INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

Second Meeting of the Africa - Indian Ocean Aviation System Planning and Implementation Group (AASPG/2)

Livingstone, Zambia, 2 - 6 November 2026

Agenda Item 4: Implementation of safety and air navigation goals, targets and indicators, including priorities set in the Regional Aviation Safety and Air Navigation Plans

OUTCOME OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE AFI ATS EVENTS ANALYSIS GROUP (AEAG/2)

(Presented by the AAMAC on behalf of AEAG)

SUMMARY	
This working paper presents the outcome of the second meeting of the AFI ATS Events Analysis Group (AEAG/2), held in N'Djamena, Chad, from 12 to 15 October 2026. The outcome includes the results of the analysis of the ATS safety events reported in 2024 and 2025, the safety recommendations formulated by the meeting, the progress made on the ATS Safety Events Database System and the way forward. The paper also provides a comparative analysis of the outcomes of AEAG/1 and AEAG/2. Action by the Meeting is at paragraph 3.	
Strategic Goals	*A-Every flight is safe and secure* *C-Aviation Delivers Seamless, Accessible, and Reliable Mobility for All*

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The AFI ATS Events Analysis Group (AEAG) was established by APIRG/27 to analyze the ATS safety events reported in the AFI region, identify their causes and trends, and formulate safety recommendations. Its Secretariat is provided by the Regional Safety Oversight Organizations (AAMAC, BAGASOO, CASSOA, SASO, URSAC and ASSA-AC), in coordination with the ICAO Regional Offices.

1.2 The first meeting of the Group (AEAG/1), held in Libreville, Gabon, in October 2025, analyzed 455 ATS events reported in 2023 and 2024 and formulated eight recommendations, including the design of a system for managing ATS safety data and the inclusion of experts from aerodromes and flight operations in the work of the Group.

1.3 The second meeting of AEAG (AEAG/2) was held in N'Djamena, Chad, from 12 to 15 October 2026, hosted by the Civil Aviation Authority of Chad. 92 participants from 14 States, ANSPs, regional organizations and partners attended the meeting. This working paper presents its outcome.

2. DISCUSSION

Data analyzed.

2.1 The meeting analyzed 793 ATS events, 765 of which occurred in 2024 and 2025 (the other 28 events were dated 2023, 2026 or 2005 and were kept for information), received from 12 States, ANSPs and airspace users and consolidated after the removal of duplicates. The analysis was carried out by three Scrutiny Groups — ATS incidents, inflight emergencies and ATC contingencies, and inflight contingencies — which, for the first time, included experts in aerodromes and flight operations. The results presented below combine two levels of analysis: the analysis of the events by the Scrutiny Groups, and the consolidated analysis of all the data carried out by the AEAG Secretariat.

Key results.

2.2 ATS incidents represent 35 % of the events, followed by inflight contingencies (25 %), ATC contingencies (9 %) and inflight emergencies (6 %); the remaining events were classified as inconclusive or non-events. 185 events were assessed as bearing HIGH threat, 141 as bearing MEDIUM threat and 169 as bearing LOW threat. ATS incidents account for more than half of the HIGH-threat events.

2.3 Main safety findings. The analysis showed that:

a) collision risk remains the first concern: near-midair collisions and losses of separation (143 events, 18 %) account for 79 of the 185 HIGH-threat events, mostly en-route and during transfers of control between FIRs;

b) runway incursions (44 events, 6 %, of which 26 assessed as HIGH threat) are mostly caused by airside vehicles, workers and persons on the movement area, often in connection with works at aerodromes;

c) wildlife strikes are the most frequent category of events (154 events, 19 %);

d) inadequate coordination between ATC units (57 events), inadequate mobile communications (53 events) and controller proficiency (44 events) are the leading contributing factors, i.e. respectively 17 %, 16 % and 13 % of the events for which contributing factors were recorded; and

e) technical failures (93 events, 12 %), weather-related unstable approaches, go-arounds and diversions (59 events, 7 %), infringements of prohibited, restricted and danger areas (12 events, of which 8 assessed as HIGH), GNSS Radio frequency interference (31 events, 4 %) and laser beam illuminations (7 events) complete the picture.

Category of events	**Events**	**% of all events**	**HIGH threat**
Near mid-air collisions and losses of separation	143	18 %	79
Wildlife strikes	154	19 %	12
Technical failures	93	12 %	11
Unstable approaches, go-arounds and weather diversions	59	7 %	4
Runway incursions	44	6 %	26
GNSS degradation	31	4 %	6
Infringements of prohibited restricted and danger areas	12	2 %	8
Laser illuminations	7	1 %	0

2.4 **Distribution by flight level.** In the consolidated analysis, the level of each event was derived from the flight level or the phase of flight reported. It is summarized below:

Flight level band	Events	%
FL290 to FL410 and above	64	8 %
Below FL290	265	33 %
Level not reported	464	59 %
Total	**793**	**100 %**

2.5 In the upper airspace (FL290 and above), 53 of the 64 events are ATS incidents, mainly near mid-air collisions and losses of separation. Threat level was assessed for 33 of the 64 events, 26 of which were rated HIGH. Below FL290, the events are more varied and include the aerodrome and terminal area events (runway incursions, wildlife strikes, go-arounds). The flight level is not reported for most events, which calls for a dedicated field in the AEAG template and in the ATS Safety Events Database System.

Contributing factors.

2.6 Contributing factors were recorded for 336 of the 793 events (42 %). Since one event may have several contributing factors, 461 factors were recorded in total. Of these, 216 were entered under the generic categories «some on ground» and «other on board», which do not specify the factor concerned. The remaining 245 factors are specific and are distributed as follows:

Contributing factor	Events	% of specific factors
Inadequate coordination between ATC units	57	23 %
Inadequate mobile communications	53	22 %
Controller proficiency inadequate	44	18 %
Crew error	35	14 %
Cockpit discipline / non-compliance	28	11 %
Inadequate ATC procedures	16	7 %
ATC overload	5	2 %
ATS frequency not used	5	2 %
Inadequate airspace organization	2	1 %
Total	**245**	**100 %**

2.7 Three factors account for almost two thirds (63 %) of the specific factors: inadequate coordination between ATC units (23 %), inadequate mobile communications (22 %) and inadequate controller proficiency (18 %). Grouped by family, factors relating to coordination, communications, controller proficiency and workload represent 65 % of the specific factors, factors relating to the flight crew 28 %, and factors relating to ATC procedures and airspace organization 7 %. Corrective action should therefore focus first on coordination between ATC units, the reliability of air-ground communications and controller proficiency. Beyond these immediate factors, the oversight and organizational causes remain to be explored in future analyses, since this is where the most durable corrective actions usually lie.

Quality of the data.

2.8 The analysis also highlighted areas where the quality of the data can be further improved, in particular the provision of consistent and complete information, the use of generic risk areas and contributing factors and the assessment of the threat level. The contributors (States, service providers, and Air operators) used different methods to record their events — such as severity scores of the EUROCONTROL Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) or ECCAIRS/ADREP occurrence categories — which the Secretariat matched to the AEAG lists so that all the data could be analyzed together.

Safety recommendations.

2.9 The meeting formulated 14 safety recommendations, grouped in five categories — ATS operational safety; aerodrome and flight operations safety; safety data and reporting; capacity building and safety promotion; and follow-up and working arrangements — and listed in order of relevance. They are addressed to the Civil Aviation Authorities, the ANSPs and, where appropriate, aerodrome operators, aircraft operators, meteorological service providers, ICAO and RSOOs. They also call for a regional safety awareness campaign based on safety bulletins. The list of recommendations is presented in the Appendix. The cross-border issues identified were referred to the Tactical Action Group (TAG), which met on 16 October 2026. Other safety issues highlighted by the analysis, such as wildlife hazards and airspace organization, already covered by the recommendations of AEAG/1, may be further addressed within the framework of the TAG.

ATS Safety Events Database System.

2.10 In line with the decisions of AEAG/1, an ATS Safety Events Database System is being developed by the Secretariat to record, analyze, protect, transmit and consolidate ATS safety events with the AEAG taxonomy and methodology. A prototype was presented to AEAG/2 for demonstration. Its design is being finalized with the lessons of the meeting, including its alignment with the ICAO ADREP/CICTT occurrence categories. The system will then be deployed, together with a training programme for State focal points, so that it becomes the dedicated tool for the collection, analysis and transmission of ATS safety data in the AFI region once approved by AASPG.

Evolution since AEAG/1

2.11 Compared with AEAG/1, which analysed 455 events from 15 FIRs, mostly dated 2023, the comparison of the two analysis cycles shows that:

a) the volume of data increased by 74 %, with 793 events received from 23 FIRs;

b) the depth of the analysis improved markedly: the threat level was assessed for 62 % of the events (18 % at AEAG/1), the main causes identified for 44 % (23 %), the contributing factors recorded for 42 % (13 %) and a recommendation formulated for 66 % (21 %);

c) the share of ATS incidents rose from 31 % to 35 % and that of ATC contingencies from 3 % to 9 %, while the share of inflight contingencies fell from 46 % to 25 %; and

d) near mid-air collisions and losses of separation and wildlife strikes remain the two largest categories of events, and inadequate coordination between ATC units and controller proficiency remain the leading contributing factors in both cycles.

2.12 The comparative graphics are provided in **Appendix B**,

Way forward

2.13 The report of AEAG/2 will be finalized by 31 December 2026. A follow-up mechanism for the implementation of the recommendations will be proposed to the States, and AEAG/3 will analyze the events of 2025 and 2026. Between meetings, the Scrutiny Groups will meet online on a quarterly basis — in March, June and December — and the next in-person meeting is planned for October 2027. The States and ANSPs focal points will be updated, and their training on the database system will be organized with the RSOOs and the States. If the time frame allows, a demonstration of the database system could be provided to the meeting.

3 ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

a) note the outcome of AEAG/2 and the main safety findings of the analysis of the 2024–2025 ATS events;

b) endorse the safety recommendations in Appendix A, and urge States, ANSPs and all stakeholders concerned to implement them and to report on their implementation;

c) note the evolution of the data and of the analysis since AEAG/1, in particular the improvement in the depth of the analysis;

d) support the deployment of the ATS Safety Events Database System when finalized, including training of the States focal points, as the dedicated tool for the collection and analysis of ATS safety data in the AFI region; and

e) encourage States to designate their focal points and to transmit their ATS safety data to AEAG in a timely manner.

— END —

APPENDIX A — SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS OF AEAG/2

No.	Recommendation	Addressed to
A. ATS operational safety		
1.	Strengthening AIRPROX Prevention, Runway Safety and ATS Coordination	CAAs, ANSPs
2.	Enhancement of Civil–Military Coordination and Cooperation	CAAs, ANSPs, military, ICAO
3.	Improvement of CNS Infrastructure and Operational Resilience	CAAs, ANSPs
4.	Strengthening GNSS Interference Monitoring and Mitigation	CAAs, ANSPs
5.	Enhancing Safety Oversight of Unmanned Aircraft Operations	CAAs, ANSPs
B. Aerodrome and flight operations safety		
6.	Stabilized Approaches and Meteorological Information	CAAs, ANSPs, MET providers
7.	Aircraft System Reliability and Technical Occurrences	CAAs, ANSPs, aircraft operators
8.	Laser beam Illumination of Aircraft	CAAs, ANSPs
C. Safety data and reporting		
9.	Strengthening ATS Occurrence Reporting, Investigation and Safety Data Analysis	CAAs, ANSPs
10.	Harmonization of the Taxonomy and Quality of AEAG Data	AEAG Secretariat, CAAs, ANSPs
11.	Operational Context of the Events (traffic density, surveillance)	AEAG Secretariat, CAAs, ANSPs
D. Capacity building and safety promotion		
12.	Capacity Building and Safety Promotion	ICAO, RSOOs
E. Follow-up and working arrangements		
13.	Monitoring Implementation of Safety Recommendations	ICAO, RSOOs
14.	Working Arrangements of AEAG	ICAO, RSOOs

The full text of the recommendations will be available in the report of AEAG/2.

APPENDIX B — EVOLUTION BETWEEN AEAG/1 AND AEAG/2

The figures below compare the data analysed at AEAG/1 (events mostly dated 2023) and at AEAG/2 (events dated 2024 and 2025). The evolution reflects the volume and quality of the data reported as much as the level of safety.

Figure B1 — Volume of data




Figure B2 — Distribution by classification




Figure B3 — Main categories of events




Figure B4 — Completeness of the analysis

