INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

Second Meeting of the Africa–Indian Ocean Aviation System Planning and Implementation Group (AASPG/2)

Livingstone, Zambia, 2 – 6 November 2026

Agenda Item 4: Implementation of aviation safety and air navigation objectives, targets and indicators, including priorities established in regional aviation safety and air navigation plans

Implementation of the State Safety Programme: Experience of Côte d'Ivoire

Presented by Côte d'Ivoire

SUMMARY	
This paper analyses institutional, human-resource and information-related obstacles that may slow effective implementation of State Safety Programmes (SSPs) in the AFI region. It describes Côte d'Ivoire's phased response: strengthening the legal framework, establishing a national SSP coordination committee, creating a dedicated SSP structure, establishing a network of technical focal points and developing a safety data collection and processing system (SDCPS). Drawing on this experience, the paper proposes measures to support effective SSP implementation in the AFI region. Action: The meeting is invited to note the experience, consider the recommendations and examine their alignment with the AFI-RASP and existing mechanisms.	
REFERENCE(S)	Annex 19 — Safety Management Doc 9859 — Safety Management Manual Doc 10159 — Safety Intelligence Manual
REFERENCE(S)	Doc 10004 — Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) AFI-RASP
Strategic objectives	Enhancement of aviation safety

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The State Safety Programme (SSP) marks the transition from compliance-focused oversight to coordinated management of safety risks and safety performance. Its effectiveness depends on robust oversight functions, the ability of institutions to act together and the conversion of data into risk mitigation measures.

1.2 Regional aviation safety bodies have identified constraints relating to resources, expertise, coordination and regional aviation safety data systems. These challenges do not affect all States in the same way.

1.3 Côte d'Ivoire shares a phased approach that may inform exchanges among States, without presenting its organizational arrangements as a single model or equating completion of documentary actions with full operational maturity of its State Safety Programme.

2. ANALYSIS

2.1. Obstacles to effective SSP implementation in the AFI region

2.1.1. The obstacles below summarize issues identified in regional programmes and guidance. Their relative significance should be established through SSP assessments, USOAP-CMA data and national diagnostics (NASPs).

Challenge	Constraint on implementation
Fragmented governance	Insufficiently coordinated mandates and decisions among institutions
Limited resources and expertise	Shortage of SSP, data analysis and risk management specialists
Uneven SMS maturity	Difficulty aggregating State–service provider risks
Fragmented safety data and underreporting of safety occurrences	Insufficient quality, completeness and trust
Different languages and taxonomies	Difficulties in coding and cross-border comparisons
Inadequate follow-up on outcomes	Actions closed without evidence of effectiveness

2.1.2. These challenges and shortcomings reinforce one another: an incomplete legal or organizational framework weakens accountability; insufficient expertise constrains analysis; poor-quality data reduce the relevance of decisions; and failure to verify effectiveness prevents institutional learning.

2.1.3. The State Safety Programme (SSP) provides the integrated framework through which a State manages civil aviation safety at national level, just as the National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) addresses the separate field of aviation security. Beyond compliance with Annex 19, making the SSP operational complements regulatory oversight through proactive hazard identification, risk management and safety performance monitoring.

2.1.4. In this regard, a functioning safety data collection and processing system (SDCPS) is essential to convert occurrence reports, oversight findings and SMS data into actionable analyses and verifiable decisions. Phased, planned implementation proportionate to the complexity of the national aviation system is appropriate, provided that priorities, responsibilities, deadlines and progress indicators are clearly defined.

2.1.5. The inclusion of SSP implementation in USOAP-CMA audit activities underscores the importance of tangible progress within reasonable time frames: persistent delays may weaken the detection of emerging risks, risk-based oversight and, consequently, the safety performance of States and the AFI region.


2.2. Institutional response of Côte d'Ivoire

2.2.1. Law No. 2022-887 of 3 January 2023 establishing the Civil Aviation Code, resulting from the 2022 reform, includes provisions on safety management. Decree No. 2024-380 of 12 June 2024 establishes the SSP and its National Coordination Committee, bringing together the institutions concerned, including ANAC, the Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA) and the relevant public authorities.

2.2.2. Within ANAC, the Directorate of Safety and Compliance Monitoring (DSSC) includes an SSP Sub-Directorate. A network of SSP focal points in the technical areas facilitates exchanges with oversight functions. An Aviation Safety and Data Analysis Group (GSAD) has been established.

The National Committee provides a high-level coordination framework without superseding the powers of the competent authorities or the independence of BEA investigations.

Figure 1 — Functional SSP governance architecture



Note: indicative functional representation; the statutory responsibilities of each institution remain unchanged.

2.3. An organization proportionate to the complexity of the aviation system


2.3.1. Organizational adequacy is not determined by a standard organization chart: it is assessed in terms of functional coverage, clarity of responsibilities, analytical capacity, competencies, continuity of service and resources. The number of service providers, diversity of operations, civil–military interfaces, SMS maturity and data volumes should inform organizational choices.

2.3.2. A documented periodic review of workload and competencies may justify specialized teams, technical focal points, cooperation agreements or shared regional support, depending on the national context.

2.4. Establishing a Safety Data Collection and Processing System (SDCPS): from reporting to decision-making

2.4.1. The system in Côte d'Ivoire brings together three groups of data: continuous oversight; performance monitoring and organizational data; and mandatory and voluntary occurrence reports. Côte d'Ivoire Aviation Regulation (RACI 8001) and procedure PROC-PNS-8400 govern occurrence reporting and processing. Reporting channels are in place and information is shared with BEA (evenevementsecurite@anac.ci; crvolontaire@anac.ci). Reporting forms are available for each


activity area, and an Excel database is used to record and process occurrences and analyse collected data.evenevementsecurite@anac.cicrvolontaire@anac.ci
2.4.2. The annual numbers of occurrence reports were 99 in 2021, 259 in 2022, 411 in 2023, 515 in 2024 and 430 in 2025.



2.4.3. Annual occurrence reporting rose from approximately 100 reports in 2021 to approximately 500 in 2024, representing an increase of about 400%. This increase is more indicative of an improved reporting culture than of a deterioration in safety performance. Trend analyses have enabled specific risks, including fatigue, to be addressed with the operators concerned.

2.4.4. Annual safety bulletins present the occurrences received and processed, trends, analyses and recommendations for improvement. Information from this system feeds, in particular, service providers' risk profiles and the prioritization of risk-based oversight (RBO) activities.

Figure 2 — Example of steps for implementing an SDCPS



2.5. Development of safety intelligence

2.5.1. A draft Safety Data and Information Management Manual (MGDIS) has been prepared. It addresses data collection, taxonomies, quality, analysis, sharing, retention and protection, as well as the use of data in decision-making.
A safety intelligence policy and development strategy are being prepared. All three documents are undergoing validation; their adoption will strengthen governance and the cross-cutting use of safety data and information.

2.6. Languages, taxonomies and secure information sharing

2.6.1. In a multilingual environment, reporting personnel must be able to understand the system while data comparability is maintained. A controlled taxonomy based on stable identifiers, validated definitions and French/English labels makes it possible to separate technical meaning from the display language.

2.6.2. Original narratives must be retained; translations and mappings to applicable international taxonomies, including ADREP, must be controlled, versioned and protected. Literal translation does not guarantee semantic equivalence.

2.7. Key success factors

2.7.1. The experience of Côte d'Ivoire highlights three determining factors in progress towards SSP implementation.

a) **Senior management commitment:** the involvement of top management has helped make the SSP an institutional priority, improve coordination among departments and ensure regular monitoring of actions undertaken;
b) **Resource mobilization**: the provision of human, technical and financial resources, together with the development of specialized skills, has supported the gradual implementation of SSP mechanisms;

c) **Safety promotion**: awareness-raising, training, communication and information-sharing activities have helped increase stakeholder engagement, encourage occurrence reporting and promote a safety culture based on learning and continuous improvement.

2.7.2. SSP implementation requires a legal basis, high-level governance, a dedicated organization, resources and a positive safety culture. Trust among reporters and protection of information are essential. Moreover, the value of an SDCPS is measured not only by reporting volume but also by the quality of analyses, the effectiveness of mitigation measures and the actual use of intelligence in oversight decisions.

2.7.3. Aviation safety does not stop at national borders: flights, air navigation services and service delivery chains continuously connect multiple oversight systems. A State with a mature SSP remains exposed, in its international operations, to risks arising from shortcomings in States with which it shares traffic flows and operational interfaces. This interdependence calls for risk management at interfaces between States, similar to that between service providers but extended to national safety systems. Excellence in one State, while necessary, is therefore not sufficient on its own to control all risks associated with its operations. Cooperation and mutual assistance among States - targeted assistance, mentoring, exchange of best practices, coordination of preventive measures and protected exchange of safety intelligence - are thus tools for regional risk management, not merely expressions of solidarity. These mechanisms must respect States' sovereign responsibilities, data confidentiality and existing cooperation frameworks.

2.7.4. The Ivorian experience may inform phased approaches, provided that the institutional framework is adapted to national complexity and the maturity of oversight systems and SMSs is verified.

2.8. Proposed regional actions

2.8.1. The following actions are proposed:

a) Develop, under the auspices of AASPG/SMO-SG with the support of the ICAO ESAF and WACAF Regional Offices, regional guidance on SSP governance and inter-institutional coordination;
b) Establish an inter-State assistance, mentoring and best-practice-sharing mechanism, together with specialized regional training in data analysis and safety intelligence;
c) Consider a regional safety intelligence development initiative and invite the SMO-SG, in coordination with the ICAO Regional Offices and existing regional mechanisms, to examine the development of practical guidance to harmonize taxonomies used to classify safety occurrences in the AFI region and to define mapping and equivalence mechanisms between reference frameworks, so as to ensure consistency, interoperability and comparability of safety data and information among States;

3 ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

a) note the experience of Côte d'Ivoire and the proposed regional actions;
b) consider organizing high-level regional awareness-raising activities on SSP institutionalization for Directors General of Civil Aviation Authorities; and
c) promote cooperation and mutual assistance among States in safety management through existing regional mechanisms, particularly mentoring, experience-sharing and secure exchange of safety intelligence.