INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

REPORT OF THE

SEVENTH MEETING OF THE SAFETY ENHANCEMENT IMPLEMENTATION GROUP (SEIG/7)

(Amman, Jordan, 12-14 October 2025)

&

REGIONAL SSP OVERSIGHT WORKSHOP

(Amman, Jordan, 15-16 October 2025)

The views expressed in this Report should be taken as those of the ANP Working Group and not of the Organization. This Report will, however, be submitted to the MIDANPIRG and any formal action taken will be published in due course as a Supplement to the Report.

Approved by the Meeting
and published by authority of the Secretary General

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PART I – HISTORY OF THE MEETING

1. PLACE AND DURATION

1.1 The Seventh meeting of the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG/7) was held in Amman, Jordan, 12-16 October 2025.

2. OPENING

2.1 The meeting was opened by his Excellency Eng. Feras Alhendawi, Deputy Chief Commissioner who welcomed all the participants. His Excellency expressed his honor and pride in hosting the Seventh Meeting of the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG/7), the National Continuous Monitoring Coordinator (NCMC) meetings, and the Regional SSP Oversight Workshop in Amman.

2.2 His Excellency extended his appreciation to ICAO MID Office, regional organizations, and Member States for their participation and continued commitment to enhancing aviation safety in the region.

2.3 He also emphasized the importance of collaboration, knowledge-sharing, and coordinated action in addressing evolving aviation safety challenges.

2.4 He also reaffirmed Jordan commitment to supporting ICAO initiatives and contributing to the continuous improvement of aviation safety oversight in alignment with the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and regional frameworks.

2.5 Dr. Mohammad M. Hushki, Chairman of SEIG, welcomed the participant to Jordan. He highlighted the importance of holding this meeting after the ICAO assembly 42nd Session. He also strongly encouraged States and all stakeholders to support the SEIG and the implementation of SEIs and their respective safety actions.

3. ATTENDANCE

3.1 The meetings and the Workshop were attended by a total of fifty-seven (57) participants from ten (10) States (Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen), Three (3) organizations (ACAO, IATA, and ICAO). The List of Participants is at **Attachment A** to the Report.

4. OFFICERS AND SECRETARIAT

4.1 The meeting was chaired by Dr. Mohammad M. Hushki, Director Compliance Monitoring & NCMC of Jordan, Jordan Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission (CARC).

4.2 Mr. Jehad Faqir, Head Regional Safety Africa & Middle East AME-RDEL-Regional Office Amman, chaired the meeting from 14 to 16 Oct 2025 as the SEIG Chairperson was unable to attend due to unscheduled mission.

4.3 Mr. Mohamed Chakib, RO/SAF-IMP and Eng. Mashhor Alblowi, RO-FLS were the Secretary of the meetings.

4.4 The Regional SSP oversight workshop was delivered by Mr. Mohamed Chakib, RO/SAF-IMP.

5. LANGUAGE

5.1 Discussions were conducted in English and documentation was issued in English.

6. AGENDA

6.1 The following Agenda was adopted:

Agenda Item 1: Election of Vice-Chairperson and Adoption of the Provisional Agenda

Agenda Item 2: Regional Performance Framework for Safety

Agenda Item 3: NCMC

Agenda Item 4: Future Work Programme

Agenda Item 5: Any other business

7. REGIONAL SSP AND OVERSIGHT WORKSHOP

The Regional SSP oversight workshop conducted back-to-back with the SEIG/7. The Workshop provided:

- Amendment 2 to Annex 19
  Developing SSP

- System description, including the identification of interfaces
- SSP coordination group and the organization responsible for coordinating the SSP
- State Safety policy and associated safety intelligence
- Surveillance obligations
- SSP Oversight

8. CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS – DEFINITION

8.1 All MIDANPIRG Sub-Groups and Task Forces record their actions in the form of Conclusions and Decisions with the following significance:

a) **Conclusions** deal with the matters which, in accordance with the Group's Terms of Reference, merit directly the attention of States on which further action will be initiated by ICAO in accordance with established procedures; and

b) **Decisions** deal with matters of concern only to MIDANPIRG and its contributory bodies

8. LIST OF DRAFT CONCLUSIONS AND DRAFT DECISIONS

DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/1:	*IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS ON THE SAFETY ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVES (SEIS)*
DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/2:	*ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY EXEMPTIONS GUIDANCE MATERIAL*
DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/3:	*REMOTE SAFETY OVERSIGHT GUIDANCE MATERIAL*
DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/4:	*JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT FOR AVIATION INSPECTORS GUIDANCE MATERIAL*
DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/5:	*DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (NASP) IN MID STATES*
DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/6:	*MID-RASP 2026-2028 EDITION*
DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/7:	*DEVELOPMENT OF STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME (SSP) IN MID STATES*
DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/8:	*DEVELOPMENT OF USOAP CMA GUIDANCE MATERIAL*

PART II: REPORT ON AGENDA ITEMS

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 1: ELECTION OF VICE-CHAIRPERSON AND ADOPTION OF THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA

1.1 The subject was addressed in WP/1, presented by the Secretariat.

1.2 Dr. Mohammad M. Hushki, Director Compliance Monitoring & NCMC of Jordan, Jordan Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission (CARC), and Mrs. Rawya Nasser Al-Adawi, Action Director General of Civil Aviation Regulations, Oman Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), unanimously elected as the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson of the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG), respectively.

1.3 The meeting reviewed and adopted the Provisional Agenda as at paragraph 6 of the History of the Meeting.

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 2: REGIONAL PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK FOR SAFETY

Outcome of the RASG-MID/12

2.1 The subject was addressed in WP/2, presented by the secretariat. The meeting noted with the appreciation the outcome of the RASG-MID/12.

Follow-up on the RASG-MID/12 Conclusions and Decisions

2.2 The subject was addressed in WP/2, presented by the Secretariat. The meeting reviewed the progress made for the implementation of the RASG-MID/12 and PIRG/RASG Conclusions and Decisions as at **Appendix 2A and Appendix 2B.**

Assembly 42nd Outcomes

2.3 The subject was addressed in PPT/19, presented by the Secretariat. The meeting was informed on the main safety-related outcomes of the 42nd Session of the ICAO Assembly (A42), held in Montréal, Canada, 23 September to 3 October 2025.

2.4 The meeting noted the endorsement of the 2026-2028 edition of the GASP by the Assembly, as well as the need for ICAO provide the necessary support to Member States to develop and implement national aviation safety plans, in line with the latest edition of the GASP. The meeting was also informed that the GASP-SG would consider proposals raised during A42, for the next edition of the GASP and related guidance materials, mainly: the inclusion of mechanisms to enhance data-driven safety planning, by identifying precursor events to the global high-risk categories of occurrences, as well as operational safety risks associated with climate.

2.5 The meeting was informed of the main issues discussed regarding accident investigation and prevention, mainly: the timely publication of investigation final reports; the effective use of regional accident and incident investigation organizations (RAIO) by States with limited aviation capacity and that do not have sufficient resources for the establishment and adequate functioning of a national independent accident investigation authority (AIA); the use of accident/incident investigation cooperation mechanisms (ICM), including support for States with limited capacity through association with RAIO/ICM to ensure independent investigations; challenges associated with the translation of technical terms in the Arabic version of Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation and the implementation of the requirements pertaining to independence of accident investigation; as well as the ongoing work in relation to assistance to aircraft accident victims and their families.

2.6 The meeting noted discussions on fatigue management, mainly the effects of the digital transformation of the modern flight deck as a contributing factor to cognitive fatigue and information overload of pilots, and the need to apply human-centered design principles in flight deck design, along with training for skills to manage complex digital information effectively, as a mitigation to these risks. The meeting also noted discussions on the need for ICAO to develop guidance, training, and regulatory provisions on fatigue risk in aviation maintenance.

2.7 The meeting noted that the UAE and Saudi Arabia, in coordination with the MID Office, IFALPA, and IATA, will be developing a Regional Safety Advisory (RSA) on fatigue risk in aviation maintenance, in line with the A42 Resolution.

2.8 The meeting was briefed on discussion related to raising the age limit for pilots and noted that the Assembly committed to continue actively studying the effects of advancing age on

flight safety and agreed that any decision to raise the pilot age limit to 67 years old should be based on a thorough analysis of relevant data to be collected, and considerations of safety.

2.9 The meeting noted discussions on global navigation satellite system (GNSS) radio frequency interference (RFI) and its significant impact on aviation safety, security, and efficiency. With the endorsement of amendments to relevant Assembly resolutions on this subject, it was noted that the Assembly requested States' active engagement to ensure that resilient communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) capabilities remain available to maintain aviation safety.

2.10 With regards to the implementation and evolution of the ICAO Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) audit programmes, the meeting noted the discussions at A42 which concluded that ICAO's safety oversight and aviation security audit programmes should be further enhanced to better suit the needs of all Member States.

2.11 The meeting was also briefed on other A42 outcomes, including those related to remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and advanced air mobility (AAM), and the expedited development and implementation of measures to facilitate legally compliant and safe UAS operations over the high seas; the important role of regional cooperation mechanisms to assist States with limited aviation capacity and resources; and the latest resolution on Halon replacement, urging Member States to continue the development of alternative solutions for aircraft fire extinguishers, while considering the need for a revised cut-off date on the use of Halon.

Update on the Implementation Progress of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs)

2.12 The subject was addressed in WP/3, presented by the Secretariat. The meeting reviewed and updated the SEIs and their respective safety actions, as well as the status of implementation of the SEIs.

2.13 The meeting noted with appreciation that 45 (72.6%) safety actions out of 62 have been completed and implemented as of August 2025.

2.14 The meeting was also apprised with appreciation of the update on the implementation progress of the SEIs and their safety actions conducted by the Secretariat. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to the Draft Conclusion:

DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/1: IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS ON THE SAFETY ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVES (SEIS)

That,

a. The implementation progress of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and safety actions included in the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition at **Appendix 2C** *is endorsed; and*

b. States, international organizations and industry were urged to support the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition activities including SEIs and safety actions.

SEIs Guidance Material Development

2.15 The subject was addressed in WP/16, presented by Qatar. The meeting noted with

appreciation the guidance material presented by Qatar on the issuance of temporary exemptions.

2.16 The issuance of temporary exemptions became critical during recent global disruptions such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

2.17 It outlines principles, processes, and risk-based methodologies for granting temporary deviations from ICAO SARPs while maintaining safety and compliance obligations.

2.18 The meeting invited States and organizations to submit any comments if any before the RASG-MID/13 meeting to finalize the guidance material in coordination with the Chairman, Qatar, and the ICAO MID Office. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to the Draft Conclusion:

DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/2: ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY EXEMPTIONS GUIDANCE MATERIAL

That the guidance material on the issuance of temporary exemptions at **Appendix 2D** *is endorsed.*

2.19 The subject was addressed in WP/17 presented by Qatar. The meeting noted with appreciation the guidance material presented by Qatar on remote safety oversight.

2.20 The COVID-19 pandemic and other global disruptions highlighted the need for innovative approaches to safety oversight. Remote oversight emerged as a practical and effective method for maintaining regulatory compliance and safety performance when on-site activities were limited.

2.21 The guidance manual on remote safety oversight provides a framework for planning, conducting, and monitoring remote safety oversight activities.

2.22 The meeting invited States and organizations to submit any comments if any before the RASG-MID/13 meeting to finalize the guidance material in coordination with the Chairman, Qatar, and the ICAO MID Office. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to the Draft Conclusion:

DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/3: REMOTE SAFETY OVERSIGHT GUIDANCE MATERIAL

That the guidance material on the remote safety oversight at **Appendix 2E** is endorsed

2.23 The subject was addressed in WP/18, presented by Qatar. The meeting noted with appreciation the guidance material presented by Qatar on Judicial Enforcement for Aviation Inspectors.

2.24 It provides a standardized approach to differentiate administrative and judicial enforcement, align with ICAO provisions.

2.25 The meeting invited States and organizations to submit any comments if any before the RASG-MID/13 meeting to finalize the guidance material in coordination with the Chairman, Qatar, and the ICAO MID Office. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to the Draft Conclusion:

DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/4: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT FOR AVIATION INSPECTORS GUIDANCE MATERIAL

That the guidance material on the judicial Enforcement for Aviation Inspectors at **Appendix 2F** is endorsed.

MID Region Safety Priorities and Performance

2.26 The subject was addressed in PPT/14, presented by the Secretariat. The meeting was provided with updated information on the MID Region safety priorities and safety targets.

2.27 The meeting noted with appreciation the MID region safety priorities.

Regional Operational Safety Risks

a. Runway Excursion (RE) and Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC) during landing;
b. Loss of Control Inflight - (LOC-I);
c. Mid Air Collision- (MAC);
d. Controlled Flight Into Terrain- (CFIT); and
e. Runway Incursion- (RI).

Other safety risks: SCF-NP and TURB

Organizational issues

a. Enhance States' Safety Oversight capabilities;
b. Safety Management;
c. Human Factors & Human Performance;
d. Competence of personnel; and
e. Risk interdependencies.

- Cybersecurity risks;
- GNSS Interference and spoofing Risks;
- Aviation health safety (AHS) risks
- Risks arising from conflict zones; and
- Security risks with an impact on aviation safety.

Emerging Issues

a. AAM and New Entrants including UAS, EVTOL, and AI.

2.28 The meeting also noted with appreciation the status of the MID region's Safety performance.

PROGRESS UPDATE ON 2026-2028 GASP AND STATES PROGRESS ON NASP DEVELOPMENT

2.29 The subject was addressed in PPT/5, presented by the Secretariat. The meeting was briefed on the process undertaken by ICAO, through the GASP Study Group (GASP-SG), to develop the final version of the 2026-2028 edition of the GASP, presented for endorsement at the 42nd

Session of the ICAO Assembly (A42).

2.30 The meeting was informed of the global safety issues presented in the GASP, including the main findings related to global operational safety risks and organizational challenges, and took note of the 2026-2028 GASP goals and targets.

2.31 The meeting was briefed on all the GASP-related documents and tools, which were being revised to coincide with the latest edition of the GASP, as well as the next steps to assist States in developing or revising their national aviation safety plans and actions by ICAO to address feedback on the GASP, received during A42.

2.32 The meeting commended and expressed appreciation for the work accomplished by the GASP-SG and ICAO.

MID STATES PROGRESS ON NASPS DEVELOPMENT

2.33 The subject was addressed in WP/8, presented by the Secretariat. The meeting recalled that ICAO issued States Letter to States on "the sharing/submission of the National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP)" through State Letter Ref.: ME 4 – 25/159 Dated 7 July 2025. So far, nine (9) States developed their NASPs and shared approved copies with the ICAO MID Office. Eight (8) have published their NASPs on the ICAO website (Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.

2.34 In line with the Safety Strategic Objective of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the 2026-2028 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. The purpose of the GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, associated with accidents by guiding the harmonized development and implementation of regional and national aviation safety plans. States, regions, and industry facilitate the implementation of the strategy presented in the GASP through RASPs and NASPs.

2.35 The States NASP should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety issues. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate).

2.36 The meeting noted that the **GASP 2026-2028 Target 5.2 calls** for all States to publish an updated NASP, taking into consideration the 2026–2028 edition of GASP and their corresponding RASP, **by 2027**.

2.37 The meeting was apprised of, and expressed appreciation to, States for sharing their safety strategies and challenges related to the development of their NASPs.

2.38 The meeting noted the Challenges faced by States in developing their NASPs.

- Capacity building and training;
- Senior management commitment
- Limited resources including financial
- Limited qualified personnel;
- Safety data and safety information collection and analysis;
- Emerging of new technologies including UTM-ATM integration sandbox;
- Limited collaboration, coordination, and communication amongst

stakeholders including industry involvement from beginning;
- Limited guidance to develop a robust safety risk management framework and processes; and
- Geopolitical situation in the region.

2.39 The SEIG/7 meeting recognized the challenges facing the Sates on the development of NASP. In this respect, the meeting was apprised about MID Regional Office to conduct Assistance Missions dedicated to NASP to support States with NASP development. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to the following Draft Conclusion:

DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/5: DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (NASP) IN MID STATES

That, States be:

a. *urged to develop and implement the NASP in line with the GASP and MID-RASP, if not yet done so;*
b. *encouraged to share the latest version of their NASPs with ICAO HQ and ICAO Regional MID office for posting on the GASP public website;*
c. *encouraged to continue to use existing ICAO guidance material and tools to implement their NASPs;*
d. *encouraged to request assistance from the ICAO MID Regional Office related to the development of their NASPs including the conduct of assistance missions and/or customized NASP Workshop for each State; and*
e. *encouraged to share their experiences related to the development of their NASPs during the SEIG meetings and/or Regional NASP Workshop to be organized by the ICAO MID Regional Office in 2026.*

MID RASP 2026-2028 Edition

2.40 The subject was addressed in WP/7 and PPT/6, presented by the Secretariat. The meeting noted with appreciation the development of RASP-MID 2026-2028 Edition including the Safety Enhancement initiatives' (SEIs) and the MID Region Safety Performance Measurement and Monitoring (SPMM).

2.41 The Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.

2.42 The MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety at the regional level. It constitutes the regional safety plan for the MID Region, setting out the strategic priorities, main risks affecting the regional aviation system, and the necessary actions to mitigate those risks to further improve aviation safety.

2.43 The MID-RASP Edition 2026-2028 aims to enhance the MID Region's commitment to improving safety oversight capabilities, reducing operational risks, and establishing effective State Safety Programmes (SSP). It serves as a key framework for raising awareness of safety risks and their consequences among States, industry, and stakeholders. The MID-RASP encourages the allocation of financial, human, and technical resources to improve safety management, oversight, and operational performance. Additionally, it facilitates information sharing among relevant stakeholders to support timely action and collaborative problem-solving.

2.44 In respect of the Turbulence Encounter (TURB) occurrence category, the meeting

was of the opinion that additional safety information should be collected to address the issue at the regional level. Accordingly, the meeting agreed that:

- IATA will explore the possibility of sharing the safety data analysis related to the TURB occurrence category to the ASRG;
- States be urged to share safety information and analysis related to TURB category with the ASRG for further processing; and
- A workshop on TURB occurrence data analysis will be organized to develop recommendations and identify appropriate safety actions for the next course of action.

2.45 Thus, to address regional operational risks, organizational issues, and emerging issues; 18 Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and 58 safety actions have been identified, developed and proposed Accordingly, the meeting agreed to the following Draft Conclusion:

DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/6: MID-RASP 2026-2028 EDITION

That,

*i. the MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition including the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and the MID region Safety performance Measurement and Monitoring (SPMM) at **Appendix 2G** is endorsed; and*

ii. urge States, international organizations, and industry to support the MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition activities including the implementation of SEIs and safety actions,

2.46 The meeting commended and expressed appreciation for the work accomplished by ICAO MID Office in developing the MID-RASP 2026-2208.

State Safety Programme (SSP)

2.47 The subject was addressed in WP/4, presented by the Secretariat. The meeting noted that States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to implement effective SSPs. As per Annex 19, States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The SMS enables service providers to capture and transmit safety information, which contributes to safety risk management. An SSP requires the implementation of a risk-based approach to measure and monitor the safety performance of the State's civil aviation system and the progress towards achieving the State's safety objectives. In this context, the role of the State evolves to include the establishment and achievement of safety performance targets, as well as effective oversight of its service providers' SMS.

2.48 The meeting noted that the **GASP 2026-2028 Edition Goal 3** is aimed at States individually and calls for the establishment and management of State safety programmes (SSPs), in accordance with Annex 19 – Safety Management.

2.7 The meeting also noted that **the GASP 2026-2028 Edition Goal 3 Target 3.1** calls **for all States to assess the level** of implementation of their SSP, **by 2026**.

2.49 The meeting was informed that the **GASP 2026-2028 Edition Goal 3 Target 3.2** calls **for all States to establish** an SSP, **by 2028.**

Workshop

2.50 The subject was addressed in PPTs/10, 11, 12, and 13, presented by the Secretariat, and the meeting commended ICAO MID office for conducting the workshop.

2.51 The meeting noted with appreciation the updated status of Annex 19, Amendment 2 including the State safety policy, objectives, and resources (SSP Component 1), State safety risk management (SSP Component 2), State safety assurance (SSP Component 3), and State safety promotion (SSP Component 4).

2.52 The meeting was provide with a detailed workshop related to the guidance on the development of Safety Intelligence including an overview on Safety Intelligence, establishment of Safety Data of Collection and Processing System (SDCPS), Governance and Management of Safety Data and Safety Information, Safety Data And Safety Information Analysis, Use of Analysis Results For Decision Making, and Sharing and Exchange of Safety Information and Safety Intelligence.

2.53 The meeting also noted with appreciation and update on the surveillance obligation as stipulated in Annex 19 Amendment 2, as well as the holistic approach for SMS assessment.

2.54 The meeting also noted that the newly revised ICAO SSP PQs draft has been published in the OLF, and the SSPIA has been integrated into the USOAP Programme. The meeting also appreciated the detailed guidance provided on the way to comply with SSP PQs.

2.55 The meeting commended and expressed its appreciation to the ICAO MID Office for its valuable efforts in supporting States in the development of their SSPs through various capacity-building activities.

2.56 The meeting was apprised and thanked states of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE for sharing their experiences and challenges related to the development of SSP.

2.57 The meeting noted the challenges faced by some of the States in developing their SSP.

- Legislation amendments;
- Capacity building and training;
- Limited human and financial resources;
- Limited guidance to establish and develop a Safety data and safety information collection and analysis;
- Limited collaboration, coordination, and communication amongst SSP stakeholders;
- Limited guidance to develop a robust safety risk management framework and processes;
- Transition from a prescriptive approach to a more risk-based and performance-based approach; and
- Geopolitical situation in the region.

2.58 The meeting recognized the challenges facing the States on the development of SSP and the preparation for the upcoming SSP assessment. In this respect, the meeting was apprised about MID Regional Office to conduct Assistance Missions dedicated to SSP to support States with SSP development. Accordingly, the meeting agreed to the following Draft Conclusion:

DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/7: DEVELOPMENT OF STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME (SSP) IN MID STATES

That, States be:

a. encouraged to effectively establish and implement / maintain their State Safety Programme in a timely manner, and to strengthen the implementation of safety management systems in their aviation industry;

b. encouraged to request assistance from the ICAO MID Regional Office related to the development and implementation of their SSPs including the conduct of:

- *i. SSP technical assistance missions to support States for the upcoming ICAO SSP audit Programme*
- *ii. SSP implementation Workshops*
- *iii. State Safety Risk Management framework and process workshops*

c. share their experiences on the development of their SSPs during the SEIG meetings; and

d. encouraged to share their latest version of SSP manuals with ICAO MID Office.

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 3: NCMCS MEETING

3.1 The Fourth National Continuous Monitoring Coordinators (NCMCs) meeting was held on 14 October 2025. The meeting was a great opportunity to share experiences, challenges, and best practices, which were appreciated by all participants.

ICAO USOAP-CMA Overview Update & Regional Status

3.2 The subject was addressed in PPT/20, presented by the Secretariat. The meeting was apprised of the USOAP CMA latest regional status, as follows:

1) 2 out of the 15 States in the MID Region have not yet received a USOAP audit (Iraq and Yemen);

2) The current average EI in the MID Region is 77% compared to 65% in 2010.

3) lowest EI are related to CE4 (62%), CE7 (68%) and CE8 (60%); and

4) lowest EI are realted to the Audit Areas of ANS (67%) followed by AGA (71%), and AIG (68%).

Presentations by the States' NCMCs related to the USOAP-CMA

3.3 States presented the status of their safety oversight systems, challenges faced, and best practices.

3.4 The meeting identified the following common challenges and recommended actions:

1. Varying Levels of Effective Implementation (EI)

- **Challenge:** There are wide differences in the USOAP Effective Implementation (EI) scores among MID States — some exceed 80%, while others remain below 60%.
- **Impact:** Uneven application of ICAO SARPs; inconsistent safety oversight performance among States.
- **Recommended Action:**
    1. Provide targeted ICAO technical assistance, training, and capacity-building activities under the No Country Left Behind (NCLB) MID Strategy.
    2. Encourage experience-sharing and mentorship between high- and low-EI States
    3. Enhance regional collaboration through MENA RSOO and MENA ARCM

2. Lack of Qualified Technical Personnel

- **Challenge:** Several CAAs experience shortages of qualified inspectors and technical experts in the areas (PEL, OPS, AIR, ANS, AGA), mainly due to recruitment and retention challenges linked to budgetary and structural limitations.
- **Impact:** Delays in certification, surveillance, and enforcement activities leading to reduced effectiveness of the State's safety oversight system and potential non-compliance with ICAO SARPs.

- **Recommended Action:**

    1. States to ensure adequate budget allocation and institutional autonomy for Civil Aviation Authorities to attract and retain qualified technical personnel.
    2. States to develop and implement sustainable human resource management and retention strategies, including competitive compensation and career development plans.
    3. Promote the utilization of regional inspector pools to share expertise and optimize resources.

3. Weak Enforcement and Surveillance Systems

- **Challenge:** Some States have not fully established effective **surveillance programmes** or **enforcement mechanisms**.
- **Impact:** Safety findings are not always corrected in a timely manner, leading to recurring deficiencies.
- **Recommended Action:**

    1. Ensure effective implementation of SSP and State oversight programmes
    2. Establish clear procedures for follow-up and corrective actions
    3. Enhance oversight planning
    4. Provide ICAO assistance to build sustainable enforcement and compliance capabilities.

4. Outdated or Incomplete Primary Aviation Legislation and Regulations

- **Challenge:** Several States still have **gaps in national legislation** and **Civil Aviation Regulations** that do not fully align with ICAO SARPs.
- **Impact:** Hinders the authority's ability to perform effective oversight or enforcement.
- **Recommended Action:**

    1. Update primary aviation legislation and Civil Aviation Regulations to ensure full SARP compliance

5. Limited Implementation of State Safety Programme (SSP)

- **Challenge:** Not all MID States have reached the advanced phases of SSP implementation.
- **Impact:** Weak integration of risk-based oversight and proactive safety management.
- **Recommended Action:**

    1. Accelerate SSP implementation;
    2. Integrate risk-based oversight within CAA processes.
    3. Develop National Safety Plan (NASP)

6. Inadequate Safety Data Management

- **Challenge:** Many CAAs lack mature systems for collecting, analyzing, and sharing safety data.
- **Impact:** Limits data-driven decision-making and identification of systemic safety risks.
- **Recommended Action:**

    1. Implement State Safety Databases

2. Promote regional data sharing via RASG-MID.

7. Fragmented Regional Cooperation

- **Challenge:** While mechanisms such as **MENA RSOO** and **MENA ARCM** exist, their full operationalization and utilization remain limited.
- **Impact:** States miss opportunities to share resources, harmonize regulations, and strengthen collective oversight capacity.
- **Recommended Action:**
    1. Enhance cooperation through effective use of MENA RSOO and regional safety mechanisms.

8. Limited Training and Continuous Professional Development

- **Challenge:** Training programmes for inspectors are not always systematic or competency-based.
- **Impact:** Variations in inspector qualifications and oversight quality.
- **Recommended Action:**
    1. Establish competency-based training and continuous professional development programmes.

9. Resource and Budget Constraints

- **Challenge:** Oversight functions in some States are underfunded and dependent on annual government allocations.
- **Impact:** Limits sustainability of surveillance activities and delays in addressing audit findings.
- **Recommended Action:**
    1. Secure sustainable funding mechanisms and prioritize safety oversight functions within State budgets.
    2. High-level commitment.

10. Transition and Institutional Stability Issues

- **Challenge:** Frequent restructuring of CAAs or changes in senior leadership can disrupt continuity of oversight programmes.
- **Impact:** Loss of institutional memory and delayed implementation of corrective actions.
- **Recommended Action:**
    1. Strengthen institutional governance, documentation, and succession planning to maintain programme stability.
    2. High-level commitment.

Development of USOAP CMA Guidance Material

3.5 The subject was addressed in WP/15, presented by Oman. The meeting supported the development of guidance material related to USOAP CMA, identifying the roles of different parties.

Accordingly, the meeting agreed to the following Draft Conclusion:

DRAFT CONCLUSION 7/8: DEVELOPMENT OF USOAP CMA GUIDANCE MATERIAL

That,

a. Establishing Safety Action, A8 under G2-SEI-01 "Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities"

b. The Safety Action is to develop guidance material on the USOAP CMA, including:

i. Enhancement of the roles of ICAO USOAP Portfolio Holder (PH) and the States' NCMCs;

ii. *Best Practices for the preparation of USOAP Audits and Validation Activities*

c. Oman supported by Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and UAE to develop the guidance material to be presented to the RASG-MID/13 meeting.

d. A USOAP Workshop to be conducted by the ICAO MID Office

ICAO MID Assistance Missions

3.6 The meeting noted with appreciation that the missions conducted by the ICAO MID Regional Office to the States provided valuable assistance and guidance related to the USOAP-CMA, including the preparation for Audits and ICVMs.

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 4: FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME

4.1 The subject was addressed in WP/21, presented by the Secretariat.

4.2 The meeting agreed that the SEIG/8, National Continuous Monitoring Coordinator (NCMC) meetings and the Regional State Safety Programme (SSP) and National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) workshops tentatively scheduled to be hosted in Oman during the month of October 2026. The dates will be coordinated with the Chairpersons.

REPORT ON AGENDA ITEM 5: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

5.1 Nothing has been discussed under this Agenda Item.

APPENDICES

FOLLOW-UP ACTION PLAN ON RASG-MID/12 CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
C. 12/1	**MENA RSOO** That States be encouraged, if not yet done, to sign the MOA and join the MENA RSOO and actively contribute to the success and sustainability of the MENA RSOO.	Enhance cooperation among MENA States in the area of SSP	Sign the MOA to support MENA States in SSP and USOAP	States	July 2025	**Actioned**
C. 12/2	**GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING GOAL 6 OF THE 2026–2028 GASP** That, ICAO is invited to develop guidance to assist states in assessing non-ICAO recognised industry evaluation programmes.	Assist states in assessing non-ICAO recognized industry evaluation Programmes	Development of guidance material	ICAO	June 2025	**Actioned** Coordination with HQ
C.12/3	**13TH ASR** That, The Thirteen MID Annual Safety Report is endorsed and be posted on the ICAO MID Website.	Sharing the final 13th MID-ASR for the period 2019-2023 with identified MID Region safety priorities and an update on safety performance	MID-ASR 13th Edition published on the ICAO website	RASG-MID/12	June 2025	**Completed**
C. 12/4	**SHARING OF SAFETY DATA ANALYSIS**	Collection of safety data analysis for a Harmonized database	Safety Data Analysis for development of ASR	States	May 2025	**Completed**

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
	In respect of the next MID ASR edition, States are encouraged to provide necessary safety information and safety data analysis to the ICAO MID Office by June 2025, related to each occurrence category in **Appendix 4B** for the past 5 years (2020– 2024) and using the templates in **Appendices 4C and 4D**. The Draft of the 14th edition of the MID ASR will be presented to the ASRG/7 meeting for review.					SL ME 4-25/104 Dated 26 May 2025
C. 12/5	**IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS ON THE SAFETY ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVES (SEIS)** That, a) The implementation progress of the Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and safety actions included in the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition at **Appendix 4F** is endorsed; and b) States, international organizations and industry are urged to support the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition activities, including SEIs and safety actions.	Support the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition activities, including SEIs and safety actions	Implementation of SEIs and safety actions	States, organizations, and industry	May 2025	**Actioned** 43 Safety actions (68%) out of 63 have been implemented and completed
C. 12/6	**AAM AND NEW ENTRANTS** That, a) AAM and AI covered under the ICAO Focus area AAM and new entrants be included as a Safety Enhancement Initiative (SEI) within the MID Region Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) 2026-2028 Edition to ensure structured regional coordination and alignment with global aviation innovation priorities;	Support AAM and new entrants in the MID Region	Include AAM and new entrants as SEI in MID-RASP 2026-2028	States, organizations, and industry	June 2025	**Actioned** SL REF:ME4 -25/115 Dated 4 June2025. Has been included as SEIs in MID-RASP 2026-2028

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
	b) Encourage States and industry stakeholders to prioritize and conduct capacity-building initiatives, to foster expertise and knowledge-sharing in AAM and AI technologies, regulatory frameworks, and risk management strategies; and c) Encourage States and stakeholders to actively engage in the proposed SEI by sharing operational insights, best practices, and lessons learned.					
C. 12/7	**DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (NASP) IN MID STATES** That, States be: a) urged to prioritize the development and implementation of the NASP in line with the GASP and MID-RASP, if not yet done so; b) encouraged to share the latest versions of their NASPs with ICAO HQ and ICAO Regional MID office for publication on the GASP public portal; c) Encouraged to leverage existing ICAO guidance materials, tools, and best practices to accelerate NASP development and implementation; d) Invited to seek technical assistance from the ICAO MID Regional Office for NASP development, including tailored on-site assistance missions and/or State-specific NASP workshops to address unique operational challenges; and e) Encouraged to actively share lessons learned, challenges, and successes in NASP development during SEIG	Compliance with Assembly Resolution A40-1	State Letter	ICAO	July 2025	**Actioned** SL REF: ME 4 – 25/159 Dated 7 July 2025

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
	meetings and/or the Regional NASP Workshops, fostering peer-to-peer knowledge exchange and regional collaboration.					
C. 12/8	**DEVELOPMENT OF SSP IN MID STATES** That, States be: a) urged to prioritize the timely establishment, implementation, and maintenance of State Safety Programmes (SSPs) and to strengthen Safety Management System (SMS) adoption across all aviation service providers, ensuring alignment with ICAO Annex 19 standards; b) encouraged to request assistance from the ICAO MID Regional Office related to the development and implementation of their SSPs including the conduct of: i. Targeted SSP technical assistance missions to prepare States for upcoming ICAO SSP assessments ii. Tailored SSP implementation Workshops iii. State Safety Risk Management framework workshops to enhance risk-based decision-making capabilities. c) Invited to share lessons learned, challenges, and successes in SSP development during SEIG meetings, fostering peer-to-peer knowledge exchange and regional collaboration; and d) encouraged to share their latest version of SSP manuals with ICAO MID Office.	Support States with the development and Implementation of SSP	MID States SSP development	ICAO and States	July 2025	**Actioned** SL REF: ME4-25/16 Dated 4 June 2025
C. 12/9	**ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTRONIC PILOT** That	Support States to establish EPL	Conduct of Survey	ICAO and States	June 2025	**Completed**

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
	a) The survey on the Electronic Pilot Licence (ePL) will be developed by the UAE GCAA, in coordination with the ICAO MID Regional Office; b) The MID Office will circulate the survey to all MID States and encourage them to provide their inputs; and c) The results of the survey analysis will be shared with the UAE to support the development of the Working Paper to be presented at the 42nd ICAO Assembly.					SL REF: ME4-25/103 Dated 26 May 2025
C.12/10	**SARPs, AND GUIDANCE RELATED TO FATIGUE RISK MANAGEMENT (FRM) FOR MAINTENANCE LICENSED PERSONNEL** That, a) a detailed survey to assess the measures taken to mitigate fatigue in the maintenance environment to be developed by UAE and Saudi Arabia, in coordination with the ICAO MID Regional Office, IATA, and IFALPA; b) the ICAO MID Office to circulate the survey to all MID States and collect feedback and proposals; c) the results of the survey to analyzed by UAE and Saudi Arabia, in coordination with the ICAO MID Regional Office, IATA, and IFALPA; d) UAE in coordination with Saudi Arabia, IATA, and IFALPA to develop a Working Paper to be presented at the 42nd ICAO Assembly, inviting ICAO to develop SARPs and guidance for maintenance licensed personnel, and e) UAE and Saudi Arabia, in coordination with the ICAO MID Regional Office, IATA, and IFALPA, to develop a Regional Safety Advisory on the subject to be presented	Support States with FRMS for maintenance	Conduct of survey	ICAO and States	June 2025	**Ongoing** SL REF:ME4-25/108 Dated 29May2025

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
	to the SEIG/7 Meeting for further discussion and agreement on the way forward.					
C.12/19	**ADHERENCE TO ICAO ANNEX 13- ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION FINAL REPORTS** That, The State conducting an aircraft accident investigation must submit a Preliminary report to ICAO within thirty days of the date of the accident and release the final report within twelve months in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 requirement.	Sharing of the Final Investigation Report	RASG-MID/12	States	June 2025	**Completed** SL REF ME4-25/113 Dated 2 June 2025

- END -

FOLLOW-UP ACTION PLAN ON PIRG/22 & RASG-MID/12 CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
C. 1	***MENA ARCM*** *That States be encouraged to sign the MENA AIG Regional Cooperation Mechanism (MENA ARCM) MoU, if not yet done.*	Enhancement of cooperation among MENA States in the provision of AIG area	Sign the MoU to support States in AIG area	States	June 2025	**Actioned** Discussed during MENA ARCM/7 meeting and SL REF: FS 4/4 -25/161 Dated 7 July 2025
C. 2	***CONSOLIDATED REGIONAL APPROACH TO GNSS RFI MANAGEMENT*** That, a consolidated regional approach for the management of GNSS RFI be established with the following actions: a) States be urged to: i. Support the establishment of regional GNSS RFI monitoring and reporting mechanisms through the appropriate MID regional frameworks; ii. Maintain an adequate network of conventional navigation aids to ensure continuity of air navigation services in case of GNSS signal degradation; iii. Strengthen civil-military coordination and ensure timely sharing of information related to intentional GNSS interference. iv. Define reversion scenarios and associated contingency procedures to maintain safe and efficient operations in the event of GNSS unavailability. b) ICAO MID Office be requested to: i. Coordinate the development of the regional GNSS RFI management framework and potential reporting mechanism; ii. Support States through regional capacity building and awareness activities on GNSS interference detection and mitigation; iii. liaise with ICAO Headquarters to contribute to the deployment of global guidance material specifications,	GNSS interference/Spoofing Operations Continuity dung GNSS RFI or Spoofing	Proposed mitigation measures to be used in case of GNSS interference.	States	June 2025	**Actioned** **SL** REF: AN 7/30.21 – 25/130 Dated 24 June 2025 GNSS RFI monitoring and reporting framework through MID regional frameworks.

No.	CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIONS	CONCERNS/ CHALLENGES (RATIONALE)	DELIVERABLE/ TO BE INITIATED BY		TARGET DATE	STATUS/REMARKS
	including the GNSS RFI mitigation iPack and available information exchange mechanisms.					
D. 3	***AMENDED RASG-MID SAFETY ADVISORY 14*** *That, the amended RASG-MID Safety Advisory 14 (RSA-14) at* ***Appendix 2B*** *is endorsed.*	Amendment of the current RSA 14	Amended RSA 14	ACAO, ICAO, IATA, IFALPA.	June 2025	**GPS spoofing** **Completed**
C. 4	***CAPACITY BUILDING ON GNSS RFI*** *That, ICAO, in collaboration with ICAO partners, organize a Regional Capacity Building event on GNSS Interference during 2025.*	GNSS interference capacity building	Organise symposium on GNSS	States, ICAO, Organizations	Nov 2025	**Ongoing**

- END -

ICAO MID

SAFETY

MID-RASP

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN

Second Edition 2023-2025

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (MID-RASP)

ICAO

SECOND EDITION 2023–2025

Executive Summary

The Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. The purpose of the GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, by guiding the development of a harmonized aviation safety strategy.

The GASP promotes the effective implementation of a State safety Programme (SSP) including National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP), a State's safety oversight system, and a risk-based approach to managing safety as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry.

The vision of the GASP is to achieve and maintain the aspirational safety goal of zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond, which is consistent with the United Nations' *2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. The plan's mission is to continually enhance international aviation safety performance and resilience by providing a collaborative framework for States, regions and industry.

The Middle East Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) 2023-2025 Edition considers and supports the objectives and priorities of GASP 2023-2025 Edition. MID-RASP also emphasizes the importance of identifying and mitigating risks at MID region level. In addition, MID-RASP is to create a common focus on regional aviation safety issues as a continuation of the MID region work to improve aviation safety and to comply with ICAO standards and supports MID States and industry in implementing the GASP 2023-2025 Edition.

Furthermore, the States national aviation safety plan (NASPs) should be developed in alignment with the GASP and the MID-RASP. However, priority should be given to national safety concerns. Moreover, the NASP should be also aligned and coordinated with the MID-RASP (as appropriate) and with other efforts aimed at enhancing aviation safety.

MID-RASP provides a three-year plan for States in MID Region to strengthen its safety oversight capability and implement an effective safety management. This relates to the continuous reduction of regional operational risks and improvement in States' safety oversight and safety management capabilities. It adopts a risk-based approach to managing safety at regional-level through a coordinated approach and collaboration between States in the region, regional organizations and industry.

The RASG-MD is the governing body responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the MID-RASP, in collaboration with the ICAO MID Office, international and regional organizations and with the aviation industry. The MID-RASP is to be reviewed by the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG) every year mainly to include new identified Safety Enhancement initiatives' (SEIs), review the existing SEIs, as well as their respective actions.

The MID Region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level is to address the region's operational risks and other safety issues in a timely manner. Therefore, the MID-RASP strategic approach would focus on organizational challenges/issues, regional operational safety risks, and emerging risks as indicated below.

a. Organizational challenges/issues including the States 'safety oversight, safety management, aircraft accident and incident investigation, human factors and competence of personnel, and Cybersecurity.
b. Regional operational safety risks, the focus would be on Regional high risks categories (R-HRC) identified in the GASP 2023-2025 Edition mainly the LOCI-I, CFIT, RE, RI, and MAC; and
c. Emerging risks, the focus would be on COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, Civil drones (Unmanned Aircraft Systems), GNSS outages, impact of security on safety, and 5G interference with Radar Altimeter frequency band.

MID Region safety indicators and targets were aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP goals and regional specific objectives and priorities. The RASG-MID would use the indicators listed in the MID Region Safety Performance Measurement & Monitoring (SPMM) to measure safety performance and monitor each regional safety target. Moreover, the RASG-MID would continuously monitor the implementation of the SEIs listed in the MID-RASP and measure safety performance of the regional civil aviation system, to ensure the intended results are achieved, using the MID Region SPMM.

The MID Region SPMM includes six (6) Goals in line with GASP 2023-2025 Edition. For each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM, identified SEI(s) be mapped to it including their respective actions. Thus, to address regional operational risks, organizational issues, and emerging risks; 24 SEIs and 61 safety actions have been identified, developed and proposed.

The MID-RASP provides guidance on how States should identify which top risks and key safety issues mentioned in the GASP and MID-RASP apply to their national context and then to be included in their NASPs. States should also add other safety issues which are unique to their operational context. Several MID-RASP SEIs which are intended for implementation by States at the national level are recommended for inclusion in their NASPs.

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Appendix A: SEIG Term of References

Appendix B: Identified safety issues as indicated in the 11th ASR

Appendix C: MID Region-Safety Performance Measurement &Monitoring (SPMM)

Appendix D: Safety Actions- List of consolidated SEIs for follow up

Appendix E: SEIs identified in MID-RASP and recommended to States for inclusion in their NASPs

Appendix F: Definitions

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PART-I. PLANNING

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objectives and Principles

The MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) presents the **strategic direction** for the **management of aviation safety** at the regional level. It constitutes the regional safety plan for MID Region, setting out the strategic priorities, main risks affecting the regional aviation system and the necessary actions to mitigate those risks to further improve aviation safety.

The purpose of this MID-RASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of accidents, through the development and implementation of regional SEIs. A safe aviation system contributes to the economic development of MID Region, the States which comprise it, and their industries. In addition, MID-RASP is to create a common focus on regional aviation safety issues as a continuation of the MID Region work to improve aviation safety and to comply with ICAO standards. This approach complements the existing system of developing safety regulations, complying with them and investigating accidents and serious incidents when they occur.

The MID-RASP promotes the effective implementation of a State safety Programme (SSP) and Safety Management System (SMS) including National Aviation Safety plan (NASP), State's safety oversight system, and a risk-based approach to managing safety as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between States, international organization, and industry. All stakeholders are encouraged to support and implement the MID-RASP as the regional strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.

The MID RASP allows the region to define the strategy for improving safety within a specified timeframe, through defined Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs).

The MID-RASP establishes the first layer of priorities which is further complemented at national level by national safety plans and Programmes. It builds a network for action; thus, coordination and close collaboration are key to keeping it up to date and effective.

The MID-RASP Edition 2023-2025 covers the three-year period between 2023 and 2025 and will be updated on a yearly basis, as required, to cover subsequent three years' periods. It is a rolling 3-year plan.

The planning activity would be followed up by a reporting activity, in which progress on the actions is evaluated and also documented. This feedback loop ensures that the process to manage risks continuously improves and may contribute to the identification of new safety issues.

MID Region is committed to enhancing aviation safety, to the resourcing of supporting activities and to increasing collaboration at the regional level.

1.2 Relationship between MID-RASP and GASP and other Plans

Aviation's contribution towards the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and in order to maximize the benefits of aviation, the priorities of the aviation sector should be integrated and reflected in State's economic and social development planning with an appropriately balanced development of transport modes, including multi-modal and urban planning initiatives. In addition, recognizing that air transport is a catalyst for sustainable development and that it represents an essential lifeline for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and especially for Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs).

ICAO Business Plan takes into consideration all of the work mandated to be undertaken by ICAO, regardless of source of funding. The Business Plan sets out the Strategic Objectives and priorities to guide the activities of the Organization to support Members States in their attainment of a safe, secure, efficient, economically viable and environmentally responsible air transport network.

ICAO's global plans are essential in supporting safe, secure, efficient, economically viable and environmentally responsible air transportation. They provide a means to advance ICAO's Strategic Objectives. The ICAO global plans include: the GASP, the GANP and the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP).

The GASP presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. The purpose of the GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, by guiding the development of a harmonized aviation safety.

The purpose of the Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP) is to drive the evolution of the global air navigation system to meet the ever-growing expectations of all sectors in the aviation community by equitably accommodating all airspace user operations in a safe, secure and cost-effective manner while reducing the aviation environmental impact. To this end, the GANP provides a series of operational improvements to increase capacity, efficiency, predictability and flexibility, while ensuring interoperability of systems and harmonization of procedures. The implementation of the GANP is enabled by promoting the effective implementation of safety oversight and a safety management approach to oversight, including SRM to permit innovation in a managed way.

The GASP complements the GANP by providing States and industry with the tools to implement a safety management approach through their SSP and SMS. The GANP, through the evolution of the system described in the conceptual roadmap and the operational improvements detailed in the technical frameworks, supports the goals within the GASP and the GASeP by enhancing safety and security of the air navigation system as reflected in the performance ambitions.

The GASP goals and targets support the GASeP by providing best practices and models that can be as effective in managing security as they are in safety management. These include effective oversight, organizational culture, risk management and assurance processes. The GASeP in turn supports the GASP's vision of zero fatalities.

MID-RASP considers and supports the objectives and priorities of GASP. The purpose of GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of accidents, by guiding the development of a harmonized aviation safety strategy and the development and implementation of regional and national aviation safety plans. A safe aviation system contributes to the economic development of States and their industries. The GASP promotes the effective implementation of SSP and SMS including NASP, a State's safety oversight system, and a risk-based approach to managing safety as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry. One of the GASP goals is for States to improve their effective safety oversight capabilities and to progress in the implementation of SSPs including NASPs. Thus, GASP calls for States to put in place robust and sustainable safety oversight systems that should progressively evolve into more sophisticated means of managing safety.

Assembly Resolution A40-1 also calls for each State to develop and implement a national aviation safety plan (NASP), in line with the GASP goals, targets and the global high-risk categories of occurrences (G-HRCs). The NASP should also be developed having close regard for the RASP, while acknowledging that each State may have its own, specific safety issues and priorities, including addressing significant safety concerns (SSCs).

In addition, to addressing systemic safety, GASP addresses Global high-risk categories (G-HRC) of occurrences, which are deemed global safety priorities. These categories were determined based on actual fatalities from past accidents, high fatality risk per accident or the number of accidents and incidents. The following G-HRCs have been identified for the 2023-2025 edition of the GASP: controlled flight into terrain (CFIT); Loss of control in flight (LOC-I); Mid-air collision (MAC); runway excursion (RE); and runway incursion (RI). The GASP G-HRCs are addressed in MID-RASP.

The MID-RASP considers the objectives and priorities of the GASP to enhance the level of safety in aviation and to better prepare the Member States for the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) audits and State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment (SSPIA) of their SSPs.

This MID-RASP edition 2023-2025 provides references to corresponding GASP 2023-2025 Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs); covering organizational challenges, Regional operational risks, and emerging risks.

The 2023-2025 Edition of the GASP would set forth ICAO's Safety Strategy in support of the prioritization and continuous improvement of aviation. The plan guides the implementation of regional and national aviation safety plans.

The 2023-2025 Edition of the GASP includes a new set of goals, targets and indicators, in line with the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In respect of MID Region SPMM, the GASP provides the global strategic direction while the MID Region SPMM provides regional specific goals and support the region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level. Consequently, MID region safety indicators and targets were aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP goals and targets as relevant in the MID Region. Furthermore, the RASG-MID would continuously monitor the implementation of the identified SEIs in the MID-RASP and measure safety performance of the regional civil aviation system, to ensure the intended targets are achieved, using the MID Region safety performance measurement & monitoring to this plan. Moreover, MID safety performance measurement & monitoring Goals support the region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level. Therefore, for each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM identified SEI(s) is mapped to it including their respective actions.

The MID Region SPMM is included as an appendix and became an integral part of MID-RASP.



Graph 1: Relationship between MID-RASP and other Plans

2. HOW MID-RASP IS STRUCTURED

This MID-RASP presents the regional strategy for enhancing aviation safety for a period of three years. It is comprised of two parts and 7 chapters. The 2023-2025 MID- RASP Edition comprises two distinct parts:

- **Part I. Planning** provides an introduction, describes how the MID-RASP is developed and monitored and includes the safety priorities. It consists of **Chapters 1 to 5**.

- **Part II. Implementation** contains the safety performance measurement & monitoring and the detailed list of MID-RASP safety actions. It consists of **Chapters 6 and 7**.

- Both parts are supported by a number of appendices providing further details or assisting the reader.

Part-I. Planning

Part I provides an introductory explaining the main objective of this MID-RASP. Chapter 2, 3, and 4 explain how MID-RASP is structured, developed, monitored and presents the structure of the document. Chapter 5 presents safety priorities and the key actions taken as indicated below:

- 5.1 Organizational Challenges/issues
- 5.2 Regional operational safety risks
- 5.3 Emerging risks

Part-II. Implementation

Part II contains the safety performance measurement and monitoring and the detailed list of MID-RASP safety actions. It consists of Chapters 6 and 7.

Chapter **6** presents the MID Region safety indicators and targets.

In respect of **chapter 7**, it facilitates the identification of SEIs and their respective actions relevant for each Goal identified in the MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring as follows:

- Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks;
- Goal 2: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities;
- Goal 3: Implement effective State safety Programmes (SSPs);
- Goal 4: Increase collaboration at the regional level;
- Goal 5: Expand the use of industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks ; and
- Goal 6: Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations.

The MID Region SPMM includes six (6) Goals in line with GASP 2023-2025 Edition. For each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM, identified SEI(s) is mapped to it including their respective actions and the following information is provided:

Goal: Goal supports the region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level.

- **Name:** Goal #Number - SEI# Number: Description of the SEI
- **Target(s)/Metrics.** Targets which serve to fulfil their respective Regional Goal
- **Rationale** behind the safety issue (why it has been identified as an issue)
- **What it is to be achieved** (objective)
- **How we intend to monitor improvement** in the future
- **How we intend to achieve** the objective; here, the various actions contributing to mitigate

the identified risk in that area are described

- **Actions**: The tasks required for the implementation of the SEI. The actions support the SEI and Targets of the Regional Goal
- **References:**
  - Indicates key existing global documents from which the SEI is adopted, if applicable.

Stakeholders: The entities/ stakeholders in the MID region, to which the Actions are addressed
Example Action 1: Description of the Action to be taken
Subtask(s) if needed to be added **Owner(s)**: Appointed Group/State(s)/Organization(s) to further develop details for implementation of the respective Action. **Priority:** Low, Medium, High **Completion Date**: The date in which the respective Action is expected to be implemented. **Status**: new, ongoing, on hold, completed. (Provide also updated progress if any)
Example Action 2: Description of the Action to be taken
Subtask(s) if needed to be added **Owner(s):** Appointed Group/State(s)/Organization(s) to further develop details for implementation of the respective Action **Priority**: Low, Medium, High **Completion Date**: The year(s) in which the respective Action is expected to be implemented **Status:** new, ongoing, on hold, completed. (**Provide also updated progress if any**)

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**TIMELINE**
Description of the Result to be achieved	The year in which the respective Target is expected to be achieved

3. HOW MID-RASP IS DEVELOPED AND MONITORED

The RASG-MD is the governing body responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the MID-RASP, in collaboration with the ICAO MID Office, international and regional organizations and with the aviation industry. The MID-RASP was developed in consultation with States, regional organizations, and other stakeholders in the region, and in alignment with the 2023-2025 of the GASP. If required, RASG-MID would seek the support of MIDANPIRG and RASFG-MID, other sub-groups, States, regional organizations, and industry to ensure the timely implementation of SEIs to address safety deficiencies and mitigate risks. Through close monitoring of the SEIs, SEIG would make adjustments to the MID-RASP and its initiatives, if needed, and update the MID-RASP document accordingly.

Furthermore, the MID-RASP is to be reviewed by SEIG every year mainly to include new identified SEIs, review the existing SEIs, and their respective actions. In addition, the MID-RASP is to be updated/endorsed by RASG-MID at least every three years and as deemed necessary.

The SEIG is established to assist RASG-MID to develop and monitor the implementation of SEIs as at **Appendix A** related to identified regional operational risks, organizational challenges, and emerged risks. In addition, the SEIG takes the lead and ensures that SEIs are implemented in a timely, effective and efficient manner in coordination with RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, and RASFG-MID groups and sub-groups (ASRG, ASPIG, AIIG, ATM-SG,..etc), States, regional organizations, and industry.

As a first step towards establishing this system and to facilitate MID-RASP implementation, it is necessary to enhance the communication and flow of safety data and information, as well as coordination processes, among RASG-MID and its subsidies, States, and regional organizations. There is also the need to continue to enhance collaboration with MIDANPIRG through coordinated processes to sustain the collection and sharing of regional air traffic management (ATM) data and the sharing and resolution of safety issues. This, in turn, would support the implementation of Aviation System Block Upgrade (ASBUs) and ensure that their implementation accounts for and properly manages existing and emerging risks, e.g. approaches with vertical guidance (APV) to mitigate risks associated with CFIT and runway excursions.

The MID-RASP was developed with the aim of addressing the MID region's operational and other safety issues in a timely manner, and as applicable. It is expected that this approach would facilitate MID States' support and participation in the implementation of these SEIs and their respective actions at both the regional and national levels. The three-year period of the MID-RASP, i.e. 2023 to 2025, was selected to coincide with the GASP review period of the same duration, to ensure continued alignment with the latest global plans.

States should ensure that a NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. The MID-RASP provides the identified safety priorities in the region and States should identify which top risks and key issues mentioned in the GASP and MID-RASP which apply to their national context and identify suitable mitigations actions within their NASP. States should also add/consider other safety issues which are unique to their operational context. Furthermore, States to establish a NASP taking into account the GASP and MID-RASP; and based on their operational safety needs.

The key contents of the MID-RASP were developed using an eight-step process recommended by the GASP to develop RASPs and NASPs, similar to the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) continuous improvement cycle, as follows:

Step 1: Conduct self-evaluation;
Step 2: Identify hazards and safety deficiencies;
Step 3: Develop list of prioritized regional safety issues;
Step 4 – Define goals, indicators, and targets
Step 5: Perform gap analysis to identify SEIs;
Step 6: Develop a list of prioritized SEIs;
Step 7: Develop a Regional aviation safety plan; and
Step 8: Monitor implementation

The MID-RASP has been developed in congruence with the GASP, and supports the GASP aspirational goal of zero fatalities by 2030 and its objectives, goals, targets and indicators.

a. The MID-RASP structure adheres closely to GASP;
b. A comprehensive gap analysis was undertaken to identify the existing gaps between the existing work by RASG-MID, and subsequently also compared with ICAO Manual: Doc 10131, 'Manual on the Development of Regional and National Aviation Safety Plans;
c. The MID Region SPMM is aligned with GASP 2023-2025 Edition, retained and included as an Appendix in the MID-RASP; and
d. MID-RASP SEIs were selected taking into consideration relevant SEIs for the region in line with GASP 2023-2025 Edition as well as relevant work plan items of DCGA, RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, and RASFG-MID meetings. Moreover, GASP SEIs for States and Industry (domestic) were not considered as these are more suitable to be included in the NASPs of the MID States.

The MID-RASP supersedes the previous work of the RASG-MID subsidy bodies (RAST and SST) initiatives to elevate the commitment of the MID Region to improve its safety oversight capability, which relates to the continuous reduction of regional operational risks and improvement in safety

oversight capabilities and safety management of States. In particular, the MID-RASP serves to raise awareness of safety risks and consequences, to States, industry and relevant stakeholders to commit and provide resources including financial, staffing and technical expertise, to making improvements in safety management, oversight capability and operational safety performance. It also provides a basis to facilitate information sharing between relevant stakeholders who can take actions or provide support to address issues.

At the regional level, the MID-RASP commits RASG-MID to continue the following efforts as indicated below:

a. Focus on the update and the development of the new regional SEIs to address the Regional High-Risk Categories (R-HRCs) of LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RI and RE, and other priorities;
b. Support States to strengthen safety oversight capabilities
c. Assist States in the development and implementation of SSP and SMS including the development of NASPs;
d. Promote regional government and industry collaboration for sharing safety information and best practices in safety management;
e. Promote the effective implementation of AGA, with a focus on implementation of Aerodrome Certification including the SMS, runway safety Programmes including the establishment of Runway Safety Teams (RSTs) and Global reporting Format methodology (GRF);
f. Support States in the development of Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) national regulations;
g. Support States on COVID-19 pandemic activities to enable a safe and secure return to operations, the GNSS interference, the impact of security on safety, manage Cybersecurity risks; and 5G interference with Radar Altimeter frequency band.
h. Support States to establish and activate the MENA RSOO;
i. Provide continuous support for the MENA ARCM activities.
j. Continue implementation support to States and industry, including the development of improved guidance materials as well as the organization of workshops and training to provide assistance and guidance to MID States; and
k. Put in place a structure for the collection, analysis and sharing of safety and operational data in the region to support a comprehensive approach to risk management, and facilitate initiatives to develop regional data collection, and analysis.

States and industry are committed to the following efforts:

a. Implement, as appropriate, the GASP SEIs and MID-RASP SEIs and their respective actions in strategic and timely manner;
b. (For any States with SSCs), accord priority to the resolution of any SSCs identified by the ICAO USOAP CMA Programme. These should draw on the necessary resources available, including technical assistance from other States and Regional Programmes to resolve the SSCs promptly;
c. Accord priority to the implementation of SSP and SMS;
d. Use data-driven methodologies to identify R-HRCs and their safety issues, and implement collaborative solutions to reduce accident rates and fatalities in the Region, and likewise accord priority to the implementation of respective SEIs; and
e. Consider various options to leverage ICAO-recognized industry assessment Programmes such as the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO), IATA Standard Safety Assessment Programme (ISSA), and ACI APEX Programme. These options range from recognition of such Programmes to encouraging registration by all applicable operators as a means to strengthen their safety management and compliance.

4. OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

4.1 Worldwide Perspective

After the year 2020 when the global economy experienced the worst crisis since the Great Depression as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the activity in 2021 rapidly recovered and the prospects for the following years are that this trend will continue. However, it is too soon to draw firm conclusions, considering the uncertainties on the evolution of certain threats (not only the pandemic, but also climate change, increasing public debts and geopolitical changes).

According to the last general IMF forecast available at *(https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/10/12/world-economic-outlook-october-2021)*, GDP fell by 3.3 % in 2020 and is expected to rebound by 5.9 % in 2021, to continue with a growth rate of 4.9 % in 2022. Behind these global figures quite diverse situations are found in national economies due to differences in the pace of vaccine roll-out and the capability of States to offer financial support. The pandemic also affected the job market, the employment conditions and other socio-economic factors. From a worldwide perspective, according to the International Labour Office, the unemployment rate grew by 1.1 point to 6.5 % in 2020, compared to 5.4 % in 2019, and will only slowly decrease to an expected 6.3 % in 2021 and 5.7 % in 2022. *(https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_795453.pdf). Table 1.2 Employment-to-population ratio, unemployment rate.*

From a worldwide aviation perspective, large aeroplane commercial passenger flights, constituting the bulk of the aviation activity, showed an unprecedented drop in 2020 and started to recover in 2021. The closure of borders fundamentally contributed to this drop in traffic, hitting airline international traffic far more than domestic traffic. If the current positive trend of pandemic recovery continues, the domestic traffic in terms of number of airlines' commercial passengers would recover in 2022 in comparison with the 2019 level. International traffic would only recover in 2024.

4.2 Middle East Perspective

The Middle East Region has been, for years, at the forefront of aviation growth and reshaping the global long-haul markets by elevating its hub position for connecting Europe and Asia-Pacific, in line with the west to east shift of the geographical centre of gravity of air transport operations. Growth of the Region started to undergo a significant transition and slow down recently. Air transport supports 2.4 million jobs and USD 130 billion in GDP in the Middle East.

With the further movement of the air transport centre of gravity from West to East, the geographic position of the Gulf hubs will continue to offer a strategic advantage to several airlines in the Region. According to ICAO long-term traffic forecasts, total passenger traffic of the Middle East Region is expected to grow by around 4.6 per cent annually up to 2045, the second fastest growth among all Regions after Asia and Pacific. The Middle East is expected to be the fastest growing Region in terms of freight traffic growth, and is projected to grow at 5.4 per cent annually up to 2045. This increase will, in turn, drive growth in the economic output and jobs that are supported by air transport in the next decade. By 2036, it is forecasted that the impact of air transport and the tourism it facilitates in the Middle East will have grown to support 4.3 million jobs (78 per cent more than in 2016) and a USD 345 billion contribution to GDP (an increase of 166 per cent).

The Middle East has to contend with situations unique to the Region such as fluctuating oil revenues, regional conflict and overcrowded air space. In addition, airlines in this Region are now facing challenges to their business models.

The growth of air transport requires a high-performing aviation system including airlines, airports and ATM. The overall efficiency of the ATM system commensurate with the level of predicted traffic growth should be increased through improved airspace design and organization. Furthermore, this

Region is in need of political commitment to market liberalization. Although the Middle East is home to some of the world's largest hub airports, the relations between States are still mostly bound by bilateral air services agreements that limit market access to each other. *(Source: Aviation Benefits Report-2019).*

The economic and social situation in the Middle East is similar to the world outlook provided above.
The COVID-19 pandemic has battered world-wide aviation in a way that could never have been imagined and we are still trying to assess the full extent of the impact that it will have on civil aviation in the longer term. While the pandemic is not yet over, there are signs at last that vaccination offers a viable way to reduce levels of infection and a basis to realistically plan for a full reopening. Throughout the pandemic, the ICAO MID Office has continued to work collaboratively with all stakeholders to ensure that the industry is equipped to resume the flight operations.
In addition, the MID-RPTF mechanisms continued to serve as a platform for coordination and cooperation amongst all stakeholders to support States with the implementation of the CART and HLCC recommendations as well as the recovery of aviation industry in the MID Region during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak.

During 2021 the reduction in airline passenger flights due to COVID-19 continued, subsequently resulting also in lack of capacity to transport cargo in that aircraft The same can be stated for the complexity of operations, ranging from quarantine measures imposed on flight crews, disruption in training and scheduling, and the need to transport cargo in the cabin.

Airlines continued to have a large portion of their aircraft grounded, leaving flight and cabin crew members with uncertainty about the return to normal operations.

However, the recovery during the summer of 2021 was faster than expected. This was a positive development but led to difficulties for operators to cope with the increased demand, adding complexity in the return to service of aircraft and flight crews.

Over the last five years, the global scheduled commercial international operations accounted for approximately 24.96 million departures in 2021, compared to 36.3 million departures in 2017. The MID Region shows a decrease in traffic volumes during 2021. Total scheduled commercial departures in 2021 accounted for approximately 806,274 estimated departures compared to 1.37 million departures in 2017. In terms of aircraft accidents, the MID Region had no accident during the year 2021. The 5-year average accident rate for 2017-2021 is 2.21, which is slightly below the global average rate (2.41) for the same period. The MID Region accident rate in 2020 is higher than the global accident rate, which is 2.14 accidents per million departures.

The MID Region had no fatal accident in 2021. However, the 5-year average fatal accident rate for 2017-2021 is 0.42, which is almost similar to the global average rate (0.41) for the same period. The MID Region had no fatal accidents in 2017, 2019, and 2021. However, two fatal accidents occurred in 2018 and 2020. The 2018 accident caused 66 fatalities and the year 2020 caused 176 fatalities.

In terms of Safety Management, the average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 76, 1%. Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top SEIs. In connection with this, the RASG-MID/9 endorsed the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT) handbook to support MID States in the implementation of the SSP in an effective and efficient way.

Common challenges in MID Region include:

a. The political/security situation in some States, the cross-national variation in Aviation development as well as the relatively small accreditation area, impede the provision of Technical assistance, implementation of Regional projects and the achievement of the Regional safety, air navigation and Security targets;

b. The drastic reduction in traffic volumes due to the COVID-19 crisis and the new risks induced by its impacts;
c. The lack of financial and human resources in some States, combined with the complexity of administrative arrangements for the approval of duty travel, political sensitivities, etc., affected the level of attendance to the activities organized by the ICAO MID Office as well as States' support to the MIDANPIRG, RASG-MID and the MID-RASFG Work Programmes and their subsidiary bodies;
d. Low level of reporting by States (inputs to the MID-Air Navigation Report and MID Annual Safety Report, incidents, national plans, success stories, replies to State Letters, etc; and
e. Resources constraints (financial and technical personnel) in the Regional Office, combined with a high rotation rate vs. necessary time for new staff/comers to cope with the way of doing business in ICAO considering the MID Region-specific challenges.

5. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

The MID-RASP presents the safety priorities that were developed based on the ICAO GASP's including organizational challenges, operational safety risks, and emerging risks as well as region-specific issues identified by a safety risk assessment and published in MID Region Annual Safety Reports and RASG-MID activities. Additionally, the MID region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level is to address the region's operational issues and other safety issues in a timely manner. Therefore, the MID-RASP strategic approach would focus on organizational challenges/issues, regional operational safety risks, and emerging risks as indicated in graph 2 below.

a. Organizational challenges/issues including the States 'safety oversight, safety management, aircraft accident and incident investigation, Human factors and competence of personnel, and Cybersecurity. In terms of human factors and competence of personnel, as new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. It is equally important for aviation personnel to take advantage of the safety opportunities presented by new technologies;

b. In respect of regional operational safety risks, the focus would be on R-HRC identified in the GASP 2023-2025 Edition mainly the LOC-I, CFIT, RE, RI, and MAC; and

c. Regarding the emerging risks, the focus would be on the COVID-19 crisis and the new risks induced by its impacts, Civil drones (Unmanned Aircraft Systems), Management of security risks with safety impact, and GNSS interference, and 5G interference with Radar altimeter band frequency.



Graph 2: Safety Priorities

Therefore, the MID-RASP adopts three focus areas approach:

First focus area involves enhancing existing regional mechanisms to strengthen effective safety oversight capabilities and improve the implementation of effective safety management, in particular to:

a. Draft the MID-RASP 2023-20225 Edition and consider inputs from MID Annual Safety Report (MID ASR), MID Region safety management Roadmap, Runway Safety Go-Team; RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, and RASFG-MID.
b. enhance coordination and communication with regional organizations including ACAO, ACI, CANSO, IATA, and other regional mechanisms, MENA ARCM, especially MENA RSOO once activated;
c. improve the scheduling and streamline the number of regional safety-related events including workshops, trainings, seminars; and
d. improve communication and sharing of safety information between States, international organizations, and industry.

In addition to the varying levels of safety oversight capabilities in the MID Region, other regional safety issues and activities have been identified and selected for inclusion in the MID-RASP. These were derived from the RASG-MID reports, analysis of USOAP data, accident and incident investigation reports, safety oversight activities over recent years from MID States, as indicated below:

a. Improve Regional Cooperation for the provision of Accident & Incident Investigation;
b. Improve implementation of ELP requirements;
c. Sharing of Safety Recommendations related to Accidents and Serious Incidents;
d. Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods;
e. Need to manage the cybersecurity risks; and
f. 5G interference with Radio altimeter frequency band.

Second focus area involves addressing effectively regional operational safety risks including specific operational risks stemming from the crisis as the vision of the GASP is to achieve and maintain the goal

of zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond.

Third focus area involves addressing the emerging safety risks that might impact safety in the future including recovering from the COVID-19 crisis without adversely affecting the high level of safety performance GNSS outages/vulnerability, civil drones to ensure safe operation of unmanned aircraft system (UAS), impact of security on safety, and 5G interference with Radar Altimeter frequency band. Additionally, for emerging risks, SEIs/safety actions would be developed and covered under the focus areas (organizational challenges and Regional operational safety risks).

5.1 Organizational Challenges/Issues

Organizational challenges are systemic issues which take into consideration the impact of organizational culture, and policies and procedures on the effectiveness of safety risk controls. Organizations include entities in a State, such as the civil aviation authorities (CAAs) and service providers, such as operators of aeroplanes, ATS providers and operators of aerodromes. Organizations should identify hazards in systemic issues and mitigate the associated risks to manage safety. A State's responsibilities for the management of safety comprise both safety oversight and safety management, collectively implemented through an SSP.

It is crucial that States' safety oversight capabilities and safety management, and aviation infrastructure should keep pace with these regional safety issues.

Therefore, for the triennium of 2023-2025, the MID Region should continue to focus its efforts in addressing the following top Regional organizational issues:

a. Lower USOAP EI scores, especially States with EI below 60% as well as AIG, ANS, AGA, and OPS areas;
b. Slow pace of SSP development & implementation including the NASP development, as well as understanding of newer safety management and performance based concepts;
c. Slow pace of SMS acceptance and surveillance;
d. Slow pace of developing Risk Management framework to support decision-making and deploy the resources needed to mitigate risks effectively;
e. Improve Regional Cooperation for the Provision of Accident & Incident Investigation;
f. Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods;
g. Support States related to Human factors and Competence of Personnel
h. Support States to manage the cybersecurity risks;
i. Management of security risks with safety impact;
j. Slow pace of implementation of RASG-MID conclusion/ MID-RASP SEIs/safety actions and tools to mitigate identified safety risks and safety deficiencies;
k. Insufficient resources and expertise to manage and collect safety data and safety information on a State level, and no formal mechanisms in place that allow for the sharing and benchmarking of information at the Regional level; and
l. Increasing risks associated with airspace structure including ATS networks and associated airspaces to accommodate the traffic flow in safe and efficient manner.

5.1.1 Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Safety oversight is defined as a function by means of which States ensure effective implementation of the safety-related SARPs and associated procedures contained in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and related ICAO documents. States have overall safety oversight responsibilities, which emphasize a State's commitment to safety in respect of the State's aviation activity. An individual State's responsibility for safety oversight is the foundation upon which a safe global air transport system is built. States that experience difficulties in carrying out safety oversight functions can impact the state of International Civil Aviation.

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that States inability to effectively oversee aviation operations which remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is 74, 67 %, which is above the world average 68.68 % (as of 29 May 2022). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%.

All eight areas have an EI above 60%. However, the areas of AIG, AGA and ANS still need more improvement. Regarding the Critical Elements (CEs), CE4 (Qualified technical personnel) improved and is above 60% (62.39%) EI, whereas CE8 (resolution of safety issues) is the only one below EI 60% (58. 89%) EI.

Moreover, the effective implementation in certification, surveillance, and resolution of safety concerns need to be improved.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Conducted technical assistance and NCLB mission activities to States
b. Capacity building activities
c. Developed and implemented a specific NCLB plan of actions for prioritized States according to established criteria
d. Established MENA RSOO to assist States and start operations

5.1.2 Improve Regional Cooperation for the Provision of Accident & Incident Investigation

In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is 74.67 %, which is above the world average 68.68 % (as of29May 2022). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%. Regarding the Critical Elements (CEs), CE4 (Qualified technical personnel) improved and is above 60% (60.08%) EI, whereas CE8 (resolution of safety issues) is the only one below EI 60% (59. 47%) EI. All eight areas have an EI above 60%. However, the area of AIG still need more improvement.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. AIG Strategy in the Provision of AIG Functions endorsed by the DGCA-MID/4
b. MENA AIG Regional Cooperation Mechanism (ARCM) endorsed by the DGCA meeting in Kuwait
c. Organized AIG capacity building activities
d. Draft MENA ARCM implementation action plan endorsed by the RSC/7 e. MENA ARCM Establishment and Activation

5.1.3 Sharing of Safety Recommendations related to Accidents and Serious Incidents

a. The Safety recommendations are the utmost results of investigation or safety studies conducted by States. In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13, a State shall send to ICAO a copy of the Final Report on its investigations into accidents and serious incidents involving aircraft of a maximum mass of over 5,700 kgs.

b. A safety recommendation is defined as a proposal by an accident investigation authority, based on information derived from an investigation. The intended purpose of a safety recommendation is the prevention of accidents or incidents, and the reduction of the consequences of such occurrences.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Establishment of an Ad-hoc Action Group championed by Saudi Arabia and UAE
b. The Questionnaire on establishing safety recommendations platform developed and circulated to MENA ARCM Member States. The questionnaire analysis has been shared with MENA ARCM/2 meeting

5.1.4 Improve Implementation of ELP Requirements

The decision to address language proficiency requirements (LPRs) for pilots and air traffic controllers was first made by the 32nd Session of the ICAO Assembly in September 1998 as a direct response to several fatal accidents, including one that cost the lives of 349 persons, as well as to previous fatal accidents in which the lack of proficiency in English was identified as a contributing factor. The intent was to improve the level of language proficiency in aviation worldwide and reduce the communication breakdowns caused by a lack of language skills. LPRs have now moved beyond implementation (Assembly Resolution A38-8 refers), entering a phase of post implementation.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Development and dissemination the Questionnaire on ELP
b. Analysis of the survey results and was reviewed by the RSC/7

5.1.5 Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods

The data analysis results of the USOAP-CMA OPS area showed that Dangerous Goods is one of the unsatisfactory PQs in operations for some states in the region. The identified issues highlighted in the analysis report as indicated below:

a. States have not implemented an effective system for safety oversight of the various entities involved in the transport of dangerous goods, including shippers, packers, cargo handling companies and air operators. Regarding the latter, some States, the authorities have not effectively reviewed the dangerous goods procedures of air operators, contained in the operations and ground handling manuals, mostly due to a lack of qualified dangerous goods inspectors.
b. Some States have not kept records relating to dangerous goods-related approvals; and
c. In addition, in some States, dangerous goods inspector procedures have not been established and implemented.

Safety actions have been planned to be taken during the year 2020 and 2021. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic some of the ICAO MID Office work Programme activities have been postponed for 2022 including Dangerous Goods workshop.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Dangerous Goods webinar
b. Dangerous Goods Capacity building activities

5.1.6 Improve the Safety Management

Despite the fact that the last years have clearly brought continued improvements in safety across every operational domain, the latest accidents and serious incidents and the massive worldwide impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the aviation system underline the complex nature of aviation safety and the significance of addressing human and organizational factor aspects.

Effective safety management including robust risk management policies and processes are essential in dealing with the multiple impacts of the pandemic on the aviation system, both at authority and organization level. This is supported by ICAO Annex 19 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation and when applicable, by flight data monitoring (FDM) requirements.

Therefore, States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to fully implement SSPs according to Annex 19, States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The SMS enables service providers to capture and transmit safety information which contributes to safety risk management. In this context, the role of the State evolves to include the establishment and achievement of safety performance targets as well as effective oversight of its service providers' SMS. Individual States should provide safety information derived from their SSPs to their respective RASGs to contribute to Regional safety risk management activities. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 76, 18%.

An SSP requires increased collaboration across operational domains to identify hazards and manage risks. Aviation authorities and organizations should anticipate new emerging threats and associated challenges by developing SRM principles.

Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). In connection with this, the RSC/7 endorsed the safety management Roadmap and established the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT). Furthermore, the RASG-MID/9 endorsed the SMIT handbook to support MID States in the implementation of the SSP in an effective and efficient way

ICAO launched SSP Implementation Assessments (SSPIAs) phase 2 under the USOAP CMA. The assessments are based on a qualitative assessment of a State's progress in implementing a State Safety Programme (SSP), using SSP-related PQs.
The PQs are reflective of Annex 19- Safety Management and the Safety Management Manual (Doc 9859).

Unlike the USOAP CMA's audit activities, SSPIAs are linked to applicable SSP components rather than critical elements (CEs). The SSP components are:

1. State safety policy, objectives and resources;
2. State safety risk management;
3. State safety assurance; and
4. State safety promotion

The SSP assessment covers 8 areas as indicated below:

1. SSP general aspects (GEN);
2. safety data analysis general aspects (SDA);
3. personnel licensing and training (PEL);
4. aircraft operations (OPS);
5. airworthiness of aircraft (AIR), approved maintenance organization (AMO) aspects only;
6. air navigation services(ANS), air traffic services provider (ATSP) aspects only;
7. aerodromes and ground aids (AGA); and
8. aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG).

In 2020, ICAO developed guidance supporting the determination of maturity levels for each SSP-related PQ. The SSP-related PQs, complemented by the maturity level matrices for each of the SSP audit areas, are available in the CMA Library of the USOAP CMA Online Framework (OLF) at www.soa.icao.int (restricted access). These matrices describe the level of progress for each element of the SSP, which can be described as:

- Not present and not planned;
- Not present but being worked on;
- Present; or
- Present and effective.

ICAO will use the SSP maturity level matrices for the scheduled SSPIAs under Phase 2, which will begin in 2021. This phase of assessments will utilize the maturity level matrices to provide a more detailed, quantitative measurement of a State's progress in the implementation and maintenance of its SSP. Two assessment missions have been planned for the year 2022.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Conducted continuously SSP/SMS capacity building activities
b. Development of the MID Region Safety Management Implementation Roadmap
c. Establishment of the Safety Management Implementation Team (SMIT) and SMIT Handbook endorsed by RASG-MID/9
d. Establishment the MENA RSOO to support States in the expeditious implementation of SSP
e. Guidance material development
f. Technical Assistance missions

5.1.7 Certification of International Aerodromes

All eight areas have an EI above 60%. In respect of the Critical Elements (CEs), CE4 (Qualified technical personnel) improved and is above 60% (60.08%) EI, whereas CE8 (resolution of safety issues) is the only one below EI 60% (59. 47%) EI. However, the areas of AGA still need more improvement.

Key Actions completed/ planned
a. Conducted Aerodrome Safety Management Workshops
b. Wildlife hazard Management and Control Workshop
c. RSA on Wildlife Management and Control Regulatory Framework & Guidance Material.
d. Certification of Annex 14 training courses
e. GRF training courses

5.1.8 Establishment of Runway Safety Teams at International Airports

All eight areas have an EI above 60%. In terms of the Critical Elements (CEs), CE4 (Qualified technical personnel) improved and is above 60% (60.08%) EI, whereas CE8 (resolution of safety issues) is the only one below EI 60% (59. 47%) EI. However, the areas of AGA still need more improvement

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Runway Safety Go-Team Missions
b. Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through capacity building activities

5.1.9 Human Factors and Competence of Personnel

As the aviation system changes, it is imperative to ensure that human factors and the impact on human performance are taken into account, both at service provider and regulatory levels.

Human factors and human performance are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably. While both human factors and human performance examine the capabilities, limitations and tendencies of human beings, they have different emphases:

- Human Factors (HF) – this term focusses on why human beings function in the way that they do. The term incorporates both mental processes and physical ones, and the

interdependency between the two.

- Human Performance (HP) – the output of human factors is human performance. This term focusses on how people do the things that they do.

As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. CRM has been identified in the MID ASR as most important human factors issue in the domain of commercial air transport and safety actions would be identified and developed. In addition, Team Resource Management (TRM) was introduced into ATC following the success achieved with Crew Resource Management (CRM) in the airline community enhancing teamwork practices. The practice is applied within virtually every airline with training given to pilots and other operational staff Within the last decade in ATM there have been numerous advances in widespread acceptance of SMS under the guidance of ICAO. ICAO has now mandated the use of SMS Manual Doc 9859 to standardize the approach to safety. TRM as defined by ICAO is an integral component of SMS under human factor

Key Actions completed/planned
a. CRM and TRM workshops/webinars
b. FRMS workshops/webinars

5.1.10 Cybersecurity Resilience

The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalization. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardized manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organizations with malicious intent.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Cybersecurity symposium/workshops
b. Development of MID Region Cybersecurity Action Plan

5.2 Regional Operational Safety Risks

Operational safety risks arise during the delivery of a service or the conduct of an activity (e.g. operation of an aircraft, airports or of air traffic control). Operational interactions between people and technology, as well as the operational context in which aviation activities are carried out are taken into consideration to identify expected performance limitations and hazards. The RASG-MID utilizes available safety data and information to determine the region's operational safety risks which include G-HRCs and additional regional operational safety risks.

5.2.1 Address Operational Safety Risks in Commercial Air Transport (CAT) Aeroplane Operations above 5,700 kgs

In terms of an aircraft accident, the MID Region had no accident during the year 2021. The 5-year average accident rate for 2017-2021 is 2.21, which is slightly below the global average rate (2.41) for the same period The MID Region accident rate in 2020 is higher than the global accident rate, which is 2.14 accidents per million departures.

The MID Region had no fatal accident in 2021. However, the 5-year average fatal accident rate for 2017-2021 is 0.42, which is almost similar to the global average rate (0.41) for the same period. The MID Region had no fatal accidents in 2017, 2019, and 2021. However, two fatal accidents occurred in 2018 and 2020. The 2018 accident caused 66 fatalities and the year 2020 caused 176 fatalities.

The GASP 2023-2025 Edition identifies the G-HRCs as LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RE and RI. In the MID Region in 2017-2021 the topmost frequent accidents related to the loss of control-inflight and runway safety, which includes RE and ARC during Landing. In terms of fatality risk, the fatal accidents for the period 2017- 2021 were attributed to LOC-I.

Therefore, for the triennium of 2023-2025, the MID Region should continue to focus its efforts on mitigating and minimizing occurrences related to the R-HRCs for this time period, namely:

1. Loss of Control-In Flight (LOC-I);
2. Runway Safety (RS); mainly (RE and ARC during landing);
3. Runway Incursion (RI);
4. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT); and
5. Mid-Air Collision (MAC).

MAC is established as a top risk for the MID region based on the existing data driven approach used to determine the R-HRCs though there is no fatal accident during the last five years. Therefore, there is a need for the MID region to build up its capability to collect and analyze safety data pertaining to MAC.

In addition, safety issues have been identified in the MID ASR and need to be considered by the States while developing their NASP as well as the industry as indicated at **Appendix B.**

5.2.2 Aircraft Upset in Flight (Loss of Control-Inflight)

Aircraft upset or loss of control inflight is the most common accident outcome for fatal accidents in CAT aero plane operations. It includes uncontrolled collisions with terrain, but also occurrences where the aircraft deviated from the intended flight path or intended aircraft flight parameters, regardless of whether the flight crew realized the deviation and whether it was possible to recover or not. It also includes the triggering of stall warning and envelope protections. During 2017-2021 aircraft upset, or loss of control contributed to one fatal accident involving MID Region aeroplane.

Key Actions completed/Planned
a. Organized and promoted training provisions on recovery from upset scenarios (UPRT workshops)
b. Assistance to States to implement the SSP/SMS through workshops/trainings
c. Development and publication of RSAs related to the LOC-I Airplane States Awareness (ASA) – Low Speed Alerting Standard Operating Procedures Effectiveness and Adherence Airplane States Awareness (ASA) –Training –Flight Crew training (Approach to stall & Up set recovery) Verification and Validation
d. Construction, approval and implementation of RNAV(GNSS) / RNP-AR procedures to all runways not currently served by precision approach procedure
e. Develop guidance material/share best practices on Ground Handling Service Provider Certification Process
f. Guidance material on flight crew proficiency
g. Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation

5.2.3 Runway Excursion

Runway excursion covers materialized runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties in maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off-centred or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during

landing. During the period 2017-2021, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flight.

Key Actions completed/planned	
a.	Conduct of assistance missions by the Runway Safety Go-Team (RST)
b.	Establishment of a MID-FPP to support states on the effective implementation of the PBN procedures
c.	Promoted operational improvements and safety enhancements associated with the implementation of ASBU modules, e.g. PBN, CDO. Implementation of Performance-Based Navigation (PBN); particularly Approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV)
d.	Assistance to States to implement the SSP/SMS
e.	RSA on Wildlife Management and Control Regulatory Framework & Guidance Material
f.	Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through Webinar/ Workshops/Training
g.	Guidance material on un-Stabilized Approach
h.	MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Implementation.

5.2.4 Runway Incursion (RI)

A Runway Incursions refers to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection. Their accident outcome is runway collisions. While there were no fatal accidents or accidents involving MID States operators in the last years involving runway collision, the risk of the reported occurrence demonstrated to be very real. In addition to this, MID States should provide further data analysis regarding runway incursion to identify the root causes and associated safety issues.

Key Actions completed/planned	
a.	Conduct of assistance missions by the Runway Safety Go-Team (RST)
b.	Assistance to States to implement the SSP/SMS

5.2.5 Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences, which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc. There was no fatal accident involving MID States operators during this period. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States and in other parts of the world that make it an area of concern. However, additional data is needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

Key Actions completed/planned	
a.	Establishment of MID-FPP to support states on the effective implementation of the PBN procedures
b.	Promoted operational improvements and safety enhancements associated with the implementation of ASBU modules; e.g., PBN, CDO, CCO. Implementation of Performance-Based Navigation (PBN); particularly Approaches with Vertical Guidance (APV)
c.	Assistance to States to implement PBN routes for en-route and terminal airspace through meeting and workshops/seminars
d.	Assistance to States to implement the SSP/SMS

e.	Development and publication of RSAs
f.	Construction, approval and implementation of RNAV (GNSS) / RNP-AR procedures to all runways not currently served by precision approach procedure
g.	Guidance for designing RNP Approach

5.2.6 Mid-Air Collision (MAC)

Refers to the potential collision of two aircraft in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine TCAS resolution advisories or airspace infringements. Although there have been no aero-plane mid-air collision accidents in recent years within the MID States. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating in Gulf area over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation. This is one specific safety issue that is a main priority in this key risk area. However, additional data is needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

Key Actions completed/planned	
a.	Assistance to States to implement the SSP/SMS
b.	Establishment of Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) Group to carry out further analyses of the reported NMAC incidents and provide feedback to the ATM SG and ASRG.
c.	Conduct workshop to implement Civil-Military cooperation
d.	Conduct seminar on raising awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas

5.3 Emerging Risks

Emerging safety issues are risks that might impact Safety in the future. These may include a possible new technology, a potential public policy, a new concept, a business model or idea that, while perhaps an outlier today, could mature and develop into a critical mainstream issue in the future or become a major trend in its own right. Therefore, for the triennium of 2023-2025, the MID Region should continue to focus its efforts on mitigating and minimizing the safety impact of emerging risks for this time period, namely:

a. Support States on establishing the UAS regulatory framework.
b. Decrease the GNSS interference impact.
c. support on maintaining collectively the pre-pandemic high aviation safety level throughout the recovery phase and improving safety post-recovery due to the drastic reduction in traffic volumes due to the COVID-19 crisis and the new risks induced by its impacts.
d. Management of security risks with safety impact.
e. 5G interference with Radio Altimeter frequency band.

The emerging risks SEIs and safety actions will be covered under organizational issues and operational safety risk SEIs.

5.3.1 GNSS interference

GNSS interference, including intentional and unintentional signal interference, has been identified as a major safety issue.

Flight Data Exchange analysis showed that the majority of GPS Signal Lost was detected within or in vicinity of Turkish airspace (Ankara FIR and Istanbul FIR), and in Eastern Mediterranean area. Compared to previous analysis, the identified hot spots have been expanded into entire Anatolian peninsula, including Istanbul FIR.

The GNSS interference SEI /safety actions covered under CFIT SEI.

Key Actions completed/t planned
a. RSA on GNSS vulnerability has been developed and published
b. Safety data analysis shared by IATA
c. Raise awareness on the potential impact of GNSS interference on the aviation during the Civil-Mil Workshop
d. Urge States to follow the reporting procedure agreed by MIDANPIRG Conclusion 19/4 when needed

5.3.2 COVID-19 Pandemic Outbreak- Safe return to operations

It was noted that the rapidly evolving COVID-19 crisis heavily affected all aspects of civil aviation. The urgent need to coordinate all efforts to reduce the risks of the spread of COVID-19 by air transport and to protect the health of air travellers and aviation personnel, while maintaining essential aviation transport operations and ensuring an orderly return to normal operations in due course was underlined. The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in an extreme reduction in operations that began in late March 2020. Recovering from this crisis without adversely affecting the high level of safety performance is proposed as a strategic priority.

In addition to the specific operational risks stemming from the crisis, there are currently a substantial number of exemptions and extensions granted; however, the use of flexibility provisions is diminishing. The aviation safety issues arising as a result of the pandemic have been identified and those safety issues that were considered to constitute the highest risk to the aviation system were assessed and resulted in a number of safety interventions and the publication of guidance material including ICAO CART documents to support stakeholders with the management of the specific risks posed by the crisis.
The UAS SEIs /safety actions covered under MAC SEI.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. Establishment of MID Region Recovery Plan Task Force (MID-RPTF) to assist in developing regional restart and recovery planning
b. MID-RPTF activities
c. Conduct of teleconferences with DGCAs and Regional international organization
d. Development of MID CART Regional Implementation Roadmap
e. Continuous communication and coordination with MID States;
f. Development of a COVID-19 web page to communicate to States and all stakeholders the guidance material issued by ICAO, WHO, international organizations, States best practices and
g. Deployment of iPacks
h. Capacity building activities

5.3.3 Ensure the safe operations of UAS (drones)

The number of drones at the global level has increased. Available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. The civil aviation authority is responsible for, inter alia, ensuring aviation safety and protecting the public from aviation hazards. Operators of aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, are likewise responsible for operating safely. The rapid rise of UAS raises new challenges that were not considered in historic aviation regulatory frameworks. Before devising any regulatory framework for UAS operations, the regulator should understand and assess the UAS situation in its State.

UA operations will involve stakeholders' familiar with aviation as well as many who are not. It is important to include these stakeholders from the beginning when developing the UAS regulations. Their early involvement will ensure that the regulations appropriately address the needs of these groups while also serving to educate them on expectations and what is feasible.

Therefore, safety actions would be developed to support States to develop their national regulations in order to ensure safe operation of UAS.

Key Actions completed/planned
a. UAS iPack deployment
b. Drones symposium
c. Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework

5.3.4 Management of security risks with safety impact

The crash of flight MH17 immediately raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. Similar events had occurred in the MID region. Thus, military or terrorist conflicts may occur in any State at any time and pose risks to civil aviation. This is why it's important for governments, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civilian flights.

Furthermore, flying over or nearby conflict zones is related to both security and safety management and requires an integrated risk management process, as proposed by ICAO in the second edition of the Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones (Doc 10084) as an activity for further development. Several steps have to be taken, as part of the continuous risk assessment cycle including: the collection of information and intelligence; the subsequent threat analysis; the security risk assessment; the hazard identification; the safety risk assessment; the determination of the acceptable risk level and lastly information sharing. Each mitigating action should be accompanied with the identification of (new) hazards as a result of unintended consequences of the risk assessment mitigating actions.

The crash of flight MH17 shows, safety and security are intertwined. To manage the risks related to flying over conflict zones and other risks at the interface of safety and security as good as possible, closer cooperation between both worlds is necessary.

Key Actions taken/planned
a- Circulate ICAO Doc 10084 Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones
b- Organize seminar/Symposium to exchange experiences and good practices on assessing the risks and sharing of information related to the overflying of conflict zones in coordination with RASFG-MID and MIDANPIRG
c- Encourage States to issue NOTAMs to share threats information emanated from conflict zones within their airspaces.

5.3.5 5G Operation on Radio Altimeter

Radar altimeters (RA), operating at 4.2-4.4 GHz, are the only sensors onboard a civil aircraft which provide a direct measurement of the clearance height of the aircraft over the terrain or other obstacles (i.e. the Above Ground Level - AGL - information).

The RA systems' input is required and used by many aircraft systems when AGL is below 2500 ft. Any failures or interruptions of these sensors can therefore lead to incidents with catastrophic outcome, potentially resulting in multiple fatalities. The radar altimeters also play a crucial role in providing

situational awareness to the flight crew. The measurements from the radar altimeters are also used by Automatic Flight Guidance and Control Systems (AFGCS) during instrument approaches, and to control the display of information from other systems, such as Predictive Wind Shear (PWS), the Engine-Indicating and Crew-Alerting System (EICAS), and Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) systems, to the flight crew.

There is a major risk that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7–3.98 GHz band will cause harmful interference to radar altimeters on all types of civil aircraft- including commercial transport airplanes; business, regional, and general aviation airplanes; and both transport and general aviation helicopters. If there is no proper mitigation, this risk has the potential for broad impacts to aviation operations in the United States as well as in other regions where the 5G network is being implemented next to the 4.2-4.4 GHz frequency band.

List of potential equipment failures:
Auto land functions, EICAS/ECAM, False or missing GPWS alert, Unreliable instrument Indications, and Abnormal behaviors in Automatic Flight Systems.

The 5G interference with Radar Altimeter SEIs/safety actions covered under CFIT SEI.

Key Actions taken/planned
a- Develop a guidance material on safeguarding measures to protect Radio Altimeter from potential harmful interference from 5G Operation
b- Conduct a Webinar addressing the matter to raise awareness and promote the guidance material developed by the RADALT AG.

PART-II. IMPLEMENTATION

6. SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION

6.1 Safety Monitoring and Implementation

This section presents an outline of the safety performance indicators reflecting the MID Region safety strategic priorities in the area of safety. The RASG-MID would use the indicators listed in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C** to measure safety performance and monitor each regional safety target. Furthermore, the MID Region SPMM includes six (6) Goals in line with GASP 2023-2025 Edition.

The RASG-MID would continuously monitor the implementation of the identified SEIs in the MID-RASP and measure safety performance of the regional civil aviation system, to ensure the intended targets are achieved, using the MID Region SPMM to this plan. Therefore, for each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM, identified SEI(s) be mapped to it including their respective actions.

MID region safety indicators and targets were aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP goals and targets as relevant in the MID Region. A MID Region Annual safety report would be annually published to provide stakeholders with relevant up-to-date information on the progress made in achieving the regional safety goals and targets, as well as the implementation status/progress of the SEIs.

In the event that the regional safety goals and targets are not met, the causes would be addressed and presented to stakeholders. If RASG-MID identifies critical operational safety risks, reasonable measures would be taken to mitigate them as soon as practicable, possibly leading to an earlier revision of the MID-RASP by SEIG.

The monitoring of safety performance and its enhancement is achieved through identification of relevant Goals and Safety Indicators, taking into consideration the GASP 2023-2025 and regional specific objectives and priorities, as well as the adoption and attainment of Safety Targets with a specific timeframe.

The MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring includes the following Goals:

Aspirational Goal: Zero fatality by 2030, the GASP aspirational goal of ‘zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond’.

Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks: This is related to2023-2025 GASP Goal 1. This is aligned with the high-level ICAO safety metrics, thereby facilitating comparison of MID Region performance with global averages. Indicators related to risk areas are identified through the MID Region risk assessment methodology and described in the MID Region ASR. These ‘operational’ safety indicators would continue to be monitored through the MID Region ASR.

Goal 2: Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities: This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2. The Monitoring will be based on the available data published through USOAP-CMA (OLF) and iSTARS. The Regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) in the MID Region (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is 74.67 %, which is above the world average 68.68% (as of 29 May 2022). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%. The objective is aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP requiring all States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI) of the critical elements (CEs) of the State’s safety oversight system (with focus on priority PQs) as follows: a) by 2024 -75 per cent; b) by 2026 – 85 per cent EI score; c) by 2030 EI Score – 95 per cent EI score.
Goal 3: Implement effective State safety Programmes (SSPs): This is related to 2023-2025 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through ICAO iSTARS and USOAP-CMA (OLF). Feedback provided by Member States and Regional organizations would also be considered.

MID Office will in addition collect relevant documentation and information from States (SSP and NASP). The objective is aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP requiring all States to implement the foundation of an SSP by 2023, all States to publish a national aviation safety plan (NASP) by 2024, all States to work towards an effective SSP with maturity levels – Present by 2025, and Present and Effective by 2028.

Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level: This is related to 2023-2025 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through ICAO iSTARS and USOAP-CMA (OLF). Feedback provided by Member States would be also considered. The objective is aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP requiring all States to achieve a positive safety oversight margin, and an effective SSP, to actively lead RASGs' safety risk management activities, by 2025.

Goal 5: Expand the use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks: This is related to 2023-2025 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be collected from IATA and other international and regional organizations. Feedback provided by Member States would also be considered. The objective is aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP requiring all States that do not expect to meet GASP Goals 2 and 3 to seek assistance to strengthen their safety oversight capabilities or facilitate SSP implementation, all States to contribute information on operational safety risks, including SSP safety performance indicators regional aviation safety group (RASG) by 2025, and all regions to publish an updated regional aviation safety plan (RASP), in line with the 2023–2025 edition of GASP by 2023.

Goal 6: Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations: This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 6. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through ICAO iSTARS. Feedback provided by Member States would also be considered. The objective is aligned with the 2023-2025 GASP requiring all States to implement the air navigation and airport core infrastructure including aerodrome safety by 2025.

6.2 Communication of Progress to RASG-MID and Regional Stakeholders

A MID Region Annual safety report would be annually published to provide stakeholders with relevant up-to-date information on the progress made in achieving the regional safety goals and targets, as well as the implementation status of the SEIs. In addition, the abovementioned information would culminate in a report on progress of implementation of the MID-RASP SEIs and their respective actions as well as in achieving the regional safety goals and targets; would be presented at every SEIG and RASG-MID meetings as well as safety seminars. The progress report should cover at least the following aspects:

a. Brief overview of the overall implementation of the MID-RASP;
b. Analysis on delay/ challenges encountered in implementation of SEIs and their respective actions; and
c. If regional safety goals and targets are not met, causes would be addressed and presented to relevant stakeholders.

7 SAFETY ACTIONS

This chapter addresses system-wide problems that affect aviation as a whole including the SEIs and their respective actions. In most scenarios, these problems are related to organizational processes and procedures, regional operational safety risks, and emerging risks. The safety actions in this chapter are driven principally by the need to maintain or increase the current level of safety in the aviation sector for the region.

This chapter also facilitates the identification of SEIs and their respective actions relevant for each Goal established in the MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring as follows:

- **Goal 1:** Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks.
- **Goal 2:** strengthen States safety oversight capabilities.
- **Goal 3:** Implementation of effective State safety Programmes.
- **Goal 4:** Increase collaboration at the regional level.
- **Goal 5:** Expand the use of industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks.
- **Goal 6:** Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations.

7.1 Organizational Challenges/issues

7.1.1 Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

The States safety oversight capabilities remains an issue mainly for AIG, AGA, ANS, and OPS areas. The lack of effective oversight remains an issue and the difficulties experienced by some authorities in properly discharging their oversight responsibilities is a concern also in the light of the size, scope and complexity of the aviation industry that some of them oversee.
Furthermore, while a number of CAAs have reached a suitable and stable level of maturity, certain continue to underperform and/or struggle in achieving sustainable improvements. Most notably, while progress has been noted in the implementation of Authorities' management systems, effective oversight of undertakings' safety management systems continues to be an area of concern in several domains.

7.1.1.1 G2-SEI-01: Strengthening States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C.**

Rationale:
The CEs are essentially the safety defense tools of the State Safety Oversight system needed for the effective and sustainable implementation of a safety-related policy and associated procedures. The effective implementation of the CEs is an indication of a State's capability for safety oversight. States must establish CE-1 through CE-5 prior to the implementation of CE-6 through CE-8 in order to provide effective safety oversight and safety management. An individual State's responsibility for safety oversight is the foundation upon which a safe global air transport system is built. States that experience difficulties in carrying out safety oversight functions can impact the state of International Civil Aviation.

States should work to continually improve their effective implementation of the eight CEs of the State's safety oversight system in all relevant areas, as appropriate to their aviation system complexity. Through collaborative efforts, the level of effective implementation of the CEs of a State's safety oversight system can increase, particularly in those States where a State faces shortages of human, financial or technical resources.

The below elements are considered enablers of a robust safety oversight system, expected to be in place according to the requirements in force:

1. ability and determination to conduct effective oversight;
2. ability to identify risks through a process to collect and analyze data;
3. ability to mitigate the identified risks in an effective way, implying measurement of performance and leading to continuous improvement;
4. willingness and possibility to exchange information and cooperate with other CAAs;
5. ability to ensure the availability of adequate personnel, where 'adequate' includes the notion of sufficient training and proper qualification; and
6. focus on the implementation of effective management systems in industry, wherever required by the regulations in force.

What we want to achieve:
A robust oversight system across MID Region, where each CAA is able to properly discharge its oversight responsibilities, with particular care to exchange of information and cooperation with other

CAAs and to the implementation of management systems in all organizations, as well as to ensure the availability of adequate personnel in CAAs. In addition, to Support MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities and increase progressively the USOAP-CMA EI results.

How we monitor improvement:
Significant increase of the number of States with an EI above 60% and implementing risk-based oversight.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4-A5-A6-A7
A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs,
A2- Conduct technical assistance activities and NCLB missions to States with a focus on ANS, AGA, AIG, and OPS areas.
A3- Develop and implement a specific NCLB plan of actions for prioritized States
A4- Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection) (Action addressed under **G6-SEI-01 A5)**
A5- Develop guidance material to assist MID Region States in the issuance of exemptions related to temporary deviations from standards
A6- Develop guidance material to support States for the conduct of remote surveillance
A7- Develop guidance material on the enhancement of understanding the concept of judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 "Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities"

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-4 & GASP SEI-10: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.
- GASP SEI-5: Provision of the Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to complete, submit and update all relevant documents and records.

Phase 2 — Implementation of a Safety Oversight System

- GASP SEI-6: Continued implementation of and compliance with ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-8: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.
- GASP SEI-9: Continued provision of the primary source of Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to update all relevant documents and records as progress is made.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, and industry

Action 1: Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs

Owner: ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: Conduct technical assistance and NCLB missions to States with focus on ANS, AGA, AIG, and OPS areas

Owner: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 3: Develop and implement a specific NCLB plan of actions for prioritized States

Owner: ICAO and concerned States

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: Ongoing

Action 4: Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection) (Action addressed under G6-SEI-01 A5)

Owner: Qatar and ICAO

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

A5- Develop guidance material to assist MID Region States in the issuance of exemptions related to temporary deviations from standards

Owner: Qatar supported by Iran, Sudan, UAE, and IATA

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

A6- Develop guidance material to support States for the conduct of remote surveillance

Owner: Qatar supported by Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, and ACAO

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

A7- Develop guidance material on the enhancement of understanding the concept of judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors

Owner: Qatar supported by Saudi Arabia and UAE

Priority: Medium

Completion date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
MID States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI)	2025

7.1.1.2 G2-SEI-02: Improve Regional Cooperation for the Provision of Accident & Incident Investigation

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:
States should work to continually improve their effective implementation of the CEs of the State's safety oversight system in the area of AIG. Through collaborative efforts and joining the MENA ARCM, the level of effective implementation of the CEs of a State's AIG can increase, particularly in those States where a State faces shortages of human, financial or technical resources.

What we want to achieve:
MID Region States to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities and increase progressively the USOAP-CMA EI results in the area of AIG.

How we monitor improvement:
Increase of the number of States with an EI above 60% for AIG area and then establishing an independent aircraft accident and incident investigation authority.

How we want to achieve it:

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Support of MENA ARCM activities
A2- Conduct AIG Capacity Building Activities.

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 "Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities"

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI-2: Establishment of an independent regional accident and incident investigation process, consistent with Annex 13.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-4: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, international organization, and industry

Action 1: Support of MENA ARCM activities

Owner:	ICAO, ACAO, and MENA ARCM Member States
Priority:	High

Completion date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing

Action 2: Conduct AIG Capacity Building Activities

Owner:	ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
MID States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI) especially the area of AIG	2025

7.1.1.3 G2-SEI-03: Sharing of Safety Recommendations related to Accidents and Serious Incidents

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:
States should work to continually improve their effective implementation of the CEs of the State's safety oversight system in the area of AIG. Through collaborative efforts, the level of effective implementation of the CEs of a State's AIG can increase, particularly in those States where a State faces shortages of human, financial or technical resources.

What we want to achieve:
MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities and increase progressively the USOAP-CMA EI results in the area of AIG. In addition, the prevention of accidents or incidents, and the reduction of the consequences of such occurrences.

How we monitor improvement:
Increase of the number of States with an EI above 60% for AIG area and establishing an independent aircraft accident and incident investigation authority.

How we want to achieve it:

Action: A1
A1- Establishing a Platform for Sharing Safety Recommendations for MENA ARCM Member States

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 "Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities"

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities
- GASP SEI-4: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, and international organization	
Action 1: Development of platform on sharing safety recommendations	
Owner:	ICAO, ACAO, and MENA ARCM Member
Priority:	Low
Completion date:	2025
Status:	On-hold
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Improve MID States the effective implementation (EI) in the area of AIG	2025

7.1.1.4 G2-SEI-04: Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:
States should work to continually improve their effective implementation of the eight CEs of the State's safety oversight system in the area of OPS.

What we want to achieve:
States to implement an effective system for safety oversight of the various entities involved in the transport of dangerous goods. In addition, MID Region States' to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities and increase progressively the USOAP-CMA EI results in the area of OPS and enhance the state oversight on Dangerous Goods

How we monitor improvement:
Increase of the number of States with an EI above 60% for OPS area and then to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1
A1- Conduct Dangerous Goods (DG) capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fires/smoke risks in cabin
A2- Develop guidance material on carriage and transport of Lithium batteries

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 "Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities" and ICAO Annex 18 "Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air".

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level

Phase 2 — Implementation of a Safety Oversight System

GASP SEI-6: Continued implementation of and compliance with ICAO SARPs at the Regional level

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, international organizations, and industry

Action 1- Conduct Dangerous Goods (DG) capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fires/smoke risks in cabin	
Owner:	ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry.
Priority:	Medium
Completion date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing

Action 2: Develop guidance material on carriage and transport of Lithium batteries	
Owner:	IATA
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
MID States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI) especially the area of OPS	2025

7.1.1.5 G2-SEI-05: Human factors and Competence of Personnel

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:
Human factors and competence of personnel are strategic priorities in the region. Human factors and the impact on human performance, as well as medical fitness are strategic priorities. As new technologies and/or operating concepts emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to properly address human factors and human performance, in terms of both limitations and its contribution to delivering safety, as part of the safety management implementation. CRM has been identified in the MID ASR as most important human factors issue in the domain of commercial air transport Aeroplanes above 5700 kgs. The safety actions related to competence of personnel mainly English language proficiency would be further developed in the future.

The main objectives of TRM for operational staff are the development of attitudes and behaviour, which will contribute to enhanced teamwork skills and performance in order to reduce teamwork failures as contributory factors in ATM related incidents and accidents. The benefits of TRM are considered to be enhanced Threat and Error Management capabilities, continuity and stability of teamwork, task efficiency, sense of working as a part of a larger and more efficient team, increased job satisfaction; and improved use of staff resources.

In addition, the safety action identified currently related to aviation personnel is also focusing on fatigue risk management (FRMS) by COVID-19 to mitigate safety issues in all domains such as personal readiness, flight crew perception or crew resource management (CRM) and communication, which play a role in improving safety across all aviation domains.

What we want to achieve:
Ensure continuous improvement in safety management activities as related to human factors and human performance.

How we monitor improvement:
Improvement in aviation personnel competence at all levels and then to Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4
A1- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). **(Action addressed under G1-SEI-04:CFIT)**
A2- Conduct Crew Resource Management capacity building activities
A3- Organize Team Resource Management capacity building activities.
A4- FRMS capacity building activities

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 "Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities". ICAO Human Performance Manual (ICAO Doc 10151) and ICAO Safety Management Manual (ICAO Doc 9859).

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 2: Organize Crew Resource Management capacity building activities	
Owner:	ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry.
Priority:	Medium
Completion date:	2023
Status:	ongoing
Action 3: Organize Team Resource Management capacity building activities	
Owner:	ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2023
Status:	ongoing
Action 4: FRMS capacity building activities	
Owner:	ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
MID States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI) and mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2025

7.1.1.6 G2-SEI-06: Management of security risks with safety impact

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:
The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating the security related safety risks. The safety action in this area also include the mitigation of the risks posed by flying over zones where an armed conflict exists. Managing the impact of security on safety is a strategic priority in MID region.

What we want to achieve:
Increase safety by managing the impact of security on safety and mitigating related safety risks.

How we monitor improvement:
Continuous assessment and mitigation of security threats.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1
Action 1- Organize seminar/Symposium/workshop to exchange experiences and good practices on assessing the risks and sharing of information related to the overflying of conflict zones in coordination with RASFG-MID and MIDANPIRG

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities". ICAO Annex 17.

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry	
Action 1- Organize seminar/Symposium/workshop to exchange experiences and good practices on assessing risks and sharing of information related to the overflying of conflict zones in coordination with RASFG-MID and MIDANPIRG	
Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2023
Status:	Ongoing
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2025

7.1.1.7 G2-SEI-07: Managing cybersecurity risks

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:
The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating the cybersecurity related safety risks. Assess the safety impact of cybersecurity threats to aviation users, support the development of mitigations and specific Training actions, identify and mitigate the vulnerabilities of aviation products and identify the required changes to aviation standards.

What we want to achieve:
Increase safety by managing the impact of cybersecurity on safety and mitigating related safety risks.

How we monitor improvement:
Continuous assessment and mitigation of cybersecurity threats.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2-A3
A1- Develop a Regional Action Plan to bridge the gap between ICAO Cyber Security Action plan and the implementation level of Cyber Resilience in the MID Region
A2- Conduct activities on Cyber Security and Resilience- (Jointly ANS and AVSEC)
A3- Develop a MID Region Cybersecurity Action Plan**.**

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities". ICAO Annex 17.

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry	
Action 1- Develop a Regional Action Plan to bridge the gap between ICAO Cyber Security Action plan and the implementation level of Cyber Resilience in the MID Region	
Owner:	ANS Cyber SeC Action group
Priority:	Medium
Completion date:	2025
Status:	New
Action 2- Conduct activities on Cyber Security and Resilience	
Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	Medium
Completion date:	2025
Status:	New
Action 3: Develop a MID Region Cybersecurity Action Plan	
Owner:	Cybersecurity Security Ad-hoc Group
Priority:	Medium
Completion date:	2025
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	

Deliverable(s)	Timeline
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2025

7.1.1.8 G2-SEI-08: Impact of COVID-19 pandemic- Safe return to operations

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:
States should manage a dedicated safety promotion campaign in support of safe return to operations. The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating the COVID-19 pandemic related safety risks. The safety action in this area would focus on continuous support to the MID-RPTF and sharing of guidance material/best practices to mitigate the risks stemmed from the pandemic.

What we want to achieve:
Increase safety by managing the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on safety and mitigating related safety risks.

How we monitor improvement:
Continuous assessment and mitigation of COVID-19 pandemic induced safety risks.
.
How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Continued support to the aviation industry through MID-RPTF meetings/Activities, as needed
A2- Sharing of guidance material/best practices

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities".

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the national level

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry
Action 1- Continued support to the aviation industry through MID-RPTF Activities, as needed
Owner: States, international organizations, and industry **Priority:** High **Completion date**: 2025 **Status**: Ongoing
Action 2: Sharing of guidance material/best practices
Owner: States, international organizations, and industry **Priority:** High **Completion date:** 2025

Status:	Ongoing
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
mitigate contributing factors/safety issues to accidents and incidents	2025

7.1.2 Goal 3: Implementation of Effective States Safety Programme (SSP)

7.1.2.1 G3-SEI-01: Implement an effective Safety Management

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM **at Appendix C.**

Rationale:
Management of safety in a systematic and proactive way enables authorities and organizations to set up management systems that take into consideration potential hazards and associated risks before aviation accidents occur. This global move is at the core of ICAO Annex 19. This safety area would enable further work to improve reporting processes, occurrence investigation at organizational level, and also the continued development of integrated data collection taxonomies.
What we want to achieve:
MID Region States to implement SSP and consequently their services providers to implement SMS. In addition, work with authorities and organizations to implement safety management.

How we monitor improvement:
ICAO Annex 19 framework requiring safety management is in place across all aviation domains, and organizations and authorities are able to demonstrate compliance.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

States to give priority to the work on SSPs
In the implementation and maintenance of the SSP, States should in particular:

- ensure effective implementation of the Annex 19 Requirements and address deficiencies in oversight capabilities, as a prerequisite for effective SSP implementation;
- ensure effective coordination between State authorities having a role in safety management;
- ensure that inspectors have the right competencies to support the evolution towards risk- and performance based oversight;
- ensure that policies and procedures are in place for risk- and performance based oversight, including a description of how an SMS is accepted and regularly monitored;
- establish policies and procedures for safety data collection, analysis, exchange and protection;
- establish a process to determine safety performance indicators at State level addressing outcomes and processes;
- ensure that an approved SSP document is made available and shared with other States; and
- ensure that the SSP is regularly reviewed and that SSP effectiveness is regularly assessed;
- ensure that the specific safety risks induced by COVID-19 be assessed and be included in the State risk picture.

SMS Assessment
States should make use of the available tools to support risk- and performance-based oversight. States also should regularly monitor status of compliance with SMS requirements of their industry.

SMS international cooperation
States should promote the common understanding of safety management and human factors principles and requirements in different countries, share lessons learned and encourage progress and harmonization, through active participation in the RASG-MID and other safety groups and fora.
FDM precursors of main operational safety risks

States in partnership with industry, other regional and international organizations should complete the good practice documentation which supports the inclusion of main operational safety risks such as RE, RI, LOC-I, CFIT and MAC into operators' FDM Programmes.

States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes

States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of:

- promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM,
- fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture,
- encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of REs, MACs, CFIT and LOC-I, or other issues identified by the SSP

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Conduct SSP/SMS capacity building activities
A2- Conduct technical assistance missions by SMIT

References: ICAO Annex 19 and GASP 2023-2025 Goal 3 "Implement effective State Safety Programmes"

Component 2 — State Safety Programme

- GASP SEI-10: Start of promotion of SSP implementation at the regional level.
- GASP SEI-11: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes for SSP implementation.
- GASP SEI-12: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to support SSP implementation.
- GASP SEI-13: Start of SSP implementation at the national level.
- GASP SEI-14: Regional allocation of resources to support continued development of the proactive use of risk modelling capabilities.
- GASP SEI-15: Regional collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to support the proactive use of risk modelling.
- GASP SEI-16: Advancement of safety risk management at the regional level.

Component 2 — State Safety Programme

GASP SEI-7: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to complete SSP implementation

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1- Conduct SSP/SMS training courses and workshops	
Owner:	ICAO, supported by organizations, and industry
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing
Action 2- Conduct technical assistance missions by SMIT	

Owner:	ICAO and SMIT Team
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
MID States to implement the foundation of an SSP	**2023**
MID States to implement an effective SSP	**2025**

7.1.2.2 G3-SEI-02: NASP Development & Implementation

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM **at Appendix C.**
Rationale:
States should ensure that a NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. The MID-RASP provides the identified safety priorities in the Region and States should identify which top risks and key issues mentioned in the GASP and MID-RASP; which apply to their national context, and identify suitable mitigation actions within their NASP. States should also add/consider others which are unique to their operational context.
.
What we want to achieve:
MID Region States to develop NASP. Successful implementation of the NASP actions would require the commitment of resources from stakeholders within State, availability of data to effectively monitor the achievement of NASP Targets, and proper project governance. In addition to the actions, NASP shall also consider how to measure their effectiveness.

How we monitor improvement:
ICAO GASP requiring States to develop NASP and region to develop RASP.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

States to establish and maintain a National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP)
States should ensure that a NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. NASP should:

- describe how the plan is developed and endorsed, including collaboration with different entities within the State, with industry and other stakeholders;
- include safety objectives, goals, indicators and targets in line with in line with GASP as well as regional safety plan;
- identify the main safety risks at national level in addition to the ones identified in MID-RASP as applicable to the State;
- include series of SEIs to address safety issues; and
- Reflect the GASP and MID-RASP SEIs as applicable to the State.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Conduct NASPs workshops & technical assistance missions
A2- NASP iPacks deployment

References: ICAO Annex 19 and GASP 2023-2025 Goal 3 “Implement effective State Safety Programmes"

Component 2 — State Safety Programme

- GASP SEI-10: Start of promotion of SSP implementation at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-11: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes for SSP implementation.
- GASP SEI-12: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to support SSP implementation.
- GASP SEI-13: Start of SSP implementation at the national level.
- GASP SEI-14: Regional allocation of resources to support continued development of the proactive use of risk modelling capabilities.
- GASP SEI-15: Regional collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to support the proactive use of risk modelling.
- GASP SEI-16: Advancement of safety risk management at the Regional level.

Component 2 — State Safety Programme

GASP SEI-7: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to complete SSP implementation

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1- Conduct NASPs workshops & technical assistance missions	
Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2- NASP iPacks deployment	
Owner:	ICAO and States
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	Timeline
MID States to develop and implement NASP	2025

7.1.3 Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level

7.1.3.1 G4-SEI-01: Development and Implementation of MID-RASP

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM **at Appendix C.**

Rationale: The RASG-MD is the governing body responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the MID-RASP, in collaboration with the ICAO MID Office, international and regional organizations and with the aviation industry. The MID-RASP is to be reviewed by the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG) every year mainly to include new identified Safety Enhancement initiatives' (SEIs), review the existing SEIs, as well as their respective actions.

What we want to achieve:
States, international organization, and industry to increase collaboration at the regional level so that to enhance safety.

How we monitor improvement:
MID region to publish an updated regional aviation safety plan (MID-RASP), in line with the 2023–2025 edition of GASP.

How we want to achieve it: This SEIs included in MID-RASP to be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

References: GASP 2023-2025Goal 4 "Increase collaboration at the Regional level"

Action: A1
A1- Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI- SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-5: Provision of the Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to complete, submit and update all relevant documents and records.

Phase 2 — Implementation of a Safety Oversight System

GASP SEI-9: Continued provision of the primary source of Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to update all relevant documents and records as progress is made.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, RASFG-MID, States, International organizations, and industry.

Action 1: Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition	
Owner:	SEIG
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
To manage and enhance safety at the regional	2025

7.1.3.2 G4-SEI-02: Enhance collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM **at Appendix C.**

Rationale: cooperation and collaboration among all stakeholders through conducting MID RCM meetings and agreeing on joint activities to avoid duplication of effort.

What we want to achieve:
States, international organizations, and industry to increase collaboration at the regional level so that to enhance safety.

How we monitor improvement: Reinforce efficient and effective cooperation and collaboration with all stakeholders, avoiding duplication and optimizing the allocation of resources at the regional level.

How we want to achieve it: Joint Programme activities

References: GASP 2023-2025 Goal 4 "Increase collaboration at the Regional level"

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Develop and agree on joint work activities through MID-RCM meetings
A2- Support the establishment of MENA RSOO and its activities

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

Phase 1 — Establishment of a Safety Oversight Framework

- GASP SEI- SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-5: Provision of the Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to complete, submit and update all relevant documents and records.

Phase 2 — Implementation of a Safety Oversight System

GASP SEI-9: Continued provision of the primary source of Regional safety information to ICAO by asking States to update all relevant documents and records as progress is made.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID. MIDANPIRG, RASFG-MID, States, international organizations, and industry.

Action 1: Develop and agree on joint work activities through MID RCMs	
Owner:	ICAO, States, international organizations, industry
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2025
Status:	New
Action 2: Support the establishment of MENA RSOO and its activities	
Owner:	ICAO and States
Priority:	Medium
Completion date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
To increase States USOAP EI and SSP level of maturity.	2025

7.2.1 Goal 5: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks

7.1.4.1 G5-SEI-01: Promote the Use of industry Programmes

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C.**

Rationale:

What we want to achieve:
Work with authorities and organizations to increase the number of service providers participating in the corresponding ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes.

H**ow we monitor improvement:**
Increase the number of service providers participating in the corresponding ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes. The RASG-MID, IATA, and ACI will give feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it:

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Encourage IATA's IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion
A2- Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme

References: This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 5 "Expand the use of industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks"

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

GASP SEI-1 — Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Encourage IATA's IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	
Owner:	IATA
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	
Owner:	ICAO and ACI
Priority:	medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Increase the number of service providers participating in ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes and maintain recurrent APEX Missions in the region:	2025

7.2.1 Goal 6: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations

7.1.1.1 G6-SEI-01: Certification of International Aerodromes

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region safety strategy at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:
Many International Airports are yet to be fully certified and many that are certified are facing challenges to apply the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) as laid out in ICAO Annex 14-Aerodromes and the ICAO Manual on Certification of Aerodromes (Doc 9774).

What we want to achieve:
MID Region States to improve international aerodromes infrastructures and ensure continuous improvement.

How we monitor improvement:
The number of certified international airports. The RASG-MID, members States, and partners would provide feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: **A1-A2-A3-A4-A5-A6**
A1- Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through Workshops/Trainings
A2- Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to aerodromes certification through Workshops/Training
A3 – Deployment of iPack on Aerodrome Re-Start
A4 - Support States in implementing aerodrome oversight/inspection mechanism through capacity building activities on Aerodrome Oversight
A5 – Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course + OJT)
A6 – Conduct a Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP. This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 6 “Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations”

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-4: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, International organizations
Action 1: Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through capacity building activities
Owner: ICAO and ACI. **Priority:** High **Completion Date**: 2025 **Status**: Ongoing
Action 2: Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to aerodromes certification through capacity building activities
Owner: ICAO and ACI

Priority:	High
Completion date:	2025
Status	ongoing
Action 3: Deployment of iPack on Aerodrome Re-Start	
Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
A4: Support States in implementing aerodrome oversight/inspection mechanism through capacity building activities on Aerodrome Oversight	
Owner:	ICAO and FAA
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
A5: Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course + OJT)	
Owner:	TBD
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
A6: Conduct a Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities	
Owner:	ICAO, ACAO, WBA
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Increase the number of Certificated International Aerodromes	2025

7.1.5.2 G6-SEI-02: Establish Runway Safety Team (RST) at International Aerodromes

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM **at Appendix C.**

Rationale:
Many States have difficulties on the development of the Runway Safety Programme and the establishment of Runway Safety Teams (RSTs) at airports as an effective means to reduce runway related accidents and incidents.

What we want to achieve:
MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to establish an effective RSTs at their aerodromes which would significantly reduce the runway safety related risks.

How we monitor improvement:
Number of the RSTs established at international aerodromes and number of the RST missions

conducted. The RASG-MID, members States, and partners will give feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions:	**A1-A2**
A1- Conduct of assistance missions by the Runway Safety Go-Team (RST)	
A2- Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through capacity building activities: (A**ction addressed under G1-SEI-02: Runway Excursion**)	

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP. This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 6 "Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations".

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.
- GASP SEI-4: Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to enhance safety in a coordinated manner.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Conduct of assistance missions by the Runway Safety Go-Team (RST)	
Owner:	ICAO, RSP (Runway Safety Programme Partners)
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through capacity building. (Action addressed under G1-SEI-02: Runway Excursion)	
Owner:	ICAO, ACI and Aircraft Manufactures
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Increase the number of establishment RST at international aerodromes	2025

7.2 Regional Operational Safety Risks

7.2.1 Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction in Operational Risks

7.2.1.1 G1-SEI-01: Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region safety strategy at **Appendix C.**

Rationale:

Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime which is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always, at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight

crew involved. Prevention of loss of control is a strategic priority. In addition, Aircraft upset or loss of control is the key risk area with the highest risk related to fatal accidents in CAT aeroplane operations having a maximum take-off weight above 5700 kg. It includes uncontrolled collisions with terrain, but also occurrences where the aircraft deviated from the intended flight path or intended aircraft flight parameters, regardless of whether the flight crew realized the deviation and whether it was possible to recover or not. It also includes the triggering of stall warning and envelope protections.
During 2017-2021 Aircraft upset or Loss of control contributed to one accident and counted for around 27% of fatalities. During the year 2018, the LOC-I occurred during En-route phase of flight.

What we want to achieve:
Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of loss of control.

How we monitor improvement:
Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it:
States should set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of LOC-I, or other issues identified by the SSP.

States to include LOC-I in national SSPs: LOC-I should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Actions: **A1-A2-A3**
A1- Guidance material on flight crew proficiency
A2- Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation
A3- Conduct Upset Recovery Workshops/Webinars
A4- Develop guidancematreial on the air cargo safety

References:

- GASP 2023-2025 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".
- GASP SEIs (States, Region, and industry) – Mitigate contributing factors to LOC-I accidents and incidents.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations/associations	
Action 1: Guidance material on flight crew proficiency	
Owner	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation	
Owner:	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers. Supported by KSA

Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing
Action 3: Conduct Upset Recovery workshop/Webinar	
Owner:	ICAO, IATA, Industry.
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
A4- Develop guidance material on the air cargo safety	
Owner:	Oman
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to LOC-I accidents and incidents	2025

7.2.1.2 G1-SEI-02: Runway Safety- Runway Excursion

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:
Runway excursion covers materialized runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties in maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off-centred or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during landing. During 2017-2020, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flights.

What we want to achieve:
Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of RE.

How we monitor improvement:
Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it:
States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of REs.

States to include Runway Excursions in national SSPs: REs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs in close cooperation with the aircraft operators, air traffic control, and airport operators. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their

effectiveness.

Actions:	**A1-A2**
A1- Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities	
A2- MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Implementation	

References:

- GASP 2023-2025 Goal 1 "Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".
- GASP SEIs (States, Region, and industry) – Mitigate contributing factors to RE accidents and incidents.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations/associations	
Action 1: Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities (Reference: G3-SEI-02)	
Owner:	ICAO, ACI, and Aircraft Manufactures
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Implementation	
Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to RE accidents and incidents	2025

7.2.1.3 G1-SEI-03: Runway Safety- Runway Incursion

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C**.

Rationale:
Collision on runway covers collisions between an aircraft and another object (other aircraft, vehicles, etc.) or person that occur on a runway of an aerodrome or other predesignated landing area; it does not include collisions with birds or wildlife. While there were no fatal accident or accident involving MID States operators in the last years involving runway collision, the risk of the reported occurrence demonstrated to be very real.

What we want to achieve:
Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of RI.

How we monitor improvement:
Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.
How we want to achieve it:

States to include Runway Incursions in national SSPs: RIs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs in close cooperation with the aircraft operators, air traffic control, and airport operators. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Action:	**A1**
A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities on the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) Implementation	

References:

- GASP 20232025 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".
- GASP SEIs (States, Region, and industry) – Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Conduct Capacity Building Activities on the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) Implementation	
Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents	2025

7.2.1.4 G1-SEI-4: Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

7.2.1.4.1 G1-SEI-4A1- Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C.**

Rationale:
It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences, which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc. There was no fatal accident involving MID States operators during this period. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States and in other parts of the world that make it an area of concern.

What we want to achieve:
Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of CFIT.

How we monitor improvement:
Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it:
States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of CFIT

or other issues identified by the SSP.

States to include CFITs in national SSPs: CFIT should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Actions: A1-A2-A3
A1- Advisory Circular: Instrument Approach Procedures Using Continuous Descent Final Approach Techniques
A2- Guidance for designing RNP Approach
A3- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)

References:

- GASP 2023-2025 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".
- GASP SEIs (States, Region, and industry) – Mitigate contributing factors to CFIT accidents and incidents.
-

Stakeholders: ICAO, RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Advisory Circular: Guidance for Operators on Training Programme on the use of GPWS	
Owner:	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing
Action 2- Guidance for designing RNP Approach	
Owner:	ICAO AND MID-FPP
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
Action 3: Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)	
Owner:	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to CFIT accidents and incidents	2025

7.2.1.4.2 G1-SEI-4A2- 5G Operation on Radio Altimeter

-

Stakeholders: ICAO, RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, RASFG-MID States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Develop a guidance material on safeguarding measures to protect Radio Altimeter from potential harmful interference from 5G Operation	
Owner:	Radio Altimeter action group (RADALT AG)

Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New

Action 2: Conduct a Webinar addressing the matter to raise awareness and promote the guidance material developed by the RADALT AG

Owner:	ICAO and RADALT AG
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to CFIT accidents and incidents including LOC-I	2025

7.2.1.5 G1-SEI-05: Airborne Conflict (Mid-Air Collisions)

7.2.1.5.1 G1-SEI-05A1: Loss of separation/TCAS RA

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM **at Appendix C.**

Rationale:
Airborne collision includes all occurrences involving actual or potential airborne collisions between aircraft, while both aircraft are airborne, and between aircraft and other airborne objects. This also includes all separation-related occurrences caused by either air traffic control (ATC) or cockpit crew, AIRPROX reports and genuine ACAS alerts. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine TCAS resolution advisories or airspace infringements.

Although there have been no aeroplane mid-air collision accident in recent years within the MID States, this risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating in Gulf area over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation. This is one specific safety issue that is a main priority in this key risk area.

States must have due regard for the safety of civil aircraft and must have established respective regulations for national State aircraft.
Some States had reported an increase in incidents involving close encounters between civil and military aircraft and more particularly an increase in non-cooperative international military traffic over the high-sea waters. The States could consider the following recommendations:

1. Fully apply the ICAO Manual on Civil-Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management (Doc 10088);
2. Closely coordinate to develop, harmonize and publish operational requirements and instructions for State aircraft to ensure that ‘due regard’ for civil aircraft is always maintained;
3. Support the development and harmonization of civil/military coordination procedures for ATM at MID Region level and beyond if possible; and
4. Report relevant occurrences.

What we want to achieve:
Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of MAC.

How we monitor improvement:

Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region Annual Safety Report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it:

States to include MACs in national SSPs: MACs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.
Sates to reinforce the appropriate reactions of flight crew in response to an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) resolution advisories (RA), which would help to mitigate the risk of mid-air collisions by providing safety promotion material and clear messages to pilots on the need to follow the instructions of the ACAS in high-risk situations.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Conduct workshop to implement Civil-Military cooperation
A2- Conduct seminar on raising awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas

References:

- GASP 2023-2025 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".
- GASP SEIs (States, Region, and industry) – Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and incidents.
- ICAO Doc 10088 ‘Manual on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management’

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Conduct workshop to implement Civil-Military cooperation	
Owner:	ICAO, IATA, and States
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Conduct seminar on raising awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas	
Owner:	ICAO and States
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and NMAC incidents	2025

7.2.1.5.2 G1-SEI-05A2: GNSS Interference

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Raise awareness on the potential impact of GNSS interference on the aviation during the Civil-Mil Workshop.	
Owner:	ICAO and IATA

Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
Action 2: Urge States to follow the reporting procedure agreed by MIDANPIRG Conclusion 19/4 when needed.	
Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and NMAC incidents	2025

7.2.1.5.3 G1-SEI-05A3: Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (drones)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix C.**

Rationale:
The civilian use of UAS has markedly increased in recent years. Research and development into the civilian applications of unmanned aircraft (UA) is a dynamic and rapidly evolving area. Control and guidance systems are now available that enable these aircraft to perform a variety of tasks that were previously unachievable, unreasonably expensive, or involved too much personal risk. As a result, UA have an increasing presence in controlled and uncontrolled airspace. In addition, available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. In connection with this, some States in the region developed their national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. However, there are currently some States in the region are unable to develop their national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. Therefore, guidance material to be developed to assist states' CAA personnel in the implementation and oversight of UAS operations and to mitigate the risk of the MAC.
When available, the guidance material would serve as an example for consideration by MID States to create, add, or amend, future or existing national UAS guidance material by the respective CAA.

What we want to achieve:
MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to develop national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS and to create growth while maintaining a high and uniform level of safety.

How we monitor improvement:
Increase of number of states established national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. The RASG-MID, members States, and partners would give feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs

Actions: **A1-A2-A3**
A1- UAS iPack deployment
A2- Organize symposium

A3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP. This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 1. “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks"

Component 1 — State Safety Oversight (SSO) System

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: UAS iPack Deployment

Owner: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

Action 2: Organize symposium related to drones (UAS)

Owner: ICAO, ACAO. Supported by FAA

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2023

Status: Ongoing

Action 3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework

Owner: ICAO and States

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2023

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Ensure the safe operations of UAS to mitigate the risk of MID-Air Collision (MAC).	2025

7.2.1.5.2 G1-SEI-05A2: GNSS Interference

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Raise awareness on the potential impact of GNSS interference on the aviation during the Civil-Mil Workshop.

Owner: ICAO and IATA

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: New

Action 2: Urge States to follow the reporting procedure agreed by MIDANPIRG Conclusion

19/4 when needed.	
Owner:	ICAO
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and NMAC incidents	2025

7.2.1.5.3- G1-SEI-05A3: Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (drones)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at Appendix C.

Rationale:
The civilian use of UAS has markedly increased in recent years. Research and development into the civilian applications of unmanned aircraft (UA) is a dynamic and rapidly evolving area. Control and guidance systems are now available that enable these aircraft to perform a variety of tasks that were previously unachievable, unreasonably expensive, or involved too much personal risk. As a result, UA have an increasing presence in controlled and uncontrolled airspace. In addition, available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. In connection with this, some States in the region developed their national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. However, there are currently some States in the region are unable to develop their national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. Therefore, guidance material to be developed to assist states' CAA personnel in the implementation and oversight of UAS operations and to mitigate the risk of the MAC.
When available, the guidance material would serve as an example for consideration by MID States to create, add, or amend, future or existing national UAS guidance material by the respective CAA.

What we want to achieve:
MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to develop national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS and to create growth while maintaining a high and uniform level of safety.

How we monitor improvement:
Increase of number of states established national regulations to ensure safe operations of UAS. The RASG-MID, members States, and partners would give feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs

Actions: **A1-A2-A3**
A1- UAS iPack deployment
A2- Organize symposium
A3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2023-2025 GASP. This is related to 2023-2025 GASP Goal 1. "Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks"

- GASP SEI-1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs at the Regional level.
- GASP SEI-3: Regional safety enhancement initiatives to support consistent coordination of Regional Programmes in establishing adequate safety oversight capabilities.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: UAS iPack Deployment

Owner: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion date: 2025

Status: New

Action 2: Organize symposium related to drones (UAS)

Owner: ICAO, ACAO. Supported by FAA

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2023

Status: Ongoing

Action 3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework

Owner: ICAO and States

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2023

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Ensure the safe operations of UAS to mitigate the risk of MID Air Collision (MAC)	2025

7.2.1.5.4 G1-SEI-05A4: Expansion of ATS route Networks

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Conduct gap analysis to identify current ATS route networks gaps

Owner: ICAO and States

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: New

Action 2: Establishment of parallel unidirectional ATS routes (De-confliction)

Owner: ICAO and States

Priority: Medium

Completion Date: 2025

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**

Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and NMAC incidents	2025

Appendix A- SEIG TORs

SAFETY ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVE GROUP

(SEIG)

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. PURPOSE OF THE SEIG TO:

1.1 Support the RASG-MID in the development/update of the MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) and the monitoring of the implementation of Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) related to identified safety issues.

1.2 Assist in the development, implementation and review of SEIs to reduce aviation safety risks. These SEIs could be established based on the analysis of regional data, based on ICAO initiatives or the initiatives of other relevant organizations or based on the risks and issues identified through the USOAP audits process.

1.3 Recommend safety mitigations to the RASG-MID related to identified safety issues which would reduce aviation risks.

1.4 In order to meet its Terms of Reference, the SEIG shall:

a. follow-up the updates of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and support the development, update and implementation of the MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) at the regional level and provide feedback to the RASG-MID;

b. identify and develop the SEIs, which are aligned with the regional priorities and targets, for implementation within the MID Region. The focus of these SEIs is to effectively and economically mitigate the safety risks identified by the ASRG;

c. identify difficulties, challenges and deficiencies related to the implementation of each SEI and propose mitigation measures;

d. identify assistance Programmes such as, but not limited to, workshops, seminars and capacity building activities to improve the level of implementation of the approved SEIs by the RASG-MID;

e. share expertise and experience and provide recommended actions for each SEI, in a prioritized manner based on best practices;

f. monitor the status of achieving related safety objectives and targets included in the MID Region Safety Strategy;

g. identify areas of concern to aviation safety that may be unique to the region, and develop data and mitigations to address those concerns;

h. work closely with States and stakeholders to ensure that SEIs and mitigation measures are implemented through a coordinated effort;

i. propose input to the RASG-MID for the development of the RASG-MID Annual Work Programme; and

j. Coordinate with relevant RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG and MID-RASFG subsidiary bodies issues with common interest.

2. COMPOSITION

The SEIG is composed of Members designated by the MID States and Partners.

3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

- SEIG Chairpersons: – Coordinate SEIG activities and provide overall guidance and leadership;

- ICAO: Support; and

- Partners: collaborate in the development of materials as requested by the SEIG, and provide technical expertise and support, as required.

4. MEETINGS ARRANGEMENTS

- The Chairperson, in close co-operation with the Secretary, shall make all necessary arrangements for the most efficient working of the SEIG. The SEIG shall at all times conduct its activities in the most efficient manner possible with a minimum of formality and paper work (paperless meetings). Permanent contact shall be maintained between the Chairperson, Secretary and Members of the SEIG to advance the work. Best advantage should be taken of modern communications facilities, particularly video-conferencing (Virtual Meetings) and e-mails.

- Face-to-face meetings will be conducted when it is necessary to do so.

Appendix B- Identified safety issues as indicated in the 11th MID ASR

Potential Accident Outcome							
Safety Issues	CFIT	LOC-I	MAC	GCOL	RE/ARC	Injury Damage inflight	Injury Damage on Ground
Monitoring of flight paremeters and automation modes	x	x			x		
Adverse Convective weather	x	x			x	x	
Un-stabilized Approach		x			x		x
Flight planning and preparation	x	x	x	x	x		
Crew Resource Management	x	x	x	x	x		
Handling of technical failure	x	x		x	x		x
Handling and execution of GOA	x	x			x		
Loss of separation in flight/ and/or airspace/TCAS RA			x			x	
Experience, training and competence of Flight Crews	x	x	x		x		
Deconfliction between IFR and VFR traffic			x				
Inappropriate flight control inputs		x			x		
Fatigue	x	x					
Entry of aircraft performance data		x					
Contained engine Failure/Power Plant Malfunctions		x			x	x	
Birdstrike/Engine Bird ingestion		x			x		
Fire/Smoke-non impact		x				x	
Wake Vortex		x				x	
Deviation from pitch or roll attitude	x	x			x		
Security Risks with impact on Safety		x					
Tail/Cross wind/Winds hear		x			x		x

Potential Accident Outcome							
Safety Issues	**CFIT**	**LOC-I**	**MAC**	**GCOL**	**RE/ARC**	**Injury Damage inflight**	**Injury Damage on Ground**
Runway Incursion				x	x		x
Maintenance events	x	x				x	
Contaminated runway/Poor braking action					x		x
Clear Air Turbulence (CAT) and Montain Waves		x				x	

Appendix C-MID Region-Safety Performance Measurement &Monitoring (SPMM)

Aspirational Goal: Zero Fatality by 2030

Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
Number of accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of accidents to be in line with the global average rate	2025
Number of fatal accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of fatal accidents to be in line with the global average rate	2025
Number of fatalities per million departures	Number of fatalities per billion passengers carried (fatality rate) to be in line with the global average rate	2025
Number of Runway Excursion accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of Runway Excursion accidents to be below the global average rate	2025
Number of Runway Incursion accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of Runway Incursion accidents to be below the global average rate	2025
Number of LOC-I related accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of LOC-I related accidents to be below the global rate	2025
Number of CFIT related accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of CFIT related accidents to be below the global rate	2025
Number of Mid Air Collision (accidents)	Regional average Mid Air Collision accident	2025

Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
USOAP-CMA Effective Implementation (EI) results: a. Regional average EI b. Number of audited States with an overall EI over 60% c. Regional average EI by area d. Regional average EI by CE e. Regional average EI of PPQs	a. Regional average EI to be above 80% : b. All MID audited States to be above 60% EI c. Regional average EI for each area to be above 70% d. Regional average EI for each CE to be above 70% e. Regional average EI PPQs above 75% :	a. 2023-2025 b. 2023-2025 c. 2023-2025 d. 2023-2025 e. 2023-2025

Goal 3: Implement effective State safety Programmes (SSPs)

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
Regional Average SSP Foundation	85%	2023- 2025
Number of States having an SSP that is present*	At least 4 States	2023- 2025
Number of States that have developed and published a national aviation safety plan (NASP)	All States	2023- 2025
Number of States that require applicable service providers under their authority to implement an SMS	All States	2023- 2025

*: The term "present" is based on the maturity levels established in the ICAO SSP Implementation Assessment (SSPIA).

Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
Percentage of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs)/Safety Actions completed	80%	2023-2025
Number of States seeking/receiving assistance, to strengthen their Safety Oversight capabilities through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	States with SSC as a first priority All States as a second priority having EI below 80%	2023-2025
Number of States seeking assistance to facilitate SSP & NASP implementation through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	All States	2023-2025
Number of States sharing safety information including operational safety risks and emerging issues to support the development of MID ASR	All States	2023-2025

Goal 5: Expand the use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
Use of the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), to complement safety oversight activities.	a. Maintain at least 60% of eligible MID airlines to be certified IATA-IOSA at all times. b. All MID States with an EI of at least 60% use the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) to complement their safety oversight activities.	a. 2023-2025 b. 2023- 2025
Use of the IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) certification, as a percentage of all Ground Handling service providers	The IATA Ground Handling Manual (IGOM) endorsed as a reference for ground handling safety standards by all MID States. Pursue at least 25% increase in ISAGO registration	2023-2025
Coordinate the ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	At least 2 ACI APEX in Safety to be conducted for 2 Airports of the Region per year	2023-2025
Number of States that have established Safety data collection and processing system (SDCPS)	At least 12 States	2023-2025
Number of MID RASP developed in consultation with industry	MID-RASP 2023-2025	2023

Goal 6: Ensure Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline
Percentage of Certified International Aerodromes*	65%	2023-2025
Percentage of Runway Safety Team (RST) effectively implemented at International Aerodromes*	80%	2023-2025
Percentage of Global reporting Format (GRF) Plans implemented for International Aerodromes*	75%	2023-2025

*: International Aerodromes included in the MID ANP (Aerodromes Operations: AOP Table I-I)

Appendix D: Safety Actions- Consolidated List of SEIs with their respective Actions for follow up- Draft

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
Regional Operational Safety Risks					
Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction in Operational Risks					
G1-SEI-01:	Aircraft Upset in Flight (LOC-I)	**A1-** Guidance material on flight crew proficiency	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers/industry	To be supported by Airbus	2025
		A2- Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers/industry.	To be supported by Airbus	2025
		A3- Conduct Upset Recovery capacity building activities	UPRT Workshop. Airbus, ICAO, Kuwait		2025
		A4- Develop guidance material on the air cargo safety	Oman		2025
G1-SEI-02:	Runway Safety- Runway Excursion	**A1-** Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI		2025
		A2- MID Region Action Plan/Milestones on the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Implementation.	ICAO		2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
G1-SEI-03:	Runway Safety- Runway Incursion	**A1-** Conduct Capacity Building Activities on the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) Implementation	ICAO	To be supported by Euro-Control, FAA	2023
G1-SEI-04A1:	Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)	**A1-** Advisory Circular: Instrument Approach Procedures Using Continuous Descent Final Approach Techniques.	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers		2025
		A2- Guidance for designing RNP Approach	ICAO and MID FPP		2025
		A3- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)	IATA and Aircraft manufacturers		2025
G1-SEI-04A2	5G Operations on Radar Altimeter	**A1-** Develop a guidance material on safeguarding measures to protect Radio Altimeter from potential harmful interference from 5G Operation	Radio Altimeter Action Group (RADALT AG)	To be supported by Boeing	2025
		A2- Conduct a Webinar addressing the matter to raise awareness and promote the guidance material developed by the RADALT AG	ICAO and RADALT AG	To be supported by Airbus & Boeing	2025
G1-SEI-05B1:	MAC- Loss of Separation	**A1-** Conduct workshop to implement Civil-Military cooperation	ICAO, States, and International Organizations		2025
		A2- Conduct seminar on raising awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas	ICAO, States, and international organizations		2025
G1-SEI-05B2:	GNSS Interference	**A1**: Raise awareness on the potential impact of GNSS interference on the aviation during the Civil-Mil Workshop	ICAO and IATA		2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		A2- Urge States to follow the reporting procedure agreed by MIDANPIRG Conclusion 19/4 when needed	ICAO		2025
G1-SEI-05B3:	Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (Drones)	**A1-** UAS iPack deployment	ICAO and States		2025
		A2- Organize symposium on Drones related subjects	ICAO and ACAO	Supported FAA and Boeing	2023
		A3- Conduct survey on States UAS regulatory framework	ICAO and States		2025
G1-SEI-05B4:	Expansion of ATS route Networks	**A1-** Conduct gap analysis to identify current ATS route networks gaps	ICAO and States		2025
		A2- Establishment of parallel unidirectional ATS routes (De-confliction)	ICAO and States		2025
Organizational Challenges/issues					
Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities					
G2-SEI-01:	Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities	**A1-** Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry	"Inspectors training" to be Supported by Airbus.	2025
		A2- Conduct technical assistance and NCLB missions to States , with focus on states with EI<80% as well as ANS, AIG, AGA, and OPS areas	ICAO and States		2025
		A3- Develop and implement a specific NCLB plan of actions.	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry		2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		A4 - Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors (Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection) **(Action addressed under G6-SEI-01 A5)**	States (Qatar) and ICAO		2025
		A5- Develop guidance material to assist MID Region States in the issuance of exemptions related to temporary deviations from standards	Qatar	supported by Iran, Sudan, UAE, ACAO, and IATA	2025
		A6- Develop guidance material to support States for the conduct of remote surveillance	Qatar	supported by Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, UAE, and ACAO	2025
		A7- Develop guidance material on the enhancement of understanding the concept of judicial enforcement for aviation inspectors	Qatar	supported by Saudi Arabia and UAE	2025
G2-SEI-03:	Sharing of Safety Recommendations related to Accidents and Serious Incidents	**A1-** Establishing a Platform for Sharing Safety Recommendations for MENA ARCM Member States	ICAO, ACAO, and MENA ARCM Member States	On-hold	2025
G2-SEI-04:	Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods	**A1-** Dangerous Goods (DG) capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fire/smoke risk in cabin	ICAO, States, International Organizations, And Industry		2025
		A2- Develop guidance material on carriage and transport of Lithium batteries	IATA, States, International Organizations, And Industry		2025
G2-SEI-05:	Human factors and Competence of Personnel	**A1-** Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). **(Action addressed under G1-SEI-04: CFIT).**	IATA and Industry		2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		A2- Organize Crew Resource Management Capacity building activities	ICAO &Jordan, States, International Organizations, and Industry	CBTA and EBT to be supported by Airbus and FAA	2025
		A3- Organize Team Resource Management Capacity building activities	ICAO & Jordan States, International Organizations, and Industry	FAA	2025
		A4- Conduct Fatigue Risk Management and Mental Health Best Practices Capacity building activities	ICAO & Jordan States, International Organizations, and Industry	To be supported by Airbus	20225
G2-SEI-06:	Impact of security on safety	**A1-** Organize seminar/Symposium/Workshop to exchange experiences and good practices on assessing the risks and sharing of information related to the overflying of conflict zones in coordination with RASFG-MID and MIDANPIRG.	ICAO		2025
		A2- Risk management on conflict zone workshop	ICAO/ACAO		2023
G2-SEI-07:	Managing cybersecurity risks	**A1-** Develop a Regional Action Plan to bridge the gap between ICAO Cyber Security Action plan and the implementation level of Cyber Resilience in the MID Region	ANS Cyber SeC Action Group		2025
		A2- Conduct activities on Cyber Security and Resilience- (Jointly ANS and AVSEC)	ICAO	To be supported by Boeing	2025

SEI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date
		A3- Develop a MID Region Cybersecurity Action Plan	Cybersecurity Security Ad-hoc Group		2025
G2-SEI-08:	Impact of COVID-19 pandemic- Safe return to operations	**A1-** Continued support to the aviation industry through MID-RPTF meetings/Activities, as needed	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry		2025
		A2- Sharing of guidance material/best practices	ICAO, States, International Organizations, and Industry	To be support by Airbus	2025
Goal 3: Implementation of Effective States Safety Programme (SSP)					
G3-SEI-01:	Implement an effective Safety Management	**A1-** Conduct ICAO SSP/SMS Capacity building activities	SSP workshops for States. SMS & Flight Data analysis workshop for airlines. Airbus, ACAO and ICAO. 2023		2025
		A2- Conduct Technical Assistance missions by SMIT	ICAO and States		2025
G3-SEI-02:	NASP Development & Implementation	**A1-** Conduct NASPs workshops & technical assistance missions	ICAO		2025
		A2- NASP iPacks deployment	ICAO		2025
Goal 4: Increase Collaboration at the Regional Level					
G4-SEI-01:	Development and Implementation of	**A1-** Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition	ICAO & SEIG		2023

	MID-RASP				
G4-SEI-02:	Enhance collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry	**A1-** Develop and agree on joint work activities through MID-RCM meetings	ICAO, States, Regional Groups, International Organizations, and Industry		2025
		A2- Support the establishment of MENA RSOO and its activities	ICAO and States		2025
Goal 5: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes and Safety Information Sharing Networks					
G5-SEI-01:	Promote the Use of industry Programmes	**A1-** Encourage IATA's IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	IATA		2025
		A2- Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	ICAO and ACI		2025
Goal 6: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations					
G6-SEI-01:	Certification of International Aerodromes	**A1-** Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI		2025
		A2- Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to Aerodromes Certification through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI		2025
		A3 - Deployment of iPack on Aerodrome Re-Start	ICAO and States		2025
		A4 - Support States in implementing aerodrome oversight/inspection mechanism through capacity building activities on Aerodrome Oversight	ICAO	Supported by FAA	2025
		A5 – Conduct a Capacity Building Activity for Aerodrome Inspectors	States (Qatar) and ICAO		2025

		(Training Course on Aerodrome Inspection)			
		A6 – Conduct a Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities	ICAO, ACAO, WBA	Supported by International Organizations	2025
G6-SEI-02:	Establish Runway Safety Team (RST) at International Aerodromes	**A1-** Conduct Runway Safety Go-Team (RST) assistance missions	ICAO	Supported RSP (Runway Safety Programme Partners)	2025
		A2: Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format Methodology through capacity building activities**: (Action addressed under G1-SEI-02: Runway Excursion).**	ICAO and ACI		2025

Appendix E:

SEIs identified in MID-RASP may be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs, as appropriate

SEI Code	SEI name
Organizational Challenges	
Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities	
G2-SEI-01:	Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities
G2-SEI-04:	Enhance State Oversight on Dangerous Goods
G2-SEI-05:	Human factors and Competence of Personnel
G2-SEI-06:	Impact of security on safety
G2-SEI-07:	Managing cybersecurity risks
G2-SEI-08:	Impact of COVID-19 pandemic- Safe return to operations
Goal 3: Implementation of Effective States Safety Programme (SSP)	
G3-SEI-01:	Implement safety management
G3-SEI-02:	NASP Development & Implementation
Goal 6: Ensure the Appropriate Infrastructure is available to Support Safe Operations	
G6-SEI-01:	Certification of International Aerodromes
G6-SEI-02:	Establish Runway Safety Team (RST) at International Aerodromes
Regional Operational Safety Risks	
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction in Operational Risks	
G1-SEI-01:	Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)
G1-SEI-02:	Runway Excursion (RE)
G1-SEI-03:	Runway Incursion (RI)
G1-SEI-4A1:	Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)
G1-SEI-04A2:	5G operations on Radar Altimeter
G1-SEI-05A1:	MAC- Loss of separation/TCAS RA
G1-SEI-05A2:	GNSS Interference
G1-SEI-05A3:	Ensure the Safe Operations of UAS (drones)

Appendix F: Definitions

Accident Investigation Authority. The authority designated by a State as responsible for aircraft accident and incident investigations within the context of Annex 13.

Audit Area. One of eight audit areas pertaining to the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP), i.e. primary aviation legislation and civil aviation regulations (LEG), civil aviation organization (ORG); personnel licensing and training (PEL); aircraft operations (OPS); airworthiness of aircraft (AIR); aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG); air navigation services (ANS); and aerodromes and ground aids (AGA).

Contributing Factors. Actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which, if eliminated, avoided or absent, would have reduced the probability of the accident or incident occurring, or mitigated the severity of the consequences of the accident or incident. the identification of contributing factors does not imply the assignment of fault or the determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability.

Critical Elements (CEs). The critical elements of a safety oversight system encompass the whole spectrum of civil aviation activities. They are the building blocks upon which an effective safety oversight system is based. The level of effective implementation of the CEs is an indication of a State's capability for safety oversight.

Effective Implementation (EI). A measure of the State's safety oversight capability, calculated for each critical element, each audit area or as an overall measure. The EI is expressed as a percentage.

Operator. The person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft operation.

Safety. The state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.

Safety Audit. A USOAP CMA audit that a State requests and pays for (on a cost recovery basis). The State determines the scope and date of a safety audit. Also see definition of audit.

Safety Data. A defined set of facts or set of safety values collected from various aviation related sources, which is used to maintain or improve safety.

Note: such safety data is collected from proactive or reactive safety-related activities, including but not limited to:

a. accident or incident investigations;
b. safety reporting;
c. continuing airworthiness reporting;
d. operational performance monitoring;
e. inspections, audits, surveys; or
f. safety studies and reviews.

Safety Enhancement: initiative (SEI). One or more actions to eliminate or mitigate risks associated with contributing factors to a safety occurrence or to address an identified safety deficiency. There are two main types of SEIs to address safety risks and issues at the Regional level.

Safety Information. Safety data processed, organized or analyzed in a given context so as to make it useful for safety management purposes.

Safety Management System (SMS). A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures.

Safety Oversight. A function performed by a State to ensure that individuals and organizations performing an aviation activity comply with safety-related national laws and regulations.

Safety Performance. A State or a service provider's safety achievement as defined by its safety performance targets and safety performance indicators.

Safety Performance Indicator. A data-based parameter used for monitoring and assessing safety performance.

Safety Performance Target. The State or service provider's planned or intended target for a safety performance indicator over a given period that aligns with the safety objectives.

Safety Risk. The predicted probability and severity of the consequences or outcomes of a hazard.

Significant Safety Concern (SSC). Occurs when the State allows the holder of an authorization or approval to exercise the privileges attached to it, although the minimum requirements established by the State and by the Standards set forth in the Annexes to the Convention are not met, resulting in an immediate safety risk to International Civil Aviation.

State Safety Programme (SSP). An integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety.

Appendix G: Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIIA:	Accident and Incident Investigation Authority
ACI:	Airports Council International
ADRM:	Aerodrome
AGA:	Aerodrome and Ground Aids
AIG:	Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
ALAR:	Approach and Landing Reduction
ANS:	Air Navigation Services
ANSP:	Air Navigation Service Provider
APV:	Approaches with Vertical Guidance
ARC:	Abnormal Runway Contact
ASBU:	Aviation System Block Upgrade
ASR:	Annual Safety Report
ATM:	Air Traffic Management
ATS:	Air Traffic Services
BIRD:	Bird Strike
CAA:	Civil Aviation Authority
CASI:	Civil Aviation Safety Inspectors
CAST:	Commercial Aviation Safety Team
CE:	Critical Element
CFIT:	Controlled Flight into Terrain
CICTT:	CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team
CMA:	Continuous Monitoring Approach
CRM:	Crew Resource Management
CAST:	US Commercial Aviation Safety Team
DGCA:	Conference of Directors General of Civil Aviation
EI:	Effective Implementation
FDAP:	Flight Data Analysis Programme
FIR:	Flight Information Region
F-NI:	Fire/ Smoke (Non-Impact)
GADSS:	Global Aeronautical Distress and Safety System
GANP:	Global Air Navigation Plan
GASeP:	Global Aviation Security Plan
GASOS:	Global Aviation Safety Oversight System
GASP:	Global Aviation Safety Plan
GASP-SG:	Global Aviation Safety Plan Study Group
GEN:	General Aspects
GPWS:	Ground Proximity Warning System
G- HRC:	Global-High Risk Categories of Occurrences
IATA:	International Air Transport Association
ICAO:	International Civil Aviation Organization
IFALPA:	International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations
IOSA:	IATA Operational Safety Audit
ISAGO:	IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations
iSTARS:	Integrated Safety Trend Analysis and Reporting System
LOC-I:	Loss of Control In-flight
MAC:	AIRPROX/ TCAS alert/ loss of separation/ near miss collisions/ mid-air collisions
MTOW:	Maximum Take-Off Weight

NASP:	National Aviation Safety Plan
NCLB:	No Country Left Behind
NDP:	National Development Plan
OAG:	Official Airline Guide
OPS:	Flight Operations (USOAP Audit Area)
ORG:	Civil Aviation Organization (USOAP Audit Area)
PDCA:	Plan-Do-Check-Act methodology
RAMP:	Ground Handling
RASG:	Regional Aviation Safety Group
RASP:	Regional Aviation Safety Plan
RE:	Runway Excursion (departure or landing)
RI:	Runway Incursion
RS:	Runway Safety
RSOO:	Regional Safety Oversight Organization
RST:	Runway Safety Team
RTC:	ICAO Regional Training Centre of Excellence
SAFE:	ICAO Safety Fund
SARPs:	Standards and Recommended Practices
SCF-NP:	System/Component Failure or Malfunction – Non-power plant
SCF-PP:	System/Component Failure or Malfunction - Power plant
SDCPS:	Safety Data Collection and Processing System
SEI:	Safety Enhancement Initiatives
SISG:	ICAO's Safety Indicator Study Group
SMS:	Safety Management Systems
SPI:	Safety Performance Indicator
SSC:	Significant Safety Concern
SSO:	State Safety Oversight
SSP:	State Safety Programme
SRP:	Safety Reporting and Programme
TCAS:	Traffic Collision and Avoidance System
TOR:	Terms of Reference
UAS:	Unmanned Aircraft Systems
UNK:	Unknown or Undetermined
UPRT:	Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
USOAP:	Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme
USOS:	Undershoot/ Overshoot

-END-

CREDITS

The RASG-MID thanks **Mr. Mohamed Chakib** for developing the MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition.

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INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

AVIATION EXEMPTIONS GUIDANCE MATERIAL FOR MID REGION STATES

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1. Introduction and Purpose and Scope

1.1 International civil aviation has reached high safety standards through risk-based decision-making and strong stakeholder cooperation during the past decades. The current global health emergencies together with technological advancements demand enhanced cooperation and harmonization to preserve aviation safety standards. States face a major challenge when it comes to handling aviation exemptions which involve controlled temporary deviations from ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs).

1.2 The HLCC 2021 Safety Stream examined a proposal from Qatar which represented Arab Civil Aviation Organization Member States to develop additional guidelines for States when granting exemptions. The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) data from ICAO revealed that States frequently receive unsatisfactory results for Protocol Questions (PQs) about exemptions because many countries lack proper assessment procedures for exemptions. The audits revealed that numerous States operated without established procedures for exemption management which demonstrated the requirement for standardized exemption procedures.

1.3 The guidance material establishes an ICAO-compliant system for MID Region States to issue aviation regulatory exemptions. The Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) must issue temporary exemptions to aviation requirements when public health emergencies or natural disasters or conflicts or operational needs (like during the COVID-19 pandemic) require them to maintain operational continuity. The document establishes procedures and tools for granting exemptions which must be limited to necessary cases while maintaining safety standards and following ICAO's standards and recommended practices (SARPs).

1.4 The guidance serves as a tool for MID Region regulators and policymakers to establish uniform practices for exemption management across all States while ensuring transparency in their processes. The guidance provides complete coverage of exemption management starting from the request process and evaluation stage and continuing through the issuance phase and condition monitoring and ending with exemption renewal or expiration.

1.5 The necessity for standardized aviation exemption procedures emerged during recent disruptions that made it impossible for operators to follow regular regulatory requirements. The COVID-19 pandemic required States to grant waivers for training and medical standards because travel restrictions and lockdowns made standard compliance impossible. ICAO created the COVID-19 Contingency Related Differences (CCRD) and Targeted Exemptions (TE) system during 2020-2021 to enable States to submit temporary exemptions for specific Standards through a unified global framework. The pandemic-specific TE online portal operated during a limited period yet demonstrates that States need established procedures to handle exemption requests before unexpected situations arise. The MID Region CAAs should develop enhanced preparedness for issuing exemptions through lessons learned from past experiences and ICAO guidance found in Doc 9734 Part A and Doc 9859 about crisis regulatory management.

1.6 The Documents follows a structured format starting with basic principles in Section 2 and preparedness in Section 3 before explaining exemption request handling through Sections

4 and 5 and concluding with post-issuance oversight in Section 6. The manual includes best practices in Section 7 followed by a final remark in Section 8. The manual includes practical tools through its annexes which contain an exemption issuance process checklist and application forms and risk assessment matrix and exemption letter and notification formats templates. States should modify these templates to match their specific national requirements. The MID State's CAA should only approve exemptions that have valid reasons and follow safety protocols and time limits and receive proper international aviation system recognition and communication.

2. *Framework for Aviation Exemptions*

2.1 2.1 The Chicago Convention requires States to implement ICAO Standards through their exemption policies. States maintain their duty to oversee safety (ICAO Critical Element 7) and handle safety problems (Critical Element 8) while providing regulatory exemptions. The CAA needs to check for ICAO Standard non-compliance before issuing any exemption according to the national exemption process. The State needs to prepare ICAO Article 38 notification when an exemption leads to non-compliance with ICAO Standards. The national exemption process should follow ICAO Annex provisions by providing relief only when necessary while implementing safety-equivalent measures. The national exemption process which follows ICAO standards protects safety levels and preserves international transparency between States. States must report differences to ICAO through the EFOD system or suitable channels when they grant exemptions that exceed Annex 1 proficiency check intervals.

2.2 Principles for Granting Exemptions: Exemptions are policy tools of last resort. They are intended for use under exceptional conditions where strict compliance with a requirement is impractical or contrary to the public interest, and where an equivalent level of safety can be achieved through alternative means. Key guiding principles include:

- **Necessity and Justification**: The applicant needs to show that they require the exemption for operational reasons as an airline or organization or individual. The CAA requires more than just cost benefits or convenience to approve an exemption. The CAA needs to understand that essential aviation operations would face major disruptions or become impossible to perform when the exemption is not granted.

- **Safety Equivalence:** The process requires documented evidence which proves that the exemption will not compromise safety standards. A safety risk assessment (Section 4.3) demonstrates this requirement by identifying new hazards from rule deviations and establishing control measures to reduce risks to acceptable levels. The proposed alternative solutions need to achieve safety standards that match those of the original requirement.

- **Temporariness and Scope:** The duration of exemptions needs to be short-term and they should only apply to particular cases. The purpose of exemptions is to provide short-term relief from regulations but not to establish permanent exceptions from rules. Every exemption needs to include a clear duration and should target particular organizations or activities or products that require special treatment. The use of exemptions that lack specific boundaries or have no defined duration should be strictly prohibited. The correct method to achieve extended

regulatory relief involves changing the existing regulation or working through international differences rather than granting ongoing exemptions.

- **Public Interest and Benefit:** The CAA needs to evaluate how public benefits from granting exemptions compare to any possible adverse effects. The CAA should approve exemptions for aviation activities which maintain public safety and industry benefits during emergency situations and unusual circumstances.

- **No Undue Advantage**: The exemption process needs to maintain fairness in its operations. The exemption system needs to prevent any situation where one party receives an unfair market benefit. The CAA needs to establish procedures for handling equivalent requests from different entities when they encounter identical challenges. The use of specific criteria helps prevent both biased treatment and arbitrary standard reductions.

2.3 This guidance applies to all exemptions which allow operators to avoid following national civil aviation requirements that include regulations and rules and implementing standards from the State. The requirements stem from ICAO SARPs and State regulations that go beyond ICAO standards. The following types of requirements qualify for exemptions under this system:

The following examples requirements qualify for exemptions:

- The extension of license validity and medical certificate validity and training/check intervals requires strict conditions for approval (multiple CAAs granted such extensions during COVID-19 for pilot medicals and proficiency checks).

- The authorization of ferry flights with overdue maintenance items becomes possible through specific operational restrictions and the permission to operate in restricted airspace with non-functional equipment that normally requires regulatory compliance.

- The temporary authorization of airport operating standard deviations and air traffic service requirements exists when infrastructure problems or emergencies occur but alternative safety measures protect passengers.

- The exemption process allows safety requirements to be waived when strict compliance becomes impossible but alternative safety measures can be implemented.

Not every rule within the system allows for exemptions. The exemption of safety-critical standards should happen only when no other solution exists and the situation presents an extremely strong case. Basic aircraft airworthiness standards along with essential operational procedures must remain unaltered. Each State needs to identify which provisions cannot receive exemptions through its policy framework while establishing strict approval requirements for these exceptions. The CAA needs to perform a unified assessment of exemption requests that span multiple domains between different departments.

2.3 Exemptions function as emergency measures which do not replace the need for proper compliance and timely regulatory updates. MID States should understand that exemptions exist to handle specific situations but they should not replace the need to implement regulatory requirements or serve as permanent fixes for outdated rules. The approval of an

exemption requires a future assessment to determine its necessity. The State should evaluate the need for rule changes through standard rulemaking procedures when an exemption results from impractical or overly strict regulations. Operators must develop solid plans to fulfill regulatory requirements because they should not depend on continuous exemptions for compliance. The regulatory system needs exemptions to handle exceptional cases but these exemptions must not compromise the system's fundamental structure. Exemptions should function as safety valves during emergencies yet they need to remain rare occurrences because their repeated use threatens safety and international trust. The objective remains to achieve full compliance after conditions improve or the original problem gets solved through permanent regulatory changes instead of maintaining exemptions forever.

3. Regulatory and Organizational Preparedness

3.1 The CAA's authority to grant exemptions should be clearly established in the State's civil aviation law or regulations. Typically, there will be a provision empowering the CAA (or a designated senior official, such as the Director General of Civil Aviation) to exempt compliance with specific requirements under defined conditions. States should review their primary aviation legislation and operating regulations to ensure that:

- The scope of allowable exemptions is defined (which regulations can be exempted and which cannot, or any general criteria mandated by law).

- The law requires that an exemption may only be granted if it is in public interest and will not compromise safety (some States explicitly write these criteria into the legal text).

- The law or a policy document outlines the procedure for granting an exemption (application, review, record, etc.), or empowers the CAA to establish such procedure via guidance material (like this document).
  If necessary, States should update their regulations to address any gaps – for instance, adding a regulation that says "The Authority may exempt compliance with a requirement of these regulations in individual cases, subject to such conditions as the Authority deems necessary in the interest of safety." All exemptions granted should cite the specific legal provision that authorizes the CAA to do so. This legal clarity protects both the State and the operator, ensuring that the exemption is enforceable and recognized under the law.

3.2 State Policy and Evaluation Criteria: Beyond the bare legal authority, CAAs need a clear internal policy or written procedures on how to evaluate and decide on exemption requests. This internal guidance (often an inspector handbook or a policy manual) should cover:

- Standard Criteria: A set of criteria that must be met for any exemption to be approved (e.g., "no acceptable alternative means of compliance available," "meets equivalent safety through mitigation," "limited duration," etc.). These criteria create consistency. For instance, the policy may state that safety risk assessment demonstrating an acceptable level of safety is mandatory for approval.

- Approval Levels: Define who within the CAA can approve exemptions. Minor technical exemptions might be approvable at the department head level, whereas major exemptions (especially those affecting international standards or multiple organizations) might require Director General or even Ministerial approval. Clear delegation of authority avoids confusion during urgent situations.

- Process Steps: Lay out the steps the CAA will follow when an application is received (screening, assignment to technical experts, review meetings, safety analysis, decision, documentation). A flowchart or checklist (like Appendix 1 of this guidance) can be part of the policy.

- Documentation and Justification: Emphasize that every exemption decision must be fully documented, including the justification for granting or denying, the analysis performed, and any special conditions imposed. This creates an auditable trail and knowledge base for future cases.

- Consistency and Precedents: The policy should task a focal point (e.g., a regulatory standards department) with maintaining a log of all exemptions granted, to monitor trends and ensure consistency. If a similar request was handled in the past, the CAA should apply a consistent approach unless circumstances have changed.

By formalizing such a policy aligned with ICAO guidance (e.g. drawing from principles in ICAO Doc 9734 Part A, Chapter 3 on compliance and enforcement), States ensure that inspectors and decision-makers have a common understanding of how to handle exemptions. This reduces subjectivity and promotes transparency and fairness in the exemption process.

3.3 Industry Communication and Transparency: It is important that the aviation industry (airlines, service providers, license holders) clearly understands the State's expectations regarding exemptions. The CAA should communicate to industry stakeholders that:

- Exemptions are exceptional: Through advisories or guidance to industry, emphasize that organizations must plan to comply with all regulations and should not assume that exemptions will be granted. Good safety management includes contingency planning that does not solely rely on regulatory relief.

- Application Process: Provide accessible information on how to apply for an exemption, including any standard application form (such as the template in Appendix 2) and the required lead time. For example, a State might publish a notice that all exemption applications should be submitted at least 60 or 90 days in advance of the needed effective date, except for unforeseen emergency cases.

- Information Required: Inform applicants that comprehensive justification and supporting evidence (safety risk assessments, impact analysis, etc.) must accompany any request. If the CAA has published guidance material or a checklist for industry on preparing exemption requests, reference it. This sets the expectation that frivolous or poorly substantiated requests will not be entertained.

- Transparency of Outcomes: States may consider publishing summaries of exemptions granted (while respecting any confidential operational details) so that industry peers and the public are aware of significant deviations. Some CAAs issue Exemption Bulletins or include exemptions in their official gazette or website. Transparency helps maintain trust that exemptions are being used responsibly and not to give unfair advantage.

Open communication ensures that when a genuine need for an exemption arises, the applicant knows how to proceed and the CAA receives better-quality submissions, thereby speeding up the evaluation. It also deters misuse of the exemption process by making it clear that requests will undergo rigorous scrutiny.

3.4 International Notification Obligations: A critical aspect of preparedness is having a mechanism to fulfill international obligations when an exemption affects compliance with ICAO Standards. Each CAA should coordinate internally (e.g., between the technical department handling the exemption and the department or National Continuous Monitoring Coordinator responsible for ICAO compliance) to ensure that:

- Difference Notification: If an exemption result in a temporary difference from an ICAO Standard, the State is ready to notify ICAO. This could be via the Electronic Filing of Differences (EFOD) system or a formal letter, depending on ICAO requirements. Appendix 5 of this document provides a sample format for notifying ICAO of a difference due to an exemption. Timely notification keeps the ICAO registry up to date and informs other States of potential impact (for instance, if a neighboring State's inspectors know that pilots from your State might have extended medical validity, they can take that into account).

- Mutual Recognition and Coordination: If the exemption involves cross-border operations, the CAA should communicate with other affected States or regional bodies. For example, if a MID State grants an exemption that allows its airline to operate in another region under alleviated requirements, it is prudent to notify the Civil Aviation Authorities of those destination States. This could be done via a formal letter or through regional coordination groups (like the MID Region Safety or Operations group). Standardized notification formats (see Appendix 5) help streamline this communication.

- Publication in Aeronautical Information (if needed): In some cases, if the exemption could impact foreign operators or flight planning (e.g., an exemption related to airport operational standards or airspace procedures), it may need to be promulgated via NOTAM or AIP Supplement so that all users are informed. The CAA's procedure should include liaising with the AIS office to issue such notifications when relevant.

By predefining these steps, States ensure that granting an exemption does not inadvertently put them in breach of international responsibilities. Instead, even when using flexibility, they remain aligned with the cooperative spirit of ICAO standards and avoid surprises to other States.

3.5 Resource and Responsibility Allocation: Handling exemption requests can be complex and time-sensitive, especially in emergencies. CAAs should allocate adequate resources and define responsibilities in advance:

- Dedicated Team or Focal Points: Identify a unit or individuals responsible for managing exemption applications. For example, a Regulatory Affairs or Standards section might act as the coordinator, logging incoming requests and convening the appropriate technical experts to evaluate each case. This focal point ensures consistency and that timelines are tracked.

- Technical Expertise: Depending on the subject of the exemption, different technical inspectors or engineers will need to be involved (flight operations inspectors for ops matters, airworthiness engineers for technical waivers, medical assessors for licensing exemptions, etc.). The CAA should maintain a roster or protocol for quickly assembling a multidisciplinary review team. Complex cases might require input from multiple departments (e.g., an exemption for extended twin-engine operations might involve both airworthiness and operations specialists).

- Risk Assessment Capability: Ensure the CAA staff are equipped to perform or evaluate safety risk assessments. This may involve having risk analysis tools or templates (see Appendix 3 for a generic risk assessment template), as well as training staff in risk-based decision making (see 3.6 Training). In some cases, the CAA might establish a safety risk panel that can be convened to collectively examine higher-risk exemption proposals.

- Administrative Support: Given that exemptions often involve formal letters, records, and possibly legal orders, administrative support is needed to prepare documents correctly and maintain the exemption register. The CAA's secretariat or legal office might help draft the official exemption instrument text to ensure it's unambiguous and legally sound.

- Emergency Procedures: Include in your planning the scenario of urgent exemption needs outside normal office hours or during crisis periods. Assigning on-call contacts or an emergency procedure (e.g., a fast-track approval by the DG with subsequent technical analysis) can be valuable. The key is to avoid panicked, ad hoc processes by having a pre-thought-out plan, even if abbreviated, for emergency cases.

3.6 Training and Competency Development: As part of preparedness, MID States should train their personnel on the exemption process. This ensures that staff at all levels understand their roles and how to uphold safety during the exemption process:

- Inspector Guidance and Workshops: Develop guidance material for inspectors and technical staff on evaluating exemptions (aligned with this document). Conduct workshops or briefing sessions to walk through hypothetical exemption scenarios. For example, simulate an airline requesting an exemption for extended pilot flight

hours, and have the team practice evaluating it, doing a risk assessment, and drafting conditions. Such exercises build competency and confidence.

- Risk Management Training: Since risk assessments are central to exemption decisions, provide training (or refresher courses) in safety risk management, as per ICAO Doc 9859 (Safety Management Manual) principles. Inspectors should be comfortable reviewing an operator's risk mitigation proposal or creating one if the operator hasn't provided a sufficient assessment.

- Legal and Communication Training: Ensure those drafting exemption documents or communicating decisions are familiar with the correct terminology and tone. The exemption letter (Appendix 4 provides an example) is an official legal document; errors or ambiguities in it could create enforcement problems. Training can be provided on how to write clear conditions and articulate the regulatory basis. Similarly, staff should know how to communicate with industry diplomatically – e.g., how to explain a denial of an exemption request with factual reasoning.

- Continuous Learning: Encourage staff to keep abreast of international best practices regarding exemptions. ICAO, EASA, and other bodies sometimes issue updated guidance or case studies (for instance, lessons from the COVID-19 Targeted Exemptions experience). By staying updated, the CAA can refine its own processes. A feedback mechanism (see Section 6.6 Post-Exemption Review) can also be part of training, wherein after each major exemption case, the team debriefs what was learned and updates procedures accordingly.

By investing in preparedness across legal, procedural, resource, and training dimensions, MID States can handle exemption needs proactively. This upfront work pays off when a request arises, as the CAA can respond swiftly but thoughtfully, rather than scrambling to invent a process on the fly. It embeds resilience in the State's safety oversight system, ensuring continuity of aviation activities even under duress, without sacrificing the rigor of oversight.

4. Process for Exemption Application and Evaluation

When an entity seeks an exemption, a structured process helps ensure thorough evaluation and consistent handling. This section (Section 4) covers the pre-issuance phase – from the moment a request is received up to the point a decision is ready to be made, but before the official exemption is issued. Following sections will cover the issuance and post-issuance phases.

4.1 Submission of Exemption Requests: The process typically starts with the **applicant** submitting a formal request to the CAA. The CAA should require that all exemption requests be made **in writing**, using an official form or letter that captures necessary details. Appendix 2 provides a *Sample Exemption Application Form* that States can adopt or tailor. Key aspects of this step include:

- Who May Apply: The request submission must come from authorized representatives who represent either the certificate holder organization or the individual licensee. The post holder or quality manager of an airline needs to submit the request as the authorized representative of the airline while providing their contact details and accepting responsibility.

- Content of ApplicationThe application needs to show which particular requirement the exemption request targets by referencing the exact regulation number and paragraph. The application needs to explain the full extent of the requested relief by stating that XYZ Airlines wants to use aircraft navigation databases that exceed the time limits specified in regulation ABC. The applicant needs to state the duration of exemption they require along with the start and end dates and explain the necessity for this exemption. The applicant needs to provide their proposed safety case/justification through attachment or outline which includes risk assessment and mitigation strategies they will use. The application requires all necessary supporting documents which include technical analysis and contingency plans and proof of non-compliance ability.

- Lead Time: All applications need to be submitted before the required effective date unless there is an unexpected emergency. The majority of states need applicants to submit their requests between thirty to ninety days ahead of time. The industry needs to receive this time frame information according to the guidelines in 3.3. The CAA must determine whether late application submission results from unanticipated circumstances or inadequate planning since poor planning by itself does not qualify as an acceptable reason for urgent processing. The CAA should handle emergency cases that require immediate exemptions for single ferry flights but must maintain all required safety assessments (see 4.5).

- Acknowledgment: The CAA needs to send a prompt confirmation after receiving the application. The acknowledgment letter or email should contain information about the following steps and a reference number for the request and when possible an expected decision timeframe. The acknowledgment process confirms the request is active while establishing clear expectations for the applicant.

4.2 Preliminary Screening of Applications: Once received, the exemption request undergoes a preliminary review to ensure it is complete and within the CAA's purview:

- Completeness Check: The CAA must check through its designated focal point or office that all necessary details and supporting documents appear in the application. The CAA needs to request immediate clarification when essential details are absent from the application such as when the regulation remains unclear or when the justification section is missing. The CAA maintains a policy to suspend or deny applications when applicants fail to provide essential details or show unwillingness to do so. The sample application form in Appendix 2 includes Section 6.3 which shows the standard information requirements. The CAA maintains an internal checklist to confirm that all necessary application items are included.

- Scope and Validity Check: The screening process identifies whether the requested exemption falls within legal boundaries for approval. The CAA needs to identify at the beginning if the requested exemption applies to safety requirements which lack legal exemption possibilities. The CAA needs to notify applicants about jurisdictional issues when their request belongs to another authority's domain such as State CAA or government agency. The CAA should stop the standard review process when it determines that the request belongs to another authority's jurisdiction.

- Assign to Technical Experts: The request will proceed to technical department evaluation after passing all required checks. The request evaluation process for flight duty need assessment from Aerodrome Safety. The evaluation process for requests that require multiple assessments leads to the time limitations goes to Flight Operations inspectors while aircraft equipment requirements need evaluation from Airworthiness and airport standards formation of a joint evaluation team. The team responsible for technical evaluation needs to establish a specific deadline for their work which should not exceed X days. The request status receives an urgent designation when appropriate during this stage.

- Risk Category (Optional): The initial risk assessment of requests through CAAs includes three categories which determine the necessary level of review. The it requires approval from higher authorities (see section 3 on Approval Levels). The triage process level of safety risk in a request determines whether it needs to go through a formal review board or if directs resources toward the most critical tasks.

4.3 Consultation and Coordination: Depending on the exemption's complexity and impact, broader consultation may be warranted before a decision is made:

- Internal CAA Consultation: The CAA requires all sections that are relevant to the process to provide their input. The Flight Operations department maintains lead responsibility for pilot licensing exemptions but the Licensing office and Medical unit need to participate in discussions about policy compliance and consequences. The legal department must verify that any new exemption meets all applicable legal requirements. An internal meeting or case conference serves as an effective tool to bring all stakeholders together for discussing the draft conditions.

- Consultation with ApplicantThe CAA should schedule technical meetings with applicants for exemption discussions when they show interest in granting exemptions with specific requirements. The CAA should verify through this meeting that the applicant understands all proposed conditions and possesses the ability to fulfill them. The applicant should present any unworkable conditions to the CAA for potential alternative solutions. The CAA maintains its authority through this collaborative method which produces stronger safety protocols. The CAA can evaluate applicant safety commitment through their willingness to participate in risk assessment discussions because applicants who show no serious interest in risk assessment do not qualify for exemptions.

- Regional CoordinationThe MID Region CAAs should work together through ICAO MID Office or regional safety groups when exemptions create potential precedents which affect multiple regions. Multiple States dealing with identical problems such as license renewal delays because of training center shutdowns can achieve harmonization through coordinated efforts. The ICAO regional offices served as a platform for States to coordinate their exemption policies during the COVID-19 pandemic. A MID State can contact another State which handled a comparable request to obtain guidance and information while respecting all confidentiality restrictions.

- External Consultation (if applicable): Consulting with other stakeholders becomes necessary at times. The aircraft manufacturer and maintenance organization should be consulted for their expert opinion and recommended limits when requesting a maintenance-related exemption. Consult representatives or ICAO when an exemption modification could impact airlines operating in different States such as changes to airport requirements. The decision process should include evaluation of multilateral agreements and requirements when the exemption affects EU-based rules or involves code-sharing operations with foreign carriers. The decision-making process requires input collection to prevent missing important information.

4.4 Timelines and Urgent Requests: The processing time for an exemption should be commensurate with its urgency and complexity. Under normal circumstances, the CAA should strive to complete evaluation and decision within a standard timeframe (e.g., 30 days) to provide predictability. However, urgent and emergency requests require flexibility:

- Expedited Process: The CAA will perform an expedited review for exemptions when unexpected circumstances require immediate action (e.g. will skip certain steps but dedicated personnel will concentrate on the case for several hours or one day. The when an aircraft becomes stranded and needs emergency flight clearance or when essential facilities become unavailable). The review process Director General or authorized official can approve minimal bureaucratic procedures for safety analysis completion. The CAA provides emergency verbal approval for urgent situations but requires immediate submission of the written exemption document.

- Justification for Urgency: The CAA conducts fast-track reviews for exemptions when urgent situations demand fast action (e.g. The organization will bypass particular procedures but assign specific personnel to handle the case for multiple hours or one day. The CAA will expedite the review process for emergency flight clearance of stranded aircraft and essential facility unavailability. The Director General or authorized official can approve basic safety analysis completion through minimal bureaucratic procedures. The CAA grants emergency verbal approval for urgent cases but requires immediate submission of the written exemption document.

- Adequate Assessment even if FastRisk assessment should always remain a priority even when under time constraints. When time is extremely limited you should rely on expert judgment together with comparable cases and available data. The CAA will establish strict safety conditions because they need to protect against potential risks when there is insufficient time for thorough evaluation. The CAA can approve a single special permit flight under specific conditions which include daytime operation without passengers and prior inspection requirements.

- Record of DecisionThe team should perform a fast internal assessment of the situation to identify any learning points (did the CAA receive all necessary information and were communications understandable?) which will enhance their

future response capabilities. The team should immediately document the exemption in the official log even though they need to work fast.

4.5 Decision-Making Criteria: Once all information is gathered (from the application, risk assessment, and consultations), the CAA's decision-makers must apply consistent criteria to arrive at approval or denial. The State's established criteria (from Section 3) will guide this. Generally, an exemption should only be approved if:

- The necessity test is met because the situation and evidence demonstrate that the action is required to reach a public interest goal or prevent an avoidable hardship which did not stem from the organization itself.

- The safety risk is acceptable with the identified mitigations in place (i.e., equivalent safety can be maintained). This typically must be clearly demonstrated in the risk assessment.

- The CAA will approve the exemption only for the shortest period and smallest scope which fulfills the requirement. The CAA would approve a more restricted version of the request if it exceeded the necessary scope or duration (e.g., approve for 3 months instead of 6 months or for specific operations instead of all).

- The CAA will consider the applicant's history of compliance when making their decision (if an applicant has a history of violations or failing to meet conditions, the CAA can factor that in – a privilege like

- The State must demonstrate that the exemption will not violate international agreements to a degree that exceeds its management capabilities (the State cannot approve it if it violates international agreements).

- The CAA should deny an exemption request when the applicant fails to show equivalent safety standards or when their justification is insufficient or when alternative solutions exist or when the CAA lacks the authority to approve the exemption. The decision needs to come from the person or body who holds the appropriate authority level. The technical staff team should present their case to the Director General or a committee when necessary for final decision-making. The recommendation should contain either specific conditions for approval or a denial statement. The authorized decision-maker maintains the final authority to make decisions even when evaluators express different opinions.

4.6 Documentation and Record-Keeping: The evaluation process needs complete documentation before proceeding to issuance. The Exemption Evaluation Report or file must contain all relevant documents which include the original application and all communication records with the applicant and the risk assessment worksheet and consultation meeting minutes and notes and the final recommendation/decision briefing.

- The exemption document text foundation will be stored in CAA archives while maintaining its current form.

- The process requires proper documentation because it ensures accountability and provides a reference point for future use when renewing exemptions or when other CAA or ICAO organizations request evaluation details. The official letter and tracking system require a distinct Exemption Reference Number or ID which should be established at this point.

- The CAA uses sequential numbering for exemptions through a system that starts with "EX-2025-005" for each year. The reference number serves as a connection between all related documents while making it easier to locate the case file at a later time.

- The CAA must determine the evaluation outcome through Section 4 to either create an exemption with defined conditions or write a denial letter.
- The established foundation provides a strong basis for all exemptions that will be granted. The following section focuses on the execution of issuance which involves formal decision-making and communication processes.

5. Issuance of Exemptions: Execution

This section describes how an approved exemption is formalized, communicated, and put into effect. Even after deciding in principle to grant an exemption, careful execution is important to ensure the exemption is legally valid and clearly understood by all parties.

5.1 Drafting the Exemption Instrument: The exemption is typically issued in writing as an official Exemption Letter or Order on the CAA's letterhead (see Appendix 4 for a Sample Exemption Approval Letter). Drafting this document requires precision:

- Addressing and References: The letter needs to direct its message to the person who requested the information (the airline accountable manager or the individual if applicable) while mentioning their initial request details including request date and reference number if available. The document needs to state its legal basis for authorization through specific references such as "Pursuant to Article X of the Civil Aviation Law and Regulation YYY-123,"..

- Grant and Scope: The exemption statement needs to be brief and clear about which requirement gets waived and for which entities. The Civil Aviation Authority grants XYZ Airlines an exemption from [Regulation citation] which requires [the rule] to enable [describe what is allowed]. The exemption applies to specific aircraft types and personnel and routes and operational activities.

- Effective PeriodThe exemption period must include both the beginning date and the final date of validity. The exemption period should be defined by absolute calendar dates that include both the start date of 01 December 2025 and the end date of 31 March 2026. The exemption should include a backup date when the aircraft reaches its base for maintenance during its upcoming flight. The exemption will terminate when the specified event occurs and the method for verifying this event should be stated.

- Conditions: The operator must list all exemption conditions and limitations in this essential section. The list of conditions should be presented through a numbered or bullet format for better understanding. The operator needs to follow specific requirements which are called conditions to access the exemption. The exemption letter requires operators to maintain specific requirements such as additional inspections and training and reporting obligations and VFR-only flight operations and altitude restrictions and on-board documentation and more. All mandatory risk assessment measures should be presented as conditions in this section. The operator must notify the CAA about all safety incidents and major changes which affect the exemption.

- ICAO Difference Note (if relevant): The letter should state that the exemption creates a deviation from ICAO standards while the State will notify I to avoid adding this responsibility to the application process. The exemption creates a short-term deviation from [AnnCAO about this difference. The CAAs have different approaches to ICAO notification because they wantex X, Chapter Y, Standard Z] which will be reported to ICAO through Article 38 notification. This approach demonstrates openness.

- Consequences and Miscellaneous: The exemption exists because of the presented facts and mitigation measures but its validity depends on maintaining current conditions and facts. The exemption will become invalid if any conditions change or if the original requirements need to be met again. The letter should specify that the exemption remains exclusive to the named party since most exemptions have this restriction. The original requirement becomes fully enforceable when the exemption period ends.

- Signature: The letter must be signed by the authorized person (DG or whomever is designated). It should carry the official seal or other authentication if required by national procedures.

The document requires an internal review process which includes legal or senior inspector participation to detect any ambiguous sections. The document requires precise language review because enforceable and clear conditions need to be established. The operator must perform X as a required action through "the operator shall do X" instead of using "the operator should try to do X."

5.2 Approval by the Competent Authority: The draft exemption letter, along with the evaluation dossier, is then submitted to the competent authority for final approval and signature. Depending on the State's setup:

- The Director General of Civil Aviation must approve these decisions but a board or committee can perform this function if they exist. The approving authority reviews all documentation to verify their acceptance of both the justification and the established conditions. The approving authority can modify the exemption by asking for additional conditions or shorter timeframes when they determine these modifications are necessary.

- The approving authority will approve the exemption letter after achieving a satisfactory outcome. The document becomes effective on the date of

signature unless an alternative effective date appears in the document. The document needs to specify its effective start date when there is any delay between signature and required implementation (5.1).

- The document needs one additional official witness for record integrity but this step remains optional.

- The exemption becomes active after signature but remains inactive for the applicant until they receive proper notification.

5.3 Communicating the Decision: Communication must be prompt and clear:

- To the Applicant: The applicant needs to receive the signed exemption letter together with any supporting certificate or official order document as soon as possible. The official transmission of documents should occur through official channels by sending a scanned signed letter via email followed by a physical copy delivery or by using an electronic signature platform when available. The letter should include a short note of appreciation for their assistance and a summary of upcoming compliance activities (Section 6.1). The denial of an exemption requires a refusal letter that explains the basis for rejection including insufficient safetyubmit their application with new parameters.

- Within the CAA: The decision needs to be communicated to all appropriate inspectors and departments. The ops inspectors who oversee the operator need to receive a copy of the flight ops exemption because they must add new oversight responsibilities to their surveillance plan to verify compliance with conditions. The CAA should notify all sections that operate under the exemption including air traffic and aerodromes. The organization should distribute this information through internal memos or daily briefings. The CAA will maintain a unified position through this approach because all staff members who deal with the operator will understand the specific operational conditions.

- Other Stakeholders: The notification process for other stakeholders depends on the specific nature of the exemption. The stakeholders who need notification about exemptions include airport personnel and air traffic control when the exemption involves unusual conditions that require their awareness. The CAA would require operators to train their pilots about showing the exemption letter to foreign ramp inspectors when they encounter questions about it. The CAA distributed general exemption notices to foreign embassies and CAAs during COVID to obtain temporary recognition of licenses and certificates..

5.4 Stipulating Conditions and Limitations: As introduced in 5.1, conditions are a key part of the exemption. Here we emphasize how the CAA ensures they are implemented:

- Operator’s AcknowledgmentThe applicant should confirm their understanding of all conditions through a signed acknowledgment. The applicant can demonstrate their agreement by signing a duplicate of the return letter or sending an email confirmation. The process becomes more accountable through this step.

- Embedding in Operator's System: The operator needs to implement exemption conditions within their operational control system when they operate as an airline or organization. performed during the exemption period. The condition will remain in the operator's memory through this approach. The The CAA requires operators to demonstrate through their maintenance planning or tracking systems that weekly maintenance actions will be operator needs to create an internal notice or bulletin which explains the CAA exemption and outlines all necessary actions for staff members. The CAA maintains the right to receive duplicate copies of all internal instructions distributed to staff.

- Limitations for Safety: The CAA needs to confirm operators have established procedures for these situations. The aircraft's inability to meet specific airspace requirements through exemptions would restrict operators to particular flight areas and heights. The flight plan and remarks need to include these operational restrictions to prevent any problems. The CAA must confirm operators have established procedures for these situations.

- Tracking Compliance: The CAA needs to establish procedures to track these conditions which will be explained in detail in Section 6.1. The implementation of conditions results in new regulatory obligations that operators must follow in the same way they follow standard rules. The CAA must enforce these conditions according to their established procedures.

5.5 Dissemination and Publication: For transparency and in fulfillment of any legal or international requirements, the CAA may disseminate information about the exemption:

- ICAO and States Notification: The CAA needs to initiate immediate notifications about the exemption to ICAO and other States when the exemption results in an ICAO difference or requires knowledge from other countries. The notification process for ICAO requires a letter submission with standard details including the affected standard and effective dates and any applicable conditions according to Appendix 5. The notification process requires sending letters to specific States and airlines for their awareness. The international community receives timely information through this process which prevents operational disruptions because foreign regulators can permit flights with expired medical certificates when they understand about official exemptions.

- Domestic Publication: States that require exemption publication through official public records such as government gazettes or CAA online registries need to follow specific timeframes for this process. The publication needs to follow the established timeline which might specify a particular number of days after the exemption issuance date. The CAA maintains the right to publish essential exemption information on their website even when publication is not mandatory as part of their transparency efforts. The CAA issued a temporary exemption to [Operator] for [Requirement] which will remain valid until [Date

- Ops Documents Update (if needed): The team needs to coordinate updates for operational documents including Aeronautical Information Publication and operations specifications attachments when the exemption applies. The Ops Spec

should include a temporary note when an exemption conflicts with its standard content or internal records must show which exemption parts override specific Ops Spec sections.

5.6 Registration and Tracking: Finally, the CAA should record the exemption in its internal tracking system:

- Exemptions Register: Enter the essential information into a database or log system which includes Reference number and recipient details and rule exemptions and effective dates and summary notes about conditions. The register enables better oversight because it shows active exemptions with their expiration dates and facilitates reporting through annual statistics about exemption numbers and types for CAAs.

- Reminders: The system should include an expiration date reminder function which notifies the assigned inspector before the deadline approaches. The system inspectors to check if the exemption was used correctly and if operations returned to normal status or if a new includes date flagging functionality but users can also create manual diary entries for this purpose. The system enables renewal application needs to be processed.

- Files and Archives: The official file contains all documents that belong to the same category in both physical and digital formats. All documentation must be filed because future audits and investigations and ICAO USOAP reviews will examine exemptions. The documentation process requires keeping duplicate copies of all ICAO notifications and other correspondence because these documents serve as part of the official record. The State's record retention policy determines the duration for which these records should be kept while significant cases should maintain indefinite retention.

With the exemption now officially issued and disseminated, the role of the CAA shifts to monitoring and eventually closing out the exemption. Section 6 will detail the post-issuance oversight and follow-up actions to ensure that safety is maintained throughout the exemption period and beyond.

6. Post-Issuance Actions and Oversight

Granting exemption is not the end of the responsibility. The CAA must oversee compliance with the exemption's terms and assess outcomes to ensure safety is indeed maintained. This section outlines the follow-up actions after issuance and leading up to the exemption's end or renewal.

6.1 Monitoring Compliance with Conditions: Once the exemption is in effect, the CAA should actively monitor the operator's adherence to all imposed conditions and any emergent safety issues:

- Inspection or Audit Activities: The oversight activities should specifically target the exemption area. Inspectors should conduct more regular checks and request documentation to confirm that all maintenance tasks listed in the exemption conditions are properly executed. The CAA should conduct random flight record reviews and operational site inspections to verify operators stay within their approved time extensions and follow all required safety protocols including fatigue management systems. The oversight team should implement standard surveillance methods to enforce all conditions established during the exemption process.

- Required Reports from Operator: The CAA requires operators to submit periodic reports as a standard condition for many exemptions which include weekly status updates and post-exemption final reports. The organization needs to verify receipt of these reports while conducting their review process. The reports help track exemption performance through flight numbers and incident records and operational challenges. The organization should take immediate action when reports fail to arrive or when they show any signs of trouble.

- Incident Monitoring: Monitor all incidents and safety reports that happen during the exemption period. The need to reassess the arrangement becomes apparent when any incident or hazard emerges that connects to the exempted area. The CAA requires operators to report immediately through regulation or specific conditions any event which could relate to the exemption (such as when a pilot under extended medical clearance needs to stop flying because of illness or when deferred maintenance produces a small in-flight problem).

- Enforcement of Non-compliance: The CAA needs to take action when operators break any terms of their exemption authorization. The CAA can take two main actions when operators fail to meet exemption requirements: they can immediately revoke the exemption to stop operations or force operators to follow the rules right away and they can start enforcement procedures for law violations. The CAA needs to inform operators at the beginning that exemptions function as conditional privileges which will be removed when operators break rules or endanger safety. The organization must document all instances of non-compliance together with all subsequent actions taken..

The operator gains confidence through regular monitoring because it proves safety standards are upheld and demonstrates to the operator that the CAA actively monitors their operations which motivates them to strictly adhere to exemption rules.

6.2 Follow-Up and Data Collection: Throughout the exemption period, gather data and insights that can inform both the ongoing safety assurance and any future considerations:

- Performance Data: The definition of success or emerging risk depends on the specific nature of the exemption. The system should monitor fatigue reports and performance data when pilots operate beyond their flight time limits. The system should monitor defect reports and mechanical reliability metrics when maintenance intervals become longer. The system should monitor proficiency levels when training currency periods extend. The operator's safety management system (SMS) maintains internal data which can be accessed through collaboration with their

safety office. The safety office of the operator should receive relevant information from your team.

- Regular Check-ins: The CAA should establish regular check-in sessions throughout extended exemption periods (e.g., once per month for a one-year exemption). The CAA and operator should use these meetings to review exemption operation progress and determine necessary adjustments. The scheduled meetings maintain continuous communication which helps prevent potential problems from arising.

- Mid-course CorrectionsThe. The CAA can implement additional conditions or strengthen existing conditions in the exemption when monitoring data reveals that one of the mitigation measures performs below expectations. The CAA will perform such changes through official letters which CAA maintains the authority to make adjustments based on monitoring data and any identified concerns during the exemption period modify existing exemptions or create new ones that update specific conditions. The legal framework must include provisions for making changes to the agreement. The operator needs to receive precise new instructions when such modifications occur. The exemption termination process should begin immediately when new evidence demonstrates that operating conditions have reached an unacceptable level of danger (see 6.3).

- Documentation of Outcomes: Keep records of all monitoring activities and findings. Note down everything if everything is running smoothly. Note down the process of finding and fixing issues. The documentation process serves two purposes because it supports future analysis and provides evidence for operator renewal or exemption applications to the CAA.

6.3 Modification or Revocation: Exemptions are granted based on certain assumptions and conditions; if those change, the CAA must be ready to modify or revoke the exemption to preserve safety:

- Triggers for Modification/Revocation: The operator fails to follow conditions or a new hazard emerges which shows the exemption poses higher risks than expected or external factors occur (such as ICAO or regional body issuing new guidance against exemptions or a vital assumption about alternate mitigation availability failing).

- Process: The authority responsible for granting exemptions holds the power to modify or cancel them within their legal jurisdiction. The exemption letter contains a provision which allows the CAA to withdraw the exemption at any point in time. The decision to revoke an exemption should involve operator discussion unless there is an immediate need for action. A formal written notice with specified reasons should be used to issue revocation notices. The modification process requires issuing an amended exemption letter or an addendum which presents new conditions and changes in a clear manner while maintaining official signature and issuance procedures.

- Safety First: The exemption must be discontinued when safety assurance becomes impossible. The operator will experience disappointment but safety requirements take precedence over all else. The operator needs advance notice for such decisions to enable a smooth transition back to compliance unless the situation demands immediate action. You should provide operators with a brief 48-hour notice before exemption revocation to enable them to stop operations safely when an immediate shutdown is not required. The situation requires immediate grounding or halt of exempted activities when it presents an imminent risk to safety.

- Communication: The revocation of an exemption requires notification to all parties who received information about the exemption including ICAO and other States which received notification about the exemption. The revocation of an exemption requires notification to all parties who received information about the exemption including ICAO and other States which received notification about the exemption. The international oversight process will be completed through this action.

6.4 Renewal of Exemptions: As the expiry nears, the operator might seek an extension or renewal of the exemption. The guidance here is to treat a renewal almost like a new application, but with the benefit of data from the first period

- Advance Request: The operator must request renewal of their exemption before the current expiration date when they require continued exemption status. The renewal application must contain both the reasons for requesting an extension and documentation showing their ongoing compliance with all requirements and their attempts to solve the root problem. The operator must explain their delay in obtaining the spare part for compliance while demonstrating their active attempts to resolve the issue. The States require operators to submit documentation showing their progress toward compliance during the exemption period.

- Review of Performance: The CAA needs to evaluate the effectiveness of the initial exemption duration. The entire process followed the established rules. The implemented mitigation strategies achieved their intended results. Any incidents or concerns? The performance data collected during the original exemption period will determine if renewal approval is possible and what specific conditions need to be met. The renewal process should include additional restrictions when minor problems occur during the original exemption period. The renewal process should be limited to one additional short-term period when performance remains good and the exemption remains valid. The CAA should consider alternative solutions or regulatory changes instead of issuing continuous renewals because they indicate a need for change.

- Updated Risk Assessment: The situation has evolved since the initial release date. The risk assessment needs to be updated to reflect the current time period. The risk assessment needs to be updated because operational tempo and seasonal changes will impact the risk level. The CAA needs to verify that the extended justification

and mitigation strategies remain effective for the new period. The assessment should include any fresh hazards that have appeared together with accessible new mitigation strategies.

- Approval and Documentation: The process requires you to issue a new exemption letter with updated dates and modified conditions when renewal becomes effective. The new document should link back to the original exemption while indicating it extends or replaces the original document. The organization must send another notification to ICAO and other relevant parties when necessary especially when the initial notification contained a specific end date. The tracking register requires an update with the renewal information. The operator needs sufficient advance notice about non-renewal to fulfill the original requirement before its expiration date.

6.5 Expiry and Return to Compliance: Once an exemption reaches its end date (and if not renewed), the operator must revert to full compliance with the normal regulation. The CAA should confirm this happens smoothly:

- Operator Confirmation: The operator needs to prove through written documentation (or the CAA must verify through inspection) that they restored full compliance within one day after the expiration date. The aircraft must cease flight operations after its inspection deadline exemption ends and crew members must end their license privileges when their extended validity period expires. The CAA should perform an audit inspection right after the expiration date to verify that the operation meets all necessary requirements.

- Grace Periods: The exemption validity period defines the maximum duration of grace period for all exemptions. Operators should receive advance notice about their pending exemption expiration dates which is usually several weeks before the deadline to prevent unexpected noncompliance. The CAAs issue notifications about upcoming expiration dates for Exemption #XXX which will become invalid on [Date]. All operations need to meet compliance standards after this date. The operator should reach out to us right away if they face any problems with their operations.

- Closing the File: The exemption case requires formal closure after both the expiry date and confirmation of compliance. The records should show that the exemption ended successfully and include any assessment of its completion status. The records should indicate the final outcome of the exemption process including any permanent solutions that resulted from its use such as regulation amendments or new system implementations.

- Post-Exemption Review: It is beneficial for the CAA to conduct a retrospective analysis of each significant exemption. This is about learning and continuous improvement:

- Effectiveness Evaluation: The evaluation should determine if the exemption reached its goal of maintaining operational continuity while avoiding negative impacts. The implemented mitigation strategies proved adequate for the situation.

The evaluation should analyze all incidents and near-miss events that occurred during the exemption period. The operator should provide operational feedback about the reasonableness and effectiveness of the conditions as well as any unexpected challenges they faced during implementation which could help improve future conditions.

- Regulatory Implications: The CAA needs to evaluate if the requirement for an exemption reveals any requirement for modifying the current regulatory structure. The State should evaluate if the rule that received the exemption contains outdated or overly strict provisions which need long-term modification. The exemption was designed for a particular occasion so there is no requirement for changes. The strategic perspective enables the regulatory system to adapt to new requirements. The CAA should review the exemption requests from multiple operators because this pattern indicates that the current regulation needs either modification or more adaptable criteria.

- Document Lessons: Document any learned lessons regarding communication and risk assessment and domain-specific operations through internal reports or debriefs. The team should exchange their findings with other inspectors. Review the official exemption guidance or checklist (Appendix 1) for potential improvements when you discover an enhanced step.

- Reporting: The State should include exemption summaries along with their results in their safety oversight reports and State Safety Program annual report. The information helps to achieve transparency while enabling the detection of recurring patterns. The summary needs to be

- Records Management: Throughout and after the exemption process, maintain meticulous records:

- Ensure the exemption file (physical or digital) has all pertinent documents, from the initial application to the final review notes. As mentioned earlier, keep records according to State policy, but given the potential significance of exemptions, long-term retention is recommended.

- Update the central database or register to mark the exemption as closed (and whether it was utilized successfully, renewed, or revoked).

- The process requires States to inform ICAO about their non-compliance status and to notify ICAO when they return to compliance. States need to notify ICAO about their non-compliance status and then notify ICAO when they achieve compliance. States must notify ICAO about their non-compliance status and then notify ICAO when they achieve compliance. The international repository requires accurate information so States need to notify ICAO about both their non-compliance status and their return to compliance. States need to file a follow-up difference notice or use the EFOD to show compliance restoration from X.

The CAA proves its dedication to safety and compliance through its thorough process of following up on exemptions until they are fully resolved. The combination of pre-issuance scrutiny with post-

issuance monitoring creates a complete process which maintains exemptions as beneficial safety measures instead of system vulnerabilities.

7. Best Practices for Effective Exemption Management

7.1 Drawing on experiences from the MID Region and globally, the following best practices can enhance the effectiveness of a state's exemption process:

- Institutionalize the ProcessThe State Safety Oversight system should treat exemption issuance as a fundamental process instead of treating it as an occasional response. The procedures should include this process and all staff members who need to know about it. A properly established process helps organizations avoid mistakes and delays and ensures consistent results.

- Maintain a Central Registry and Analyze TrendsThe CAA should maintain a single log that contains all exemption information to perform periodic data analysis for identifying recurring patterns. The analysis of exemption data reveals which regulations need updates because numerous exemptions apply to specific rules. The analysis of trends helps identify operators who request exemptions repeatedly which might indicate compliance problems that require assistance or enforcement action.

- Ensure Equivalence of Safety: Stakeholders at all levels must understand that safety stands as an absolute priority. The granting of an exemption must never create conditions that are riskier than those which would exist under full compliance. The implementation of Safety Risk Management tools together with ICAO safety management principles will help achieve this goal. When faced with uncertainty always choose caution because refusing or limiting an exemption remains safer than permitting a possible unsafe situation.

- Promote Transparency and Confidence: The level of transparency in your exemption process will determine how much confidence stakeholders will have in it. Your organization should disclose its policies and reveal non-sensitive exemption approvals along with their supporting reasons. Your organization will gain trust from both industry stakeholders and public audiences and international partners through this approach. States will be more willing to accept your exemption implications for airline operations in their airspace when they observe your well-established system rather than suspecting you show leniency or make arbitrary decisions.

- Leverage Regional Collaboration: The MID Region under ICAO coordination enables member states to exchange best practices. States can create standardized criteria and checklists for specific exemption types through collaborative efforts (Multiple states united to create standardized COVID-related exemption

requirements). States should establish mutual recognition agreements with neighboring countries to accept each other's exemptions for pilot licenses and aircraft ferry operations when their regulatory systems match. States with matching regulatory systems and shared operators can benefit most from this approach.

- Regular Training and Scenario Drills: Staff members should receive ongoing training about new operational scenarios. The organization should anticipate upcoming aviation developments such as new technologies and drone operations to develop strategies for potential exemption requests. The team can identify readiness deficiencies through internal tabletop exercises which simulate hypothetical exemption requests while maintaining their readiness.

- Balance Flexibility and Rigor: A well-designed exemption system achieves equilibrium between operational adaptability and safety requirements through its ability to demonstrate flexibility in handling real-world situations while maintaining strict safety standards for justification and condition compliance. Both aspects are important. The system becomes ineffective when it refuses all exemptions during crises because it restricts operational activities yet becomes dangerous when it allows excessive flexibility. The ICAO promotes a risk-based approach which should guide the development of a balanced system.

- Document and Share Lessons Learned: The organization should create a lessons learned report following major events which include pandemics and other crises that result in broad exemptions. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and regional organizations request this feedback to enhance their worldwide guidelines. State's participation in this process enables the development of a worldwide knowledge base which could lead to better standards and emergency response plans for future crises. Update your organization's guidance documents through internal revisions to reflect the knowledge gained from recent experiences.

8. Final Comments

8.1 8.1 The aviation sector operates as a dynamic field which requires regulatory bodies to handle exceptional circumstances that deviate from typical scenarios. The exemption process enables operators to temporarily depart from standard rules when their operations need it to continue functioning or when they face unexpected challenges. The MID Region States need to implement a unified exemption system based on ICAO standards to preserve safety levels and maintain trust between member states. The provided guidance material establishes a complete framework with operational resources to help CAAs achieve their goal..

8.2 Exemptions need to be granted with caution because they should be used only in exceptional circumstances. The procedures and protective measures outlined in this document show that exemptions require both the regulator and operator to demonstrate increased responsibility and diligence. An exemption properly implemented supports both safety standards and operational continuity which benefits the public and aviation industry sustainability. The improper use of exemptions leads to damage of regulatory trust and

compromised safety performance.MID States are encouraged to collaborate, share information on exemptions granted, and support each other through ICAO MID and other platforms.

8.3 The implementation of a unified regional approach to common matters leads to reduced confusion and results in elevated safety standards. The aviation industry must remember the lessons from past global incidents because preparedness with adaptable yet secure regulatory approaches has become essential for aviation safety oversight.

8.4 The civil aviation authorities of the MID Region can establish readiness for future exemption needs through the implementation of these principles and processes and practices. The ICAO MID Office provides support to States for implementing this guidance while maintaining information exchange to help the MID Region uphold its top aviation safety standards during challenging times.

9. Sources:

- ICAO Doc 9734, Safety Oversight Manual, Part A – Chapter 3 (establishing regulatory policies, including use of flexibility tools)
- ICAO Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual (principles of safety risk management applied to regulatory processes)
- Chicago Convention (Doc 7300), Article 38 (State obligations to notify differences from international standards) and related ICAO guidance on filing of differences
- Lessons Learned from COVID-19 Contingency Coordination (ICAO State letters AN 11/55 and Targeted Exemptions repository usage in 2020-2021)
- Sample State Regulations and Manuals (e.g., Oman CAA Exemptions Procedure Manual, EASA Guidance on Targeted Exemptions) – used for benchmarking best practices in exemption evaluation and documentation.

Appendix 1

Example Checklist: Exemption Issuance Process

To assist CAAs and inspectors, below is an example step-by-step checklist for processing an exemption request. This checklist can be used as a reference to ensure all critical actions are completed during the evaluation and issuance of an exemption.

Step	Action/Requirement	Status (✓/✗/N/A)	Remarks
1. Application Received	Exemption request letter/form received from applicant; logged with reference number.	✓	(Date received, reference)
2. Initial Completeness Check	Application reviewed for all required information (rule citation, justification, duration, risk assessment, etc.).	✓	(If incomplete, info requested on [date])
3. Acceptability Screening	Confirm request falls within CAA authority and is not for a non-exemptible requirement.	✓	(If not, inform applicant/redirect)
4. Acknowledgment Sent	Acknowledge receipt to applicant, outline expected timeline or additional info needed.	✓	(Sent via email/letter on [date])
5. Assign Technical Team	Relevant technical experts/inspectors assigned to evaluate (ops, airworthiness, etc. as needed).	✓	(Team leader: [Name])
6. Risk Assessment Performed	Hazard identification and safety risk assessment completed (with mitigations identified).	✓	(Risk assessment doc ref no.)
7. Internal Consultation	Multi-department review/meeting held for consensus and input (including legal if needed).	✓	(Meeting date, key points)
8. Draft Decision Prepared	Draft determination made (approve or deny) with rationale. If approving, conditions drafted.	✓	(Draft exemption text ready)
9. Management Approval	Decision elevated to appropriate authority (DG or committee) for review and sign-off.	✓	(Approved/Denied on [date])
10. Exemption Document Issued	Official exemption letter/order signed and issued to applicant with all conditions.	✓	(Letter ref no., date sent)
11. ICAO/External Notification	If required, notify ICAO of difference and/or other States of the exemption.	✓	(State letter or EFOD updated on [date])

Step	Action/Requirement	Status (✓/✗/N/A)	Remarks
12. Update CAA Records	Log the exemption in registry, set reminder for monitoring and expiry.	✓	(Registry entry no., files archived)
13. Monitor Compliance	Oversight plan in place to monitor operator's compliance with conditions during exemption period.	✓	(Inspector assigned for follow-up)
14. Post-Exemption Review	After expiry, review outcomes and lessons. Operator back in compliance or exemption renewed properly.	✓	(Review done on [date])

Appendix 2

Sample Exemption Application Form

(This sample form can be provided to operators or individuals to standardize the exemption request submissions. The form ensures all necessary information is captured for the CAA's review.)

Civil Aviation Authority – Application for Exemption

1. **Applicant Information:**
   - **Name of Applicant/Organization:** ……
   - **CAA Certificate/License No.:** (if applicable) ……
   - **Contact Person:** …… **Title/Position:** ……
   - **Contact Details:** Tel …… Email …… Address ……
2. **Regulatory Requirement for which Exemption is Sought:**
   - **Reference of Regulation/Rule:** …… (cite exact paragraph or provision)
   - **Title/Description of Requirement:** ……
     (Example: CAR Ops 5.123 – requirement for pilots to complete a proficiency check every 6 months.)
3. **Details of the Proposed Exemption:**
   - **Requested Relief:** Describe exactly what compliance requirement is to be exempted and the proposed extent of the exemption.
     (Example: "To allow a 2-month extension beyond the 6-month proficiency check requirement for pilots of XYZ Airlines.")
   - **Individuals/Operations Affected:** Specify who or what will be covered by the exemption (aircraft, routes, personnel, etc.).
     (Example: "This exemption would apply to 50 pilots of XYZ Airlines operating the ABC-123 aircraft type.")
4. **Reason and Justification:**
   - **Operational Justification:** Explain why this exemption is necessary. What circumstances prevent compliance?
     (Example: "Due to unforeseen closure of the training simulator center as a result of natural disaster, pilots cannot complete proficiency checks by the due date.")
   - **Impact if Not Granted:** Briefly describe the consequences if the exemption is not approved.
     (Example: "If not granted, 50 pilots will be grounded, significantly disrupting the airline's scheduled operations and connectivity for remote regions.")
5. **Safety Risk Assessment:** *(Attach separate risk assessment document if needed)*
   - **Hazards Identified:** ……
     (Example: Pilots' skills may degrade without recurrent check on schedule.)

- **Mitigations Proposed:**
  ……
  (Example: All affected pilots will undergo extended ground refresher training and supervised line flying; no pilot will exceed 8 months without a proficiency check.)
- **Safety Statement:** Explain how an acceptable level of safety will be maintained.
  (Example: "With the proposed mitigations, we assess that operational risk remains low and safety is not compromised during the extension period.")

6. **Duration of Exemption:**
   - **Requested Start Date:** ……. **Requested End Date:** …….
     (Provide specific dates or event-based duration. Example: from 01-July-2025 to 30-Sep-2025.)
   - **Is this a one-time exemption or are you planning to apply for renewal if needed?**
     ……
7. **ICAO Standards Impact:** (For international operations)
   - Does the exemption contravene any ICAO Standard in Annexes (yes/no)? ……
   - If yes, identify the ICAO Standard and Annex involved:
     ……
   - Have you notified or coordinated with any other State or entity about this potential difference? ……
     (This helps the CAA in determining notification needs.)
8. **Previous or Related Exemptions:**
   - Have you or your organization previously been granted a similar exemption? (yes/no)
     ……
   - If yes, provide reference number or details:
     ……
   - If this is a renewal of a current exemption, list the current exemption reference:
     ……
9. **Applicant's Attestation:**
   I hereby certify that the information provided above and in attached documents is true and complete to the best of my knowledge. I understand the safety obligations associated with the granting of an exemption and commit to implementing any conditions imposed by the CAA to ensure safety.
   - **Name:** ……
   - **Position:** ……
   - **Date:** ……
   - **Signature:** ……

Attachments Checklist: (to be filled by applicant)

- Detailed Safety Risk Assessment document
- Supporting evidence (e.g., maintenance reports, training records, third-party letters, etc.)
- Copy of relevant current certificate or license (if needed for context)
- Any other pertinent documentation: ……

For CAA Use: (Leave this section for authority's processing notes)

- Date Application Received: ……

- Application Complete? Yes/No (If no, date additional info requested: ……)
- Assigned Evaluation Team/Inspector: ……
- Decision: **Approved / Denied**
- Exemption Ref No.: …… Date of Decision: ……

(End of Form)

Appendix 3

Risk Assessment Template for Exemption Evaluation

(This template is intended for CAA inspectors or safety risk managers to systematically evaluate the safety impact of a proposed exemption. It ensures all factors are considered and documented.)

A. Overview of Exemption Request:

- Exemption Reference (if assigned): ……
- Applicant/Organization: ……
- Rule from which Exemption is Sought: ……
- Brief Description of Proposed Exemption: ……
- Duration: From …… to …… (or event: ……)

B. Hazard Identification:
List the potential hazards or failure modes introduced by the exemption. Consider what could go wrong because the normal requirement is not met. For each hazard, identify the consequence in the worst-case scenario. For example:

- Hazard 1: ……
  - Potential Consequence: ……
- Hazard 2: ……
  - Potential Consequence: ……
- Hazard 3: ……
  - Potential Consequence: ……

(Add more as needed)

C. Initial Risk Analysis (Without Mitigations):
For each hazard identified, assess:

- **Likelihood (Probability)** of the hazard leading to an occurrence under exemption conditions. *(Use qualitative terms: Frequent, Occasional, Remote, etc., or numerical if available.)*
- **Severity** of the consequence if it occurs. *(Use standard severity classes: e.g., Catastrophic, Major, Minor, etc.)*
- **Initial Risk Level:** Determine the risk level or index from the combination of likelihood and severity (using the State's risk matrix or methodology). Indicate if it falls in Acceptable, Tolerable (with mitigation), or Unacceptable region prior to mitigation.

For example:

- Hazard 1: Likelihood – *Occasional*; Severity – *Major*; **Initial Risk: Medium-High (Tolerable only with mitigation)**
- Hazard 2: Likelihood – *Remote*; Severity – *Catastrophic*; **Initial Risk: High (Unacceptable)**
- Hazard 3: Likelihood – *Occasional*; Severity – *Minor*; **Initial Risk: Low (Acceptable)**

(These are illustrative. Conduct actual assessment based on evidence or expert judgment.)

D. Mitigation Measures:
List the safety measures that will be in place to reduce the risk of each hazard. Mitigations can be proposed by the applicant or added by the CAA. They might include operational restrictions, additional inspections, backup systems, increased monitoring, etc. For clarity, map each mitigation to the hazard(s) it addresses:

- Mitigation 1: ……
  - Addresses Hazard(s) #: ……
- Mitigation 2: ……
  - Addresses Hazard(s) #: ……
- Mitigation 3: ……
  - Addresses Hazard(s) #: ……

(Ensure all high/tolerable risks have at least one mitigation. Some mitigations may cover multiple hazards.)

E. Residual Risk Analysis (With Mitigations):
Re-assess the Likelihood and Severity for each hazard after implementing the above Mitigations:

- Hazard 1: New Likelihood – *Remote*; Severity – *Major*; **Residual Risk: Medium (Tolerable)**
- Hazard 2: New Likelihood – *Extremely Improbable*; Severity – *Catastrophic*; **Residual Risk: Medium (Tolerable)**
- Hazard 3: (if unchanged, copy as is) Likelihood – *Occasional*; Severity – *Minor*; **Residual Risk: Low (Acceptable)**

Evaluate if the **Residual Risk Level is acceptable** per State's criteria. (Typically, high risks must be reduced; medium may be tolerated with management decision; low are acceptable.) In this example, assume Hazard 1 and 2 have been reduced to a tolerable level with strong oversight, and Hazard 3 was already acceptable.

F. Additional Considerations:

- **Cumulative or Interactive Effects:** Consider if multiple exemptions or other concurrent issues could compound risk. *(Example: Pilot's training interval extended **and** aircraft maintenance check extended at same time – combined effect on safety.)*
- **Impact on Other Parties:** Does the exemption pose any risk to others (e.g., other operators, general public) beyond the applicant's operation? If so, addressed by mitigation? ……
- **Human Factors and Organizational Factors:** Any concern about human performance or organizational capability that could affect the outcome (e.g., reliance on pilot judgment, workload issues, company's SMS robustness)? ……

G. Risk Assessment Conclusion:

- Given the above analysis, is the risk of granting the exemption **acceptable with the identified mitigations** in place? **Yes / No**
- Summary Statement: ……
  (e.g., "With the conditions proposed (extra training, limited operations, monitoring), the

operational safety risk is reduced to an acceptable level for the duration of the exemption. It is concluded that the exemption can be granted without compromising safety.")

- If no, state reasons and what would be required to achieve acceptability (or conclude exemption cannot be granted safely). ……

H. Recommended Conditions for Exemption:
Based on the mitigation measures and any other regulatory considerations, list the conditions that should be imposed if the exemption is approved. These should correlate with the mitigations:

1. ……
2. ……
3. ……

(These conditions will be inserted into the exemption letter. E.g., "Aircraft XYZ shall only be operated on daytime cargo flights under VFR during the exemption period.")

I. Evaluation Team Sign-off:

- Lead Evaluator: _____ (Name, Position) – **Date:** ____ – **Signature:** ____
- Other Team Members: [Names/Initials] ……
- Reviewed/Concurred by (Supervisor/Manager): _____ – **Date:** ____

(The sign-off signifies that the risk assessment has been completed and reviewed as per CAA procedures.)

Appendix 4

Sample Exemption Approval Letter

(This is a generic template of an exemption approval letter from a Civil Aviation Authority to an applicant. It should be adapted to the State's official format and specific case details.)

[On Official CAA Letterhead]
Ref: CAA/EXEMPT/2025-xx (e.g., reference number of exemption)
Date: 15 November 2025

To: Mr. ABC XYZ, Director of Operations
XYZ Airlines
P.O. Box 12345, [City], [State]

Subject: Exemption Approval – [Brief Description, e.g., Extension of Pilot Proficiency Check Interval]

Dear Mr. XYZ,

1. Introduction:
We refer to your application dated 10 October 2025, in which **XYZ Airlines** requested an exemption from **[Regulation YYY-123, Paragraph 4.5]**, which requires that flight crew proficiency checks be conducted every 6 months. Your request was to allow an extension of this interval to 8 months for certain pilots, due to the temporary closure of the ABC Training Simulator Center.

2. Authority:
Under the powers granted to the Civil Aviation Authority of [State] by **Section 10 of the Civil Aviation Act and Part 1.2 of the [State Aviation Regulations]**, the CAA may grant exemptions to regulatory requirements on a case-by-case basis, provided such action is in the public interest and does not compromise safety.

3. Approval:
After careful review of your application, including the safety risk assessment and mitigation measures proposed, the CAA has decided to **grant the requested exemption**. This exemption allows XYZ Airlines to operate specified flights with pilots who are overdue for proficiency check, subject to the conditions below.

4. Details of Exemption:

- **Regulation Exempted:** [State Aviation Regulation YYY-123, Paragraph 4.5], which prescribes a 6-month interval for flight crew proficiency checks.
- **Nature of Exemption:** Authorizes an extension of the proficiency check interval up to a maximum of **8 months** for eligible pilots under conditions stipulated herein.
- **Effective Period:** This exemption is effective from **01 December 2025** until **31 March 2026**. Unless renewed, it will automatically expire at 23:59 LT on 31 March 2026, after which all pilots must fully comply with the 6-month proficiency check requirement.

- **Applicability:** This exemption applies only to **flight crew of XYZ Airlines who held valid proficiency checks as of 01 September 2025** that have since lapsed or will lapse before they can complete recheck due to simulator unavailability. It is not transferable to any other airline or personnel.

5.Conditions:
XYZ Airlines is required to comply with the following conditions as part of this exemption approval:
a. **Additional Training:** Prior to operating beyond the normal 6-month limit, each affected pilot shall undergo a structured refresher training program. This program (as described in your letter) must include at least 4 hours of classroom/theoretical training and 2 supervised line flights in a non-command role. Documentation of completion for each pilot must be retained and made available to the CAA on request.
b. **Operational Limitation:** Pilots operating under this exemption shall **not serve as Pilot-in-Command (PIC)** on any flight beyond 6 months since their last proficiency check. They may operate in the co-pilot role only. A currently qualified PIC (within 6-month proficiency) must be on board as the commander for all flights where an exempted pilot is part of the crew.
c. **Route Restrictions:** Exempted pilots shall only operate on domestic routes within [State] or routes to [Neighboring State] (as specified in your request). They are not permitted to operate to any other international destinations under this exemption unless specifically approved by the CAA.
d. **Monitoring and Reports:** XYZ Airlines shall closely monitor the performance of pilots flying under this exemption. Any abnormal events, safety concerns, or pilot proficiency issues must be reported to the CAA immediately. Additionally, XYZ Airlines must submit a **brief report every 30 days** during the exemption period summarizing how many flights were conducted under this exemption, and confirming that conditions were met on each flight. The first report is due by 01 January 2026.
e. **Simulator Scheduling:** XYZ Airlines must provide the CAA with evidence by 31 January 2026 that all affected pilots have been scheduled for proficiency checks at the earliest possible date once the ABC Simulator Center resumes operation (or an alternate training arrangement is made).
f. **Safety Standards:** All other operational and safety regulations remain in effect. This exemption in no way waives compliance with any requirement except the specific proficiency check interval stated. Pilots must continue to meet all other fitness for duty requirements (rest, medical fitness, etc.).

6.ICAO Compliance:
It is acknowledged that by extending pilot proficiency beyond 6 months, [State] is temporarily not in full compliance with ICAO Annex 1, Chapter 3, Standard 3.7.3 (which implies recurrent training proficiency within a given period). The CAA will file a difference with ICAO for the duration of this exemption, in accordance with Article 38 of the Chicago Convention, and notify concerned States as necessary.

7. Rights and Limitations:
The CAA reserves the right to **revoke or modify** this exemption at any time prior to 31 March 2026 if it is deemed in the interest of safety or if XYZ Airlines fails to adhere strictly to the conditions herein. Should the circumstances that necessitated this exemption abate (e.g., simulator training opportunities become available sooner), the CAA expects XYZ Airlines to promptly return to normal compliance and cease use of the exemption.

This exemption is a temporary measure granted based on the specific facts and mitigation strategies presented. It reflects the CAA's commitment to supporting continued operations during challenging circumstances **while maintaining an acceptable level of safety**. The CAA appreciates XYZ Airlines' proactive safety risk management in this process.

8. Conclusion:
Please signify your agreement to the terms and conditions of this exemption by countersigning and

returning a copy of this letter (or by a written confirmation of acceptance via email). By using this exemption, XYZ Airlines and its pilots agree to comply with all stated conditions. We look forward to your continued cooperation.

For any questions regarding this exemption, you may contact [CAA focal point name] at [contact info].

Sincerely,

[Signature]
[Name of DG/Authorized Officer]
Director General (or appropriate title)
[Civil Aviation Authority of State]

Countersignature (Applicant):
I, **[Name]**, on behalf of **XYZ Airlines**, acknowledge and agree to the above terms and conditions.

Signature: _____ Date: _____

(End of Exemption Letter Template)

- END -

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

REMOTE SAFETY OVERSIGHT GUIDANCE MATERIALFOR MID REGION STATES

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Example Checklist: Remote Audit Preparation

1. Introduction and Purpose and Scope

1.1 The COVID-19 pandemic together with other crises have forced aviation safety oversight to move away from its conventional on-site inspection model. The combination of travel limitations and health dangers and civil disturbances and natural disasters and restricted resources makes it difficult for civil aviation authorities (CAAs) to perform their in-person inspection duties.

1.2 1.2 CAAs need to use remote surveillance methods to maintain ongoing regulatory compliance for airlines and their service providers including maintenance organizations and airports during adverse conditions. Remote safety oversight which also operates under the names remote or virtual audits/inspections enables off-site technological execution of oversight tasks.

1.3 The manual establishes ICAO-compliant procedures for MID Region States to perform remote safety oversight according to ICAO principles and terminology from Doc 9859 (Safety Management Manual) and Doc 9734 (Safety Oversight Manual Part A) and Doc 8335 (Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection Certification and Continued Surveillance).

1.4 The system includes knowledge gained from the COVID-19 pandemic together with successful methods from the MID Region and worldwide organizations. The system uses remote oversight as an additional tool that supports traditional on-site inspections but does not replace them. The direct observation of operations and safety culture through on-site visits remains essential because these aspects cannot be fully captured through digital monitoring. The system should employ remote surveillance to support ongoing oversight when physical inspections become impossible but organizations must maintain plans for conducting on-site verification of essential items.

2. *Framework for Remote Safety Oversight*

2.1 2.1 Remote safety oversight needs to operate within the State's complete safety oversight framework which follows ICAO's Critical Elements of safety oversight (per Doc 9734) and the State Safety Programme (per Doc 9859). States maintain their responsibility to perform effective surveillance (Critical Element 7) and solve safety issues promptly (Critical Element 8) through virtual means. The framework follows ICAO standards and terminology which enables MID States to perform remote oversight according to international guidelines. The approach implements ICAO recommendations for oversight innovation and resilience after the COVID-19 pandemic.

2.2 The remote oversight system operates under specific circumstances which include pandemics and public health emergencies and civil unrest and natural disasters and financial limitations that prevent travel. Remote surveillance functions as a risk management tool to maintain vital oversight activities when specific conditions like pandemics or public health emergencies or civil unrest or natural disasters or severe financial or resource limitations prevent travel. The implementation of remote methods for oversight requires regulators to conduct risk assessments to determine their appropriate use. The suitability of remote execution for oversight tasks depends on their complexity level and safety-critical nature according to aviationweek.com. Each CAA needs to implement remote options within their Safety Risk Management framework to evaluate the risks of absent oversight against remote inspection constraints.

2.3 Scope of Application: Remote safety oversight techniques can be applied across various domains of aviation oversight, including:

- Certification and Approvals: The certification process includes remote execution of specific stages which include document assessments and procedure demonstrations through video connections. FAA policy now enables real-time video inspections for prototype conformity checks and engineering tests and production conformity assessments and airworthiness certificate approvals when specific conditions are met.

- Surveillance and Auditing: The team conducts virtual inspections of airlines (AOC holders) and maintenance organizations (AMOs) and training organizations and airports through virtual meetings and document portals and live video facility tours.

- Continued Compliance Monitoring: The organization will use remote methods to monitor corrective actions and foreign operators and to conduct interim surveillance when on-site visits become impossible.

Crucially, remote oversight should be institutionalized as part of the State's oversight system, not merely an ad-hoc pandemic workaround. A clear policy and framework gives inspectors and service providers certainty on how and when remote audits will be used. Many States worldwide are moving in this direction – for example, the East African Community's aviation oversight agency (CASSOA) has issued guidelines for the conduct of remote oversight activities as part of COVID-19 measures. The MID States are encouraged to establish similar guidance within their regulatory framework.

2.4 No Replacement for On-Site Oversight: Remote surveillance will stay as a permanent safety oversight tool yet MID States need to understand that physical inspections remain essential. The combination of remote audits and inspections functions as an additional oversight system which enables continuous monitoring when physical site access becomes impossible. The remote documentation audit serves as a preliminary step before targeted on-site inspections or as a follow-up assessment after on-site visits. CAAs should plan on-site inspections for areas that require direct assessment when conditions allow because these locations cannot be properly evaluated through remote methods (e.g. observing live operations and performing hands-on equipment checks and safety culture assessments on the ground). The combination of virtual and physical oversight methods protects the effectiveness of monitoring systems from becoming dependent on remote inspection methods only.

3. Regulatory and Organizational Preparedness

For remote oversight to be effective, States need to ensure their **regulations and internal procedures** explicitly support and govern its use. This section addresses the first main component: **regulations/special procedures for remote oversight**.

3.1 **Legal and Regulatory Framework:** Review all national civil aviation regulations together with guidance materials to determine which obstacles prevent remote oversight activities. The safety standards remain unchanged by regulations but CAAs should provide clarification about using audio/video and electronic methods for required audits and inspections and tests. The regulation requires an inspector to perform inspections at times

and locations which the Authority finds acceptable thus virtual inspections become possible when properly documented. The implementation of temporary exemptions and guidance should occur when necessary to enable remote inspections during emergency situations which multiple regulators established during COVID-19. The State should add permanent surveillance provisions or acceptable remote monitoring methods to its regulatory framework and inspector handbooks according to ICAO Doc 8335 guidelines for surveillance procedures.

3.2 **State Oversight Policy and Inspector Guidance:** States should create official procedures through an inspector bulletin which explains the complete process of remote oversight planning and execution and documentation requirements. The document needs to include complete instructions for all stages starting from planning through execution and reporting while specifying authorized technological tools. The guidance must follow ICAO Doc 9734 Part A principles by maintaining continuous surveillance through remote activities. The guidance needs to specify which inspection tasks cannot be performed remotely because new airline certification requires direct assessment of operational facilities. States must establish a clear policy for inspectors to maintain both consistent and transparent remote method implementation.

3.3 **Agreement with Industry and Acceptance of Results:** The aviation industry needs to receive clear expectations about its operations. Service providers need to understand that remote audits/inspections maintain full authority like traditional on-site inspections, and they must provide virtual access to personnel and documentation and requested areas to the CAA. States should implement remote oversight requirements through approval conditions which demand certificate holders to enable remote inspections and maintain required technological systems. The CAA needs to establish how remote inspection results will be treated since they should have the same enforcement power as findings from on-site inspections. The CAA should resolve legal barriers that restrict inspector presence for specific sign-offs through legal interpretations or amendments..

3.4 **Confidentiality and Security Measures:** The process of remote oversight requires organizations to exchange sensitive documents through digital channels and to monitor facilities through live video streams. The protection of sensitive information requires CAAs to develop security protocols for their operations. The review of documents should happen through secure file transfer systems or encrypted digital platforms. The recording of remote sessions requires organizations to determine storage procedures and disposal methods which must comply with privacy regulations and records management guidelines. All parties involved in remote oversight need to understand and approve the established protocols before starting their work. The implementation of these protocols creates trust that remote oversight operations will maintain the security of proprietary and personal data.

3.5 **Resource and Infrastructure Requirements:** The CAA requires essential tools for remote operations which include dependable high-speed internet and secure videoconferencing software and VPN access to CAA networks and possibly specialized equipment for inspectors when using advanced remote inspection tools. Organizations should establish a remote inspection station at CAA offices when resources permit to create an efficient virtual inspection process. The organizations undergoing inspection should prepare suitable equipment including portable cameras and mobile devices for virtual facility tours.

3.6 **Training and Competency:** The CAA inspectors need training that covers both technical and soft skills which are essential for performing remote oversight effectively. The training should focus on two areas: video conferencing and document-sharing tool proficiency and cybersecurity/hardware setup knowledge and remote communication methods including video interviewing and evidence request procedures. The inspectors should start their remote audit training through observation sessions with experienced colleagues or by working in pairs. The CAA should add these competencies to their inspector training program based on Doc 8335 competency frameworks and ICAO related guidance.

By establishing a robust regulatory and organizational foundation, MID States create an environment where remote surveillance is conducted in a controlled, standardized manner. With the framework in place, we now turn to the **operational procedures** for planning and conducting remote audits and inspections

4. Planning and Preparation for Remote Oversight

Thorough planning is key to a successful remote audit or inspection. This section outlines step-by-step procedures for the **pre-inspection phase**, ensuring that both the CAA team and the organization to be inspected are ready.

4.1 **Determine Oversight Scope and Feasibility:** The CAA (team leader or supervisor) needs to determine which activities will be part of remote oversight at the beginning. The team needs to establish specific goals and boundaries for the oversight process including which departments or functional areas to monitor and what type of oversight to perform. The team needs to conduct a risk assessment to validate the suitability of remote task execution. The operation complexity level and inspection area importance should guide the assessment of remote inspection risks. The inspection of complex equipment and operational site visits presents higher risks when performed virtually but document reviews and remote interviews remain safe for remote execution. The risk assessment results should guide the team to either remove specific elements from remote assessment or implement additional safety measures such as camera angle multiplication or on-site delegate presence.

4.2 **Notification and Agreement with the Service Provider:** The organization needs to receive advance notification about upcoming remote oversight activities after defining the scope of work. The notification should include an official document which explains the audit/inspection goals and specifies review areas and functions and describes the inspection methods including video meetings and document delivery and live video assessments. The notification should include all necessary documentation which must be provided in advance. The audit team requires all requested documents including manuals and training records and maintenance logs and specific evidence such as internal audit reports and safety performance data at least several days before the remote audit begins. The organization needs to verify they possess the necessary technology or establish it before the audit begins. The organization should select a main contact to handle logistics and perform video conferencing platform tests with CAA team members before the audit starts. The effectiveness of remote surveillance improves when auditees receive early information about the process so they can prepare properly.

4.3 **Assemble the CAA Inspection/Audit Team:** The team needs to establish the required number of inspectors who will perform operations inspections and airworthiness checks and ATM evaluations based on the defined scope. The remote inspection process allows

specialists from various locations to join the team because they do not need to travel to the site. The Team Leader position will handle meeting leadership and main communication duties while Technical Members will focus on designated checklist sections and subject areas. All team members need to access the schedule and organization documents and technical tools. The team should hold an internal pre-briefing session to review the plan and distribute responsibilities for interviews and camera observations and establish backup plans for technical system breakdowns.

4.4 **Review of Documentation (Pre-audit):** The organization must provide documents to inspectors for review before they conduct live virtual sessions. The process resembles the on-site document review procedure which takes place beforehand. The assigned inspectors examine their specific documents (the ops inspector reviews operations manual sections and the airworthiness inspector reviews maintenance records and so on) to identify any necessary clarification points and document their findings. The secure sharing of documents requires a previously agreed method between parties which includes secure email or cloud drive access or the CAA's portal. The inspectors should create a document review checklist to verify they examine all necessary items through remote means. The inspection team must obtain all essential missing documents prior to the scheduled inspection date. The pre-inspection review process optimizes efficiency because it lets inspectors dedicate their live remote sessions to interactive verification and clarification instead of reading documents in real time.

4.5 **Technology Setup and Testing:** The CAA team and organization team members need to perform technology tests before the scheduled inspection date. The team needs to confirm that the video conferencing system operates properly between both ends with clear video and audio and screen-sharing functions and that all firewall restrictions are resolved. The team needs to conduct connectivity tests at hangar and aircraft locations to verify signal strength and camera functionality through mobile devices or wearable cameras. The team should establish an alternative communication system through phone teleconferencing or instant messaging as a backup when the main video connection becomes unavailable. The CAA team needs to bring all necessary tools including electronic checklists and shared digital documents for real-time documentation of inspection results. The auditee needs to understand the inspection process through demonstrations of camera direction requests and electronic system screen-sharing functionality. The success of technology operations will prevent delays and frustration during the actual remote oversight process.

4.6 **Time Zone and Scheduling Considerations:** The oversight process requires scheduling that accommodates different time zones when inspecting foreign operators remotely through MID State CAA. The daily schedule should include shorter sessions because remote work tends to exhaust employees. The schedule should include extra time for dealing with technical problems and extended work periods. The auditee should receive a complete schedule which outlines the start and end times for all activities including the opening meeting and document discussions and interview sessions with named participants and live demonstrations of specific areas and equipment and scheduled breaks and final meeting. The organization can use this detailed schedule to ensure the necessary personnel including the accountable manager and safety manager and

The CAA establishes a solid foundation for remote oversight success through its thorough preparation process. The following section explains the complete process of conducting an audit/inspection

through remote methods which includes document assessment and virtual site visits and digital meetings.

5. Conducting Remote Audits and Inspections: Execution

The CAA team will execute remote surveillance through multiple stages after finishing the planning process. The execution of remote The audit/inspection process contains three distinct sections which are explained in detail in the following sub-sections oversight depends on three essential components which include digital document review and virtual inspection and their corresponding regulatory procedures..

5.1 **Opening Meeting (Virtual)**; Just as in an on-site audit, the process begins with an Opening **Meeting**. This meeting is held via video conference with the CAA team and the organization's key personnel. Best practices for the opening meeting include:

- **Introduction:** The Team Leader starts by presenting all CAA participants through their names and roles before asking organization representatives to present themselves including their accountable executive and department heads and virtual tour escorts. The remote setting does not affect the professional environment that the introduction process creates.

- **Purpose and Scope:** The audit/inspection purpose needs to be restated along with all activities that will be included in the assessment. The initial communication about the audit scope remains important because it helps all participants understand the objectives before starting. The audit serves as a regulatory oversight process which takes place remotely because of present circumstances (specify travel restrictions or other applicable reasons).

- **Outline of Method and Schedule:** Explain the procedures for remote inspection operations. The inspection plan includes document assessment and interview sessions and live video inspections which will take place according to a predetermined timeline. The Microsoft Teams call will continue for interviews before we transition to mobile video inspection of the hangar at 1300 local time. All participants need to understand the exact timing and methods for each inspection segment. All participants need to understand the session rules which include keeping their microphones off during silence and obtaining permission before recording the session.

- **Technical Checks:** All participants need to confirm their ability to see and hear each other clearly. The team should resolve any remaining technical problems at this point. The team should check that all required screen-sharing functions operate correctly for displaying documents and inspection checklists.

- **Questions and Consent:** The organization should have a chance to ask questions about the process at this point. The organization needs to confirm their readiness to start and accept the chosen method. The team should verify administrative details at this stage including document verification and personnel availability and connectivity failure procedures. The CAA needs permission to record audio or video during the session for official use only. The organization should obtain consent for recording sessions but formal recording is usually unnecessary since detailed notes serve the purpose.

By the end of the opening meeting, both the CAA and organization should be aligned on the plan and comfortable with the virtual format. The inspectors should project approachability and clarity, setting a collaborative tone similar to an on-site audit, while maintaining authority as regulators.

5.2 **Remote Documentation Review:** Following the opening, the team typically proceeds with documentation review discussions, which leverage the digital document audit that was conducted pre-inspection. In a remote audit, document review may happen in a couple of ways:

- **Offline Review with Follow:** Inspectors examine the provided documents before the audit process begins. The remote audit process includes scheduled meetings for inspectors to review their findings and request additional clarification about specific points. The inspector reviews your submitted maintenance training records before asking (I reviewed your maintenance training records that were submitted. The inspector wants to understand your process for maintaining recurrent training intervals for technicians because they need to verify compliance with requirements. The organization's staff members can provide immediate explanations and present additional proof through real-time screen-sharing of their training database to show compliance. The document validation process becomes more effective through this interactive question and answer method.
- **Live Screen-Sharing of Electronic Records:** The inspector will request to view electronic management system records (including safety reports and maintenance logs) through live screen sharing when the organization operates these systems. The process mirrors an on-site auditor who requests a random document from filing cabinets but uses the company's information system instead. The inspector will instruct the company representative to display the aircraft maintenance log for tail number XYZ followed by the last inspection entry. Real-time access to data ensures both its current status and its complete accuracy. The inspector can perform spontaneous sampling by requesting to view the training file of employee "name" in the same way as an onsite audit.

- **Use of Digital Audit Tools:** The can use existing audit software platforms which organizations share for collaborative document assessment. The inspector can use cloud-based audit process may utilize specific software systems or shared platforms that particular CAAs or organizations maintain. The inspector checklists to verify evidence by marking completed items and upload supporting files and screenshots directly to the audit record.

The process of reviewing documents from a remote location requires absolute precision in every detail. The inspector needs to confirm document versions are up to date because remote oversight depends on electronic manuals to track active revision numbers. The inspector needs to determine if the audit documents were created for the review or if they represent standard business records. Inspectors can prevent document tampering in remote settings by requesting current documents and verifying document timestamps and signatures. The inspector should request additional context or multiple examples of documents when they identify any suspicious documents.

The auditor needs to maintain a clear record of all review activities. The auditor uses document numbers or titles from the checklist to track review progress while documenting any found discrepancies or confirmations. The inspector marks down any discovered issues (outdated procedures or absent training records) for the report and requests immediate clarification or corrective action from the organization during the audit process.

5.3 Remote Interviews and Discussions: Interviewing personnel is a key part of oversight to assess competence, understanding of responsibilities, and the safety culture. In a remote context, interviews are typically done via video call. To conduct effective **remote interviews**:

- **Plan Interview Sessions Separately:** The most effective approach involves dividing video call sessions into distinct periods for different groups and individuals (management interview sessions should be separate from frontline staff sessions and safety officer sessions). The approach guarantees that all necessary participants will attend while minimizing interruptions. Remote interviews enable you to include participants who work in different locations because they can participate without needing to travel to the same location.
- **Build Rapport and Observe Cues:** Begin each interview session by creating a relaxed atmosphere through casual statements which help bridge the distance of virtual communication. The camera allows you to maintain eye contact while you should also attempt to read body language to the extent that the platform enables. The inability to read room dynamics through video calls becomes more challenging but you can still detect changes in voice tone and facial expressions. The interviewee needs to keep their camera active while being in a private space that prevents external influences from affecting their responses.
- **Use Open-Ended Questions:** The interview process should include open-ended questions which prevent candidates from giving simple yes/no responses. The interview question "Please describe your approach to managing aircraft groundings because of mechanical problems under your maintenance control program" assesses their procedural understanding and application skills. The interviewer should actively listen to their response before asking additional detailed questions or hypothetical situations to evaluate their comprehension. The remote interview process requires breaking down questions into smaller sections while checking for understanding at regular intervals because audio delays and dropouts might happen.
- **Ensure Inclusivity:** The interviewer should organize teleconference discussions with multiple maintenance technicians to ensure each participant receives speaking opportunities. The interviewer should actively seek contributions from participants who remain silent because virtual meetings tend to suppress some attendees. The process mirrors the physical practice of walking around a meeting table to include all participants.
- **Confidentiality and Openness:** During on-site audits inspectors sometimes conduct private meetings with individual employees to discuss safety matters. Virtual environments require separate scheduled calls when private discussions become necessary. The interviewee should understand they can express themselves without interruption because only the planned group members should be present in the room. The inspector can document sensitive matters during the meeting then contact the person by phone for additional privacy when needed.

- **Assessing Safety Culture Remotely:** Inspectors need to ask specific questions which help them understand both the organization's safety culture and its leadership dedication to safety. The inspector should ask two specific questions to assess management support for remote safety issue resolution and recent safety improvements with their communication methods. The inspector can determine if the organization maintains an open reporting culture and active safety management system through the detailed responses obtained during video inspections which align with ICAO Doc 9859 safety management principles.

During remote interviews you should maintain professional language while following a structured approach to discuss all required topics using a questionnaire or checklist. Take detailed notes. The inspector can ask for evidence when a response creates a concern by requesting either the new procedure document to be displayed on screen or by asking for it to be sent through email. When technical issues prevent clear hearing of a statement you should request the person to repeat it instead of making assumptions. The process aims to obtain equivalent quality information from remote interviews while understanding the limitations of virtual communication.

5.4 **Virtual On-Site Inspection (Facility and Operations Tour):** The most difficult part of remote oversight involves inspecting physical facilities and equipment and observing live operations from a distance. The inspector relies on technology to substitute for their direct on-site visual inspection. The following steps enable effective virtual inspection operations:

- **Assign a Camera Operator:** The organization needs someone to perform on-site inspections by walking through facilities while using a camera device which could be a smartphone or tablet with internet access and good camera quality. The designated person functions as both eyes and hands of the inspector to execute instructions about locations and display requirements. The person conducting the inspection needs to be both competent and cooperative since they should be an experienced staff member who understands the facility layout and can fulfill requests (such as QA managers or safety officers).
- **Use Real-Time Video Tours:** The inspector will guide the camera operator through the live video call. The inspector will ask the camera operator to move the camera during an aircraft maintenance hangar inspection by saying “Please pan slowly across the tool calibration board… hold there, zoom in on that calibration sticker… what is the date on that? Okay, thank you. The inspector needs to see the left wing open panel of the aircraft. The inspector follows their on-site inspection process by examining equipment while reading labels and watching work activities. The camera operator needs to maintain active communication by saying “Now we are walking into the engine shop…” while following all instructions immediately. The inspector can use screenshot functionality to record video evidence that appears on the screen.
- **Structured and Unstructured Observations:** Create a virtual tour schedule which includes specific locations such as the ops control center and maintenance hangar and training classroom but also permit free exploration. The inspector can request to examine specific areas after noticing something on camera while performing their inspection in the same way an on-site inspector would conduct spot checks. The organization will demonstrate actual operational areas instead of

staged clean spaces because of this approach. The operator should guide the tour to current activities including flight dispatch briefings and maintenance operations so viewers can see real-time operations. Remote observation of actual operations enables inspectors to assess both current safety practices and real-time compliance status.

- **Multiple Camera Angles:** The use of multiple devices together with cameras represents an optimal solution. The system includes fixed cameras (CCTV) which enable remote access through advanced features. The CAA requires either temporary access to critical area CCTV feeds or screen-sharing of CCTV views from those areas. The inspection process becomes more comprehensive through the participation of multiple staff members who use cameras to join the call from different locations such as the training simulator cockpit and the ramp area. The inspector possesses the ability to move between different video feeds.
- **Limitations Acknowledgement:** The inspection process requires physical verification of certain items because remote checks cannot achieve high accuracy for tasks like component tugs or fuel smell detection. The inspection process should focus on visual checks and operator-led actions at the site including panel opening and camera-based measurements. The FAA has found that video-based inspections prove difficult for complex interior checks according to their experience. Inspectors need to note all unverifiable critical items which will require on-site evaluation for future assessment. Organizations can enhance their virtual inspection process by using their internal inspection reports and third-party audit results when direct inspection proves impossible.
- **Safety during Virtual Tours:** The on-site camera operator needs to follow all safety protocols and regulatory requirements while conducting the tour. The operator should follow all safety rules at all times because violating any rule by moving the camera to restricted areas will result in prohibition. The inspector should only conduct high-risk area tours such as airside apron tours when it is safe and allowed by regulations and the operator must use protective equipment and receive assistance from another person for lookout duties.

The inspector needs to document all observations through notes during the virtual inspection process as if they were physically present. The inspector needs to document all observed discrepancies and take screenshots as evidence when they spot expired fire extinguishers or dangerous practices. The inspector maintains continuous communication by describing their desired views to the camera operator who verifies the display before asking the subject-matter expert to explain observed items. The inspector asks the engine shop subject-matter expert to explain their chemical storage cabinet security procedures and identify the responsible personnel.

The team leader should perform a quick summary of the tour while remaining online to verify that all necessary areas have been inspected. The team leader should ask inspectors to identify their remaining video inspection needs before finishing this audit segment.

5.5 **Closing Meeting (Virtual)**

After the document reviews, interviews, and virtual facility tour are completed, the remote oversight activity should conclude with a **Closing Meeting** via video conference. The

closing meeting allows the CAA team to present their findings and for both sides to clarify the results. Key points for the closing meeting:

- **Attendance:** The same participants who attended the opening session should be present at this meeting including management staff and concerned personnel and any other organization representatives who want to hear the results (e.g. the CEO or Accountable Manager if they were not present throughout the audit). The CAA team must be fully present while a lead spokesperson (Team Leader) should be chosen to represent the group.
- **Thank and Acknowledge:** The Team Leader needs to start by expressing gratitude to participants for their help with remote oversight activities and their flexibility during the process. The team leader should recognize the difficulties that were solved during the process (e.g. "We value the work of your team for organizing the virtual tour and delivering documents quickly."). The positive feedback establishes a constructive atmosphere for evaluation.
- **Summary of Activities:** The remote inspection summary should include a concise overview of completed work which states "We examined [X number] documents and conducted [Y] personnel interviews and virtually checked facilities A, B and C during the past two days." The summary demonstrates the wide range of oversight activities while introducing the subsequent findings section.
- **Presentation of Findings:** The presentation should include all identified findings which combine positive aspects (conformities and good practices) with negative elements (non-compliances and concerns). A summary document or slide should be displayed on your screen to present the findings for better understanding. Each identified finding requires detailed explanation through evidence references. The documentation for the training program lacks proof of simulator training for all pilots according to regulation X as shown in the document reference. The analysis of 15 pilot records revealed that three of them lacked simulator session logs. The digital nature of all reviewed materials enables you to provide exact references to the files or records you observed. Use severity levels to organize your findings when your CAA implements a system with different levels (e.g., Level 1 for major safety concerns and Level 2 for minor issues). The SMS benefits from an electronic safety reporting system which you have implemented as a positive development.
- **Clarifications and Reactions:** The organization should receive a chance to request clarification about the findings and contribute supplementary information after the presentation of all results. The organization should describe particular events and present supplementary evidence at this moment. The remote environment enables them to instantly share files which help them defend their position when they feel a particular point has been incorrectly understood. The CAA team should accept additional evidence when possible but maintain audit objectivity at all times. The audit team should document all unresolved disputes for future evaluation.
- **Next Steps and Corrective Actions:** The organization needs to know about the upcoming steps in the process. The organization will receive a complete formal audit/inspection report which will be ready for delivery within two weeks. The organization needs to understand their process for responding to audit results because they must create a corrective action plan (CAP) for each finding with established deadlines even though the audit took place remotely. The organization

needs to follow the standard closure procedures for all findings while the CAA will enforce immediate safety risk mitigation through specific requirements such as operation restrictions or urgent fixes when serious issues are detected.

- **On-Site Follow-up (if applicable):** The document should include information about any planned on-site follow-up activities. The plan includes a short on-site validation of maintenance facilities which will take place during the next six months after travel restrictions are lifted. The team will focus on [XYZ] during this validation process. The remote process will receive complete closure through this future on-site validation.
- **Closing Remarks:** The meeting concludes with appreciation for all participants who took part. The remote oversight process demonstrates how both parties maintain their dedication to safety through their collective efforts. The organization should maintain its dedication to address the identified issues while the CAA remains accessible for any questions that may arise during the corrective action period. The remote oversight process achieved its goals by detecting improvement needs and verifying compliance standards even though it took place virtually.

After ending the call, the CAA team should internally debrief (perhaps immediately on a separate call) to discuss how the remote audit went and ensure alignment on the findings recorded. This internal debrief can feed into improving future remote oversight activities.

6. Post-Oversight Reporting and Follow-Up

The remote oversight process doesn't end with the closing meeting. Proper documentation and follow-up are crucial to ensure the oversight achieves its purpose of enhancing safety.

6.1 **Report Preparation:** The CAA team will create an official report which follows the procedures used for standard audit and inspection activities. The report must specify that the oversight took place remotely through detailed descriptions of methods and dates and recorded limitations. The documentation should include all identified issues together with supporting evidence through document names and virtual tour screenshots when available. The report should contain both positive observations and verification of compliance. The report needs to pass future audit inspections because it will serve as proof that the State maintained its oversight responsibilities through remote methods. The report must use the CAA's established format (Doc 8335 offers guidelines for reporting) and undergo peer review according to internal quality assessment procedures.

6.2 **Distribution:** The organization should receive the completed report according to the established deadline. The organization will receive the report through email brief follow-up call should be arranged to present detailed report findings to the organization because some points might have remained unclear during the final meeting due to time constraints.

6.3 **Corrective Action Plans:** The organization needs to present their proposed corrective action plan (CAP) for each identified finding before a specified deadline. The plan must explain the steps to resolve non-compliance or deficiency along with the responsible personnel and timeframes. The organization should focus on implementing systemic solutions that enhance their processes beyond fixing individual cases because these solutions align with safety management principles including root cause analysis for major problems. The CAA inspectors will assess these CAPs through remote review before they

either validate them or ask for additional improvements based on standard oversight procedures.

6.4 **Follow-Up Activities:** The CAA needs to track all corrective actions that are being put into practice. The CAA can perform this task from a distance by checking through email whether new records have been added or an updated procedure has been distributed when training records were absent. The CAA will perform additional remote checks or on-site verifications for critical findings when possible. The CAA needs to document all follow-up activities through their oversight system until they reach completion.

6.5 **On-Site Validation (if needed):** The team should schedule any required on-site validation activities according to the closing meeting instructions. The team should perform a specific inspection at the site when travel restrictions are lifted to confirm essential items that needed physical verification. The on-site follow-up results need to include references to the original remote audit findings for clear connection purposes.

6.6 **Records Management:** All records from remote oversight operations need to be stored in an appropriate archive system. The documentation includes the report together with all interview transcripts and notes and screenshots and files and all correspondence. The CAA's recordkeeping rules require proper management of electronic records from remote activities through secure storage of chat logs and recordings for defined retention periods. The collected records will function as proof of State oversight activities during internal assessments and international evaluation processes.

6.7 **Evaluation and Improvement:** The CAA should conduct an evaluation of their remote oversight system following its completion. The inspectors should provide feedback about their experience through a survey to identify successful aspects and technical and procedural obstacles they encountered. The inspection team should confirm whether they achieved all the results they would have obtained through on-site inspections. The evaluation process helps organizations discover important learning points. The inspected organization should provide feedback about the remote process because their insights can help identify better communication methods and technological improvements for future inspections. The CAA should use collected information to enhance their remote oversight procedures and training programs. The process will evolve into a more efficient and effective system through technological advancements and increased experience. By diligently following up, the CAA ensures that remote surveillance achieves tangible safety outcomes (corrected deficiencies, improved compliance) and not just a checklist exercise. The end goal remains the same as traditional oversight: to enhance aviation safety and compliance in the State.

7. Best Practices for Effective Remote Oversight

Drawing on experiences around the world, this section compiles **best practices** and tips to maximize the effectiveness of remote safety oversight:

7.1 **Adopt a Risk-Based Approach:** Choose specific times to use remote oversight methods while selecting the most suitable areas for technological evaluation. The evaluation process should focus on technological assessment of specific areas while conducting on-site inspections for non-assessable regions. The risk assessment should guide your decision to

use remote audits for operators who demonstrate good compliance history and strong performance but on-site checks should occur first for new or underperforming operators.

7.2 **Leverage Technology Smartly:** The team should use the most advanced tools available while staying updated about emerging solutions. The quality of virtual inspections becomes significantly better when organizations implement two basic solutions which include high-definition cameras and reliable internet connections. The CAAs have tested wearable cameras mounted on hard hats and drones to provide remote access to airfield facilities inspection. The team needs to practice using the tools until everyone feels comfortable with them. The team should maintain backup systems which include a substitute video conference platform and additional power sources for the on-site camera operator and a phone hotline for emergency communication.

7.3 **Ensure Strong Communication:** The success of remote oversight depends heavily on clear communication between parties. Inspectors need to provide direct and clear instructions and verification statements to their requests. The process of document requests should include precise identification of titles or IDs and interview conclusions should include essential point summaries to verify mutual understanding. The absence of physical presence creates space for misunderstandings to occur thus it is essential to verify that both parties share identical interpretations of all agreements and observations. The auditee should maintain a comfortable environment to request clarification through "Could you please repeat that?" or to report missing details by saying "We didn’t catch that detail" to prevent any misinterpretations.

7.4 **Document Everything:** Maintain an extensive paper (or digital) trail. The inspector uses a notepad for note-taking during on-site audits but remote audits require a shared document or inspection log that receives real-time updates. Save essential evidence files and screenshots because they serve dual purposes for report creation and future defense of remote oversight results. The data collected during remote audits should receive the same level of attention as physical evidence collected during on-site audits. The electronic checklist tool requires backup protection to function properly. The data collected during remote audits needs identical treatment to physical evidence collected during on-site audits..

7.5 **Focus on Human Factors:** The remote audit process presents new challenges for both auditee staff members and CAA personnel. The combination of prolonged video meetings leads to staff fatigue so organizations should implement scheduled breaks and limit their virtual workday to shorter intervals. The combination of technical problems and virtual communication stiffness creates higher stress levels for both inspection teams and organizational personnel. The combination of patience and flexibility will help you achieve better results. Internet connectivity problems require you to pause the session until stability returns before resuming or switch to audio-only mode when bandwidth levels become insufficient.

7.6 **Maintain Professionalism and Authority:** The oversight activity maintains official status even though you perform it from your home or office through webcam. Inspect inspector should present themselves properly on camera while maintaining punctuality for virtual meetings and following established protocols through systematicors need to maintain their professional conduct during virtual inspections at the same level as their fieldwork. The execution of introductions and briefing and debriefing procedures. The auditee needs to understand the process requires full attention so they should schedule specific time for the

audit and avoid treating remote audits as informal conversations that can be done while performing other tasks.

7.7 **Incorporate Data and Tools from Industry:** Remote oversight can be complemented by other sources of safety data. ICAO and various industry groups have suggested using, third-party audit results, safety performance indicators reported through the State Safety Program, or even live data (like Flight Data Monitoring summaries) could be leveraged. These can enrich the remote audit and compensate for some lack of on-site exposure.

7.8 **Regional and International Cooperation:** Remote technologies enable international collaboration between different locations. The MID Region States can arrange for specialists to participate in remote inspections of each other's facilities through observer or advisory roles with suitable arrangements. The system enables smaller CAAs to obtain specialized expertise and establishes uniform inspection methods. The Asia-Pacific region demonstrated during COVID-19 that mutual support for oversight operations and practice sharing brings significant value to all participants.

7.9 **Continuously Update Remote Oversight Procedures:** The remote oversight guidance of CAAs needs periodic updates as technology advances and new knowledge emerges. The methods and tools which proved effective in 2021 will likely become outdated by superior alternatives that emerge in the future. The remote oversight framework should exist as an active document which receives updates. The framework should receive input from inspectors while it adapts to new ICAO recommendations and develops better standards for remote oversight implementation. The long-term objective involves making remote oversight an integral part of standard safety oversight operations to enhance both operational efficiency and coverage while maintaining high quality standards.

By following these best practices, CAA inspectors can conduct remote surveillance that is both effective and credible, yielding real safety oversight value.

8. Final Comments

8.1 Remote surveillance for aviation safety oversight has transitioned from an emergency improvisation into a **valuable component of modern oversight strategies**. By adhering to ICAO's principles and the guidance in this manual, MID Region States can implement remote auditing and inspection practices that uphold safety and compliance even when traditional methods are disrupted. The framework and procedures outlined – covering regulatory adjustments, meticulous planning, effective use of technology during execution, and thorough follow-up – provide a **comprehensive roadmap** for CAAs to follow

8.2 The overarching message is one of balance and continuous improvement: remote oversight is not a panacea, but it is a potent tool when used appropriately. It can increase efficiency (cover more ground with less cost) and ensure oversight continuity in trying times, thereby supporting the State's obligations under ICAO's safety oversight system. At the same time, CAAs must remain vigilant about the limitations and maintain on-site presence whenever necessary to capture the full picture of an aviation entity's operations and culture.

8.3 By developing capacity in remote surveillance, the MID region will be better equipped to handle future challenges – whether they be another pandemic, geopolitical issues, or simply the need to do more with limited resources. **Collaboration, technology, and a strong safety focus** will drive the successful integration of remote oversight. In line with global best practices and with support from ICAO, MID States can lead by example, showing how to maintain the highest standards of aviation safety oversight no matter the circumstances.

Finally, this guidance is intended to be a living document. Users are encouraged to customize it to their national context and share feedback or new best practices. The aviation world will continue to evolve, and so too should our oversight methods – always aiming to enhance safety in the skies.

9. Sources:

- ICAO SEIG/4 Working Paper on Remote Oversight (Presented by Qatar)
- FAA Policy and Industry Practice on Remote Inspections (Aviation Week, Apr 2020)aviationweek.comctsys.com
- CASSOA (East African Community) Guidelines for Remote Oversight cassoa.org
- ICAO Doc 9734, Safety Oversight Manual, Part A
- ICAO Doc 9859, Safety Management Manual

Appendix 1

Example Checklist: Remote Audit Preparation

To further assist CAAs and inspectors, below is a simplified example of a **Remote Audit Pre-Flight (Preparation) Checklist** that could be used as a reference:

Step	Action/Requirement	Status (✓/✗/N/A)	Remarks
1. Define Scope & Objectives	Confirm audit scope, areas, and regulations. Ensure suitability for remote evaluation.		
2. Risk Assessment	Assess remote feasibility (complexity, critical checks). Hybrid/on-site if risk is high.		
3. Team Assigned	Identify team members. Allocate roles (Team Leader, Ops Inspector, Airworthiness Inspector, etc.).		
4. Notify Operator	Send official audit notification (dates, scope, expectations). Ensure acknowledgment is received.		
5. Documents Requested	Send list of requested documents (manuals, records, org charts, training logs). Set submission deadline.		
6. Documents Received	Confirm receipt and accessibility of all requested documents. Follow up if pending.		
7. Pre-Review Done	Team reviews documents. Note preliminary observations/questions.		
8. Tech Platform Setup	Select primary video platform (Zoom/Teams). Create links and share with operator. Arrange backup method.		
9. Test Call Completed	Conduct audio/video test with operator. Check video quality for critical areas (e.g., hangar).		Date:
10. Schedule Finalized	Prepare detailed agenda (opening, interviews, tour, closing). Confirm with operator. Time zones checked.		
11. Inspector Equipment Check	Ensure inspectors have laptops, webcams, headsets, and templates. Quiet environment confirmed.		
12. Security Check	Agree on secure file sharing, screen sharing permissions, and recording rules.		
13. Contingency Plan	Brief team and operator on disconnection protocol (e.g., wait 10 min, then call by phone).		
14. Ready to Commence	Confirm all preparations complete. Team Leader approves audit start.		

- END -

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INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

GUIDANCE MATERIAL ON JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT FOR AVIATION INSPECTORS FOR MID REGION STATES

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1. Introduction and Purpose and Scope

1.1 The civil aviation authorities (CAAs) and their inspectors in the MID Region have the fundamental duty to enforce aviation safety regulations. The standard procedures for safety violation management consist of administrative actions which include warnings and fines and certificate suspensions but specific cases need judicial system involvement for proper enforcement. Judicial enforcement requires State courts or judiciary institutions to take legal action against serious aviation law violations for penalty enforcement. This guidance material has been developed specifically for MID Region States to enhance aviation inspectors' understanding of judicial enforcement mechanisms. The system offers a standardized framework together with established procedures and best practices that follow ICAO standards while adapting to the specific legal requirements and regional needs of MID States.

1.2 This document's primary objective is to guide aviation safety inspectors on how and when to engage the judicial enforcement process as part of their oversight duties. It aims to ensure that serious breaches of aviation regulations, especially willful, reckless, or repeat violations are dealt with effectively through legal channels, thereby enhancing overall safety compliance. By clarifying roles, processes, and expectations, the material seeks to bolster inspectors' confidence and competence in cooperating with judicial authorities.

1.3 The complete judicial process for aviation oversight enforcement starts at the beginning and ends at the end of the enforcement process. It spans from the initial identification of violations and gathering of evidence, through the decision making to pursue legal action, up to participating in court proceedings and post-trial follow-up. It addresses various sectors of aviation (flight operations, airworthiness, licensing, aerodromes, etc.)Inspectors will find violations that need judicial intervention during their inspections. The document focuses on inspection cases that require preparation for prosecution or legal adjudication yet administrative enforcement actions remain important. It is assumed that each State may adopt these guidelines in accordance with national laws and judicial structures.

1.4 The guidance helps MID Region regulators and policymakers to develop uniform exemption management systems for their respective states. The system tracks all stages of exemption management starting from the first request evaluation until the issuance of the exemption and its subsequent monitoring for compliance with conditions and the process of renewal or expiration.

1.5 The guidance bases its approach on ICAO Safety Oversight principles while using the State Safety Programme (SSP) framework. The document bases its content on ICAO publications Doc 9734 (Safety Oversight Manual Part A) and Doc 8335 (Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection Certification and Continued Surveillance) which establish that proper enforcement stands as the fundamental element of a complete safety oversight system. States must develop safety issue resolution procedures and establish penalty systems for non-compliance according to the eighth critical element of ICAO. This material interprets those global principles for practical application by inspectors in the judicial context of MID Region States. The development of this guidance also responds to regional aviation safety goals (as noted by MIDANPIRG/RASG-MID) to strengthen enforcement capabilities of inspectors.

1.6 Ultimately, the effective use of judicial enforcement by CAAs serves two key purposes: deterrence (sending a strong message that serious violations will be met with serious consequences) and accountability (ensuring that individuals or entities who flout aviation laws are held responsible under the law). By working hand-in-hand with prosecutors and judges, aviation inspectors can help uphold aviation safety regulations and protect the traveling public. The sections that follow outline the framework and detailed procedures to achieve these aims, mirroring the structured approach of other ICAO guidance materials for consistency and ease of use.

2. Framework for Judicial Enforcement in Aviation Oversight

2.1 The State requires all civil aviation judicial enforcement activities to function under its safety oversight system which follows ICAO standards and recommended practices through its legal framework. ICAO's safety oversight model calls for States not only to monitor compliance (through inspections and audits) but also to ensure the resolution of safety issues, which includes enforcement actions up to prosecution if necessary. In the MID Region context, this means CAAs should integrate judicial enforcement as a formal component of their State Safety oversight system and enforcement policies, consistent with Critical Element 7 (Surveillance) and Critical Element 8 (Resolution of Safety Concerns) of ICAO's framework. The adoption of ICAO standards enables the use of uniform enforcement terminology and procedures which international authorities can both recognize and verify. For instance, when pursuing legal action for an aviation violation, inspectors and CAA legal staff should reference the relevant ICAO Standards and national regulations that have been promulgated from those standards. The State demonstrates to international auditors (e.g. ICAO USOAP missions) through its legal framework that it operates a system which enforces legal procedures for handling violations when needed. A State demonstrates its dedication to enforcing aviation safety rules through every possible means by establishing judicial enforcement as part of its regulatory system.

2.2 **Principles of Judicial Enforcement:** The use of judicial enforcement should be guided by key principles to ensure it is fair, effective, and contributes to aviation safety. These core principles include:

- **Legality and Due Process:** Enforcement actions must have a clear basis in national law and regulations. Inspectors should only initiate judicial proceedings for violations that are defined as offenses or non-compliances under the law. All actions must respect due process rights of the accused, including proper notification, the right to a defense, and an impartial judicial review.
- **Proportionality:** The enforcement action must have a level of severity that matches the seriousness of the violation according to proportionality principles. The court should impose criminal penalties or substantial sanctions only for major violations that include intentional noncompliance and record tampering and repeated offenses and dangerous conduct. The organization addresses small infractions and unintentional errors through corrective actions and administrative disciplinary measures
- **Consistency:** The CAA needs to enforce its rules with uniformity because it should impose equal legal consequences for identical violations. The public disclosure process allows the industry to trust that enforcement actions result from established criteria instead of personal decisions. The enforcement policy in Section 3.2 enables inspectors to recommend judicial actions through established criteria which replaces their individual judgment. The system

requires prosecutors to work with judges for establishing uniform legal penalties which match previous court decisions.

- **Deterrence and Compliance:** The main objective of enforcement activities is to prevent violations from happening. The threat of court penalties and sanctions will stop regulated organizations from deliberately violating established rules. The enforcement system needs to focus on making sure offenders follow the rules that have been set. Judicial enforcement functions to enforce accountability but it also creates better compliance for future cases.
- **Transparency:** The enforcement process needs to maintain full transparency throughout all its operational activities. The CAA will share information about the violation and penalty through a summary to the aviation community after a case ends but only when national laws permit it. Inspectors need to document all internal procedures which result in judicial referral to establish a complete record of their decision-making process.

The principles outlined in this document will help MID States achieve rule of law enforcement in aviation safety through judicial actions that maintain trust between Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) and operators and service providers. Within the framework of the State Safety Oversight (SSO) system and CE-8 requirements, enforcement decisions must clearly distinguish between:

- **Non-punitive responses** to unintentional errors or voluntarily reported safety events, which support a Just Culture and encourage transparency; and
- **Judicial enforcement measures** for intentional, reckless, or repeated violations that threaten lives, property, or public order.

Inspectors must apply this distinction carefully to avoid undermining safety reporting systems or creating a climate of fear, while ensuring that deliberate non-compliance is met with firm legal action. Judicial enforcement should therefore be used neither excessively nor hesitantly:

- **Not excessively**, so as not to discourage self-disclosure and safety learning;
- **Not hesitantly**, so that serious safety breaches receive timely, proportionate, and transparent legal resolution.

2.3 **This balanced approach ensures that enforcement actions serve their primary purpose:** to resolve safety concerns, prevent recurrence, and protect the traveling public**, while maintaining confidence in the State's aviation safety oversight system**

Scope of Application: Judicial enforcement in aviation can apply across various domains and scenarios where legal violations occur. Inspectors should be aware of the types of cases that typically warrant judicial action under their national framework. Examples within the scope include:

- **Serious Regulatory Violations:** The list contains cases of serious regulatory violations that involve either purposeful or accidental non-compliance with safety regulations by aviation service providers and their personnel. The airline operates an aircraft with known dangerous flaws while its maintenance organization creates fake inspection records. Such deliberate non-compliances endanger lives and usually meet the threshold for legal prosecution.
- **Operation Without Valid Certification:** • Operation Without Valid Certification: Instances of entities or personnel operating in civil aviation without the required certifications, licenses, or approvals. For example, a charter company flying passengers without an Air Operator Certificate (AOC), or an unlicensed individual presenting themselves as a certified aircraft mechanic. These situations often involve fraudulent activity and undermine the regulatory system, thus calling for judicial enforcement

- **Interference and Obstruction:** Any acts of obstructing inspectors or investigations can fall under judicial enforcement. The operator's refusal to grant access to facilities along with hiding evidence and threatening inspectors could result in legal violations under obstruction of government official statutes which require prosecution. Inspectors require complete access to execute their duties properly for proper oversight to happen.
- **Criminal Offenses in Aviation Context:** Some violations overlap with criminal law. The following events fall under this category: dangerous goods transportation without authorization and security breaches and cases of corruption where inspectors accept bribes to provide fake certificates. The detection of such offenses takes place through audit and surveillance activities which inspectors conduct. Specialized agencies should deal with particular matters (e.g., security authorities for security violations) but aviation inspectors need to stay connected and offer specialized expertise which could result in expert witness duties during judicial cases.
- **Environmental and Other Specialized Violations:** The following states have laws that regulate environmental crimes (such as aircraft pollution and waste disposal) and economic offenses (including consumer protection violations in aviation). The inspectors would need to work with authorities to enforce these violations through courts when they occur under CAA oversight.

The judicial system has no authority to enforce all safety findings and concerns that researchers discover. The best way to address many safety findings involves implementing corrective action plans and safety management processes and administrative penalties. Judicial enforcement is appropriate for the high-end, more egregious cases where the State needs to exercise its full legal authority to sanction and correct behavior. Inspectors must use their judgement (guided by State policy and legal advice) to distinguish routine compliance issues from those rising to the level of judicial action. The CAA recommends seeking legal counsel from their enforcement office or legal counsel for unclear cases before taking any action.

2.4 **Just Culture and Enforcement Balance:** The current aviation safety management system depends on Just Culture principles to encourage reporting of errors and hazards by establishing distinct boundaries between accidental mistakes and purposeful or reckless actions. MID States are strongly encouraged to foster a just culture environment even as they implement judicial enforcement. Inspectors along with CAA officials should refrain from issuing penalties to people who find and fix system problems and make genuine attempts to correct their errors. The best solution for these situations involves training programs and system development initiatives. The State needs to establish suitable penalties for willful violations and gross negligence because these dangerous behaviors result from deliberate harm or severe safety negligence. The State will achieve this balance through its enforcement program and its occurrence reporting systems and safety management processes. The CAA will implement non-punitive measures including counseling and enhanced oversight when operators self-report safety incidents and demonstrate their mistake was unintentional. The evidence shows that the incident resulted from intentional rule violations and evidence tampering which would have activated both enforcement actions and judicial proceedings. Ultimately, a Just Culture approach in the MID Region means that inspectors use enforcement as a scalpel, not a sledgehammer targeting the truly unacceptable behaviors while promoting a culture of safety and learning for all others.

3. ***Regulatory and Organizational Preparedness***

For judicial enforcement to be effective, States need to ensure that their **regulations**, **policies**, and **organizational structures** explicitly support and govern the use of legal

action in oversight. This section addresses key preparatory components that MID States should have in place to empower inspectors in carrying out judicial enforcement

3.1 **Legal and Regulatory Framework:** A solid legal foundation is the first requirement. Each State's primary aviation legislation and regulations must define the violations and offenses that can be subject to legal enforcement. The civil aviation law or act contains a list of violations which include operating without a license and violating flight rules and failing to follow safety directives and their corresponding penalties such as fines and imprisonment. Inspectors need to understand these regulations because they define their power to start court proceedings. CAAs need to review national civil aviation laws to verify that all essential safety requirements exist as enforceable regulations. The State needs to establish new regulations and guidelines to address current system weaknesses which lack defined safety penalties and have ambiguous inspector review protocols.

States need to create legal systems which allow their CAA to impose administrative penalties on minor infractions but reserve judicial review for major cases under a multi-level legal framework. The legal framework gives inspectors confidence to use legal authority for pursuing major violations when they become aware of them. It also signals to the judiciary the intent of the State to treat aviation violations with due seriousness.

Open communication ensures that when a genuine need for an exemption arises, the applicant knows how to proceed and the CAA receives better-quality submissions, thereby speeding up the evaluation. It also deters misuse of the exemption process by making it clear that requests will undergo rigorous scrutiny.

3.2 State Enforcement Policy and Inspector GuidanceThe CAAs need to create a written enforcement policy which explains their procedures for taking enforcement actions and their process for moving cases to court. The policy which appears in enforcement manuals or inspector handbooks defines the selection criteria for enforcement actions. The policy defines two types of violations which require different responses. The policy requires legal enforcement for all cases of intentional or reckless or repeated violations but administrative remedies should be used for isolated unintentional violations. The inclusion of these criteria allows inspectors to achieve consistent assessment results. The policy needs to outline the internal procedures which inspectors must follow before court proceedings start including notification of their supervisor and legal counsel consultation and enforcement case file preparation (as explained in Sections 4 and 5).

In addition to policy, practical guidance materials or bulletins should be provided to inspectors. The toolkit includes evidence collection checklists as well as templates for enforcement reports and standard operating procedures for working with law enforcement agencies. States need to establish a specific judicial enforcement system for inspectors to follow because this will prevent them from creating their own procedures. The CAA benefits from documented processes because these records show that enforcement actions follow a systematic and unbiased approach which helps prevent accusations of unfairness.

3.3 **Coordination with Judicial Authorities**: Effective judicial enforcement requires close coordination between the CAA (and its inspectors) and the State's judicial apparatus – typically prosecutors, police (for criminal investigations), and the courts. MID States should strive to establish formal channels of coordination. This might be achieved through Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) or inter-agency protocols that outline

how aviation cases are handled. For example, a State could have an MOU between the CAA and the national Prosecutor General's Office specifying that aviation safety violations discovered by the CAA will be reviewed promptly for potential prosecution, and that technical support (expertise from inspectors) will be provided to prosecutors. Some States designate specific prosecutors or units to handle aviation-related cases; if feasible, this is a best practice as it builds expertise in the judiciary on aviation matters. Inspectors should be introduced to those counterparts so they know whom to contact when a violation needs referral.

Coordination also involves practical arrangements: agreeing on how evidence will be handed over (chain of custody procedures), how communication will occur during investigations, and whether joint training or workshops are held. It's beneficial to sensitize judges and prosecutors about aviation safety and the importance of enforcement, possibly through seminars or including them in aviation safety events. This mutual understanding can lead to more effective handling of cases. In summary, inspectors should not view judicial enforcement as entering a foreign territory alone there should be a structured partnership between the CAA and judicial authorities supporting the process.

3.4 **Evidence Collection and Preservation**: Evidence integrity protection represents the essential element which determines the success of legal action preparation. CAAs require the development of particular inspection methods and equipment that help inspectors obtain evidence in a manner which preserves its legal admissibility. The evidence collection process includes physical items (faulty parts and printed records and documents) and digital materials (e-mails and electronic records and photos and videos). Inspectors need training to handle original documents by securing them or obtaining certified true copies and to document evidence through photography and videography with timestamped records and witness testimony collection. It's important to establish a chain of custody for all evidence, a log of who obtained it, how it was stored, and who accessed it to prevent any challenge to its authenticity in court.

Organizations need to establish security protocols for their safety data while maintaining legal evidence accessibility according to the oversight perspective. Inspectors must seek legal advice about evidence handling procedures when dealing with information that belongs to individuals or companies. The inspectors need to use sealed court submissions for specific situations. Inspectors must learn all legal evidence collection procedures because they need court authorization and police assistance to get records from operators who do not want to cooperate. The Court Evidence Checklist provided in Appendix 2 offers a reference for inspectors on what types of evidence to gather for common violations. The results of prosecution become better because inspectors perform evidence collection in a systematic way. Evidence will serve as the basis for court decisions so this aspect of readiness stands as the most crucial one.

3.5 **Resources and Legal Support:** The process of getting judicial enforcement needs substantial financial backing. CAAs need to develop resource allocation plans which will help support inspectors in their work. Legal support is crucial this might involve having a dedicated legal advisor or enforcement unit within the CAA that works with inspectors on case preparation. Specialized legal experts who work in this field convert scientific evidence into legal language to create charges while helping prosecutors. The State legal authorities need to provide counsel to the CAA when needed because the CAA does not have its own legal staff. The budget includes funding for expert witnesses and technical

analyses which prove violations in court as well as travel expenses for inspectors who need to visit distant courts or accompany law enforcement on additional actions. The CAA needs to provide inspectors with suitable equipment which includes protected evidence storage facilities and digital evidence analysis tools and secure communication channels with prosecutors through email or case management systems. Managers should allocate time resources for inspectors who participate in court cases because they will need to spend substantial time preparing and testifying in court. The MID Region CAAs will enhance their oversight duties through proper judicial enforcement functions which will lead to better inspector support and improved enforcement results.

3.6 **Training and Competency:** Inspectors need training in both auditing and surveillance methods as well as enforcement and legal procedures. The MID States should include training modules about enforcement procedures and evidence handling and courtroom skills for their inspectors. The training program needs to show staff members which infractions need legal action and teach them how to create court-approved documentation and conduct witness interviews and file enforcement reports and teach criminal procedure basics about burden of proof and prosecutor-judge responsibilities.

Role-playing exercises serve as an effective tool for example by creating situations where inspectors demonstrate their case presentation to a pretend prosecutor or their testimony about inspection results in a mock trial. The exercises enable students to enhance their self-assurance while improving their communication skills. Inspectors can develop judicial expertise through cross-training with law enforcement by learning investigative techniques from police investigators and observing prosecutors build their cases. Inspectors need to stay informed about all changes in laws and regulations because new laws that penalize specific behaviors (such as aircraft laser strikes or passenger misconduct) will affect their inspection responsibilities.

The evaluation of enforcement competency needs to occur at regular intervals. The low number of serious violations requires inspectors who rarely handle court cases to receive training from experienced inspectors through CAAs for enforcement activities. The CAA achieves effective courtroom representation through continuous training and enforcement competency frameworks which prepare inspectors to handle legal proceedings with professional competence.

4. Planning and Initiation of Enforcement Actions

When an inspector identifies a potential serious violation, a systematic process should be followed to decide on and initiate judicial enforcement. Proper planning at this stage will set the foundation for a strong case. This section outlines steps from detection of a violation up to the point of formally referring a case for prosecution.

4.1 **Detection of Violations and Initial Investigation**: The system starts its process after a violation becomes detectable through oversight activities. A compliance audit can occur at any time through scheduled inspections or audits and accident investigations and reported complaints and whistleblower activities. The inspector needs to start by collecting first-hand information about the potential serious violation while evaluating its current state. It is important to verify the violation to the extent possible: confirm which regulation or law has been breached and collect preliminary evidence. The first action for an inspector who believes an airline operated flights without qualified crew members should be to obtain crew license documents and flight log records. At this stage, discretion is key the inspector

may not yet inform the entity that a legal action is being considered, to avoid any tampering with evidence or heightened resistance. The inspector needs to establish safety protocols right away for violations that create immediate safety risks yet start legal actions for other violations. All observations need to be documented precisely through an inspection report or violation report. The report needs to present all discovered evidence by specifying the time and location of each finding together with explanations about which regulations have been violated. The first stage of investigation requires senior inspectors and managers to verify that the problem has escalated to a point of crisis. Once the inspector is satisfied that a serious violation has occurred and initial evidence is in hand, they proceed to the next step.

4.2 **Enforcement Decision Process:** The inspector will determine between judicial enforcement and alternative solutions after collecting all necessary facts while possibly seeking guidance from the CAA enforcement committee or management team. Many CAAs have an internal Enforcement Review Board or similar mechanism to review significant violations. The evaluation criteria for this decision must follow the State's enforcement policy (see 3.2) by examining three main elements which include intent and harm and compliance attitude. The evaluation process must contain a question that determines if not pursuing legal action against the violation would create harmful legal precedents or enable vital safety issues to persist. The court needs to initiate legal proceedings when the answer is positive. The existing evidence strength plays a vital role because it allows us to prove guilt beyond doubt which results in both correct convictions and suitable punishments. The prosecution will fail because evidence becomes unavailable and certificate action proves to be a more effective enforcement method. At this stage, inspectors should involve the CAA's legal advisors. Often a prosecutorial discretion comes into play; the case may be discussed informally with a prosecutor to gauge their interest or get advice on how to proceed. The last stage of decision-making demands documentation of all participants together with their reasons for making decisions. The inspector needs to take administrative or compliance actions against the violation following a decision to forego judicial enforcement. The inspector will proceed with formal notification and case building activities after choosing judicial enforcement as the method of action. The applicant needs to start the exemption request process by sending their application.

4.3 **Notification and Coordination with Authorities:** Once a decision for judicial enforcement is made, the inspector/CAA needs to formally notify the relevant authorities and coordinate the next steps. Typically, this involves:

- **Internal Notification:** The inspector notifies the CAA's higher management (if not already involved) that a case is being escalated. The Director General of CAA or a designated Enforcement Office within certain states needs to approve all judicial referrals. Internal leadership awareness provides organizations with the ability to prevent unexpected events because it enables them to distribute necessary support.
- **Notifying Law Enforcement/Prosecutor:** Depending on the State's process, the inspector either contacts a designated prosecutor directly or goes through a law enforcement agency (such as the police or a special investigations unit). A formal referral letter is usually prepared (see Appendix 1 for a model). This letter outlines the facts of the case, the regulations violated, and requests that legal action be taken. It should be accompanied by initial evidence or an offer to supply evidence. In some jurisdictions, the CAA may file a complaint or an offence report as the triggering document for the judicial process**.**
- **Notifying the Offender (if required):** In many cases, once a violation is being referred for legal action, the entity or individual involved should be informed that the matter is now subject

to judicial proceedings. The organization would handle this through a written document which states that CAA has sent the violation of XYZ to [Prosecutor/Law Enforcement] for suitable legal response. However, the timing of this notification can be sensitive if a criminal investigation is to occur, law enforcement might advise to delay informing the accused until certain steps (like evidence seizure or interviews) are done. Inspectors should coordinate with prosecutors on when and how the violator will be notified. The administrative enforcement process needs immediate notification but judicial enforcement requires officials to create official charges or summonses before starting their process.

- **Cross-Agency Coordination:** Some cases require informing other agencies. For example, if the violation involves smuggling or security issues, customs or security agencies should be looped in. If it involves fraud in personnel licensing, the licensing authority might need alerting to possibly suspend the license pending outcome.

4.4 Evidence Gathering and Documentation: After initiating coordination, the inspector must deepen the evidence collection to build a robust case file. While some initial evidence was gathered in step 4.1, now the effort becomes more comprehensive and formal. The **Court Evidence Checklist** (Appendix 2) should be used to ensure all relevant types of evidence are considered. Key actions in this phase:

- **Gather Additional Documents:** The collection of all documents which relate to the case must be completed. The evidence collection process should include all relevant documentation which proves the violation through flight records and maintenance logs and training records and communication transcripts and approval certificates and surveillance reports. The preferred method of documentation requires the use of original documents or official certified copies. Every document needs an index or label to serve as identification for future reference.
- **Witness Statements:** Identify all people who have knowledge of the violation (witnesses). These might be CAA inspectors (including the one who found the issue and any colleagues), employees of the company (whistleblowers or those directly involved), or others. It is often useful for inspectors to take written statements or interview these witnesses. The process requires proper attention because official interviews under caution become necessary when criminal charges are possible since law enforcement and prosecutors need to ensure evidence can be admitted as evidence. The inspectors need to follow procedures for witness statements because they can take initial statements from witnesses but the prosecutor will conduct formal re-interviews later. Note down all possible witnesses together with their key information.
- **Physical Evidence:** All physical evidence from the case needs to be protected. The aircraft should have its substandard or fake parts removed and preserved when these components cause a violation. Tag it as evidence. If it's too large (like an aircraft), extensive photos/videos and examination reports by experts might serve in lieu. Physical evidence must be stored in a secure manner through the use of tamper-evident bags or secure facilities.
- **Analytical Reports:** In some instances, an expert analysis or lab test might be needed (for instance, testing fuel samples if fuel quality caused an engine failure that ties to a violation). Coordinate to get those analyses done and documented. The inspector might not do this personally but should facilitate and include the expert's report in the case file.
- **Enforcement Report Preparation:** The majority of CAAs need inspectors to create an enforcement report which summarizes the entire case. The report functions as a vital document which presents all essential details about the violation including who was involved and what happened when and where along with evidence-based proof. It should clearly cite the breached regulations and describe the safety impact of the violation. The narrative serves as the main story which helps prosecutors and the court to understand the case. The report must use direct factual statements which should avoid legal terms and abbreviations that non-lawyers cannot understand (or else include a definitions section).

As evidence is gathered, keep updating the evidence inventory and ensure all items are cross-referenced in the enforcement report. Good documentation at this stage increases the chances that the prosecutor will accept the case and that it will result in a successful outcome. It also demonstrates professionalism; a well-documented case file shows the judiciary that the CAA's inspectors are competent and thorough.

4.5 Preparing the Judicial Referral: With evidence in hand, the next step is formally referring or filing the case for judicial action. This involves packaging the information and evidence in a format suitable for legal proceedings. The **model judicial referral letter** in Appendix 1 provides a template for the cover letter of such a referral. Key elements of the referral package include:

- **Referral Letter:** A signed letter from the CAA (ideally from a high-ranking official like the Director of Aviation Safety or Director General, if appropriate) addressed to the prosecutorial authority. It should reference the specific case, summarize the violation (including date, location, parties involved), cite the legal provisions violated, and request that legal proceedings be initiated. It may also indicate the contact point (e.g., the inspector or enforcement officer) for further coordination
- **Enforcement Report:** Attach the detailed enforcement report written by the inspector . This gives the full narrative and evidence list. In some jurisdictions, this might be akin to an affidavit or official statement of the inspector. Ensure it is signed and dated. If law requires it to be sworn, arrange for that formality
- **Evidence Dossier**: The collection of all evidence items must be completed. The prosecutor should receive duplicate copies of all documents and photographs but CAA must maintain possession of the original materials until court proceedings require them. The organization of extensive evidence collections needs either an indexed binder system or an electronic file management structure for effective management. Every evidence item requires identification through specific labels which should include Exhibit 1: Copy of Aircraft Maintenance Log dated XX and Exhibit 2: Photograph of unapproved part and so on. Note the storage location and accessibility status of evidence which exists outside the crime scene (such as a seized part kept in storage)
- **Legal References:** Although prosecutors will know the law, it can be helpful to include a copy of the relevant regulation or law section that was violated, especially if it's an aviation-specific rule that general prosecutors might not be familiar with. The method removes all uncertainty about which criminal offense occurred.
- **Suggested Charges or Actions:** The CAAs establish which legal penalties or charges should apply to each situation (e.g., Civil Aviation Act §123 violation which results in penalties of XYZ). The prosecutor will use this information to make their decision but they retain complete authority in the process.

The referral package needs to go through a peer review with another inspector or legal advisor to confirm both its clarity and completeness before it gets submitted. The referral process needs to be finished before sending it through the official channel which accepts physical delivery with signature confirmation or secure electronic submission based on the agreement. The CAA will keep a duplicate of all documents in their files after receiving them. The case moves into the jurisdiction of the judicial system at this stage.

4.6 Engaging Law Enforcement (if applicable): In some cases, particularly where criminal investigation aspects are involved (fraud, intentional misconduct, etc.),law enforcement agencies will take an active role post-referral. Inspectors should be prepared to work with police or other investigators as needed. This may include accompanying officers on site visits to the entity for seizure of additional evidence, helping interpret technical aspects during interrogations, or providing subject-matter expertise to an investigative task force. It's important for inspectors to understand their role: generally, they act as technical consultants to the law enforcement, rather than leading the investigation. Ensure to hand over leadership on criminal investigative steps to those with legal authority (e.g., only police can interview a suspect in many jurisdictions). However, inspectors should remain closely involved to

ensure no important technical detail is overlooked. If arrests or urgent interventions are needed (for example, preventing an unsafe flight from departing), law enforcement coordination is critical and should be done swiftly.

5. Executing Judicial Enforcement Actions: Court Proceedings

Once a case enters the judicial arena, the enforcement action moves into the prosecution and court phase. In this phase, aviation inspectors transition into a supporting role for the legal process – providing expertise, clarifications, and occasionally testimony to ensure the case is accurately presented and adjudicated. The following outlines the typical steps and the inspector's involvement during court proceedings.

5.1 **Filing of Charges and Case Initiation:** The prosecutor and judicial authority will decide when to start the case based on their evaluation of the referral. The legal process demands that victims submit their legal documents to court against the perpetrators who carried out the offense. From the inspector's perspective, at this stage their role is to assist the prosecutor in finalizing the charges. The prosecutor requires the inspector to provide technical case information and to confirm which particular regulations are relevant to the situation. The prosecutors would ask for instance: "Is this act clearly against Civil Aviation Regulation X?Can you explain how?"The inspector needs to explain the violation through simple language which enables the prosecutor to create an accurate charge sheet or indictment.

The process starts with an initial payment but investigators will need to pay more when they discover new evidence (such as when police investigations uncover unrelated criminal activity). Inspectors need to check aviation-related charges against regulatory requirements for verification purposes. Once charges are filed, the case is officially before the court and a process (criminal trial or administrative court hearing, depending on the legal system) is scheduled. The defendant will get a court summons or police arrest to begin the legal process. The inspectors need to review the charge sheet to understand the legal charges against the defendant because this information will determine their future participation in the process.

5.2 Pre-Trial Coordination and Case Building: Between the filing of charges and the actual court hearings, there is often a pre-trial phase. During this time, the prosecution builds its case fully, and the defense may also gather their side. Inspectors can expect to be actively engaged with prosecutors in this period. Key activities include:

- **Briefings and Strategy Meetings:** Prosecutors may hold meetings with the inspector and any CAA legal representatives to outline the strategy for prosecution. They will discuss which witnesses to call, what evidence to prioritize, and how to present the technical aspects to a judge or jury. Inspectors should provide input on what they consider the strongest evidence and whether any technical demonstrations or visuals might help (for example, using a diagram of an aircraft system to show where a tampered part was found).
- **Further Evidence Requests:** The prosecution needs to establish which information is missing and what extra details they need. They might say, (We need proof that this regulation was communicated to the operator) requiring the inspector to fetch a copy of an earlier letter or certificate. Or they may need an expert analysis to be formally written as an expert report. The inspector needs to take immediate action for any such request. The inspectors have the authority to create additional statements which help explain their initial findings when there are unclear points in their report..
- **Pre-Trial Hearings and Legal Motions:** The court process begins with initial hearings that include bail hearings and plea hearings as well as motions from the defense to dismiss evidence or suppress it. Inspectors typically do not speak in these but should remain on

standby to support the prosecutor with facts if needed. The defense lawyer asserts that the CAA conducted an unlawful search but the prosecutor would request the inspector to explain the evidence collection process (to prove legal compliance). The inspectors need to create complete records with honesty because any indication of improper procedure will result in the complete collapse of the case. **Expert Witness Preparation:** If the inspector (or another technical person) will testify as an expert witness, this is the time to prepare. The prosecutor will show possible questions to ask and identify the main points which need to be included in the testimony. The inspector needs training to transform complex technical terms into basic language which enables everyone to understand the information. It might be useful to practice answering likely cross-examination questions. The case result will depend on the inspector's credibility together with witness clarity so complete preparation must be done.

All evidence must be properly arranged and easily available for the trial process. Originals of documents and evidence items should be secured and ready to be presented in court when required. The inspector will assist in identifying and presenting evidence during the trial with Exhibit A which includes the logbook that shows X. The pre-trial stage requires inspectors and prosecutors to work together for creating an effective court presentation.

5.3 Court Hearings and Inspector Testimony: The case will eventually be heard in court, which could range from a single-day hearing to a complex trial spanning multiple days or weeks, depending on the complexity of the case. During the court hearings, the inspector's involvement will primarily be as a witness for the prosecution (and occasionally assisting behind the scenes). Here's what to expect:

- **Giving Testimony:** Almost certainly, the inspector who investigated the case will testify. This typically involves sitting in the witness box, swearing an oath, and answering questions posed by both the prosecution and defense (and sometimes the judge). The prosecution will start by asking the inspector to confirm their qualifications through their experience and CAA role followed by questions about the discovery and handling of the violation. The inspector needs to present all observed facts along with collected evidence to prove how defendant actions broke particular regulations. It's important to speak clearly and avoid technical jargon unless immediately explained – remember, the judge or jury may not have any aviation background. For example, instead of saying "he violated ANTR Ops 1.2.3 by not having an MEL," say "he violated the regulation that requires a Minimum Equipment List – a list of allowable equipment outages – to be on board; he did not have that, which is a legal requirement for operating the aircraft."
- **Handling Cross-Examination:** The defense attorney will cross-examine the inspector. The inspectors may dispute their findings as well as the evidence collection methods and the qualifications of the inspectors. Inspectors must provide answers that combine both professional calmness with precise factual information. The inspector requires exact details to confirm the accusation (e.g.,Isn't it true you didn't calibrate your equipment) (e.g., "The equipment I used was a standard device; our lab performs annual calibration which was still within its valid period. Avoid becoming defensive or making assumptions about answers because when you are unsure about a question you should admit it and refer legal interpretations to the appropriate expert. The process demands that you answer only the questions that are asked while keeping your responses neutral and refraining from hostile answers. Your answers should be delivered to the judge or jury.
- **Presenting Evidence in Court:** Inspectors need to show particular evidence during their testimony as part of their duties. The prosecutor would ask (Could you identify this document?)and the inspector will respond, "This is the maintenance log I obtained from the company on May 5th, which shows the aircraft was flown 5 times when it was under a grounding order."Through the inspector, such documents become exhibits in court. The inspector needs to describe their source of the document while proving its authenticity. The inspector will describe physical evidence found at the scene while also performing demonstrations of fake parts against real parts when it is safe to do so.

- **Supporting Other Witnesses:** The court may require additional expert witnesses to testify based on the specific case requirements such as an aircraft engineer or meteorologist. Inspectors may need to return to court for additional verification of information that becomes relevant during the trial process. The audience members need to focus on what is happening in the courtroom. The prosecutor requested from the inspector to clarify particular technical aspects which defense attorneys had pointed out during their breaks for possible use in re-examination or with alternative witnesses.

Throughout the court hearings, the inspector's professionalism reflects on the CAA. Dress appropriately (uniform or business attire as required), address the judge as "Your Honour" (or appropriate title in the jurisdiction), and remain objective. Remember that as a witness, the inspector's duty is to tell the truth and explain the facts not to "win" the case at all costs. If the facts are presented clearly and truthfully, and the evidence is strong, that itself is the best contribution an inspector can make to achieving a just outcome.

5.4 Judicial Decision and Sentencing: Following the trial, the court will render a decision. If the case is proven, this could result in a conviction (in criminal cases) or a finding of violation (in administrative or civil enforcement cases), and the court will impose penalties. Penalties might include fines, imprisonment (for individuals), or other sanctions like revocation of licenses or operating permits through court order. For inspectors, once the verdict is out, their role is not yet over. They should:

- **Review the Judgment:** Read the court's decision in detail. The feedback contains vital details about the assessment process of the case. The court would establish key evidence while revealing the weaknesses of the case. The CAA can use this data to improve their future enforcement operations. The CAA needs to confirm all penalties and court orders issued by the court including any orders to stop company operations.
- **Assist in Sentencing Input:** The court needs defendant recommendations and impact statements for sentencing purposes after determining guilt during the sentencing process. The CAA (through the inspector or a senior official) would be invited to provide input on the severity of the offense from a safety perspective to help determine the appropriate sentence. The CAA needs to focus on safety dangers by declaring "The defendant showed absolute disregard for passenger safety which we at the safety regulator consider to be a very serious violation."The court requires objective factual information which should exclude exaggerated statements to enable them to grasp the circumstances.
- **Public or Industry Notification:** After a judicial decision, CAAs often have the discretion to publish or circulate information about the outcome (unless restricted by the court). While this is typically done by the CAA's communications office, inspectors might provide the technical summary for a press release or notice to industry. Penalties become more enforceable through brief case summaries which show others that regulatory bodies and courts actively monitor compliance activities. Any communication should, of course, stick to the facts of the court's findings now that the matter is adjudicated.

It's also possible the defendant may appeal the decision. If an appeal is filed, inspectors might need to repeat some of the above steps at a higher court. Prepare to support the case in appeals by keeping all documentation handy and staying in touch with the prosecutors during the appeal process.

5.5 Concluding the Case and Post-Trial Actions: Once all court proceedings (trial, sentencing, and any appeals) are concluded, the enforcement action moves into a closure phase. Inspectors and the CAA have a few important tasks at this point:

- **Enforcement of Court Orders:** Ensure that whatever the court has ordered is effectively carried out. If a fine was imposed, verify (perhaps through the judicial channels) that it was paid, or if imprisonment was ordered, that the individual is not operating in aviation during

that period. Often, the CAA may need to take administrative action in parallel for instance, if not already done, revoking a license or certificate as mandated by the court's conviction (in some cases the court might not directly order revocation, but the conviction might allow or require the CAA to revoke under its own statutes). Work with the CAA's licensing or certification departments to ensure any required followon actions (like re-exams, suspensions) are executed.

- **Closing Report:** The inspector should compile a closing report or memorandum for the CAA's records. This document would note the final outcome (e.g., "Operator X was convicted on Date Y; penalty Z imposed") and any follow-up needed. It should also record lessons learned by the inspector during the process – for internal improvement. Include references to the judgment document and file it in the enforcement database or archive.
- **Return or Disposal of Evidence:** The evidence collected during the case requires appropriate handling for its disposal after the investigation ends. Evidence that belongs to owners can be returned when appropriate but hazardous items must stay in possession and perishable evidence requires destruction according to court orders or legal procedures. The inspector needs to work with legal authorities to determine the proper course of action. The inspector must handle all sealed or restricted aircraft and facilities according to the case results (aircraft impoundment will be released when safety conditions are met).
- **Informing the Victims or Stakeholders:** If the violation had identifiable victims or safety implications (say passengers put at risk, or an incident that prompted the case), it is good practice to inform relevant stakeholders of the conclusion. For example, the CAA might brief the airline's management or the complainant who reported the issue about the outcome, to close the loop and show that due process was followed.
- **Personal Debrief and Well-Being:** Inspectors experience high levels of stress when they participate in court proceedings. The team involved in enforcement cases should receive debriefing sessions from agencies to evaluate their performance and identify areas for improvement in upcoming cases. The management team needs to recognize inspector work because successful safety-enhancing prosecutions represent major accomplishments. The conclusion serves as an opportunity for inspectors to evaluate their experience before they redirect their focus toward different oversight responsibilities.

By concluding the case properly, the CAA and its inspectors ensure that the judicial enforcement action fully achieves its purpose and that the chapter is properly closed in the oversight records. The final step is to take the knowledge gained and feed it back into the continuous improvement of the State's safety oversight system, which is covered in the next section.

6. Post-Enforcement Reporting and Follow-Up

Enforcement doesn't end with a court's verdict. There are important post-enforcement activities that help integrate the outcome into the State's safety oversight and ensure lasting safety improvements. Just as with remote oversight (or any oversight activity), documentation and follow-up are crucial in judicial enforcement cases. This section outlines what should be done after a case is closed to wrap up administratively and to learn from the experience.

6.1 Documentation of Outcomes: Every enforcement case that proceeds to judicial action requires formal documentation of its outcome within CAA records. The enforcement database or tracking system requires an update with the case outcome which should include "Case #2025-01: Prosecuted – Guilty, Fine of $50,000 and 6-month license suspension imposed by court on [Date]". The enforcement process requires filing of all necessary documents including court judgments and sentencing orders and the inspector's closing report (from 5.5). The proper organization of enforcement case archives serves two purposes because it enhances transparency while providing access to past case information for future

reference. The inspection team can use past enforcement records to determine previous violation handling methods and resulting penalties which helps maintain consistent enforcement practices. The State's safety concern resolution effectiveness will be evaluated through ICAO USOAP audits and internal audits which examine enforcement case files. The documentation of enforcement files needs to be complete with a clear sequence from initial discovery to final outcome to prove ICAO compliance..

6.2 Communication of Enforcement Outcomes: The process of reporting incidents helps organizations achieve both accountability goals and educational objectives. The CAA needs to inform all relevant staff members about major case results through brief internal memos or scheduled meetings. The process maintains staff awareness about enforcement actions while building an organizational environment that strictly enforces major violations.

6.3 Corrective Actions by the Offender: The safety problems require permanent solutions even though legal consequences have been applied. The CAA needs to verify that all safety problems get fixed by the convicted party who operates after paying fines and fixing their issues. The operator needs to create a corrective action plan which resembles post-audit requirements but operates under enforcement oversight. The airline needs to prove to the CAA that it has enhanced its maintenance management system to address previous maintenance problems. The court may have issued particular instructions which include requiring external safety audits and engineer license revocation. The CAA needs to monitor these requirements while making sure the operators follow them. The inspectors will perform an additional inspection following enforcement to check that all unauthorized components have been taken out and new operational procedures have been put into place. The main objective of this process is to stop the violation from happening again. The offender needs to rebuild trust with the CAA through extended monitoring during this period. The CAA needs to monitor operators while providing assistance for their remediation efforts to achieve future compliance..

6.4 Continued Monitoring and Compliance Verification: The CAA needs to add the enforcement case to its risk-based oversight planning after conducting an enforcement action at any level. The entities that received enforcement actions become more likely to break regulations in the future although they might choose to enhance their operations either way. The inspection team needs to apply enhanced examination to organizations that received enforcement actions. The inspection team needs to verify the problematic areas at the airport after it received prosecution for airfield safety violations. The inspection program or checklist for the following year should include specific notes about the areas that need verification. The inspectors should recognize the operator's management improvements resulting from enforcement but they need to confirm the effectiveness of these changes. The entity will return to standard oversight procedures after showing continuous compliance but additional administrative or judicial enforcement actions will become necessary if non-compliance persists. The enforcement process achieves closure through this monitoring system which uses results to direct future proactive oversight activities.

6.5 On-Site Validation (if required): The CAA needs to conduct on-site follow-ups to confirm that enforcement results lead to actual organizational changes. A maintenance organization received prosecution because they used unauthorized parts in their operations. The organization asserts they removed all unauthorized parts from their inventory while enhancing their inventory management systems after the trial. The CAA needs to conduct an on-site verification inspection which resembles post-major-finding audits to verify their stated changes. The process of on-site validation in remote oversight systems uses the same method as remote audits by conducting a follow-up inspection. The process of judicial enforcement requires on-site validation to verify that court-ordered penalties and management promises lead to actual implementation at the operational level. The inspectors who perform validation need to work with case-handling personnel to achieve the best possible inspection results. The CAA must initiate additional enforcement procedures when validation discovers

unapproved parts still present in the facility. The on-site inspection functions as an assessment mechanism to verify the effectiveness of enforcement actions.

6.6 Records Management: The process of post-enforcement requires proper records management which serves as an essential yet unexciting duty. All case documents need to follow the State's established guidelines for document preservation. The storage of enforcement records needs to be secure because these documents will serve as references for future trend analysis and potential reoffending cases of the same operator. The MID Region encourages CAAs to convert their enforcement records into a digital database which enables quick access to stored information. The system needs restricted access because its contents contain sensitive information including investigation records and personal data. The records must contain special protection for all confidential sources together with whistleblower identities. The appropriate channels must be used to distribute case results to relevant parties when international involvement exists through foreign operators or ICAO USOAP findings. The documentation process for evidence item release or disposal should be recorded in the case files after the case reaches its closure. A properly maintained complete record allows future personnel to understand enforcement actions without needing direct involvement in the original process.

6.7 Evaluation and Continuous Improvement: The oversight system of CAAs needs to learn from each enforcement case they handle. The organization should conduct internal debriefs and after-action reviews for this purpose. The team consisting of inspectors and legal officers and management personnel should gather to assess the case by identifying successful aspects and obstacles encountered during the process. The difficulty in evidence collection stemmed from unclear document seizure authority which requires either regulatory clarification or enhanced legal powers. The extended duration of court proceedings requires training for judges about aviation matters to achieve faster case resolutions in future cases. The evaluation process should produce documented recommendations for future use. The recommendations span from procedure updates to enforcement manual revisions and training programs and policy modifications. The CAA should propose new legal powers to address the identified regulatory gaps. The CAA should propose legislative changes to the State after determining that current penalties in law are insufficient. The analysis of multiple enforcement cases spanning multiple years helps identify recurring factors that contribute to violations. The analysis shows that multiple cases of training record falsification require the CAA to enhance its oversight of this area through comprehensive improvements instead of individual case handling. The insights obtained from these evaluations should be integrated into the State's overall safety management framework. The feedback loop enables MID States to use judicial enforcement actions for both immediate violation resolution and long-term development of an enhanced safety oversight system.

7. Best Practices for Effective Judicial Enforcement

7.1 Drawing on the experience of States both within and outside the MID Region, this section highlights best practices that can enhance the effectiveness of judicial enforcement in aviation safety oversight. Implementing these practices can help CAAs and inspectors achieve better outcomes and foster stronger compliance culture:

- **Early Engagement and Education of the Judiciary:** Proactively build relationships with prosecutors and judges before major cases arise. Provide informational sessions or materials about the aviation regulatory system, common violations, and the safety significance of enforcement. A judiciary that understands aviation context is more likely to prioritize and effectively handle aviation cases.
- **Robust Whistleblower Protections:** The organization should support all workers who report major safety infractions while safeguarding their rights. The most severe violations tend to be actively concealed by organizations. The process of whistleblowing enables employees to reveal safety protocol violations to the public. Organizations should create protective measures through laws and policies which defend whistleblowers from workplace retaliation

and provide options for maintaining their identity hidden. Inspectors need to handle whistleblower information with absolute confidentiality while conducting independent verification of the information whenever feasible to establish evidence. The system's trustworthiness enables successful enforcement actions that begin with insider reports which have proven effective in multiple global cases.

- **Efficient Case Management:** The process of enforcement requires immediate action. The process of delayed justice reduces both public safety outcomes and the ability to prevent future offenses. The CAAs need to work on reducing the time it takes to move from detecting violations to sending cases for review. The organization should create faster internal approval processes and assign personnel to execute enforcement actions quickly. The organization should stay actively involved in judicial proceedings to stop prolonged delays by checking with prosecutors about case status and providing assistance when needed and requesting court acceleration for urgent safety-related cases when national laws allow it. Certain states achieved positive results through their decision to classify aviation offenses as critical economic crimes which receive priority court processing.
- **Leverage Regional Collaboration:** The MID Region maintains cooperative structures through ICAO MID Office and RASG-MID and other entities. States can exchange information about their enforcement cases with each other but must maintain confidentiality when necessary. The information exchange between states could help identify typical enforcement obstacles and effective methods for compliance. A State that obtains a legal victory against an operator for safety noncompliance can use this precedent to support their legal positions in court proceedings throughout neighboring countries. The MID Regional Safety Plan initiatives should establish working groups to organize seminars about enforcement which will prove beneficial for the region. The guidance material resulted from regional cooperation and States should maintain this collaborative approach by sharing information about significant judicial enforcement advancements.
- **Promote a Safety Culture Alongside Enforcement:** The industry needs to understand that enforcement exists to protect safety instead of being used as a confrontational tool. The positive recognition of industry self-reporting and correction efforts will help maintain a balance between enforcement actions and Operators should develop their own internal systems for compliance and auditing which detect problems before regulatory bodies identify them. voluntary compliance. Some states operate recognition programs for airlines and organizations that demonstrate excellent compliance which motivates other entities to stay off the enforcement list. The most effective result occurs when few cases need prosecution because the combination of deterrent measures and safety-focused culture minimizes violations.
- **Document Success Stories:** Document safety improvements that result from enforcement actions through case study development. The prosecution of a maintenance company should be documented because it resulted in better training for all maintenance personnel throughout the sector. The documented success stories should be used to demonstrate enforcement value during meetings and training sessions and ICAO forums. The inspectors' dedication to pursuing challenging cases becomes more meaningful because their efforts result in safer flight operations.
- **Ensure Ethical Conduct and Avoid Conflicts:** Inspectors and CAA personnel who conduct violator pursuits need to always uphold absolute ethical conduct. Any sign of improper conduct by inspectors or CAA personnel such as inspector conflicts of interest or industry-related gifts will invalidate enforcement actions and make them unusable in court proceedings. The enforcement process benefits from internal ethics rules that receive strict oversight. The enforcement process requires complete transparency when dealing with influential entities because independent observers should monitor the situation to prevent political or improper interference. The enforcement process requires absolute integrity to achieve its success goals.

The implementation of these best practices will enhance the judicial enforcement systems of MID States. The system will establish a framework which enables inspectors to enforce aviation regulations effectively while service providers recognize that non-compliance results in severe penalties. The system will develop into a safer aviation environment through reduced violations and increased industry-wide proactive compliance.

8. Final Comments

8.1 The State's aviation safety oversight system requires judicial enforcement as a strategic tool for safety management. The MID Region needs to establish judicial enforcement based on non-punitive "Just Culture" principles which work together with Critical Element 8 (Resolution of Safety Concerns). The document establishes safety promotion boundaries with enforcement through which CAA service providers receive trust-based corrective actions and safety education for unintentional non-compliance but face legal consequences for deliberate and dangerous violations. The inspection process requires documented escalation procedures and proportional enforcement actions and judicial authority involvement only after established criteria are fulfilled. Judicial enforcement becomes an effective tool for compliance promotion and non-compliance prevention while enabling quick safety solutions while maintaining reporting trust and oversight system credibility.

8.2 The process of initial detection through case building and legal authority coordination and court participation and post-case follow-up enables inspectors to identify and handle all major safety infractions. States achieve proper safety improvement through ICAO standard compliance and just culture adoption which enables them to implement appropriate safety measures. Inspectors now possess a clear path to handle safety matters that require legal action.

8.3 MID States should maintain ongoing improvement of their judicial enforcement systems through mutual exchange of operational knowledge and experience and by providing their inspectors with appropriate training and resources. An inspector who receives knowledge and legal support and organizational backing becomes highly effective at both identifying and fixing safety problems and upholding accountability through legal frameworks. Our combined efforts toward safer skies in the Middle East and worldwide support ICAO's goal of safe aviation for everyone.

9. Sources:

- ICAO Doc 9734 – *Safety Oversight Manual, Part A* (for ICAO Critical Elements framework)
- ICAO Doc 8335 – *Manual of Procedures for Operations Inspection, Certification and Continued Surveillance*
- ICAO MID RASG/ASPIG records – Proposal for guidance on judicial enforcement
- **Skyboard** – Article on Just Culture (emphasizing accountability for willful violations) skybrary.aero
- **FAA Order 2150.3C** – Compliance and Enforcement Program (criteria for legal)

Appendix 1

Model Judicial Referral Letter (Template)

[This template provides a general format for a letter from the CAA to the judicial authorities (e.g., Prosecutor's Office) referring a case for legal enforcement. It should be customized to the specific case and national protocols.]

[CAA Letterhead]
Ref: **[Case/Enforcement Reference Number]**
Date: **[DD Month YYYY]**

To:
The Chief Prosecutor, **[Name of Prosecutorial Authority or Court]**
Address: **[Office Address]**

Subject: Referral for Prosecution – Aviation Safety Violations by **[Name of Entity/Individual]**

Dear **[Title and Name of Prosecutor]**,

The **[Civil Aviation Authority of State]** (CAA) hereby refers a case of aviation safety violations for your review and appropriate legal action. The details of the case are as follows:

- **Offender:** [Name of airline/operator/individual], [license or certificate number if applicable, and address or headquarters].
- **Violation Summary:** On [date(s)], the above-mentioned did commit violations of the national civil aviation regulations, namely [cite specific law/regulation sections]. The key facts are:
    - [Brief description of violation #1, with date/location – e.g., "Operating Flight ABC123 on 5 June 2025 without a valid Certificate of Airworthiness for the aircraft."]
    - [Brief description of violation #2, etc., as needed.]
      These actions are in contravention of [Law/Regulation reference], which stipulates [brief quote or summary of what the law requires].
- **Safety Impact:** The violations identified are considered serious. [Provide a sentence on why it's serious – e.g., "Operating without a valid airworthiness certificate poses an immediate threat to passenger and crew safety."]
- **Evidence Collected:** The CAA's Aviation Safety Inspectors have conducted an investigation into this matter. Key evidence includes:
    - Certified copies of [specific documents, e.g., maintenance logs, flight records] demonstrating the non-compliances.
    - Statements from [witnesses or personnel], attesting to the operations and knowledge of the violations.
    - [Any physical evidence, e.g., "The aircraft component (serial no. XYZ) which was installed without approval, currently secured by CAA."]
      A comprehensive **Enforcement Report** is attached to this letter, detailing the investigation findings and listing all evidence available. The CAA can promptly furnish originals of documents or any additional information at your request.
- **Previous Actions:** [If applicable, mention if the CAA took any immediate actions like grounding aircraft or suspending a license, and that these remain in effect or were interim measures. Also, mention if the entity has a history of violations or if this seems an isolated case.]

In light of the above, the CAA requests your office to initiate prosecution under [relevant section of the penal code or aviation law] against [the offender]. We believe the evidence establishes a prima facie case of [e.g., "operating an aircraft in violation of safety regulations," or "endangering civil aviation safety" – use the legal terminology if available]. The penalties upon conviction under these provisions may include [briefly state possible penalties like fines/imprisonment as per law].

The CAA underscores the importance of this case from a safety perspective. Vigorous enforcement of aviation safety laws is essential to prevent future occurrences and maintain public confidence in air transport. We appreciate the close cooperation between our agencies in upholding these laws.

Point of Contact: For any further information or clarification, please contact [Name, Title], who is the lead aviation safety inspector for this case. [He/She] can be reached at [phone, email]. We are ready to assist your investigation and legal proceedings in any capacity, including providing expert technical testimony to the court.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. We trust in your esteemed office to take the necessary action in accordance with the law.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
[Name of CAA Head or Authorized Official]
[Title]
[Civil Aviation Authority of ...]

Attachments:

- CAA Enforcement Report (Ref. No. …) and evidence inventory.
- Copies of key evidence documents [list attachments as needed].

Cc: [Internal CAA file reference or other agencies, if applicable

(End of Template)

Appendix 2 –

Court Evidence Checklist

SEIG/7-REPORT

APPENDIX 2F

Category	What to include	Guidance / Notes	Status ☑	File ref. / link
Regulation Reference	Exact law/regulation violated (section No. + wording)	Attach official text; cite section and exact wording used in report	☐	
Inspection Reports & Notes	Original inspection/audit report	Ensure final signed copy is included	☐	
	Inspector's contemporaneous notes/worksheets	Legible, dated/timestamped; keep originals	☐	
Official Correspondence	Warning letters / notices of violation / grounding orders	Show history and entity awareness; include delivery proofs	☐	
Operational Docs (as applicable)	Flight records / journey logs / manifests	Verify dates, aircraft, crew consistency	☐	
	Maintenance records (logbooks, work orders, component history)	Cross-check part numbers, signatures, certifying staff	☐	
	Training records / personnel licenses	Validate currency, ratings, medicals where relevant	☐	
	Aircraft/component certificates (C of A, STC, etc.)	Verify validity and configuration match	☐	
	Exemptions/permits (or confirmation none exist)	Include scope, dates, conditions	☐	
Evidence of Act/Violation	Photographs / videos	Time/date-stamped; note camera/device; preserve originals	☐	
	Physical evidence items (e.g., failed part, forged doc)	Secure, label, uniquely identify	☐	
	Data logs / electronic evidence (FDR, ACARS, emails, e-maintenance)	Secure original files; create verified copies; provide printed excerpts	☐	
Witness Testimonies	Witness list (name, role, contact)	Note availability and potential conflicts	☐	
	Written statements (signed if possible)	Separate internal vs external witnesses	☐	
	Expert analysis reports + expert credentials	Lab tests, engineering analyses; include CV/qualifications	☐	
Compliance History	Prior violations/enforcement actions	Past letters, penalties; demonstrate pattern if relevant	☐	
	Compliance record / safety audit results	Context: isolated vs systemic	☐	
Impact / Consequence	Incident/accident description linked to violation	Include official incident/occurrence report if any	☐	
	Risk assessment / safety analysis (if no incident)	Explain plausible severity and likelihood to court	☐	
Chain of Custody	Evidence handling log (who, when, where)	Unique IDs; storage conditions; signatures	☐	
	Transfers to law enforcement / others	Record date/time, receiving party, signatures	☐	
Referral & Legal Docs	Prosecutor referral letter (per Appendix 1/equivalent)	Check signatory authority and addenda	☐	

Category	What to include	Guidance / Notes	Status ☑	File ref. / link
	Comprehensive enforcement report (inspector's summary)	Clear facts, elements of offense, legal basis	☐	
	Internal CAA approval/minutes authorizing referral	Attach memo or minutes excerpt	☐	
Administrative Prep	Confidentiality markings where needed	e.g., "Confidential – Court Use Only"	☐	
	Remove purely internal opinions from share set	Keep factual evidence in disclosure pack	☐	
	Legible copies; certified translations if required	Verify completeness and readability	☐	
Final Review	Evidence supports each element of the offense	Timeline consistency: who/what/when/where/how	☐	
	Peer/supervisor review of evidence package	Capture comments and resolutions	☐	
	Secure master copy in CAA archives; provide copies to prosecutors	Record what was sent and when	☐	

Appendix 3

Summery of Enforcement Escalation Process

Below is a description of the enforcement escalation process in a flowchart format, illustrating how an issue can progress from detection to judicial action. Inspectors and managers can use this as a quick-reference overview.

Step 1: Violation Detected – An inspector discovers or is alerted to a potential safety regulation violation during oversight (inspection, incident report, etc.).

Step 2: Preliminary Assessment – Inspector assesses severity and nature of violation. Is it minor/unintentional or serious/intentional? Collect initial facts.

Decision Point A: Severity of Violation – *Minor or Major?*

- **If Minor/Unintentional:** Escalation to judicial enforcement is **Not Required**. Handle via compliance action (e.g., finding, corrective action request, administrative penalty). **End of Judicial Path** (monitor corrective action).
- **If Major/Deliberate:** Potential **Enforcement Case**. Proceed to formal investigation.
  (for major cases)
  Step 3: Internal Review – Discuss within CAA (enforcement committee/management). Confirm that judicial action is appropriate based on criteria (intentional, reckless, etc.).

  Decision Point B: Go/No-Go for Judicial – *Proceed with Judicial Enforcement?*
- **No:** (If after review, decided not strong enough for court) – Revert to administrative handling (e.g., license action) and close judicial path.
- **Yes:** Formal **Enforcement Case Opened**.
  (if Yes)
  Step 4: Investigation & Evidence Gathering – Inspector (with team) gathers comprehensive evidence, documentation, witness statements. Prepare enforcement report.

  Step 5: Legal Referral – CAA prepares referral package (referral letter + report + evidence) and sends to Prosecutor/Law Enforcement.

  Step 6: Prosecutor Review – Prosecutor evaluates case. Possibly asks for more info. Decides whether to file charges.
  Decision Point C: Prosecutor Action – *Proceed with Prosecution?*
- **Decline/Delay:** If prosecutor decides not to pursue (e.g., insufficient evidence), case may revert to CAA for alternative action or further investigation. (CAA might strengthen case or use admin penalties). **[Loop back]**
- **Accept:** Prosecutor files charges in court.
  ↓ *(if accepted)*
  Step 7: Judicial Process – Case goes to court. Includes pre-trial, trial, verdict. Inspector provides testimony/expertise as needed. Court renders judgment.

  Decision Point D: Outcome – *Guilty or Not Guilty (or other judgment)?*
- **Not Guilty/Case Dismissed:** Enforcement action ends without penalty. CAA internal review needed (what went wrong, was it evidence or interpretation?). Possibly consider civil/administrative action if any available.

- **Guilty/Violation Confirmed:** Court imposes penalties (fines, jail, etc.) and/or orders (e.g., revoke license).
  (if guilty)
  Step 8: Penalty Execution & Follow-Up – Ensure penalties are implemented (collect fines, revoke certificates as ordered, etc.).

  Step 9: Post-Enforcement Actions – CAA monitors compliance after case: verify corrective actions by offender, communicate outcome to industry, incorporate lessons learned into future oversight. Case closed in records.

Appendix 4

Sample Case Summary Template

Inspectors can use a case summary template to report on enforcement cases for internal records or for sharing within the CAA/ICAO as needed. Below is a sample format:

Case Summary: Judicial Enforcement Action Report

- **CAA Case Reference:** [e.g., ENF-2025-05]
- **Inspector(s) Name:** [Lead Inspector Full Name, Team members if any]
- **Entity/Individual:** [Name of operator or person involved; include license/certificate numbers]
- **Violation Description:** [Short description of what rule was violated and how. Example: "Operation of ABC Airlines Flight 123 on 05/06/2025 in commercial service without a valid Certificate of Airworthiness for the aircraft, violating Section 4 of Civil Aviation Act."]
- **Date of Violation (Detection):** [Date when violation occurred or was detected]
- **Location:** [Where it happened – airport, airspace, etc.]
- **Initial Actions Taken by CAA:** [Describe any immediate safety actions – e.g., "Aircraft was grounded on 06/06/2025 via emergency order; operator's permit temporarily suspended pending investigation."]
- **Investigation Summary:**
    - Initiation date of investigation and involved units.
    - Key evidence collected (list major evidence items).
    - Any coordination with other agencies during investigation (e.g., police, other regulators).
    - Conclusion of investigation: [e.g., "Evidence confirmed deliberate violation of maintenance requirements by the operator."]
- **Enforcement Decision:**
    - Date of internal decision to pursue judicial enforcement.
    - Approval by: [Name/Title of approving authority].
    - Rationale: [e.g., "Violation was willful and posed high safety risk; met criteria for prosecution."]
- **Referral Details:**
    - Date referred to Prosecutor and reference of referral letter.
    - Prosecutor Office/Contact.
    - Charges filed: [List the legal charges filed by prosecutor, e.g., "Count 1: Endangering Aircraft Safety (Art. X of Penal Code), Count 2: Falsification of Documents (Art. Y…)"].
    - Date charges filed in court.
- **Court Proceedings:**
    - Court name and case number.
    - Timeline: [e.g., "Trial held on 10–12 Oct 2025 in [Court]. Inspector and two witnesses testified."]
    - Outcome (Date of judgment): [e.g., "Guilty on all counts" or "Guilty on some, acquitted on others" or "Not guilty"].
    - Sentence: [e.g., "Company fined US$100,000; accountable manager sentenced to 3 months imprisonment (suspended for 1 year); court order to CAA to revoke AOC for 6 months."].
    - If not guilty or case dismissed, note reasons if known (e.g., lack of evidence, legal technicality).
- **Post-Judgment Actions by CAA:**

  - Penalties/Orders executed: [e.g., "Fine paid on 01/12/2025; AOC formally reinstated on 01/06/2026 after compliance check."].
  - Follow-up inspections: [e.g., "Conducted follow-up audit on 15/04/2026 to verify compliance improvements – satisfactory."].
  - Communication: ["Case outcome circulated to industry via Safety Bulletin 02/2026" or "No public disclosure due to ongoing appeal"].
- **Lessons Learned:**
  - [Bullet points on what went well or challenges: e.g., "Need to involve legal team earlier – will do so in future.", "This case sets a precedent for handling unairworthy operations, will reference in future enforcement.", "Training needed on evidence handling – identified and planned."]
- **Attachments:**
  - [List of key documents attached to this summary if any, like judgment copy, etc.]
- **Prepared by:** [Inspector Name], **Date:**
- **Reviewed/Approved by:** [Manager or Director Name], **Date:**

(End of Case Summary Template)

- END -

ICAO MID

SAFETY

MID-RASP

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN

Third Edition **2026-2028**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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- **Appendix A:** Identified safety issues as indicated in the 13th ASR
- **Appendix B:** MID Region-Safety Performance Measurement &Monitoring (SPMM)
- **Appendix C:** Safety Actions-Consolidated List of SEIs with their respective Actions for follow up - Draft
- **Appendix D:** SEIs identified in MID-RASP may be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs
- **Appendix E:** Definitions

MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN (MID-RASP)

ICAO

THIRD EDITION 2026–2028

PART I- PLANNING

SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview of the RASP

MID Region is committed to enhancing aviation safety, to the resourcing of supporting activities and to increasing collaboration at the regional level. The MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety at the regional level. It constitutes the regional safety plan for MID Region, setting out the strategic priorities, main risks affecting the regional aviation system and the necessary actions to mitigate those risks to further improve aviation safety.

The purpose of this MID-RASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of accidents, through the development and implementation of regional SEIs. A safe, resilient and sustainable aviation system contributes to the economic development of MID Region, the States which comprise it and their industries.

The MID-RASP promotes the effective implementation of safety oversight systems of States in MID Region, a risk-based approach to managing safety at the regional level, as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between States in the region, international organizations and industry. All stakeholders are encouraged to support and implement the MID-RASP as the regional strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.

In addition, MID-RASP is to create a common focus on regional aviation safety issues as a continuation of the MID Region work to improve aviation safety and to comply with ICAO standards. This approach complements the existing system of developing safety regulations, complying with them and investigating accidents and serious incidents when they occur.

The MID-RASP is in alignment with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) *Global Aviation Safety Plan* (GASP, Doc 10004) and the national aviation safety plans of States in the region.

1.2 Structure of the MID RASP

The MID- RASP presents the regional direction for the management of aviation safety at the regional level, for a period of three years (2026-2028). It comprises seven sections. In addition to the introduction, sections include: the purpose of the MID-RASP, the regional operational safety risks, the regional organizational challenges, MID region's strategic direction for the management of aviation safety at the regional level, and a description of how the implementation of the safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) listed in the MID-RASP is going to be monitored.

- **Part I. Planning** provides an introduction, which describes how MID-RASP is structured, developed and monitored and includes the MID region's strategic safety priorities. It consists of **sections 1 to 3**.

- **Part II. Implementation** contains safety performance measurement & monitoring and the detailed list of MID-RASP safety actions. It consists of **sections 4 and 5**.

- Both parts are supported by a number of appendices providing further details or assisting the reader.

Part-I. Planning

Part I provides an introductory explanation. Sections 1 and 2 explain how MID-RASP is structured, developed, monitored; presents the structure of the document; operational context; and the main purpose of this MID-RASP. Section 3 presents MID region's safety priorities:

Part-II. Implementation

Part II contains MID region's strategic direction for the management of aviation safety and safety actions. It consists of sections 4 and 5. Section **4** presents the MID Region safety performance monitoring and measurement (SPMM).

In respect of **section 5**, it facilitates the identification of SEIs and their respective actions relevant for each Goal identified in the MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring as follows:

- Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks
- Goal 2: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities
- Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)
- Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional & national levels to address safety issues
- Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP)
- Goal 6: Expand the use of industry safety assessment and safety data sharing Programmes.

The MID Region SPMM includes six (6) Goals in line with GASP 2026-2028 Edition. For each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM, identified SEI(s) is mapped to it including their respective actions and the following information is provided:

Goal: Goal supports the region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level.

- **Goal #**Number & name
- **SEI# Number**: Description of the SEI
- **Target.** Target which serves to fulfil respective Regional Goal (Refer to MID Region SPMM)
- **Rationale** behind the safety issue (why it has been identified as an issue)
- **What it is to be achieved** (objective)
- **How we intend to monitor improvement/implementation of SEI** in the future
- **How we intend to achieve** the objective; here, the various actions contributing to mitigate the identified risk in that area are described
- **Actions**: The tasks required for the implementation of the SEI. The actions support the SEI and Targets of the Regional Goal
- **References:**
  - Indicates key existing global documents from which the SEI is adopted, if applicable.

Stakeholders:	Stakeholders in MID region
Example Action 1:	Description of the action to be taken
Responsible entity:	Appointed Group/State(s)/Organization(s) to develop details for implementation of the respective action
Priority:	Low, Medium, High
Completion Date:	The year(s) in which the respective action is expected to be implemented
Status:	new, ongoing, on hold, completed. (Provide also updated progress if any)

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable	**TIMELINE**
Description of result be achieved	The year in which the Target is expected to be achieved

1.3 Process for the MID RASP development, implementation and monitoring

The RASG-MD is the governing body responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the MID-RASP, in collaboration with the ICAO MID Office, international and regional organizations and with the aviation industry. The MID-RASP was developed in consultation with States, regional organizations, and other stakeholders in the region, and in alignment with the 2026-2028 of the GASP. If required, RASG-MID would seek the support of MIDANPIRG and RASFG-MID, other sub-groups, States, regional organizations, and industry to ensure the timely implementation of SEIs to address safety deficiencies and mitigate risks. Through close monitoring of the SEIs, SEIG would make adjustments to the MID-RASP and its initiatives, if needed, and update the MID-RASP document accordingly.

Furthermore, the MID-RASP is to be reviewed by SEIG every year mainly to include new identified SEIs, review/update the existing SEIs, and their respective safety actions. In addition, the MID-RASP is to be updated/endorsed by RASG-MID at least every three years and as deemed necessary.

The SEIG is established to assist RASG-MID to develop and monitor the implementation of SEIs related to identified regional operational risks, Regional organizational challenges, and emerged issues. In addition, the SEIG takes the lead and ensures that SEIs are implemented in a timely, effective and efficient manner in coordination with RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, and RASFG-MID groups and sub-groups (ASRG, ASPIG, AIIG, ATM-SG,..etc), States, regional organizations, and industry.

As a first step towards establishing this system and to facilitate MID-RASP implementation, it is necessary to enhance the communication and flow of safety data and information, as well as coordination processes, among RASG-MID and its subsidies, States, and regional organizations. There is also the need to continue to enhance collaboration with MIDANPIRG through coordinated processes to sustain the collection and sharing of regional air traffic management (ATM) data and the sharing and resolution of safety issues. This, in turn, would support the implementation of Aviation System Block Upgrade (ASBUs) and ensure that their implementation accounts for and properly manages existing and emerging issues, e.g. approaches with vertical guidance (APV) to mitigate risks associated with CFIT and runway excursions.

The MID-RASP was developed with the aim of addressing the MID region's safety issues in a timely manner, as applicable. It is expected that this approach would facilitate MID States' support and participation in the implementation of these SEIs and their respective actions at both the regional and national levels. The three-year period of the MID-RASP, i.e. 2026 to 2028, was selected to coincide with the GASP review period of the same duration, to ensure continued alignment with the latest global plans.

States should ensure that a NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. MID-RASP provides the identified safety priorities in the region and States should identify which top risks and key issues mentioned in the GASP and MID-RASP which apply to their national context and identify suitable mitigation actions within their NASP. States should also add/consider other safety issues which are unique to their operational context. Furthermore, States to establish their NASPs taking into account the GASP and MID-RASP; and based on their operational safety needs.

The key contents of the MID-RASP were developed using an eight-step process recommended by the GASP to develop RASPs and NASPs as indicated below:



1.4 Regional safety issues, goals and targets

MID-RASP has been developed in full alignment with the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP), actively supporting its aspirational goal of achieving zero aviation fatalities by 2030, as well as its overarching objectives, targets, and performance indicators. Furthermore, the MID Region, its States, and industry stakeholders are committed to reducing the aviation accident rate by 2028, measured through a 5-year rolling average using 2025 as the baseline year.

Key Features of MID-RASP Implementation:

a. **Structural Alignment with GASP:** MID-RASP adheres rigorously to the framework and strategic priorities outlined in GASP, ensuring harmonized global and regional safety efforts.

b. **Comprehensive Gap Analysis:** A systematic review was conducted to identify gaps between RASG-MID initiatives and ICAO Doc 10131 (Manual on Regional and National Aviation Safety Plans), enabling targeted enhancements to align with global standards.

c. **Integration of SPMM:** The MID Region Safety Performance Monitoring and Mechanism (SPMM), aligned with the GASP 2026-2028 Edition, has been updated and incorporated as an appendix within MID-RASP to ensure continuity and measurable progress tracking.

d. **Strategic Selection of SEIs:** Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) for MID-RASP were prioritized based on regional relevance, GASP 2026-2028 guidance, and actionable outcomes from key forums (DCGA, RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, and RASFG-MID). Notably, GASP SEIs focused on domestic State/industry responsibilities were excluded, as these will be addressed through individual National Aviation Safety Plans (NASPs) developed by MID States.

The MID Regional Aviation Safety Plan (MID-RASP) aims to enhance the MID Region's commitment to improving safety oversight capabilities, reducing operational risks, and establishing effective State Safety Programmes (SSP). It serves as a key framework for raising awareness of safety risks and their consequences among States, industry, and stakeholders. MID-RASP encourages the allocation of financial, human, and technical resources to improve safety management, oversight, and operational performance. Additionally, it facilitates information sharing among relevant stakeholders to support timely action and collaborative problem-solving.

At the regional level, MID-RASP commits RASG-MID to the following strategic priorities:

a. **Continuous reduction of regional operational risks:** Updating and developing new SEIs to address Regional High-Risk Categories (R-HRCs) such as Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I), Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT), Mid-Air Collision (MAC), Runway Incursion (RI), and Runway Excursion (RE), along with other safety priorities.
b. **Strengthening Safety Oversight**: Supporting States in enhancing their safety oversight capabilities notably for **AIG, AGA,** and **ANS** areas and resolving any Significant Safety Concerns (SSCs).
c. **SSP and SMS Implementation:** Assisting States in developing and implementing SSPs and Safety Management Systems (SMS) for service providers, including the formulation of National Aviation Safety Plans (NASPs).
d. **Promoting Regional Collaboration:** Encouraging States and Industry to share safety information and best practices.
e. **Aerodrome Safety and Certification:** Enhancing the implementation of Aerodrome Certification, SMS, Runway Safety Programmes, Runway Safety Teams (RSTs), and the Global Reporting Format (GRF) methodology.
f. **Integrating UAS and AAM:** Supporting States in addressing challenges and opportunities related to the integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) into national and global aviation ecosystems.
g. **Managing cross-sector risks:** Helping States mitigate risk interdependencies including cybersecurity threats, GNSS interference/spoofing, 5G interference with radio altimeters, aviation health safety risks, conflict zone hazards, and security risks impacting aviation safety.
h. **Supporting MENA ARCM Activities:** Providing continuous assistance for the activities of the MENA Aviation Regional Cooperation Mechanism (MENA ARCM).
i. **Advance the operation of MENA RSOO:** Assisting States in setting up and operationalizing the MENA Regional Safety Oversight Organization (MENA RSOO).
j. **Capacity Building and Implementation Support**: Conducting capacity building activities including resource mobilization, developing guidance material and sharing best practices to enhance State and industry capabilities.
k. **Promoting Safety Data Management:** promote the implementation of a regional framework for safety data collection, analysis, and sharing to enable proactive risk management and evidence-based decision-making.

Through these initiatives, MID-RASP reinforces a proactive and collaborative approach to aviation safety, ensuring continuous improvement and resilience in the MID Region.

Commitment of States and Industry: States and industry are dedicated to the following efforts to enhance aviation safety in the MID Region:

a. **Implementation of SEIs:** Strategically and timely implement the GASP and MID-RASP SEIs, as appropriate, along with their respective actions.
b. **Strengthen state oversight system** to address deficiencies notably for AIG, AGA, &ANS
c. **Resolution of Significant Safety Concerns (SSCs):** States with SSCs identified under the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP CMA) should prioritize their resolution. This includes utilizing available resources, such as technical assistance from other States and Regional Programmes, to address SSCs promptly.
d. **Developing and implementing Safety Management:** Prioritize the implementation of State Safety Programmes (SSP), Safety Management Systems (SMS), and National Aviation Safety Plans (NASP).
e. **Data-Driven Risk Mitigation:** Use data-driven methodologies to identify Regional High-Risk Categories (R-HRCs) and associated safety issues. Implement collaborative solutions to reduce accident rates and fatalities while prioritizing the implementation of relevant SEIs.
f. **Leveraging Industry Safety Programmes:** Explore and utilize ICAO-recognized industry assessment Programmes, such as:

- IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA)
- IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO)
- IATA Standard Safety Assessment Programme (ISSA)
- ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) Programme

States and industry should consider options ranging from recognizing these Programmes to encouraging registration by applicable operators to enhance safety management and compliance.

1.5 Operational context

The Middle East's aviation market is poised for significant growth in the coming years, driven by increased passenger demand, substantial investments, and strategic initiatives by regional carriers and governments.

Aviation Industry Overview

The Middle East's aviation industry is experiencing a transformative phase characterized by several key developments:

- Fleet Expansion and Modernization: Airlines in the region are investing heavily in expanding and modernizing their fleets. For instance, Etihad Airways plans to invest up to $1 billion in upgrading the cabins of its Boeing 787 and 777 planes, introducing high-speed internet and new entertainment systems. *(Business Insider)*
- Emergence of New Carriers: The region is witnessing the launch of new airlines, such as Saudi Arabia's Riyadh Air, set to begin passenger flights in 2025. *(Arab News)*
- Infrastructure Investments: Governments are investing in infrastructure to support the anticipated growth. The UAE, for example, has initiated mapping air corridors for air taxis and cargo drones, aiming to integrate advanced air mobility into the nation's infrastructure. *(Reuters*)
- Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) Growth: The fleet expansion is set to drive MRO spending from $16 billion in 2025 to $20 billion by 2035. *(Fast Company, oliverwyman.com)*

Passenger Market Forecast

In February 2025, airlines operating in the Middle East recorded a 3.3% year-on-year increase in passenger demand, with total flight capacity rising by 1.3% during the same period. This growth is part of a broader trend, as the region's aviation market is expected to reach USD 28.38 billion in 2025 and grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.4% to reach USD 35.19 billion by 2030. Additionally, air passenger traffic in the Middle East is projected to surge by 300% to 1.1 billion passengers by 2040. (Arab News, IATA; Mordor Intelligence Airside International, Moodie Davitt Report)

These developments underscore the Middle East's commitment to becoming a global aviation hub, leveraging its strategic location and investing in both fleet and infrastructure to meet growing passenger demand.

The global scheduled commercial international operations accounted for approximately 35.25 million departures in 2023, compared to 31.2 million departures in 2022; which showed a high increase after covid-19 pandemic. The MID Region shows a slight increase in traffic volumes during 2023. Total scheduled commercial departures in 2023 accounted for approximately 1.33 million departures compared to 1.31 million departures in 2019. In terms of an aircraft accident, the MID Region had no accidents in 2023. The 5-year average accident rate for 2019-2023 is 1.77, which is below the global average rate (2.18) for the same period.

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 76,8 %, which is above the world EI 69.68% (as of 10 August 2024). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%. *(13th MID ASR)*

The Middle East's complex geopolitical landscape significantly influences the safety and operations of commercial air transport. Ongoing conflicts, political tensions, and military activities in the region present various challenges for airlines, regulatory authorities, and passengers. The interplay between geopolitical tensions and aviation safety in the Middle East necessitates continuous monitoring, proactive risk management, and effective communication among airlines, regulatory authorities, and flight crews to ensure the safe operation of commercial air transport in the region. Furthermore, the political/security situation in some States, the cross-national variation in aviation development, impede the provision of technical assistance, implementation of regional projects and the achievement of the regional safety, air navigation and Security targets as well as the insufficient financial and human resources in some States.

SECTION 2. PURPOSE OF MID'S REGIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN

The MID RASP is the master planning document containing the strategic direction of the region for the management of aviation safety for a period of three years (2026 to 2028). This plan lists regional safety issues, sets regional safety goals and targets, and presents a series of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) to achieve those goals.

2.1 Relationship between MID-RASP and GASP and other Plans

Aviation's contribution towards the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to maximize the benefits of aviation, the priorities of the aviation sector should be integrated and reflected in State's economic and social development planning with an appropriately balanced development of transport modes, including multi-modal and urban planning initiatives. In addition, recognizing that air transport is a catalyst for sustainable development and that it represents an essential lifeline for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and especially for Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs).

ICAO Business Plan takes into consideration all of the work mandated to be undertaken by ICAO, regardless of source of funding. The Business Plan sets out the Strategic Goals and priorities to guide the activities of the Organization to support Members States in their attainment of a safe, secure, efficient, economically viable and environmentally responsible air transport network.
ICAO's global plans are essential in supporting safe, secure, efficient, economically viable and environmentally responsible air transportation. They provide a means to advance ICAO's Strategic Goals. The ICAO global plans include: the GASP, the GANP and the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP).

The GASP presents the global strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety. The purpose of the GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, by guiding the development of a harmonized aviation safety.

The purpose of the Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP) is to drive the evolution of the global air navigation system to meet the ever-growing expectations of all sectors in the aviation community by equitably accommodating all airspace user operations in a safe, secure and cost-effective manner while reducing the environmental impact on aviation. To this end, GANP provides a series of operational improvements to increase capacity, efficiency, predictability and flexibility, while ensuring interoperability of systems and harmonization of procedures. The implementation of the GANP is enabled by promoting the effective implementation of safety oversight and a safety management approach to oversight, including SRM to permit innovation in a managed way.
GASP complements GANP by providing States and industry with the tools to implement a safety management approach through their SSP and SMS. The GANP, through the evolution of the system described in the conceptual roadmap and the operational improvements detailed in the technical frameworks, supports the goals within the GASP and the GASeP by enhancing safety and security of the air navigation system as reflected in the performance ambitions.

The GASP goals and targets support GASeP by providing the best practices and models that can be as effective in managing security as they are in safety management. These include effective oversight, organizational culture, risk management and assurance processes. GASeP in turn supports GASP's vision of zero fatalities.

The MID RASP has been developed using the goals and targets, and the global high-risk categories of occurrences (G-HRCs), and the global organizational challenges from the ICAO GASP (www.icao.int/gasp). Moreover, MID-RASP considers and supports the objectives and priorities of GASP. The purpose of GASP is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of accidents, by guiding the development of a harmonized aviation safety strategy and the development and implementation of regional and national aviation safety plans. A safe aviation system contributes to the economic development of States and their industries. GASP promotes the effective implementation of SSP and SMS including NASP, a state's safety oversight system, and a risk-based approach to managing safety as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between States, international organizations, and industry. One of the GASP goals is for States to improve their effective safety oversight capabilities and to progress in the implementation of SSPs including NASPs. Thus, GASP calls for States to put in place robust and sustainable safety oversight systems that should progressively evolve into more sophisticated means of managing safety.

Assembly Resolution A40-1 also calls for each State to develop and implement a national aviation safety plan (NASP), in line with the GASP goals, targets and the global high-risk categories of occurrences (G-HRCs). The NASP should also be developed having close regard for the RASP, while acknowledging that each State may have its own, specific safety issues and priorities, including addressing significant safety concerns (SSCs).



Relationship between GASP, RASP and NASP

In addition, to addressing systemic safety issues, GASP addresses Global high-risk categories (G-HRC) of occurrences, which are deemed global safety priorities. These categories were determined based on actual fatalities from past accidents, high fatality risk per accident or the number of accidents and incidents. The following G-HRCs have been identified for the 2026-2028 edition of the GASP: controlled flight into terrain (CFIT); Loss of control in flight (LOC-I); Mid-air collision (MAC); runway excursion (RE); and runway incursion (RI). The GASP G-HRCs are addressed in MID-RASP.

The MID-RASP considers the objectives and priorities of the GASP to enhance the level of safety in aviation and to better prepare the Member States for the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) audits including State Safety Programme.

The SEIs listed in the MID RASP form the action plan that supports the regional safety strategy. Ultimately, they support the improvement of safety at the individual State level, for States in the region, and contribute to the enhancement of safety at the wider international level. The MID RASP includes several actions to address specific safety issues and recommended SEIs for individual States in the region. It is expected that States in the region adopt these SEIs and include them in their respective national aviation safety plans

The 2026-2028 Edition of the GASP includes a new set of goals, targets and indicators, in line with the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In respect of MID Region SPMM, the GASP provides global strategic direction while the MID region SPMM provides regional specific goals and supports the region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level. Consequently, MID region safety indicators and targets were aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP goals and targets as relevant in the MID Region. Furthermore, the RASG-MID would continuously monitor the implementation of the identified SEIs in the MID-RASP and measure safety performance of the regional civil aviation system, to ensure the intended targets are achieved, using the MID Region safety performance measurement & monitoring to this plan. Moreover, MID safety performance measurement & monitoring Goals support the region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level. Therefore, for each Goal established in the MID region SPMM identified SEI(s) is mapped to it including their respective actions.

The MID Region SPMM is included as an integral part of MID-RASP ***at Appendix B***.



Relationship between MID-RASP and other Plans

SECTION 3. MID REGION'S STRATEGIC SAFETY PRIORITIES

The MID-RASP presents the safety priorities that were developed based on the ICAO GASP's including organizational challenges, operational safety risks and emerging issues as well as MID region-specific issues identified by a safety risk assessment and published in MID Region Annual Safety Reports and RASG-MID activities. Additionally, the MID region's strategic approach to managing safety at the regional level is to address the region's safety issues in a timely manner. Therefore, the MID-RASP strategic approach would focus on regional organizational challenges/issues, regional operational safety risks, and emerging issues as indicated in the graph below.



Therefore, the MID-RASP adopts three focus areas approach:

<u>First focus area:</u> Mitigation of Regional Operational Safety Risks

The GASP envisions achieving and sustaining zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond. To support this vision, the first focus area prioritizes the effective mitigation of regional operational safety risks, particularly: Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I), Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), Mid-Air Collision (MAC), Runway Incursion (RI), Runway Excursion (RE).

Addressing these risks at the regional level requires a structured and integrated approach that includes:

- **Effective mitigation strategies:** Promote and develop effective mitigations strategies at the regional level to address operational safety risks (LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RE, and RI)
- **Safety Data Collection & Analysis**: Promote data-driven insights to identify safety issues and address them in an effective way.
- **Improve the Implementation of Safety Management:** Strengthen State Safety Programs (SSP) to incorporate data-driven safety risk management in line Annex 19 requirements
- **Foster regional collaboration:** Foster regional collaboration, including information exchange and best practice sharing as well as collaboration between regulators and service providers.
- **Collaborative Safety Enhancement Initiatives:** Encouraging joint efforts among States, industry, and stakeholders to address the regional operational safety risks.
- **Continuous Safety Promotion & Training:** Ensuring ongoing education and awareness for aviation professionals.

This approach creates a closed-loop system where data informs action, stakeholders collaborate, and adaptive strategies drive continuous improvement. By focusing on regional priorities while leveraging global best practices, this initiative ensures a comprehensive and sustainable reduction in LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RI, and RE risks.

Second focus area: Strengthening Regional Safety Oversight and Management

The second focus area focuses on enhancing regional mechanisms to strengthen effective safety oversight capabilities, improve the establishment and implementation of safety management, and address risk interdependencies. Key regional challenges in aviation safety include regulatory oversight challenges, resource constraints, and deficiencies in safety management implementation. Addressing these issues requires a structured governance framework, capacity-building initiatives, and enhanced regional collaboration to ensure sustained safety improvements.

Strengthening Safety Oversight and Capacity Building

- Organizing and conducting regional technical assistance missions, capacity-building and Training Initiatives, and safety promotion activities.
- Enhancing human factors and human performance management.
- Supporting the establishment of an effective SSP and service providers' SMS.
- Manage risk interdependencies: Addressing interconnected risks such as cybersecurity risks, GNSS interference & spoofing risks, aviation health safety (AHS) risks, risks arising from conflict zones, and security risks with an impact on aviation safety.

Enhancing Regional Coordination and Cooperation

- Strengthening regional collaboration with States and regional organizations to support the implementation of MID-RASP SEIs.
- Enhancing communication and safety information sharing between States, international organizations, and industry stakeholders.
- Actively engage with donors, States and international organizations to mobilize the necessary financial and technical support.

Supporting and leveraging Regional Safety Initiatives

- Providing continuous support for MENA ARCM activities.
- Supporting the operation of the MENA Regional Safety Oversight Organization (MENA RSOO).

This structured mechanism ensures a systematic and effective approach to addressing regional safety oversight challenges, strengthening safety governance, and fostering collaborative risk management across the MID Region.

Third focus area: Integration of Emerging Technologies

Emerging technologies such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), and electric Vertical Take-Off and Landing (eVTOL) aircraft are reshaping the aviation industry. However, their integration into existing airspace presents significant regulatory, operational, and safety challenges. To support States in addressing these challenges, efforts will focus on:

- Conducting capacity building initiatives to promote a structured, safe, and harmonized approach.
- Promoting regional cooperation among states, organizations, and industry.
- Supporting the Development of a regional roadmap for the integration of AAM and new entrants.

Key Pillars for Safe Integration: A structured mechanism must address the following critical areas:

- **Regulatory and Policy Frameworks:** establishing clear regulations, policies, and guidelines for AAM and UAS operations.
- **Airspace Integration & Traffic Management:** Developing strategies for safe and efficient integration into controlled and uncontrolled airspace.
- **Safety Oversight & Risk Management:** Implementing robust safety oversight mechanisms and risk mitigation strategies.
- **Infrastructure Development & Certification:** Facilitating the development of vertiports, communication

systems, and necessary certification processes.
- **Public Acceptance & Cybersecurity:** Addressing societal concerns, cybersecurity risks, and overall system resilience.

By leveraging global best practices and fostering regional collaboration, this initiative aims to ensure the safe, efficient, and sustainable integration of AAM and new entrants into the MID Region's aviation ecosystem.

3.1. REGIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS

The vision of the GASP is to achieve and maintain the goal of zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond. To do so, regional operational safety risks need to be identified and addressed. In line with the vision of the GASP, regional operational safety risks are listed in this section of the MID RASP. They addressed through the action plan presented in Section 5 of this document.
The RASG-MID produces and publishes an Annual Safety Report, available on the ICAO MID Office website. The RASG-MID Annual Safety Report is a timely, unbiased, and transparent source of safety-related information essential for all aviation stakeholders interested in having a tool to enable sound decision-making on safety-related matters.
The summary of accidents and serious incidents that occurred in MID Region as state of occurrence involved in scheduled commercial operations involving aircraft having a Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) above 5700 kg, is shown in the tables below.

Year	***Fatal accidents***	***Non-fatal accidents***	***Serious incidents***
2019 - 2023	1	7	287

The MID region (8) eight accidents occurred between 2019 and 2023. One fatal accident occurred respectively during the year 2020. The 5-year average accident rate for 2019-2023 is 1.77, which is below the global average rate (2.18) for the same period.
The MID Region had no fatal accident in 2023. However, the 5-year average fatal accident rate for 2019-2023 is 0.28 is slightly higher than the global average rate (0.21) for the same period. The MID Region had no fatal accidents in 2019, 2021, 2022, and 2023. However, one fatal accident occurred in 2020. The 2020 accident caused176 fatalities.

The GASP 2026-2028 Edition identifies the G-HRCs as LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RE and RI. In the MID Region in 2019-2023 the topmost frequent accidents related to the security and runway safety, which includes RE and ARC during Landing. In terms of fatality risk, the fatal accidents for the period 2019- 2023 were attributed to security related. Thus, based on the analyses of reactive and proactive safety information, it is concluded that the regional operational safety risks including the identified safety issues for the MID Region for the triennium 2026-2028 are:

1. Loss of Control-In Flight (LOC-I);
2. Runway Safety (RS); mainly (RE and ARC during landing);
3. Mid-Air Collision (MAC);
3. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT); and
5. Runway incursion (RI).

Other regional risk categories of occurrences: SCF-NP and TURB.

In addition, safety issues which could lead to the potential outcomes of LOC-I, CFIT, MAC, RE, and RI including the security related issue have been identified in the MID ASR and should be also considered by the States while developing their NASP as well as the industry as indicated at ***Appendix A.***

Aircraft Upset in Flight (Loss of Control-Inflight)
Aircraft upset or loss of control inflight is the most common accident outcome for fatal accidents in CAT aero plane operations. It includes uncontrolled collisions with terrain, but also occurrences where the aircraft deviated from the intended flight path or intended aircraft flight parameters, regardless of whether the flight crew realized the deviation and whether it was possible to recover or not. It also includes the triggering of stall warning and envelope protections. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States that make it an area of concern. Therefore, the prevention of

loss of control is a strategic priority.

Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)
It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences, which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc. There was no fatal accident involving MID States operators during this period. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States and in other parts of the world that make it an area of concern. However, additional data is needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

Mid-Air Collision (MAC)
Refers to the potential collision of two aircraft in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine TCAS resolution advisories, or airspace infringements. During 2020, no mid-air collision accident has been recorded. However, the flight crew received TCAS RA and applied high rate of climb according to the TCAS display to prevent Mid-air collision with military aircraft which caused injuries to some persons on board. In addition, this key risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation. This is one specific safety issue that is the main priority in this key risk area. However, additional safety data and safety information are needed for further analysis to identify the underlying safety issues.

Runway Excursion
Runway excursion covers materialized runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties in maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off-centred or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during landing. During the period 2019-2023, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flight. In addition, High Airspeed and Low Engine Thrust identified as key contributing factors to the Unstable Approaches Events.

Runway Incursion (RI)
A Runway Incursions refers to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection. Their accident outcome is runway collisions. While there were no fatal accidents or accidents involving MID States operators in the last years involving runway collision, the risk of the reported occurrence demonstrated to be very real. In addition to this, MID States should provide further data analysis regarding runway incursion to identify the root causes and associated safety issues.

3.2 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES/ISSUES

Organizational challenges are systemic issues which take into consideration the impact of organizational culture, policies and procedures on the effectiveness of safety risk controls. The MID RASP has included the identified regional organizational challenges/issues. The deficiencies have been identified mainly from RASG-MID Annual Safety Report, USOPA Data, technical assistance mission. These are given priority in the MID RASP since they are aimed at enhancing and strengthening the management of aviation safety at the regional level.
To accelerate progress, a structured regional approach is needed, leveraging collaboration, capacity-building, regulatory alignment, and data-driven decision-making. It is crucial that States' safety oversight capabilities and safety management should keep pace with these regional safety issues. Therefore, for the triennium of 2026-2028, the MID region should continue to focus its efforts on addressing the following top regional organizational issues:

a. **Low USOAP EI scores:** Addressing persistently low Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) Effective Implementation (EI) scores, particularly in States scoring below 60%, as well as in Accident Investigation (AIG)- (slow progress in establishing independent aircraft accident investigation authorities), Aerodrome & Ground Aids (AGA), and Air Navigation Services (ANS) domains.
b. **Slow SSP and NASP Implementation:** Accelerating the development and implementation of SSP, including the formulation of NASP.
c. **Delayed SMS Implementation & Oversight:** Enhancing the acceptance and regulatory surveillance of SMS for service providers.
d. **Gaps in State Safety Risk Management (SRM)**: Developing a holistic State Safety Risk Management

framework to support data-driven decision-making, safety performance management, and effective resource allocation for risk mitigation.

e. **Challenges in Safety Data Management & Sharing:** Addressing the lack of resources, expertise, and formal mechanisms for collecting, managing, and sharing safety data and intelligence at both State and regional levels.
f. **Human Factors & Human Competence:** Strengthening initiatives to enhance human factors management, human performance optimization, and personnel competency development.
g. **Manage risk interdependencies:** Addressing interconnected risks such as cybersecurity risks, GNSS interference & spoofing risks, aviation health safety (AHS) risks, risks arising from conflict zones, and security risks with an impact on aviation safety.
h. **Slow Implementation of Safety Enhancements:** Accelerating the adoption of RASG-MID conclusions, MID-RASP Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs), and other safety actions/tools to mitigate identified safety issues and deficiencies.
i. **Airspace Structure & Geopolitical Challenges:** Mitigating risks associated with airspace restrictions and rerouting, ensuring safe and efficient traffic flow amid the complex geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

3.2.1 Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Safety oversight is defined as a function by means of which States ensure effective implementation of the safety-related SARPs, and associated procedures contained in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and related ICAO documents. States have overall safety oversight responsibilities, which emphasize a state's commitment to safety in respect of the State's aviation activity. An individual State's responsibility for safety oversight is the foundation upon which a safe global air transport system is built. States that experience difficulties in carrying out safety oversight functions can impact the state of International Civil Aviation.
The eight critical elements (CEs) of a safety oversight system are defined by ICAO. MID Region is committed to the effective implementation of these eight CEs among all States in the region, as part of overall safety oversight



responsibilities, which emphasize MID region's commitment to safety in respect of its aviation activities. The eight CEs are presented in the figure below.

USOAP-CMA audits had identified that State's inability to effectively oversee aviation operations remains a global concern. In respect of MID Region, the regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is approx. 76,8 %, which is above the world EI 69.68% (as of 10 August 2024). Three (3) States are currently below EI 60%.

All eight areas and 5 CEs have an EI above 60%. For CE-4: AIG- 43.8%, AGA- 51.5%; and ANS- 52.4%. For CE-8: AGA – 53.4% and ANS – 44.3% respectively. However, the areas of AIG, AGA and ANS and CE4 and CE8 still need more improvement.
Moreover, the establishment in terms of training and effective implementation in certification, surveillance, and

resolution of Safety concerns need to be improved.
The latest ICAO activities, which aim to measure the effective implementation of the eight CEs of States' individual safety oversight systems, as part of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP), have resulted



in the following scores, compiled as an average for the region of MID region as indicated in the table below.

The lowest EI areas in the region were aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG), aerodrome & ground handling (AGA), and Air Navigation services (ANS) and identified as the organizational challenges/issues at the regional level considered of the utmost priority because they impact States' safety oversight and safety management capabilities and, consequently aviation safety at the regional level. They were identified based on analysis from USOAP data analysis, accident and incident investigation reports, technical assistance activities as well as based on regional analysis conducted by RASG-MID groups. These issues are typically systemic in nature and relate to challenges associated with the conduct of States' safety oversight functions, implementation of SSP at the regional level and the level of SMS implementation by industry in the region. Most of these organizational challenges/issues are in line with those listed in the GASP 2026-2028 Edition.

3.2.2 Improve the development and implementation of Safety Management

States should build upon fundamental safety oversight systems to fully implement SSPs according to Annex 19; States shall require that applicable service providers under their authority implement an SMS. The average EI for SSP foundation PQs for States in the MID Region is 78, 59%.

Proactive safety management considering all known safety data and information has proven essential for the ability of the aviation system to deal with disruptive events. SSP will be increasingly instrumental within MID region aviation safety management system, not only in ensuring that safety issues are addressed at the right level, but also in guaranteeing the availability of required data and safety intelligence to support the identification of hazards and safety issues. Establishing.

safety risk management capabilities in a collaborative manner is key to the safe development of aviation. Safety management also entails the management of human factors and human performance issues, fostering capable and streamlined oversight and establishing a safety promotion programme. In addition, An SSP requires increased collaboration across operational domains to identify hazards and manage risks. Aviation authorities and organizations should anticipate new emerging threats and associated challenges by developing SRM principles. Implementation of SSP is one of the main challenges faced by the State in the MID Region. The RASG-MID addresses the improvement of SSP implementation in the MID Region as one of the top Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs). Moreover, the RASG-MID also supported the establishment and activation of the MENA RSOO, with a primary objective to assist member States to develop and implement SSP; and Several capacity building activities have been conducted to support the implementation of SSP & SMS as well as NASP and address the challenges and difficulties as well as the sharing of experiences and best practices.

Therefore, support to States with SSP, SMS and NASP development and implementation considered a strategic priority at the regional as they impact States' safety oversight and safety management capabilities and, consequently aviation safety at the regional level.

3.2.3. Human Factors and Human Performance

The performance of the aviation system, including its safety performance, depends on humans and on the effective integration of the human factors into the management systems in place. Accordingly, focus on human factors and human performance should form an integral part of any safety management approach, be it at regional, State or industry level.

Human Factors as a discipline has traditionally served as a special focus area in aviation safety management. With the fast-evolving aviation industry, the large variety of operating conditions and business models, but also in the face of disruptive events affecting the entire aviation ecosystem, it is increasingly important for aviation stakeholders to adopt a systems' view on safety. This requires sound knowledge and understanding of how and where people work within the aviation system and what may positively or negatively affect their performance.

The associated strategic goal is to improve the management of Human Factors/Human Performance issues at the level of States and industry by promoting a thorough understanding of Human Factors/Human Performance principles and their relevance in safety management. With this we aim at maximizing the ability for humans to make a positive contribution to system performance, while reducing the exposure of the aviation system to Human Factors/Human Performance related safety issues. This will improve safety performance as well as operational performance.
As new technologies emerge on the market and the complexity of the system continues increasing, it is of key importance to have the right competencies and adapt training methods to cope with new challenges. The top three key risk areas related to human factors (HF) and human performance (HP) are LOC-I, MAC, and RI.

3.2.4 Manage Risk Interdependencies

The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that safety, security, health safety and other risks can no longer be managed in isolation. The aviation community has realised that continuing to develop tools and specific guidance for each situation and for each domain affected by transversal risks may delay not only the implementation of mitigation measures, but also the development of an enabling framework to support integrated, collaborative risk management.
Managing some of the risks of interdependencies considered a strategic priority at the regional as they impact on aviation safety at the regional level.

3.2.4. 1 Cybersecurity Risks

The global civil aviation ecosystem is accelerating towards more digitalisation. This implies that any exchange of information within any digital workflow of the aviation community needs to be resilient to information security threats which have consequences on the safety of flight or the availability of airspace and beyond. Aware of the complexity of the aviation system and of the need to manage the cybersecurity risk the MID Region needs to consider and address information security risks in a comprehensive and standardised manner across all aviation domains. In addition, it is essential that the aviation industry and civil aviation authorities share knowledge and learn from experience to ensure systems are secure from individuals/organisations with malicious intent.

3.2.4.2 Security Risks with an Impact on Aviation Safety

The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport security, aircraft security or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider potential impacts on aviation safety. States should consider where interdependencies between civil aviation safety and security exist.
Therefore, an integrated approach to the management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities would bring benefits such as a complete overview of risks, a better sharing of security information and the closure of gaps in the security system while focusing on increasing the overall level of safety. Consequently, this would allow ensuring synergies where security measures can have an impact on safety and vice versa; thereby avoiding incompatible actions and strengthening the overall safety and security of civil aviation.

3.2.4.3 Risks Arising from Conflict Zones

The crash of flight MH17 immediately raised the question why the aero plane was flying over an area where there was an ongoing armed conflict. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region. This is why it's important for governments, aircraft operators, and other airspace users such as air navigation service providers (ANSPs), to work together to share the most up-to-date conflict zone risk-based information possible to assure the safety of civilian flights. Similar events had occurred in the MID Region on Jan 2020 involving Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752. The tragic accident with the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 highlighted once more the importance of information sharing and risk assessments.

3.2.4.4 GNSS Interference & spoofing Risks

Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which involves systems such as Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia's GLONASS, China's, BeiDou, Europe's Galileo includes navigation satellite infrastructures and constellations which provide position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information supporting aircraft and air traffic management operations and support navigation applications in all phases of flight as well as surveillance application like ADS-B. GNSS is also used in safety nets like the EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems) and provides the time reference that is used to synchronize systems and operations in ATM.

GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents have increasingly threatened the integrity of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing services across Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Similar incidents have been reported in other locations globally.

Jamming' blocks the GNSS signal, whereas 'spoofing' sends false information to the aircraft's receiver. There is a high safety risk as GPS spoofing has made backup inertial navigation systems unreliable by corrupting GPS data. This threat turns off the entire navigation system by tricking the Flight Management System into indicating that the aircraft is off-track. The aircraft's Inertia Reference System fails, leading to corrupted navigation systems. GPS jamming, while problematic, is a different risk level from GPS Spoofing, as it only blocks GPS signals. Still, the sensor fusion software can use other sources of information to provide continuous, precise navigation.

The analysis utilized data from the Flight Data Exchange (FDX) showed a total of 46444 'GPS signal in the MENA region from January 2023 to December 2023 with the rate of 98.76 compared to global average of 30.19 per cent.

3.2.4.5 Aviation Health Safety (AHS) Risks

The COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the harmonisation of health policies affecting aviation, and in particular the CAT domain, has become an important topic to help overcome the pandemic. The objective is to minimise the impact of health safety threats in CAT. Health safety threats should be included in the management of risk interdependencies. COVID-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic we will be faced with. It is crucial to continue supporting the European aviation industry competitiveness by offering the safest aircraft interior environment to reduce the risk of disease transmission between continents and States, restore public trust and facilitate future responses to events of similar nature.

3.3 EMERGING ISSUES

3.3.1 Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) and New Entrants

ICAO identified AAM and new entrants as one priority focus area out of seven. In terms of Regulatory Development for AAM, the 41st Session of the ICAO Assembly recognized that the rapidly evolving AAM ecosystem calls for work to be undertaken by ICAO, as well as the potential need for a globally harmonized framework. In addition, Urban air mobility is new revolution in transportation system and transforming urban transportation by leveraging advanced air vehicles to alleviate traffic congestion and provide efficient transportation solutions. AAM is integrating with urban infrastructure to enable seamless aerial transportation, connecting urban centers and offering new mobility options for passengers. AAM is experiencing rapid technological advancements, including electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, advanced air traffic management systems, and autonomous flight capabilities.

Available evidence demonstrates an increase of drones coming into close proximity with manned aviation (both aeroplanes and helicopters) and the need to mitigate the associated risk. The civil aviation authority is responsible for, inter alia, ensuring aviation safety and protecting the public from aviation hazards.

The safe integration on the basis of granting fair access to airspace of all new entrants into the airspace network will

be one of the main challenges in relation to the integration of UAS technologies and related concepts of operation.
Enabling the safe integration of UAS, being a fast evolving and emerging market segment, as well as of (initially manned) VTOL-capable aircraft, also intended for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations, continue to be priority activities.
At the regional level to support states in establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework and Airspace Integration and Traffic Management for UAS and manned VTOL-capable aircraft.

PART-II. IMPLEMENTATION

Section 4. MID region's strategic direction for the management of aviation safety

4.1 Monitoring implementation

This section presents an outline of the safety performance indicators reflecting the MID Region strategic safety priorities in the area of safety. The RASG-MID would use the indicators listed in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B** to measure safety performance and monitor each regional safety target. Furthermore, the MID Region SPMM includes six (6) Goals in line with GASP 2026-2028 Edition.
The RASG-MID would continuously monitor the implementation of the identified SEIs in the MID-RASP and measure safety performance of the regional civil aviation system, to ensure the intended targets are achieved, using the MID Region SPMM to this plan. Therefore, for each Goal established in the MID Region SPMM, identified SEI(s) be mapped to it including their respective actions.
MID region safety indicators and targets were aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP goals and targets as relevant in the MID Region. A MID Region Annual safety report would be annually published to provide stakeholders with relevant up-to-date information on the progress made in achieving the regional safety goals and targets, as well as the implementation status/progress of the SEIs.

In the event that the regional safety goals and targets are not met, the causes would be addressed and presented to stakeholders. If RASG-MID identifies critical operational safety risks, reasonable measures would be taken to mitigate them as soon as practicable, possibly leading to an earlier revision of the MID-RASP by SEIG.
The monitoring of safety performance and its enhancement is achieved through identification of relevant Goals and Safety Indicators, taking into consideration the GASP 2026-2028 and regional specific objectives and priorities, as well as the adoption and attainment of Safety Targets with a specific timeframe.
The MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring includes the following Goals:
Aspirational Goal: Zero fatality by 2030, the GASP aspirational goal of 'zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond'.

Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks: This relates to GASP Goal 1 for 2026-2028 and aligns with ICAO's high-level safety metrics, enabling a direct comparison of the MID region's performance with global averages. Risk area indicators are identified using the MID region risk assessment methodology and are detailed in the MID Annual Safety Report (MID ASR). These operational safety indicators will continue to be monitored through the MID ASR.

Goal 2: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities: This is related to 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2. The monitoring will be based on the available data published through USOAP-CMA (OLF). The regional average overall Effective Implementation (EI) in the MID Region (13 out of 15 States have been audited) is 76.8 %, which is above the world average 69.68% (as of 10 August 2024). Three (3) states are currently below EI 60%. The objective is aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP requiring all states by 2028, to commit to national aviation safety plans that allocate to each safety oversight authority sufficient financial resources to meet national and international obligations, with at least 70% of States having sufficient financial resources, improve their EI score for qualified technical personnel (CE-4) for aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG) and for aerodromes and ground aids (AGA), and improve their EI score for the resolution of safety issues (CE-8) in AGA.

Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP): This is related to 2026-2028 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through USOAP-CMA (OLF). Feedback provided by Member States would also be considered. MID Office will in addition collect relevant documentation and information from States (SSP and NASP). The objective is aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP requiring all States by 2026, to assess the level of implementation of their SSP and by 2028, all States to establish an SSP.

Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional & national levels to address safety issues: This is related to 2026-2028 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through USOAP-CMA (OLF) and MID Office data. Feedback provided by States would be also considered. The objective is aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP requiring by 2026, all regions to identify States that need assistance to address safety issues; by 2028, all regions to facilitate the required assistance, to identified States, to address safety issues; and by 2027, all regions to implement

a mechanism to make use of the information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning.

Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP): This is related to 2026-2028 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be based on data available through MID Office data. Feedback provided by States would be also considered. The objective is aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP requiring by 2026, all regions to publish an updated RASP, taking into consideration the 2026-2028 edition of the GASP and by 2026, all States to publish an updated NASP, taking into consideration the 2026-2028 edition of the GASP and their corresponding RASP.

Goal 6: Expand the use of industry safety assessment and safety data sharing Programmes: This is related to 2026-2028 GASP. Related indicators will mainly be collected from IATA and other international and regional organizations. Feedback provided by States would also be considered. The objective is aligned with the 2026-2028 GASP requiring by 2028, industry to maintain an increasing trend in its use of industry safety assessment and safety data sharing Programmes.

4.2 Communication of Progress to RASG-MID and Regional Stakeholders

Effective communication of MID-RASP progress is essential for transparency, accountability, and continuous improvement in aviation safety. A structured communication framework will ensure that RASG-MID, States, industry partners, and other regional stakeholders are regularly updated on:

- Safety performance trends
- Challenges encountered
- Milestones achieved

To maintain clear and consistent communication, the following reporting mechanisms will be established:

MID Region Annual Safety Report: Published annually, this report will provide up-to-date insights on regional safety performance, progress toward achieving safety goals and targets, and the implementation status of Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) and their respective safety actions.

Regular Progress Reports: A comprehensive report on the status of MID-RASP SEI implementation and safety performance achievements will be presented at:

- Safety Enhancement Initiatives Group (SEIG) meetings
- RASG-MID meetings
- Regional safety seminars and workshops

Key Aspects Covered in Progress Reports: Each progress report will include:

a. **Overview of MID-RASP Implementation**: A summary of the overall progress and key developments.
b. **Challenges and Delays in SEI Implementation:** Analysis of implementation barriers and any corrective actions required.
c. **Evaluation of Safety Goals & Targets**: If regional safety goals and targets are not met, the root causes would be addressed and presented to the relevant stakeholders.

By ensuring regular and structured communication, this framework will enhance collaboration, data-driven decision-making, and continuous improvement in aviation safety across the MID Region.

SECTION 5: Safety Actions

This section addresses system-wide problems that affect aviation safety in MID region including the SEIs and their respective actions. In most scenarios, these problems are related to regional organizational processes and procedures, regional operational safety risks, and emerging issues. The safety actions in this section are driven principally by the need to maintain or increase the current level of safety in the aviation sector for the region.
This section also facilitates the identification of SEIs and their respective actions relevant for each Goal established in the MID Region Safety performance measurement and monitoring as follows:

Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks
Goal 2: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities
Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)
Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional & national levels to address safety issues
Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP)
Goal 6: Expand the use of industry safety assessment and safety data sharing Programmes

5.1 Regional Operational Safety Risks

5.1.1 Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction in Operational Risks

5.1.1.1 G1-SEI-01: Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region safety strategy at **Appendix B.**

Rationale: Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime which is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always, at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved. Prevention of loss of control is a strategic priority. In addition, Aircraft upset or loss of control is the key risk area with the highest risk related to fatal accidents in CAT aeroplane operations having a maximum take-off weight above 5700 kg. It includes uncontrolled collisions with terrain, but also occurrences where the aircraft deviated from the intended flight path or intended aircraft flight parameters, regardless of whether the flight crew realized the deviation and whether it was possible to recover or not. It also includes the triggering of stall warning and envelope protections.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of loss of control.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it: States should set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of LOC-I, or other issues identified by the SSP.

States to include LOC-I in national SSPs: LOC-I should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Actions: **A1-A2-A3-A4-A5-A6**
A1- Guidance material on flight crew proficiency
A2- Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation
A3-Promote and conduct Upset Recovery Capacity building activities
A4- Conduct Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities
A5- Promote DG capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fire/smoke risk in cabin
A6- Promote Data-Driven Safety Management – Use flight data monitoring (FDM) to identify precursors to LOC-I events and develop targeted interventions

References:

- GASP 2026-2028 Goal 1 "Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".

- GASP SEI-10 (Region) – Mitigate contributing factors to LOC-I accidents and incidents at the regional level.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations
Action 1: Develop Guidance material on flight crew proficiency
Responsible entity: IATA and industry **Priority:** Medium **Completion Date**: 2026 **Status:** Ongoing
Action 2: Develop Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation
Responsible entity: IATA and industry **Priority:** High **Completion Date**: 2026 **Status:** ongoing
Action 3: Conduct Upset Recovery Capacity building activities
Responsible entity: ICAO, IATA, Industry. **Priority:** High **Completion Date:** 2026 **Status:** Ongoing
Action 4- Conduct Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities
Responsible entity: ICAO **Priority:** Medium **Completion Date:** 2026 **Status:** New
Action 5: Promote DG capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fire/smoke risk in cabin
Responsible entity: ICAO **Priority:** Medium **Completion Date:** 2026 **Status:** New
Action 6: Promote Data-Driven Safety Management during workshops and meetings
Responsible entity: ICAO **Priority:** Medium **Completion Date:** 2026 **Status:** New

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to LOC-I accidents and incidents	2028

5.1.1.2 G1-SEI-02: Runway Safety- Runway Excursion

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Runway excursion covers materialized runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties in maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off-centred or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during landing. During 2019-2023, Runway Excursions and abnormal runway contact accidents and serious incidents mainly occurred in the landing phase of flights.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of RE.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it: States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of REs.

States to include Runway Excursions in national SSPs: REs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs in close cooperation with the aircraft operators, air traffic control, and airport operators. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Actions: **A1-A2-A3-A4**
A1- Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities
A2- Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through capacity building activities.
A3- Conduct Runway Safety Go-Team (RST) assistance missions
A4- Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to Aerodromes Certification through capacity building activities.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations
Reference:
GASP 2026-2028 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".
GASP SEI-12 (Region) – Mitigate contributing factors to RE accidents and incidents at the regional level

Action 1: Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities (Reference: G3-SEI-02)	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, ACI, and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2025
Status:	Ongoing

Action 2: Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing

Action 3: Conduct Runway Safety Go-Team (RST) assistance missions	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing

Action 4: Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to RE accidents and incidents	2028

5.1.1.3 G1-SEI-03: Runway Safety- Runway Incursion

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Collision on the runway covers collisions between an aircraft and another object (other aircraft, vehicles, etc.) or person that occurs on a runway of an aerodrome or other predesignated landing area; it does not include collisions with birds or wildlife. While there were no fatal accident or accident involving MID States operators in the last years involving runway collision, the risk of the reported occurrence demonstrated to be very real.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of RI.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it: **States to include Runway Incursions in national SSPs**: RIs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs in close cooperation with the aircraft operators, air traffic control, and airport operators. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Action: **A1-A2-A3-A4-A5**
A1- Promote the establishment and implementation of States' runway safety Programmes and runway safety teams
A2- Certification of aerodromes in accordance with Annex 14
A3- Promote the identification and publication in AIP of hot spots at aerodromes during workshops and sub-groups meetings
A4- Promote suitable strategies to remove hazards or mitigate risks associated with identified hot spots during workshops and sub-groups meetings
A5- Promote the use of standardized Phraseology & ATC Procedures through capacity activities.
A6- Promote the effective use of suitable technologies to assist the improvement of situational awareness, such as improved resolution A-SMGCS, stop bars and ARIWS

References:

- GASP 2026-2085 Goal 1 "Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".
- GASP SEI-13 (Region) – Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents at the regional level.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations
Action 1: Promote the establishment and implementation of States' runway safety Programmes and runway safety teams
Responsible entity: ICAO **Priority:** High **Completion Date**: 2026 **Status:** New
Action 2: Certification of aerodromes in accordance with Annex 14 – Aerodromes
Responsible entity: ICAO **Priority:** High **Completion Date**: 2026 **Status:** Ongoing
Action 3: Promote the identification and publication in the AIP of hot spots at aerodromes
Responsible entity: ICAO **Priority:** High **Completion Date**: 2026 **Status:** New
Action 4: Promote suitable strategies to remove hazards or mitigate risks associated with identified hot spots
Responsible entity: ICAO **Priority:** High **Completion Date**: 2026 **Status:** New
Action 5: Promote the use of standardized Phraseology & ATC Procedures through workshops and meetings
Responsible entity: ICAO **Priority:** High **Completion Date**: 2026 **Status:** New
Action 6: Promote the effective use of suitable technologies to assist the improvement of situational awareness
Responsible entity: ICAO

Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents	2028

5.1.1.4 G1-SEI-04: Airborne Conflict (Mid-Air Collisions)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM **at Appendix B.**

Rationale: Airborne collision includes all occurrences involving actual or potential airborne collisions between aircraft, while both aircraft are airborne, and between aircraft and other airborne objects. This also includes all separation-related occurrences caused by either air traffic control (ATC) or cockpit crew, AIRPROX reports and genuine ACAS alerts. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine TCAS resolution advisories or airspace infringements.
Although there have been no aeroplane mid-air collision accidents in recent years within the MID States, this risk area has been raised by some MID States specifically in the context of the collision risk posed by military aircraft operating over the high seas which are not subject to any coordination with related FIRs for airborne operation. This is one specific safety issue that is a main priority in this key risk area.

States must have due regard for the safety of civil aircraft and must have established respective regulations for national State aircraft.
Some States have reported an increase in incidents involving close encounters between civil and military aircraft and more particularly an increase in non-cooperative international military traffic over the high-sea waters. The States could consider the following recommendations:

1. Fully apply the ICAO Manual on Civil-Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management (Doc 10088)
2. Closely coordinate to develop, harmonize and publish operational requirements and instructions for State aircraft to ensure that 'due regard' for civil aircraft is always maintained
3. Support the development and harmonization of civil/military coordination procedures for ATM at MID Region level and beyond if possible; and
4. Report relevant occurrences.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of MAC.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region Annual Safety Report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it: **States to include MACs in national SSPs**: MACs should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.
Sates to reinforce the appropriate reactions of flight crew in response to an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) resolution advisory (RA), which would help to mitigate the risk of mid-air collisions by providing safety promotion material and clear messages to pilots on the need to follow the instructions of the ACAS in high-risk situations.

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4-A5
A1- Promote Civil-Military cooperation through capacity building activities
A2- Promote awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas through capacity building activities.
A3- Promote guidance to ensure aircraft are equipped with ACAS, in accordance with Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft during workshops, meetings, seminars.
A4- Promote airspace among stakeholders, including complexity of airspace design, Free Route Airspace (FRA) concept, route layout, and proximity of military operational or conflict zones, establishment of FUAs through capacity building activities.
A5- Promote the improvement of ATC systems, procedures and tools to enhance conflict management

References:

- GASP 2026-2028 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".
- GASP SEI-11 (Region) – Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and incidents at the regional level.
- ICAO Doc 10088 ‘Manual on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management’

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Promote Civil-Military cooperation through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, IATA, and States
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Promote awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and States
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
Action 3: Promote guidance to ensure aircraft are equipped with ACAS	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and States
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 4: Promote airspace among stakeholders, including complexity of airspace design, route layout, and proximity of military operational or conflict zones through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and States
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 5: Promote the improvement of ATC systems, procedures and tools to enhance conflict management	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and States
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and NMAC incidents	2028

5.1.1.5 G1-SEI-5: Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B.**

Rationale: It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences, which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc. There was no fatal accident involving MID States operators during this period. This key risk area has been raised by some MID States and in other parts of the world that make it an area of concern.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of CFIT**.**

How we monitor improvement: Continuous monitoring of safety issues identified in the MID Region annual safety report for CAT aeroplane above 5,700 kgs.

How we want to achieve it: States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of: promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM, fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture, encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of CFIT or other issues identified by the SSP.

States to include CFITs in national SSPs: CFIT should be addressed by the States on their SSPs and included in NASPs. This should include as a minimum agreeing a set of actions and measuring their effectiveness.

Actions: A1-A2-A3
A1- Advisory Circular: Instrument Approach Procedures Using Continuous Descent Final Approach Techniques
A2- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)

References:

- GASP 2023-2025 Goal 1 “Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks".
- GASP SEI-9 (Region) – Mitigate contributing factors to CFIT accidents and incidents at the regional level.

Stakeholders: ICAO, RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry**,** international organizations	
Action 1: Advisory Circular: Guidance for Operators on Training Programme on the use of GPWS	
Responsible entity:	IATA and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing
Action 2: Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)	
Responsible entity:	IATA and industry
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to CFIT accidents and incidents	2028

5.2 Regional Organizational Challenges/issues

5.2.1 Goal 2: Strengthen States’ Safety Oversight Capabilities

The States safety oversight capabilities remain an issue mainly for AIG, AGA, a d ANS areas. The inappropriate effective oversight remains an issue and the difficulties experienced by some authorities in properly discharging their oversight responsibilities is a concern also in the light of the size, scope and complexity of the aviation industry that some of them oversee. Furthermore, while a number of CAAs have reached a suitable and stable level of maturity, certain CAAs continue to underperform and/or struggle in achieving sustainable improvements. Most notably, while progress has been noted in the implementation of Authorities’ management systems, effective oversight of undertakings’ safety management systems continues to be an area of concern in several domains.

5.2.1.1 G2-SEI-01: Strengthening States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B.**

Rationale: The CEs are essentially the safety defense tools of the State Safety Oversight system needed for the effective and sustainable implementation of a safety-related policy and associated procedures. The effective implementation of the CEs is an

indication of a State's capability for safety oversight. States must establish CE-1 through CE-5 prior to the implementation of CE-6 through CE-8 to provide effective safety oversight and safety management. An individual State's responsibility for safety oversight is the foundation upon which a safe global air transport system is built. States that experience difficulties in carrying out safety oversight functions can impact the state of International Civil Aviation.

States should work to continually improve their effective implementation of the eight CEs of the State's safety oversight system in all relevant areas, as appropriate to their aviation system complexity. Through collaborative efforts, the level of effective implementation of the CEs of a State's safety oversight system can increase, particularly in those States where a State faces shortages of human, financial or technical resources.

The following elements are considered enablers of a robust safety oversight system, expected to be in place according to the requirements in force:

1. ability and determination to conduct effective oversight
2. ability to identify risks through a process of collecting and analyze data
3. ability to mitigate the identified risks in an effective way, implying measurement of performance and leading to continuous improvement
4. willingness and possibility to exchange information and cooperate with other CAAs
5. ability to ensure the availability of adequate personnel, where 'adequate' includes the notion of sufficient training and proper qualification; and
6. focus on the implementation of effective management systems in industry, wherever required by the regulations in force.

What we want to achieve:
A robust oversight system across the MID Region, where each CAA is able to properly discharge its oversight responsibilities, with particular care to exchange information and cooperate with other CAAs and to the implementation of management systems in all organizations, as well as to ensure the availability of adequate personnel in CAAs. In addition, to support MID Region States' civil aviation authorities to strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities and increase progressively the USOAP-CMA EI results.

How we monitor improvement:
Significant increase of the number of States with an EI above 60% and implementing risk-based oversight**.**

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs. Therefore, States to ensure oversight capabilities:
a) Availability of adequate personnel in CAAs**:** States shall ensure that adequate personnel are available to discharge their safety oversight responsibilities.
b) Organizations' management system in all sectors: States shall foster the ability of CAAs to assess and oversee the organizations' management system in all sectors. This shall focus in particular on safety culture, the governance structure of the organization, the interaction between the risk identification/assessment process and the organization's monitoring process, the use of inspection findings and safety information such as occurrences, incidents and accidents and, where applicable, flight data monitoring (FDM). This should lead CAAs to adapt and improve their oversight system.

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4-A5-A6-A7
A1- Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs with focus on AGA, AIG, & ANS areas
A2- Conduct of technical assistance missions to States, to address safety issues and enhance safety with a focus on AGA, AIG, & ANS areas.
A3- Continuous support to strengthen MENA ARCM to best support States in the region
A4- Identify and mobilize resources to support SEIs for States in need to address safety issues and establish effective safety oversight capabilities
A5- Continuous support to strengthen MENA RSOO to best support States in the region
A6- Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to enhance safety in the region
A7- Sharing of safety information via RASG-MID platform to make use of the information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning

References:

- ICAO SARPs & guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 "Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities"
- GASP SEIs : SEI-19, SEI-20, SEI-21, SEI-22, SEI-23, and SEI-24 (Regions).

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, and industry

Action 1: Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

Action 2: Conduct technical assistance and NCLB missions to States

Responsible entity: ICAO

Priority: High

Completion date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

Action 3- Continuous support to strengthen MENA ARCM to best support States in the region

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, organizations, and industry

Priority: High

Completion date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

Action 4: Identify and mobilize resources to support SEIs for States in need

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, organizations, industry

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2026

Status: New

Action 5- Continuous support to strengthen MENA RSOO

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, organizations, industry

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2026

Status: ongoing

Action 6- Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to enhance safety in the region

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, organizations, industry

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

Action 7- Sharing of safety information via RASG-MID platform

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, organizations, industry

Priority: Medium

Completion date: 2026

Status: New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
MID States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI)	2028

5.2.1.2 G2-SEI-02: Manage Human Factors and Human Performance

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM **at Appendix B**.

Rationale: Human factors and human performance are strategic priorities. As new technologies and concepts of operations emerge on the market and the complexity of the aviation system continuously increases, it is of key importance to properly address human factors and human performance in terms of both limitations and their contribution to delivering safety, as part of the safety management implementation.

What we want to achieve: Ensure continuous improvement in safety management activities as related to human factors and human performance.

How we monitor improvement: Improvement in aviation personnel competence at all levels and feedback from States and MIDASR.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). **(Action addressed under G1-SEI-04: CFIT)**
A2- Conduct capacity building activities
A3- Develop practical guides and promotion material on aircrew fatigue

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities".
- ICAO Human Performance Manual (ICAO Doc 10151) and ICAO Safety Management Manual (ICAO Doc 9859).

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). (Action addressed under G1-SEI-04: CFIT)

Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry.
Priority:	Medium
Completion date:	2026
Status:	ongoing

Action 2: Conduct capacity building activities related HF & HP

Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing

Action 3: Develop practical guides and promotion material on aircrew fatigue

Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, international organizations, and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
mitigates risks incurred through the inadequate understanding, regulation and oversight of human factors and mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2028

5.2.1.3 G2-SEI-03: Manage Risk interdependencies

5.2.1.3.1 G2-SEI-03A: Managing GNSS Interference and spoofing

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM **at Appendix B**.

Rationale: The management of GNSS interference & spoofing risks within the region that have an impact on safety is a strategic priority.

What we want to achieve: Increase aviation safety by managing the impact of GNSS interference & spoofing risks on safety and mitigating the related safety risks. GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents have increasingly threatened the integrity of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing services across Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous assessment of safety-related occurrences and mitigations at the regional level and feedback from States.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Raise awareness on the potential safety impact of GNSS interference and spoofing through capacity building activities
A2- Promote civil-military coordination and cooperation activities to facilitate the sharing of relevant information with airspace users
A3-

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities".
- ICAO Doc 9849, GNSS Manual

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1: Raise awareness on the potential safety impact of GNSS interference and spoofing	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, Organizations, industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Promote civil-military coordination and cooperation activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, & Organizations
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Mitigate contributing factors to MAC & CFIT accidents	2028

5.2.1.3.2 G2-SEI-03B: Management of security risks with safety impact

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating the security-related safety risks. The implementation of aviation security measures can have a direct impact on the safety aspects of aerodrome or aircraft operations. Airport, aircraft or in-flight security are the areas where the interdependencies are highly visible and where any security requirements should also consider

possible potential impacts on aviation safety. Managing the impact of security on safety is a strategic priority in MID region.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by managing the impact of security on safety and mitigating related safety risks. Increase safety by managing the impact of security measures on safety, avoiding risk transfer and mitigating related safety risks. Encourage an integrated approach to management of safety and security risks across the spectrum of aviation activities

How we monitor improvement: Continuous assessment and mitigation of security threats.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs. For MID States, a) to assess the impact of security measures implemented on the ground and in flight on operational safety and performance; b) assess the preparedness of aviation personnel and flight crews to cope with potential conflicting security and safety measures; c) Assess safety risk management techniques that can be applied to the security domain to produce harmonized risk assessment and support integrated policy and decision-making processes at national level.

Actions:
A1- Promote security risks with safety impact through capacity building activities

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities". ICAO Annex 17.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry

Action 1: Promote security risks with safety impact through capacity building activities

Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, Organizations
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2026
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2028

5.2.1.3.3 G2-SEI-03C: Management of the risks arising from conflict zones

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Managing the risks arising from conflict zones is a strategic priority for MID region. There is a need to provide information on conflict zones developments and resulting risks to air operators so that they are able to conduct an informed risk assessment to mitigate the risks and threats posed by flying over or in the vicinity of zones where armed conflicts exist.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by managing the risks arising from conflict zones and mitigation actions. Enable effective information-sharing about risks and possible threats in conflict zones.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous assessment and mitigation of conflict zones risks by air operators.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions:
A1- Promote risks arising from conflict zones through capacity building activities

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities".
- ICAO Annex 17.
- Doc 10084 – Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones
- Doc 10108 – Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry

Action 1: Promote risks arising from conflict zones through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO & States
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2028

5.2.1.3.4 G2-SEI-03D: Management of cybersecurity risks

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM **at Appendix B**.

Rationale: The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating cybersecurity related safety risks. Assess the safety impact of cybersecurity threats to aviation users, support the development of mitigations and specific Training actions, identify and mitigate the vulnerabilities of aviation products and identify the required changes to aviation standards.

What we want to achieve: Increase safety by managing the impact of cybersecurity on safety and mitigating related safety risks.

How we monitor improvement: Continuous assessment and mitigation of cybersecurity threats.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs. For states, to assess the safety impact of cybersecurity threats to aviation users, support the development of mitigation actions and specific training actions, identify and mitigate the vulnerabilities of aviation products and identify the required changes to aviation standards.

Action: A1
A1- Promote Cybersecurity risks through capacity building activities

References: ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities". ICAO Annex 17.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry

Action 1- Promote Cybersecurity risks through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, States, & Organizations
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2028

5.2.1.3.5 G2-SEI-03E: Manage aviation health safety (AHS) risks

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that public health emergencies may severely impact the entire aviation environment and in particular crew members and passengers. The objective is to minimize the impact of health safety threats on CAT.
The safety action in this area is aimed at mitigating the COVID-19 or any other pandemic related to safety risks. The safety

action in this area would focus on continuous support to the MID-RPTF and sharing of guidance material/best practices to mitigate the risks stemmed from the pandemic

What we want to achieve: Reduce the risk of disease transmission during the travel experience without negative impact on safety, maintain public trust and facilitate future responses to public health emergencies.

How we monitor improvement: Regular assessment of preventive measures used onboard aircraft while at the same time monitoring the emerging public health threats.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1
A1: Activation of MID-RPTF, as needed

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities".

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry	
Action 1- Activation of MID-RPTF, as needed	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and All stakeholders
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
mitigate contributing factors to accidents and incidents	2028

5.2.1.4 G2-SEI-04: AAM and New Entrants

Target/Metrics: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B**.

Rationale: Enabling the safe integration of UAS, being a fast evolving and emerging market segment, as well as of (initially manned) VTOL-capable aircraft, also intended for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations, continue to be priority activities. At the regional level to support states in establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework and Airspace Integration and Traffic Management for UAS and manned VTOL-capable aircraft.

What we want to achieve: to ensure safe UAS operations and mitigate the risks, it is important to manage their safe integration into the airspace. In addition, to enable the safe integration of UAS into airspace while maintaining a high and uniform level of safety.

How we monitor improvement: Feedback from states on the effectiveness of the related activities.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

Actions: A1 – A2
A1: Support States to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for UAS and manned VTOL-capable aircraft’ through capacity building activities
A2: Support States with the implementation of the UTM Regulatory Framework through capacity building activities

References:

- ICAO SARPs and guidance documents and 2026-2028 GASP Goal 2 “Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities".
- Annex 6-Part IV

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, RASFG-MID, MIDANPIRG, States, international organizations, industry	
Action 1- Support States to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for UAS and manned VTOL-capable aircraft' through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and All stakeholders
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Support States with the implementation of the UTM Regulatory Framework through capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and All stakeholders
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2026
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
mitigate contributing factors to MAC, LOC-I, CFIT accidents	2028

5.2.2 Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)

5.2.2.1 G3-SEI-01: Improve the development and implementation of Safety Management

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B.**

Rationale: Management of safety in a systematic and proactive way enables authorities and organizations to set up management systems that take into consideration potential hazards and associated risks before aviation accidents occur. This global move is at the core of ICAO Annex 19. This safety area would enable further work to improve reporting processes, occurrence investigation at organizational level, and also the continued development of integrated data collection taxonomies.
The proactive implementation of safety management considering all known safety data and information has proven essential for the ability of the aviation system to deal with safety issues.

What we want to achieve: MID Region States implement SSP and consequently their services providers to implement SMS. In addition, improve the level of safety through the effective implementation of safety management by authorities and service providers.

How we monitor improvement: ICAO Annex 19 framework requiring safety management is in place across all aviation domains, and organizations and authorities are able to demonstrate compliance.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs**.**

States to give priority to the work on SSPs: In the implementation and maintenance of the SSP, States should in particular:

- ensure effective implementation of the Annex 19 Requirements and address deficiencies in oversight capabilities, as a prerequisite for effective SSP implementation
- ensure effective coordination between State authorities having a role in safety management
- ensure that inspectors have the right competencies to support the evolution towards risk- and performance-based oversight
- ensure that policies and procedures are in place for risk- and performance-based oversight, including a description of how an SMS is accepted and regularly monitored
- establish policies and procedures for safety data collection, analysis, exchange and protection
- establish a process to determine safety performance indicators at State level addressing outcomes and processes
- ensure that an approved SSP document is made available and published; and
- ensure that the SSP is regularly reviewed and that SSP effectiveness is regularly assessed.

SMS Assessment

States should make use of the available tools to support risk- and performance-based oversight. States also should regularly monitor status of compliance with SMS requirements of their industry.

SMS international cooperation
States should promote the common understanding of safety management and human factors principles and requirements in different countries, share lessons learned and encourage progress and harmonization, through active participation in the RASG-MID and other safety groups and fora.

FDM precursors of main operational safety risks
States in partnership with industry, other regional and international organizations should complete the good practice documentation which supports the inclusion of main operational safety risks such as RE, RI, LOC-I, CFIT and MAC into operators' FDM Programmes.

States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes
States to set up a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) Programmes, with the objectives of:

- promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM,
- fostering an open dialogue on FDM Programmes that takes place in the framework of just culture,
- encouraging operators to include and further develop FDM events relevant for the prevention of REs, MACs, CFIT and LOC-I, or other issues identified by the SSP

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4-A5-A6-A7
A1- Conduct SSP & SMS capacity building activities
A2- SRM capacity building activities
A3- Conduct technical assistance missions to facilitate the establishment of SSP
A4- Promote safety management best practices
A5- Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need to establish an SSP
A6- Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to support the establishment of SSPs
A7- Encourage all States to report safety issues via the Secure Portal on Operational Safety Risks and Emerging Issues

References:

- ICAO Annex 19 & Doc 9859 and GASP 2026-2028 Goal 3 "Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)"

- GASP SEIs: SEI-38, SEI-39, SEI-40, SEI-41, SEI-42, SEI-43, and SEI-44.

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1- Conduct SSP/SMS capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, supported by organizations, and industry
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing
Action 2: Conduct SRM capacity building activities	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, supported by organizations, and industry
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing
Action 3- Conduct technical assistance missions	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High

Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 4: Promote safety management best practices	
Responsible entity:	ICAO, states, organizations, and industry
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 5: Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need to establish an SSP	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 6: Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to support the establishment of SSPs	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and all stakeholders
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New
Action 7: Encourage all States to report safety issues via the Secure Portal on Operational Safety Risks and Emerging Issues	
Responsible entity:	ICAO
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
MID States to Establish & manage effective SSP	2028

5.2.3 Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues

5.2.3.1 G4-SEI-01: Collaboration and coordination with stakeholders to address safety issues

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at ***Appendix B***.

Rationale: cooperation and collaboration among all stakeholders to identify States that need assistance and facilitate the required assistance to address safety issues through Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders, mobilization of resources, sharing of safety information, and agreeing on joint activities to avoid duplication of effort.

What we want to achieve: States, international organizations, and industry to increase collaboration at the regional and national levels so that to enhance safety.

How we monitor improvement: Reinforce efficient and effective cooperation and collaboration with all stakeholders, avoiding duplication and optimizing the allocation of resources at the regional and national levels.

How we want to achieve it: Joint Programme activities

References:

- GASP 2026-2028 Goal 4 “Strengthen collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues”
- GASP SEIs: SEI-21, SEI-22, SEI-23, and SEI-24 (Regions).

Actions: A1-A2-A3-A4-A5
A1- Develop and agree on joint work activities with all stakeholders through MID RCMs
A2- Continuous support to strengthen MENA ARCM to best support States in the region **(Addressed in G2-SEI-01)**
A3- Continuous support to strengthen MENA RSOO to best support States in the region. **(Addressed in G2-SEI-01)**
A4- Identify and mobilize resources to support SEIs for States in need to address safety issues and establish effective safety oversight capabilities. **(Addressed in G2-SEI-01)**
A5- Sharing of safety information via RASG-MID platform to make use of the information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning. **(Addressed in G2-SEI-01)**

Stakeholders: RASG-MID. MIDANPIRG, RASFG-MID, States, international organizations, and industry.

Action 1: Develop and agree on joint work activities with all stakeholders through MID RCMs

Responsible entity: ICAO, States, international organizations, industry

Priority: High

Completion date: 2026

Status: Ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
To increase States USOAP EI and SSP level of maturity.	2028

5.2.4 Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP)

5.2.4.1 G5-SEI-01: Development and Implementation of MID-RASP

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM **at Appendix B.**

Rationale: The RASG-MD is the governing body responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the MID-RASP, in collaboration with the ICAO MID Office, international and regional organizations and with the aviation industry. MID-RASP is to be reviewed by the Safety Enhancement Implementation Group (SEIG) every year mainly to include new identified Safety Enhancement initiatives’(SEIs), reviewing the existing SEIs, as well as their respective actions.

What we want to achieve: States, international organization, and industry to increase collaboration at the regional level to enhance safety.

How we monitor improvement: MID region to publish an updated regional aviation safety plan (MID-RASP), in line with the 2026–2028 edition of GASP.

How we want to achieve it: This SEIs included in MID-RASP to be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

References:

- GASP 2026-2028 Goal 5: “Strengthen aviation safety planning”
- GASP SEIs: SEI-21, SEI-22, SEI-23, and SEI-24 (Regions).

Action: A1
A1- Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, MIDANPIRG, RASFG-MID, States, International organizations, and industry.

Action 1: Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2023-2025 Edition

Responsible entity:	ICAO MID & SEIG
Priority:	High
Completion date:	2025
Status:	New

EXPECTED OUTPUT	
Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
To manage and enhance safety at the regional	2028

5.2.4.2 G5-SEI-02: MID States to develop and publish NASP

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B.**

Rationale: States should ensure that NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. MID-RASP provides the identified safety priorities in the region and States should identify which top risks and safety issues mentioned in the GASP and MID-RASP; which apply to their national context and identify suitable mitigation actions within their NASP. States should also add/consider others which are unique to their operational context.

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What we want to achieve: MID Region States to develop NASP. Successful implementation of the NASP actions would require the commitment of resources from stakeholders within State, availability of data to effectively monitor the achievement of NASP Targets, and proper project governance. In addition to the actions, NASP shall also consider how to measure their effectiveness.

How we monitor improvement: ICAO GASP requiring States to develop NASP and region to develop RASP. Feedback from RASG-MID and states on NASP implementation.

How we want to achieve it: This SEI should be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs.

States to establish and maintain a National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP)
States should ensure that a NASP is maintained and regularly reviewed. NASP should:

- Describe how the plan is developed and endorsed, including collaboration with different entities within the State, with industry and other stakeholders
- Include safety objectives, goals, indicators and targets in line with GASP as well as regional safety plan
- Identify the main safety risks at national level in addition to the ones identified in MID-RASP as applicable to the State
- Include series of SEIs to address safety issues
- Reflect the GASP and MID-RASP SEIs as applicable to the State.

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Conduct NASPs capacity building activities & technical assistance missions**.**
A2- Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need of developing NASP.

References:

- ICAO Annex 19 and GASP 2026-2028 Goal 5: “Strengthen aviation safety planning”
- GASP SEIs: SEI-21, SEI-22, SEI-23, and SEI-24 (Regions).

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations

Action 1- Conduct NASPs capacity building activities & technical assistance missions	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and states
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026

Status:	Ongoing
Action 2- Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need of developing an NASP	
Responsible entity:	States, organizations, and industry
Priority:	High
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
MID States to develop and publish NASP	2026

5.2.5 Goal 6: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks

5.2.5.1 G6-SEI-01: Promote the Use of industry Programmes

Target: The safety targets of this goal are indicated in the MID Region SPMM at **Appendix B.**

Rationale: What we want to achieve: Work with the civil aviation authorities and organizations to increase the number of service providers participating in the corresponding ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes.

H**ow we monitor improvement:** Increase the number of service providers participating in the corresponding ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes. RASG-MID, IATA, and ACI will give feedback on the effectiveness of the activities.

How we want to achieve it: Actions

Actions: A1-A2
A1- Encourage IATA's IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion
A2- Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme

References:

- This is related to 2026-2028 GASP Goal 6 "Expand the use of industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks"
- GASP SEIs: SEI-21, SEI-22, SEI-23, and SEI-24 (Regions).

Stakeholders: RASG-MID, States, industry, international organizations	
Action 1: Encourage IATA's IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	
Responsible entity:	IATA
Priority:	Medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	Ongoing
Action 2: Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	
Responsible entity:	ICAO and ACI
Priority:	medium
Completion Date:	2026
Status:	ongoing

EXPECTED OUTPUT

Deliverable(s)	**Timeline**
Increase the number of service providers participating in ICAO recognized industry assessment Programmes and maintain recurrent APEX Missions in the region:	2028

Appendix A- Identified safety issues as indicated in the 13th MID ASR

Potential Accident Outcome							
Safety Issues	CFIT	LOC-I	MAC	RI	RE/ARC	Injury Damage inflight	Injury Damage on Ground
Monitoring of flight paremeters and automation modes	x	x			x		
Adverse Convective weather (Turb, Hail,..etc)	x	x			x	x	
Un-stabilized Approach		x			x		x
Flight planning and preparation	x	x	x	x	x		
Crew Resource Management	x	x	x	x	x		
Handling of technical failure	x	x		x	x		x
Handling and execution of GOA	x	x			x		
Loss of separation in flight/ and/or airspace/TCAS RA			x			x	
Experience, training and competence of Flight Crews	x	x	x		x		
Deconfliction between IFR and VFR traffic			x				
Inappropriate flight control inputs		x			x		
Fatigue	x	x					
Entry of aircraft performance data		x					
Contained engine Failure/Power Plant Malfunctions		x			x	x	
Birdstrike/Engine Bird ingestion		x			x		

Fire/Smoke-non impact		x				x	
Wake Vortex		x				x	
Deviation from pitch or roll attitude	x	x			x		
Security Risks with impact on Safety		x					
Tail/Cross wind/Winds hear		x			x		x
Runway Incursion				x	x		x
Maintenance events	x	x				x	
Contaminated runway/Poor braking action					x		x
Turbulence and Montain Waves		x				x	
GNSS Jamming/Spoofing	x		x				
Carriage and transport of lithium batteries		x					
Effectiveness of safety management	x	x	x	x	x		

Appendix B-MID Region-Safety Performance Measurement & Monitoring (SPMM)

Aspirational Goal: Zero Fatality by 2030

Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction of Operational Safety Risks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
Number of accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of accidents to be in line with the global average rate	2028	Target 1.1 Target 1.2 Target 1.3
Number of fatal accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of fatal accidents to be in line with the global average rate	2028	
Number of fatalities per million departures	Number of fatalities per billion passengers carried (fatality rate) to be in line with the global average rate	2028	
Number of Runway Excursion accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of Runway Excursion accidents to be below the global average rate	2028	
Number of Runway Incursion accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of Runway Incursion accidents to be below the global average rate	2028	
Number of LOC-I related accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of LOC-I related accidents to be below the global rate	2028	
Number of CFIT related accidents per million departures	Regional average rate of CFIT related accidents to be below the global rate	2028	
Number of Mid-Air Collision (accidents)	Regional average rate of MID-Air Collision accident	2028	

Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
a. Regional average EI b. States committed to national allocate to each safety oversight authority sufficient financial resources c. Number of audited States with an overall EI over 60% d. States to improve EI for CE-4 & CE-8 e. Regional average EI of PPQs	a. Regional average EI to be above 75% b. At least 10 States with a "satisfactory" rating for USOAP PQ: 2.051 c. All MID audited States to be above 60% EI d. Number of MID States average EI for CE-4 & CE-8. (AIG, AGA, ANS) to be above 60% e. Regional average EI PPQs above 75%	a. 2026-2028 b. 2026-2028 c. 2026-2028 d. 2026-2028 e. 2026-2028	Target 2.1 Target 2.2 Target 2.3

Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
Regional Average SSP Foundation	85%	2026- 2028	Target 3.1 Target 3.2
States to complete SSP self-assessment	All states	2026	
States to establish an SSP	• At least 10 States established an SSP • At least 10 States established SDCPS • At least 10 established safety data and safety information protection	2026- 2028	

Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
Number of States in need of assistance, to strengthen their Safety Oversight capabilities through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	States with SSC as a first priority All States as a second priority having EI below 80%	2026-2028	Target 4.1 Target 4.2 Target 4.3
Number of States in need of assistance to address safety issues and facilitate SSP & NASP implementation through NCLB MID Strategy/Technical assistance	All States	2026-2028	
Percentage of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs)/Safety Actions completed	80%	2026-2028	
Number of States sharing safety information to support the development of MID ASR	All states	2026-2028	

Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP)

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
MID Region to publish an updated RASP in consultation with states and industry	2026	2026	Target 5.1 Target 5.5
Number of States that have developed and published NASP	At least 10 States	2026	

Goal 6: Expand the use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks

Safety Indicator	Safety Target	Timeline	Mapped with GASP
Use of the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA), to complement safety oversight activities.	a. Maintain at least 60% of eligible MID airlines to be certified IATA-IOSA at all times. b. All MID States with an EI of at least 60% use IOSA to complement their safety oversight activities.	a. 2026-2028 b. 2026-2028	Target 6.1
Use of the IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) certification, as a percentage of all Ground Handling service providers	IATA Ground Handling Manual (IGOM) endorsed as a reference for ground handling safety standards by all MID States. Pursue at least 25% increase in ISAGO registration	2026-2028	
Coordinate the ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	At least 2 ACI APEX in Safety to be conducted for 2 Airports of the Region per year	2026-2028	

Appendix C: Safety Actions- Consolidated List of SEIs with their respective Actions for follow up- Draft

EI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date	Name & # Activities
Regional Operational Safety Risks						
Goal 1: Achieve a Continuous Reduction in Operational Risks						
G1-SEI-01:	Aircraft Upset in Flight (LOC-I)	**A1-** Guidance material on flight crew proficiency	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
		A2- Advisory Circular: Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
		A3- Promote and conduct Upset Recovery Capacity building activities	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
		A4- Conduct Wildlife Hazard Management Control capacity building Activities	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
		A5- Promote DG capacity building activities including Lithium batteries fire/smoke risk in cabin	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
		A6- Promote Data-Driven Safety Management – Use flight data monitoring (FDM) to identify precursors to LOC-I events and develop targeted interventions	States, Organizations, industry		2026- 2028	
G1-SEI-02:	Runway Safety- Runway Excursion	**A1-** A1- Support States to implement the Global Reporting Format (GRF) Methodology through capacity building activities.	ICAO and ACI		2026-2028	
		A2- Support States on the implementation of the ICAO Annex 14 requirements to achieve compliance with regards to Aerodrome Design and Operations, through capacity building activities.	ICAO		2026-2028	
		A3- Conduct Runway Safety Go-Team (RST) assistance missions	States, ICAO, industry		2026-2028	

EI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date	Name & # Activities
		A4- Enhance capacity building for States CAAs and Airport operators related to Aerodromes Certification through capacity building activities.	States, ICAO, industry		2026-2028	
G1-SEI-03:	Runway Safety-Runway Incursion	**A1-** Promote the establishment and implementation of States' runway safety Programmes and runway safety teams	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Certification of aerodromes in accordance with Annex 14	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A3- Promote the identification and publication in AIP of hot spots at aerodromes during workshops and sub-groups meetings	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A4- Promote suitable strategies to remove hazards or mitigate risks associated with identified hot spots during workshops and sub-groups meetings	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A5- Promote the use of standardized Phraseology & ATC Procedures through capacity activities.	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A6- Promote the effective use of suitable technologies to assist the improvement of situational awareness, such as improved resolution A-SMGCS, stop bars and ARIWS	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
G1-SEI-04	MID-Air Collision (MAC)	A1- Promote Civil-Military cooperation through capacity building activities	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Promote awareness among stakeholders related to the potential risk of MAC over high seas through capacity building activities.	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A3- Promote guidance to ensure aircraft are equipped with ACAS, in accordance with Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft during	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	

EI Code	SEI Name	Actions	Owner(s)	Status/Progress	Completion Date	Name & # Activities
		workshops, meetings, seminars.				
		A4- A4- Promote airspace among stakeholders, including complexity of airspace design, Free Route Airspace (FRA) concept, route layout, and proximity of military operational or conflict zones, establishment of FUAs through capacity building activities.	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A5- Promote the improvement of ATC systems, procedures and tools to enhance conflict management	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
G1-SEI-05	Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)	**A1-** A1- Advisory Circular: Instrument Approach Procedures Using Continuous Descent Final Approach Techniques	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM)	ICAO, states, industry		2026-2028	

Organizational Challenges/issues						
Goal 2: Strengthen States' Safety Oversight Capabilities						
G2-SEI-01:	Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight Capabilities	**A1**- Conduct Capacity Building Activities to promote effective implementation of SARPs with focus on AGA, AIG, & ANS areas	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry.		2026-2028	
		A2- Conduct of technical assistance missions to States, to address safety issues and enhance safety with a focus on AGA, AIG, & ANS areas.	ICAO and States		2026-2028	
		A3 - Continuous support to strengthen MENA ARCM to best support States in the region**)**	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A4- Identify and mobilize resources to support	ICAO, States,		2026-2028	

		SEIs for States in need to address safety issues and establish effective safety oversight capabilities	Organizations, and Industry			
		A5- Continuous support to strengthen MENA RSOO to best support States in the region	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A6- Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to enhance safety in the region	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A7- Sharing of safety information via RASG-MID platform to make use of the information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-02:	Manage Human Factors and Human Performance	**A1-** A1- Advisory Circular: Crew Resource Management Training Programme (CRM). (**Action addressed under G1-SEI-04: CFIT)**	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Conduct capacity building activities	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A3- Develop practical guides and promotion material on aircrew fatigue	ICAO, States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-03:	**Manage Risk interdependencies**					
G2-SEI-03A:	Managing GNSS Interference and spoofing	**A1**- Raise awareness on the potential safety impact of GNSS interference and spoofing through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Promote civil-military coordination and cooperation activities to facilitate the sharing of relevant information with airspace users	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-03B:	Management of security risks with safety impact	**A1**- Promote security risks with safety impact through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	

G2-SEI-03C:	Management of the risks arising from conflict zones	**A1-**Promote risks arising from conflict zones through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-03D:	Management of cybersecurity risks	**A1-** Promote Cybersecurity risks through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-03E:	Manage aviation health safety (AHS) risks	**A1-** Activation of MID-RPTF, as needed	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
G2-SEI-04:	AAM and New Entrants	**A1-** Support States to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for UAS and manned VTOL-capable aircraft' through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Support States with the implementation of the UTM Regulatory Framework through capacity building activities	States, Organizations, and Industry		2026-2028	

Goal 3: Establish & manage effective State safety Programmes (SSP)

G3-SEI-01:	Improve the development and implementation of Safety Management	**A1**- Conduct SSP & SMS capacity building activities	ICAO, States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	
		A2- SRM capacity building activities	ICAO		2026-2028	
		A3- Conduct technical assistance missions to facilitate the establishment of SSP	ICAO		2026-2028	
		A4- Promote safety management best practices	ICAO		2026-2028	
		A5- Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need to establish an SSP	ICAO, States, organizations, &		2026-2028	

			industry			
		A6- Cooperation and collaboration with key stakeholders to support the establishment of SSP	ICAO, States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	
		A7- Encourage all States to report safety issues via the Secure Portal on Operational Safety Risks and Emerging Issues	ICAO, States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	

Goal 4: Strengthen collaboration at the regional and national levels to address safety issues

G4-SEI-01:	Collaboration and coordination with stakeholders to address safety issues	**A1-** A1- Develop and agree on joint work activities with all stakeholders through MID RCMs	ICAO, States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Continuous support to strengthen MENA ARCM to best support States in the region **(Addressed in G2-SEI-01)**	States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	
		A3- Continuous support to strengthen MENA RSOO to best support States in the region**. (Addressed in G2-SEI-01)**	States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	
			States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	
		A4- Identify and mobilize resources to support SEIs for States in need to address safety issues and establish effective safety oversight capabilities. **(Addressed in G2-SEI-01)**	States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	
		A5- Sharing of safety information via RASG-MID platform to make use of the information on operational safety risks and emerging issues for the purpose of aviation safety planning. **(Addressed in G2-SEI-01)**	States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	

Goal 5: Strengthen aviation safety planning (RASP & NASP)						
G5-SEI-01:	Development and Implementation of MID-RASP	**A1-** Development and Implementation of MID-RASP 2026-2028 Edition	States, organizations, & industry		2026-2028	
G5-SEI-02:	MID States to develop and publish NASP	**A1-** Conduct NASPs capacity building activities & technical assistance missions.	States, organizations		2026-2028	
		A2- Identify and mobilize resources to support states in need of developing NASP.	States, organizations, industry		2026-2028	
Goal 6: Expand the Use of Industry Programmes and safety information sharing networks						
G6-SEI-01:	Promote the Use of industry Programmes	**A1-** Encourage IATA's IOSA and ISAGO registrations through safety promotion	States, organizations, industry		2026-2028	
		A2- Encourage the implementation of ACI Airport Excellence (APEX) in Safety Programme	States, organizations, industry		2026-2028	

Appendix D:

SEIs identified in MID-RASP may be considered by States for inclusion in their NASPs, as appropriate

G1-SEI-01:
LOC-I

G1-SEI-02:
RE

G1-SEI-03:
RI

G1-SEI-04:
MAC

G1-SEI-05:
CFIT

G2-SEI-01:
Strengthening of States' Safety Oversight

G2-SEI-02:
Manage Human Factors and Human Performance

G2-SEI-03:
Manage Risk interdependencies

G2-SEI-04:
AAM and New Entrants

G3-SEI-01:
Implement an effective Safety Management

G5-SEI-02:
MID States to develop and publish NASP

Appendix E: Definitions

GLOSSARY

DEFINITIONS

Audit. A systematic, independent and documented process for obtaining evidence and evaluating it objectively to determine the extent to which requirements and audit criteria are fulfilled.

Critical elements (CEs). The critical elements of a safety oversight system encompass the whole spectrum of civil aviation activities. They are the building blocks upon which an effective safety oversight system is based. The level of effective implementation of the CEs is an indication of a State's capability for safety oversight.

Effective implementation (EI). A measure of the State's safety oversight capability, calculated for each critical element, each audit area or as an overall measure. The EI is expressed as a percentage.

Hazard. A condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident.

Safety data. A defined set of facts or values collected for reference, processing or analysis which could be used to maintain or improve safety.

Safety enhancement initiative (SEI). One or more actions to eliminate or mitigate operational safety risks or to address organizational challenges.

Safety information. Safety data processed, organized or analysed in a given context to support safety management and the development of safety intelligence.

Safety oversight. A function performed by a State to ensure that individuals and organizations performing an aviation activity comply with safety-related national laws and regulations.

Safety performance. A State or a service provider's measurable effect on safety achievement.

Safety risk. The predicted probability and severity of the consequences or outcomes of a hazard.

State safety programme (SSP). An integrated set of laws, regulations, policies, objectives, processes, procedures and activities aimed at managing safety, at the State level.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA	Audit area
ACI	Airports Council International
AI	Artificial Intelligence
ANC	Air Navigation Commission
ARC	Abnormal runway contact
ATS	Air traffic service
BARS	Basic aviation risk standard
CANSO	Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation

CAST	Commercial Aviation Safety Team
CE	Critical element
CFIT	Controlled flight into terrain
CICTT	CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team
CMA	Continuous monitoring approach
COSCAP	Cooperative Development of Operational Safety and Continuing Airworthiness Programme
EI	Effective implementation
EUROCONTROL	European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation
FSF	Flight Safety Foundation
GANP	Global Air Navigation Plan
GASP	Global Aviation Safety Plan
GASeP	Global Aviation Security Plan
GASP-SG	Global Aviation Safety Plan Study Group
G-HRC	Global high-risk category of occurrence
GNSS	Global navigation satellite system
IATA	International Air Transport Association
IBAC	International Business Aviation Council
IOSA	IATA Operational Safety Audit
ISAGO	IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations
IS-BAH	IBAC International Standard for Business Aircraft Handling
IS-BAO	IBAC International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations
iSTARS	Integrated Safety Trend Analysis and Reporting System
LOC-I	Loss of control in-flight
MAC	Mid-air collision
NASP	National aviation safety plan
N-HRC	National high-risk category of occurrence
OLF	Online framework
PQ	Protocol Question
PANS	Procedures for Air Navigation Services
RAIO	Regional Accident and Incident Investigation Organization
RASG	Regional Aviation Safety Group
RASP	Regional aviation safety plan
RE	Runway excursion
RFI	Radio frequency interference
R-HRC	Regional high-risk category of occurrence
RI	Runway incursion
RSOO	Regional Safety Oversight Organization
SARPs	Standards and Recommended Practices
SCF–NP	System/component failure or malfunction (non-powerplant)
SDCPS	Safety data collection and processing system
SEI	Safety enhancement initiative
SMS	Safety management system
SOP	Standard operating procedure
SSP	State safety programme
SUPPS	Regional Supplementary Procedures
TURB	Turbulence encounter
USOAP	Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme

Attachment A

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

State / Organiza	Name in Full	Title / Official Position
MID States		
Egypt	Hossam Eldin Mohamed Sayed	Vice Head of the Technical Secretariat Sector
Egypt	yasser Mohamadain hafez khalil	Vice Head of the ATC Sector
Egypt	Ahmed Gamal Ibrahim Sabry	Director General of Safety Management ECAA
Egypt	Rania Mohamed Hassan Hammad	Safety Manager in SMGD ECAA
Iran	Mohammad Mahdi Adineh Nia	Deputy Director of Safety and Quality assurance
Iran	Jaber Goodarzi	Director of Safety and Quality Assurance
Iran	Abbas saberi	Flight Operations Inspector, Civil Aviation Authority
Iraq	Suha Khudhair Flayyih	General Company for Air Navigation Services
Iraq	MUSTAFA SHAKIR AMOORI HAMAD	Director of safety and licensing department
Iraq	Ahmed Muneer Ismael Al Zaide	GCANS- Air traffic management - Iraq NASP team
Iraq	Aiham Jamaldeen Sadiq Alasadi	GCANS-ATM - Iraq NASP Team member
Iraq	Ali Abdulwahab Joudah	ATC/Safety officer
Iraq	Aws Asaad Abdulhadi	Approach training Manager
Iraq	Mohammed Sameer Kareem	ATCO / NASP MEMBER
Jordan	Rawan Suleiman Mohammed Alnaimat	Chief of Operations Auditing Division/ Compliance Monitoring Directorate
Jordan	Eng. Ahmad Mahmoud Odeh	Director Of JORDAN Air Navigation Services
Jordan	Ahmed hamad Al-Khraisha	Flight Operations Inspector
Jordan	HANAN MUNIR A. ABU DAYYEH	Aviation Safety Auditor
Jordan	Hadeel Nimer Hamedalla Al-Awaysheh	Chief of division / National Safety Program
Jordan	Mohammad ahmad sanad aljbour	Airworthiness inspector
Jordan	Eva Abed Marzouq Hammoudeh	Aerodrome Safety Inspector
Jordan	Abdelrahman Abujbara	Airports Oversight Director
Jordan	Eva Abed Marzouq Hammoudeh	Aerodrome Safety Inspector
Jordan	Areej Said Khaled Al Ajou	CNS inspector
Jordan	Dr Khalil M Khalil	Civil Aviation Safety Adminstartion Director
Jordan	Dr. Bassam Abed	Quality and Safety Management System Direc9rr
Jordan	Mohammed Farouq Othman Doqa	Director of Air Navigation Oversight (CARC - CAA)
Jordan	Mohammad Hushki	Director Compliance Monitoring
Jordan	Mohammad Ahmad Hamdi Hajeh	Flight Operations Inspector
Jordan	Louai Adnan Dheif Allah Alhanandeh	Director Flight Operations Oversight
Jordan	Maher Ahmed Mahmoud Al-Shawagfeh	dangerous goods inspector
Jordan	Neveen Mahmoud Jum'ah Askar	Director of Planning & Training - JANS /CARC
Jordan	Majd Ahmad Al Jaghbeer	Flight Operations Commercial Inspector Assistant
Jordan	Abier Nabih Mahmoud	Aviation Safety Auditor
Jordan	ELHAM ALRAWASHDEH	DIRECTOR OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
Jordan	Bilal subhi Said Nazzal	Director Airworthiness Oversight
Jordan	abdallah falah al samarat	accident investigation expert
Jordan	Suhad Alwahidi	Cabin safety inspector
Jordan	Ahmad Khraisat	Cabin safety inspector
Libya	WALED MOFTAH TAHER HAMAM	SSP DIRECTOR
Oman	Naif Nasser Al-Daghari	Safety Regulations Specialist
Oman	Abdalaziz Khalfan Ali Al Sakiti	Safety Regulation Specialist
Qatar	Majed Al Atawi	Director Air Safety Department
Qatar	Nayif Nasser AlJaber	Head of Air Navigation Services Inspectorate
Qatar	Ahmad Abdulaziz Al Muhamadi	Electronics Engineering Specialist
Qatar	Dr. Ramy Saad	ANS Inspector
Saudi Arabia	Ttal Jamjoom	Section Head - Business Performance

Saudi Arabia	Omar Al-Shahrani	Safety Strategy and Planning Section Head
UAE	Amna Darwish Alraeesi	Specialist - Strategic Safety & Performance
UAE	Ammar Al Mazrouei	Senior Director - Policies, Regulation and Planning
UAE	Mubarak Saleh Al Gheilani	Senior Expert Policy, Regulation and and Planning
Yemen	Musaed Maher Mohammed alshuaibi	Airworthiness inspector under training
Yemen	Sumaia Hussain Alkaff	Aerodrome Inspector
Yemen	Saeed Ahmed Bawazir	NCMC
Yemen	SALEM SALEH SALEEM BIN NUHAID	Director General of Aircraft Accident Incident investigation
Yemen	Samara Ahmed Abdullah	ATC
Organizations		
IATA	Jehad Faqir	Head Regional Safety Africa & Middle East