



ICAO

SAFETY

MID Region Annual Safety Report



13th Edition

2024

Reference Period (2019 - 2023)

Disclaimer

This report is produced and disseminated by the Regional Aviation Safety Group- Middle East (RASG-MID). It makes use of information, which is provided to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) by third parties. All third-party content was obtained from sources believed to be reliable and was accurately reproduced in the report at the time of printing. However, ICAO specifically does not make any warranties or representations as to the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of such information and accepts no liability or responsibility arising from reliance upon or use of the same.

The confidentiality/de-identification of data contained in this report is ensured.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect individual or collective opinions or official positions of ICAO Member States.



Contents

Disclaimer	- 1 -
Foreword	- 4 -
Executive Summary	- 5 -
A. <i>Regional Operational Safety Risks</i>	- 5 -
B. <i>Organizational issues</i>	- 6 -
C. <i>Emerging Issues</i>	- 9 -
1. Traffic Volumes	- 10 -
1.1 <i>Global Traffic</i>	- 10 -
1.2 <i>MID Traffic</i>	- 10 -
2. Reactive Safety Information	- 11 -
2.1 <i>Safety Risk Assessment Methodology</i>	- 11 -
2.2 <i>ICAO Data</i>	- 12 -
2.2.1 <i>MID State of Occurrence</i>	- 13 -
2.2.2 <i>MID State of Registry and Operator</i>	- 16 -
2.2.3 <i>ICAO In-depth Analysis of Accident</i>	- 19 -
2.2.4 <i>Commercial helicopters operations Data Analysis</i>	- 21 -
2.3 <i>MID Region Safety Performance - Safety Indicators-Reactive</i>	- 22 -
2.3.1 <i>Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks</i>	- 22 -
3. Proactive Safety Information	- 23 -
3.1 <i>ICAO USOAP-CMA</i>	- 23 -
3.1.1 <i>USOAP-CMA Review</i>	- 23 -
3.1.2 <i>ICAO USOAP CMA Activities — MID States Status for 2022</i>	- 24 -
3.2 <i>MID Region State Safety Programme (SSP)</i>	- 24 -
3.2.1 <i>SSP Foundation</i>	- 24 -
3.2.2 <i>SSP Gap Analysis</i>	- 26 -
3.2.3 <i>Implementation Packages</i>	- 26 -
3.3 <i>Human Factors and Human Performamnce</i>	- 28 -
3.4 <i>Competence of Personnel</i>	- 29 -
3.5 <i>Manage Risk Interdependencies</i>	- 29 -
3.5.1 <i>Cybersecurity Risks</i>	- 29 -
3.5.2 <i>GNSS Intereference Risks</i>	- 30 -

3.5.3	<i>5G interference with Radio Altimeter Risks.....</i>	<i>- 32 -</i>
3.5.4	<i>Security Risks with an Impact on Aviation Safety.....</i>	<i>- 32 -</i>
3.5.5	<i>Risks Arising from Conflict Zones.....</i>	<i>- 33 -</i>
3.5.6	<i>Aviation Health Safety (AHS) Risks</i>	<i>- 33 -</i>
3.6	<i>Incidents Data.....</i>	<i>- 33 -</i>
3.6.1	<i>Incident Data shared by States for the Period 2019-2023</i>	<i>- 33 -</i>
3.6.2	<i>IATA Data.....</i>	<i>- 34 -</i>
3.6.3	<i>IATA Data.....</i>	<i>- 36 -</i>
3.7	<i>Region Safety Performance - Safety Indicators-Proactive.....</i>	<i>- 39 -</i>
3.7.1	<i>Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities.....</i>	<i>- 39 -</i>
3.7.2	<i>Goal 3: Implementation of Effective SSP.....</i>	<i>- 39 -</i>
3.7.3	<i>Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level.....</i>	<i>- 40 -</i>
3.7.4	<i>Goal 5: Expand the use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks</i>	<i>- 40 -</i>
3.7.5	<i>Goal 6: Ensure Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations....</i>	<i>- 41 -</i>
4	Safety Priorities for MID Region	- 42 -
4.1	<i>Regional Operational Safety Risks.....</i>	<i>- 42 -</i>
4.2	<i>Organizational Issues</i>	<i>- 45 -</i>
4.2.1	<i>Enhance States' Safety Oversight Capabilities</i>	<i>- 45 -</i>
4.2.2	<i>Improve Safety Management.....</i>	<i>- 45 -</i>
4.2.3	<i>Human Factors and Human Performance.....</i>	<i>- 46 -</i>
4.2.4	<i>Competence of Personnel.....</i>	<i>- 46 -</i>
4.2.5	<i>Manage Risk Interdependencies</i>	<i>- 46 -</i>
4.3	<i>Emerging Issues.....</i>	<i>- 48 -</i>
5.	MID-RASP SEIs Implementation Status	- 50 -
6.	Final Conclusions	- 50 -
	<i>Appendix A: CICTT Occurrence Categories.....</i>	<i>- 51 -</i>
	<i>Appendix B: Safety Actions- Consolidated List of SEIs with their respective Actions.....</i>	<i>- 52 -</i>

Foreword

The Regional Aviation Safety Group-Middle East (RASG-MID) was established in September 2011 to develop an integrated, data-driven strategy and implement a work program that supports a Regional performance framework for the management of Safety.

RASG-MID supports the implementation of the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the achievement of the Safety Targets in the MID Region Safety Strategy. The RASG-MID membership includes representatives from ICAO, MID States, and international organizations.

RASG-MID consists of four main teams: The Annual Safety Report Group (ASRG), the Aerodrome Safety planning and Implementation Group (ASPIG), the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG), the Accident and Incident Investigation Group (AIIG). The Annual Safety Report Group (ASRG) is in charge of collecting and analysing safety information. The Group is also responsible for the identification of the main safety risks, MID Region safety priorities and the production of the RASG-MID Annual Safety Report (ASR).

The RASG-MID Annual Safety Report is a timely, unbiased, and transparent source of safety-related information essential for all aviation stakeholders interested in having a tool to enable sound decision-making on safety-related matters.



Executive Summary

The global scheduled commercial international operations accounted for approximately 35.25 million departures in 2023, compared to 31.2 million departures in 2022; which showed a high increase after covid-19 pandemic. The MID Region shows a slight increase in traffic volumes during 2023. Total scheduled commercial departures in 2023 accounted for approximately 1.33 million departures compared to 1.31 million departures in 2019. In terms of an aircraft accident, the MID Region had no accidents in 2023. The 5-year average accident rate for 2019-2023 is 1.77, which is below the global average rate (2.18) for the same period.

The MID Region had no fatal accident in 2023. However, the 5-year average fatal accident rate for 2019-2023 is 0.28 is slightly higher than the global average rate (0.21) for the same period. The MID Region had no fatal accidents in 2019, 2021, 2022, and 2023. However, one fatal accident occurred in 2020. The 2020 accident caused 176 fatalities.

MID Region Safety Priorities

The Middle East Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) 2023-2025 Edition presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety in the MID Region, to strengthen Member States Safety Oversight System, and risk-based approach to managing safety and support effective implementation of States' Safety Programmes (SSP) and Safety Management System (SMS) including the development of NASPs.

The MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition identifies MID Region Safety Performance Measurement and Monitoring (SPMM) with specific safety targets in line with GASP and the RASG-MID would continuously monitor the implementation of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and measure safety performance of regional civil aviation, to ensure the intended targets are achieved using the MID Region SPMM.

The MID-RASP provides strategy for improving safety within a specified timeframe, through defined SEIs in a coordinated, cooperative and collaborative approach among States, international organizations, and industry to achieve Safety Targets.

Fostering effective risk management capabilities in the MID Region, State and industry level to cope with the systemic and operational safety risks and wide-ranging effects of the crisis and constitute an important enabler for building back a more resilient aviation system

The tenth meeting of the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Middle East (RASG-MID/10) meeting was held in Muscat, Oman, 14-17 May 2023; endorsed the MID-RASP 2023-2025 including 24 Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and 61 safety actions through RASG-MID Conclusion 10/7. In addition, the RASG-MID/11 was apprised with appreciation on the updated progress on SEIs and their respective safety actions and noted that 26 Safety actions (43%) out of 61 have been implemented and completed.

A. Regional Operational Safety Risks

Operational safety risks arise during the delivery of a service or the conduct of an activity (e.g., operation of an aircraft, airports, or air traffic control). Based on the analyses of reactive and proactive safety information, it is concluded that the Regional operational safety risks for the MID Region are:

1. Loss of Control-In Flight (LOC-I);
2. RE and ARC during landing;
3. Mid-Air Collision (MAC);

4. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT); and
5. Runway incursion (RI)

In addition to this, safety issues have been identified and mapped to their respective potential accident outcomes.

B. Organizational issues

Organizational issues are systemic issues which take into consideration the impact of organizational culture, and policies and procedures on the effectiveness of safety risk controls.

1. Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the Regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 76,8 %, which is above the world EI 69.68% (as of 10 August 2024). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%.

All eight areas and CEs have an EI above 60%. However, the areas of AIG and ANS and CE4, CE7, and CE8 still need more improvement. 6 areas and 5 critical elements are above the target of 70% EI. Moreover, the effective implementation in certification, surveillance, and resolution of Safety concerns need to be improved.

2. Improve Safety Management

States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to fully implement SSPs according to Annex 19; States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 78, 59%.

An SSP requires increased collaboration across operational domains to identify hazards and manage risks. Aviation authorities and organizations should anticipate new emerging threats and associated challenges by developing SRM principles. Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). In connection with this, the RASG-MID/9 endorsed the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT) handbook to support MID States in the implementation of the SSP in an effective and efficient way. Moreover, the RASG-MID also supported the establishment and activation of the MENA RSOO, with a primary objective to assist member States to develop and implement SSP; and Several Safety Management Workshops, training courses, and meetings have been organized to support the implementation of SSP/SMS and address the challenges and difficulties, as well as sharing of experiences and best practices.

In addition, the development of National Aviation Safety plan (NASP) is one of the MID region safety priorities and 8 States had developed their NASPs.

In line with the Safety Strategic Objective of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 2023-2025 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. It also provides a framework in which regional and national aviation safety plans (RASPs and NASPs) are developed and implemented.

The States NASP should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety issues. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate).

Recognizing the challenges facing the States in the development of their NASPs, the ICAO MID Office conducted NASP workshops and assistance Missions dedicated to NASP in order to support States with NASP development.

3. Human Factors and Human Performance

As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. CRM has been identified as most important human factors issue in the domain of commercial air transport and safety actions would be identified and developed.

4. Competence of Personnel

Availability of well-trained and competent aviation personnel is paramount to the safety and resilience of the aviation industry. Some of States in MID Region has a mature and detailed regulatory framework in place to ensure proper training, licensing, adequacy of training devices and oversight. Nevertheless, several factors are challenging this mature framework: new technologies and increasing automation are changing the safety needs for aviation personnel and new training devices are emerging. New aircraft types and technological advancements in artificial intelligence are revolutionising pilot training altogether

5. Manage Risk Interdependencies

The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that safety, security, health safety and other risks can no longer be managed in isolation. The aviation community has realised that continuing to develop tools and specific guidance for each situation and for each domain affected by transversal risks may delay not only the implementation of mitigation measures, but also the development of an enabling framework to support integrated, collaborative risk management.

5.1 Cybersecurity Risks

The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalisation. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardised manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organisations with malicious intent.

5.2 Security Risks with an Impact on Aviation Safety

The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport security, aircraft security or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider potential impacts on aviation safety. States should consider where interdependencies between civil aviation safety and security exist.

Therefore, an integrated approach to the management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities would bring benefits such as a complete overview of risks, a better sharing of security information and the closure of gaps in the security system while focusing on increasing the overall level of safety. Consequently, this would allow ensuring synergies where security measures can have an impact on safety and vice versa; thereby avoiding incompatible actions and strengthening the overall safety and security of civil aviation.

5.3 Risks Arising from Conflict Zones

The crash of flight MH17 immediately raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region. This is why it's important for governments, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civilian flights. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region on Jan 2020 involving Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752. The tragic accident with the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 highlighted once more the importance of information sharing and risk assessments.

5.4 Aviation Health Safety (AHS) Risks

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the harmonisation of health policies affecting aviation, and in particular in the CAT domain, has become an important topic to help overcome the pandemic. The objective is to minimise the impact of health safety threats in CAT. Health safety threats should be included in the management of risk interdependencies.

COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we will be faced with. It is crucial to continue supporting the European aviation industry competitiveness by offering the safest aircraft interior environment to reduce the risk of disease transmission between continents and States, restore public trust and facilitate future responses to events of similar nature.

5.5 GNSS Interference & spoofing Risks

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which involves systems such as Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia's GLONASS, China's, BeiDou, Europe's Galileo includes navigation satellite infrastructures and constellations which provide position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information supporting aircraft and air traffic management operations and support navigation applications in all phases of flight as well as surveillance application like ADS-B. GNSS is also used in safety nets like the EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems) and provides the time reference that is used to synchronize systems and operations in ATM.

GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents have increasingly threatened the integrity of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing services across Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Similar incidents have been reported in other locations globally.

Jamming' blocks the GNSS signal, whereas 'spoofing' sends false information to the aircraft's receiver. There is a high safety risk as GPS spoofing has made backup inertial navigation systems unreliable by corrupting GPS data. This threat turns off the entire navigation system by tricking the Flight Management System into indicating that the aircraft is off-track. The aircraft's Inertia Reference System fails, leading to corrupted navigation systems. GPS jamming, while problematic, is a different risk level from GPS Spoofing, as it only blocks GPS signals. Still, the sensor fusion software can use other sources of information to provide continuous, precise navigation.

The analysis utilized data from the Flight Data Exchange (FDX) showed a total of 46444 'GPS signal in the MENA region from January 2023 to December 2023 with the rate of 98.76 compared to global average of 30.19 per cent.

To bring attention to the critical issue of GNSS interference and spoofing, and to foster discussions on the management of GNSS vulnerabilities and potential mitigation measures against GNSS RFI, ICAO convened the ICAO EUR/MID Radio Navigation Symposium from 6 to 8 February 2024 in, Turkey and several recommendations have been adopted by the meeting.

5.6 5G Interference with Radio Altimeter

There is a major risk that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band will cause harmful interference to radar altimeters on all types of civil aircraft- including commercial transport airplanes; business, regional, and general aviation airplanes; and both transport and general aviation helicopters. If there is no proper mitigation, this risk has the potential for broad impacts to aviation operations in the United States as well as in other regions where the 5G network is being implemented next to the 4.2-4.4 GHz frequency band.

C. Emerging Issues

Emerging safety issues are risks that might impact Safety in the future, these may include a possible new technology, a potential public policy, a new concept, business model or idea that, while perhaps an outlier today, could mature and develop into a critical mainstream issue in the future or become a major trend in its own right. Therefore, it is important that the international aviation community remain vigilant to identify emerging safety issues and develop mitigations to address them. Failure to address emerging safety issues can affect a State, Region or industry's ability to mitigate the safety risks.

1. UAS, AAM and Manned VTOL-Capable Aircraft

The number of drones at the global level has increased. Available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. The civil aviation authority is responsible for, inter alia, ensuring aviation safety and protecting the public from aviation hazards.

The safe integration on the basis of granting fair access to airspace of all new entrants into the airspace network will be one of the main challenges in relation to the integration of UAS technologies and related concepts of operation.

Enabling the safe integration of UAS, being a fast evolving and emerging market segment, as well as of (initially manned) VTOL-capable aircraft, also intended for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations, continue to be priority activities.

Vertiports: VTOL-capable aircraft will use aerodromes, heliports and the so-called vertiports. 'Vertiport' means an area of land, water or structure used or intended to be used for the landing and take-off of VTOL-capable aircraft. Vertiports are classified as aerodromes for the purpose of aerodrome and vertiport regulations.

2. Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Aviation

The next generation of automation in aviation systems is enabled and accelerated by the use of AI technologies. Whilst the trend towards increasing automation has resulted overall in improved safety, the introduction AI will likely be modifying the paradigm of interaction between the Human and the AI-based systems (reduced crew operations), and in parallel even open the path towards more autonomous types of operations AAM.

3. Digitalisation in the Aviation Field

Aviation is moving fast to digitalise all areas, as there are demonstrated tangible benefits in safety, economics, operations, traffic management and control, manufacturing, training and maintenance. Automation, remote control, machine-to-machine communication, robotics: 3D printing, virtual and augmented reality, blockchain, AI/cognitive computing, and sensors are among the technologies that will increasingly be used in aviation and that will impact the activity of regulators and aviation authorities.


In order to exploit the full digitalisation potential, the aviation sector needs to progress in the 'information management' dimension. Today, the fragmentation of data in terms of both taxonomy

and storage does not allow a significant progress for the analysis according to the latest methodologies. These developments are increasingly challenging traditional aviation regulations and calling for an evolution towards more performance based, technology-neutral requirements, which will enable the novel business models that emerge from the digital transformation, increasing at the same time safety and efficiency.

1. Traffic Volumes

1.1 Global Traffic


The global scheduled commercial international operations accounted for approximately 35.25 million departures in 2023, compared to 31.2 million departures in 2022; which showed a high increase after covid-19 pandemic.



Graph 1: Global Traffic Volume (Source ICAO Safety Report 2024)

1.2 MID Traffic

The MID Region shows a slight increase in traffic volumes during 2023. Total scheduled commercial departures in 2023 accounted for approximately 1.33 million departures compared to 1.31 million departures in 2019.



Graph 2: MID Traffic Growth (Source ICAO Safety Report 2024)

2. Reactive Safety Information

2.1 Safety Risk Assessment Methodology

To facilitate the identification and prioritization of the main Regional Safety Operational Risks, accidents are categorized in terms of frequency and severity and the serious incidents in terms of frequency. The severity assessment is based on fatalities, injuries, and damage to aircraft, property, and equipment. (For Frequency rating: 1 is the most frequent, and six is the least frequent. For Severity: 1 is the most severe and four is the least severe)

The MID ASRT/2 meeting (Cairo, Egypt, 4-5 February 2018) agreed to the following improvements to the methodology used for risk assessment:

a) improvement of the current risk matrix used for the identification of Regional operational risks (four (4) levels of severity instead of three (3)), as follows:

improvement of the current risk matrix used for the identification of focus areas (four (4) levels of severity instead of three (3)), The level of severity is categorized as follows:

- 1) Catastrophic: multiple deaths; serious damage to aircraft/equipment (destroyed)
- 2) Major: serious injury/fatalities; major aircraft/equipment damage
- 3) Minor: little consequences (minor injuries, minor damage to aircraft);
- 4) No potential damage or injury

Frequency \ Severity	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1	2	3	4	5	6
2	2	4	6	8	10	12
3	3	6	9	12	15	18
4	4	8	12	16	20	24

Table 1 Risk matrix

b) Adoption of the "feared consequences" of the risk portfolio of DGAC France:

Table 2 below shows that each identified Undesirable event/safety issue is linked to the potential accident outcome.

NB	Identification of Undesirable Event	Potential Accident outcome						
		CFIT	LOC-I	MAC	Ground Collision	RE	Damage to aircraft or injury in flight	Damage to aircraft or /injury on ground
UE.1	Unstabilised or non-compliant approach	X	X			X		X
UE.2	Abnormal airplane attitude (Roll, pitch, speed...)		X				X	

UE.3	Events relating to aerodrome conditions (Runway surface condition and aerological parameters)		X			X	X	X
UE.4	En-route encounter of dangerous weather phenomena (Thunderstorm, turbulence, Icing)		X	#			X	X
UE.5	Misuse of aircraft system (Weight and Balance, speed track, aircraft config)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UE.6	Event pertaining to works/maintenance operations on or close to a runway		#		X	X		X
UE.7	Bad coordination/execution of ground operations (deicing, loading, stowing, line maintenance, etc)	X	X		X		X	X
UE.8	Runway/taxiway incursion				X	X		X
UE.9	Loss of separation in flight/ and/or airspace infringement /level bust		X			X	X	X
UE.10	Wildlife hazard, including bird strike		X		X	X	X	
UE.11	Ground-onboard interface failure (Misunderstanding, unsuitability of transmitted information,etc)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UE.12	Aircraft maintenance event	X	X		#	X	X	X
UE.13	Fire/Smoke inflight	#	X				X	X
UE.14	Aircraft system failure resulting in flight management disturbance	X	X			X	X	X
UE.15	Loss of cabin pressure		X	#			X	
UE.16	Aircraft damage due to FOD		X			X	X	X

Table:2 identified Undesirable event/safety issue

2.2 ICAO Data

ICAO's primary indicator of Safety in the global air transport sector is the accident rate based on scheduled commercial operations involving aircraft having a Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) above 5700 kg. Exposure data is comprised of scheduled commercial operations that involve the transportation of passengers, cargo, and mail for remuneration or hire and is a preliminary estimate solely for the calculation of the accident rates.

ICAO iSTARS applications used for the development of the ICAO Safety Reports. In addition, Occurrence Validation Study Group (OVSG) final validation accidents data is also used as source of the data analysis.

Note: The accident data presented here is the official ICAO accident statistics, used for the development of the ICAO safety reports. The data is based on scheduled commercial operations involving aircraft having a Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) above 5700 kg (validated or under validation by ICAO). Serious incidents presented here are safety information shared by the MID States.


The main part of this section provides an analysis of the accidents that occurred in the MID Region (State of Occurrence) for the period (2019-2023), which is used for monitoring the progress of achieving the Safety Targets in the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition (MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring).

Besides, it provides data analysis regarding accidents aircraft registered in the MID Region (State of Registry) as well as for the MID-air operators (State of the Operator) using the same criteria mentioned above. It is to be highlighted that the State of registry and State of the operator Section focuses mainly on counts and percent distribution (no rates).

2.2.1 MID State of Occurrence

2.2.1.1 Accidents Rates and Fatalities

Graph 3 shows that the MID Region had no accidents in 2023. The 5-year average accident rate for 2019-2023 is 1.77, which is below the global average rate (2.18) for the same period.




Graph 3: Global Accident Rate Vs. MID Accident Rate (Source OVSG Data & ICAO ASR 2024)

Graph 4 shows that 8 accidents and one fatal accident occurred in the MID Region during the period (2019-2023), whereas (342) accidents and 22 fatal accidents occurred globally.




Graph 4: Number of MID Accidents Vs. Number of Global Accidents Per Year (Source OVSG Data & ICAO ASR 2024)

Graph 5 shows that the MID Region had no fatal accident in 2023. However, the 5-year average fatal accident rate for 2019-2023 is 0.28 is slightly higher than the global average rate (0.21) for the same period. The MID Region had no fatal accidents in 2019, 2021, 2022, and 2023. However, one fatal accident occurred in 2020. The 2020 accident caused 176 fatalities, as shown in Graph 6.




Graph 5: Global Fatal Accident Rate Vs. MID Fatal Accident Rate (Source OVSG Data & ICAO ASR 2024)




Graph 6: Number of MID Fatalities Vs. Global Fatalities (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2023)

Accident by year for the world. Graph 7 shows that at the world level 342 accidents occurred between 2019 and 2023. 22 fatal accident occurred respectively during the same period.




Graph 7: Accident by year for the world

Graph 8 shows that at the MID region 8 accidents occurred between 2019 and 2023. One fatal accident occurred respectively during the year 2020.




Graph 8: Number of Fatal Accidents Vs. Non-Fatal Accidents Per Year (2019-2023) (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2023)



Graph 9: Accident by Regional Office

2.2.1.2 Occurrence Category


Graph 10 indicates that during the period (2019-2023), CFIT, LOC-I, and MAC accidents have not been reported. However, the runway excursion (RE), and abnormal runway contact (ARC) events represent the main areas of concern. In respect of the occurrence category Abrupt Manoeuvre (AMAN), the flightcrew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Mid air collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board.



Graph 10: Distribution of Occurrence Category Per Year (2019-2023) ((Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2024)


2.2.1.3 Phase of Flight

Graph 11 shows that most accidents occurred during landing phase of flight. The majority of Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) and Runway Excursion (RE) events took place during landing phase.



Graph 11: Distribution of Occurrence Category Per Phase of Flight (2019-2023) (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2024)

Graph 12 shows that most of the Regional high risk (R-HRCs)category accidents experienced during the 2019-2023 were RE/ARC, and MAC. It is to be noted that for the Abrupt Manoeuvre (AMAN) occurrence category, the flightcrew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Mid air collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. Therefore, the MAC occurrence category was also considered as R-HRC.



Graph 12: Occurrence Category Distribution as Percentage Per Accident (Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2024)

Taking a more in-depth look at the fatal accidents and accidents for the MID Region (State of occurrence) for the period 2019-2023, the following observations are made:

- A. In terms of fatality, the top three fatal accidents categories in the MID Region are:
 1. Security related (SEC);
- B. In terms of frequency, the most frequent accidents categories in the MID Region (State of occurrence) are:

1. Runway Safety (RS) including (RE and ARC);
2. Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC);
3. System Component Failure – Non-Power Plant (SCF-NP); and
4. Turbulence (TURB).

Identification of the Key Risk Areas based on the analysis of accident data related to the State of Occurrence (2019-2023)

To facilitate the identification of the safety priority areas; the safety risk assessment methodology is applied.

Main Risk Area	Frequency	Severity	Risk Level
Runway Safety (RS)-(RE/ARC)	1	3	3
Security (SEC)	3	1	3
Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC)	4	1	4
System Component Failure – Non-Power Plant (SCF-NP)	4	3	12
TURB	4	4	16

Table 3: Key Risk Area


Therefore, the key risk areas according to the State of occurrence's accidents data are

1. Runway Safety (RS): Runway Excursion (RE) and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) during landing;
2. MID Air Collision (MAC); and
3. Security related (SEC).

2.2.2 MID State of Registry and Operator

2.2.2.1 Accident Data Analysis


Graph 13 shows the change in the number of Fatal Accidents and non-Fatal Accidents over the last five years involving MID State of registry and State of operator airplanes. The graph indicated that there is no fatal for the last five years.



Graph 13: Number of Fatal and Non-Fatal Accidents per Year (2019-2023) Source OVSG Data& ICAO ASR 2024)

2.2.2.2 Phase of Flight


The Graph 14 shows that the majority of accidents related to Runway Excursion (RE) and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) occurrence categories took place during landing flight phase. It was also noted that the Turbulence related accident occurred during en-route phases of flight.



Graph 14: Distribution of the Number of Accidents Category per Phase of Flight (2019-2023) (Source OVSG Data & ICAO ASR 2024)


2.2.2.3 Occurrence Category

Graph 15 shows that the high risk categories (HRC) identified are RE/ARC, and MAC. However, the RE and ARC are still the most frequent. It is to be noted that for the Abrupt Manoeuvre (AMAN) occurrence category, the flightcrew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Mid air collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. Therefore, the MAC occurrence category was also considered as HRC.



Graph 15: Accident Distribution as Percentage per Occurrence Category (2019-2023) (Source OVSG Data & ICAO ASR 2024)

During 2019-2023, no CFIT or LOC-I accident occurred. Runway Excursion (RE) and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) are also a serious concern in the Region. In respect of the occurrence category Abrupt Manoeuvre (AMAN), the flightcrew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Mid air collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. Turbulence (TURB) events were registered and are still prevailing as shown in Graph 16.



Graph 16: Accident Category Distribution per Year (Source OVSG Data & ICAO ASR 2024)

Taking a more in-depth look at the fatal and non-fatal accidents for the MID Region (State of registry and State of operator) for the period 2019-2023, the following is to be highlighted:

- A. In terms of fatality, the fatal accidents categories in the MID Region for the period 2019 – 2023 are:

1. No fatal accident.
- B. In terms of frequency, the most frequent accidents categories in the MID Region (State of registry and State of occurrence) for the period 2019 – 2023 are:
 1. Runway Safety (RS) (REand ARC);
 2. Turbulence encounter (TURB); and
 3. Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC).

Identification of the key risk Areas based on the analysis of safety data related to the State of registry and State of operator (2019-2023)

To facilitate the identification of the safety priority areas; the safety risk assessment methodology is applied.

Main Risk Area	Frequency	Severity	Risk Level
Runway Safety (RS). (RE/ARC)	1	3	3
Mid Air Collision (MAC)	3	1	3
Turbulence (TURB)	2	6	12

Table 4: key Risk Area


Therefore, the key risk areas according to the State of registry and operator accidents data are:

1. Runway Safety (RS): Runway Excursion (RE) and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) during landing; and
2. Mid Air Collision (MAC).

2.2.2.4 Serious Incidents Data Analysis

2.2.2.4.1 Occurrence Category

Graph 17 shows the total number of serious incidents provided by the MID States for the period 2019-2023



Graph 17: Number of Serious Incidents Distribution Per Year (2019-2023)

The data shows that there was a significant increase on the number of NMAC Occurrences. The number of serious incidents data shared by the MID States have been considered and included in the analysis to shed light and identify the potential safety concerns in the MID Region. However further data analysis should be provided by the MID States for an in-depth analysis.

Taking a more in-depth look at the serious incidents reported by the MID Region for the period 2019-2023, the following is to be highlighted:

- A. In terms of frequency, the most frequent serious incidents categories in the MID Region are:
 1. Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC);
 2. System Component Failure-power Plant (SCF-PP); and
 3. System Component Failure- Non Power Plant (SCF-NP).

With respect to the Mid Air collision (MAC)/NMAC: The most common root causes for MAC occurrences are Human performance errors and Ineffective training for ATCs. In addition, this key risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating in Gulf area over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation.

For the System Component Failure-Non-Power Plant (SCF-NP): Unexpected technical failure, lack of maintenance, not complying with the ICAO standards for Air Operator Certificates (AOC) & Operations Specifications, flying with Minimum equipment limitations

The main safety issues identified and shared by the States as follows:

- Regulatory oversight
- Human factors and Human Performance
- competence of personnel
- EGPWS warning (GPS Jamming)
- TCAS/RA
- GPS Jamming/Spoofing
- Runway Incursion
- Low level wind shear
- System Component Failure-Power Plant (SCF-PP)
- Technical failures
- Birdstrike
- Navigation Errors (NAV)

2.2.3 ICAO In-depth Analysis of Accident

2.2.3.1 Runway Excursions and Abnormal Runway Contact:

During 2019-2023, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flight. This focus area covers the risk of runway excursions, including the direct precursors such as hard landings, high speed landing, landings following an un-stabilized approach. The MID Region continued improvement in runway safety, which is one of the industry's principal risk areas. Table 5 indicted the root cause.

Root Cause Analysis		
Latent Conditions	1	Ineffective safety management system
	2	Incomplete/inefficient operator SOP
	3	Deficient flight crew training
	4	Regulatory oversight
Threat	1	Decision to make a landing on short runway with tailwind
	2	Poor judgment and continued landing after an un-stabilized approach
	3	Improper calculating of landing speed without focusing on the tailwind component
	4	Technical failures Pilot information
	5	Ineffective reporting of runway surface condition/Contaminated runways
	6	Airport facilities including poor runway paintings/markings/signage lighting

	7	Meteorology
Errors	1	Timely crew decisions (very low-level go-arounds)
	2	Failed to go around after un-stabilized approach
	3	SOP Manual not updated and maximum tailwind not mentioned
	4	Manual handling/flight controls
	5	Contaminated runways
Contributing factors	1	High Airspeed and Low Engine Thrust. Anti-skid failures of landing gear causing prolong landing distance.
	2	Instantaneous variable wind condition on aerodrome traffic pattern.
	3	Late activation of airbrakes and spoilers (especially airbrakes) with tailwind cause to increase the landing roll distance.

Table 5: RE and ARC Root Cause

Some of the Precursors, which could Lead to Runway Excursion:

- A. Precursors for aircraft overrunning the end of the runway on landing (landing overrun) could include:
1. Long landing / high across threshold / extended flare / floating,
 2. incorrect performance calculation,
 3. ineffective use of stopping devices / time to apply reverse thrust or braking / inappropriate use of auto brake setting,
 4. weather related / runway condition / aquaplaning, unsterilized approach, tailwind landing.
- B. Precursors for aircraft veering off the side of the runway during landing (landing veer-off) could include:
1. Crosswind and wet /contaminated runway,
 2. hard landing / inappropriate use of stopping devices / asymmetric braking or reverse thrust,
 3. inappropriate use of nose wheel steering.

2.2.3.2 Loss of Control-Inflight

During 2019-2023 there was no Aircraft upset or Loss of contro. Table 6 below the root-cause analysis is based mainly on industry's analysis of the LOC-I accidents:

Root Cause Analysis		
Latent Conditions	1	Inadequate safety management system including the use of the FDM data
	2	Incomplete/Inefficient Flight operations
	3	Regulatory oversight
Threat	1	Inappropriate Flight Crew Automation training
	2	Type-rating related issues on complex and highly automated aircraft
	3	Contained engine/power plant malfunction

	4	Severe turbulence, Thunderstorms, wind shear/Gusty wind
	5	Poor visibility/IMC conditions
	6	Spatial disorientation/Somatogravic illusion
	7	Flt Crew misdiagnose the problem leading to the application of an incorrect recovery procedure
	8	Lack of exposure to the required maneuvers during normal line flying operations
	9	Limitations in simulator fidelity could lead to pilots not having the manual flying skills required to recover from some loss of control scenarios.
Errors	1	Inappropriate/Incorrect use of Automation by flight crew
	2	Inadequate flight crew monitoring skills/awareness or communication
	3	Flt Crew mishandling of manual flight path and/or speed control
	4	Abnormal checklist
	5	Incorrect recovery technique by flight crew when their aircraft has become fully stalled
Contributing factors	1	Unnecessary weather penetration
	2	Operation outside aircraft limitations
	3	Unstable approach
	4	Vertical/lateral speed deviation


Table 6: LOC-I Root Cause

A. Direct Precursors to a Loss of Control Event:

1. Deviation from flight path
2. Abnormal airspeed or triggering of stall protections

2.2.4 Commercial helicopters operations Data Analysis

Only five (5) States shared the number of occurrences and some data analysis related to commercial helicopter operation. For the period 2019-2023, one LOC-I accident and one CFIT serious incident had occurred.



Graph 18. Commercial Hel operations incidents 2019-2023 reported by States

The data shows that there was a significant increase on the number of SCF-NP incidents. The number of incidents data shared by the MID States have been considered and included in the analysis to shed light and identify the potential safety concerns in the MID Region. However further data analysis should be provided by the MID States for an in-depth analysis and provide more visibility on the high risk categories and safety issues at the regional level. Therefore, MID States are strongly encouraged to share data analysis related to commercial helicopter operation to conduct appropriate analysis.

Identified top occurrence categories:

LOC-I, CFIT, SCF-PP, NAV, SCF-NP, and BIRD.

2.3 MID Region Safety Performance - Safety Indicators-Reactive

2.3.1 Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Average 2019-2023		2023	
		MID	Global	MID	Global
Number of accidents per million departures	Reduce/Maintain the Regional average rate of accidents to be in line with the global	1.77	3.21	0	2.09
Number of fatal accidents per million departures	Reduce/Maintain the Regional average rate of fatal accidents to be in line with the global	0.28	0.21	0	0.04
Number of Runway Excursion related accidents per million departures	Reduce/Maintain the Regional average rate of Runway Excursion related accidents to be below the global	0.45	0.23	0	0.08
Number of Runway Incursion accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of Runway Incursion accidents to be below the global	0	0.01	0	0
Number of LOC-I related accidents per million departures	Reduce/Maintain the Regional average rate of LOC-I related accidents to be below the global average	0	0.06	0	0.08
Number of CFIT related accidents per million departures	Reduce/Maintain the Regional average rate of CFIT related accidents to be below the global rate	0	0.02	0	0
Number of Mid Air Collision (accidents)	Zero Mid Air Collision accident	0	0	0	0

Table 7: Goal 1-Safety indicators-Reactive

3. Proactive Safety Information


This section of the Annual Safety Report focuses on proactive safety data analysis to identify organizational issues that forms the basis for the development of SEIs.

3.1 ICAO USOAP-CMA

3.1.1 USOAP-CMA Review


Each ICAO Member State is expected to establish and maintain an effective safety oversight system that addresses all safety-related areas of aviation activities. The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP-CMA) measures the effective implementation (EI) of a State’s safety oversight system.

In order to standardise the audits conducted under the USOAP CMA, ICAO established protocol questions (PQs) based on safety-related ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) established in the Annexes to the Chicago Convention, the Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS), and supporting ICAO guidance material. The PQs contribute to assessing the eight critical elements (CEs) of a State’s safety oversight system.




Graph 19. Critical elements of a State’s safety oversight system

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the Regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 76.8% which is above the world EI 69.68% (as of 10 August 2024). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%. No SSC in the MID Region.



Graph 20: Source: ICAO USOAP CMA Online Framework (OLF), as of 10 August 2024

All eight areas and CEs have an EI above 60%. However, the areas of AIG and ANS and CE4, CE7, and CE8 still need more improvement. 6 areas and 5 critical elements are above the target of 70% EI. Moreover, the effective implementation in certification, surveillance, and resolution of Safety concerns need to be improved.



Graph 21: Source: ICAO iSTARS, as of 11 June 2024

3.1.2 ICAO USOAP CMA Activities — MID States Status for 2022

The main activities under USOAP-CMA are:

- **Audit:** This activity is performed on-site to conduct a systematic and objective assessment of State's safety oversight system. It can be full or limited.
- **ICAO Coordinated Validated Mission (ICVM):** This activity is performed to assess a State's effective corrective actions addressing previously identified findings related to PQs requiring an on-site activity.
- **Off-site Validation activity:** This activity is performed to assess a State's effective corrective actions addressing previously identified findings related to PQs not requiring an on-site activity.
- **State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment (SSPIA):** This activity is to perform a qualitative (non-quantitative) assessment of the progress made by State in implementing SSP. Broken down into 8 areas: GEN (SSP general aspects), SDA (safety data analysis), PEL, OPS, AIR (AMO aspects only), ANS (ATS aspects only), AGA, and AIG.

State/organization	Type of activity	Date	Status
Oman	ICVM	16 Nov 2023	Completed
Oman	Audit (AIG area)	23 Jan – 1 Feb 2024	Completed
Egypt	Audit	26 Nov – 8 Dec 2024	Postponed

Table 8: ICAO USOAP CMA Activities — MID States Status for 2023

3.2 MID Region State Safety Programme (SSP)


3.2.1 SSP Foundation

Safety Management Tools: The full list of SSP Foundation PQs can be found on the SSP Foundation tool, available on iSTARS since 2017.




SSP Foundation

A sub-set of 299 Protocol Questions (PQs) out of the 943 PQs used to calculate the USOAP Effective Implementation (EI). This sub-set of questions are considered as the foundation for a State Safety Programme (SSP) implementation. A SSP Foundation indicator is calculated, as the percentage of PQs which are either validated by USOAP or submitted as completed through the corrective action plans (CAP) on the USOAP CMA Online Framework. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is **78, 59%**. The SSP foundation EI for MID Region States is shown in the graph 21 below.



Graph 22: Overall SSP foundation for MID Region States (Source: iSTARS as of 5 July 2024)

The sub-set of PQs are grouped by 17 subjects based on the Annex 19 amendment 1 and the 4th edition of the Safety Management Manual (forthcoming). States with EI above 60% may still have



PQs to address which are fundamental for their SSP. Hazard identification and risk assessment is the lowest one with 51%, followed by qualified technical personnel with 55%.

Graph 23: Average EI by Safety Management subjects for States in MID Region (Source: iSTARS as of 5 July 2024)

3.2.2 SSP Gap Analysis

Safety Management Tools: The application was updated in 2019 to reflect Amendment 1 to Annex 19 and the 4th edition of the SMM. It now comprises 62 questions, which cover all the requirements of an SSP and provides project owners the opportunity to develop an implementation plan to address the gaps identified.



SSP Gap Analysis State Safety Programs

These PQs can be prioritised and addressed when conducting the SSP gap analysis or while defining the SSP implementation/action plan. States can use the ICAO iSTARS online to perform an SSP Gap Analysis-SMM 4th Edition. This provides an indication of the broad scope of gaps and hence overall workload to be expected. This initial information can be useful to senior management in anticipating the

scale of the SSP implementation effort and hence the resources to be allocated/provided.


The SSP statistics shown in the graph 26 are high-level information about each Gap analysis project performed by States themselves (Self-reported by the State and not validated by ICAO). SSP implementation progress has been measured for each State using simple milestones as per the entered data.

State Safety Programme (SSP) Implementation

ICAO measures SSP implementation in levels as follows:

- Level 1: States having started a GAP analysis
- Level 2: States having reviewed all the GAP analysis questions
- Level 3: States having defined an implementation plan to address the gaps
- Level 4: States having closed all actions and fully implemented their SSPs

The completion percentage of GAQs in each level is given in graph 22 for States in the MID Region.



Graph 24: SSP Implementation Progress for States in MID Region: (Source: iSTARS as of 5 July 2024)


3.2.3 Implementation Packages

On 17 July 2020, ICAO issued Electronic Bulletin 2020/40 informing States of the availability of implementation packages (iPacks) to support States in their response, recovery and resilience efforts following the COVID-19 outbreak. An iPack is a new ICAO initiative, which bundles standardized



guidance material, training, tools, checklists and subject matter expert support to facilitate and guide the implementation of ICAO provisions for State entities (e.g. governments, civil aviation authorities (CAAs), national air transport facilitation committees), aviation service providers, supply chain stakeholders and their personnel.

iPacks are developed and implemented in full alignment with the measures and recommendations contained in the Council Aviation Recovery Task Force (CART) Report.



Preparing for ICAO USOAP CMA activities iPack has been deployed and completed to support State in the MID Region.

MID Region State Safety Programme (SSP) Implementation challenges

Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top Safety priorities. Common challenges have been identified based on the States' feedback, as follows:

1. Legislation amendments;
2. Capacity building and training;
3. Limited qualified personnel;
4. Limited guidance to establish and develop a Safety data and safety information collection and analysis;
5. Limited collaboration, coordination, and communication amongst SSP stakeholders;
6. Limited guidance to develop a robust safety risk management framework and processes;
7. Transition from a prescriptive approach to a more risk-based and performance-based approach; and
8. Allocation of resources to enable SSP implementation

The following actions were recommended to support the SSP implementation:

- Continuous update of the SSP Gap Analysis available on iSTARS
- Participate in the new ICAO Safety Management Training Programme (SMTP), with the CBT part and the Safety Management for Practitioners Course
- Work with the ICAO Regional Office to make use of available means (e.g. Technical Co-operation Bureau) to provide assistance needed for SSP implementation
- Identify safety management best practices in coordination with States (champion State to promote best practices among other States) including sharing of technical guidance and tools related to SSP (e.g. advisory circulars, staff instructions)
- Establishment of voluntary and mandatory safety reporting systems
- The RASG-MID also supported the establishment of the MENA RSOO, with a primary objective to assist member States to develop and implement SSP. The MENA RSOO is still in the establishment and activation process.

- Several Safety Management Workshops, training courses, webinars, and meetings have been organized to support the implementation of SSP/SMS and address the challenges and difficulties, as well as sharing of experiences and best practices.
- In addition, the MID Region safety management implementation Roadmap has been endorsed by the RSC/7 to assist MID Region States to comply with the requirement for the implementation of the SSPs by States and the SMS by service providers as established in the Annex 19, Safety Management, GASP 2023-2025 Edition, and MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition. The Roadmap will be linked to the MID NCLB Strategy in order to support the States in a prioritized manner and will be implemented within the RASG-MID framework.
- Moreover, the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT) is established as the main Regional Framework for the provision of assistance to States through Safety Management Assistance Missions. Its handbook endorsed by the RASG-MID/9 to support States with SSP implementation in an effective and efficient manner.

National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP)

In line with the ICAO Safety Strategic Objective, the 2023-2025 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. It also provides a framework in which regional and national aviation safety plans (RASPs and NASPs) are developed and implemented.

The States NASP should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety issues. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate).

Recognizing the challenges facing the States in the development of their NASPs, the ICAO MID Office conducted NASP workshops and assistance Missions dedicated to NASP in order to support States with NASP development.

The main challenges faced by States in developing their NASPs.

- Capacity building and training;
- Senior management commitment;
- Limited resources including financial;
- Limited qualified personnel;
- Safety data and safety information collection and analysis;
- Emerging of new technologies;
- Limited collaboration, coordination, and communication amongst stakeholders; and
- Limited guidance to develop a robust safety risk management framework and processes.

3.3 Human Factors and Human Performance

As the aviation system changes, it is imperative to ensure that human factors and the impact on human performance are taken into account, both at service provider and regulatory levels. Human factors and human performance are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably.

The performance of the aviation system, including its safety performance, depends on humans and on the effective integration of the human factors into the management systems in place. Accordingly, focus on human factors and human performance should form an integral part of any safety management approach, be it at regional, State or industry level.

ICAO emphasised the importance of addressing human factors and human performance issues by publishing ICAO Doc 10151 'Manual on Human Performance (HP) for Regulators (first edition 2021). As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. Crew Resource Management (CRM) has been identified in the MID ASR as a safety issue in the domain of commercial air transport. In addition, Team Resource Management (TRM) was introduced into ATC following the success achieved with CRM in the airline community enhancing teamwork practices. The practice is applied within virtually every airline with training given to pilots and other operational staff.

Within the last decade in ATM there have been numerous advances in widespread acceptance of SMS under the guidance of ICAO. ICAO has now mandated the use of SMS Manual Doc 9859 to standardize the approach to safety. TRM as defined by ICAO is an integral component of SMS under human factor.

3.4 Competence of Personnel

Availability of well-trained and competent aviation personnel is paramount to the safety and resilience of the aviation industry. Some of States in MID Region has a mature and detailed regulatory framework in place to ensure proper training, licensing, adequacy of training devices and oversight. Nevertheless, several factors are challenging this mature framework: new technologies and increasing automation are changing the safety needs for aviation personnel and new training devices are emerging. New aircraft types and technological advancements in virtual reality/artificial intelligence are revolutionising pilot training altogether.

3.5 Manage Risk Interdependencies

The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that safety, security, health safety and other risks can no longer be managed in isolation. The aviation community has realised that continuing to develop tools and specific guidance for each situation and for each domain affected by transversal risks may delay not only the implementation of mitigation measures, but also the development of an enabling framework to support integrated, collaborative risk management.

Some initial integration steps have already been taken in the safety and security domains-in accordance with ICAO Annex 17 and Annex 19 Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), the Contracting States are required to establish reporting systems for the analysis of security and safety information. States have been advised by ICAO to consider aligning their security reporting mechanisms with existing aviation safety reporting systems, in order to allow for an integrated approach to the management of risks. This should also enable the use of existing safety tools and concepts especially in relation to the appropriate protection of data and of those reporting for the benefit of aviation security, as well as foster the implementation of a safety and security culture amongst States and stakeholders.

3.5.1 Cybersecurity Risks

The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalisation. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardised manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that

the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organisations with malicious intent.

3.5.2 GNSS Interference & Spoofing Risks

GNSS/GPS Interference Reported in MENA Region 2023

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which involves systems such as Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia’s GLONASS, China’s, BeiDou, Europe’s Galileo includes navigation satellite infrastructures and constellations which provide position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information supporting aircraft and air traffic management operations and support navigation applications in all phases of flight as well as surveillance application like ADS-B. GNSS is also used in safety nets like the EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems) and provides the time reference that is used to synchronize systems and operations in ATM.

GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents have increasingly threatened the integrity of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing services across Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Similar incidents have been reported in other locations globally.


Jamming’ blocks the GNSS signal, whereas ‘spoofing’ sends false information to the aircraft's receiver. There is a high safety risk as GPS spoofing has made backup inertial navigation systems unreliable by corrupting GPS data. This threat turns off the entire navigation system by tricking the Flight Management System into indicating that the aircraft is off-track. The aircraft’s Inertia Reference System fails, leading to corrupted navigation systems. GPS jamming, while problematic, is a different risk level from GPS Spoofing, as it only blocks GPS signals. Still, the sensor fusion software can use other sources of information to provide continuous, precise navigation.

In a continuous monitoring the regional safety risk of GNSS/GPS Interference, an updated analysis is presented to provide figure from January until December 2023 of GNSS/GPS Interference in MID Region.

The analysis utilized data from the Flight Data Exchange (FDX) showed a total of 46444 ‘GPS signal in the MENA region from January 2023 to December 2023 with the rate of 98.76 compared to global average of 30.19 per cent.



Graph 24: Reported GNSS/GPS Interference



Graph 25: GNSS Interference and Spoofing MID Region

Above chart depicts flights in the MENA region that have experienced 'GPS Signal Loss' or spoofing during flights & departure or arrival near airports.

The problem has exacerbated with global conflicts occurring from Eastern Europe to the Middle East, and numerous airlines are being impacted by GNSS spoofing.

To bring attention to the critical issue of GNSS interference and spoofing, and to foster discussions on the management of GNSS vulnerabilities and potential mitigation measures against GNSS RFI, ICAO convened the ICAO EUR/MID Radio Navigation Symposium from 6 to 8 February 2024 in Turkey. Several recommendations adopted by the meeting.

Recommendations:

To address this issue of harmful interference to GNSS.

Airlines

- To develop/update their own risk model using the appropriate assessment technique to evaluate the operator's exposure to GNSS RFI hazards across the operational network.
- To establish a safety Performance Indicator (SPI) related to GNSS RFI and the aircraft navigation and surveillance performance degradation.
- To enforce flight crews to submit GNSS RFI-related safety reports is also recommended as a complementary means to capture and follow up on the GNSS RFI Issue.
- Periodically evaluate established SPIs and exposure to GNSS RFI to determine the effectiveness of controls.

IATA

- To assist operators in identifying GNSS interference hotspots, evaluating the feasibility of providing near real-time source information such as FDX could help assess exposure to jamming and spoofing threats. ANSP
- To promptly notify airlines and airspace users once interference to GNSS was notified.
- To inform flight crews and air traffic controllers about the impact of GNSS interference and establish effective contingency procedures and capabilities as appropriate.

STATES

- To implement appropriate mitigation measures as contained in ICAO GNSS Manual (Doc 9849) as a matter of high priority and to report progress and any difficulties to ICAO.
- While using GNSS jammers during military exercises and operations, to recognize the intended impact of harmful interference to civil flight operations and to exercise caution to the maximum extent possible to protect the safety of civil aircraft.
- To establish and ensure appropriate frequency regulations are in place and maintained to protect allocated GNSS frequencies from harmful interference in line with ITU Radio Regulations.
- To carefully consider operational risks associated to harmful interference to GNSS during their planning for rationalization of conventional navigation and surveillance infrastructures and to incorporate inputs from airspace users while developing a CNS rationalization plan.
- To ensure that contingency procedures are established in coordination with air navigation service providers and airspace users and that essential conventional navigation

infrastructure, particularly Instrument Landing System (ILS), are retained and fully operational.

ICAO

- In coordination with manufacturers and airspace user communities, to develop a global strategy on Alternative Position, Navigation, and Timing. This A-PNT strategy should aim to ensure continuity of flight and ATM operations during interruptions of GNSS and should include the increasing capabilities and roles of onboard INS/IRU.
- In cooperation with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to analyze the reported cases of harmful interference to GNSS and establish appropriate measures to address the safety impact on aviation

3.5.3 5G interference with Radio Altimeter Risks

Radar altimeters (RA), operating at 4.2-4.4 GHz, are the only sensors onboard a civil aircraft which provide a direct measurement of the clearance height of the aircraft over the terrain or other obstacles (i.e. the Above Ground Level - AGL - information).

The RA systems' input is required and used by many aircraft systems when AGL is below 2500 ft. Any failures or interruptions of these sensors can therefore lead to incidents with catastrophic outcome, potentially resulting in multiple fatalities. The radar altimeters also play a crucial role in providing situational awareness to the flight crew. The measurements from the radar altimeters are also used by Automatic Flight Guidance and Control Systems (AFGCS) during instrument approaches, and to control the display of information from other systems, such as Predictive Wind Shear (PWS), the Engine-Indicating and Crew-Alerting System (EICAS), and Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) systems, to the flight crew.

There is a major risk that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band will cause harmful interference to radar altimeters on all types of civil aircraft- including commercial transport airplanes; business, regional, and general aviation airplanes; and both transport and general aviation helicopters. If there is no proper mitigation, this risk has the potential for broad impacts to aviation operations in the United States as well as in other regions where the 5G network is being implemented next to the 4.2-4.4 GHz frequency band.

List of potential equipment failures:

Auto land functions, EICAS/ECAM, False or missing GPWS alert, Unreliable instrument Indications, and Abnormal behaviors in Automatic Flight Systems.

3.5.4 Security Risks with an Impact on Aviation Safety

The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport security, aircraft security or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider potential impacts on aviation safety. States should consider where interdependencies between civil aviation safety and security exist.

Therefore, an integrated approach to the management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities would bring benefits such as a complete overview of risks, a better sharing of security information and the closure of gaps in the security system while focusing on increasing the overall level of safety. Consequently, this would allow ensuring synergies where security measures can

have an impact on safety and vice versa; thereby avoiding incompatible actions and strengthening the overall safety and security of civil aviation.

3.5.5 Risks Arising from Conflict Zones

The crash of flight MH17 immediately raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region. This is why it's important for governments, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civilian flights. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region on Jan 2020 involving the Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752. The tragic accident with the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 highlighted once more the importance of information sharing and risk assessments.

3.5.6 Aviation Health Safety (AHS) Risks

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the harmonisation of health policies affecting aviation, and in particular in the CAT domain, has become an important topic to help overcome the pandemic. The objective is to minimise the impact of health safety threats in CAT. Health safety threats should be included in the management of risk interdependencies.


COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we will be faced with. It is crucial to continue supporting the European aviation industry competitiveness by offering the safest aircraft interior environment to reduce the risk of disease transmission between continents and States, restore public trust and facilitate future responses to events of similar nature.

A number of actions were initiated following the onset the COVID-19 pandemic including the establishment of the MID-RPTF to serve as a platform for coordination and cooperation amongst all stakeholders to support States with the implementation of the CART and HLCC recommendations as well as the recovery of aviation industry in the MID Region during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. The development of ICAO CART CART I, CART II, CART III, and CART IV Reports and the associated "Take-Off Guidance Document" (TOGD).

3.6 Incidents Data

3.6.1 Incident Data shared by States for the Period 2019-2023

Graph 26 below shows that the number of Navigation (NAV) incident reported is the highest one followed by the system component system-non-power plant (SCF-NP), Wake Turbulence, airborne conflict incidents (near mid-air collision) and birds. For an in-depth analysis and to identify the underlying safety issues, MID States should provide further safety information and safety analysis in order to come out with strategic initiatives and mitigations.



Graph 26: Total number of incidents provided by the MID States for the period 2019-2023

3.6.2 IATA Data

3.6.2.1 Global Accidents

Data Driven Approach

Data for IATA’s Annual Safety Report is collected through IATA’s Global Aviation Data Management (GADM) programme, the world’s most diverse aviation data exchange programme. Data captured in GADM databases comprises accident and incident reports, ground damage occurrences and flight data from more than 470 different industry participants.


By analyzing data from over 100,000 flights each day, through GADM, IATA is tackling safety issues before they become problems and continuously improving safety.

Safety as a shared responsibility


A strong safety culture within the aviation industry is essential for continuous improvement in all aspects of operations. Creating an environment that encourages the transparent and timely reporting of incidents and accidents is essential to be able to identify systemic issues and prevent future occurrences. IATA is actively working on two fronts to bolster this effort:

- **Enhancing Airline Safety Culture:** In 2023, IATA introduced The Safety Leadership Charter, designed to reinforce organizational safety culture through airline executives committing to the eight IATA safety leadership principles. To date 89 airlines have signed the charter.
- **Encouraging States to Provide Timely, Comprehensive and Public Accident Reports:** An IATA analysis of accident investigations from 2018 to 2022 showed that just over half are investigated and published as prescribed by the Chicago Convention. The current shortfall in compliance prevents the aviation industry's various stakeholders from accessing vital information that could significantly improve flight safety.

Accidents by Final Report Status * Data source IATA



Final Report Status by Year * Data source IATA




Graph 27: Final Report Status MENA

2023 Full Year Accident Update

The 2023 all accident rate improved compared to 2022. Therefore, MENA regions recorded a fatality risk of zero in 2023. During 2023, there were a total of 30 accidents worldwide, of which 1 caused 72 fatalities compared with 158 fatalities in 2022. As a result, the fatal accident rate improved from 0.16 per million sectors in 2022 to 0.03 for 2023, which was also ahead of the 5-year fatal accident rate of 0.20.

	2022		2023	
	Count	Rate**	Count	Rate**
Industry	42	1.30	30 ↓	0.80 ↓
Jet	26	0.90	23 ↓	0.67 ↓
Turboprop	16	4.69	7 ↓	1.99 ↓
IATA Members	13	0.58	20 ↑	0.77 ↑
IOSA Members	18	0.74	19 ↑	0.69 ↓
Non-IOSA Members	24	3.07	11 ↓	1.08 ↓

% of Total Accidents



Graph 28: Top Findings 2019 – 2023

MID Accidents 2019-2023:

Accidents	Fatal Accidents	Fatalities Onboard	Other Fatalities	Jet	Turboprop	Passenger	Cargo	IATA	IOSA
7	0	0	0	6	1	5	2	5	5

A total of 7 accidents occurred in the last 5 years with majority of accidents occurring in 2022 and 2023, 5 of the accidents by MENA carriers occurred in MENA and 2 in NAM, 6 were Jet aircraft and 1 Turboprop. Most of the accidents occurred in Landing Phase of flight.



3.6.3 IATA Data

3.6.3.1 IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA)


The IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) is the benchmark for global safety management in airlines and is an internationally recognized and accepted evaluation system designed to assess the operational management and control systems of an airline. The program aims to increase global safety performance and reduce the number of redundant auditing activities in the industry.

IOSA scope covers eight (8) areas, which include: Organization and Management (ORG), Maintenance (MNT), Cargo (CGO), Security (SEC), Flight Operations (FLT), Dispatch (DSP), Cabin Safety (CAB) and Ground Handling Operations (GRH).

IATA launched the Risk Based IOSA (RBI) model with a transition to a risk-based model focusing on pertinent safety risks while maintain a baseline of safety. IOSA will become an even more powerful tool to help airlines and regulators to maintain and improve very high levels of safety performance. The transition to a risk-based approach is planned to take 3 years with the first risk-based pilots audits occurred in 2022. During the transition period both, traditional and risk-based audits will co-exist in the IOSA program. Following a period of transition, Risk Based IOSA will be the only IOSA audit program from 2025 onwards.

Additionally, the IATA Standard Safety Assessment (ISSA), for operators of smaller aircraft that are not eligible for the IOSA program, ensures we look to deliver continuous improvement in safety performance across the whole aviation ecosystem.

Currently 440 operators are on the IOSA Registry, including 107 non-IATA Members. The five year (2019-2023) average accident rate of IOSA airlines is 0.84 per million sectors which is almost three times better than the non-IOSA average of 2.24.



Graph 29: Accident rate 2018-2022 IOSA Airlines Vs non-IOSA Airlines

IOSA Audit Results

Globally a total of 3467 audits have been conducted since 2009 under IOSA program of which 135 audits conducted during the first half of 2024,




Graph 30: Global Number of Audits

In MENA a total of 285 audits have been conducted since 2009 under IOSA program of which 12 audits conducted during the first half of 2024 with average of 14 findings per audit and with average of 11 observations per audit . Findings were mainly in the areas of Dispatch (DSP), Flight Operations (FLT) ; Ground Handling Operations (GRH) and Organization Management (ORG).



Graph 31: Number of Audits conducted in MENA



Graph 32: IOSA Top Findings MENA Region 2023

3.6.3.2 IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO)

IATA and its member airlines welcome ICAO's initiatives on ground handling and the publication of Doc 10121, Manual on Ground Handling. The ICAO Doc recognizes that there is well-established industry developed and implemented standards for the management and operation of ground handling services as well as standardized operational procedures, and an associated audit program. It also points out that ad-hoc implementation of non-harmonized standards and procedures not only hinders global standardization but may also create additional safety risks, and inefficient operations. The manual also mentions that the established industry safety initiatives and best practices such as AHM, IGOM, ISAGO etc. are recommended guidelines for ground operations. As a result, these programs can be used to strengthen States' oversight, as recommended in Doc 10004, Global Aviation Safety Plan 2020-2022.


IATA and its member airlines support risk based « SMART » regulation and are in favour of the establishment of performance-based safety rules for ground handling operations that support the use and implementation of existing industry standards, best practices, and programs.

IATA, and its member airlines request that States recognize IATA's initiatives and programs as an Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) to any State regulation on ground handling. IATA and its member airlines are ready to work with the States, to develop and propose regulations, and ensure a balance between flexibility risks, controls, and impact.


IATA and its member airlines call on industry stakeholders to collaborate effectively to: Improve Safety through implementation of harmonized global standards; Modernize ground operations process and infrastructure through innovative technology and sustainable operations

Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) has been advancing aviation safety for the last 16 years. ISAGO is an industry program for the global oversight of ground handling service providers (GHSPs). It is based on the IATA's Ground Operations Manual (IGOM) standards. Since its launch in May 2008, over 3,000 audits have been conducted worldwide, making it the industry global standard for ground handling service providers (GHSPs).

The ISAGO Registry now includes 351 GHSPs registered of which 42 GHSPs in MENA Region that provide services at 346 accredited stations in 206 airports around the world. **Audit Result Analysis per region** 34 audits conducted in MENA during 2022 with average of 6.88 findings per audit. The Top 5 findings based on analysis of all findings of 2022 audits:



Graph 33: Registered GHSP per Region



Graph 34: Accredited Stations per Region

Audit Result Analysis per region.

315 audits have been conducted globally of which 37 audits conducted in MENA during 2023 with average of 10.95 2 findings per audit.

3.7 Region Safety Performance - Safety Indicators-Proactive

3.7.1 Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	MID	Remark
A. Regional average EI	a. Increase the Regional average EI to be above 80 by 2025	76,07%	
B. Number of MID States with an overall EI over 60%.	b. All MID audited States to be above 60% EI by 2025	10 States	
C. Regional average EI by area	c. Regional average EI for each area to be above 70% by 2025	6 areas	
D. Regional average EI by CE	d. Regional average EI for each CE to be above 70% by 2025	5 CEs	
E. Regional average EI of PPQs	e. Regional average EI PPQs above 75% by 2025	74.6%	

Table 9: Goal 2

3.7.2 Goal 3: Implementation of Effective SSP

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	MID	Remark
Regional Average SSP Foundation	85% by 2025	78.59%	
Number of States having an SSP that is present*	At least 4 States	TBD	
Number of States that have developed and published a national aviation safety plan (NASP)	All States by 2025	6	
Number of States that require applicable service providers under their authority to implement an SMS	All States	TBD	

Table 10: Goal 3

3.7.3 Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	MID	Remark
Percentage of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) completed	80% by 2025	43%	
Number of States seeking/receiving assistance, to strengthen their Safety Oversight capabilities through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	States with SSC as a first priority All States as a second priority having EI below 80%	10 States	
Number of States seeking assistance to facilitate SSP & NASP implementation through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	All States	6 States	
Number of States sharing safety information including operational safety risks and emerging issues to support the development of MID ASR	All States	6	

Table 11: Goal 4

3.7.4 Goal 5: Expand the use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	MID	Remark
Use of the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), to complement safety oversight activities.	a. Maintain at least 60% of eligible MID airlines to be certified IATA-IOSA at all times. b. All MID States with an EI of at least 60% use the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) to complement their safety oversight activities.	6 states (40%)	
Use of the IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) certification, as a percentage of all Ground Handling service providers	The IATA Ground Handling Manual (IGOM) endorsed as a reference for ground handling safety standards by all MID States by 2025	6 States (40%)	
MID RASP developed in consultation with industry	MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition	Completed	Target achieved
Number of States that have established Safety data collection and processing system (SDCPS)	At least 12 States by 2025	TBD	

Table 12: Goal 5

3.7.5 Goal 6: Ensure Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	MID	Remark
Percentage of Certified International Aerodromes*	65% by 2025	58,62%	
Percentage of established Runway Safety Team (RST) at MID International Aerodromes.	80% by 2025	68,97%	
Percentage of Global reporting Format (GRF) Plans implemented for International Aerodromes*	75% by 2025	65.33%	

Table13: Goal 6

4 Safety Priorities for MID Region

One of the GASP goals is for States to improve their effective safety oversight capabilities and to progress in the implementation of SSPs. Thus, GASP calls for States to put in place robust and sustainable safety oversight systems that should progressively evolve into more sophisticated means of managing Safety. In addition to addressing organizational/systemic safety issues, GASP addresses high-risk categories of occurrences, which are deemed global safety priorities. These categories were determined based on actual fatalities from past accidents, high fatality risk per accident or the number of accidents and incidents. Therefore, the Regional operational Safety risks, organizational issues, and the emerging safety risks will be defined and which would support and improve the development of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs).

4.1 Regional Operational Safety Risks

Operational safety risks arise during the delivery of a service or the conduct of an activity (e.g. operation of an aircraft, airports or of air traffic control). Operational interactions between people and technology, as well as the operational context in which aviation activities are carried out are taken into consideration to identify expected performance limitations and hazards.

The reactive and proactive safety information provided by ICAO, IATA, MID Region States and the safety risk portfolio were considered for identifying the Regional operational risks . Table14 shows that each identified safety issue is mapped to its respective potential accident outcome (s), and the safety risk Portfolio for the MID Region as follow:

Safety Issues	Potential Accident Outcome						Injury Damage inflight	Injury Damage on Ground
	CFIT	LOC-I	MAC	GCOL	RE/ARC			
Monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes	X	X			X			
Adverse Convective weather (Turb, Hail,..etc)	X	X			X	X		
Un-stabilized Approach		X			X		X	
Flight planning and preparation	X	X	X	X	X			
Crew Resource Management	X	X	X	X	X			
Handling of technical failure	X	X		X	X		X	
Handling and execution of GOA	X	X			X			
Loss of separation in flight/ and/or airspace/TCAS RA			X			X		
Experience, training and competence of Flight Crews	X	X	X		X			
Deconfliction between IFR and VFR traffic			X					

Potential Accident Outcome							
Safety Issues	CFIT	LOC-I	MAC	GCOL	RE/ARC	Injury Damage inflight	Injury Damage on Ground
Inappropriate flight control inputs		X			X		
Fatigue	X	X					
Entry of aircraft performance data		X					
Contained engine Failure/Power Plant Malfunctions		X			X	X	
Birdstrike/Engine Bird ingestion		X			X		
Fire/Smoke-non impact		X				X	
Wake Vortex		X				X	
Deviation from pitch or roll attitude	X	X			X		
Security Risks with impact on Safety		X					
Tail/Cross wind/Windshear		X			X		X
Runway Incursion				X	X		X
Maintenance events	X	X				X	
Contaminated runway/Poor braking action					X		X
Turbulence and Mountain Waves		X				X	
GNSS Jamming/Spoofing	X		X				
Carriage and transport of lithium batteries		X					
Effectiveness of safety management	X	X	X	X	X		

Table 14: Safety Risk Portfolio

First, Considering ICAO reactive safety information, the Regional operational safety risks identified was runway safety (RE/ARC). It is also to be noted that for the Abrupt Manoeuvre (AMAN) occurrence category, the flightcrew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Mid air collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. Therefore, the MAC occurrence category was also considered as a HRC. Considering also the reactive and proactive safety information, safety issues identified which could lead to the potential accident outcomes of Loss of control Inflight (LOC-I), Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), Mid Air Collision (MAC), and runway incursion (RI) as detailed in the above safety risk portfolio. Therefore, the LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RI were also considered as Regional operational safety risks (R-HRC) due to the potential risk of these type of accidents though the MID States did not experience those accidents during the period 2019-2023.

Based on the analyses of reactive and proactive safety information, it is concluded that the Regional operational safety risks for the MID Region are:

1. Loss of Control-In Flight (LOC-I);
2. Runway Safety (RS); mainly (RE and ARC during landing);
3. Mid-Air Collision (MAC);
3. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT); and
5. Runway incursion (RI).

In addition to this, main safety issues have been identified and mapped to their respective potential outcomes as detailed in the table 14.

1. Loss of control inflight (LOC-I)

Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime that is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always, at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved. Prevention of loss of control is a strategic priority.

2. Runway Excursions (RE):

RE is a veer or overrun off the runway surface. RE events can happen during take-off or landing. During the period 2019-2023, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flight. In addition, High Airspeed and Low Engine Thrust identified as key contributing factors to the Unstable Approaches Events.

3. MID-Air Collision (MAC)

Refers to the potential collision of two aircraft in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine TCAS resolution advisories, or airspace infringements. During 2020, no mid-air collision accident has been recorded. However, the flightcrew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Mid air collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. In addition, this key risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating in Gulf area over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation. This is one specific safety issue that is the main priority in this key risk area. However, additional safety data and safety information are needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

4. Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)

It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences, which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc. There was no fatal accident involving MID States operators during this period. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States and in other parts of the world that make it an area of concern. However, additional safety data and safety information are needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

5. Runway incursion (RI)

A Runway Incursions refers to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection. Their accident outcome is runway collisions. While there were no fatal accidents or accidents involving MID States operators in the last years involving runway collision, the risk of the reported occurrence demonstrated to be very real. In addition to this, MID States should provide further safety data and safety information regarding runway incursion to identify the root causes and associated safety issues.

4.2 Organizational Issues

Organizational issues are systemic issues which take into consideration the impact of organizational culture, and policies and procedures on the effectiveness of safety risk controls. Organizations include entities in a State, such as the civil aviation authority (CAA) and service providers, such as operators of aeroplanes, ATS providers, and operators of aerodromes. Organizations should identify hazards in systemic issues and mitigate the associated risks to manage Safety. A State's responsibilities for the management of Safety comprise both safety oversight and safety management, collectively implemented through an SSP.

4.2.1 Enhance States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the Regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 76,07 %, which is above the world EI 69.05% (as of 6 July 2024). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%.

All eight areas and CEs have an EI above 60%. However, the areas of AIG and ANS and CE4, CE7, and CE8 still need more improvement. 6 areas and 5 critical elements are above the target of 70% EI. Moreover, the effective implementation in certification, surveillance, and resolution of Safety concerns need to be improved.

4.2.2 Improve Safety Management

States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to fully implement SSPs according to Annex 19; States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 78, 59%.

An SSP requires increased collaboration across operational domains to identify hazards and manage risks. Aviation authorities and organizations should anticipate new emerging threats and associated challenges by developing SRM principles. Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). In connection with this, the RASG-MID/9 endorsed the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT) handbook to support MID States in the implementation of the SSP in an effective and efficient way. Moreover, the RASG-MID also supported the establishment and activation of the MENA RSOO, with a primary objective to assist member States to develop and implement SSP; and Several Safety Management Workshops, training courses, and meetings have been organized to support the implementation of SSP/SMS and address the challenges and difficulties, as well as sharing of experiences and best practices.

In addition, the development of National Aviation Safety plan (NASP) is one of the MID region priorities and 7 States had developed their NASPs.

In line with the Safety Strategic Objective of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 2023-2025 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. It also provides a framework in which regional and national aviation safety plans (RASPs and NASPs) are developed and implemented.

The States NASP should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety issues. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate).

Recognizing the challenges facing the States in the development of their NASPs. In this respect, the ICAO MID Office conducted NASP workshops and assistance Missions dedicated to NASP in order to support States with NASP development.

4.2.3 Human Factors and Human Performance

As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. CRM has been identified as most important human factors issue in the domain of commercial air transport and safety actions would be identified and developed.

4.2.4 Competence of Personnel

Availability of well-trained and competent aviation personnel is paramount to the safety and resilience of the aviation industry. Some of States in MID Region has a mature and detailed regulatory framework in place to ensure proper training, licensing, adequacy of training devices and oversight. Nevertheless, several factors are challenging this mature framework: new technologies and increasing automation are changing the safety needs for aviation personnel and new training devices are emerging. New aircraft types and technological advancements in virtual reality/artificial intelligence are revolutionising pilot training altogether

4.2.5 Manage Risk Interdependencies

The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that safety, security, health safety and other risks can no longer be managed in isolation. The aviation community has realised that continuing to develop tools and specific guidance for each situation and for each domain affected by transversal risks may delay not only the implementation of mitigation measures, but also the development of an enabling framework to support integrated, collaborative risk management.

4.2.5.1 Cybersecurity Risks

The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalisation. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardised manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organisations with malicious intent.

4.2.5.2 Security risks with an impact on aviation safety

The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport security, aircraft security or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider potential impacts on aviation safety. States should consider where interdependencies between civil aviation safety and security exist.

Therefore, an integrated approach to the management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities would bring benefits such as a complete overview of risks, a better sharing of security information and the closure of gaps in the security system while focusing on increasing the overall level of safety. Consequently, this would allow ensuring synergies where security measures can have an impact on safety and vice versa; thereby avoiding incompatible actions and strengthening the overall safety and security of civil aviation.

4.2.5.3 Risks arising from conflict zones

The crash of flight MH17 immediately raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region. This is why it's important for governments, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civilian flights. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region on Jan 2020 involving the Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752. The tragic accident with the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 highlighted once more the importance of information sharing and risk assessments.

4.2.5.4 aviation health safety (AHS) risks

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the harmonisation of health policies affecting aviation, and in particular in the CAT domain, has become an important topic to help overcome the pandemic. The objective is to minimise the impact of health safety threats in CAT. Health safety threats should be included in the management of risk interdependencies.

COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we will be faced with. It is crucial to continue supporting the European aviation industry competitiveness by offering the safest aircraft interior environment to reduce the risk of disease transmission between continents and States, restore public trust and facilitate future responses to events of similar nature.

4.2.5.5 GNSS Interference/Spoofing Risks

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which involves systems such as Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia's GLONASS, China's, BeiDou, Europe's Galileo includes navigation satellite infrastructures and constellations which provide position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information supporting aircraft and air traffic management operations and support navigation applications in all phases of flight as well as surveillance application like ADS-B. GNSS is also used in safety nets like the EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems) and provides the time reference that is used to synchronize systems and operations in ATM.

GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents have increasingly threatened the integrity of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing services across Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Similar incidents have been reported in other locations globally.

Jamming' blocks the GNSS signal, whereas 'spoofing' sends false information to the aircraft's receiver. There is a high safety risk as GPS spoofing has made backup inertial navigation systems unreliable by corrupting GPS data. This threat turns off the entire navigation system by tricking the Flight Management System into indicating that the aircraft is off-track. The aircraft's Inertia Reference System fails, leading to corrupted navigation systems. GPS jamming, while problematic, is a different risk level from GPS Spoofing, as it only blocks GPS signals. Still, the sensor fusion software can use other sources of information to provide continuous, precise navigation.

The analysis utilized data from the Flight Data Exchange (FDX) showed a total of 46444 'GPS signal in the MENA region from January 2023 to December 2023 with the rate of 98.76 compared to global average of 30.19 per cent.

To bring attention to the critical issue of GNSS interference and spoofing, and to foster discussions on the management of GNSS vulnerabilities and potential mitigation measures against GNSS RFI, ICAO convened the ICAO EUR/MID Radio Navigation Symposium from 6 to 8 February 2024 in, Turkey and several recommendations have been adopted by the meeting.

4.2.5.6 5G interference with Radio Altimeter

There is a major risk that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band will cause harmful interference to radar altimeters on all types of civil aircraft- including commercial transport airplanes; business, regional, and general aviation airplanes; and both transport and general aviation helicopters. If there is no proper mitigation, this risk has the potential for broad impacts to aviation operations in the United States as well as in other regions where the 5G network is being implemented next to the 4.2-4.4 GHz frequency band.

4.3 Emerging Issues

Emerging issues are risks that might impact Safety in the future, these may include a possible new technology, a potential public policy, a new concept, business model or idea that, while perhaps an outlier today, could mature and develop into a critical mainstream issue in the future or become a major trend in its own right. Therefore, it is important that the international aviation community remain vigilant to identify emerging safety issues and develop mitigations to address them. Failure to address emerging safety issues can affect a State, Region or industry's ability to mitigate the safety risks.

4.3.1 UAS, AAM and manned VTOL-capable aircraft

The number of drones at the global level has increased. Available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. The civil aviation authority is responsible for, inter alia, ensuring aviation safety and protecting the public from aviation hazards.

The safe integration on the basis of granting fair access to airspace of all new entrants into the airspace network will be one of the main challenges in relation to the integration of UAS technologies and related concepts of operation.

Enabling the safe integration of UAS, being a fast evolving and emerging market segment, as well as of (initially manned) VTOL-capable aircraft, also intended for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations, continue to be priority activities.

Vertiports: VTOL-capable aircraft will use aerodromes, heliports and the so-called vertiports. 'Vertiport' means an area of land, water or structure used or intended to be used for the landing and take-off of VTOL-capable aircraft. Vertiports are classified as aerodromes for the purpose of aerodrome and vertiport regulations.

4.3.2 Artificial intelligence (AI) in Aviation

The next generation of automation in aviation systems is enabled and accelerated by the use of AI technologies. Whilst the trend towards increasing automation has resulted overall in improved safety, the introduction of AI will likely be modifying the paradigm of interaction between the Human and the AI-based systems (reduced crew operations), and in parallel even open the path towards more autonomous types of operations AAM.

4.3.3 Digitalisation in the aviation field

Aviation is moving fast to digitalise all areas, as there are demonstrated tangible benefits in safety, economics, operations, traffic management and control, manufacturing, training and maintenance.

Automation, remote control, machine-to-machine communication, robotics: 3D printing, virtual and augmented reality, blockchain, AI/cognitive computing, and sensors are among the technologies that will increasingly be used in aviation and that will impact the activity of regulators and aviation authorities.

In order to exploit the full digitalisation potential, the aviation sector needs to progress in the 'information management' dimension. Today, the fragmentation of data in terms of both taxonomy and storage does not allow a significant progress for the analysis according to the latest methodologies. These developments are increasingly challenging traditional aviation regulations and calling for an evolution towards more performance based, technology-neutral requirements, which will enable the novel business models that emerge from the digital transformation, increasing at the same time safety and efficiency.

5. MID-RASP SEIs Implementation Status

The Middle East Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) 2023-2025 Edition presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety in the MID Region, to strengthen Member States Safety Oversight System, and risk-based approach to managing safety and support effective implementation of States' Safety Programmes (SSP) and Safety Management System (SMS) including the development of NASPs.

The tenth meeting of the Regional Aviation Safety Group – Middle East (RASG-MID/10) meeting was held in Muscat, Oman, 14-17 May 2023; endorsed the MID-RASP 2023-2025 including 24 Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and 61 safety actions through RASG-MID Conclusion 10/7. In addition, the RASG-MID/11 was apprised with appreciation on the updated progress on SEIs and their respective safety actions and noted that 26 Safety actions (43%) out of 61 have been implemented and completed at **Appendix B**.

6. Final Conclusions

One of the GASP goals is for States to improve their effective safety oversight capabilities and to progress in the implementation of SSPs. In addition to addressing organizational issues, GASP addresses Global high-risk categories (G-HRCs) of occurrences, which are deemed global safety priorities. These categories were determined based on actual fatalities from past accidents, high fatality risk per accident, or the number of accidents and incidents.

Following the analysis of the reactive and proactive safety information provided by ICAO, IATA, and MID States for the period 2019 - 2023, it was concluded that the safety priorities defined for the MID Region are:

A. Regional operational Safety risks

1. Loss of Control-Inflight (LOC-I);
2. RE and ARC during landing;
3. Mid-Air Collision (MAC)
4. Controlled Flight Into Terrain- (CFIT); and
5. Runway incursion (RI).

B. Organizational issues:

1. Strengthen States' Safety Oversight capabilities;
2. Improve Safety Management;
3. Human factors and human performance;
4. Competence of personnel; and
5. Manage Risk interdependencies.
 - Cybersecurity risks
 - GNSS Interference/Spoofing Risks
 - 5G interference with Radio Altimeter
 - aviation health safety (AHS) risks
 - Risks arising from conflict zones, and
 - Security risks with an impact on aviation safety.

C. Emerging Issues

1. AAM and new entrants including UAS and eVTOL.

Appendix A: CICTT Occurrence Categories

Code	Description
ADRM	Aerodrome
AMAN	Abrupt Maneuver
ARC	Abnormal runway contact
BIRD	Bird
CABIN	Cabin safety events
CFIT	Controlled flight into/towards terrain
CTOL	Collision with obstacles during take-off and landing
EVAC	Evacuation
F-NI	Fire/smoke (non-impact)
F-POST	Fire/smoke (post-impact)
GCOL	Ground collision
ICE	Icing
LOC-I	Loss of control in-flight
LOC-G	Loss of control-ground
OTHR	Other
RAMP	Ground handling
RE	Runway excursion
SCF-NP	System/component failure (non-power plant)
SCF-PP	System/component failure (power plant)
TURB	Turbulence encounter
UNK	Unknown or undetermined
USOS	Undershoot/overshoot
WILD	Wildlife
WSTRW	Wind shear or thunderstorm

Appendix B: Safety Actions- Consolidated List of SEIs with their respective Actions

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
Regional Operational Safety Risks					
Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction in Operational Risks					
G1-SEI-01:	Aircraft Upset in Flight (LOC-I)	A1- Guidance material on flight crew proficiency	IATA to be supported by Airbus	Planned 2025	2023- 2025
		A2- Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation	IATA to be supported by Airbus	Planned 2025	2023- 2025
		A3- Conduct Upset Recovery capacity building activities	UPRT Workshop. Airbus, ICAO, Kuwait	Regional ICAO UPRT Workshop (jointly involving Airbus, ICAO, Kuwait) conducted in Kuwait 7-11 May 2023. Completed for 2023 /UPRT webinar conducted 2024	2023-2025
		A4- Develop guidance material on the air cargo safety	Oman	Planned for 2024	2023-2025
G1-SEI-02:	Runway Safety- Runway Excursion	A1- Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI	Completed for 2023 / continuous for 2024/2025	2023-2025
		A2- MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF)	ICAO	Completed for 2023 / continuous for 2024/2025	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		Implementation.			
G1-SEI-03:	Runway Safety- Runway Incursion	A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities on the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) Implementation	ICAO To be supported by Euro-Control, FAA	Completed Conducted February 2023	2023-2025
G1-SEI-04A1:	Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)	A1- Advisory Circular: Instrument Approach Procedures Using Continuous Descent Final Approach Techniques.	IATA supported by aircraft manufacturers	Planned 2025	2023-2025
		A2- Guidance for designing RNP Approach	ICAO and MID FPP	Planned for 2024	2023-2025
		A3- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)	IATA supported by Aircraft manufacturers	Planned for 2025	2023-2025
		A4- Awareness Material on the vulnerabilities of BARO-VNAV approaches and mitigation actions	ICAO	Circulated to all States 2024. Completed.	2023-2025
G1-SEI-04A2	5G Operations on Radar Altimeter	A1- Develop a guidance material on safeguarding measures to protect Radio Altimeter from potential harmful interference from 5G Operation	Radio Altimeter Action Group (RADALT AG) To be supported by Boeing	Completed Publication of the guidance material: MID DOC 15 edition 1.0 in May 2023.	2023-2025
		A2- Conduct a Webinar addressing the matter to raise awareness and promote the guidance material developed by the RADALT AG	ICAO and RADALT AG To be supported by Airbus & Boeing	Completed The webinar has been conducted.	2023-2025
G1-SEI-05B1:	MAC- Loss of Separation	A1- Conduct workshop to implement Civil-Military cooperation.	ICAO supported by States, and International Organizations	At national level, workshop has been conducted in Iran in 2022 and follow up meeting was conducted in Aug 2023. In this respect the action plan has been developed and agreed. Completed	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
				In addition, this issue has been raised by Iran during MIDANPIRG 20 meeting. As agreed in the side meeting with participation of Bahrain, Iran, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE, states are going to report safety issues regarding the operation of due regard specifically over the high seas to ICAO MID for further study and actions. At regional level, the plan was postponed to 2024. The ATM SG developed a draft reporting form, will be presented to the MIDANPIRG/21 for endorsement. Reporting form was reviewed and endorsed by MIDANPIRG/21	
		A2- Conduct seminar on raising awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas	ICAO supported by States, and international organizations	To be planned for 2025	2023-2025
G1-SEI-05B2:	GNSS Interference & Spoofing	A1: Raise awareness on the potential impact of GNSS interference on the aviation during the Civil-Mil Workshop	ICAO and IATA	The CMC Workshop is planned during 2024.	2023-2025
		A2- Urge States to follow the reporting procedure agreed by MIDANPIRG Conclusion 19/4 when needed	ICAO	SL has been issued. Completed	2023-2025
		A3- Capacity Building on GNSS operations and GNSS RFI	ICAO and ACAA	Regional GNSS Workshop conducted 2024. Completed	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
G1-SEI-05B3:	Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (Drones)	A1- UAS iPack deployment	ICAO and States		2023-2025
		A2- Organize symposium on Drones related subjects	ICAO and ACAO supported by FAA and Boeing	ACAO organized Drones symposium in Morocco during the period 4-5 October 2023. Completed/Continuous for 2024.	2023-2025
		A3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework	ICAO and States	To be circulated during 2024	2023-2025
		A4- Develop an AAM study report	UAE	Planned for 2024. WP to be presented by UAE during the upcoming SEIG/6 meeting	2023-2025
G1-SEI-05B4:	Expansion of ATS route Networks	A1- Conduct gap analysis to identify current ATS route networks gaps	ICAO and States	Required data and information have been gathered and dashboard was deployed. Completed.	2023-2025
		A2- Establishment of parallel unidirectional ATS routes (De-confliction)	ICAO and States	Establishment of the parallel airway at interface of Kuwait and Iraq is on process. In addition Iran requested to establish new parallel ATS route between Iran and Iraq to accommodate regional traffic in the most safe and efficient manner. Completed. In addition, During last MIDANPIRG proposed to enhance the structure of the ATS route at interface of MID and APAC regions by establishment of required parallel airways. This WP was supported by UAE and Saudi Arabia and endorsed by MIDANPIRG 20. Ongoing. As endorsed by	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
				MIDANPIRG/21, Airspace Management Working Group was established to address all ASM matters including establishment of unidirectional ATS routes in the MID region in harmonized manner. The first meeting will be conducted in October 2024 in Qatar.	
Organizational Challenges/issues					
Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities					
G2-SEI-01:	Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities	A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry.	<p>USOAP workshops conducted.</p> <p>ACAO and Singapore CAA: an AOC certification & Flight Inspectors course conducted in Amman the 29 -2 Jun 2023. Completed/continuous for 2024.</p> <p>ICAO & GCAA Symposium: “The Future of Aviation safety and Aircraft Accident Investigation” in Dubai, during 3 to 4 May 2023.</p> <p>“The Prevention of Aircraft Accidents and Incidents through the Collection & Analysis of Safety Data & Information” Workshop held in Rabat, Morocco from 11 to 12 July 2023.</p> <p>Conference on “Assistance to Aircraft Accident Victims and their Families” (AAAVF 2024) conducted 8-9 May 2024.</p>	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
				Aviation Safety and Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation Symposium planned to be conducted this year in Abu Dhabi.	
		A2- Conduct technical assistance and NCLB missions to States , with focus on states with EI<80% as well as ANS, AIG, AGA, and OPS areas	ICAO and States	TAs conducted 2023 (Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Sudan, Libya). ANS Technical assistance to Kuwait, Sudan, Jordan and Lebanon conducted. Completed. NCLB Missions to be conducted this year for Kuwait and Bahrain the year 2025.	2023-2025
		A3- Develop and implement a specific NCLB plan of actions.	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry		2023-2025
		A4 - Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection) (Action addressed under G6-SEI-01 A5)	States (Qatar) and ICAO	Conducted February 2023. Completed.	2023-2025
		A5- Develop guidance material to assist MID Region States in the issuance of exemptions related to temporary	Qatar supported by Iran, Sudan, UAE, ACAO, and IATA	Planned to be presented during the upcoming SEIG/6 meeting in Kuwait for 2024.	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		deviations from standards			
		A6- Develop guidance material to support States for the conduct of remote surveillance	Qatar supported by Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, and ACAO	Planned to be presented during the upcoming SEIG/6 meeting in Kuwait for 2024.	2023-2025
		A7- Develop guidance material on the enhancement of understanding the concept of judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors	Qatar supported by Saudi Arabia and UAE	Planned to be presented during the upcoming SEIG/6 meeting in Kuwait for 2024.	2023-2025
G2-SEI-03:	Establishment of MENA ARCM Database	A1- Establishing a Platform for Sharing data for MENA ARCM Member States	ICAO, ACAO, and MENA ARCM Member States	ACAO has established a share folder as an initial step for sharing information. Online platform establishment is on going	2023-2025
G2-SEI-04:	Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods	A1- Dangerous Goods (DG) capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fire/smoke risk in cabin	ICAO, States, International Organizations, IATA, And Industry		2023-2025
		A2- Develop guidance material on carriage and transport of Lithium batteries	IATA supported by States, International Organizations, And Industry	Guidance material endorsed by RASG-MID/11 and circulated. Completed.	2023-2025
G2-SEI-05:	Human factors and Competence of Personnel	A1- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). (Action addressed under G1-SEI-04: CFIT).	IATA		2023-2025
		A2- Organize CBAT/EBT, Crew Resource Management Capacity building activities	ACAO, ICAO & Airbus,	Planned for 2024. CBTA/EBT workshop planned to be conducted 25-26 Sep 2024.	2023-2025
		A3- Organize Team Resource Management Capacity building activities	ACAO, ICAO & Airbus	Planned for 2025	2023-2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		A4- Conduct Fatigue Risk Management and Mental Health Best Practices Capacity building activities	ACAO, ICAO & Airbus	Webinar planned for 23 Sep 2024.	2023-2025
		A5. Data analysis and Artificial intelligence	UAE	Planned for 2025	
G2-SEI-06:	Impact of security on safety	A1- Organize seminar/Symposium/Workshop to exchange experiences and good practices on assessing the risks and sharing of information related to the overflying of conflict zones in coordination with RASFG-MID and MIDANPIRG.	ICAO		2023-2025
		A2- Risk management on conflict zone workshop	ICAO/ACAO	Planned for 2024	2023-2025
G2-SEI-07:	Managing cybersecurity risks	A1- Develop a Regional Action Plan to bridge the gap between ICAO Cyber Security Action plan and the implementation level of Cyber Resilience in the MID Region	ANS Cyber SeC Action Group	Completed.	2023-2025
		A2- Conduct activities on Cyber Security and Resilience- (Jointly ANS and AVSEC)	ICAO supported by Boeing	Completed conducted Nov 2023	2023-2025
		A3- Develop a MID Region Cybersecurity Action Plan	Cybersecurity Security Ad-hoc Group	Completed	2023-2025



SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
G2-SEI-08:	Impact of COVID-19 pandemic- Safe return to operations	A1- Continued support to the aviation industry through MID-RPTF meetings/Activities, as needed	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry	Completed Aviation medicine workshop conducted Feb 2023	2023-2025
		A2- Sharing of guidance material/best practices	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry	Completed.	2023-2025
Goal 3: Implementation of Effective States Safety Programme (SSP)					
G3-SEI-01:	Implement an effective Safety Management	A1- Conduct ICAO SSP/SMS Capacity building activities	SSP workshops for States. 2023 SMS & Flight Data analysis workshop for airlines. ACAO, Airbus and ICAO.	SSP training course and SSP workshop conducted. (Kuwait & Oman) 2023 SRM Workshop conducted 2024. SMS & Flight Data analysis workshop for airlines Conducted Nov 2023. Completed/Continuous for 2024. SSP workshops provided for UAE & Jordan	2023-2025
		A2- Conduct Technical Assistance missions by SMIT	ICAO and States		2023-2025
G3-SEI-02:	NASP Development & Implementation	A1- Conduct NASPs workshops & technical assistance missions	ICAO. 2023	Workshop conducted in Kuwait and Qatar 2023. Completed/Continuous for 2024. To be conducted Back to back with SEIG/6 meeting	2023-2025

		A2- NASP iPacks deployment	ICAO	If requested by states	2023-2025
Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level					
G4-SEI-01:	Development and Implementation of MID-RASP	A1- Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition	SEIG	Published May 2023. Completed	2023-2025
G4-SEI-02:	Enhance collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry	A1- Develop and agree on joint work activities through MID-RCM meetings	ICAO, States, Regional Groups, International Organizations, and Industry	Completed Conducted Oct 2023	2023-2025
		A2- Support the establishment of MENA RSOO and its activities	ICAO and States	States Signed the RSOO MoU on Dec 2023 and RSOO started its operations. Completed.	2023-2025
Goal 5: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes and Safety Information Sharing Networks					
G5-SEI-01:	Promote the Use of industry Programmes	A1- Encourage IATA's IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	IATA	Completed/ Continuous action for 2024/2025	2023-2025
		A2- Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	ICAO and ACI	Completed/ Continuous action for 2024/2025	2023-2025
Goal 6: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations					
G6-SEI-01:	Certification of International Aerodromes	A1- Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and	ICAO and ACI	Four (04) activities have coordinated with ACI for 2024	2023-2025



		Operations, through capacity building activities.		(Implementation Status: On Track)	
		A2- Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to Aerodromes Certification through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI	Planned activity for 2025	2023-2025
		A3 - Deployment of iPack on Aerodrome Re-Start	ICAO and States	If requested by states	2023-2025
		A4 - Support States in implementing aerodrome oversight/inspection mechanism through capacity building activities on Aerodrome Oversight	ICAO Supported by FAA	Planned activity for 2024/2025	2023-2025
		A5 – Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection)	States (Qatar) and ICAO	Conducted February 2023. Completed.	2023-2025
		A6 – Conduct a Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities	ICAO, ACAO, WBA	Regional Symposium rescheduled for 2025	2023-2025
G6-SEI-02:	Establish Runway Safety Team (RST) at International Aerodromes	A1- Conduct Runway Safety Go-Team (RST) assistance missions	ICAO. Supported RSP (Runway Safety Programme Partners)	Planned for 2024	2023-2025
		A2: Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through capacity building activities: (Action addressed under G1-SEI-02: Runway Excursion).	ICAO and ACI	Completed for 2023/ continuous for 2024/2025	2023-2025

- END -



CREDITS

The RASG-MID thanks all those who contributed to the elaboration of this Annual Safety Report and provided necessary support and information to the members of the Annual Safety Report Group (ASRG). Special thanks go to:

Mr. Mohamed Chakib

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

Mr. Jehad Faqir

International Air Transport Association (IATA)

-END-



CAO, Middle East Office

Egyptian Civil Aviation Complex, Cairo Airport Road, Cairo, Egypt

Mail: P.O. Box 85, Cairo Airport Post Office Terminal One, Cairo 11776,
Arab Republic of Egypt

Tel.: +20 2 22674841/42/45/46

+20 2 22692173

Fax: +20 2 22674843

E-mail: icaomid@icao.int

