



ICAO

SAFETY

## MID Region Annual Safety Report



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Reference Period (2020 - 2024)

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## Foreword

The Regional Aviation Safety Group-Middle East (RASG-MID) was established in September 2011 to develop an integrated, data-driven strategy and implement a work program that supports a Regional performance framework for the management of Safety.

RASG-MID supports the implementation of the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the achievement of the Safety Targets in the MID Region Safety Strategy. The RASG-MID membership includes representatives from ICAO, MID States, and international organizations.

RASG-MID consists of four main teams: The Annual Safety Report Group (ASRG), the Aerodrome Safety planning and Implementation Group (ASPIG), the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG), the Accident and Incident Investigation Group (AIIG). The Annual Safety Report Group (ASRG) is in charge of collecting and analysing safety information. The Group is also responsible for the identification of the main safety risks, MID Region safety priorities and the production of the RASG-MID Annual Safety Report (ASR).

The RASG-MID Annual Safety Report is a timely, unbiased, and transparent source of safety-related information essential for all aviation stakeholders interested in having a tool to enable sound decision-making on safety-related matters.



## Executive Summary

The global scheduled commercial international operations accounted for approximately 37.08 million departures in 2024, compared to 35.25 million departures in 2023, which showed a high increase after covid-19 pandemic. The MID Region shows a slight increase in traffic volumes during 2024. Total scheduled commercial departures in 2024 accounted for approximately 1.39 million departures compared to 0.69 million departures in 2020. In terms of an aircraft accident, the MID Region had two accidents in 2024. The 5-year average accident rate for 2020-2024 is 1.75, which is below the global average rate (2.11) for the same period.

The MID Region had one fatal accident in 2024. However, the 5-year average fatal accident rate for 2020-2024 is 0.42 is higher than the global average rate (0.22) for the same period. The MID Region had no fatal accidents in 2021, 2022, and 2023. However, two fatal accidents occurred in 2020 and 2024. The 2020 and 2024 accidents caused 176 fatalities and 1 fatality respectively.

### MID Region Safety Priorities

The Middle East Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) 2023-2025 Edition presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety in the MID Region, to strengthen Member States Safety Oversight System, and risk-based approach to managing safety and support effective implementation of States' Safety Programmes (SSP) and Safety Management System (SMS) including the development of NASPs.

The MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition identifies MID Region Safety Performance Measurement and Monitoring (SPMM) with specific safety targets in line with GASP and the RASG-MID would continuously monitor the implementation of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and measure safety performance of regional civil aviation, to ensure the intended targets are achieved using the MID Region SPMM.

The MID-RASP provides strategy for improving safety within a specified timeframe, through defined SEIs in a coordinated, cooperative and collaborative approach among States, international organizations, and industry to achieve Safety Targets.

Fostering effective risk management capabilities in the MID Region, State and industry level to cope with the systemic and operational safety risks and wide-ranging effects of the crisis and constitute an important enabler for building back a more resilient aviation system

The tenth meeting of the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Middle East (RASG-MID/10) meeting was held in Muscat, Oman, 14-17 May 2023; endorsed the MID-RASP 2023-2025 including 24 Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and 63 safety actions through RASG-MID Conclusion 10/7. In addition, the RASG-MID/12 was apprised with appreciation on the updated progress on SEIs and their respective safety actions and noted that 44 Safety actions (70%) out of 63 have been implemented and completed.

#### A. Regional Operational Safety Risks

Operational safety risks arise during the delivery of a service or the conduct of an activity (e.g., operation of an aircraft, airports, or air traffic control). Based on the analyses of reactive and proactive safety information, it is concluded that the Regional operational safety risks for the MID Region are:

1. Loss of Control-In Flight (LOC-I);
2. RE and ARC during landing;
3. Mid-Air Collision (MAC);

4. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT); and
5. Runway incursion (RI)

In line with GASP 2026-2028 Edition, other considered regional occurrence categories: SCF-NP and TURB.

In addition to this, safety issues have been identified and mapped to their respective potential accident outcomes.

#### B. Organizational issues

Organizational issues are systemic issues which take into consideration the impact of organizational culture, and policies and procedures on the effectiveness of safety risk controls.

##### 1. **Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities**

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 76,08 %, which is above the world EI 69.05% (as of 9 July 2025). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%.

AIG, ANS, & AGA areas and CE4, CE7, and CE8 still need more improvement. Moreover, the effective implementation in training, surveillance, and resolution of Safety concerns need to be improved.

The MID Office continues to support States in strengthening their safety oversight capabilities through capacity-building activities and technical assistance missions.

##### 2. **Improve Safety Management**

States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to fully implement SSPs according to Annex 19; States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 78, 99%.

An SSP requires increased collaboration across operational domains to identify hazards and manage risks. Aviation authorities and organizations should anticipate new emerging threats and associated challenges by developing SRM principles. Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). In connection with this, the RASG-MID supported the establishment and activation of the MENA RSOO, with a primary objective to assist member States to develop and implement SSP. Recognizing the challenges faced by States in developing their SSPs, the MID Office has organized various workshops and activities focused on SSP implementation including Safety Risk Management (SRM), safety performance management, developing a safety intelligence.

The Collaborative Approach to Managing and Enhancing Aviation Safety in the MID Region, 5th Safety Summit was held in Kuwait from 25th –27th November 2024, bringing together over 100 participants from States, international organizations, and industry stakeholders. The summit served as a platform to foster collaboration in aviation safety by aligning strategies, sharing experiences, and addressing emerging challenges and supporting states with SSP development.

The following actions were recommended to support the SSP implementation in the MID Region:

- Enhance State Commitment: Secure high-level commitment and adequate resources for effective SSP implementation.
- Strengthen Governance: Establish clear governance and coordination mechanisms at the State level.
- Capacity Building: Provide targeted training, workshops, and technical assistance to develop SSP expertise.
- Establish a robust safety risk management framework at the state level
- Promote Data-Driven Oversight: Improve safety data collection, sharing, and analysis to support proactive risk management.
- Develop Regional Safety Performance Measurement and Monitoring: Harmonize SPIs across States to enable effective monitoring and benchmarking.
- Foster Collaboration: Encourage sharing of best practices and lessons learned among States and stakeholders.

In addition, the development of National Aviation Safety plan (NASP) is one of the MID region safety priorities and 9 States had developed their NASPs.

In line with the Safety Strategic Objective of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 2023-2025 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. It also provides a framework in which regional and national aviation safety plans (RASPs and NASPs) are developed and implemented.

The States NASP should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety issues. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate).

Recognizing the challenges facing the States in the development of their NASPs, the ICAO MID Office conducted NASP workshops and assistance Missions dedicated to NASP to support States with NASP development.

### **3. Human Factors and Human Performance**

As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges.

### **4. Competence of Personnel**

Availability of well-trained and competent aviation personnel is paramount to the safety and resilience of the aviation industry. Some of States in MID Region has a mature and detailed regulatory framework in place to ensure proper training, licensing, adequacy of training devices and oversight. Nevertheless, several factors are challenging this mature framework: new technologies and increasing automation are changing the safety needs for aviation personnel and new training devices are emerging. New aircraft types and technological advancements in artificial intelligence are revolutionizing pilot training altogether

### **5. Manage Risk Interdependencies**

The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that safety, security, health safety and other risks can no longer be managed in isolation. The aviation community has realized that continuing to develop tools and specific guidance for each situation and for each domain affected by transversal risks may delay not only the implementation of mitigation measures, but also the development of an enabling framework to support integrated, collaborative risk management.

### **5.1 Cybersecurity Risks**

The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalization. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardized manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organizations with malicious intent.

### **5.2 Security Risks with an Impact on Aviation Safety**

The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport security, aircraft security or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider potential impacts on aviation safety. States should consider where interdependencies between civil aviation safety and security exist.

Therefore, an integrated approach to the management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities would bring benefits such as a complete overview of risks, a better sharing of security information and the closure of gaps in the security system while focusing on increasing the overall level of safety. Consequently, this would allow ensuring synergies where security measures can have an impact on safety and vice versa; thereby avoiding incompatible actions and strengthening the overall safety and security of civil aviation.

### **5.3 Risks Arising from Conflict Zones**

The crash of flight MH17 immediately raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region. This is why it's important for CAAs, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civilian flights. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region on Jan 2020 involving Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752. The tragic accident with the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 highlighted once more the importance of information sharing and risk assessments.

### **5.4 Aviation Health Safety (AHS) Risks**

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the harmonization of health policies affecting aviation, and in particular in the CAT domain, has become an important topic to help overcome the pandemic. The objective is to minimize the impact of health safety threats in CAT. Health safety threats should be included in the management of risk interdependencies.

COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we will be faced with. It is crucial to continue supporting the Middle East aviation industry competitiveness by offering the safest aircraft interior environment to reduce the risk of disease transmission between continents and States, restore public trust and facilitate future responses to events of similar nature.

### **5.5 GNSS Interference & spoofing Risks**

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which involves systems such as Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia's GLONASS, China's, BeiDou, Europe's Galileo includes navigation satellite infrastructures and constellations which provide position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information supporting aircraft and air traffic management operations and support navigation applications in all phases of flight as well as surveillance application like ADS-B. GNSS is also used in safety nets like the

EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems) and provides the time reference that is used to synchronize systems and operations in ATM.

GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents have increasingly threatened the integrity of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing services across Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Similar incidents have been reported in other locations globally.

Jamming' blocks the GNSS signal, whereas 'spoofing' sends false information to the aircraft's receiver. There is a high safety risk as GPS spoofing has made backup inertial navigation systems unreliable by corrupting GPS data. This threat turns off the entire navigation system by tricking the Flight Management System into indicating that the aircraft is off-track. The aircraft's Inertia Reference System fails, leading to corrupted navigation systems. GPS jamming, while problematic, is a different risk level from GPS Spoofing, as it only blocks GPS signals. Still, the sensor fusion software can use other sources of information to provide continuous, precise navigation.

IATA presented statistical evidence covering over 36,000 reported events, highlighting sharp increases in spoofing (375%) and jamming (58%) from January 2023 to September 2024, with Egypt, Iraq, and Türkiye identified among the most affected States.

To bring attention to the critical issue of GNSS interference and spoofing, and to foster discussions on the management of GNSS vulnerabilities and potential mitigation measures against GNSS RFI, ICAO convened the ICAO EUR/MID Radio Navigation Symposium from 6 to 8 February 2024 in, Turkey and several recommendations have been adopted by the meeting.

#### **5.6 5G Interference with Radio Altimeter**

There is a major risk that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band will cause harmful interference to radar altimeters on all types of civil aircraft- including commercial transport airplanes; business, regional, and general aviation airplanes; and both transport and general aviation helicopters. If there is no proper mitigation, this risk has the potential for broad impacts to aviation operations in the United States as well as in other regions where the 5G network is being implemented next to the 4.2-4.4 GHz frequency band.

### **C. Emerging Issues**

Emerging safety issues are risks that might impact Safety in the future, these may include a possible new technology, a potential public policy, a new concept, business model or idea that, while perhaps an outlier today, could mature and develop into a critical mainstream issue in the future or become a major trend in its own right. Therefore, it is important that the international aviation community remain vigilant to identify emerging safety issues and develop mitigations to address them. Failure to address emerging safety issues can affect a State, Region or industry's ability to mitigate the safety risks.

#### **1. AAM and new Entrants**

The number of drones at the global level has increased. Available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. The civil aviation authority is responsible for, inter alia, ensuring aviation safety and protecting the public from aviation hazards.

The safe integration on the basis of granting fair access to airspace of all new entrants into the airspace network will be one of the main challenges in relation to the integration of UAS technologies and related concepts of operation.


Enabling the safe integration of UAS, being a fast evolving and emerging market segment, as well as of (initially manned) VTOL-capable aircraft, also intended for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations, continue to be priority activities.

Vertiports: VTOL-capable aircraft will use aerodromes, heliports and the so-called vertiports. ‘Vertiport’ means an area of land, water or structure used or intended to be used for the landing and take-off of VTOL-capable aircraft. Vertiports are classified as aerodromes for the purpose of aerodrome and vertiport regulations.

## 1. Traffic Volumes

### 1.1 Global Traffic


The global scheduled commercial international operations accounted for approximately 37.08 million departures in 2024, compared to 35.25 million departures in 2023, which showed a high increase after covid-19 pandemic.



*Graph 1: Global Traffic Volume (Source ICAO Safety Report 2025)*

### 1.2 MID Traffic

The MID Region shows a slight increase in traffic volumes during 2024. Total scheduled commercial departures in 2024 accounted for approximately 1.39 million departures compared to 0.69 million departures in 2020.



*Graph 2: MID Traffic Growth (Source ICAO Safety Report 2025)*

## 2. Reactive Safety Information

### 2.1 Safety Risk Assessment Methodology

To facilitate the identification and prioritization of the main Regional Safety Operational Risks, accidents are categorized in terms of frequency and severity and the serious incidents in terms of frequency. The severity assessment is based on fatalities, injuries, and damage to aircraft, property, and equipment. (For Frequency rating: 1 is the most frequent, and six is the least frequent. For Severity: 1 is the most severe and four is the least severe)

The MID ASRT/2 meeting (Cairo, Egypt, 4-5 February 2018) agreed to the following improvements to the methodology used for risk assessment:

*a) improvement of the current risk matrix used for the identification of Regional operational risks (four (4) levels of severity instead of three (3)), as follows:*

*improvement of the current risk matrix used for the identification of focus areas (four (4) levels of severity instead of three (3)), The level of severity is categorized as follows:*

- 1) Catastrophic: multiple deaths; serious damage to aircraft/equipment (destroyed)
- 2) Major: serious injury/fatalities; major aircraft/equipment damage
- 3) Minor: little consequences (minor injuries, minor damage to aircraft);
- 4) No potential damage or injury

Frequency \ Severity	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	2	3	4	5	6
2	2	4	6	8	10	12
3	3	6	9	12	15	18
4	4	8	12	16	20	24

**Table 1 Risk matrix**

*b) Adoption of the "feared consequences" of the risk portfolio of DGAC France:*

Table 2 below shows that each identified Undesirable event/safety issue is linked to the potential accident outcome.

NB	Identification of Undesirable Event	Potential Accident outcome						
		CFIT	LOC-I	MAC	Ground Collision	RE	Damage to aircraft or injury inflight	Damage to aircraft or /injury on ground
UE.1	Unstabilised or non-compliant approach	X	X			X		X
UE.2	Abnormal airplane attitude (Roll, pitch, speed...)		X				X	

UE.3	Events relating to aerodrome conditions (Runway surface condition and aerological parameters)		X			X	X	X
UE.4	En-route encounter of dangerous weather phenomena (Thunderstorm, turbulence, Icing)		X	#			X	X
UE.5	Misuse of aircraft system (Weight and Balance, speed track, aircraft config)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UE.6	Event pertaining to works/maintenance operations on or close to a runway		#		X	X		X
UE.7	Bad coordination/execution of ground operations (deicing, loading, stowing, line maintenance, etc)	X	X		X		X	X
UE.8	Runway/taxiway incursion				X	X		X
UE.9	Loss of separation in flight/ and/or airspace infringement /level bust		X			X	X	X
UE.10	Wildlife hazard, including bird strike		X		X	X	X	
UE.11	Ground-onboard interface failure (Misunderstanding, unsuitability of transmitted information,etc)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UE.12	Aircraft maintenance event	X	X		#	X	X	X
UE.13	Fire/Smoke inflight	#	X				X	X
UE.14	Aircraft system failure resulting in flight management disturbance	X	X			X	X	X
UE.15	Loss of cabin pressure		X	#			X	
UE.16	Aircraft damage due to FOD		X			X	X	X

**Table:2 identified Undesirable event/safety issue**

## 2.2 ICAO Data

ICAO's primary indicator of Safety in the global air transport sector is the accident rate based on scheduled commercial operations involving aircraft having a Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) above 5700 kg. Exposure data is comprised of scheduled commercial operations that involve the transportation of passengers, cargo, and mail for remuneration or hire and is a preliminary estimate solely for the calculation of the accident rates.

ICAO iSTARS applications used for the development of the ICAO Safety Reports. In addition, Occurrence Validation Study Group (OVSG) final validation accidents data is also used as source of the data analysis.

**Note:** The accident data presented here is the official ICAO accident statistics, used for the development of the ICAO safety reports. The data is based on scheduled commercial operations involving aircraft having a Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) above 5700 kg (validated or under validation by ICAO). Serious incidents presented here are safety information shared by the MID States.


The main part of this section provides an analysis of the accidents that occurred in the MID Region (State of Occurrence) for the period (2020-2024), which is used for monitoring the progress of achieving the Safety Targets in the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition (MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring).

Besides, it provides data analysis regarding accidents aircraft registered in the MID Region (State of Registry) as well as for the MID - Air operators (State of the Operator) using the same criteria mentioned above. It is to be highlighted that the State of registry and State of the operator Section focuses mainly on counts and percent distribution (no rates).

## 2.2.1 MID State of Occurrence


### 2.2.1.1 Accidents Rates and Fatalities

Graph 3 shows that the MID Region had two accidents in 2024. The 5-year average accident rate for 2020-2024 is 1.75, which is below the global average rate (2.11) for the same period.




Graph 3: Global Accident Rate Vs. MID Accident Rate (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2025)

Graph 4 shows that 8 accidents and one fatal accident occurred in the MID Region during the period (2020-2024).



Graph 4: Number of MID Accidents Vs. Number of Global Accidents Per Year (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2025)

Graph 5 shows that the MID Region had one fatal accident in 2024. However, the 5-year average fatal accident rate for 2020-2024 is 0.42 is higher than the global average rate (0.22) for the same period. The MID Region had no fatal accidents in 2021, 2022, and 2023. However, two fatal accidents occurred in 2020 and 2024. The 2020 and 2024 accidents caused 176 fatalities and 1 fatality respectively, as shown in Graph 6.




Graph 5: Global Fatal Accident Rate Vs. MID Fatal Accident Rate (Source OVSG Data & ICAO ASR 2025)




Graph 6: Number of MID Fatalities Vs. Global Fatalities (Source OVSG Data & ICAO ASR 2025)

**Accident by year for the world.** Graph 7 shows that at the world level 333 accidents occurred between 2020 and 2024. 26 fatal accidents occurred respectively during the same period.



Graph 7: Accident by year for the world


Graph 8 shows that at the MID region 8 accidents occurred between 2020 and 2024. Two fatal accidents occurred respectively during the year 2020 and 2024.



**Graph 8: MID Number of Fatal Accidents Vs. Non-Fatal Accidents Per Year (2020-2024) (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2025)**

### 2.2.1.2 Occurrence Category


Graph 09 indicates that during the period (2020-2024), CFIT, LOC-I, and MAC accidents have not been reported. However, Security related, runway excursion (RE), and abnormal runway contact (ARC) events represent the main areas of concern. In respect of the occurrence category Abrupt Manoeuvre (AMAN), the flight crew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Midair collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. It is also worth noting that one RAMP occurrence category had led to one fatality.



**Graph 09: Distribution of Occurrence Category Year (2020-2024) (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2025)**


### 2.2.1.3 Phase of Flight

Graph 10 shows that most accidents occurred during enroute phase of flight. The majority of Runway Excursion (RE) events took place during landing flight phase.



**Graph 10: Distribution of Occurrence Category Per Phase of Flight (2020-2024) (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2025)**

Graph 11 shows that most of the Regional high risk (R-HRCs) category accidents experienced during the 2020-2024 were RE/ARC, Security related, RAMP, TURB, and MAC. It is to be noted that for the Abrupt Manoeuvre (AMAN) occurrence category, the flight crew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Midair collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some people on board. Therefore, the MAC occurrence category was also considered as R-HRC. It is also worth noting that one RAMP occurrence category had led to one fatality.



**Graph 11: Occurrence Category Distribution as Percentage Per Accident (Source OVSG Data & ICAO ASR 2025)**

Taking a more in-depth look at the fatal accidents and accidents for the MID Region (State of occurrence) for the period 2020-2024, the following observations are made:

- A. In terms of fatality, the top three fatal accidents categories in the MID Region are:
  1. Security related (SEC); and
  2. Ramp
  
- B. In terms of frequency, the most frequent accidents categories in the MID Region (State of occurrence) are:
  1. Runway Safety (RS) including (RE and ARC);
  2. Turbulence (TURB); and
  3. Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC).

**Identification of the Key Risk Areas based on the analysis of accident data related to the State of Occurrence (2020-2024)**

To facilitate the identification of the safety priority areas; the safety risk assessment methodology is applied.

Main Risk Area	Frequency	Severity	Risk Level
Runway Safety (RS)-(RE/ARC)	1	3	3
Security (SEC)	3	1	3
Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC)	4	1	4
TURB	4	3	12

**Table 3: Key Risk Area**


Therefore, the key risk areas according to the State of occurrence's accidents data are

1. Runway Safety (RS): Runway Excursion (RE) and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) during landing;
2. MID Air Collision (MAC); and
3. Security related (SEC); and
4. Turbulence (TURB)

## 2.2.2 MID State of Registry and Operator

### 2.2.2.1 Accident Data Analysis


Graph 12 shows the change in the number of Fatal Accidents and non-Fatal Accidents over the last five years involving MID State of registry and State of operator airplanes. The graph indicated that there is one fatal for the last five years.



**Graph 12: Number of Fatal and Non-Fatal Accidents per Year (2020-2024) Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2025)**

### 2.2.2.2 Phase of Flight


The Graph 13 shows that the majority of accidents related to Runway Excursion (RE) and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) occurrence categories took place during landing flight phase. It was also noted that the Turbulence related accident occurred during en-route phases of flight.



**Graph 13: Distribution of the Number of Accidents Category per Phase of Flight (2020-2024) (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2025)**


### 2.2.2.3 Occurrence Category

Graph 14 shows that the high risk categories (HRC) identified are RE/ARC, and MAC. However, the RE and ARC are still the most frequent. It is to be noted that for the Abrupt Manoeuvre (AMAN) occurrence category, the flight crew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Mid-air collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. Therefore, the MAC occurrence category was also considered as HRC. It is also worth to note that a RAMP occurrence category has resulted in one fatality.



**Graph 14: Accident Distribution as Percentage per Occurrence Category (2020-2024) (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2025)**

During 2020-2024, no CFIT or LOC-I accident occurred. Runway Excursion (RE) and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) are also a serious concern in the Region. In respect of the occurrence category Abrupt Manoeuvre (AMAN), the flight crew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Midair collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. It is also worth noting that one RAMP occurrence category has led to one fatality. Turbulence (TURB) events were registered and are still prevailing as shown in Graph15.



**Graph 15: Accident Category Distribution per Year (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2025)**

Taking a more in-depth look at the fatal and non-fatal accidents for the MID Region (State of registry and State of operator) for the period 2020-2024, the following is to be highlighted:

- A. In terms of fatality, the fatal accidents categories in the MID Region for the period 2020 – 2024 are:
  - 1. One fatal accident. RAMP
- B. In terms of frequency, the most frequent accidents categories in the MID Region (State of registry and State of occurrence) for the period 2020 – 2024 are:
  - 1. Runway Safety (RS) (REand ARC);
  - 2. Turbulence encounter (TURB); and
  - 3. Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC).

**Identification of the key risk Areas based on the analysis of safety data related to the State of registry and State of operator (2020-2024)**

To facilitate the identification of the safety priority areas; the safety risk assessment methodology is applied.

Main Risk Area	Frequency	Severity	Risk Level
Runway Safety (RS). (RE/ARC)	1	3	3
Mid Air Collision (MAC)	3	1	3
Turbulence (TURB)	2	6	12

**Table 4: key Risk Area**


Therefore, the key risk areas according to the State of registry and operator accidents data are:

- 1. RAMP
- 2. Runway Safety (RS): Runway Excursion (RE) and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) during landing;
- 3. Mid Air Collision (MAC); and
- 4. Turbulence (TURB).

## 2.2.2.4 Serious Incidents Data Analysis

### 2.2.2.4.1 Occurrence Category

Graph 17 shows the total number of serious incidents provided by the MID States for the period 2020-2024



**Graph 16: Number of Serious Incidents Distribution Per Year (2020-2024)**

The data shows that there was a significant increase on the number of NMAC Occurrences. The number of serious incidents data shared by the MID States have been considered and included in the analysis to shed light and identify the potential safety concerns in the MID Region. However further data analysis should be provided by the MID States for an in-depth analysis.

Taking a more in-depth look at the serious incidents reported by the MID Region for the period 2020-2024, the following is to be highlighted:

- A. In terms of frequency, the most frequent serious incidents categories in the MID Region are:
1. Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC);
  2. Runway Excursion (RE)
  3. System Component Failure-power Plant (SCF-PP); and
  4. System Component Failure- Non-Power Plant (SCF-NP).

With respect to the Mid-Air collision (MAC)/NMAC: The most common root causes for MAC occurrences are Human performance errors and Ineffective training for ATCs. In addition, this key risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating in Gulf area over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation.

For the System Component Failure-Non-Power Plant (SCF-NP): Unexpected technical failure, lack of maintenance, not complying with the ICAO standards for Air Operator Certificates (AOC) & Operations Specifications, flying with Minimum equipment limitations

The main safety issues identified and shared by the States as follows:

- Regulatory oversight including SSP development and implementation
- SMS
- Human factors and Human Performance
- competence of personnel
- EGPWS warning (GPS Jamming)
- TCAS/RA
- GPS Jamming/Spoofing
- Runway Incursion
- Low level wind shear
- System Component Failure-Power Plant (SCF-PP)
- Technical failures

- Birdstrike
- Navigation Errors (NAV)
- Dangerous Goods
- Wake Turbulence

### 2.2.3 ICAO In-depth Analysis of Accident

#### 2.2.3.1 Runway Excursions and Abnormal Runway Contact:

During 2020-2024, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flight. This focus area covers the risk of runway excursions, including direct precursors such as hard landings, high speed landing, landings following an un-stabilized approach. The MID Region continued improvement in runway safety, which is one of the industry's principal risk areas. Table 5 indicated the root cause.

Root Cause Analysis		
<b>Latent Conditions</b>	1	Ineffective safety management system
	2	Incomplete/inefficient operator SOP
	3	Deficient flight crew training
	4	Regulatory oversight
<b>Threat</b>	1	Decision to make a landing on short runway with tailwind
	2	Poor judgment and continued landing after an un-stabilized approach
	3	Improper calculating of landing speed without focusing on the tailwind component
	4	Technical failures Pilot information
	5	Ineffective reporting of runway surface condition/Contaminated runways
	6	Airport facilities including poor runway paintings/markings/signage lighting
	7	Meteorology
<b>Errors</b>	1	Timely crew decisions (very low-level go-arounds)
	2	Failed to go around after un-stabilized approach
	3	SOP Manual not updated and maximum tailwind not mentioned
	4	Manual handling/flight controls
	5	Contaminated runways
<b>Contributing factors</b>	1	High Airspeed and Low Engine Thrust. Anti-skid failures of landing gear causing prolong landing distance.
	2	Instantaneous variable wind condition on aerodrome traffic pattern.
	3	Late activation of airbrakes and spoilers (especially airbrakes) with tailwind cause to increase the landing roll distance.

**Table 5: RE and ARC Root Cause**

Some of the Precursors, which could Lead to Runway Excursion:

- A. Precursors for aircraft overrunning the end of the runway on landing (landing overrun) could include:
1. Long landing / high across threshold / extended flare / floating,
  2. incorrect performance calculation,
  3. ineffective use of stopping devices / time to apply reverse thrust or braking / inappropriate use of auto brake setting,
  4. weather related / runway condition / aquaplaning, unsterilized approach, tailwind landing.
- B. Precursors for aircraft veering off the side of the runway during landing (landing veer-off) could include:
1. Crosswind and wet /contaminated runway,
  2. hard landing / inappropriate use of stopping devices / asymmetric braking or reverse thrust,
  3. inappropriate use of nose wheel steering.

### 2.2.3.2 Loss of Control-Inflight

During 2020-2024 there was no Aircraft upset or Loss of control. Table 6 below the root-cause analysis is based mainly on industry's analysis of the LOC-I accidents:

Root Cause Analysis		
Latent Conditions	1	Inadequate safety management system including the use of the FDM data
	2	Incomplete/Inefficient Flight operations
	3	Regulatory oversight
Threat	1	Inappropriate Flight Crew Automation training
	2	Type-rating related issues on complex and highly automated aircraft
	3	Contained engine/power plant malfunction
	4	Severe turbulence, Thunderstorms, wind shear/Gusty wind
	5	Poor visibility/IMC conditions
	6	Spatial disorientation/Somatogravic illusion
	7	Flt Crew misdiagnose the problem leading to the application of an incorrect recovery procedure
	8	Lack of exposure to the required maneuvers during normal line flying operations
	9	Limitations in simulator fidelity could lead to pilots not having the manual flying skills required to recover from some loss of control scenarios.
Errors	1	Inappropriate/Incorrect use of Automation by flight crew
	2	Inadequate flight crew monitoring skills/awareness or communication
	3	Flt Crew mishandling of manual flight path and/or speed control
	4	Abnormal checklist

	5	Incorrect recovery technique by flight crew when their aircraft has become fully stalled
<b>Contributing factors</b>	1	Unnecessary weather penetration
	2	Operation outside aircraft limitations
	3	Unstable approach
	4	Vertical/lateral speed deviation


**Table 6: LOC-I Root Cause**

**A. Direct Precursors to a Loss of Control Event:**

1. Deviation from flight path
2. Abnormal air speed or triggering of stall protections

**2.2.4 Commercial helicopters operations Data Analysis**

Only five (5) States shared the number of occurrences, and some data analysis related to commercial helicopter operation. For the period 2020-2024, one LOC-I accident and one CFIT serious incident had occurred.



**Graph 17. Commercial Hel operations incidents 2020-2024 reported by States**

The data shows that there was a significant increase on the number of SCF-NP incidents. The number of incidents data shared by the MID States have been considered and included in the analysis to shed light and identify the potential safety concerns in the MID Region. However further data analysis should be provided by the MID States for an in-depth analysis and provide more visibility on the high-risk categories and safety issues at the regional level. Therefore, MID States are strongly encouraged to share data analysis related to commercial helicopter operation to conduct appropriate analysis.

Identified top occurrence categories:

LOC-I, CFIT, SCF-PP, NAV, SCF-NP, MAC, GNSS jamming and spoofing, and BIRD.

## 2.3 MID Region Safety Performance - Safety Indicators-Reactive

### 2.3.1 Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Average 2020-2024		2024	
		MID	Global	MID	Global
Number of accidents per million departures	Reduce/Maintain the Regional average rate of accidents to be in line with the global	1.75	2.11	1.43	2.11
Number of fatal accidents per million departures	Reduce/Maintain the Regional average rate of fatal accidents to be in line with the global	0.42	0.22	0.71	0.26
Number of Runway Excursion related accidents per million departures	Reduce/Maintain the Regional average rate of Runway Excursion related accidents to be below the global	0.45	0.19	0	0.21
Number of Runway Incursion accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of Runway Incursion accidents to be below the global	0	0.02	0	0.02
Number of LOC-I related accidents per million departures	Reduce/Maintain the Regional average rate of LOC-I related accidents to be below the global average	0	0.05	0	0.02
Number of CFIT related accidents per million departures	Reduce/Maintain the Regional average rate of CFIT related accidents to be below the global rate	0	0.02	0	0.02
Number of Mid Air Collision (accidents)	Zero Mid Air Collision accident	0	0.02	0	0.004

**Table7: Goal 1-Safety indicators-Reactive**

### 3. Proactive Safety Information


This section of the Annual Safety Report focuses on proactive safety data analysis to identify organizational issues that form the basis for the development of SEIs.

#### 3.1 ICAO USOAP-CMA

##### 3.1.1 USOAP-CMA Review


Each ICAO Member State is expected to establish and maintain an effective safety oversight system that addresses all safety-related areas of aviation activities. The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP-CMA) measures the effective implementation (EI) of a State's safety oversight system.

In order to standardise the audits conducted under the USOAP CMA, ICAO established protocol questions (PQs) based on safety-related ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) established in the Annexes to the Chicago Convention, the Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS), and supporting ICAO guidance material. The PQs contribute to assessing the eight critical elements (CEs) of a State's safety oversight system.



**Graph 18. Critical elements of a State's safety oversight system**

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 76.8% which is above the world EI 69.68% (as of 9 July 2025). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%. No SSC in the MID Region.




**Graph 19: Source: ICAO USOAP CMA Online Framework (OLF), as of 09 July 2025**

**Regional EI by Audit Area and Critical Element (CE):**


CE-1	85.6			95.2		76.3	84.2	78.6
CE-2	71.6		90.5	84.9	93.5	78.3	74.6	85
CE-3		67.1	89.3	86.7	89.1	59.4	70.5	69.2
CE-4		81.5	69	75.4	81.7	43.8	52.4	51.5
CE-5	85.7	92.9	90.6	88.4	91.7	69.5	81.5	76.8
CE-6			86.2	80.7	88.9		76.2	72.2
CE-7			71.8	63.1	79.1		67.6	67.3
CE-8			64.7	57.7	81.4	66.3	44.3	53.4
	LEG	ORG	PEL	OPS	AIR	AIG	ANS	AGA

**Graph 20: Regional EI by Audit Area and Critical Element (CE): Source: ICAO USOAP CMA Online Framework (OLF), as of 09 July 2025**

AIG, ANS, & AGA areas and CE4, CE7, and CE8 still need more improvement. Moreover, the effective implementation in training, surveillance, and resolution of Safety concerns need to be improved.




**Graph 21: Source ICAO iSTARS, as of 21 August 2025**



**Graph 22: Top 3 lowest PQ EI by Audit Area Source: ICAO USOAP CMA Online Framework (OLF), as of 09 July 2025**

**Regional PPQ EI by Audit Area and Critical Element (CE):** the lowest CEs below 60% by area are CE3, CE4, CE5, and CE8



**Graph 23: Regional PPQ EI by Audit Area and Critical Element (CE): Source: ICAO USOAP CMA Online Framework (OLF), as of 09 July 2025**

### 3.1.2 ICAO USOAP CMA Activities — MID States Status for 2025

The main activities under USOAP-CMA are:

- **Audit:** This activity is performed on-site to conduct a systematic and objective assessment of State's safety oversight system. It can be full or limited.
- **ICAO Coordinated Validated Mission (ICVM):** This activity is performed to assess a State's effective corrective actions addressing previously identified findings related to PQs requiring an on-site activity.
- **Off-site Validation activity:** This activity is performed to assess a State's effective corrective actions addressing previously identified findings related to PQs not requiring an on-site activity.
- **State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment (SSPIA):** This activity is to perform a qualitative (non-quantitative) assessment of the progress made by State in implementing SSP. Broken down into 8 areas: GEN (SSP general aspects), SDA (safety data analysis), PEL, OPS, AIR (AMO aspects only), ANS (ATS aspects only), AGA, and AIG.

State/organization	Type of activity	Date	Status
Kuwait	Audit	4 to 16 Nov 2025	Planned
Bahrain	Audit	2 to 14 Dec 2025	Postponed for 2026

**Table 8: ICAO USOAP CMA Activities — MID States Status for 2025**

## 3.2 MID Region State Safety Programme (SSP)

### 3.2.1 SSP Foundation


**Safety Management Tools:** The full list of SSP Foundation PQs can be found on the SSP Foundation tool, available on iSTARS since 2017.



#### SSP Foundation

A sub-set of 299 Protocol Questions (PQs) out of the 943 PQs used to calculate the USOAP Effective Implementation (EI). This sub-set of questions are considered as the foundation for the implementation of a State Safety Programme (SSP) implementation. A SSP Foundation indicator is calculated, as the percentage of PQs which are either validated by USOAP or submitted as completed through the corrective action plans (CAP) on the USOAP CMA Online

Framework. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is **78, 99%**. The SSP foundation EI for MID Region States is shown in graph 24 below.



**Graph 24: Overall SSP foundation for MID Region States (Source: iSTARS as of 8 July 2025)**

### 3.2.2 SSP Gap Analysis

This app is designed for States at the beginning stages of implementing an SSP. It helps identify gaps between current safety management practices and the requirements outlined in ICAO Annex 19, Amendment 1. As a bonus, the app also includes a feature that supports the development of an action plan to address the gaps.



#### SSP Gap Analysis

State Safety Programs

You are invited to create an initial SSP implementation project for your State, which can be exported to facilitate offline sharing with your team.

Once you have initially established an SSP, you should use the USOAP CMA Online Framework to conduct further SSP self-assessments and provide a mechanism for ICAO to monitor the

status of your SSP.

### 3.2.3 Implementation Packages

On 17 July 2020, ICAO issued Electronic Bulletin 2020/40 informing States of the availability of implementation packages (iPacks) to support States in their response, recovery and resilience efforts following the COVID-19 outbreak. An iPack is a new ICAO initiative, which bundles standardized guidance material, training, tools, checklists and subject matter expert support to facilitate and guide the implementation of ICAO provisions for State entities (e.g. Governments, CAAs, national air transport facilitation committees), aviation service providers, supply chain stakeholders and their personnel.

iPacks are developed and implemented in full alignment with the measures and recommendations contained in the Council Aviation Recovery Task Force (CART) Report.

#### MID Region State Safety Programme (SSP) Implementation challenges

Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top Safety priorities. Common challenges have been identified based on the States' feedback, as follows:

- Legislation amendments;
- Capacity building and training;
- Limited qualified personnel;

- Limited guidance to establish and develop a Safety data and safety information collection and analysis;
- Limited collaboration, coordination, and communication amongst SSP stakeholders;
- Limited guidance to develop a robust safety risk management framework and processes;
- Transition from a prescriptive approach to a more risk-based and performance-based approach; and
- Geopolitical situation in the region

The following actions were recommended to support the SSP implementation in the MID Region:

- Enhance State Commitment: Secure high-level commitment and adequate resources for effective SSP implementation.
- Strengthen Governance: Establish clear governance and coordination mechanisms at the State level.
- Capacity Building: Provide targeted training, workshops, and technical assistance to develop SSP expertise.
- Establish a robust safety risk management framework at the state level
- Promote Data-Driven Oversight: Improve safety data collection, sharing, and analysis to support proactive risk management.
- Develop Regional Safety Performance Measurement and Monitoring: Harmonize SPIs across States to enable effective monitoring and benchmarking.
- Foster Collaboration: Encourage sharing of best practices and lessons learned among States and stakeholders.

#### National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP)

In line with the ICAO Safety Strategic Objective, the 2023-2025 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. It also provides a framework in which regional and national aviation safety plans (RASPs and NASPs) are developed and implemented.

The States NASP should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety issues. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate).

Recognizing the challenges facing the States in the development of their NASPs, the ICAO MID Office conducted NASP workshops and assistance Missions dedicated to NASP in order to support States with NASP development.

The main challenges faced by States in developing their NASPs.

- Capacity building and training;
- Senior management commitment
- Limited resources including financial
- Limited qualified personnel;
- Safety data and safety information collection and analysis;
- Emerging of new technologies;
- Limited collaboration, coordination, and communication amongst stakeholders;
- Limited guidance to develop a robust safety risk management framework and

- processes; and
- Geopolitical situation in the region.

### MID Region 5th safety summit outcome

The Collaborative Approach to Managing and Enhancing Aviation Safety in the MID Region, 5<sup>th</sup> Safety Summit was held in Kuwait from 25<sup>th</sup> –27<sup>th</sup> November 2024, bringing together over 100 participants from States, international organizations, and industry stakeholders. The summit served as a platform to foster collaboration in aviation safety by aligning strategies, sharing experiences, and addressing emerging challenges.

#### **Key Focus Areas:**

- Implementation of State Safety Program (SSP) and Safety Management System (SMS).
- Establishing a robust Safety Risk Management (SRM) framework at the state level.
- Developing effective Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs).
- Enhancing safety intelligence and data analysis capabilities.
- Assessment of SSP and SMS implementation.
- Addressing emerging threats such as GNSS interference & spoofing, Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) integration, and cybersecurity risks.
- Advancing aerodrome certification and establishing Runway Safety Teams.

#### **Key outcomes**

The summit reinforced the importance of strengthened collaboration among stakeholders to address aviation safety challenges; leveraging data-driven safety intelligence for informed decision-making; and capacity-building initiatives to enhance regional safety capabilities. A strong commitment was made to align regional safety strategies with ICAO standards to ensure continuous improvement and resilience in addressing emerging challenges. Additionally, the MID Office’s role in providing technical support and facilitating cross-state coordination was highlighted as critical to advancing aviation safety in the region.

### **6<sup>th</sup> MID Region Safety Summit**

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has graciously volunteered to host the 6<sup>th</sup> MID Region Safety Summit in 2026. This reflects the UAE's dedication to promoting aviation, safety and fostering regional collaboration.

### ***3.3 Human Factors and Human Performance***

As the aviation system changes, it is imperative to ensure that human factors and the impact on human performance are taken into account, both at service provider and regulatory levels. Human factors and human performance are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably.

The performance of the aviation system, including its safety performance, depends on humans and on the effective integration of the human factors into the management systems in place. Accordingly, focus on human factors and human performance should form an integral part of any safety management approach, be it at regional, State or industry level.

ICAO emphasized the importance of addressing human factors and human performance issues by publishing ICAO Doc 10151 ‘Manual on Human Performance (HP) for Regulators (first edition 2021).

As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new

challenges. In addition, Team Resource Management (TRM) was introduced into ATC following the success achieved with CRM in the airline community enhancing teamwork practices. The practice is applied within virtually every airline with training given to pilots and other operational staff.

Within the last decade in ATM there have been numerous advances in widespread acceptance of SMS under the guidance of ICAO. ICAO has now mandated the use of SMS Manual Doc 9859 to standardize the approach to safety. TRM as defined by ICAO is an integral component of SMS under human factor.

### **3.4 Competence of Personnel**

Availability of well-trained and competent aviation personnel is paramount to the safety and resilience of the aviation industry. Some of States in MID Region has a mature and detailed regulatory framework in place to ensure proper training, licensing, adequacy of training devices and oversight. Nevertheless, several factors are challenging this mature framework: new technologies and increasing automation are changing the safety needs for aviation personnel and new training devices are emerging. New aircraft types and technological advancements in virtual reality/artificial intelligence are revolutionizing pilot training altogether.

### **3.5 Manage Risk Interdependencies**

The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that safety, security, health safety and other risks can no longer be managed in isolation. The aviation community has realized that continuing to develop tools and specific guidance for each situation and for each domain affected by transversal risks may delay not only the implementation of mitigation measures, but also the development of an enabling framework to support integrated, collaborative risk management.

Some initial integration steps have already been taken in the safety and security domains-in accordance with ICAO Annex 17 and Annex 19 Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), the Contracting States are required to establish reporting systems for the analysis of security and safety information. States have been advised by ICAO to consider aligning their security reporting mechanisms with existing aviation safety reporting systems, to allow for an integrated approach to the management of risks. This should also enable the use of existing safety tools and concepts especially in relation to the appropriate protection of data and of those reporting for the benefit of aviation security, as well as foster the implementation of a safety and security culture amongst States and stakeholders.

#### **3.5.1 Cybersecurity Risks**

The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalization. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardized manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organizations with malicious intent.

#### **3.5.2 GNSS Interference & Spoofing Risks**

Satellite navigation signals are used both for aircraft navigation and for aggressive aircraft/ drone in the region. Satellite navigation signals are weak and can easily be compromised by a range of growing threats, including intentional or unintentional signal interference, jamming, spoofing, and/or the

manipulation of position and timing information. The effects of such threats vary greatly. Satellite signal jamming can have a serious effect on the accuracy of navigation systems and, in some cases, results in unusual system behaviour.

IATA presented statistical evidence covering over 36,000 reported events, highlighting sharp increases in spoofing (375%) and jamming (58%) from January 2023 to September 2024, with Egypt, Iraq, and Türkiye identified among the most affected States. Summary of Analysis – IDX Events - January 2023 to September 2024:

#### Reported GPS Signal Interference events

- Number/Rate: 36,253 reported events / 0.77 events per 1,000 flights
- Trend: 107% increase (no of events) and 175% increase (rate)
- Highest Regions: EUR, MENA
- Highest FIRs: LTAA/Ankara, ORBB/Baghdad, HECC/Cairo

#### Reported GPS jamming events:

- Number/Rate: 25,756 reports / 0.54 events per 1,000 flights
- Trend: 58% increase (no of events) and 111% increase (rate)
- Highest Regions: EUR, MENA
- Highest FIR: LTAA/Ankara, ORBB/Baghdad


#### Reported GPS spoofing events

- Number/Rate: 10,497 reports / 0.21 events per 1,000 flights
- Trend: 375% increase (no of events) and 500% increase (rate)
- Highest Regions: MENA, EUR
- Highest FIR: HECC/Cairo, LTAA/Ankara, ORBB/Baghdad

#### Reported EGPWS events

- Number/Rate: 8,896 reports / 0.19 events per 1,000 flights
- Trend: 384% increase (no of events) and 500% increase (rate)
- Highest Regions: MENA, EUR
- Highest FIR: HECC/Cairo, LTAA/Ankara, OJAC/Amman

To bring attention to the critical issue of GNSS interference and spoofing, and to foster discussions on the management of GNSS vulnerabilities and potential mitigation measures against GNSS RFI, ICAO convened the ICAO EUR/MID Radio Navigation Symposium from 6 to 8 February 2024 in, Turkey and several recommendations have been adopted by the meeting.



***Graph 25: Reported GNSS/GPS Interference- FDX Events***

## **Recommendations:**

To address this issue of harmful interference to GNSS.

### **Airlines**

- To develop/update their own risk model using the appropriate assessment technique to evaluate the operator's exposure to GNSS RFI hazards across the operational network.
- To establish a safety Performance Indicator (SPI) related to GNSS RFI and the aircraft navigation and surveillance performance degradation.
- To enforce flight crews to submit GNSS RFI-related safety reports is also recommended as a complementary means to capture and follow up on the GNSS RFI Issue.
- Periodically evaluate established SPIs and exposure to GNSS RFI to determine the effectiveness of controls.

### **IATA**

- To assist operators in identifying GNSS interference hotspots, evaluating the feasibility of providing near real-time source information such as FDX could help assess exposure to jamming and spoofing threats. ANSP
- To promptly notify airlines and airspace users once interference to GNSS was notified.
- To inform flight crews and air traffic controllers about the impact of GNSS interference and establish effective contingency procedures and capabilities as appropriate.

### **STATES**

- To implement appropriate mitigation measures as contained in ICAO GNSS Manual (Doc 9849) as a matter of high priority and to report progress and any difficulties to ICAO.
- While using GNSS jammers during military exercises and operations, to recognize the intended impact of harmful interference to civil flight operations and to exercise caution to the maximum extent possible to protect the safety of civil aircraft.
- To establish and ensure appropriate frequency regulations are in place and maintained to protect allocated GNSS frequencies from harmful interference in line with ITU Radio Regulations.
- To carefully consider operational risks associated to harmful interference to GNSS during their planning for rationalization of conventional navigation and surveillance infrastructures and to incorporate inputs from airspace users while developing a CNS rationalization plan.
- To ensure that contingency procedures are established in coordination with air navigation service providers and airspace users and that essential conventional navigation infrastructure, particularly Instrument Landing System (ILS), are retained and fully operational.

### **ICAO**

- In coordination with manufacturers and airspace user communities, to develop a global strategy on Alternative Position, Navigation, and Timing. This A-PNT strategy should aim to ensure continuity of flight and ATM operations during interruptions of GNSS and should include the increasing capabilities and roles of onboard INS/IRU.
- In cooperation with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to analyze the reported cases of harmful interference to GNSS and establish appropriate measures to address the safety impact on aviation

### **3.5.3 5G interference with Radio Altimeter Risks**

Radar altimeters (RA), operating at 4.2-4.4 GHz, are the only sensors onboard a civil aircraft which provide a direct measurement of the clearance height of the aircraft over the terrain or other obstacles (i.e. the Above Ground Level - AGL - information).

The RA systems' input is required and used by many aircraft systems when AGL is below 2500 ft. Any failures or interruptions of these sensors can therefore lead to incidents with catastrophic outcome, potentially resulting in multiple fatalities. The radar altimeters also play a crucial role in providing situational awareness to the flight crew. The measurements from the radar altimeters are also used by Automatic Flight Guidance and Control Systems (AFGCS) during instrument approaches, and to control the display of information from other systems, such as Predictive Wind Shear (PWS), the Engine-Indicating and Crew-Alerting System (EICAS), and Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) systems, to the flight crew.

There is a major risk that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band will cause harmful interference to radar altimeters on all types of civil aircraft- including commercial transport airplanes; business, regional, and general aviation airplanes; and both transport and general aviation helicopters. If there is no proper mitigation, this risk has the potential for broad impacts to aviation operations in the United States as well as in other regions where the 5G network is being implemented next to the 4.2-4.4 GHz frequency band.

List of potential equipment failures:

Auto land functions, EICAS/ECAM, False or missing GPWS alert, Unreliable instrument Indications, and Abnormal behaviors in Automatic Flight Systems.

### **3.5.4 Security Risks with an Impact on Aviation Safety**

The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport security, aircraft security or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider potential impacts on aviation safety. States should consider where interdependencies between civil aviation safety and security exist.

Therefore, an integrated approach to the management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities would bring benefits such as a complete overview of risks, a better sharing of security information and the closure of gaps in the security system while focusing on increasing the overall level of safety. Consequently, this would allow ensuring synergies where security measures can have an impact on safety and vice versa; thereby avoiding incompatible actions and strengthening the overall safety and security of civil aviation.

### **3.5.5 Risks Arising from Conflict Zones**

The crash of flight MH17 immediately raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region. This is why it's important for CAAs, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civilian flights. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region on Jan 2020 involving the Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752. The tragic accident with the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 highlighted once more the importance of information sharing and risk assessments.

### 3.5.6 Aviation Health Safety (AHS) Risks

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the harmonization of health policies affecting aviation, and in particular in the CAT domain, has become an important topic to help overcome the pandemic. The objective is to minimize the impact of health safety threats in CAT. Health safety threats should be included in the management of risk interdependencies.


COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we will be faced with. It is crucial to continue supporting the aviation industry competitiveness by offering the safest aircraft interior environment to reduce the risk of disease transmission between continents and States, restore public trust and facilitate future responses to events of similar nature.

A number of actions were initiated following the onset the COVID-19 pandemic including the establishment of the MID-RPTF to serve as a platform for coordination and cooperation amongst all stakeholders to support States with the implementation of the CART and HLCC recommendations as well as the recovery of aviation industry in the MID Region during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. The development of ICAO CART CART I, CART II, CART III, and CART IV Reports and the associated "Take-Off Guidance Document" (TOGD).

## 3.6 Incidents Data

### 3.6.1 Incident Data shared by States for the Period 2020-2024

Graph 26 below shows that the number of Navigation (NAV) incident reported is the highest one followed by the system component failure-non-power plant (SCF-NP), Wake Turbulence, airborne conflict incidents (near mid-air collision) and birds. For an in-depth analysis and to identify the underlying safety issues, MID States should provide further safety information and safety analysis to come out with strategic initiatives and mitigations.



**Graph 26: Total number of incidents provided by the MID States for the period 2020-2024**

### 3.6.2 IATA Data

#### 3.6.2.1 Global Accidents

## **IATA 2024 MID Safety Report**

The Region continues face challenges due to disruptions to aviation caused by geopolitical tensions. During the course of the year, IATA/ICAO established a series of Contingency Coordination Teams (CCTs) to ensure continuity of operations with robust contingency plans and routes established. Regional Contingency Coordination activities remain a priority for the region.

Large Height Deviations (LHD) events continue to persist in MID region. Inconsistent LHD reporting from several member states, particularly those with high traffic volumes, undermines the confidence in Safety Monitoring Report (SMR) results. Meanwhile, a significant increase in LHD reports at the eastern boundaries of Muscat FIR raises concerns requiring immediate attention.

Substantial progress has been made in MID region in building the technical capacity required for the use of ADS-B data analysis for aircraft altimetry system height monitoring. It is expected to declare this capability by MID RMA in the 1st quarter of 2025.

GNSS, interference has remained significant in the MID Region. All forms of GPS signal interference and spoofing have increased dramatically between Jan 2023 and Sept 2024. The MID region has recorded the highest number of GPS incident reports with FDX rate of 138% compared to FDX world average of 39.38%.

Commercial aviation remains one of the safest modes of public transport. This is evidenced by a long-term trend showing a significant reduction in accident rates, from 3.72 accidents per million sectors in 2005 to 1.13 accidents per million sectors in 2024

A total of 46 accidents in 2024 representing a 9% increase from 2023. In 2024, seven accidents were fatal, resulting in 244 onboard deaths this marks a significant increase compared to 2023, which recorded 72 onboard fatalities.

The fatality risk rate per million sectors increased from 0.03 in 2023 to 0.06 in 2024. However, the long-term trend continues to show a significant decline, dropping from 0.69 in 2005 to 0.06 in 2024.


**Accident categories** in 2024, listed in order of the number of fatalities, with the number of accidents in brackets, were:

- Other End State 1 (4) with 182 On-Board fatalities, plus one fatality onboard where aircraft experienced minimal damage.
- Loss of Control – In-Flight (LOC-I) (1) with 62 On-Board fatalities
- Runway Damage (1) 5 Other fatalities
- Mid-Air Collision (1) 2 Other fatalities

**The accident categories in 2024**, listed by the frequency of **non-fatal accidents**, were:

- Tail Strike (12)
- Runway Excursion (10)
- Landing Gear (5)
- Ground Damage (3)
- Runway Damage (2)
- Off Runway Touchdown (Off or Partial) (2)
- Hard Landing (2)
- Other End State (2)


▪ In-flight Damage (1)



**Graph 27: Accident Rate by Region of Operator**

MID Region see an improvement when comparing with 2023: the accident rate per million sectors decreased from 1.12 in 2023 to 1.08 in 2024. Fatality risk rate has remained zero since 2019.

**Accident Rate (per Million sector) and Sector Count (Percentage) by Region of Operator**



**Graph 28: Accident Rate (per Million sector) and Sector Count (Percentage) by Region of Operator**


**3.6.3 IATA Data**

**3.6.3.1 IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) – Risk-Based Approach**


In 2024, the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) Program rolled out its risk-based audits on a large scale and successfully conducted over 100 audits, meeting IATA’s Board of Governors target. Risk-based IOSA (RBI) delivers greater safety insights through a data-driven approach to identifying the most critical IOSA Standards and Recommended Practices (ISARPs) to an operator’s individual profile, and by performing a deeper assessment of these. The new approach includes new audit methods such as a maturity assessment of the operator’s Safety Management System (SMS) and safety critical programs.

IATA’s risk-based audits have demonstrated that maturity assessments provide invaluable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the operators’ SMS and other safety-critical programs. The risk-based audits identified, on average, three times more non-conformities than conventional audits, thanks to a more targeted and effective audit methodology, as well as enhanced auditor training and qualification programs. The IOSA Program currently trains, maintains and oversees some 190 IOSA Auditors worldwide.

The IOSA Registry has grown significantly in 2024: 46 new airlines across all regions have completed their initial IOSA audit bringing the total number of airlines on the registry to 446.



**Graph 29: Findings per Discipline (2023-April 2025)**



**Graph 30: Findings per Sub-Section**

### 3.6.3.2 IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO)


IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) is the industry program for the global oversight of ground handling service providers (GHSPs). There are 226 GHSPs in the ISAGO Registry providing services at 401 accredited stations at 239 airports worldwide. As of 31st Dec 2024, 267 audits were completed, and 370 audits are expected in the year 2025. Currently, 169 airlines (145 in FEB 24) have access to the ISAGO audit reports repository, which contains over 500 reports.

ISAGO audit model is being revamped to meet the industry requests for enhancements, driving even more standardization, adoption of industry requirements for ground operations, and safety risk reduction.

#### Top ISAGO findings for 2024

Data range 01 Jan- 31 Dec 2024 Top issues for ORM are being reported from SMS, documentation control, training, Ground Service Equipment (GSE) maintenance and addressing QMS issues, see below graph


**Organisation and Management (ORM)**



**Findings** – SMS, operational documents control, GSE maintenance program, training management and records and addressing QMS issues

*Graph 31: Top ISAGO Findings for 2024*


**Load Control (LOD)**



**Findings**- procedures for manual, documents accessibility, job-specific training, weight & balance, load control communication, valid manual load documentation used

*Graph 32: Load control*


**Passenger and Baggage (PAB)**



**Findings**-Operational documents accessibility, boarding pass issuance, handling of battery-operated mobility aids, training program, transfer of information and data to load control.

*Graph 33: PAB*


**Aircraft Ground Movement (AGM)**



**Findings-** Operational documents accessibility, clear engine danger area, walkaround inspection, prior to aircraft arrival ramp is clear and free of FOD, GSE compatible for aircraft type/weather, job specific training, airside driving license/airside training, aircraft Inspection for each arrival.

*Graph 34: AGM*

**Aircraft Handling and Loading (HDL)**



**Findings -** Operational documents accessibility, GSE maintenance program, water quality standards, lavatory services procedures/handling, operational procedures, job-specific training, driving speed, airside driving training and license, potable water servicing operations

*Graph 35: HDL*

**3.7 Region Safety Performance - Safety Indicators-Proactive**

**3.7.1 Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities**

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	MID	Remark
A. Regional average EI	a. Increase the Regional average EI to be above 80 by 2025	<b>76,08%</b>	
B. Number of MID States with an overall EI over 60%.	b. All MID audited States to be above 60% EI by 2025	10 States	
C. Regional average EI by area	c. Regional average EI for each area to be above 70% by 2025	6 areas	
D. Regional average EI by CE	d. Regional average EI for each CE to be above 70% by 2025	5 CEs	
E. Regional average EI of PPQs	e. Regional average EI PPQs above 75% by 2025	74.6%	

*Table 9: Goal 2*

### 3.7.2 Goal 3: Implementation of Effective SSP

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	MID	Remark
Regional Average SSP Foundation	85% by 2025	78.99%	
Number of States having an SSP that is present*	At least 4 States	TBD	
Number of States that have developed and published a national aviation safety plan (NASP)	All States by 2025	9	
Number of States that require applicable service providers under their authority to implement an SMS	All States	TBD	

*Table 10: Goal 3*

### 3.7.3 Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	MID	Remark
Percentage of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) completed	80% by 2025	70%	
Number of States seeking/receiving assistance, to strengthen their Safety Oversight capabilities through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	States with SSC as a first priority All States as a second priority having EI below 80%	10 States	
Number of States seeking assistance to facilitate SSP & NASP implementation through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	All States	6 States	
Number of States sharing safety information including operational safety risks and emerging issues to support the development of MID ASR	All States	6	

*Table 11: Goal 4*

### 3.7.4 Goal 5: Expand the use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	MID	Remark
Use of the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), to complement safety oversight activities.	a. Maintain at least 60% of eligible MID airlines to be certified IATA-IOSA at all times. b. All MID States with an EI of at least 60% use the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) to complement their safety oversight activities.	6 states (40%)	

Use of the IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) certification, as a percentage of all Ground Handling service providers	The IATA Ground Handling Manual (IGOM) endorsed as a reference for ground handling safety standards by all MID States by 2025	6 States (40%)	
MID RASP developed in consultation with industry	MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition	Completed	Target achieved
Number of States that have established Safety data collection and processing system (SDCPS)	At least 12 States by 2025	TBD	

**Table12: Goal 5**

### 3.7.5 Goal 6: Ensure Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	MID	Remark
Percentage of Certified International Aerodromes*	65% by 2025	58,62%	
Percentage of established Runway Safety Team (RST) at MID International Aerodromes.	80% by 2025	<b>68,97%</b>	
Percentage of Global reporting Format (GRF) Plans implemented for International Aerodromes*	75% by 2025	65.33%	

**Table13: Goal 6**

## 4 Safety Priorities for MID Region

One of the GASP goals is for States to improve their effective safety oversight capabilities and to progress in the implementation of SSPs. Thus, GASP calls for States to put in place robust and sustainable safety oversight systems that should progressively evolve into more sophisticated means of managing Safety. In addition to addressing organizational/systemic safety issues, GASP addresses high-risk categories of occurrences, which are deemed global safety priorities. These categories were determined based on actual fatalities from past accidents, high fatality risk per accident or the number of accidents and incidents. Therefore, the Regional operational Safety risks, organizational issues, and the emerging safety risks will be defined and which would support and improve the development of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs).

### 4.1 Regional Operational Safety Risks

Operational safety risks arise during the delivery of a service or the conduct of an activity (e.g. operation of an aircraft, airport or of air traffic control). Operational interactions between people and technology, as well as the operational context in which aviation activities are carried out are taken into consideration to identify expected performance limitations and hazards.

The reactive and proactive safety information provided by ICAO, IATA, MID Region States and the safety risk portfolio were considered for identifying the Regional operational risks. Table 14 shows that each identified safety issue is mapped to its respective potential accident outcome (s), and the safety risk Portfolio for the MID Region as follow:

Safety Issues	Potential Accident Outcome					Injury Damage inflight	Injury Damage on Ground
	CFIT	LOC-I	MAC	GCOL	RE/ARC		
Monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes	X	X			X		
Adverse Convective weather (Turb, Hail,..etc)	X	X			X	X	
Un-stabilized Approach		X			X		X
Flight planning and preparation	X	X	X	X	X		
Crew Resource Management	X	X	X	X	X		
Handling of technical failure	X	X		X	X		X
Handling and execution of GOA	X	X			X		
Loss of separation in flight/ and/or airspace/TCAS RA			X			X	
Experience, training and competence of Flight Crews	X	X	X		X		
Deconfliction between IFR and VFR traffic			X				

Potential Accident Outcome							
Safety Issues	CFIT	LOC-I	MAC	GCOL	RE/ARC	Injury Damage inflight	Injury Damage on Ground
Inappropriate flight control inputs		X			X		
Fatigue	X	X					
Entry of aircraft performance data		X					
Contained engine Failure/Power Plant Malfunctions		X			X	X	
Birdstrike/Engine Bird ingestion		X			X		
Fire/Smoke-non impact		X				X	
Wake Vortex		X				X	
Deviation from pitch or roll attitude	X	X			X		
Security Risks with impact on Safety		X					
Tail/Cross wind/Windshear		X			X		X
Runway Incursion				X	X		X
Maintenance events	X	X				X	
Contaminated runway/Poor braking action					X		X
Turbulence and Mountain Waves		X				X	
GNSS Jamming/Spoofing	X		X				
Carriage and transport of lithium batteries		X					
Effectiveness of safety management	X	X	X	X	X		

Table 14: Safety Risk Portfolio

First, Considering ICAO reactive safety information, the Regional operational safety risks identified was runway safety (RE/ARC). It is also to be noted that for the Abrupt Manoeuvre (AMAN) occurrence category, the flight crew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Mid-air collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. Therefore, the MAC occurrence category was also considered as a HRC. Considering also the reactive and proactive safety information, safety issues identified which could lead to the potential accident outcomes of Loss of control Inflight (LOC-I), Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), Mid Air Collision (MAC), and runway incursion (RI) as detailed in the above safety risk portfolio. Therefore, LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RI were also considered as Regional operational safety risks (R-HRC) due to the potential risk of these types of accidents though the MID States did not experience those accidents during the period 2019-2023.

Based on the analyses of reactive and proactive safety information, it is concluded that the regional operational safety risks for the MID Region are:

1. Loss of Control-In Flight (LOC-I);
2. Runway Safety (RS); mainly (RE and ARC during landing);
3. Mid-Air Collision (MAC);
3. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT); and
5. Runway incursion (RI).

In line with GASP 2026-2028 Edition, other considered regional occurrence categories: SCF-NP and TURB.

In addition to this, main safety issues have been identified and mapped to their respective potential outcomes as detailed in the table 14.

### **1. Loss of control inflight (LOC-I)**

Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime that is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always, at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved. Prevention of loss of control is a strategic priority.

### **2. Runway Excursions (RE):**

RE is a veer or overrun off the runway surface. RE events can happen during take-off or landing. During the period 2020-2024, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flight. In addition, High Airspeed and Low Engine Thrust identified as key contributing factors to the Unstable Approaches Events.

### **3. Mid-Air Collision (MAC)**

Refers to the potential collision of two aircraft in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine TCAS resolution advisories, or airspace infringements. During 2020, no mid-air collision accident has been recorded. However, the flight crew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Mid-air collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. In addition, this key risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating in Gulf area over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation. This is one specific safety issue that is the main priority in this key risk area. However, additional safety data and safety information are needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

### **4. Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)**

It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences, which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc. There was no fatal accident involving MID States operators during this period. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States and in other parts of the world that make it an area of concern. However, additional safety data and safety information are needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

### **5. Runway incursion (RI)**

A Runway Incursions refers to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection. Their accident outcome is runway collisions. While there were no fatal accidents or accidents involving MID States operators in the last years involving runway collision,

the risk of the reported occurrence demonstrated to be very real. In addition to this, MID States should provide further safety data and safety information regarding runway incursion to identify the root causes and associated safety issues.

## **4.2 Organizational Issues**

Organizational issues are systemic issues which take into consideration the impact of organizational culture, and policies and procedures on the effectiveness of safety risk controls. Organizations include entities in a State, such as the civil aviation authority (CAA) and service providers, such as operators of aeroplanes, ATS providers, and operators of aerodromes. Organizations should identify hazards in systemic issues and mitigate the associated risks to manage Safety. A State's responsibilities for the management of Safety comprise both safety oversight and safety management, collectively implemented through an SSP.

### **4.2.1 Enhance States' Safety Oversight Capabilities**

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 76,08 %, which is above the world EI 69.05% (as of 9 July 2025). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%.

4 areas and 5 critical elements are above the target of 75% EI. However, the areas of AIG, ANS, &AGA and CE4, CE7, and CE8 still need more improvement. Moreover, the effective implementation in training, surveillance, and resolution of Safety concerns need to be improved.

The MID Office continues to support States in strengthening their safety oversight capabilities through capacity-building activities and technical assistance missions.

### **4.2.2 Improve Safety Management**

States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to fully implement SSPs according to Annex 19; States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 78, 99%.

An SSP requires increased collaboration across operational domains to identify hazards and manage risks. Aviation authorities and organizations should anticipate new emerging issues and associated challenges by developing SRM principles. Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). In connection with this, the RASG-MID supported the establishment and activation of the MENA RSOO, with a primary objective to assist member States to develop and implement SSP. Recognizing the challenges faced by States in developing their SSPs, the MID Office has organized several workshops and activities focused on SSP implementation including Safety Risk Management (SRM), safety performance management, developing safety intelligence.

Additionally, the development of National Aviation Safety plan (NASP) is one of the MID region priorities and 9 States had developed their NASPs.

In line with the Safety Strategic Objective of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 2023-2025 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. It also provides a framework in which regional and national aviation safety plans (RASPs and NASPs) are developed and implemented.

The States NASP should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety issues. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate).

Recognizing the challenges facing the States in the development of their NASPs. In this respect, the ICAO MID Office conducted NASP workshops and assistance Missions dedicated to NASP to support States with NASP development.

#### **4.2.3 Human Factors and Human Performance**

As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. CRM has been identified as most important human factors issue in the domain of commercial air transport and safety actions would be identified and developed.

#### **4.2.4 Competence of Personnel**

Availability of well-trained and competent aviation personnel is paramount to the safety and resilience of the aviation industry. Some of States in MID Region has a mature and detailed regulatory framework in place to ensure proper training, licensing, adequacy of training devices and oversight. Nevertheless, several factors are challenging this mature framework: new technologies and increasing automation are changing the safety needs for aviation personnel and new training devices are emerging. New aircraft types and technological advancements in virtual reality/artificial intelligence are revolutionizing pilot training altogether

#### **4.2.5 Manage Risk Interdependencies**

The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that safety, security, health safety and other risks can no longer be managed in isolation. The aviation community has realized that continuing to develop tools and specific guidance for each situation and for each domain affected by transversal risks may delay not only the implementation of mitigation measures, but also the development of an enabling framework to support integrated, collaborative risk management.

##### **4.2.5.1 Cybersecurity Risks**

The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalization. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardized manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organizations with malicious intent.

##### **4.2.5.2 Security risks with an impact on aviation safety**

The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport security, aircraft security or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider potential impacts on aviation safety. States should consider where interdependencies between civil aviation safety and security exist.

Therefore, an integrated approach to the management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities would bring benefits such as a complete overview of risks, a better sharing of

security information and the closure of gaps in the security system while focusing on increasing the overall level of safety. Consequently, this would allow ensuring synergies where security measures can have an impact on safety and vice versa; thereby avoiding incompatible actions and strengthening the overall safety and security of civil aviation.

#### **4.2.5.3 Risks arising from conflict zones**

The crash of flight MH17 immediately raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region. This is why it's important for CAAs, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civilian flights. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region on Jan 2020 involving the Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752. The tragic accident with the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 highlighted once more the importance of information sharing and risk assessments.

#### **4.2.5.4 aviation health safety (AHS) risks**

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the harmonization of health policies affecting aviation, and in particular in the CAT domain, has become an important topic to help overcome the pandemic. The objective is to minimize the impact of health safety threats in CAT. Health safety threats should be included in the management of risk interdependencies.

COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we will be faced with. It is crucial to continue supporting the Middle East aviation industry competitiveness by offering the safest aircraft interior environment to reduce the risk of disease transmission between continents and States, restore public trust and facilitate future responses to events of similar nature.

#### **4.2.5.5 GNSS Interference/Spoofing Risks**

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which involves systems such as Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia's GLONASS, China's, BeiDou, Europe's Galileo includes navigation satellite infrastructures and constellations which provide position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information supporting aircraft and air traffic management operations and support navigation applications in all phases of flight as well as surveillance application like ADS-B. GNSS is also used in safety nets like the EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems) and provides the time reference that is used to synchronize systems and operations in ATM.

GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents have increasingly threatened the integrity of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing services across Eastern F and the Middle East. Similar incidents have been reported in other locations globally.

Jamming' blocks the GNSS signal, whereas 'spoofing' sends false information to the aircraft's receiver. There is a high safety risk as GPS spoofing has made backup inertial navigation systems unreliable by corrupting GPS data. This threat turns off the entire navigation system by tricking the Flight Management System into indicating that the aircraft is off-track. The aircraft's Inertia Reference System fails, leading to corrupted navigation systems. GPS jamming, while problematic, is a different risk level from GPS Spoofing, as it only blocks GPS signals. Still, the sensor fusion software can use other sources of information to provide continuous, precise navigation.

The analysis utilized data from the Flight Data Exchange (FDX) showed a total of 46444 'GPS signal in the MENA region from January 2023 to December 2023 with the rate of 98.76 compared to global average of 30.19 per cent.

To bring attention to the critical issue of GNSS interference and spoofing, and to foster discussions on the management of GNSS vulnerabilities and potential mitigation measures against GNSS RFI, ICAO convened the ICAO EUR/MID Radio Navigation Symposium from 6 to 8 February 2024 in, Turkey and several recommendations have been adopted by the meeting.

#### **4.2.5.6 5G interference with Radio Altimeter**

There is a major risk that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band will cause harmful interference to radar altimeters on all types of civil aircraft- including commercial transport airplanes; business, regional, and general aviation airplanes; and both transport and general aviation helicopters. If there is no proper mitigation, this risk has the potential for broad impacts to aviation operations in the United States as well as in other regions where the 5G network is being implemented next to the 4.2-4.4 GHz frequency band.

### **4.3 Emerging Issues**

Emerging issues are risks that might impact Safety in the future, these may include a possible new technology, a potential public policy, a new concept, business model or idea that, while perhaps an outlier today, could mature and develop into a critical mainstream issue in the future or become a major trend in its own right. Therefore, it is important that the international aviation community remain vigilant to identify emerging safety issues and develop mitigations to address them. Failure to address emerging safety issues can affect a State, Region or industry's ability to mitigate the safety risks.

#### **4.3.1 AAM and new Entrants**

The number of drones at the global level has increased. Available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. The civil aviation authority is responsible for, inter alia, ensuring aviation safety and protecting the public from aviation hazards.

The safe integration on the basis of granting fair access to airspace of all new entrants into the airspace network will be one of the main challenges in relation to the integration of UAS technologies and related concepts of operation.

Enabling the safe integration of UAS, being a fast evolving and emerging market segment, as well as of (initially manned) VTOL-capable aircraft, also intended for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations, continue to be priority activities.

Vertiports: VTOL-capable aircraft will use aerodromes, heliports and the so-called vertiports. 'Vertiport' means an area of land, water or structure used or intended to be used for the landing and take-off of VTOL-capable aircraft. Vertiports are classified as aerodromes for the purpose of aerodrome and vertiport regulations.

#### **Artificial intelligence (AI) in Aviation**

The next generation of automation in aviation systems is enabled and accelerated by the use of AI technologies. Whilst the trend towards increasing automation has resulted overall in improved safety, the introduction of AI will likely be modifying the paradigm of interaction between the Human and the AI-based systems (reduced crew operations), and in parallel even open the path towards more autonomous types of operations AAM.

## Digitalization in the aviation field

Aviation is moving fast to digitalize all areas, as there are demonstrated tangible benefits in safety, economics, operations, traffic management and control, manufacturing, training and maintenance.

Automation, remote control, machine-to-machine communication, robotics: 3D printing, virtual and augmented reality, blockchain, AI/cognitive computing, and sensors are among the technologies that will increasingly be used in aviation and that will impact the activity of regulators and aviation authorities.

To exploit the full digitalization potential, the aviation sector needs to progress in the ‘information management’ dimension. Today, the fragmentation of data in terms of both taxonomy and storage does not allow significant progress for the analysis according to the latest methodologies. These developments are increasingly challenging traditional aviation regulations and calling for an evolution towards more performance based, technology-neutral requirements, which will enable the novel business models that emerge from the digital transformation, increasing at the same time safety and efficiency.

## 5. MID-RASP SEIs Implementation Status

The Middle East Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) 2023-2025 Edition presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety in the MID Region, to strengthen Member States Safety Oversight System, and risk-based approach to managing safety and support effective implementation of States’ Safety Programmes (SSP) and Safety Management System (SMS) including the development of NASPs.

The tenth meeting of the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Middle East (RASG-MID/10) meeting was held in Muscat, Oman, 14-17 May 2023; endorsed the MID-RASP 2023-2025 including 24 Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and 63 safety actions through RASG-MID Conclusion 10/7. In addition, the RASG-MID/12 was apprised with appreciation on the updated progress on SEIs and their respective safety actions and noted that 44 Safety actions (70%) out of 63 have been implemented and completed at **Appendix B**.

## 6. Final Conclusions

One of the GASP goals is for States to improve their effective safety oversight capabilities and to progress in the implementation of SSPs. In addition to addressing organizational issues, GASP addresses Global high-risk categories (G-HRCs) of occurrences, which are deemed global safety priorities. These categories were determined based on actual fatalities from past accidents, high fatality risk per accident, or the number of accidents and incidents.

Following the analysis of the reactive and proactive safety information provided by ICAO, IATA, and MID States for the period 2020 - 2024, it was concluded that the safety priorities defined for the MID Region are:

### A. Regional operational Safety risks

1. Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I);
2. RE and ARC during landing;
3. Mid-Air Collision (MAC)
4. Controlled Flight Into Terrain- (CFIT); and
5. Runway incursion (RI).

Other considered occurrence categories in line with GASP 2026-2028 Edition: SCF-NP and TURB

**B. Organizational issues:**

1. Strengthen States' Safety Oversight capabilities;
2. Improve Safety Management;
3. Human factors and human performance;
4. Competence of personnel; and
5. Manage Risk interdependencies.
  - Cybersecurity risks
  - GNSS Interference/Spoofing Risks
  - 5G interference with Radio Altimeter
  - aviation health safety (AHS) risks
  - Risks arising from conflict zones, and
  - Security risks with an impact on aviation safety.

**C. Emerging Issues**

1. AAM and new entrants including UAS and eVTOL.

***Appendix A: CICTT Occurrence Categories***

<b>Code</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>ADRM</b>	Aerodrome
<b>AMAN</b>	Abrupt Maneuver
<b>ARC</b>	Abnormal runway contact
<b>BIRD</b>	Bird
<b>CABIN</b>	Cabin safety events
<b>CFIT</b>	Controlled flight into/towards terrain
<b>CTOL</b>	Collision with obstacles during take-off and landing
<b>EVAC</b>	Evacuation
<b>F-NI</b>	Fire/smoke (non-impact)
<b>F-POST</b>	Fire/smoke (post-impact)
<b>GCOL</b>	Ground collision
<b>ICE</b>	Icing
<b>LOC-I</b>	Loss of control in-flight
<b>LOC-G</b>	Loss of control-ground
<b>OTHR</b>	Other
<b>RAMP</b>	Ground handling
<b>RE</b>	Runway excursion

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<b>SCF-NP</b>	System/component failure (non-power plant)
<b>SCF-PP</b>	System/component failure (power plant)
<b>TURB</b>	Turbulence encounter
<b>UNK</b>	Unknown or undetermined
<b>USOS</b>	Undershoot/overshoot
<b>WILD</b>	Wildlife
<b>WSTRW</b>	Wind shear or thunderstorm

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**Appendix B: Safety Actions- Consolidated List of SEIs with their respective Actions**

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
<b>Regional Operational Safety Risks</b>					
<b>Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction in Operational Risks</b>					
<b>G1-SEI-01:</b>	Aircraft Upset in Flight (LOC-I)	<b>A1-</b> Guidance material on flight crew proficiency	IATA to be supported by Airbus	Planned 2025	2023- 2025
		<b>A2-</b> Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation	IATA to be supported by Airbus	Planned 2025	2023- 2025
		<b>A3-</b> Conduct Upset Recovery capacity building activities	UPRT Workshop. Airbus, ICAO, Kuwait	Regional ICAO UPRT Workshop (jointly involving Airbus, ICAO, Kuwait) conducted in Kuwait 7-11 May 2023. <b>Completed for 2023/UPRT</b> webinar conducted 2024	2023-2025
		<b>A4-</b> Develop guidance material on the air cargo safety	Oman	Planned for 2024	2023-2025
<b>G1-SEI-02:</b>	Runway Safety- Runway Excursion	<b>A1-</b> Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI	<b>Completed for 2023/</b> continuous for 2024/2025	2023-2025
		<b>A2-</b> MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF)	ICAO	<b>Completed for 2023/</b> continuous for 2024/2025	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		Implementation.			
<b>G1-SEI-03:</b>	Runway Safety- Runway Incursion	<b>A1-</b> Conduct Capacity Building Activities on the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) Implementation	ICAO To be supported by Euro-Control, FAA	<b>Completed</b> Conducted February 2023	2023-2025
<b>G1-SEI-04A1:</b>	Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)	<b>A1-</b> Advisory Circular: Instrument Approach Procedures Using Continuous Descent Final Approach Techniques.	IATA supported by aircraft manufacturers	Planned 2025	2023-2025
		<b>A2-</b> Guidance for designing RNP Approach	ICAO and MID FPP	Planned for 2024	2023-2025
		<b>A3-</b> Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)	IATA supported by Aircraft manufacturers	Planned for 2025	2023-2025
		<b>A4-</b> Awareness Material on the vulnerabilities of BARO-VNAV approaches and mitigation actions	ICAO	Circulated to all States 2024. <b>Completed.</b>	2023-2025
<b>G1-SEI-04A2</b>	5G Operations on Radar Altimeter	<b>A1-</b> Develop a guidance material on safeguarding measures to protect Radio Altimeter from potential harmful interference from 5G Operation	Radio Altimeter Action Group (RADALT AG) To be supported by Boeing	<b>Completed</b> Publication of the guidance material: MID DOC 15 edition 1.0 in May 2023.	2023-2025
		<b>A2-</b> Conduct a Webinar addressing the matter to raise awareness and promote the guidance material developed by the RADALT AG	ICAO and RADALT AG To be supported by Airbus & Boeing	<b>Completed</b> The webinar has been conducted.	2023-2025
<b>G1-SEI-05B1:</b>	MAC- Loss of Separation	<b>A1-</b> Conduct workshop to implement Civil-Military cooperation.	ICAO supported by States, and International Organizations	At national level, workshop has been conducted in Iran in 2022 and follow up meeting was conducted in Aug 2023. In this respect the action plan has been developed and agreed. <b>Completed</b>	2023-2025



SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
				In addition, this issue has been raised by Iran during MIDANPIRG 20 meeting. As agreed in the side meeting with participation of Bahrain, Iran, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE, states are going to report safety issues regarding the operation of due regard specifically over the high seas to ICAO MID for further study and actions. At regional level, the plan was postponed to 2024. The ATM SG developed a draft reporting form, will be presented to the MIDANPIRG/21 for endorsement. Reporting form was reviewed and endorsed by MIDANPIRG/21	
		<b>A2-</b> Conduct seminar on raising awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas	ICAO supported by States, and international organizations	To be planned for 2025	2023-2025
<b>G1-SEI-05B2:</b>	GNSS Interference & Spoofing	<b>A1:</b> Raise awareness on the potential impact of GNSS interference on the aviation during the Civil-Mil Workshop	ICAO and IATA	The CMC Workshop is planned during 2024.	2023-2025
		<b>A2-</b> Urge States to follow the reporting procedure agreed by MIDANPIRG Conclusion 19/4 when needed	ICAO	SL has been issued. <b>Completed</b>	2023-2025
		<b>A3-</b> Capacity Building on GNSS operations and GNSS RFI	ICAO and ACAA	Regional GNSS Workshop conducted 2024. <b>Completed</b>	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
G1-SEI-05B3:	Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (Drones)	A1- UAS iPack deployment	ICAO and States		2023-2025
		A2- Organize symposium on Drones related subjects	ICAO and ACAO supported by FAA and Boeing	ACAO organized Drones symposium in Morocco during the period 4-5 October 2023. <b>Completed/Continuous for 2024.</b>	2023-2025
		A3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework	ICAO and States	To be circulated during 2024	2023-2025
		A4- Develop an AAM study report	UAE	Planned for 2024. WP to be presented by UAE during the upcoming SEIG/6 meeting	2023-2025
G1-SEI-05B4:	Expansion of ATS route Networks	A1- Conduct gap analysis to identify current ATS route networks gaps	ICAO and States	Required data and information have been gathered and dashboard was deployed. <b>Completed.</b>	2023-2025
		A2- Establishment of parallel unidirectional ATS routes (De-confliction)	ICAO and States	Establishment of the parallel airway at interface of Kuwait and Iraq is on process. In addition Iran requested to establish new parallel ATS route between Iran and Iraq to accommodate regional traffic in the most safe and efficient manner. <b>Completed.</b>  In addition, During last MIDANPIRG proposed to enhance the structure of the ATS route at interface of MID and APAC regions by establishment of required parallel airways. This WP was supported by UAE and Saudi Arabia and endorsed by MIDANPIRG 20.  Ongoing. As endorsed by	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
				MIDANPIRG/21, Airspace Management Working Group was established to address all ASM matters including establishment of unidirectional ATS routes in the MID region in harmonized manner. The first meeting will be conducted in October 2024 in Qatar.	
<b>Organizational Challenges/issues</b>					
<b>Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities</b>					
<b>G2-SEI-01:</b>	Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities	<b>A1-</b> Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry.	<p>USOAP workshops conducted.</p> <p>ACAO and Singapore CAA: an AOC certification &amp; Flight Inspectors course conducted in Amman the 29 -2 Jun 2023. <b>Completed/continuous for 2024.</b></p> <p>ICAO &amp; GCAA Symposium: “The Future of Aviation safety and Aircraft Accident Investigation” in Dubai, during 3 to 4 May 2023.</p> <p>“The Prevention of Aircraft Accidents and Incidents through the Collection &amp; Analysis of Safety Data &amp; Information” Workshop held in Rabat, Morocco from 11 to 12 July 2023.</p> <p>Conference on “Assistance to Aircraft Accident Victims and their Families” (AAAVF 2024) conducted 8-9 May 2024.</p>	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
				Aviation Safety and Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation Symposium planned to be conducted this year in Abu Dhabi.	
		<b>A2-</b> Conduct technical assistance and NCLB missions to States , with focus on states with EI<80% as well as ANS, AIG, AGA, and OPS areas	ICAO and States	TAs conducted 2023 (Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Sudan, Libya).  ANS Technical assistance to Kuwait, Sudan, Jordan and Lebanon conducted. <b>Completed.</b>  NCLB Missions to be conducted this year for Kuwait and Bahrain the year 2025.	2023-2025
		<b>A3-</b> Develop and implement a specific NCLB plan of actions.	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry		2023-2025
		<b>A4 -</b> Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection) ( <b>Action addressed under G6-SEI-01 A5</b> )	States (Qatar) and ICAO	Conducted February 2023. <b>Completed.</b>	2023-2025
		<b>A5-</b> Develop guidance material to assist MID Region States in the issuance of exemptions related to temporary	Qatar supported by Iran, Sudan, UAE, ACAO, and IATA	Planned to be presented during the upcoming SEIG/6 meeting in Kuwait for 2024.	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		deviations from standards			
		A6- Develop guidance material to support States for the conduct of remote surveillance	Qatar supported by Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, and ACAO	Planned to be presented during the upcoming SEIG/6 meeting in Kuwait for 2024.	2023-2025
		A7- Develop guidance material on the enhancement of understanding the concept of judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors	Qatar supported by Saudi Arabia and UAE	Planned to be presented during the upcoming SEIG/6 meeting in Kuwait for 2024.	2023-2025
G2-SEI-03:	Establishment of MENA ARCM Database	A1- Establishing a Platform for Sharing data for MENA ARCM Member States	ICAO, ACAO, and MENA ARCM Member States	ACAO has established a share folder as an initial step for sharing information. Online platform establishment is on going	2023-2025
G2-SEI-04:	Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods	A1- Dangerous Goods (DG) capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fire/smoke risk in cabin	ICAO, States, International Organizations, IATA, And Industry		2023-2025
		A2- Develop guidance material on carriage and transport of Lithium batteries	IATA supported by States, International Organizations, And Industry	Guidance material endorsed by RASG-MID/11 and circulated. <b>Completed.</b>	2023-2025
G2-SEI-05:	Human factors and Competence of Personnel	A1- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). <b>(Action addressed under G1-SEI-04: CFIT).</b>	IATA		2023-2025
		A2- Organize CBAT/EBT, Crew Resource Management Capacity building activities	ACAO, ICAO & Airbus,	Planned for 2024. CBTA/EBT workshop planned to be conducted 25-26 Sep 2024.	2023-2025
		A3- Organize Team Resource Management Capacity building activities	ACAO, ICAO & Airbus	Planned for 2025	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		A4- Conduct Fatigue Risk Management and Mental Health Best Practices Capacity building activities	ACAO, ICAO & Airbus	Webinar planned for 23 Sep 2024.	2023-2025
		A5. Data analysis and Artificial intelligence	UAE	Planned for 2025	
G2-SEI-06:	Impact of security on safety	A1- Organize seminar/Symposium/Workshop to exchange experiences and good practices on assessing the risks and sharing of information related to the overflying of conflict zones in coordination with RASFG-MID and MIDANPIRG.	ICAO		2023-2025
		A2- Risk management on conflict zone workshop	ICAO/ACAO	Planned for 2024	2023-2025
G2-SEI-07:	Managing cybersecurity risks	A1- Develop a Regional Action Plan to bridge the gap between ICAO Cyber Security Action plan and the implementation level of Cyber Resilience in the MID Region	ANS Cyber SeC Action Group	<b>Completed.</b>	2023-2025
		A2- Conduct activities on Cyber Security and Resilience- (Jointly ANS and AVSEC)	ICAO supported by Boeing	<b>Completed</b> conducted Nov 2023	2023-2025
		A3- Develop a MID Region Cybersecurity Action Plan	Cybersecurity Security Ad-hoc Group	<b>Completed</b>	2023-2025



SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
G2-SEI-08:	Impact of COVID-19 pandemic- Safe return to operations	A1- Continued support to the aviation industry through MID-RPTF meetings/Activities, as needed	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry	<b>Completed</b> Aviation medicine workshop conducted Feb 2023	2023-2025
		A2- Sharing of guidance material/best practices	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry	<b>Completed.</b>	2023-2025
<b>Goal 3: Implementation of Effective States Safety Programme (SSP)</b>					
G3-SEI-01:	Implement an effective Safety Management	A1- Conduct ICAO SSP/SMS Capacity building activities	SSP workshops for States. 2023  SMS & Flight Data analysis workshop for airlines.  ACAO, Airbus and ICAO.	SSP training course and SSP workshop conducted. (Kuwait & Oman) 2023  SRM Workshop conducted 2024.  SMS & Flight Data analysis workshop for airlines Conducted Nov 2023.  <b>Completed/Continuous for 2024.</b> <b>SSP workshops provided for UAE &amp; Jordan</b>	2023-2025
		A2- Conduct Technical Assistance missions by SMIT	ICAO and States		2023-2025
G3-SEI-02:	NASP Development & Implementation	A1- <b>Conduct</b> NASPs workshops & technical assistance missions	ICAO. 2023	Workshop conducted in Kuwait and Qatar 2023. <b>Completed/Continuous</b> for 2024. To be conducted Back to back with SEIG/6 meeting	2023-2025

		<b>A2-</b> NASP iPacks deployment	ICAO	If requested by states	2023-2025
<b>Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level</b>					
<b>G4-SEI-01:</b>	Development and Implementation of MID-RASP	<b>A1-</b> Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition	SEIG	Published May 2023. <b>Completed</b>	2023-2025
<b>G4-SEI-02:</b>	Enhance collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry	<b>A1-</b> Develop and agree on joint work activities through MID-RCM meetings	ICAO, States, Regional Groups, International Organizations, and Industry	<b>Completed</b> Conducted Oct 2023	2023-2025
		<b>A2-</b> Support the establishment of MENA RSOO and its activities	ICAO and States	States Signed the RSOO MoU on Dec 2023 and RSOO started its operations. <b>Completed.</b>	2023-2025
<b>Goal 5: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes and Safety Information Sharing Networks</b>					
<b>G5-SEI-01:</b>	Promote the Use of industry Programmes	<b>A1-</b> Encourage IATA's IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	IATA	<b>Completed/</b> Continuous action for 2024/2025	2023-2025
		<b>A2-</b> Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	ICAO and ACI	<b>Completed/</b> Continuous action for 2024/2025	2023-2025
<b>Goal 6: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations</b>					
<b>G6-SEI-01:</b>	Certification of International Aerodromes	<b>A1-</b> Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and	ICAO and ACI	Four (04) activities have coordinated with ACI for 2024	2023-2025



		Operations, through capacity building activities.		(Implementation Status: On Track)	
		<b>A2-</b> Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to Aerodromes Certification through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI	Planned activity for 2025	2023-2025
		<b>A3 -</b> Deployment of iPack on Aerodrome Re-Start	ICAO and States	If requested by states	2023-2025
		<b>A4 -</b> Support States in implementing aerodrome oversight/inspection mechanism through capacity building activities on Aerodrome Oversight	ICAO Supported by FAA	Planned activity for 2024/2025	2023-2025
		<b>A5 –</b> Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection)	States (Qatar) and ICAO	Conducted February 2023. <b>Completed.</b>	2023-2025
		<b>A6 –</b> Conduct a Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities	ICAO, ACAO, WBA	Regional Symposium rescheduled for 2025	2023-2025
<b>G6-SEI-02:</b>	Establish Runway Safety Team (RST) at International Aerodromes	<b>A1-</b> Conduct Runway Safety Go-Team (RST) assistance missions	ICAO. Supported RSP (Runway Safety Programme Partners)	Planned for 2024	2023-2025
		<b>A2:</b> Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through capacity building activities: <b>(Action addressed under G1-SEI-02: Runway Excursion).</b>	ICAO and ACI	<b>Completed for 2023/</b> continuous for 2024/2025	2023-2025

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## CREDITS

The RASG-MID thanks all those who contributed to the elaboration of this Annual Safety Report and provided necessary support and information to the members of the Annual Safety Report Group (ASRG). Special thanks go to:

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