.

6.1 Documentation of Outcomes: Every enforcement case that goes to judicial action should have its outcome formally documented in CAA records. This includes updating the enforcement database or tracking system with the final disposition (e.g., “Case #2025-01: Prosecuted – Guilty, Fine of \$50,000 and 6-month license suspension imposed by court on [Date]”). All relevant documents, such as the court judgment, sentencing order, and the inspector’s closing report (from 5.5), should be filed. Maintaining a well-organized archive of enforcement cases is important for transparency and for reference in future cases. For example, if a similar violation occurs in the future, inspectors can look back to see how it was handled and what penalty was achieved, guiding consistency. Additionally, ICAO USOAP audits or internal audits may review enforcement case files to assess the effectiveness of the State’s resolution of safety concerns. Ensuring that files are complete and clearly show the trail from initial finding to final resolution will demonstrate compliance with ICAO expectations.

6.2 Communication of Enforcement Outcomes: Communicating what happened can serve both accountability and educational purposes. Internally, the CAA should brief relevant staff (perhaps via a short internal memo or meeting) on the outcome of significant cases. This keeps all inspectors aware of enforcement actions and reinforces a culture of not tolerating serious violations.

6.3 Corrective Actions by the Offender: Even after legal penalties, from a safety perspective the underlying issues need resolution. If the convicted party is still operating (for instance, an airline fined but allowed to continue operating after paying fines and correcting issues), the CAA should ensure that all **safety deficiencies are corrected**. This might involve requiring a corrective action plan from the operator, similar to what would happen after an audit finding – but now under the shadow of enforcement. For example, if maintenance lapses were at issue, the airline should demonstrate improvements in its maintenance management to the CAA. In some cases, the court itself may have ordered specific actions (like “the company must undergo an external safety audit” or “the engineer’s license is revoked”). The CAA must track these and ensure compliance. Inspectors might schedule a special post-enforcement inspection to verify that, say, all unauthorized parts have been removed or new procedures implemented. The goal is to prevent recurrence of the violation. Additionally, the offender may have to regain trust; the CAA could impose a period of heightened surveillance on them. Essentially, while the judicial process punished the past behavior, the CAA’s job is to secure future compliance – a combination of oversight and support to the operator in remediation.

6.4 Continued Monitoring and Compliance Verification: Following an enforcement action, especially a major one, the CAA should incorporate the case into its risk-based oversight planning. Entities that have been subject to enforcement may be at higher risk of future non-compliance (or might be prompted to improve significantly either way, they are notable). Inspectors should treat such entities with appropriate scrutiny. For example, if an airport was prosecuted for safety breaches on the airfield, future inspections at that airport should specifically check the areas that were problematic. This might even be explicitly noted in the inspection program or checklist for the next year. Conversely, if the enforcement triggered a positive overhaul of the operator’s management, inspectors should acknowledge that improvement while still verifying its effectiveness. Over time,

if the entity demonstrates sustained compliance, they can be treated normally again; if not, further enforcement (administrative or judicial) might be necessary. This cyclical monitoring closes the loop of the enforcement process by feeding the outcome back into proactive oversight.

6.5 On-Site Validation (if required): There are instances where an on-site follow-up is essential to validate that the enforcement outcome has translated into real change. For example, consider a scenario: a maintenance organization was prosecuted for using unapproved parts. Post-trial, they claim to have purged all unapproved parts and improved inventory control. The CAA should perform an **on-site validation inspection** to confirm these changes – much like an audit after a major finding. This concept mirrors the approach in remote oversight where an on-site validation might follow a remote audit. In judicial enforcement, on-site validation ensures that paper compliance (court fines, management commitments) is actually implemented on the ground. Inspectors conducting such validation should coordinate with those who handled the case to target the inspection effectively. If the validation finds lingering issues (e.g., still some unapproved parts found), the CAA may need to take further action (which could be another enforcement action, or administrative penalties, depending on severity). The on-site check serves as a quality control on the enforcement process itself.

6.6 Records Management: Proper records management is a mundane but vital part of post-enforcement. All documents related to the case should be preserved according to the State’s record retention policies. Given that enforcement cases might be referenced years later (for trend analysis, or if the same operator offends again), secure storage is important. In the MID Region, CAAs are encouraged to digitize enforcement records in a central database or electronic filing system for easy retrieval. Access to these records should be controlled due to their potentially sensitive content (investigation details, personal data, etc.). Additionally, any confidential sources or whistleblower identities should be specially protected in the records. If the case had international aspects (say a foreign operator or an ICAO USOAP finding related to it), consider also sharing the outcome with relevant parties (for example, ICAO or the foreign authority, as appropriate) – but only through proper channels and not violating any confidentiality. At this stage, if the case is closed, one may also release certain evidence items from custody as mentioned earlier, documenting their release or disposal in the records. A complete and well-maintained record ensures that the enforcement action can be reviewed and understood in the future by someone who was not involved directly, which is important for institutional knowledge.

6.7 Evaluation and Continuous Improvement: Finally, CAAs should treat each enforcement case as a learning opportunity to improve their oversight system. This involves an internal debrief or after-action review. The inspectors, legal officers, and management involved in the case should meet to discuss: *What went well? What challenges were faced?* For instance, maybe the evidence collection was difficult because the legal authority to seize documents was not clear – this might indicate a need to clarify regulations or obtain stronger legal powers. Or perhaps the case took very long in court – maybe training judges on aviation matters could help expedite future cases. Document any recommendations arising from this evaluation. These could range from **amending procedures** (e.g., updating the enforcement manual based on a gap noted), providing **additional training** (if an inspector felt unprepared for cross-examination on a particular topic), or even

policy changes (if, say, the outcome suggests the penalties available in law are too lenient, the CAA might propose legislative changes).

Continuous improvement also means looking at **trends**: after accumulating several enforcement cases over years, analyze them for common root causes. It could reveal systemic issues – for example, if multiple cases involve falsification of training records, perhaps the CAA needs to strengthen oversight in that area more broadly, not just case-by-case. Feed these insights into the broader safety management processes of the State. In summary, by closing the feedback loop, MID States can ensure that every judicial enforcement action not only addresses an individual violation but also contributes to a stronger, more proactive safety oversight system in the long run.

7. Best Practices for Effective Judicial Enforcement

7.1 Drawing on the experience of States both within and outside the MID Region, this section highlights best practices that can enhance the effectiveness of judicial enforcement in aviation safety oversight. Implementing these practices can help CAAs and inspectors achieve better outcomes and foster stronger compliance culture:

- **Early Engagement and Education of the Judiciary:** Proactively build relationships with prosecutors and judges before major cases arise. Provide informational sessions or materials about the aviation regulatory system, common violations, and the safety significance of enforcement. A judiciary that understands aviation context is more likely to prioritize and effectively handle aviation cases. In some MID States, establishing a liaison officer for the CAA at the prosecutor’s office has proven useful to streamline communications.
- **Clearly Defined Enforcement Thresholds:** Develop and publish (at least internally) clear criteria for what types of violations will trigger judicial enforcement. As noted earlier, the FAA’s policy explicitly lists conditions requiring legal enforcement (intentional conduct, reckless conduct, etc. Adopting a similar approach in a State’s policy ensures inspectors and industry both know the “red lines.” This clarity not only guides inspectors but also acts as a deterrent (operators know what actions will certainly land them in court).
- **Robust Whistleblower Protections:** Encourage and protect individuals who report serious safety violations. Often, the worst violations are intentionally hidden. Whistleblowers (e.g., an employee reporting that their company is bypassing safety protocols) can bring these to light. Ensure that laws or policies exist to shield such individuals from retaliation and, if appropriate, maintain their anonymity. Inspectors should treat whistleblower information confidentially and verify it independently where possible to build a case. Several successful enforcement actions globally have started from an insider tip-off – harnessing this requires trust in the system.
- **Efficient Case Management:** Time is of the essence in enforcement. Delayed justice can diminish safety impact and deterrence. CAAs should strive to shorten the timeline from violation detection to case referral. This might involve streamlining internal approvals or dedicating resources to handle enforcement swiftly. Additionally, once in the judicial system, maintain a presence to prevent unnecessary delays – politely follow up with prosecutors about case status, offer any help needed, and, if national law permits, request courts to expedite cases that involve pressing safety concerns. Some States have had

success by categorizing aviation offenses under critical economic crimes, which get faster track in courts.

- **Leverage Regional Collaboration:** The MID Region has a structure for cooperation (through ICAO MID Office, RASG-MID, etc.). States can share experiences of enforcement cases with each other (while respecting confidentiality where needed). This exchange might reveal common challenges or successful strategies. For example, if one State’s legal system set a precedent by convicting an operator for a safety violation, neighboring States could cite that in their own legal arguments to courts, demonstrating that such enforcement is internationally supported. Regional seminars or working groups on enforcement (possibly under the MID Regional Safety Plan initiatives) can be very useful. This guidance material itself is a product of regional collaboration, and States should continue this spirit by updating one another on major developments in judicial enforcement.
- **Promote a Safety Culture Alongside Enforcement:** Emphasize to industry that enforcement is a tool for safety, not an adversarial weapon. Encourage operators to have their own internal compliance and auditing systems that catch issues before regulators do. When industry willingly reports and corrects issues, acknowledge that positively – this carrot can balance the stick of enforcement. Some States run recognition programs for airlines or organizations with strong compliance records, which indirectly encourages others to avoid being on the “enforcement list.” The best outcome is not prosecuting many cases, but having few cases because the deterrent effect and safety culture prevent violations.
- **Document Success Stories:** When enforcement actions lead to tangible safety improvements, document these as case studies. For instance, if a prosecution of a maintenance company led to sector-wide improvements in maintenance training (because others raised their game out of concern), write that up. These success stories can be presented in meetings, training, or ICAO forums to illustrate the value of enforcement. It also boosts inspector morale by showing that their hard work in pursuing a difficult case paid off in safer skies.
- **Ensure Ethical Conduct and Avoid Conflicts:** While pursuing violators, inspectors and CAA must maintain the highest ethical standards themselves. Any hint of impropriety (such as an inspector with a conflict of interest in a case, or accepting any gifts/favors from industry) can undermine an enforcement action or even void it in court. Strict internal ethics rules and oversight help here. If an enforcement case involves an entity with powerful influence, ensure transparency and possibly involve independent observers to avoid any political or undue interference. The integrity of the enforcement process is non-negotiable for it to succeed.

By incorporating these best practices, MID States can strengthen their judicial enforcement regimes. It will help create an environment where **aviation inspectors are empowered and equipped** to take strong action when needed, and where **aviation service providers understand that non-compliance has serious consequences**. Over time, this contributes to a safer aviation system with fewer violations and a proactive compliance mindset across the industry.

8. Final Comments

- 8.1 Judicial enforcement is an essential—but carefully targeted—instrument within a State’s aviation safety oversight system. In the MID Region, its use must be firmly anchored in the principles of a non-punitive, “Just Culture” approach and applied in harmony with Critical Element 8 (Resolution of Safety Concerns). This guidance clarifies the boundary between safety promotion and enforcement: routine, inadvertent, or self-disclosed non-compliance should be addressed through corrective actions, safety education, and continuous monitoring, preserving trust between the CAA and service providers; by contrast, deliberate, reckless, systemic, or repeated violations—especially those that endanger life, property, or public order—warrant proportionate legal action. Inspectors should follow a documented escalation path, apply due process and proportionality, and coordinate with judicial authorities only when established thresholds are met. Used in this calibrated manner, judicial enforcement reinforces compliance, deters willful non-conformance, and supports timely safety resolution without undermining reporting cultures or the credibility of the State’s oversight system.
- 8.2 By following the structured steps from initial detection and careful case building, through coordination with legal authorities, to active participation in court and thorough post-case follow-up inspectors can ensure that no significant safety violation goes unaddressed. At the same time, by aligning actions with ICAO standards and embracing just culture principles, **States will strike the right balance between punitive measures and safety improvement. Not every safety issue needs a courtroom, but for those that do, inspectors now have a roadmap to navigate that journey.**
- 8.3 In closing, MID States are encouraged to continuously refine their judicial enforcement practices, share experiences and learned lessons with each other, and support their inspectors with the necessary training and resources. An inspector armed with knowledge, legal backing, and organizational support can be incredibly effective – not only detecting and correcting safety issues, but also ensuring accountability through the rule of law. By doing so, we collectively contribute to safer skies in the Middle East and globally, in line with ICAO’s mission of safe, secure, and sustainable aviation for all.

9. Sources:

- ICAO Doc 9734 – *Safety Oversight Manual, Part A* (for ICAO Critical Elements framework)
- ICAO Doc 8335 – *Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance*
- ICAO MID RASG/ASPIG records – Proposal for guidance on judicial enforcement [icao.int](https://www.icao.int)
- **Skybrary** – Article on Just Culture (emphasizing accountability for willful violations) [skybrary.aero](https://www.skybrary.aero)
- **FAA Order 2150.3C** – Compliance and Enforcement Program (criteria for legal enforcement) [gao.gov](https://www.gao.gov)
- **ICAO State Safety Programme** guidance – Enforcement as part of safety assurance [aviation-professional.net](https://www.aviation-professional.net)

(The above sources and examples have been referenced to align this guidance with international best practices and terminologies. MID States should adapt these references to their national context as needed.)

Appendix 1

Model Judicial Referral Letter (Template)

[This template provides a general format for a letter from the CAA to the judicial authorities (e.g., Prosecutor's Office) referring a case for legal enforcement. It should be customized to the specific case and national protocols.]

[CAA Letterhead]

Ref: **[Case/Enforcement Reference Number]**

Date: **[DD Month YYYY]**

To:

The Chief Prosecutor, **[Name of Prosecutorial Authority or Court]**

Address: **[Office Address]**

Subject: Referral for Prosecution – Aviation Safety Violations by **[Name of Entity/Individual]**

Dear **[Title and Name of Prosecutor]**,

The **[Civil Aviation Authority of State]** (CAA) hereby refers a case of aviation safety violations for your review and appropriate legal action. The details of the case are as follows:

- **Offender:** [Name of airline/operator/individual], [license or certificate number if applicable, and address or headquarters].
- **Violation Summary:** On [date(s)], the above-mentioned did commit violations of the national civil aviation regulations, namely [cite specific law/regulation sections]. The key facts are:
 - [Brief description of violation #1, with date/location – e.g., “Operating Flight ABC123 on 5 June 2025 without a valid Certificate of Airworthiness for the aircraft.”]
 - [Brief description of violation #2, etc., as needed.]
These actions are in contravention of [Law/Regulation reference], which stipulates [brief quote or summary of what the law requires].

- **Safety Impact:** The violations identified are considered serious. [Provide a sentence on why it's serious – e.g., “Operating without a valid airworthiness certificate poses an immediate threat to passenger and crew safety.”]
- **Evidence Collected:** The CAA’s Aviation Safety Inspectors have conducted an investigation into this matter. Key evidence includes:
 - Certified copies of [specific documents, e.g., maintenance logs, flight records] demonstrating the non-compliances.
 - Statements from [witnesses or personnel], attesting to the operations and knowledge of the violations.
 - [Any physical evidence, e.g., “The aircraft component (serial no. XYZ) which was installed without approval, currently secured by CAA.”]
A comprehensive **Enforcement Report** is attached to this letter, detailing the investigation findings and listing all evidence available. The CAA can promptly furnish originals of documents or any additional information at your request.
- **Previous Actions:** [If applicable, mention if the CAA took any immediate actions like grounding aircraft or suspending a license, and that these remain in effect or were interim measures. Also, mention if the entity has a history of violations or if this seems an isolated case.]

In light of the above, the CAA requests your office to initiate prosecution under [relevant section of the penal code or aviation law] against [the offender]. We believe the evidence establishes a prima facie case of [e.g., “operating an aircraft in violation of safety regulations,” or “endangering civil aviation safety” – use the legal terminology if available]. The penalties upon conviction under these provisions may include [briefly state possible penalties like fines/imprisonment as per law].

The CAA underscores the importance of this case from a safety perspective. Vigorous enforcement of aviation safety laws is essential to prevent future occurrences and maintain public confidence in air transport. We appreciate the close cooperation between our agencies in upholding these laws.

Point of Contact: For any further information or clarification, please contact [Name, Title], who is the lead aviation safety inspector for this case. [He/She] can be reached at [phone, email]. We are ready to assist your investigation and legal proceedings in any capacity, including providing expert technical testimony to the court.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. We trust in your esteemed office to take the necessary action in accordance with the law.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Name of CAA Head or Authorized Official]

[Title]

[Civil Aviation Authority of ...]

Attachments:

- CAA Enforcement Report (Ref. No. ...) and evidence inventory.
- Copies of key evidence documents [list attachments as needed].

Cc: [Internal CAA file reference or other agencies, if applicable]

Appendix 2 – Court Evidence Checklist

Category	What to include	Guidance / Notes	Status <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	File ref. / link
Regulation Reference	Exact law/regulation violated (section No. + wording)	Attach official text; cite section and exact wording used in report	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Inspection Reports & Notes	Original inspection/audit report	Ensure final signed copy is included	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Inspector’s contemporaneous notes/worksheets	Legible, dated/timestamped; keep originals	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Official Correspondence	Warning letters / notices of violation / grounding orders	Show history and entity awareness; include delivery proofs	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Operational Docs (as applicable)	Flight records / journey logs / manifests	Verify dates, aircraft, crew consistency	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Maintenance records (logbooks, work orders, component history)	Cross-check part numbers, signatures, certifying staff	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Training records / personnel licenses	Validate currency, ratings, medicals where relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Aircraft/component certificates (C of A, STC, etc.)	Verify validity and configuration match	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Exemptions/permits (or confirmation none exist)	Include scope, dates, conditions	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Evidence of Act/Violation	Photographs / videos	Time/date-stamped; note camera/device; preserve originals	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Physical evidence items (e.g., failed part, forged doc)	Secure, label, uniquely identify	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Data logs / electronic evidence (FDR, ACARS, emails, e-maintenance)	Secure original files; create verified copies; provide printed excerpts	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Category	What to include	Guidance / Notes	Status <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	File ref. / link
Witness Testimonies	Witness list (name, role, contact)	Note availability and potential conflicts	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Written statements (signed if possible)	Separate internal vs external witnesses	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Expert analysis reports + expert credentials	Lab tests, engineering analyses; include CV/qualifications	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Compliance History	Prior violations/enforcement actions	Past letters, penalties; demonstrate pattern if relevant	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Compliance record / safety audit results	Context: isolated vs systemic	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Impact / Consequence	Incident/accident description linked to violation	Include official incident/occurrence report if any	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Risk assessment / safety analysis (if no incident)	Explain plausible severity and likelihood to court	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Chain of Custody	Evidence handling log (who, when, where)	Unique IDs; storage conditions; signatures	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Transfers to law enforcement / others	Record date/time, receiving party, signatures	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Referral & Legal Docs	Prosecutor referral letter (per Appendix 1/equivalent)	Check signatory authority and addenda	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Comprehensive enforcement report (inspector's summary)	Clear facts, elements of offense, legal basis	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Internal CAA approval/minutes authorizing referral	Attach memo or minutes excerpt	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Administrative Prep	Confidentiality markings where needed	e.g., "Confidential – Court Use Only"	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Remove purely internal opinions from share set	Keep factual evidence in disclosure pack	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Legible copies; certified translations if required	Verify completeness and readability	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Final Review	Evidence supports each element of the offense	Timeline consistency: who/what/when/where/how	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Peer/supervisor review of evidence package	Capture comments and resolutions	<input type="checkbox"/>	
	Secure master copy in CAA archives; provide copies to prosecutors	Record what was sent and when	<input type="checkbox"/>	

(End of Form)

Appendix 3 Summary of Enforcement Escalation Process

Below is a description of the enforcement escalation process in a flowchart format, illustrating how an issue can progress from detection to judicial action. Inspectors and managers can use this as a quick-reference overview.

Step 1: Violation Detected – An inspector discovers or is alerted to a potential safety regulation violation during oversight (inspection, incident report, etc.).

Step 2: Preliminary Assessment – Inspector assesses severity and nature of violation. Is it minor/unintentional or serious/intentional? Collect initial facts.

Decision Point A: Severity of Violation – *Minor or Major?*

- **If Minor/Unintentional:** Escalation to judicial enforcement is **Not Required**. Handle via compliance action (e.g., finding, corrective action request, administrative penalty). **End of Judicial Path** (monitor corrective action).
- **If Major/Deliberate:** Potential **Enforcement Case**. Proceed to formal investigation.
(for major cases)

Step 3: Internal Review – Discuss within CAA (enforcement committee/management). Confirm that judicial action is appropriate based on criteria (intentional, reckless, etc.).

Decision Point B: Go/No-Go for Judicial – *Proceed with Judicial Enforcement?*

- **No:** (If after review, decided not strong enough for court) – Revert to administrative handling (e.g., license action) and close judicial path.
- **Yes: Formal Enforcement Case Opened.**
(if Yes)

Step 4: Investigation & Evidence Gathering – Inspector (with team) gathers comprehensive evidence, documentation, witness statements. Prepare enforcement report.

Step 5: Legal Referral – CAA prepares referral package (referral letter + report + evidence) and sends to Prosecutor/Law Enforcement.

Step 6: Prosecutor Review – Prosecutor evaluates case. Possibly asks for more info.

Decides whether to file charges.

Decision Point C: Prosecutor Action – *Proceed with Prosecution?*

- **Decline/Delay:** If prosecutor decides not to pursue (e.g., insufficient evidence), case may revert to CAA for alternative action or further investigation. (CAA might strengthen case or use admin penalties). [**Loop back**]
- **Accept:** Prosecutor files charges in court.

↓ *(if accepted)*

Step 7: Judicial Process – Case goes to court. Includes pre-trial, trial, verdict. Inspector provides testimony/expertise as needed. Court renders judgment.

Decision Point D: Outcome – *Guilty or Not Guilty (or other judgment)?*

- **Not Guilty/Case Dismissed:** Enforcement action ends without penalty. CAA internal review needed (what went wrong, was it evidence or interpretation?). Possibly consider civil/administrative action if any available.
- **Guilty/Violation Confirmed:** Court imposes penalties (fines, jail, etc.) and/or orders (e.g., revoke license).

(if guilty)

Step 8: Penalty Execution & Follow-Up – Ensure penalties are implemented (collect fines, revoke certificates as ordered, etc.).

Step 9: Post-Enforcement Actions – CAA monitors compliance after case: verify corrective actions by offender, communicate outcome to industry, incorporate lessons learned into future oversight. Case closed in records.

Appendix 4

Sample Case Summary Template

Inspectors can use a case summary template to report on enforcement cases for internal records or for sharing within the CAA/ICAO as needed. Below is a sample format:

Case Summary: Judicial Enforcement Action Report

- **CAA Case Reference:** [e.g., ENF-2025-05]
- **Inspector(s) Name:** [Lead Inspector Full Name, Team members if any]
- **Entity/Individual:** [Name of operator or person involved; include license/certificate numbers]
- **Violation Description:** [Short description of what rule was violated and how. Example: “Operation of ABC Airlines Flight 123 on 05/06/2025 in commercial service without a valid Certificate of Airworthiness for the aircraft, violating Section 4 of Civil Aviation Act.”]
- **Date of Violation (Detection):** [Date when violation occurred or was detected]
- **Location:** [Where it happened – airport, airspace, etc.]
- **Initial Actions Taken by CAA:** [Describe any immediate safety actions – e.g., “Aircraft was grounded on 06/06/2025 via emergency order; operator’s permit temporarily suspended pending investigation.”]
- **Investigation Summary:**
 - Initiation date of investigation and involved units.
 - Key evidence collected (list major evidence items).
 - Any coordination with other agencies during investigation (e.g., police, other regulators).
 - Conclusion of investigation: [e.g., “Evidence confirmed deliberate violation of maintenance requirements by the operator.”]
- **Enforcement Decision:**
 - Date of internal decision to pursue judicial enforcement.
 - Approval by: [Name/Title of approving authority].
 - Rationale: [e.g., “Violation was willful and posed high safety risk; met criteria for prosecution.”]

- **Referral Details:**
 - Date referred to Prosecutor and reference of referral letter.
 - Prosecutor Office/Contact.
 - Charges filed: [List the legal charges filed by prosecutor, e.g., “Count 1: Endangering Aircraft Safety (Art. X of Penal Code), Count 2: Falsification of Documents (Art. Y...)”].
 - Date charges filed in court.
- **Court Proceedings:**
 - Court name and case number.
 - Timeline: [e.g., “Trial held on 10–12 Oct 2025 in [Court]. Inspector and two witnesses testified.”]
 - Outcome (Date of judgment): [e.g., “Guilty on all counts” or “Guilty on some, acquitted on others” or “Not guilty”].
 - Sentence: [e.g., “Company fined US\$100,000; accountable manager sentenced to 3 months imprisonment (suspended for 1 year); court order to CAA to revoke AOC for 6 months.”].
 - If not guilty or case dismissed, note reasons if known (e.g., lack of evidence, legal technicality).
- **Post-Judgment Actions by CAA:**
 - Penalties/Orders executed: [e.g., “Fine paid on 01/12/2025; AOC formally reinstated on 01/06/2026 after compliance check.”].
 - Follow-up inspections: [e.g., “Conducted follow-up audit on 15/04/2026 to verify compliance improvements – satisfactory.”].
 - Communication: [“Case outcome circulated to industry via Safety Bulletin 02/2026” or “No public disclosure due to ongoing appeal”].
- **Lessons Learned:**
 - [Bullet points on what went well or challenges: e.g., “Need to involve legal team earlier – will do so in future.”, “This case sets a precedent for handling unairworthy operations, will reference in future enforcement.”, “Training needed on evidence handling – identified and planned.”]
- **Attachments:**
 - [List of key documents attached to this summary if any, like judgment copy, etc.]
- **Prepared by:** [Inspector Name], **Date:**
- **Reviewed/Approved by:** [Manager or Director Name], **Date:**

(End of Case Summary Template)



ICAO MID

SAFETY

MID-RASP

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN



Third Edition

2026-2028

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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- **Appendix A:** Identified safety issues as indicated in the 13th ASR
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- **Appendix C:** Safety Actions-Consolidated List of SEIs with their respective Actions for follow up - Draft
- **Appendix D:** SEIs identified in MID-RASP may be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs
- **Appendix E:** Definitions

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (MID-RASP)



THIRD EDITION 2026–2028

PART I- PLANNING



SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview of the RASP

MID Region is committed to enhancing aviation safety, to the resourcing of supporting activities and to increasing collaboration at the regional level. The MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety at the regional level. It constitutes the regional safety plan for MID Region, setting out the strategic priorities, main risks affecting the regional aviation system and the necessary actions to mitigate those risks to further improve aviation safety.

The purpose of this MID-RASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of accidents, through the development and implementation of regional SEIs. A safe, resilient and sustainable aviation system contributes to the economic development of MID Region, the States which comprise it and their industries.

The MID-RASP promotes the effective implementation of safety oversight systems of States in MID Region, a risk-based approach to managing safety at the regional level, as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between States in the region, international organizations and industry. All stakeholders are encouraged to support and implement the MID-RASP as the regional strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.

In addition, MID-RASP is to create a common focus on regional aviation safety issues as a continuation of the MID Region work to improve aviation safety and to comply with ICAO standards. This approach complements the existing system of developing safety regulations, complying with them and investigating accidents and serious incidents when they occur.

The MID-RASP is in alignment with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) *Global Aviation Safety Plan* (GASP, Doc 10004) and the national aviation safety plans of States in the region.

1.2 Structure of the MID RASP

The MID- RASP presents the regional direction for the management of aviation safety at the regional level, for a period of three years (2026-2028). It comprises seven sections. In addition to the introduction, sections include: the purpose of the MID-RASP, the regional operational safety risks, the regional organizational challenges, MID region's strategic direction for the management of aviation safety at the regional level, and a description of how the implementation of the safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) listed in the MID-RASP is going to be monitored.

- **Part I. Planning** provides an introduction, which describes how MID-RASP is structured, developed and monitored and includes the MID region's strategic safety priorities. It consists of **sections 1 to 3**.
- **Part II. Implementation** contains safety performance measurement & monitoring and the detailed list of MID-RASP safety actions. It consists of **sections 4 and 5**.
- Both parts are supported by a number of appendices providing further details or assisting the reader.

Part-I. Planning

Part I provides an introductory explanation. Sections 1 and 2 explain how MID-RASP is structured, developed, monitored; presents the structure of the document; operational context; and the main purpose of this MID-RASP. Section 3 presents MID region's safety priorities:

Part-II. Implementation

Part II contains MID region’s strategic direction for the management of aviation safety and safety actions. It consists of sections 4 and 5. Section 4 presents the MID Region safety performance monitoring and measurement (SPMM).

In respect of **section 5**, it facilitates the identification of SEIs and their respective actions relevant for each Goal identified in the MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring as follows:

- Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks
- Goal 2: Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities
- Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)
- Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional & national levels to address safety issues
- Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP)
- Goal 6: Expand the use of industry safety assessment and safety data sharing Programmes.

The MID Region SPMM includes six (6) Goals in line with GASP 2026-2028 Edition. For each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM, identified SEI(s) is mapped to it including their respective actions and the following information is provided:

Goal: Goal supports the region’s strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level.

- **Goal #Number & name**
- **SEI# Number:** Description of the SEI
- **Target.** Target which serves to fulfil respective Regional Goal (Refer to MID Region SPMM)
- **Rationale** behind the safety issue (why it has been identified as an issue)
- **What it is to be achieved** (objective)
- **How we intend to monitor improvement/implementation of SEI** in the future
- **How we intend to achieve** the objective; here, the various actions contributing to mitigate the identified risk in that area are described
- **Actions:** The tasks required for the implementation of the SEI. The actions support the SEI and Targets of the Regional Goal
- **References:**
 - Indicates key existing global documents from which the SEI is adopted, if applicable.

Stakeholders:	Stakeholders in MID region
Example Action 1:	Description of the action to be taken
Responsible entity:	Appointed Group/State(s)/Organization(s) to develop details for implementation of the respective action
Priority:	Low, Medium, High
Completion Date:	The year(s) in which the respective action is expected to be implemented
Status:	new, ongoing, on hold, completed. (Provide also updated progress if any)

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable	TIMELINE
Description of result to be achieved	The year in which the Target is expected to be achieved

1.3 Process for the MID RASP development, implementation and monitoring

The RASG-MD is the governing body responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the MID-RASP, in collaboration with the ICAO MID Office, international and regional organizations and with the aviation

industry. The MID-RASP was developed in consultation with States, regional organizations, and other stakeholders in the region, and in alignment with the 2026-2028 of the GASP. If required, RASG-MID would seek the support of MIDANPIRG and RASFG-MID, other sub-groups, States, regional organizations, and industry to ensure the timely implementation of SEIs to address safety deficiencies and mitigate risks. Through close monitoring of the SEIs, SEIG would make adjustments to the MID-RASP and its initiatives, if needed, and update the MID-RASP document accordingly.

Furthermore, the MID-RASP is to be reviewed by SEIG every year mainly to include new identified SEIs, review/update the existing SEIs, and their respective safety actions. In addition, the MID-RASP is to be updated/endorsed by RASG-MID at least every three years and as deemed necessary.


The SEIG is established to assist RASG-MID to develop and monitor the implementation of SEIs related to identified regional operational risks, Regional organizational challenges, and emerged issues. In addition, the SEIG takes the lead and ensures that SEIs are implemented in a timely, effective and efficient manner in coordination with RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, and RASFG-MID groups and sub-groups (ASRG, ASPIG, AIIG, ATM-SG,..etc), States, regional organizations, and industry.

As a first step towards establishing this system and to facilitate MID-RASP implementation, it is necessary to enhance the communication and flow of safety data and information, as well as coordination processes, among RASG-MID and its subsidiaries, States, and regional organizations. There is also the need to continue to enhance collaboration with MIDANPIRG through coordinated processes to sustain the collection and sharing of regional air traffic management (ATM) data and the sharing and resolution of safety issues. This, in turn, would support the implementation of Aviation System Block Upgrade (ASBUs) and ensure that their implementation accounts for and properly manages existing and emerging issues, e.g. approaches with vertical guidance (APV) to mitigate risks associated with CFIT and runway excursions.

The MID-RASP was developed with the aim of addressing the MID region’s safety issues in a timely manner, as applicable. It is expected that this approach would facilitate MID States’ support and participation in the implementation of these SEIs and their respective actions at both the regional and national levels. The three-year period of the MID-RASP, i.e. 2026 to 2028, was selected to coincide with the GASP review period of the same duration, to ensure continued alignment with the latest global plans.

States should ensure that a NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. MID-RASP provides the identified safety priorities in the region and States should identify which top risks and key issues mentioned in the GASP and MID-RASP which apply to their national context and identify suitable mitigation actions within their NASP. States should also add/consider other safety issues which are unique to their operational context. Furthermore, States to establish their NASPs taking into account the GASP and MID-RASP; and based on their operational safety needs.

The key contents of the MID-RASP were developed using an eight-step process recommended by the GASP to develop RASPs and NASPs as indicated below:



1.4 Regional safety issues, goals and targets

MID-RASP has been developed in full alignment with the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP), actively supporting its aspirational goal of achieving zero aviation fatalities by 2030, as well as its overarching objectives, targets, and performance indicators. Furthermore, the MID Region, its States, and industry stakeholders are committed to reducing the aviation accident rate by 2028, measured through a 5-year rolling average using 2025 as the baseline year.

Key Features of MID-RASP Implementation:

- a. **Structural Alignment with GASP:** MID-RASP adheres rigorously to the framework and strategic priorities outlined in GASP, ensuring harmonized global and regional safety efforts.
- b. **Comprehensive Gap Analysis:** A systematic review was conducted to identify gaps between RASG-MID initiatives and ICAO Doc 10131 (Manual on Regional and National Aviation Safety Plans), enabling targeted enhancements to align with global standards.
- c. **Integration of SPMM:** The MID Region Safety Performance Monitoring and Mechanism (SPMM), aligned with the GASP 2026-2028 Edition, has been updated and incorporated as an appendix within MID-RASP to ensure continuity and measurable progress tracking.
- d. **Strategic Selection of SEIs:** Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) for MID-RASP were prioritized based on regional relevance, GASP 2026-2028 guidance, and actionable outcomes from key forums (DCGA, RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, and RASFG-MID). Notably, GASP SEIs focused on domestic State/industry responsibilities were excluded, as these will be addressed through individual National Aviation Safety Plans (NASPs) developed by MID States.

The MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) aims to enhance the MID Region's commitment to improving safety oversight capabilities, reducing operational risks, and establishing effective State Safety Programmes (SSP). It serves as a key framework for raising awareness of safety risks and their consequences among States, industry, and stakeholders. MID-RASP encourages the allocation of financial, human, and technical resources to improve safety management, oversight, and operational performance. Additionally, it facilitates information sharing among relevant stakeholders to support timely action and collaborative problem-solving.

At the regional level, MID-RASP commits RASG-MID to the following strategic priorities:

- a. **Continuous reduction of regional operational risks:** Updating and developing new SEIs to address Regional High-Risk Categories (R-HRCs) such as Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I), Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT), Mid-Air Collision (MAC), Runway Incursion (RI), and Runway Excursion (RE), along with other safety priorities.
- b. **Strengthening Safety Oversight:** Supporting States in enhancing their safety oversight capabilities notably for AIG, AGA, and ANS areas and resolving any Significant Safety Concerns (SSCs).
- c. **SSP and SMS Implementation:** Assisting States in developing and implementing SSPs and Safety Management Systems (SMS) for service providers, including the formulation of National Aviation Safety Plans (NASPs).
- d. **Promoting Regional Collaboration:** Encouraging States and Industry to share safety information and best practices.
- e. **Aerodrome Safety and Certification:** Enhancing the implementation of Aerodrome Certification, SMS, Runway Safety Programmes, Runway Safety Teams (RSTs), and the Global Reporting Format (GRF) methodology.
- f. **Integrating UAS and AAM:** Supporting States in addressing challenges and opportunities related to the integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) into national and global aviation ecosystems.
- g. **Managing cross-sector risks:** Helping States mitigate risk interdependencies including cybersecurity threats, GNSS interference/spoofing, 5G interference with radio altimeters, aviation health safety risks, conflict zone hazards, and security risks impacting aviation safety.
- h. **Supporting MENA ARCM Activities:** Providing continuous assistance for the activities of the MENA

Aviation Regional Cooperation Mechanism (MENA ARCM).

- i. **Advance the operation of MENA RSOO:** Assisting States in setting up and operationalizing the MENA Regional Safety Oversight Organization (MENA RSOO).
- j. **Capacity Building and Implementation Support:** Conducting capacity building activities including resource mobilization, developing guidance material and sharing best practices to enhance State and industry capabilities.
- k. **Promoting Safety Data Management:** promote the implementation of a regional framework for safety data collection, analysis, and sharing to enable proactive risk management and evidence-based decision-making.

Through these initiatives, MID-RASP reinforces a proactive and collaborative approach to aviation safety, ensuring continuous improvement and resilience in the MID Region.

Commitment of States and Industry: States and industry are dedicated to the following efforts to enhance aviation safety in the MID Region:

- a. **Implementation of SEIs:** Strategically and timely implement the GASP and MID-RASP SEIs, as appropriate, along with their respective actions.
- b. **Strengthen state oversight system** to address deficiencies notably for AIG, AGA, &ANS
- c. **Resolution of Significant Safety Concerns (SSCs):** States with SSCs identified under the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP CMA) should prioritize their resolution. This includes utilizing available resources, such as technical assistance from other States and Regional Programmes, to address SSCs promptly.
- d. **Developing and implementing Safety Management:** Prioritize the implementation of State Safety Programmes (SSP), Safety Management Systems (SMS), and National Aviation Safety Plans (NASP).
- e. **Data-Driven Risk Mitigation:** Use data-driven methodologies to identify Regional High-Risk Categories (R-HRCs) and associated safety issues. Implement collaborative solutions to reduce accident rates and fatalities while prioritizing the implementation of relevant SEIs.
- f. **Leveraging Industry Safety Programmes:** Explore and utilize ICAO-recognized industry assessment Programmes, such as:
 - IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA)
 - IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO)
 - IATA Standard Safety Assessment Programme (ISSA)
 - ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) Programme

States and industry should consider options ranging from recognizing these Programmes to encouraging registration by applicable operators to enhance safety management and compliance.

1.5 Operational context

The Middle East's aviation market is poised for significant growth in the coming years, driven by increased passenger demand, substantial investments, and strategic initiatives by regional carriers and governments.

Aviation Industry Overview

The Middle East's aviation industry is experiencing a transformative phase characterized by several key developments:

- **Fleet Expansion and Modernization:** Airlines in the region are investing heavily in expanding and modernizing their fleets. For instance, Etihad Airways plans to invest up to \$1 billion in upgrading the cabins

of its Boeing 787 and 777 planes, introducing high-speed internet and new entertainment systems. (*Business Insider*)

- Emergence of New Carriers: The region is witnessing the launch of new airlines, such as Saudi Arabia's Riyadh Air, set to begin passenger flights in 2025. (*Arab News*)
- Infrastructure Investments: Governments are investing in infrastructure to support the anticipated growth. The UAE, for example, has initiated mapping air corridors for air taxis and cargo drones, aiming to integrate advanced air mobility into the nation's infrastructure. (*Reuters*)
- Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) Growth: The fleet expansion is set to drive MRO spending from \$16 billion in 2025 to \$20 billion by 2035. (*Fast Company, oliverwyman.com*)

Passenger Market Forecast

In February 2025, airlines operating in the Middle East recorded a 3.3% year-on-year increase in passenger demand, with total flight capacity rising by 1.3% during the same period. This growth is part of a broader trend, as the region's aviation market is expected to reach USD 28.38 billion in 2025 and grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.4% to reach USD 35.19 billion by 2030. Additionally, air passenger traffic in the Middle East is projected to surge by 300% to 1.1 billion passengers by 2040. (Arab News, IATA; Mordor Intelligence Airside International, Moodie Davitt Report)

These developments underscore the Middle East's commitment to becoming a global aviation hub, leveraging its strategic location and investing in both fleet and infrastructure to meet growing passenger demand.

The global scheduled commercial international operations accounted for approximately 35.25 million departures in 2023, compared to 31.2 million departures in 2022; which showed a high increase after covid-19 pandemic. The MID Region shows a slight increase in traffic volumes during 2023. Total scheduled commercial departures in 2023 accounted for approximately 1.33 million departures compared to 1.31 million departures in 2019. In terms of an aircraft accident, the MID Region had no accidents in 2023. The 5-year average accident rate for 2019-2023 is 1.77, which is below the global average rate (2.18) for the same period.

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 76,8 %, which is above the world EI 69.68% (as of 10 August 2024). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%. (*13th MID ASR*)

The Middle East's complex geopolitical landscape significantly influences the safety and operations of commercial air transport. Ongoing conflicts, political tensions, and military activities in the region present various challenges for airlines, regulatory authorities, and passengers. The interplay between geopolitical tensions and aviation safety in the Middle East necessitates continuous monitoring, proactive risk management, and effective communication among airlines, regulatory authorities, and flight crews to ensure the safe operation of commercial air transport in the region. Furthermore, the political/security situation in some States, the cross-national variation in aviation development, impede the provision of technical assistance, implementation of regional projects and the achievement of the regional safety, air navigation and Security targets as well as the insufficient financial and human resources in some States.

SECTION 2. PURPOSE OF MID'S REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN

The MID RASP is the master planning document containing the strategic direction of the region for the management of aviation safety for a period of three years (2026 to 2028). This plan lists regional safety issues, sets regional safety goals and targets, and presents a series of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) to achieve those goals.

2.1 Relationship between MID-RASP and GASP and other Plans

Aviation's contribution towards the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to maximize the benefits of aviation, the priorities of the aviation sector should be integrated and reflected in State's economic and

social development planning with an appropriately balanced development of transport modes, including multi-modal and urban planning initiatives. In addition, recognizing that air transport is a catalyst for sustainable development and that it represents an essential lifeline for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and especially for Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs).

ICAO Business Plan takes into consideration all of the work mandated to be undertaken by ICAO, regardless of source of funding. The Business Plan sets out the Strategic Goals and priorities to guide the activities of the Organization to support Members States in their attainment of a safe, secure, efficient, economically viable and environmentally responsible air transport network.

ICAO's global plans are essential in supporting safe, secure, efficient, economically viable and environmentally responsible air transportation. They provide a means to advance ICAO's Strategic Goals. The ICAO global plans include: the GASP, the GANP and the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP).

The GASP presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. The purpose of the GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, by guiding the development of a harmonized aviation safety.

The purpose of the Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP) is to drive the evolution of the global air navigation system to meet the ever-growing expectations of all sectors in the aviation community by equitably accommodating all airspace user operations in a safe, secure and cost-effective manner while reducing the environmental impact on aviation. To this end, GANP provides a series of operational improvements to increase capacity, efficiency, predictability and flexibility, while ensuring interoperability of systems and harmonization of procedures. The implementation of the GANP is enabled by promoting the effective implementation of safety oversight and a safety management approach to oversight, including SRM to permit innovation in a managed way.

GASP complements GANP by providing States and industry with the tools to implement a safety management approach through their SSP and SMS. The GANP, through the evolution of the system described in the conceptual roadmap and the operational improvements detailed in the technical frameworks, supports the goals within the GASP and the GASeP by enhancing safety and security of the air navigation system as reflected in the performance ambitions.

The GASP goals and targets support GASeP by providing the best practices and models that can be as effective in managing security as they are in safety management. These include effective oversight, organizational culture, risk management and assurance processes. GASeP in turn supports GASP's vision of zero fatalities.


The MID RASP has been developed using the goals and targets, and the global high-risk categories of occurrences (G-HRCs), and the global organizational challenges from the ICAO GASP (www.icao.int/gasp). Moreover, MID-RASP considers and supports the objectives and priorities of GASP. The purpose of GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of accidents, by guiding the development of a harmonized aviation safety strategy and the development and implementation of regional and national aviation safety plans. A safe aviation system contributes to the economic development of States and their industries. GASP promotes the effective implementation of SSP and SMS including NASP, a state's safety oversight system, and a risk-based approach to managing safety as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry. One of the GASP goals is for States to improve their effective safety oversight capabilities and to progress in the implementation of SSPs including NASPs. Thus, GASP calls for States to put in place robust and sustainable safety oversight systems that should progressively evolve into more sophisticated means of managing safety.

Assembly Resolution A40-1 also calls for each State to develop and implement a national aviation safety plan (NASP), in line with the GASP goals, targets and the global high-risk categories of occurrences (G-HRCs). The NASP should also be developed having close regard for the RASP, while acknowledging that each State may have its own, specific safety issues and priorities, including addressing significant safety concerns (SSCs).

Relationship between MID-RASP and other Plans

SECTION 3. MID REGION’S STRATEGIC SAFETY PRIORITIES

The MID-RASP presents the safety priorities that were developed based on the ICAO GASP’s including organizational challenges, operational safety risks and emerging issues as well as MID region-specific issues identified by a safety risk assessment and published in MID Region Annual Safety Reports and RASG-MID activities. Additionally, the MID region’s strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level is to address the region’s safety issues in a timely manner. Therefore, the MID-RASP strategic approach would focus on regional organizational challenges/issues, regional operational safety risks, and emerging issues as indicated in the graph below.



Therefore, the MID-RASP adopts three focus areas approach:

First focus area: Mitigation of Regional Operational Safety Risks

The GASP envisions achieving and sustaining zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond. To support this vision, the first focus area prioritizes the effective mitigation of regional operational safety risks, particularly: Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I), Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), Mid-Air Collision (MAC), Runway Incursion (RI), Runway Excursion (RE).

Addressing these risks at the regional level requires a structured and integrated approach that includes:

- **Effective mitigation strategies:** Promote and develop effective mitigations strategies at the regional level to address operational safety risks (LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RE, and RI)
- **Safety Data Collection & Analysis:** Promote data-driven insights to identify safety issues and address them in an effective way.

- **Improve the Implementation of Safety Management:** Strengthen State Safety Programs (SSP) to incorporate data-driven safety risk management in line Annex 19 requirements
- **Foster regional collaboration:** Foster regional collaboration, including information exchange and best practice sharing as well as collaboration between regulators and service providers.
- **Collaborative Safety Enhancement Initiatives:** Encouraging joint efforts among States, industry, and stakeholders to address the regional operational safety risks.
- **Continuous Safety Promotion & Training:** Ensuring ongoing education and awareness for aviation professionals.

This approach creates a closed-loop system where data informs action, stakeholders collaborate, and adaptive strategies drive continuous improvement. By focusing on regional priorities while leveraging global best practices, this initiative ensures a comprehensive and sustainable reduction in LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RI, and RE risks.

Second focus area: Strengthening Regional Safety Oversight and Management

The second focus area focuses on enhancing regional mechanisms to strengthen effective safety oversight capabilities, improve the establishment and implementation of safety management, and address risk interdependencies. Key regional challenges in aviation safety include regulatory oversight challenges, resource constraints, and deficiencies in safety management implementation. Addressing these issues requires a structured governance framework, capacity-building initiatives, and enhanced regional collaboration to ensure sustained safety improvements.

Strengthening Safety Oversight and Capacity Building

- Organizing and conducting regional technical assistance missions, capacity-building and Training Initiatives, and safety promotion activities.
- Enhancing human factors and human performance management.
- Supporting the establishment of an effective SSP and service providers' SMS.
- Manage risk interdependencies: Addressing interconnected risks such as cybersecurity risks, GNSS interference & spoofing risks, aviation health safety (AHS) risks, risks arising from conflict zones, and security risks with an impact on aviation safety.

Enhancing Regional Coordination and Cooperation

- Strengthening regional collaboration with States and regional organizations to support the implementation of MID-RASP SEIs.
- Enhancing communication and safety information sharing between States, international organizations, and industry stakeholders.
- Actively engage with donors, States and international organizations to mobilize the necessary financial and technical support.

Supporting and leveraging Regional Safety Initiatives

- Providing continuous support for MENA ARCM activities.
- Supporting the operation of the MENA Regional Safety Oversight Organization (MENA RSOO).

This structured mechanism ensures a systematic and effective approach to addressing regional safety oversight challenges, strengthening safety governance, and fostering collaborative risk management across the MID Region.

Third focus area: Integration of Emerging Technologies

Emerging technologies such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), and electric Vertical Take-Off and Landing (eVTOL) aircraft are reshaping the aviation industry. However, their integration into existing airspace presents significant regulatory, operational, and safety challenges. To support States in addressing these challenges, efforts will focus on:

- Conducting capacity building initiatives to promote a structured, safe, and harmonized approach.
- Promoting regional cooperation among states, organizations, and industry.
- Supporting the Development of a regional roadmap for the integration of AAM and new entrants.

Key Pillars for Safe Integration: A structured mechanism must address the following critical areas:

- **Regulatory and Policy Frameworks:** establishing clear regulations, policies, and guidelines for AAM and UAS operations.
- **Airspace Integration & Traffic Management:** Developing strategies for safe and efficient integration into controlled and uncontrolled airspace.
- **Safety Oversight & Risk Management:** Implementing robust safety oversight mechanisms and risk mitigation strategies.
- **Infrastructure Development & Certification:** Facilitating the development of vertiports, communication systems, and necessary certification processes.
- **Public Acceptance & Cybersecurity:** Addressing societal concerns, cybersecurity risks, and overall system resilience.

By leveraging global best practices and fostering regional collaboration, this initiative aims to ensure the safe, efficient, and sustainable integration of AAM and new entrants into the MID Region’s aviation ecosystem.

3.1. REGIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS

The vision of the GASP is to achieve and maintain the goal of zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond. To do so, regional operational safety risks need to be identified and addressed. In line with the vision of the GASP, regional operational safety risks are listed in this section of the MID RASP. They addressed through the action plan presented in Section 5 of this document.

The RASG-MID produces and publishes an Annual Safety Report, available on the ICAO MID Office website. The RASG-MID Annual Safety Report is a timely, unbiased, and transparent source of safety-related information essential for all aviation stakeholders interested in having a tool to enable sound decision-making on safety-related matters.

The summary of accidents and serious incidents that occurred in MID Region as state of occurrence involved in scheduled commercial operations involving aircraft having a Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) above 5700 kg, is shown in the tables below.

Year	Fatal accidents	Non-fatal accidents	Serious incidents
2019 - 2023	1	7	287

The MID region (8) eight accidents occurred between 2019 and 2023. One fatal accident occurred respectively during the year 2020. The 5-year average accident rate for 2019-2023 is 1.77, which is below the global average rate (2.18) for the same period.

The MID Region had no fatal accident in 2023. However, the 5-year average fatal accident rate for 2019-2023 is 0.28 is slightly higher than the global average rate (0.21) for the same period. The MID Region had no fatal accidents in 2019, 2021, 2022, and 2023. However, one fatal accident occurred in 2020. The 2020 accident caused 176 fatalities.

The GASP 2026-2028 Edition identifies the G-HRCs as LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RE and RI. In the MID Region in 2019-2023 the topmost frequent accidents related to the security and runway safety, which includes RE and ARC during Landing. In terms of fatality risk, the fatal accidents for the period 2019- 2023 were attributed to security related. Thus, based on the analyses of reactive and proactive safety information, it is concluded that the regional operational safety risks including the identified safety issues for the MID Region for the triennium 2026-2028 are:

1. Loss of Control-In Flight (LOC-I);
2. Runway Safety (RS); mainly (RE and ARC during landing);
3. Mid-Air Collision (MAC);
3. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT); and
5. Runway incursion (RI).

Other regional risk categories of occurrences: SCF-NP and TURB.

In addition, safety issues which could lead to the potential outcomes of LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RE, and RI including the security related issue have been identified in the MID ASR and should be also considered by the States while developing their NASP as well as the industry as indicated at *Appendix A*.

Aircraft Upset in Flight (Loss of Control-Inflight)

Aircraft upset or loss of control inflight is the most common accident outcome for fatal accidents in CAT aero plane operations. It includes uncontrolled collisions with terrain, but also occurrences where the aircraft deviated from the intended flight path or intended aircraft flight parameters, regardless of whether the flight crew realized the deviation and whether it was possible to recover or not. It also includes the triggering of stall warning and envelope protections. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States that make it an area of concern. Therefore, the prevention of loss of control is a strategic priority.

Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences, which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc. There was no fatal accident involving MID States operators during this period. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States and in other parts of the world that make it an area of concern. However, additional data is needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

Mid-Air Collision (MAC)

Refers to the potential collision of two aircraft in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine TCAS resolution advisories, or airspace infringements. During 2020, no mid-air collision accident has been recorded. However, the flight crew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Mid-air collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. In addition, this key risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation. This is one specific safety issue that is the main priority in this key risk area. However, additional safety data and safety information are needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

Runway Excursion

Runway excursion covers materialized runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties in maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off-centred or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during landing. During the period 2019-2023, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flight. In addition, High Airspeed and Low Engine Thrust identified as key contributing factors to the Unstable Approaches Events.

Runway Incursion (RI)

A Runway Incursions refers to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection. Their accident outcome is runway collisions. While there were no fatal accidents or accidents involving MID States operators in the last years involving runway collision, the risk of the reported occurrence demonstrated to be very real. In addition to this, MID States should provide further data analysis regarding runway incursion to identify the root causes and associated safety issues.

3.2 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES/ISSUES

Organizational challenges are systemic issues which take into consideration the impact of organizational culture, policies and procedures on the effectiveness of safety risk controls. The MID RASP has included the identified regional organizational challenges/issues. The deficiencies have been identified mainly from RASG-MID Annual Safety Report, USOPA Data, technical assistance mission. These are given priority in the MID RASP since they are aimed at enhancing and strengthening the management of aviation safety at the regional level.

To accelerate progress, a structured regional approach is needed, leveraging collaboration, capacity-building, regulatory alignment, and data-driven decision-making. It is crucial that States' safety oversight capabilities and safety management should keep pace with these regional safety issues. Therefore, for the triennium of 2026-2028, the MID

region should continue to focus its efforts on addressing the following top regional organizational issues:

- a. **Low USOAP EI scores:** Addressing persistently low Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) Effective Implementation (EI) scores, particularly in States scoring below 60%, as well as in Accident Investigation (AIG)- (slow progress in establishing independent aircraft accident investigation authorities), Aerodrome & Ground Aids (AGA), and Air Navigation Services (ANS) domains.
- b. **Slow SSP and NASP Implementation:** Accelerating the development and implementation of SSP, including the formulation of NASP.
- c. **Delayed SMS Implementation & Oversight:** Enhancing the acceptance and regulatory surveillance of SMS for service providers.
- d. **Gaps in State Safety Risk Management (SRM):** Developing a holistic State Safety Risk Management framework to support data-driven decision-making, safety performance management, and effective resource allocation for risk mitigation.
- e. **Challenges in Safety Data Management & Sharing:** Addressing the lack of resources, expertise, and formal mechanisms for collecting, managing, and sharing safety data and intelligence at both State and regional levels.
- f. **Human Factors & Human Competence:** Strengthening initiatives to enhance human factors management, human performance optimization, and personnel competency development.
- g. **Manage risk interdependencies:** Addressing interconnected risks such as cybersecurity risks, GNSS interference & spoofing risks, aviation health safety (AHS) risks, risks arising from conflict zones, and security risks with an impact on aviation safety.
- h. **Slow Implementation of Safety Enhancements:** Accelerating the adoption of RASG-MID conclusions, MID-RASP Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs), and other safety actions/tools to mitigate identified safety issues and deficiencies.
- i. **Airspace Structure & Geopolitical Challenges:** Mitigating risks associated with airspace restrictions and rerouting, ensuring safe and efficient traffic flow amid the complex geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

3.2.1 Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Safety oversight is defined as a function by means of which States ensure effective implementation of the safety-related SARPs, and associated procedures contained in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and related ICAO documents. States have overall safety oversight responsibilities, which emphasize a state's commitment to safety in respect of the State's aviation activity. An individual State's responsibility for safety oversight is the foundation upon which a safe global air transport system is built. States that experience difficulties in carrying out safety oversight functions can impact the state of International Civil Aviation.

The eight critical elements (CEs) of a safety oversight system are defined by ICAO. MID Region is committed to the effective implementation of these eight CEs among all States in the region, as part of overall safety oversight responsibilities, which emphasize MID region's commitment to safety in respect of its aviation activities. The eight CEs are presented in the figure below.

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 76,8 %, which is above the world EI 69.68% (as of 10 August 2024). Three (3) States


CE-1	85.6			95.2		76.3	84.2	78.6
CE-2	71.6		90.5	84.9	93.5	78.3	75.7	85
CE-3		67.1	89.3	86.7	89.1	59.4	70.2	69.2
CE-4		81.5	69	75.4	81.7	43.8	52.4	51.5
CE-5	85.7	92.9	90.6	88.4	91.7	69.5	81.5	76.8
CE-6			86	80.7	88.9		76	72.2
CE-7			71.8	63.1	79.1		67.2	67.3
CE-8			64.7	57.7	81.4	66.3	44.3	53.4
	LEG	ORG	PEL	OPS	AIR	AIG	ANS	AGA

are currently below EI 60%.

All eight areas and 5 CEs have an EI above 60%. For CE-4: AIG- 43.8%, AGA- 51.5%; and ANS- 52.4%. For CE-8: AGA – 53.4% and ANS – 44.3% respectively. However, the areas of AIG, AGA and ANS and CE4 and CE8 still need more improvement.

Moreover, the establishment in terms of training and effective implementation in certification, surveillance, and resolution of Safety concerns need to be improved.

The latest ICAO activities, which aim to measure the effective implementation of the eight CEs of States' individual safety oversight systems, as part of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP), have resulted



in the following scores, compiled as an average for the region of MID region as indicated in the table below.

The lowest EI areas in the region were aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG), aerodrome & ground handling (AGA), and Air Navigation services (ANS) and identified as the organizational challenges/issues at the regional level considered of the utmost priority because they impact States' safety oversight and safety management capabilities and, consequently aviation safety at the regional level. They were identified based on analysis from USOAP data analysis, accident and incident investigation reports, technical assistance activities as well as based on regional analysis conducted by RASG-MID groups. These issues are typically systemic in nature and relate to challenges associated with the conduct of States' safety oversight functions, implementation of SSP at the regional level and the level of SMS implementation by industry in the region. Most of these organizational challenges/issues

are in line with those listed in the GASP 2026-2028 Edition.

3.2.2 Improve the development and implementation of Safety Management

States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to fully implement SSPs according to Annex 19; States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 78, 59%.

Proactive safety management considering all known safety data and information has proven essential for the ability of the aviation system to deal with disruptive events. SSP will be increasingly instrumental within MID region aviation safety management system, not only in ensuring that safety issues are addressed at the right level, but also in guaranteeing the availability of required data and safety intelligence to support the identification of hazards and safety issues. Establishing.

safety risk management capabilities in a collaborative manner is key to the safe development of aviation. Safety management also entails the management of human factors and human performance issues, fostering capable and streamlined oversight and establishing a safety promotion programme. In addition, An SSP requires increased collaboration across operational domains to identify hazards and manage risks. Aviation authorities and organizations should anticipate new emerging threats and associated challenges by developing SRM principles. Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). Moreover, the RASG-MID also supported the establishment and activation of the MENA RSOO, with a primary objective to assist member States to develop and implement SSP; and Several capacity building activities have been conducted to support the implementation of SSP & SMS as well as NASP and address the challenges and difficulties as well as the sharing of experiences and best practices.

Therefore, support to States with SSP, SMS and NASP development and implementation considered a strategic priority at the regional as they impact States' safety oversight and safety management capabilities and, consequently aviation safety at the regional level.

3.2.3. Human Factors and Human Performance

The performance of the aviation system, including its safety performance, depends on humans and on the effective integration of the human factors into the management systems in place. Accordingly, focus on human factors and human performance should form an integral part of any safety management approach, be it at regional, State or industry level.

Human Factors as a discipline has traditionally served as a special focus area in aviation safety management. With the fast-evolving aviation industry, the large variety of operating conditions and business models, but also in the face of disruptive events affecting the entire aviation ecosystem, it is increasingly important for aviation stakeholders to adopt a systems' view on safety. This requires sound knowledge and understanding of how and where people work within the aviation system and what may positively or negatively affect their performance.

The associated strategic goal is to improve the management of Human Factors/Human Performance issues at the level of States and industry by promoting a thorough understanding of Human Factors/Human Performance principles and their relevance in safety management. With this we aim at maximizing the ability for humans to make a positive contribution to system performance, while reducing the exposure of the aviation system to Human Factors/Human Performance related safety issues. This will improve safety performance as well as operational performance.

As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. The top three key risk areas related to human factors (HF) and human performance (HP) are LOC-I, MAC, and RI.

3.2.4 Manage Risk Interdependencies

The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that safety, security, health safety and other risks can no longer be managed in isolation. The aviation community has realised that continuing to develop tools and specific guidance for each situation and for each domain affected by transversal risks may delay not only the implementation of mitigation measures, but also the development of an enabling framework to support integrated, collaborative risk management.

Managing some of the risks of interdependencies considered a strategic priority at the regional as they impact on aviation safety at the regional level.

3.2.4.1 Cybersecurity Risks

The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalisation. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardised manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organisations with malicious intent.

3.2.4.2 Security Risks with an Impact on Aviation Safety

The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport security, aircraft security or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider potential impacts on aviation safety. States should consider where interdependencies between civil aviation safety and security exist.

Therefore, an integrated approach to the management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities would bring benefits such as a complete overview of risks, a better sharing of security information and the closure of gaps in the security system while focusing on increasing the overall level of safety. Consequently, this would allow ensuring synergies where security measures can have an impact on safety and vice versa; thereby avoiding incompatible actions and strengthening the overall safety and security of civil aviation.

3.2.4.3 Risks Arising from Conflict Zones

The crash of flight MH17 immediately raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region. This is why it's important for governments, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civilian flights. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region on Jan 2020 involving Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752. The tragic accident with the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 highlighted once more the importance of information sharing and risk assessments.

3.2.4.4 GNSS Interference & spoofing Risks

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which involves systems such as Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia's GLONASS, China's, BeiDou, Europe's Galileo includes navigation satellite infrastructures and constellations which provide position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information supporting aircraft and air traffic management operations and support navigation applications in all phases of flight as well as surveillance application like ADS-B. GNSS is also used in safety nets like the EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems) and provides the time reference that is used to synchronize systems and operations in ATM.

GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents have increasingly threatened the integrity of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing services across Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Similar incidents have been reported in other locations globally.

Jamming' blocks the GNSS signal, whereas 'spoofing' sends false information to the aircraft's receiver. There is a high safety risk as GPS spoofing has made backup inertial navigation systems unreliable by corrupting GPS data. This threat turns off the entire navigation system by tricking the Flight Management System into indicating that the aircraft is off-track. The aircraft's Inertia Reference System fails, leading to corrupted navigation systems. GPS jamming, while problematic, is a different risk level from GPS Spoofing, as it only blocks GPS signals. Still, the sensor fusion software can use other sources of information to provide continuous, precise navigation.

The analysis utilized data from the Flight Data Exchange (FDX) showed a total of 46444 'GPS signal in the MENA region from January 2023 to December 2023 with the rate of 98.76 compared to global average of 30.19 per cent.

3.2.4.5 Aviation Health Safety (AHS) Risks

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the harmonisation of health policies affecting aviation, and in particular the CAT domain, has become an important topic to help overcome the pandemic. The objective is to minimise the impact of health safety threats in CAT. Health safety threats should be included in the management of risk interdependencies. COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we will be faced with. It is crucial to continue supporting the European aviation industry competitiveness by offering the safest aircraft interior environment to reduce the risk of disease transmission between continents and States, restore public trust and facilitate future responses to events of similar nature.

3.3 EMERGING ISSUES

3.3.1 Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and New Entrants

ICAO identified AAM and new entrants as one priority focus area out of seven. In terms of Regulatory Development for AAM, the 41st Session of the ICAO Assembly recognized that the rapidly evolving AAM ecosystem calls for work to be undertaken by ICAO, as well as the potential need for a globally harmonized framework. In addition, Urban air mobility is new revolution in transportation system and transforming urban transportation by leveraging advanced air vehicles to alleviate traffic congestion and provide efficient transportation solutions. AAM is integrating with urban infrastructure to enable seamless aerial transportation, connecting urban centers and offering new mobility options for passengers. AAM is experiencing rapid technological advancements, including electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, advanced air traffic management systems, and autonomous flight capabilities.

Available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. The civil aviation authority is responsible for, inter alia, ensuring aviation safety and protecting the public from aviation hazards.

The safe integration on the basis of granting fair access to airspace of all new entrants into the airspace network will be one of the main challenges in relation to the integration of UAS technologies and related concepts of operation.

Enabling the safe integration of UAS, being a fast evolving and emerging market segment, as well as of (initially manned) VTOL-capable aircraft, also intended for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations, continue to be priority activities.

At the regional level to support states in establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework and Airspace Integration and Traffic Management for UAS and manned VTOL-capable aircraft.

PART-II. IMPLEMENTATION

Section 4. MID region's strategic direction for the management of aviation safety



4.1 Monitoring implementation

This section presents an outline of the safety performance indicators reflecting the MID Region strategic safety priorities in the area of safety. The RASG-MID would use the indicators listed in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B** to measure safety performance and monitor each regional safety target. Furthermore, the MID Region SPMM includes six (6) Goals in line with GASP 2026-2028 Edition.

The RASG-MID would continuously monitor the implementation of the identified SEIs in the MID-RASP and measure safety performance of the regional civil aviation system, to ensure the intended targets are achieved, using the MID Region SPMM to this plan. Therefore, for each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM, identified SEI(s) be mapped to it including their respective actions.

MID region safety indicators and targets were aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP goals and targets as relevant in the MID Region. A MID Region Annual safety report would be annually published to provide stakeholders with relevant up-to-date information on the progress made in achieving the regional safety goals and targets, as well as the implementation status/progress of the SEIs.

In the event that the regional safety goals and targets are not met, the causes would be addressed and presented to stakeholders. If RASG-MID identifies critical operational safety risks, reasonable measures would be taken to mitigate them as soon as practicable, possibly leading to an earlier revision of the MID-RASP by SEIG.

The monitoring of safety performance and its enhancement is achieved through identification of relevant Goals and Safety Indicators, taking into consideration the GASP 2026-2028 and regional specific objectives and priorities, as well as the adoption and attainment of Safety Targets with a specific timeframe.

The MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring includes the following Goals:

Aspirational Goal: Zero fatality by 2030, the GASP aspirational goal of ‘zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond’.

Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks: This relates to GASP Goal 1 for 2026-2028 and aligns with ICAO's high-level safety metrics, enabling a direct comparison of the MID region's performance with global averages. Risk area indicators are identified using the MID region risk assessment methodology and are detailed in the MID Annual Safety Report (MID ASR). These operational safety indicators will continue to be monitored through the MID ASR.

Goal 2: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities: This is related to 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2. The monitoring will be based on the available data published through USOAP-CMA (OLF). The regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) in the MID Region (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is 76.8 %, which is above the world average 69.68% (as of 10 August 2024). Three (3) states are currently below EI 60%. The objective is aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP requiring all states by 2028, to commit to national aviation safety plans that allocate to each safety oversight authority sufficient financial resources to meet national and international obligations, with at least 70% of States having sufficient financial resources, improve their EI score for qualified technical personnel (CE-4) for aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG) and for aerodromes and ground aids (AGA), and improve their EI score for the resolution of safety issues (CE-8) in AGA.

Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP): This is related to 2026-2028 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through USOAP-CMA (OLF). Feedback provided by Member States would also be considered. MID Office will in addition collect relevant documentation and information from States (SSP and NASP). The objective is aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP requiring all States by 2026, to assess the level of implementation of their SSP and by 2028, all States to establish an SSP.

Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional & national levels to address safety issues: This is related to 2026-2028 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through USOAP-CMA (OLF) and MID Office data. Feedback provided by States would be also considered. The objective is aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP requiring by 2026, all regions to identify States that need assistance to address safety issues; by 2028, all regions to facilitate the required assistance, to identified States, to address safety issues; and by 2027, all regions to implement a mechanism to make use of the information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning.

Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP): This is related to 2026-2028 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through MID Office data. Feedback provided by States would be also considered. The objective is aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP requiring by 2026, all regions to publish an updated RASP, taking into consideration the 2026-2028 edition of the GASP and by 2026, all States to publish an updated NASP, taking into consideration the 2026-2028 edition of the GASP and their corresponding RASP.

Goal 6: Expand the use of industry safety assessment and safety data sharing Programmes: This is related to 2026-2028 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be collected from IATA and other international and regional organizations. Feedback provided by States would also be considered. The objective is aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP requiring by 2028, industry to maintain an increasing trend in its use of industry safety assessment and safety data sharing Programmes.

4.2 Communication of Progress to RASG-MID and Regional Stakeholders

Effective communication of MID-RASP progress is essential for transparency, accountability, and continuous improvement in aviation safety. A structured communication framework will ensure that RASG-MID, States, industry partners, and other regional stakeholders are regularly updated on:

- Safety performance trends
- Challenges encountered
- Milestones achieved

To maintain clear and consistent communication, the following reporting mechanisms will be established:

MID Region Annual Safety Report: Published annually, this report will provide up-to-date insights on regional safety performance, progress toward achieving safety goals and targets, and the implementation status of Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and their respective safety actions.

Regular Progress Reports: A comprehensive report on the status of MID-RASP SEI implementation and safety performance achievements will be presented at:

- Safety Enhancement Initiatives Group (SEIG) meetings
- RASG-MID meetings
- Regional safety seminars and workshops

Key Aspects Covered in Progress Reports: Each progress report will include:

- Overview of MID-RASP Implementation:** A summary of the overall progress and key developments.
- Challenges and Delays in SEI Implementation:** Analysis of implementation barriers and any corrective actions required.
- Evaluation of Safety Goals & Targets:** If regional safety goals and targets are not met, the root causes would be addressed and presented to the relevant stakeholders.

By ensuring regular and structured communication, this framework will enhance collaboration, data-driven decision-making, and continuous improvement in aviation safety across the MID Region.

SECTION 5: Safety Actions

This section addresses system-wide problems that affect aviation safety in MID region including the SEIs and their respective actions. In most scenarios, these problems are related to regional organizational processes and procedures, regional operational safety risks, and emerging issues. The safety actions in this section are driven principally by the need to maintain or increase the current level of safety in the aviation sector for the region.

This section also facilitates the identification of SEIs and their respective actions relevant for each Goal established in the MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring as follows:

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks

Goal 2: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities

Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)

Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional & national levels to address safety issues

Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP)

Goal 6: Expand the use of industry safety assessment and safety data sharing Programmes

5.1 Regional Operational Safety Risks

5.1.1 Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction in Operational Risks

5.1.1.1 G1-SEI-01: Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region safety strategy at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime which is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always, at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved. Prevention of loss of control is a strategic priority. In addition, Aircraft upset or loss of control is the key risk area with the highest risk related to fatal accidents in CAT aeroplane operations having a maximum take-off weight above 5700 kg. It includes uncontrolled collisions with terrain, but also occurrences where the aircraft deviated from the intended flight path or intended aircraft flight parameters, regardless of whether the flight crew realized the deviation and whether it was possible to recover or not. It also includes the triggering of stall warning and envelope protections.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of loss of control.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it: States should set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of LOC-I, or other issues identified by the SSP.

States to include LOC-I in national SSPs: LOC-I should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Actions:	A1-A2-A3-A4-A5-A6
A1-	Guidance material on flight crew proficiency
A2-	Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation
A3-	Promote and conduct Upset Recovery Capacity building activities
A4-	Conduct Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities
A5-	Promote DG capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fire/smoke risk in cabin
A6-	Promote Data-Driven Safety Management – Use flight data monitoring (FDM) to identify precursors to LOC-I events and develop targeted interventions

References:

- GASP 2026-2028 Goal 1 "Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".

- GASP SEI-10 (Region) – Mitigate contributing factors to LOC-I accidents and incidents at the regional level.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Develop Guidance material on flight crew proficiency	
Responsible entity:	IATA and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Develop Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation	
Responsible entity:	IATA and industry
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing
Action 3: Conduct Upset Recovery Capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, IATA, Industry.
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
Action 4- Conduct Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 5: Promote DG capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fire/smoke risk in cabin	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 6: Promote Data-Driven Safety Management during workshops and meetings	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable	Timeline

5.1.1.2 G1-SEI-02: Runway Safety- Runway Excursion

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Runway excursion covers materialized runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties in maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off-centred or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during landing. During 2019-2023, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flights.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of RE.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it: States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of REs.

States to include Runway Excursions in national SSPs: REs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs in close cooperation with the aircraft operators, air traffic control, and airport operators. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Actions:	A1-A2-A3-A4
A1-	Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities
A2-	Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through capacity building activities.
A3-	Conduct Runway Safety Go-Team (RST) assistance missions
A4-	Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to Aerodromes Certification through capacity building activities.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Reference:

GASP 2026-2028 Goal 1 "Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".

GASP SEI-12 (Region) – Mitigate contributing factors to RE accidents and incidents at the regional level

Action 1: Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities (Reference: G3-SEI-02)

Responsible entity: ICAO, ACI, and industry

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements

Responsible entity: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2026

Status: ongoing

Action 3: Conduct Runway Safety Go-Team (RST) assistance missions

Responsible entity: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2026

Status: ongoing

Action 4: Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators

Responsible entity: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2026

Status: ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable	Timeline
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Mitigate contributing factors to RE accidents and incidents	2028
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5.1.1.3 G1-SEI-03: Runway Safety- Runway Incursion

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Collision on the runway covers collisions between an aircraft and another object (other aircraft, vehicles, etc.) or person that occurs on a runway of an aerodrome or other predesignated landing area; it does not include collisions with birds or wildlife. While there were no fatal accident or accident involving MID States operators in the last years involving runway collision, the risk of the reported occurrence demonstrated to be very real.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of RI.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it: States to include Runway Incursions in national SSPs: RIs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs in close cooperation with the aircraft operators, air traffic control, and airport operators. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Action:	A1-A2-A3-A4-A5
A1-	Promote the establishment and implementation of States' runway safety Programmes and runway safety teams
A2-	Certification of aerodromes in accordance with Annex 14
A3-	Promote the identification and publication in AIP of hot spots at aerodromes during workshops and sub-groups meetings
A4-	Promote suitable strategies to remove hazards or mitigate risks associated with identified hot spots during workshops and sub-groups meetings
A5-	Promote the use of standardized Phraseology & ATC Procedures through capacity activities.
A6-	Promote the effective use of suitable technologies to assist the improvement of situational awareness, such as improved resolution A-SMGCS, stop bars and ARIWS

References:

- GASP 2026-2085 Goal 1 "Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".
- GASP SEI-13 (Region) – Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents at the regional level.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Promote the establishment and implementation of States' runway safety Programmes and runway safety teams	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 2: Certification of aerodromes in accordance with Annex 14 – Aerodromes	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
Action 3: Promote the identification and publication in the AIP of hot spots at aerodromes	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 4: Promote suitable strategies to remove hazards or mitigate risks associated with identified hot spots	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 5: Promote the use of standardized Phraseology & ATC Procedures through workshops and meetings	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High

Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 6: Promote the effective use of suitable technologies to assist the improvement of situational awareness	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents	2028

5.1.1.4 G1-SEI-04: Airborne Conflict (Mid-Air Collisions)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Airborne collision includes all occurrences involving actual or potential airborne collisions between aircraft, while both aircraft are airborne, and between aircraft and other airborne objects. This also includes all separation-related occurrences caused by either air traffic control (ATC) or cockpit crew, AIRPROX reports and genuine ACAS alerts. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine TCAS resolution advisories or airspace infringements.

Although there have been no aeroplane mid-air collision accidents in recent years within the MID States, this risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation. This is one specific safety issue that is a main priority in this key risk area.

States must have due regard for the safety of civil aircraft and must have established respective regulations for national State aircraft.

Some States have reported an increase in incidents involving close encounters between civil and military aircraft and more particularly an increase in non-cooperative international military traffic over the high-sea waters. The States could consider the following recommendations:

1. Fully apply the ICAO Manual on Civil-Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management (Doc 10088)
2. Closely coordinate to develop, harmonize and publish operational requirements and instructions for State aircraft to ensure that 'due regard' for civil aircraft is always maintained
3. Support the development and harmonization of civil/military coordination procedures for ATM at MID Region level and beyond if possible; and
4. Report relevant occurrences.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of MAC.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region Annual Safety Report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it: States to include MACs in national SSPs: MACs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

States to reinforce the appropriate reactions of flight crew in response to an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) resolution advisory (RA), which would help to mitigate the risk of mid-air collisions by providing safety promotion material and clear messages to pilots on the need to follow the instructions of the ACAS in high-risk situations.

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4-A5
A1- Promote Civil-Military cooperation through capacity building activities

A2- Promote awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas through capacity building activities.
A3- Promote guidance to ensure aircraft are equipped with ACAS, in accordance with Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft during workshops, meetings, seminars.
A4- Promote airspace among stakeholders, including complexity of airspace design, Free Route Airspace (FRA) concept, route layout, and proximity of military operational or conflict zones, establishment of FUA's through capacity building activities.
A5- Promote the improvement of ATC systems, procedures and tools to enhance conflict management

References:

- GASP 2026-2028 Goal 1 "Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".
- GASP SEI-11 (Region) – Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and incidents at the regional level.
- ICAO Doc 10088 'Manual on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management'

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Promote Civil-Military cooperation through capacity building activities

Responsible entity: ICAO, IATA, and States

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: Promote awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas through capacity building activities

Responsible entity: ICAO and States

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

Action 3: Promote guidance to ensure aircraft are equipped with ACAS

Responsible entity: ICAO and States

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2026

Status: New

Action 4: Promote airspace among stakeholders, including complexity of airspace design, route layout, and proximity of military operational or conflict zones through capacity building activities

Responsible entity: ICAO and States

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2026

Status: New

Action 5: Promote the improvement of ATC systems, procedures and tools to enhance conflict management

Responsible entity: ICAO and States

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2026

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)

Timeline

Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and NMAC incidents

2028

5.1.1.5 G1-SEI-5: Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences, which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc. There was no fatal accident involving MID States operators during this period. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States and in other parts of the world that make it an area of concern.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of CFIT.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it: States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of CFIT or other issues identified by the SSP.

States to include CFITs in national SSPs: CFIT should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Actions: A1-A2-A3
A1- Advisory Circular: Instrument Approach Procedures Using Continuous Descent Final Approach Techniques
A2- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)

References:

- GASP 2023-2025 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks”.
- GASP SEI-9 (Region) – Mitigate contributing factors to CFIT accidents and incidents at the regional level.

Stakeholders: ICAO, RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Advisory Circular: Guidance for Operators on Training Programme on the use of GPWS	
Responsible entity:	IATA and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing
Action 2: Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)	
Responsible entity:	IATA and industry
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Mitigate contributing factors to CFIT accidents and incidents	2028

5.2 Regional Organizational Challenges/issues

5.2.1 Goal 2: Strengthen States’ Safety Oversight Capabilities

The States safety oversight capabilities remain an issue mainly for AIG, AGA, and ANS areas. The inappropriate effective oversight remains an issue and the difficulties experienced by some authorities in properly discharging their oversight responsibilities is a concern also in the light of the size, scope and complexity of the aviation industry that some of them oversee. Furthermore, while a number of CAAs have reached a suitable and stable level of maturity, certain CAAs continue to underperform and/or struggle in achieving sustainable improvements. Most notably, while progress has been noted in the implementation of Authorities' management systems, effective oversight of undertakings' safety management systems continues to be an area of concern in several domains.

5.2.1.1 G2-SEI-01: Strengthening States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: The CEs are essentially the safety defense tools of the State Safety Oversight system needed for the effective and sustainable implementation of a safety-related policy and associated procedures. The effective implementation of the CEs is an indication of a State's capability for safety oversight. States must establish CE-1 through CE-5 prior to the implementation of CE-6 through CE-8 to provide effective safety oversight and safety management. An individual State's responsibility for safety oversight is the foundation upon which a safe global air transport system is built. States that experience difficulties in carrying out safety oversight functions can impact the state of International Civil Aviation.

States should work to continually improve their effective implementation of the eight CEs of the State's safety oversight system in all relevant areas, as appropriate to their aviation system complexity. Through collaborative efforts, the level of effective implementation of the CEs of a State's safety oversight system can increase, particularly in those States where a State faces shortages of human, financial or technical resources.

The following elements are considered enablers of a robust safety oversight system, expected to be in place according to the requirements in force:

1. ability and determination to conduct effective oversight
2. ability to identify risks through a process of collecting and analyze data
3. ability to mitigate the identified risks in an effective way, implying measurement of performance and leading to continuous improvement
4. willingness and possibility to exchange information and cooperate with other CAAs
5. ability to ensure the availability of adequate personnel, where 'adequate' includes the notion of sufficient training and proper qualification; and
6. focus on the implementation of effective management systems in industry, wherever required by the regulations in force.

What we want to achieve:

A robust oversight system across the MID Region, where each CAA is able to properly discharge its oversight responsibilities, with particular care to exchange information and cooperate with other CAAs and to the implementation of management systems in all organizations, as well as to ensure the availability of adequate personnel in CAAs. In addition, to support MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities and increase progressively the USOAP-CMA EI results.

How we monitor improvement:

Significant increase of the number of States with an EI above 60% and implementing risk-based oversight.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs. Therefore, States to ensure oversight capabilities:

- a) Availability of adequate personnel in CAAs: States shall ensure that adequate personnel are available to discharge their safety oversight responsibilities.
- b) Organizations' management system in all sectors: States shall foster the ability of CAAs to assess and oversee the organizations' management system in all sectors. This shall focus in particular on safety culture, the governance structure of the organization, the interaction between the risk identification/assessment process and the organization's monitoring process, the use of inspection findings and safety information such as occurrences, incidents and accidents and, where applicable, flight data monitoring (FDM). This should lead CAAs to adapt and improve their oversight system.

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4-A5-A6-A7
A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs with focus on AGA, AIG, & ANS areas
A2- Conduct of technical assistance missions to States, to address safety issues and enhance safety with a focus on AGA, AIG, & ANS areas.
A3- Continuous support to strengthen MENA ARCM to best support States in the region

A4- Identify and mobilize resources to support SEIs for States in need to address safety issues and establish effective safety oversight capabilities
A5- Continuous support to strengthen MENA RSOO to best support States in the region
A6- Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to enhance safety in the region
A7- Sharing of safety information via RASG-MID platform to make use of the information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning

References:

- ICAO SARPs & guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities”
- GASP SEIs : SEI-19, SEI-20, SEI-21, SEI-22, SEI-23, and SEI-24 (Regions).

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, and industry

Action 1: Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: Conduct technical assistance and NCLB missions to States

Responsible entity: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

Action 3- Continuous support to strengthen MENA ARCM to best support States in the region

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, organizations, and industry

Priority: High

Completion date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

Action 4: Identify and mobilize resources to support SEIs for States in need

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, organizations, industry

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2026

Status: New

Action 5- Continuous support to strengthen MENA RSOO

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, organizations, industry

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2026

Status: ongoing

Action 6- Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to enhance safety in the region

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, organizations, industry

Priority:	Medium
Completion date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
Action 7- Sharing of safety information via RASG-MID platform	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, organizations, industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion date:	2026
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
MID States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI)	2028

5.2.1.2 G2-SEI-02: Manage Human Factors and Human Performance

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Human factors and human performance are strategic priorities. As new technologies and concepts of operations emerge on the market and the complexity of the aviation system continuously increases, it is of key importance to properly address human factors and human performance in terms of both limitations and their contribution to delivering safety, as part of the safety management implementation.

What we want to achieve: Ensure continuous improvement in safety management activities as related to human factors and human performance.

How we monitor improvement: Improvement in aviation personnel competence at all levels and feedback from States and MIDASR.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). (Action addressed under G1-SEI-04: CFIT)
A2- Conduct capacity building activities
A3- Develop practical guides and promotion material on aircrew fatigue

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities”.
- ICAO Human Performance Manual (ICAO Doc 10151) and ICAO Safety Management Manual (ICAO Doc 9859).

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). (Action addressed under G1-SEI-04: CFIT)	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry.
Priority:	Medium
Completion date:	2026
Status:	ongoing
Action 2: Conduct capacity building activities related HF & HP	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry

Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing
Action 3: Develop practical guides and promotion material on aircrew fatigue	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
mitigates risks incurred through the inadequate understanding, regulation and oversight of human factors and mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2028

5.2.1.3 G2-SEI-03: Manage Risk interdependencies

5.2.1.3.1 G2-SEI-03A: Managing GNSS Interference and spoofing

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: The management of GNSS interference & spoofing risks within the region that have an impact on safety is a strategic priority.

What we want to achieve: Increase aviation safety by managing the impact of GNSS interference & spoofing risks on safety and mitigating the related safety risks. GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents have increasingly threatened the integrity of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing services across Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous assessment of safety-related occurrences and mitigations at the regional level and feedback from States.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Raise awareness on the potential safety impact of GNSS interference and spoofing through capacity building activities
A2- Promote civil-military coordination and cooperation activities to facilitate the sharing of relevant information with airspace users
A3-

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities”.
- ICAO Doc 9849, GNSS Manual

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Raise awareness on the potential safety impact of GNSS interference and spoofing

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, Organizations, industry

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2026

Status:	Ongoing
Action 2:	Promote civil-military coordination and cooperation activities
Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, & Organizations
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026

Status:	EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)		Timeline
Mitigate contributing factors to MAC & CFIT accidents		2028

5.2.1.3.2 G2-SEI-03B: Management of security risks with safety impact

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating the security-related safety risks. The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on the safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport, aircraft or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider possible potential impacts on aviation safety. Managing the impact of security on safety is a strategic priority in MID region.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by managing the impact of security on safety and mitigating related safety risks. Increase safety by managing the impact of security measures on safety, avoiding risk transfer and mitigating related safety risks. Encourage an integrated approach to management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities

How we monitor improvement: Continuous assessment and mitigation of security threats.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs. For MID States, a) to assess the impact of security measures implemented on the ground and in flight on operational safety and performance; b) assess the preparedness of aviation personnel and flight crews to cope with potential conflicting security and safety measures; c) Assess safety risk management techniques that can be applied to the security domain to produce harmonized risk assessment and support integrated policy and decision-making processes at national level.

Actions:
A1- Promote security risks with safety impact through capacity building activities

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities”. ICAO Annex 17.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry
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Action 1:	Promote security risks with safety impact through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, Organizations	
Priority:	High	
Completion date:	2026	
Status:	New	

	EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)		Timeline
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents		2028

5.2.1.3.3 G2-SEI-03C: Management of the risks arising from conflict zones

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Managing the risks arising from conflict zones is a strategic priority for MID region. There is a need to provide information on conflict zones developments and resulting risks to air operators so that they are able to conduct an informed risk assessment to mitigate the risks and threats posed by flying over or in the vicinity of zones where armed conflicts exist.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by managing the risks arising from conflict zones and mitigation actions. Enable effective information-sharing about risks and possible threats in conflict zones.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous assessment and mitigation of conflict zones risks by air operators.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions:
A1- Promote risks arising from conflict zones through capacity building activities

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities”.
- ICAO Annex 17.
- Doc 10084 – Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones
- Doc 10108 – Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry

Action 1: Promote risks arising from conflict zones through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO & States
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2028

5.2.1.3.4 G2-SEI-03D: Management of cybersecurity risks

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating cybersecurity related safety risks. Assess the safety impact of cybersecurity threats to aviation users, support the development of mitigations and specific Training actions, identify and mitigate the vulnerabilities of aviation products and identify the required changes to aviation standards.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by managing the impact of cybersecurity on safety and mitigating related safety risks.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous assessment and mitigation of cybersecurity threats.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs. For states, to assess the safety impact of cybersecurity threats to aviation users, support the development of mitigation actions and specific training actions, identify and mitigate the vulnerabilities of aviation products and identify the required changes to aviation standards.

Action: A1
A1- Promote Cybersecurity risks through capacity building activities

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight

capabilities". ICAO Annex 17.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry	
Action 1- Promote Cybersecurity risks through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, & Organizations
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2028

5.2.1.3.5 G2-SEI-03E: Manage aviation health safety (AHS) risks

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that public health emergencies may severely impact the entire aviation environment and in particular crew members and passengers. The objective is to minimize the impact of health safety threats on CAT.

The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating the COVID-19 or any other pandemic related to safety risks. The safety action in this area would focus on continuous support to the MID-RPTF and sharing of guidance material/best practices to mitigate the risks stemmed from the pandemic

What we want to achieve: Reduce the risk of disease transmission during the travel experience without negative impact on safety, maintain public trust and facilitate future responses to public health emergencies.

How we monitor improvement: Regular assessment of preventive measures used onboard aircraft while at the same time monitoring the emerging public health threats.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1
A1: Activation of MID-RPTF, as needed

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities”.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry	
Action 1- Activation of MID-RPTF, as needed	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and All stakeholders
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2028

5.2.1.4 G2-SEI-04: AAM and New Entrants

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Enabling the safe integration of UAS, being a fast evolving and emerging market segment, as well as of (initially manned) VTOL-capable aircraft, also intended for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations, continue to be priority activities.

At the regional level to support states in establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework and Airspace Integration and Traffic Management for UAS and manned VTOL-capable aircraft.

What we want to achieve: to ensure safe UAS operations and mitigate the risks, it is important to manage their safe integration into the airspace. In addition, to enable the safe integration of UAS into airspace while maintaining a high and uniform level of safety.

How we monitor improvement: Feedback from states on the effectiveness of the related activities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1 – A2
A1: Support States to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for UAS and manned VTOL-capable aircraft’ through capacity building activities
A2: Support States with the implementation of the UTM Regulatory Framework through capacity building activities

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities”.
- Annex 6-Part IV

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry	
Action 1- Support States to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for UAS and manned VTOL-capable aircraft’ through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and All stakeholders
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Support States with the implementation of the UTM Regulatory Framework through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and All stakeholders
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2026
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
mitigate contributing factors to MAC, LOC-I, CFIT accidents	2028

5.2.2 Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)

5.2.2.1 G3-SEI-01: Improve the development and implementation of Safety Management

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Management of safety in a systematic and proactive way enables authorities and organizations to set up management systems that take into consideration potential hazards and associated risks before aviation accidents occur. This global move is at the core of ICAO Annex 19. This safety area would enable further work to improve reporting processes, occurrence

investigation at organizational level, and also the continued development of integrated data collection taxonomies. The proactive implementation of safety management considering all known safety data and information has proven essential for the ability of the aviation system to deal with safety issues.

What we want to achieve: MID Region States implement SSP and consequently their services providers to implement SMS. In addition, improve the level of safety through the effective implementation of safety management by authorities and service providers.

How we monitor improvement: ICAO Annex 19 framework requiring safety management is in place across all aviation domains, and organizations and authorities are able to demonstrate compliance.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

States to give priority to the work on SSPs: In the implementation and maintenance of the SSP, States should in particular:

- ensure effective implementation of the Annex 19 Requirements and address deficiencies in oversight capabilities, as a prerequisite for effective SSP implementation
- ensure effective coordination between State authorities having a role in safety management
- ensure that inspectors have the right competencies to support the evolution towards risk- and performance-based oversight
- ensure that policies and procedures are in place for risk- and performance-based oversight, including a description of how an SMS is accepted and regularly monitored
- establish policies and procedures for safety data collection, analysis, exchange and protection
- establish a process to determine safety performance indicators at State level addressing outcomes and processes
- ensure that an approved SSP document is made available and published; and
- ensure that the SSP is regularly reviewed and that SSP effectiveness is regularly assessed.

SMS Assessment

States should make use of the available tools to support risk- and performance-based oversight. States also should regularly monitor status of compliance with SMS requirements of their industry.

SMS international cooperation

States should promote the common understanding of safety management and human factors principles and requirements in different countries, share lessons learned and encourage progress and harmonization, through active participation in the RASG-MID and other safety groups and fora.

FDM precursors of main operational safety risks

States in partnership with industry, other regional and international organizations should complete the good practice documentation which supports the inclusion of main operational safety risks such as RE, RI, LOC-I, CFIT and MAC into operators' FDM Programmes.

States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes
States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of:

- promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM,
- fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture,
- encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of REs, MACs, CFIT and LOC-I, or other issues identified by the SSP

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4-A5-A6-A7
A1- Conduct SSP & SMS capacity building activities
A2- SRM capacity building activities
A3- Conduct technical assistance missions to facilitate the establishment of SSP
A4- Promote safety management best practices
A5- Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need to establish an SSP
A6- Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to support the establishment of SSPs
A7- Encourage all States to report safety issues via the Secure Portal on Operational Safety Risks and Emerging Issues

References:

- ICAO Annex 19 & Doc 9859 and GASP 2026-2028 Goal 3 “Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)”
- GASP SEIs: SEI-38, SEI-39, SEI-40, SEI-41, SEI-42, SEI-43, and SEI-44.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1- Conduct SSP/SMS capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, supported by organizations, and industry
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing
Action 2: Conduct SRM capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, supported by organizations, and industry
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing
Action 3- Conduct technical assistance missions	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 4: Promote safety management best practices	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, states, organizations, and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 5: Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need to establish an SSP	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 6: Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to support the establishment of SSPs	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and all stakeholders
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New

Action 7: Encourage all States to report safety issues via the Secure Portal on Operational Safety Risks and Emerging Issues

Responsible entity: ICAO

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2026

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
MID States to Establish & manage effective SSP	2028

5.2.3 Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues

5.2.3.1 G4-SEI-01: Collaboration and coordination with stakeholders to address safety issues

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at *Appendix B*.

Rationale: cooperation and collaboration among all stakeholders to identify States that need assistance and facilitate the required assistance to address safety issues through Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders, mobilization of resources, sharing of safety information, and agreeing on joint activities to avoid duplication of effort.

What we want to achieve: States, international organizations, and industry to increase collaboration at the regional and national levels so that to enhance safety.

How we monitor improvement: Reinforce efficient and effective cooperation and collaboration with all stakeholders, avoiding duplication and optimizing the allocation of resources at the regional and national levels.

How we want to achieve it: Joint Programme activities

References:

- GASP 2026-2028 Goal 4 “Strengthen collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues”
- GASP SEIs: SEI-21, SEI-22, SEI-23, and SEI-24 (Regions).

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4-A5
A1- Develop and agree on joint work activities with all stakeholders through MID RCMs
A2- Continuous support to strengthen MENA ARCM to best support States in the region. (Addressed in G2-SEI-01)
A3- Continuous support to strengthen MENA RSOO to best support States in the region. (Addressed in G2-SEI-01)
A4- Identify and mobilize resources to support SEIs for States in need to address safety issues and establish effective safety oversight capabilities. (Addressed in G2-SEI-01)
A5- Sharing of safety information via RASG-MID platform to make use of the information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning. (Addressed in G2-SEI-01)

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, RASFG-MID, States, international organizations, and industry.

Action 1: Develop and agree on joint work activities with all stakeholders through MID RCMs

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, international organizations, industry

Priority: High

Completion date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
To increase States USOAP EI and SSP level of maturity.	2028

5.2.4 Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP)

5.2.4.1 G5-SEI-01: Development and Implementation of MID-RASP

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: The RASG-MD is the governing body responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the MID-RASP, in collaboration with the ICAO MID Office, international and regional organizations and with the aviation industry. MID-RASP is to be reviewed by the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG) every year mainly to include new identified Safety Enhancement initiatives (SEIs), reviewing the existing SEIs, as well as their respective actions.

What we want to achieve: States, international organization, and industry to increase collaboration at the regional level to enhance safety.

How we monitor improvement: MID region to publish an updated regional aviation safety plan (MID-RASP), in line with the 2026–2028 edition of GASP.

How we want to achieve it: This SEIs included in MID-RASP to be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

References:

- GASP 2026-2028 Goal 5: “Strengthen aviation safety planning”
- GASP SEIs: SEI-21, SEI-22, SEI-23, and SEI-24 (Regions).

Action: A1
A1- Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, RASFG-MID, States, International organizations, and industry.

Action 1: Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition

Responsible entity: ICAO MID & SEIG

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
To manage and enhance safety at the regional	2028

5.2.4.2 G5-SEI-02: MID States to develop and publish NASP

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: States should ensure that NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. MID-RASP provides the identified safety priorities in the region and States should identify which top risks and safety issues mentioned in the GASP and MID-RASP; which apply to their national context and identify suitable mitigation actions within their NASP. States should also add/consider others which are unique to their operational context.

What we want to achieve: MID Region States to develop NASP. Successful implementation of the NASP actions would require the commitment of resources from stakeholders within State, availability of data to effectively monitor the achievement of NASP Targets, and proper project governance. In addition to the actions, NASP shall also consider how to measure their effectiveness.

How we monitor improvement: ICAO GASP requiring States to develop NASP and region to develop RASP. Feedback from RASG-MID and states on NASP implementation.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

States to establish and maintain a National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP)
 States should ensure that a NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. NASP should:

- Describe how the plan is developed and endorsed, including collaboration with different entities within the State, with industry and other stakeholders
- Include safety objectives, goals, indicators and targets in line with GASP as well as regional safety plan
- Identify the main safety risks at national level in addition to the ones identified in MID-RASP as applicable to the State
- Include series of SEIs to address safety issues
- Reflect the GASP and MID-RASP SEIs as applicable to the State.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Conduct NASPs capacity building activities & technical assistance missions.
A2- Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need of developing NASP.

References:

- ICAO Annex 19 and GASP 2026-2028 Goal 5: “Strengthen aviation safety planning”
- GASP SEIs: SEI-21, SEI-22, SEI-23, and SEI-24 (Regions).

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1- Conduct NASPs capacity building activities & technical assistance missions

Responsible entity: ICAO and states

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

Action 2- Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need of developing an NASP

Responsible entity: States, organizations, and industry

Priority: High

Completion Date: 2026

Status: ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
MID States to develop and publish NASP	2026

5.2.5 Goal 6: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks

5.2.5.1 G6-SEI-01: Promote the Use of industry Programmes

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: What we want to achieve: Work with the civil aviation authorities and organizations to increase the number of service providers participating in the corresponding ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes.

How we monitor improvement: Increase the number of service providers participating in the corresponding ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes. RASG-MID, IATA, and ACI will give feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it: Actions

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Encourage IATA’s IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion
A2- Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme

References:

- This is related to 2026-2028 GASP Goal 6 “Expand the use of industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks”
- GASP SEIs: SEI-21, SEI-22, SEI-23, and SEI-24 (Regions).

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Encourage IATA’s IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	
Responsible entity:	IATA
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and ACI
Priority:	medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
Increase the number of service providers participating in ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes and maintain recurrent APEX Missions in the region:	2028

Appendix A- Identified safety issues as indicated in the 13th MID ASR

Potential Accident Outcome							
Safety Issues	CFIT	LOC-I	MAC	RI	RE/ARC	Injury Damage inflight	Injury Damage on Ground
Monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes	X	X			X		
Adverse Convective weather (Turb, Hail,..etc)	X	X			X	X	
Un-stabilized Approach		X			X		X

Flight planning and preparation	X	X	X	X	X		
Crew Resource Management	X	X	X	X	X		
Handling of technical failure	X	X		X	X		X
Handling and execution of GOA	X	X			X		
Loss of separation in flight/ and/or airspace/TCAS RA			X			X	
Experience, training and competence of Flight Crews	X	X	X		X		
Deconfliction between IFR and VFR traffic			X				
Inappropriate flight control inputs		X			X		
Fatigue	X	X					
Entry of aircraft performance data		X					
Contained engine Failure/Power Plant Malfunctions		X			X	X	
Birdstrike/Engine Bird ingestion		X			X		
Fire/Smoke-non impact		X				X	
Wake Vortex		X				X	
Deviation from pitch or roll attitude	X	X			X		
Security Risks with impact on Safety		X					
Tail/Cross wind/Windshear		X			X		X
Runway Incursion				X	X		X
Maintenance events	X	X				X	
Contaminated runway/Poor braking action					X		X
Turbulence and Mountain Waves		X				X	
GNSS Jamming/Spoofing	X		X				
Carriage and transport of lithium batteries		X					
Effectiveness of safety management	X	X	X	X	X		

Appendix B-MID Region-Safety Performance Measurement & Monitoring (SPMM)

Aspirational Goal: Zero Fatality by 2030

Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
Number of accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of accidents to be in line with the global average rate	2028	
Number of fatal accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of fatal accidents to be in line with the global average rate	2028	
Number of fatalities per million departures	Number of fatalities per billion passengers carried (fatality rate) to be in line with the global average rate	2028	

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
Number of Runway Excursion accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of Runway Excursion accidents to be below the global average rate	2028	Target 1.1 Target 1.2 Target 1.3
Number of Runway Incursion accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of Runway Incursion accidents to be below the global average rate	2028	
Number of LOC-I related accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of LOC-I related accidents to be below the global rate	2028	
Number of CFIT related accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of CFIT related accidents to be below the global rate	2028	
Number of Mid-Air Collision (accidents)	Regional average rate of MID-Air Collision accident	2028	

Goal 2: Strengthen States’ Safety Oversight Capabilities

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
a. Regional average EI	a. Regional average EI to be above 75%		
b. States committed to national allocate to each safety oversight authority sufficient financial resources	b. At least 10 States with a “satisfactory” rating for USOAP PQ: 2.051	a. 2026-2028	Target 2.1
c. Number of audited States with an overall EI over 60%	c. All MID audited States to be above 60% EI	b. 2026-2028	Target 2.2
d. States to improve EI for CE-4 & CE-8	d. Number of MID States average EI for CE-4 & CE-8. (AIG, AGA, ANS) to be above 60%	c. 2026-2028	Target 2.3
e. Regional average EI of PPQs	e. Regional average EI PPQs above 75%	d. 2026-2028	
		e. 2026-2028	

Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
Regional Average SSP Foundation	85%	2026- 2028	
States to complete SSP self-assessment	All states	2026	Target 3.1
States to establish an SSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least 10 States established an SSP At least 10 States established SDCPS At least 10 established safety data and safety information protection 	2026- 2028	Target 3.2

Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
Number of States in need of assistance, to strengthen their Safety Oversight capabilities through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	States with SSC as a first priority All States as a second priority having EI below 80%	2026-2028	
Number of States in need of assistance to address safety issues and facilitate SSP & NASP implementation through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	All States	2026-2028	Target 4.1 Target 4.2 Target 4.3
Percentage of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs)/Safety Actions completed	80%	2026-2028	
Number of States sharing safety information to support the development of MID ASR	All states	2026-2028	

Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP)

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
MID Region to publish an updated RASP in consultation with states and industry	2026	2026	Target 5.1
Number of States that have developed and published NASP	At least 10 States	2026	Target 5.5

Goal 6: Expand the use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
Use of the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), to complement safety oversight activities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Maintain at least 60% of eligible MID airlines to be certified IATA-IOSA at all times. b. All MID States with an EI of at least 60% use IOSA to complement their safety oversight activities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. 2026-2028 b. 2026-2028 	Target 6.1
Use of the IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) certification, as a percentage of all Ground Handling service providers	<p>IATA Ground Handling Manual (IGOM) endorsed as a reference for ground handling safety standards by all MID States.</p> <p>Pursue at least 25% increase in ISAGO registration</p>	2026-2028	
Coordinate the ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	At least 2 ACI APEX in Safety to be conducted for 2 Airports of the Region per year	2026-2028	

Appendix C: Safety Actions- Consolidated List of SEIs with their respective Actions for follow up- Draft

EI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date	Name & # Activities
Regional Operational Safety Risks						
Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction in Operational Risks						
G1-SEI-01:	Aircraft Upset in Flight (LOC-I)	A1- Guidance material on flight crew proficiency	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
		A2- Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
		A3- Promote and conduct Upset Recovery Capacity building activities	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
		A4- Conduct Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
		A5- Promote DG capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fire/smoke risk in cabin	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
		A6- Promote Data-Driven Safety Management – Use flight data monitoring (FDM) to identify precursors to LOC-I events and develop targeted interventions	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
G1-SEI-02:	Runway Safety-Runway Excursion	A1- A1- Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI		2026-2028	
		A2- Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through capacity building activities.	ICAO		2026-2028	

EI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date	Name & # Activities
		A3- Conduct Runway Safety Go-Team (RST) assistance missions	States, ICAO, industry		2026-2028	
		A4- Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to Aerodromes Certification through capacity building activities.	States, ICAO, industry		2026-2028	
G1-SEI-03:	Runway Safety-Runway Incursion	A1- Promote the establishment and implementation of States' runway safety Programmes and runway safety teams	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Certification of aerodromes in accordance with Annex 14	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A3- Promote the identification and publication in AIP of hot spots at aerodromes during workshops and sub-groups meetings	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A4- Promote suitable strategies to remove hazards or mitigate risks associated with identified hot spots during workshops and sub-groups meetings	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A5- Promote the use of standardized Phraseology & ATC Procedures through capacity activities.	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A6- Promote the effective use of suitable technologies to assist the improvement of situational awareness, such as improved resolution A-SMGCS, stop bars and ARIWS	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
G1-SEI-04	MID-Air Collision (MAC)	A1- Promote Civil-Military cooperation through capacity building activities	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Promote awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas through capacity building activities.	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A3- Promote guidance to ensure aircraft are equipped with ACAS, in accordance with	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	

EI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date	Name & # Activities
		Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft during workshops, meetings, seminars.				
		A4- A4- Promote airspace among stakeholders, including complexity of airspace design, Free Route Airspace (FRA) concept, route layout, and proximity of military operational or conflict zones, establishment of FUA's through capacity building activities.	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A5- Promote the improvement of ATC systems, procedures and tools to enhance conflict management	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
G1-SEI-05	Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)	A1- A1- Advisory Circular: Instrument Approach Procedures Using Continuous Descent Final Approach Techniques	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	

Organizational Challenges/issues

Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

G2-SEI-01:	Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities	A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs with focus on AGA, AIG, & ANS areas	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry.		2026-2028	
		A2- Conduct of technical assistance missions to States, to address safety issues and enhance safety with a focus on AGA, AIG, & ANS areas.	ICAO and States		2026-2028	

		A3 - Continuous support to strengthen MENA ARCM to best support States in the region)	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A4- Identify and mobilize resources to support SEIs for States in need to address safety issues and establish effective safety oversight capabilities	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A5- Continuous support to strengthen MENA RSOO to best support States in the region	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A6- Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to enhance safety in the region	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A7- Sharing of safety information via RASG-MID platform to make use of the information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-02:	Manage Human Factors and Human Performance	A1- A1- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). (Action addressed under G1-SEI-04: CFIT)	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Conduct capacity building activities	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A3- Develop practical guides and promotion material on aircrew fatigue	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-03:	Manage Risk interdependencies					
G2-SEI-03A:	Managing GNSS Interference and spoofing	A1- Raise awareness on the potential safety impact of GNSS interference and spoofing through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	

		A2- Promote civil-military coordination and cooperation activities to facilitate the sharing of relevant information with airspace users	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-03B:	Management of security risks with safety impact	A1- Promote security risks with safety impact through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-03C:	Management of the risks arising from conflict zones	A1-Promote risks arising from conflict zones through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-03D:	Management of cybersecurity risks	A1- Promote Cybersecurity risks through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-03E:	Manage aviation health safety (AHS) risks	A1- Activation of MID-RPTF, as needed	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	

G2-SEI-04:	AAM and New Entrants	A1- Support States to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for UAS and manned VTOL-capable aircraft' through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Support States with the implementation of the UTM Regulatory Framework through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	

Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)

G3-SEI-01:	Improve the development and implementation of Safety Management	A1- Conduct SSP & SMS capacity building activities	ICAO, States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	
		A2- SRM capacity building activities	ICAO		2026-2028	

		A3- Conduct technical assistance missions to facilitate the establishment of SSP	ICAO		2026-2028
		A4- Promote safety management best practices	ICAO		2026-2028
		A5- Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need to establish an SSP	ICAO, States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028
		A6- Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to support the establishment of SSP	ICAO, States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028
		A7- Encourage all States to report safety issues via the Secure Portal on Operational Safety Risks and Emerging Issues	ICAO, States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028

Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues

G4-SEI-01:	Collaboration and coordination with stakeholders to address safety issues	A1- A1- Develop and agree on joint work activities with all stakeholders through MID RCMs	ICAO, States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028
		A2- Continuous support to strengthen MENA ARCM to best support States in the region (Addressed in G2-SEI-01)	States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028
		A3- Continuous support to strengthen MENA RSOO to best support States in the region. (Addressed in G2-SEI-01)	States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028
			States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028
		A4- Identify and mobilize resources to support SEIs for States in need to address safety issues and establish effective safety oversight capabilities. (Addressed	States, organizations, &		2026-2028

		in G2-SEI-01)	industry			
		A5- Sharing of safety information via RASG-MID platform to make use of the information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning. (Addressed in G2-SEI-01)	States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	

Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP)

G5-SEI-01:	Development and Implementation of MID-RASP	A1- Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition	States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	
G5-SEI-02:	MID States to develop and publish NASP	A1- Conduct NASPs capacity building activities & technical assistance missions.	States, organizations		2026-2028	
		A2- Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need of developing NASP.	States, organizations, industry		2026-2028	

Goal 6: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks

G6-SEI-01:	Promote the Use of industry Programmes	A1- Encourage IATA's IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	States, organizations, industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	States, organizations, industry		2026-2028	

Appendix D:

SEIs identified in MID-RASP may be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs, as appropriate



G1-SEI-01:
LOC-I



G1-SEI-02:
RE



G1-SEI-03:
RI



G1-SEI-04:
MAC



G1-SEI-05:
CFT



G2-SEI-01:
Strengthening of States'
Safety Oversight



G2-SEI-02:
Manage Human Factors
and Human
Performance



G2-SEI-03:
Manage Risk
interdependencies



G2-SEI-04:
AAM and New Entrants



G3-SEI-01:
Implement an effective
Safety Management



G5-SEI-02:
MID States to
develop and
publish NASP

Appendix E: Definitions

GLOSSARY

DEFINITIONS

Audit. A systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining evidence and evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to which requirements and audit criteria are fulfilled.

Critical elements (CEs). The critical elements of a safety oversight system encompass the whole spectrum of civil aviation activities. They are the building blocks upon which an effective safety oversight system is based. The level of effective implementation of the CEs is an indication of a State's capability for safety oversight.

Effective implementation (EI). A measure of the State's safety oversight capability, calculated for each critical element, each audit area or as an overall measure. The EI is expressed as a percentage.

Hazard. A condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident.

Safety data. A defined set of facts or values collected for reference, processing or analysis which could be used to maintain or improve safety.

Safety enhancement initiative (SEI). One or more actions to eliminate or mitigate operational safety risks or to address organizational challenges.

Safety information. Safety data processed, organized or analysed in a given context to support safety management and the development of safety intelligence.

Safety oversight. A function performed by a State to ensure that individuals and organizations performing an aviation activity comply with safety-related national laws and regulations.

Safety performance. A State or a service provider's measurable effect on safety achievement.

Safety risk. The predicted probability and severity of the consequences or outcomes of a hazard.

State safety programme (SSP). An integrated set of laws, regulations, policies, objectives, processes, procedures and activities aimed at managing safety, at the State level.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA	Audit area
ACI	Airports Council International
AI	Artificial Intelligence
ANC	Air Navigation Commission
ARC	Abnormal runway contact

ATS	Air traffic service
BARS	Basic aviation risk standard
CANSO	Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation
CAST	Commercial Aviation Safety Team
CE	Critical element
CFIT	Controlled flight into terrain
CICTT	CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team
CMA	Continuous monitoring approach
COSCAP	Cooperative Development of Operational Safety and Continuing Airworthiness Programme
EI	Effective implementation
EUROCONTROL	European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
FSF	Flight Safety Foundation
GANP	Global Air Navigation Plan
GASP	Global Aviation Safety Plan
GASeP	Global Aviation Security Plan
GASP-SG	Global Aviation Safety Plan Study Group
G-HRC	Global high-risk category of occurrence
GNSS	Global navigation satellite system
IATA	International Air Transport Association
IBAC	International Business Aviation Council
IOSA	IATA Operational Safety Audit
ISAGO	IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations
IS-BAH	IBAC International Standard for Business Aircraft Handling
IS-BAO	IBAC International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations
iSTARS	Integrated Safety Trend Analysis and Reporting System
LOC-I	Loss of control in-flight
MAC	Mid-air collision
NASP	National aviation safety plan
N-HRC	National high-risk category of occurrence
OLF	Online framework
PQ	Protocol Question
PANS	Procedures for Air Navigation Services
RAIO	Regional Accident and Incident Investigation Organization
RASG	Regional Aviation Safety Group
RASP	Regional aviation safety plan
RE	Runway excursion
RFI	Radio frequency interference
R-HRC	Regional high-risk category of occurrence
RI	Runway incursion
RSOO	Regional Safety Oversight Organization
SARPs	Standards and Recommended Practices
SCF-NP	System/component failure or malfunction (non-powerplant)
SDCPS	Safety data collection and processing system
SEI	Safety enhancement initiative
SMS	Safety management system
SOP	Standard operating procedure
SSP	State safety programme
SUPPS	Regional Supplementary Procedures
TURB	Turbulence encounter
USOAP	Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme