INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

Second Meeting of the Africa - Indian Ocean Aviation System Planning and Implementation Group (AASPG/2)

Livingstone, Zambia, 2 - 6 November 2026

Agenda Item 4: Implementation of safety and air navigation goals, targets and indicators, including priorities set in the Regional Aviation Safety and Air Navigation Plans

Addressing NASP development and implementation challenges in BAGASOO Member States

(Presented by BAGASOO)

SUMMARY	
This information paper presents BAGASOO's perspective on the challenges affecting the development and implementation of National Aviation Safety Plans (NASPs), including the absence of an established or operational State safety programme (SSP). BAGASOO proposes coordinated support for NASP delivery and progressive SSP establishment, with clear national responsibilities, practical assistance and phased deliverables adapted to each Member State's needs. Action by the Meeting is set out in paragraph 3.1.	
Strategic Goals	*Every flight is safe and secure*

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The development of realistic National Aviation Safety Plans (NASPs) and their translation into sustained safety improvements have been hindered by significant challenges across BAGASOO Member States. A key contributing factor is the absence of an established State safety programme (SSP), or the existence of an SSP framework whose processes are not yet operational. This issue must be addressed together with shortages of technical capacity, competing resource demands and weak implementation follow-up. Its extent differs among Member States.

1.2 The NASP sets national safety goals, targets and safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs), consistent with the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the relevant Regional Aviation Safety Plan (RASP), that aims to manage safety for a specific timeframe. The SSP provides the continuing State framework for managing safety, based on 4 components State safety policy, objectives and resources. State risk management, State safety assurance and State safety promotion.

1.3 In light of the common identified difficulties, BAGASOO proposes that support for the two should proceed together. Member States should develop and implement their NASPs while progressively establishing or strengthening the SSP processes needed to inform, deliver and assess those plans.

2 DISCUSSION

2.1 **Absence of an operational SSP as a key factor.** Where an SSP has not been established, the State lacks an integrated framework connecting safety responsibilities, information, risk decisions and assurance. Where an SSP exists only as documentation, similar practical gaps can remain. For BAGASOO, this means that assistance confined to drafting a NASP cannot resolve the underlying implementation problem. Support must also establish the national processes that keep priorities evidence-based and actions under review, that promotes the establishment of the foundational SSP framework and the deployment of the NASP.

2.2 **Difficulties in developing a realistic NASP**. Without functioning SSP processes, national teams have a weaker basis for identifying organizational challenges, prioritizing operational risks and selecting measurable targets. A plan can consequently reproduce global or regional priorities without sufficient adaptation to national operations and available resources. BAGASOO proposes to support each Member State in assembling an initial safety profile using oversight findings, occurrence information, investigation recommendations and operational activity. Regional evidence and structured expert judgement can supplement incomplete national data, with assumptions recorded and priorities reviewed as information improves. A realistic NASP should also consider specific State variables such as size and the complexity available of the aviation system in the State, the resources available etc; it should be suitable and scalable.

2.3 **From drafting to approval and delivery**. Developing a NASP requires agreement on priorities, institutional contributions, costs and approval responsibilities. Implementation then requires those commitments to enter national work programmes. BAGASOO proposes practical drafting and review sessions that produce a nationally owned plan and costed delivery schedule. National consultation and approval steps should have responsible officers and target dates. States with an existing NASP should revise gaps in its delivery arrangements while continuing justified safety actions.

2.4 **Governance, stakeholders responsibilities and engagement**. The absence of effective coordination also weakens NASP ownership across institutions. Each Member State should designate a senior responsibility to coordinate the NASP, identify NASP and SSP focal points, and establish or strengthen a national safety coordination mechanism. Its decisions should assign actions and resolve resource or approval delays. Relevant authorities and industry should participate according to their responsibilities. BAGASOO proposes early involvement of all stakeholders' top management in the NASP development project, including top management awareness training covering NASP and SSP, common working tools and facilitation.

2.5 **Limited expertise and competing resources**. SSP establishment and NASP delivery require safety analysis and programme management skills alongside routine oversight duties. BAGASOO proposes support to national teams through practical mentoring, shared specialists and relevant training actions involving nominated implementation teams, including their deputies. Training should result in usable outputs, such as a risk assessment, an SEI delivery schedule or an indicator record. Member States should allocate staff time and national funding; BAGASOO proposes common assistance needs and coordinate partner support. Deputies and documented handovers should help sustain the work when personnel change.

2.6 **Safety information gaps**. An SSP that is absent or not operational limits the routine collection, analysis and use of safety information. BAGASOO proposes a manageable initial set of national data sources, a simplified initial SDCPS, responsible data owners and periodic analysis. Information-sharing arrangements should address permitted use, confidentiality and applicable protections. States should distinguish completion of NASP activities from evidence of their effectiveness, using indicator baselines, review intervals and documented follow-up. Missing data should be recorded as a gap requiring action.

2.7 **A coordinated NASP and SSP assistance approach.** BAGASOO proposes one coordinated support work plan with distinct NASP and SSP deliverables. A State without an SSP should begin by assigning responsibilities, assessing gaps and establishing priority safety management processes. A State with a documented but partly implemented SSP should concentrate on putting those processes into routine use. In both cases, NASP development or revision should proceed using the best available information, with SSP establishment actions included among relevant SEIs.

2.8 **Phased Implementation.**

i) **First three months with needs and priorities established.** Within three months of an agreed start date, each participating Member State and BAGASOO should complete a joint review of NASP status and SSP arrangements. The review should distinguish an absent SSP, documented arrangements and processes demonstrated in operation. Outputs should include designated focal points, an initial safety profile, priority gaps and an agreed assistance schedule. Existing national safety initiatives and BAGASOO training and harmonization work should be mapped to priorities to avoid duplicate activities. No uniform SSP status is presumed across Member States.

ii) **Months four to six with plans and processes activated.** Member States should develop or revise their NASPs, complete the agreed national consultation and approval steps, and adopt costed implementation schedules. In parallel, each State should commence priority SSP actions, including coordination, safety information review and risk assessment. BAGASOO should facilitate technical reviews and mentoring, while the State addresses institutional approvals and resources. At the six-month review, deliverables should show both progress on the NASP and evidence that selected SSP processes are operating, with recovery actions for delays.

iii) **Months seven to twelve with effectiveness reviewed.** States should continue priority SEIs and SSP actions, hold quarterly delivery reviews and assess the use of new processes. By month twelve, each should review completed outputs, available safety trends and remaining weaknesses, then revise its next annual schedule. BAGASOO should consolidate State-validated progress and unresolved assistance needs. Reports shall be shared withthe Safety Management and Oversight Sub-Group (SMO/SG). Reporting should distinguish NASP approval, SEI delivery and operational SSP capabilities. Neither publication of a NASP nor an SSP document should be reported as proof of effective SSP implementation.

2.9 **Resources and regional support.** BAGASOO should prepare the support work plan and budget with participating States and coordinate assistance with ICAO Regional Offices and interested partners. Support should match each State’s development or implementation needs. The programme should track approved plans, resourced actions, completed reviews and SSP processes demonstrated in use. Participation, resources and start date require agreement; the proposed three-, six- and twelve-month milestones are support targets, not existing ICAO deadlines or a commitment to achieve full SSP maturity within one year.

3 ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

a) note the challenges affecting NASP development and implementation in BAGASOO Member States, including gaps in operational SSP arrangements;
b) support the proposed coordinated assistance approach, combining NASP development and delivery with progressive SSP establishment or strengthening;

c) note the proposed three-, six- and twelve-month milestones, subject to agreed participation, national ownership and available resources; and
d) note the importance of reviewing State-validated progress separately for NASP development, safety enhancement initiatives and SSP processes demonstrated in operation.