



NORTH ATLANTIC SYSTEMS PLANNING GROUP (NAT SPG)

NAT Annual Safety Report



Foreword

For over six decades, the North Atlantic (NAT) Region, under the leadership of the NAT Systems Planning Group (NAT SPG) established in 1965 by the ICAO Council, has continuously advanced the operational safety and efficiency of the world's busiest oceanic airspace through close collaboration among States, ANSPs, and industry. In 2009 the NAT SPG approved a new high level safety policy to take account of the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan and in 2012 the first NAT Annual Safety Report was issued to provide information about the NAT Region, its safety principles and its safety risks. Alongside the implementation of increasingly sophisticated communications, navigation, and surveillance capabilities that have enabled more visibility into the oceanic operating environment, the NAT Annual Safety Report has matured to a more data-driven and forward-looking tool to highlight key operational safety issues and support pre-emptive corrective actions.

This report provides a concise overview of current safety performance, key trends, and areas identified for attention. Readers are encouraged to use the insights presented to inform decision-making, strengthen operational practices, and contribute to collective efforts to further enhance safety across the North Atlantic Region.

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Executive Summary

This edition of the North Atlantic Region's (NAT) Annual Safety Report (ASR) presents the safety performance of the NAT Region for the 2025 calendar year. It provides an overview of how safety risk is monitored in the NAT High Level Airspace (HLA), highlights key trends and operational risks, and identifies areas where continued attention or action may be required.

The objective of the NAT Systems Planning Group (NAT SPG) member States is to maintain and, where possible, improve agreed safety standards across all activities supporting the provision of air navigation services in the NAT Region. The NAT SPG structure was established to study, monitor, and evaluate the air navigation system in the NAT Region, taking into account changes to technology, changing traffic characteristics and traffic forecasts.

Purpose of this report: The purpose of the NAT ASR is to inform readers about how the NAT Region monitors safety risk in the airspace, provide information about areas where safety performance in the last year is reported above or below expectations, and highlight possible safety enhancement actions for the aviation community.

Who should read this report: The NAT ASR is intended to be informative and actionable for aviation stakeholders, including Civil Aviation Authorities, Air Navigation Services Providers (ANSPs), air operators, the ICAO Air Navigation Commission and relevant ICAO expert groups.

NAT safety performance metrics: The NAT HLA is the busiest oceanic airspace in the world, transited almost exclusively by jet transport aircraft operating at altitudes between 29,000 and 41,000 feet. Safety performance in the NAT HLA is measured against the global Target Level of Safety (TLS) and by setting additional targets associated with NAT Region Safety Key Performance Indicators (SKPIs), with targets based on three years of rolling data. The safety performance relative to the TLS and SKPIs and associated targets provides a benchmark to estimate the risk of midair collision between aircraft, which is the primary risk of concern to oceanic airspace. Midair collision is also one of the global high-risk categories of occurrences (G-HRCs) identified in the ICAO GASP.

Top Takeaways for 2025

- Traffic levels continued to increase in 2025, with NAT HLA flights reaching approximately 1.6 million, the highest level ever recorded in the NAT.
- Overall, safety performance in the NAT Region in 2025 remained stable and showed improvement in several key areas:
 - No accidents were recorded in the NAT HLA during 2025.
 - The Region continued to monitor the estimated collision risk compared to the TLS. The 2025 results indicate improvement in both vertical and lateral risk compared with 2024, despite continued traffic growth.
 - Lateral risk estimate met the TLS for the first time since 2021.
 - Vertical risk estimate exceeded the TLS but showed a 33.5% improvement over 2024.
 - The Region also continued to monitor the established SKPIs for the NAT, meeting 37% of its targets for 2025. While several indicators were not achieved, largely due to operational changes, the results should also be considered in the context of higher traffic levels and increasing reporting.
 - The ongoing refinement of collision risk models and associated metrics is critical to ensure they reflect the modern oceanic operating environment.
- Continued investment in reporting, surveillance capabilities, and data analysis is improving the Region's ability to identify and manage safety risks.

How to use this report: The NAT Region pioneers the implementation of advanced procedures and technology supporting the progress of the ICAO Global Air Navigation and Aviation Safety Plans, and these advanced capabilities combined with the Region's strong safety reporting culture provide extensive visibility

into the NAT HLA operating environment. Through proactive safety oversight and effective mitigation strategies leading to the prevention of potential operational deviations, the NAT HLA continues to operate at a level of safety that meets or exceeds global expectations even if the TLS and other targets are not fully met in an individual calendar year. The NAT SPG structure regularly reviews the Region's safety management processes and the SKPIs to ensure that safety performance monitoring continues to reflect the increasing traffic volume and evolving operational demands and provides actionable information.

Stakeholders are advised to study the information presented and evaluate where changes in requirements, procedures, systems, or training could reduce deviation and improve safety performance.

2025 Safety Performance Snapshot

This section provides a high-level overview of safety performance in the NAT Region for 2025, including key trends, significant events, and the main risks requiring continued attention.

The NAT Safety Oversight Group (NAT SOG), established under the NAT Systems Planning Group (NAT SPG), is responsible for monitoring overall safety performance in the NAT Region and driving improvements to the safety performance of the air navigation system. Supporting this work, the NAT Scrutiny Group (NAT SG) reviews all reported events including actual and prevented lateral deviations, vertical deviations, losses of longitudinal separation and coordination errors. They ensure the accurate categorization of reported events for safety analysis purposes, enabling the identification of trends and prevalent causal factors and determine whether each event is risk-bearing. The NAT Mathematicians' Working Group (NAT MWG) calculates the Lateral and Vertical Collision Risk Estimates (CREs) based on the NAT SG categorization.

2025 Overview

Between January and December 2025, 661 events were reported to the NAT Central Monitoring Agency (CMA) as having occurred in the NAT High Level Airspace (HLA) Oceanic Control Areas (OCAs) of Shanwick, Santa Maria, Reykjavik, New York East, Gander and Bodø. This represented an increase of 38% compared with 478 events reported in 2024, while traffic levels also increased. This increase in reported events can mainly be attributed to the removal of Oceanic Clearance.

Target Level of Safety and Collision Risk Estimates

The NAT Region assesses collision risk using the CRE, which provides an indication of the likelihood of a mid-air collision in the NAT HLA. The CRE is expressed in fatal accidents per flight-hour (fapfh) and is calculated in the lateral and vertical planes. The Lateral and Vertical CREs are each compared against the Target Level of Safety (TLS), a globally established benchmark of 5×10^{-9} fapfh, which is equivalent to approximately one fatal accident every 83 years of NAT HLA operations.

The estimates of Lateral and Vertical Collision Risk for 2025 in the NAT HLA are based on the risk bearing events reported to the NAT CMA for the period of January to December 2025. Flight activity data from the five NAT OCAs was used in deriving the estimates.

- The Lateral CRE for 2025 was estimated to be 4.9×10^{-9} fapfh, improving from 2024 (8.1×10^{-9}), and meeting the TLS for the first time since 2021.
- The Vertical CRE for 2025 was estimated to be 22.0×10^{-9} fapfh, representing an improvement from 2024 (33.1×10^{-9}), but remaining above the TLS.

Figure 1 shows the Lateral and Vertical CREs over recent years, together with the total number of flight hours in the NAT HLA.



Figure 1 – Flight Hours and Collision Risk Estimates in the NAT HLA (2018-2025)

Overall, the 2025 results indicate improvement in both Lateral and Vertical Collision Risk compared with 2024, despite continued traffic growth. NAT HLA flight hours increased to 2.39 million, the highest level recorded in the period shown. This suggests that safety controls continue to perform effectively, while highlighting the relatively small number of events that drive a significant proportion of calculated risk. However, the Vertical Collision Risk continues to significantly exceed the TLS and the Lateral Collision Risk, indicating a need for increased attention on the causes and potential mitigations for deviations leading to loss of separation in the vertical dimension.

In 2025, two long duration events accounted for 44% of the total risk estimate. Excluding these events, the Vertical CRE would reduce to 12.4×10^{-9} fapfh, demonstrating the continued sensitivity of the model to a small number of high-impact occurrences. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, excluding the two long duration events, the Vertical CRE in 2025 would exceed the TLS. Although it decreased in 2025 compared to 2024, the Vertical CRE also remains well above the 2019 (pre-COVID-19 pandemic) estimate.

NAT Region Safety Key Performance Indicators and Targets

The NAT Region monitors a set of Safety Key Performance Indicators (SKPIs) established to provide leading information on trends that may influence safety risk in the NAT HLA. The SKPIs and associated targets focus on reducing the numbers and types of events reported to the NAT CMA, as well as progressively reducing the Lateral and Vertical CREs.

- In 2025, no accidents were recorded in the NAT HLA.
- 4 of the 11 SKPI targets (37%) were met.
 - While several SKPIs targets were not achieved, this performance should be considered in the context of interrelated operational, procedural, and systemic factors, including increasing traffic levels and a significant rise in occurrence reporting in recent years. The Gander OCA experienced the bulk of the increased reporting in the first months of 2025 when starting the Oceanic Clearance Removal (OCR) process in association with CPDLC Uplink messages. Those issues were addressed and reports during the last six months of 2025 returned to normal in Gander.
 - Two of the SKPIs targets not met in 2025 relate directly to the Vertical CRE, addressing the number of Large Height Deviation (LHD) events and targeting a progressive reduction in the Vertical CRE.

- o Other SKPIs targets not met reflect performance in both the vertical and lateral dimensions, and address targets related to frequently reported types of events.

The full details, including 2025 performance, targets, rolling three-year averages, and contributing factors of the SKPIs can be found in **Appendix B**.

2025 Safety Performance Analysis

Based on the NAT SG reviews of reported risk bearing events, the following top safety risks were identified for 2025:

1. Missed, late or incomplete coordination between ATC Units was the most common causal factor in risk-bearing events reported during 2025 and the increased frequency and duration of such events resulted in a negative impact on several SKPIs. There was also a direct negative impact on both the lateral and vertical CREs due to the severity and duration of those events.
2. CPDLC uplink messages incorrectly or, more commonly, not actioned by crew was the most common crew causal factor in risk-bearing events reported during 2025. ATC barriers in place to prevent a deviation from clearance from taking place are very effective at reducing the number of actual events, however failures by crew to act on changes to their flight planned route, particularly involving half-degree waypoints, were prevalent and contributed to increased reports and increased lateral CRE.
3. Incorrect Weather Contingency action taken by Crew continues to be a common contributor to reported events. The most common types of error included failure to ask for clearance in a timely manner before deviation and failure to correctly change Flight Level when passing 5NM off track, with both error types contributing to an increase in reported lateral and vertical events and a subsequent increase in CRE.

These safety risks are continuously monitored by the NAT SPG subgroups and addressed through safety promotion activities, guidance material, stakeholder engagement, and collaboration with industry organizations to support operational improvements across the NAT.

Other Contributing Factors

“Flight Plan vs. Clearance” was once again the top contributing factor in 2025, contributing to 39% of events. Most of the events stemmed from deficiencies in flight crew compliance with OCR procedures and the use of CPDLC route clearance uplinks (UM79). It should be noted that in 90% of “Flight Plan vs. Clearance” events, the deviations did not actually occur as they were prevented by an air traffic controller.

Mitigations

Prevented deviations for all event types were classified according to the implemented mitigations used to avert a deviation. Figure 2 shows that the practice of requiring position reporting of “NEXT and NEXT +1” and the “CONFIRM ASSIGNED ROUTE” CPDLC message sets (UM137/DM40) are proving to be of benefit.




Figure 2 – Mitigations used for prevented deviation events in 2025

The use of Strategical Lateral Offset Procedures (SLOP) is a safety mitigation that distributes traffic between the centreline of a route and up to 2 NM right of centreline. The application of the random selection of the offset greatly reduces collision risk in the airspace. The desired distribution for the region is 33.3% for each option, however evidence suggests some operators apply different interpretations of SLOP.

The following table shows the SLOP distributions by the average of the four best conforming operators, with regards to the optimal distribution of SLOP, while Y and Z represent operators with the least optimal use of SLOP, as provided by the NAT Mathematicians Working Group (NAT MWG).

	Centerline	1-Mile Right Offset	2-Mile Right Offset
Top Four Average	36%	31%	27%
Operator Y	0.1%	99.9%	0%
Operator Z	70%	13%	11%

Table 1 – SLOP distributions for 2025

Future Focus

The NAT Region, under the framework of the NAT SPG, continues to collaborate closely with States and partners to shape the future of aviation in the North Atlantic, with enhanced resilience and sustainability of civil aviation remaining the top priorities. Through innovation and the adoption of new technologies, the region is strengthening its capacity to respond to emerging challenges while enhancing the adaptability and performance of air traffic management services.

NAT Vision Workshop 2026

The NAT Vision Workshop, held in Paris on 27 April 2026, discussed high-level principles, goals, and objectives to guide the future of the NAT Region. The outcome will be an updated NAT Vision incorporating identified improvements to better align with evolving operational, technological, and strategic priorities.

Space Transport Operations

Planned work will continue to support the integration of space transport operations (STO) within the NAT Region. This includes the development of common regional practices, improved information sharing among States and STO operators, harmonisation of safety risk management frameworks, and enhancement of guidance material. Continued collaboration between States and industry stakeholders will remain essential to enable safe, efficient, and coordinated STO integration.

Updated Collision Risk Model

The NAT Mathematicians Working Group (MWG) will continue its work to update the Collision Risk Model (CRM), which will be applied to the 2026 and future analyses presented in the ASR. While the TLS serves as an important reference point, it should be interpreted alongside broader operational context. The work to continue maturing the CRM will incorporate analytics more closely aligned with surveillance improvements implemented in the NAT Region. The revised model will more accurately account for occupancy calculations and reduce the influence of outlier long-duration events, providing a more representative picture of operational risk.

Enhancements to the NAT Annual Safety Report Project Team (ENASR PT)

The Enhancements to the NAT Annual Safety Report Project Team (ENASR PT) was established in 2026 to improve the structure, clarity, and effectiveness of the NAT ASR. The PT is focusing on making the report more concise, actionable, and better aligned with the needs of stakeholders, while also considering longer-term enhancements to ensure the report remains relevant and impactful.

Improvement to NAT CMA Service KPIs and 2026 deliverables

Enhancements to the NAT CMA Service KPIs and 2026 deliverables aim to improve the visibility, timeliness, and impact of NAT CMA activities for stakeholders. From 2026, the NAT CMA will monitor a set of service-oriented KPIs focused on areas such as response times, report publication, and dissemination of performance data, with performance reviewed regularly by the NAT SOG. In parallel, key deliverables will focus on strengthening technical capabilities and service accessibility, including improvements to height monitoring through ADS-B data, introduction of self-service tools for operator performance monitoring, and migration of procedures to enhance business resilience. These initiatives are intended to support more efficient service delivery and better-informed safety oversight across the NAT Region.

Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan

Work is underway to update the EUR/NAT Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan (VACP). The project will develop the necessary operational, technical, and regulatory amendments to ensure the plan provides harmonised and

practical guidance for regulators, ANSPs, MWOs, aircraft operators, international organizations, and other stakeholders across the EUR/NAT area.

Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO)

The NAT Region will continue its focus on data link as a core enabler of the future Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO) environment, where complex route clearances and trajectory exchanges become a primary means of communication. Building on this foundation and recognising FF-ICE as the operational centrepiece of TBO, the region will advance FF-ICE readiness in coordination with the EUR/NAT FF-ICE Task Force, harmonising procedures and guidance to prepare NAT States and airspace users for the transition ahead.

NAT Docs and NAT OPS Bulletin updates:

In 2026, the following documents are planned for updates:

NAT Doc or OPS Bulletin	Purpose of Amendment
NAT Doc 007 (NAT Operations and Airspace Manual)	▪ Simplification of Chapter 6 (NAT HLA flight operations and navigation procedures), Chapter 7 (RVSM in the NAT HLA), and Chapter 13 (Monitoring of aircraft systems and flight crew performance) ▪ Other changes to align with recent NAT operational changes and NAT OPS Bulletins including OCR, Surveillance Service and Waypoint Insertion
NAT OPS Bulletin – Oceanic Errors Safety Bulletin (OESB)	▪ Significant updates to improve clarity for flight crews with focused highlights and current common issues experienced in the NAT HLA.
NAT OPS Bulletin – NAT Oceanic Clearance Removal	▪ To align with the RCL discontinuation by Iceland

All NAT related documents are available on the ICAO EUR/NAT website: www.icao.int/eurnat/eur-nat-docs/nat-documents

Next Steps

Stakeholders are encouraged to consider all the information contained in the 2025 NAT Annual Safety Report and use it to inform decision-making, operational practices, and safety improvements across the NAT Region and globally.

For any feedback regarding this report please use the contact details found at the end of this document.

Appendix A

NAT Safety Policy

The North Atlantic Systems Planning Group (NAT SPG) aims to achieve the highest level of safety performance and meet regional safety objectives in line with national and international standards, the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP), and the Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP). This group is committed to developing, implementing, maintaining and constantly improving strategies and processes while ensuring that all aviation activities take place under a balanced allocation of organizational resources.

Objective

The objective of the NAT SPG member States is to maintain and, where possible, improve the agreed safety standards in all activities supporting the provision of air navigation services in the NAT Region:

- All involved States are accountable for the delivery of the agreed level of safety performance in the provision of air navigation services in the North Atlantic Region.
- All involved States are accountable for the delivery of the agreed level of safety performance in aircraft operations in the North Atlantic Region.
- Safety in the NAT Region is managed through the organization and activities of the relevant implementation and oversight groups established by the NAT SPG, in coordination with the non-member States and observers, to achieve its Safety Objective.

Guiding Principles

The NAT SPG will act to:

- **Clearly** define all accountabilities and responsibilities for the delivery of safety performance with respect to the provision of air navigation services and participation in the NAT SPG and its contributory bodies;
- **Support** the safety management activities that will result in an organizational culture that fosters safe practices, encourages effective safety reporting and communication, and actively manages safety within the NAT Region;
- **Share** safety related data, knowledge and expertise with concerned stakeholders;
- **Disseminate** safety information and NAT operating requirements to stakeholders;
- **Establish and implement** hazard identification and risk management processes in order to eliminate or mitigate the safety risks associated with air navigation services supporting aircraft operations in the North Atlantic Region;
- **Establish and measure** NAT Region safety performance against agreed safety standards; and
- **Continually improve** our safety performance through safety management processes.

All of the NAT member States contribute experts to the NAT SPG, or one or more of its various subgroups, and so support the overall management of safety in the Region. The NAT safety policy is enhanced by the agreement of member States to use the information shared at NAT Safety Oversight Group (NAT SOG) meetings for the purposes of education and for making safety improvements within the Region. This has paved the way for members to discuss and share information and act upon it within the framework of the NAT SPG.

Appendix B

Safety Key Performance Indicators (SKPIs)

The NAT SPG has established SKPIs and associated targets for the NAT HLA. The NAT HLA performance for the last 4 years is shown in the table below. The 2025 figures are shown in green when the performance meets the targets and in red otherwise.

Safety KPI		Target	Previous rolling three-year period of performance (2021-2022-2023)	2022 Performance	2023 Performance	2024 Performance	2025 Performance
NAT.SKPI.01	Number of accidents	0	n/a	0	0	0	0
NAT.SKPI.02a	Number of LHD events divided by number of flight hours flown in the NAT HLA	Reduction over previous rolling three-year period of performance	5.55×10^{-5}	5.09×10^{-5}	4.50×10^{-5}	7.06×10^{-5}	6.20×10^{-5}
NAT.SKPI.02b	Overall time of LHDs at unprotected flight level divided by total duration of flights in minutes	Reduction over previous rolling three-year period of performance	1.65×10^{-6}	8.75×10^{-7}	2.16×10^{-6}	1.91×10^{-6}	1.36×10^{-6}

The increased frequency of LHD events is largely driven by an increase in the number of coordination errors between ATC units and weather including incorrectly executed weather contingency procedures. Despite more events being recorded there was less time at unprotected levels due to fewer long duration events and effective ATC mitigations, in particular ADS-B.

NAT.SKPI.03a	Number of Lateral deviations divided by number of flight hours flown in the NAT HLA	Reduction over previous rolling three-year period of performance	7.39×10^{-5}	5.25×10^{-5}	8.67×10^{-5}	8.26×10^{-5}	8.77×10^{-5}
NAT.SKPI.03b	Overall time of lateral deviations on an unprotected profile divided by total duration of flights in minutes	Reduction over previous rolling three-year period of performance	1.41×10^{-6}	7.18×10^{-7}	2.33×10^{-6}	1.18×10^{-6}	9.41×10^{-7}

The increased frequency of Lateral events is largely driven by incorrectly executed weather contingency procedures, crews following their flight planned route instead of their cleared route and errors related to re-routes from whole degree to half-degree waypoints. Despite more events being recorded there was less time on unprotected profiles due to fewer long duration events and effective ATC mitigations, in particular ADS-B.

NAT.SKPI.04	Number of losses of separation events divided by number of flight hours flown in the NAT HLA	Reduction over previous rolling three-year period of performance	1.38×10^{-5}	1.10×10^{-5}	1.47×10^{-5}	1.55×10^{-5}	1.60×10^{-5}
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Safety KPI		Target	Previous rolling three-year period of performance (2021-2022-2023)	2022 Performance	2023 Performance	2024 Performance	2025 Performance
The slight increase in the number of losses of separation was due to incorrectly executed weather contingency procedures.							
NAT.SKPI.05a	Number of coordination errors divided by number of flight hours flown in the NAT HLA	Reduction over previous rolling three-year period of performance	1.55×10^{-5}	9.98×10^{-6}	1.61×10^{-5}	2.04×10^{-5}	2.19×10^{-5}
NAT.SKPI.05b	Overall time of coordination errors spent at unprotected profile divided by total duration of flights in minutes	Reduction over previous rolling three-year period of performance	6.59×10^{-7}	2.63×10^{-8}	1.37×10^{-6}	5.85×10^{-7}	9.56×10^{-7}
Coordination errors by ATC units presenting traffic to adjacent units contributed most to the frequency and unprotected time of events although errors by ATC units receiving traffic such as early turns or climbs were also common.							
NAT.SKPI.06a	Collision Risk Estimate (CRE) in the vertical dimension	5×10^{-9} fapfh	n/a	8.80×10^{-9}	20.3×10^{-9}	33.1×10^{-9}	22×10^{-9}
Despite an improvement in the Vertical CRE it is still influenced negatively by long duration events, particularly those related to coordination errors. Weather avoidance and GNSS interference issues are among the underlying causes for some of the events requiring additional coordination which were not actioned correctly.							
NAT.SKPI.06b	Collision Risk Estimate (CRE) in the lateral dimension	5×10^{-9} fapfh	n/a	12.9×10^{-9}	12.7×10^{-9}	8.1×10^{-9}	4.9×10^{-9}
NAT.SKPI.07	Regional Effective Implementation (EI) score in ANS for NAT provider States	-Maintain 85% or above until 2026 -Reach 95% by 2030	n/a	88.58%	85.15%	85.7%	84.5%
Several NAT States are scheduled for USOAP CMA activities and there may be future adjustments to EI.							
Targets, from the 2023–2025 edition of the GASP, calling for States to reach an effective implementation (EI) score of a certain per cent were replaced in the 2026-2028 edition by targets addressing specific challenges, based on critical elements and audit areas. The NAT SOG plans to review SKPI.07 in the near future accordingly.							

Appendix C

Abbreviations

ADS-B	Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
ANS	Air Navigation Service
ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider
ATC	Air Traffic Control
ATS	Air Traffic Service
CPDLC	Controller-pilot data link communications (data link)
CSO	Commercial Space Operations
fapfh	Fatal Accidents per Flight Hour
GANP	Global Air Navigation Plan
GASP	Global Aviation Safety Plan
HLA	High Level Airspace
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
LHD	Large Height Deviation
NAT	North Atlantic
NAT CMA	North Atlantic Central Monitoring Agency
NAT MWG	North Atlantic Mathematicians Working Group
NAT SG	North Atlantic Scrutiny Group
NAT SOG	North Atlantic Safety Oversight Group
NAT SPG	North Atlantic Systems Planning Group
NAT OESB	North Atlantic Oceanic Errors Safety Bulletin
OCA	Oceanic Control Area
SASP	Separation Airspace Safety Panel
SKPI	Safety Key Performance Indicator
SLOP	Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure



EURNAT

**North Atlantic Systems
Planning Group
(NAT SPG)**

International Civil Aviation Organization

European and North Atlantic Office, Paris (EUR/NAT)
3 bis Villa Emile Bergerat
92522 Neuilly-sur-Seine Cedex
France

Tel.: +33 1 46 41 85 85

Fax: +33 1 46 41 85 00

E-mail: icaoeurnat@icao.int

<http://www.icao.int/EURNAT>

