



**INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION**





European and North Atlantic Office



AFS to SWIM Transition Task Force (AST TF)

SEVENTH MEETING

AMHS SECURITY WORKSHOP

(Dubrovnik, Croatia, 21-24 April 2026)



Agenda

- ✓ Introduction to the European Aviation Common PKI (EACP)
- ✓ AMHS requirements gathering and analysis
- ✓ Securing AMHS with EACP certificates



European and North Atlantic Office



Dr Abdel Youssef

Securing AMHS services with EACP certificates




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European Aviation Common PKI

Introduction



Family 5.1.1: Common Backbone for digital certificate

Lifecycle management + Interoperability Tool for Local PKIs.

Family 5.2.1:

- Option A: Use Common Backbone
- Option B: Use eligible local PKIs

Improve security throughout aviation value chain

Trust Framework (governance, policies, procedures)

Common service reducing costs & providing:


- Digital certificates
- Interoperability between existing Local PKI





European Aviation Common PKI

Introduction



- EACP: Family 5.1.1
 - EACP - Common PKI Services
 - EACP – Public (Well-Known CA) part.
 - EACP – Private (Non-Well-Known CA) part.
 - EACP – Certificate Trust List (CTL)
- Stakeholders can use:
 - Family 5.2.1 Option A: use EACP – Common Backbone
 - Family 5.2.1 Option B: Use eligible Local PKI from the CTL
 - Both options



European Aviation Common PKI

Introduction

- EACP Interfaces:
 - EACP Production (OPS) Environment: <https://cm.harica.gr>
 - EACP Staging environment: <https://cm-stg.harica.gr>
- Provider's CAs:
 - https://repo.harica.gr/rep_dyn.php
- EACP Policy documentation (CP, CPS, PDS, Subscriber Agreement, Data Privacy Statement):
 - <https://repo.harica.gr/procedures.php>
- Certificate Status:
 - Via OCSP: <http://ocsp.harica.gr>
 - Via CRLs: <http://crl.harica.gr> / + reference to the certificate type signed by the issuer
- Guides on how to purchase HARICA digital certificates:
 - <https://www.harica.gr/en/Guides> and <https://guides-stg.harica.gr/docs/Guides/>
 - To develop JSON calls (REST API): <https://developer.harica.gr>



European Aviation Common PKI

EACP Certificate fees

Digital certificate for TLS server (not required to be signed by a Well-known CA) – Type 2

Type of certificate	Number of certificates	Validity		
		cost for 1 year validity	cost for 2 year validity	cost for 3 year validity
SSL DV (simple) Cost per validated Domain	1 - 5.000	€ 0,80	€ 1,44	€ 1,92
	5.001 - 10.000	€ 0,72	€ 1,30	€ 1,73
	10.001 - 20.000	€ 0,65	€ 1,17	€ 1,56
	20.001 - 50.000	€ 0,58	€ 1,05	€ 1,40
	50.001 - 100.000	€ 0,52	€ 0,94	€ 1,26
	100.001 - 500.000	€ 0,47	€ 0,85	€ 1,13
	500.001 - 1.000.000	€ 0,43	€ 0,77	€ 1,02


Type of certificate	Number of certificates	Validity		
		cost for 1 year validity	cost for 2 year validity	cost for 3 year validity
TLS client OV Certificates for client authentication that contain Subject information about the Organization	1 - 5.000	€ 2,00	€ 3,60	€ 4,80
	5.001 - 10.000	€ 1,80	€ 3,24	€ 4,32
	10.001 - 20.000	€ 1,62	€ 2,92	€ 3,89
	20.001 - 50.000	€ 1,46	€ 2,62	€ 3,50
	50.001 - 100.000	€ 1,31	€ 2,36	€ 3,15
	100.001 - 500.000	€ 1,18	€ 2,13	€ 2,83
	500.001 - 1.000.000	€ 1,06	€ 1,91	€ 2,55





European Aviation Common PKI

EACP Onboarding Process





Agenda

- ✓ Introduction to the European Aviation Common PKI (EACP)
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AMHS Requirements gathering and analysis

AMHS - Requirement 1

Use Case 1	
Business Case Description	Certificates for mutual authentication between AMHS MTAs, upon X.400 MTABind.
Description	Authentication by means of X.400 bind-token (including a <i>bind-token-signed-data</i>), based on the signature of a random number. The system (MTA) itself, which corresponds to the <i>subject</i> of the certificate, is identified by its MTAName, stored in the <i>subjectAltName</i> certificate extension taking its <i>otherName</i> name form.
ICAO Requirements	<p>ICAO Requirement (ICAO Doc 9880 Part II, paras 3.2.4.7:</p> <p><i>An X.509 MTA certificate used in support of the extended ATSMHS shall include a SubjectAltName certificate extension implementing the otherName name form among those offered by the GeneralName syntax.</i></p> <p>The type/OID required by the otherName is set to <u>2.6.5.6.0</u>.</p>



AMHS Requirements gathering and analysis

AMHS – Requirement 2

Use Case 2	
Business Case Description	Certificates for mutual authentication between a UA and its Attachment-MTA, upon X.400 MTSBind. The MTA certificates can be identical to those for MTA-MTA authentication.
Description	Authentication by means of X.400 bind-token (including a bind-token-signed-data), based on the signature of a random number. The system (UA) itself, which corresponds to the subject of the certificate, is identified by itsORAddressAndOptionalDirectoryName, which is an X.400 O/R address and is stored in the subjectAltNamecertificate extension taking it in its x400Address name form.
ICAO Requirements	ICAO Requirement (ICAO Doc 9880 Part II, para 3.1.4.3.5: <i>An AMHS user X.509 certificate used in support of the extended ATSMHS shall include a SubjectAltName certificate extension implementing the x400Address name form among those offered by the GeneralName syntax.</i>



AMHS Requirements gathering and analysis

AMHS - Requirement 3

Use Case 3	
Business Case Description	Certificates for digital signature of messages generated and sent by a UA, to ensure message origin authentication and message content integrity.
Description	Signature by means of X.400 message-token (including a message-token-signed-data), based on message content signature. The system (UA) itself, which corresponds to the subject of the certificate, is identified by itsORAddressAndOptionalDirectoryName, which is an X.400 O/R address and is stored in the subjectAltNamecertificate extension taking its in its x400Address name form.
ICAO Requirements	ICAO Requirement (ICAO Doc 9880 Part II, para 3.1.4.3.5: <i>An AMHS user X.509 certificate used in support of the extended ATSMHS shall include a SubjectAltName certificate extension implementing the x400Address name form among those offered by the GeneralName syntax.</i>



AMHS Requirements gathering and analysis

AMHS - Requirement 4

Use Case 4	
Business Case Description	Certificates for digital signature of messages generated and sent by a MTCU.
Description	Signature by means of X.400 message-token (including a message-token-signed-data), based on message content signature. The system (MTCU) itself, which corresponds to the subject of the certificate, is identified by its MTAName, stored in the subjectAltNamecertificate extension taking its otherName name form.
ICAO Requirements	ICAO Requirement (ICAO Doc 9880 Part II, paras 4.2.3.13: <i>An X.509 MTA certificate allocated to a message transfer and control unit used to support the extended ATSMHS shall include a SubjectAltName certificate extension implementing the otherName name form among those offered by the GeneralName syntax.</i>



AMHS Digital Certificate Specifications

AMHS Digital Certificate analysis

- Digital Certificate Type and Purpose:
 - Type 1 certificate: MTA to MTA (requirement 1)
 - → Authentication certificate with SAN having Othername with OID= 2.6.5.6.0 and MTA-name
 - Type 2 certificate: UA to MTA (requirement 2 & requirement 3)
 - → Authentication and Message Signing certificate having SAN with X400AddressName
 - Type 3 certificate MTCU (requirement 4)
 - → Message Signing certificate with SAN having Othername with OID= 2.6.5.6.0 and MTA-name



AMHS Digital Certificate Specifications

Digital Certificate Validation: Basic validation

- Path validation. At every layer, validate the following items up to a trusted Anchor:
 - Validity period
 - Digital signature
 - Revocation

Certificate Path Building Details



- [-] ✓ CN=test3,OU=European Aviation,OU=Common PKI Services,O=EUROCONTROL
 - [-] ✓ Certificate Expiry Check
 - [-] ✓ Certificate Signature Check
 - [-] ✓ Revocation
- [-] ✓ CN=European Aviation Test Safety Critical CA,OU=European Aviation,OU=Common PKI Services,O=EUROCONTROL
 - [-] ✓ Certificate Expiry Check
 - [-] ✓ Certificate Signature Check
 - [-] ✓ Revocation
- [-] ✓ CN=European Aviation Test ROOT CA,OU=European Aviation,OU=Common PKI Services,O=EUROCONTROL
 - [-] ✓ Certificate Expiry Check
 - [-] ✓ Certificate Signature Check



AMHS Digital Certificate Specifications

Digital Certificate Validation: Basic validation

- AMHS servers and associated services may be provided in dedicated network (e.g. PENS/NewPENS) while the PKI services are (may be) running on the Internet.
- Need to access at least Validation inputs (CRLs/OCSP + CA Certificates)
- EUROCONTROL is studying the possibility to provide Replica/Proxy
- In the meantime: use the CRL and CA certificate **caching**





Agenda


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AMHS Digital Certificate Lifecycle Management

Certificate lifecycle management phases


- Key-pair generation
- Certificate Request
- Request Verification
- Certificate Issuance
- Certificate Publication
- Certificate Use ...
- Expiration / Revocation
- Renewal/Rekeying





AMHS Digital Certificate Specifications

AMHS Hierarchy of Certification under EACP Private PKI





AMHS Digital Certificate Lifecycle Management

Key Pair Creation and Certificate Request creation

- Example of Key Pair Generation using openssl

```
Administrator: Command Prompt  
c:\>openssl ecparam -genkey -name secp384r1 -out myMTA.key
```

- Parsing the Key using openssl

```
c:\>openssl pkey -in myMTA.key -text -noout  
Private-Key: (384 bit)  
priv:  
  b4:66:f5:ec:91:91:6a:30:03:84:bf:5b:b6:96:7d:  
  50:4c:43:59:13:0d:ec:99:de:5b:39:f4:ea:22:82:  
  17:b1:61:ed:f9:9f:06:e3:86:58:63:6b:1d:2a:7e:  
  37:ed:b7  
pub:  
  04:32:df:5c:af:95:9c:45:77:22:61:8d:56:22:37:  
  2b:ac:24:f8:51:1f:36:82:c5:3d:b5:55:53:cd:c1:  
  2f:c1:46:0c:ed:f1:a2:fe:1a:7a:85:dd:48:36:da:  
  3d:e7:13:bc:f6:f4:7a:71:1b:bb:94:3b:c4:12:06:  
  9f:db:e5:90:4c:ab:4a:2f:5b:21:32:49:70:35:25:  
  0e:5f:3f:3a:46:18:c3:13:97:0e:52:b6:54:07:47:  
  23:d4:7b:d1:11:58:c6  
ASN1 OID: secp384r1  
NIST CURVE: P-384
```



AMHS Digital Certificate Lifecycle Management

Key Pair Creation and Certificate Signing Request creation

- Example of Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Creation

```
c:\>openssl req -key myMTA.key -addext "subjectAltName=otherName:2.6.5.6.0;UTF8:myMTAName"  
-subj "/CN=example-MTA" -sha384 -new -out myMTA.csr
```

- Certificate Signing Request format

```
c:\>type myMTA.csr  
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----  
MIIBPzCBxgIBADAWMRQwEgYDVQQDDAtleGFtZXQwGx1LU1UQTU2MBAGByqGSM49AgEG  
BSuBBAAiA2IABDLfXK+VnEV3ImGNViI3K6wk+FEfNoLFPbVWU83BL8FGD03xov4a  
eoXdSDbaPecTvPb0enEbu5Q7xBIGn9v1kEyrSi9bITJJcDU1D18/OkYYwxOXD1K2  
VAdHI9R70RFYxqAaxMC8GCSqGSIB3DQEJDjEiMCAwHgYDVR0RBBcwFaATBgRWBQYA  
oAsMCW15TVRBTmFtZTAKBggqhkJOPQDDAwNoADB1AjEA0PIitHnHEF1iD0Y1jP1S  
uAB320KXE1EVlnYcB92K+FvHQxJqv2KK909hKrBUjJcAjBs+xCdAZtAwM5/rBqJ  
bnh1W/drTTIwPc1kcf7+uBGCqloHyHi0b205PXAEX18/w8=  
-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
```



AMHS Digital Certificate Lifecycle Management

Key Pair Creation and Certificate Signing Request creation

- Parsing the Certificate Signing Request (CSR)


```
c:\>openssl req -text -noout -verify -in myMTA.csr
Certificate request self-signature verify OK
Certificate Request:
Data:
  Version: 1 (0x0)
  Subject: CN=example-MTA
  Subject Public Key Info:
    Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
    Public-Key: (384 bit)
    pub:
      04:32:df:5c:af:95:9c:45:77:22:61:8d:56:22:37:
      2b:ac:24:f8:51:1f:36:82:c5:3d:b5:55:53:cd:c1:
      2f:c1:46:0c:ed:f1:a2:fe:1a:7a:85:dd:48:36:da:
      3d:e7:13:bc:f6:f4:7a:71:1b:bb:94:3b:c4:12:06:
      9f:db:e5:90:4c:ab:4a:2f:5b:21:32:49:70:35:25:
      0e:5f:3f:3a:46:18:c3:13:97:0e:52:b6:54:07:47:
      23:d4:7b:d1:11:58:c6
    ASN1 OID: secp384r1
    NIST CURVE: P-384
  Attributes:
    Requested Extensions:
      X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
        othername: 2.6.5.6.0:myMTAName
  Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384
  Signature Value:
    30:65:02:31:00:d0:f2:22:b4:79:c7:10:5d:62:0f:46:25:8c:
    fd:52:b8:00:77:db:42:97:13:51:15:96:76:1c:07:dd:8a:f8:
    5b:c7:43:12:6a:bf:62:8a:f7:4f:61:2a:b0:54:8d:f2:5c:02:
    30:6c:fb:10:9d:01:9b:40:c0:ce:7f:ac:1a:89:6e:78:75:5b:
    f7:6b:4d:32:16:a4:2d:64:71:fe:fe:b8:11:82:aa:5a:07:c8:
    78:8e:6f:6d:39:3d:70:15:11:7d:7c:ff:0f
```



AMHS Digital Certificate Specifications

AMHS Digital Certificate Provisioning

- Bulk Certificate
- REST API





European and North Atlantic Office



THANK YOU

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Thank You

