GNSS interference – Mitigations from the Flight Deck

ICAO EUR/NAT & MID Workshop on GNSS RFI

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19 November 2025

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Timeline of GNSS Interference Management

Lessons and Milestones

2021 — Initial encounter

GPS primary lost being reported on Wizz Air's Middle-East routes due to GPS jamming

2022 — Early consequences

Nuisance EGPWS warnings on Middle-East routes

2023 — Further escalation

GPS interference spreading to Eastern Mediterranean region
Map shifts

2024 — First level of mitigations

FCOM update and NTC
Periodic FDM report

2025 — Beyond the systems

Low reporting rate
Misuse of GPS interference procedure
Recovery tracking gap

Most affected areas Wizz Air network

1. Middle East
2. Black Sea and South Caucasus
3. Eastern Mediterranean
4. Baltics and Northern Poland



Affected aircraft systems experienced by Wizz Air



- **EGPWS**: nuisance "PULL UP" warnings → CFIT
- **Map shifts** → CFIT
- **Wind direction and speed indication**: Inconsistent information about wind speed and direction → CFIT
- **ROW/ROP**: nuisance "RWY too short (if wet)" alerts → RE

Low reporting rate of GNSS interference cases

Stems from routine exposure.

“It’s normal now.”



Why is it a problem?

Loss of situational awareness
Underreporting limits the available sources of information, making more difficult to identify contributing factors and assess risk.

Information sources

Audits
FDM event monitoring
Air Safety Reports (ASRs)

Further operational issues

Misuse of GPS interference procedure

Why is it a problem?

Flight crew applies GPS interference procedure deliberately, based on assumptions even when not applicable to their current route or airport.

Additional risk

Switching off the EGPWS terrain alerting system without prior assessment of the airport, especially the terrain can increase the risk of CFIT

Information sources

Audits
FDM event monitoring
Air Safety Reports (ASRs)

Lack of recovery procedure

Why is it a problem?

Difficult evaluation of a certain area, once the GPS interference is no longer in place.
Unnecessary degradation of GPWS enhanced function

Information sources

FDM parameter monitoring

Mitigation strategies

Communication

- Aircraft manufacturer – harmonized information
- Pilot community – clear procedures, consultation sessions
- Safety Objective

Information for flight crew community must be centralized and simplified

Tools & information sources

- FCOM
- LIDO GPS interference layer
- FDM event monitoring
- Airport assessments
- Reporting culture

Outlook for the future

- Monitoring the situation
- Training flight crew
- Maintaining awareness

Further actions?

Industry collaboration



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Thank you for your attention!