International Civil Aviation Organization

WORKING PAPER

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DANGEROUS GOODS PANEL (DGP)
MEETING OF THE WORKING GROUP OF THE WHOLE

Beijing, China, 25 October to 3 November 2006

Agenda Item 6: Discussion of miscellaneous dangerous goods issues

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY PERSONNEL

(Presented by D. Raadgers)

SUMMARY

Because of the recent terrorist threats in the United Kingdom and the outcome of the Aviation Security Panel (AVSECP), it is clear that the focus of dangerous goods has diverted from only a safety issue to also a security issue. This paper invites the working group to consider the need to instruct security personnel to a greater depth and to review the current training requirements. The working group is also invited to consider the need to make a differentiation in trainings requirements for different kinds of security personnel.

Action by the DGP-WG is in paragraph 2.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 On 10 August 2006, law enforcement authorities in the United Kingdom arrested twenty-three people in connection with a terrorist plot to blow up as many as ten aircraft over the North Atlantic in the following days. The authorities reported that the terrorists intended to apply a different approach than that used on 11 September 2001 to commit their terrorist acts. In this case it was revealed that liquid materials were intended to be carried on board the aircraft, disguised in various ways, to be assembled into an explosive device once on board.

1.2 In response to this terrorist threat, concerned States raised their threat level to the highest level, as a precautionary measure. At the same time, all airports in the United Kingdom and all airlines operating from the United Kingdom implemented a heightened level of security. For all international flights arriving in the United States and all United States domestic flights, passengers were prohibited from carrying any liquids or gels such as beverages, shampoo and toothpaste onboard an aircraft. This has inevitably caused severe disruptions for passengers, and significant delays at some airports. All hand baggage was required to be checked in, with only a very small number of essential items allowed through search controls, and some additional measures were imposed for flights departing the United Kingdom for

the United States. Measures taken included that all cabin baggage be processed as hold baggage on passenger aircraft departing United Kingdom airports; all passengers be hand searched, and their footwear and all the items they are carrying must be x-ray screened; pushchairs and walking aids be x-ray screened, and only airport-provided wheelchairs may pass through the screening point. In addition to the above, all passengers boarding flights to the United States and all the items they were carrying, including those acquired after the central screening point, were subjected to secondary search at the boarding gate. Any liquids discovered were removed from the passenger. On 13 August, the United States modified its restrictions to mandate shoe screening and allow up to four ounces of non-prescription medicine. The restrictions on duty-free products were also modified to allow delivery to the aircraft. The United States restrictions on the Heathrow Airport originating flights were later modified to allow limited carry-on baggage. Other governments imposed similar measures.

1.3 The investigation into the terrorist plot is still ongoing, therefore the full scope of information concerning the plot, the terrorists involved and their plans are still to be confirmed. The investigation is raising additional threats and concerns. This threat remains as serious today as it was on 10 August. There are aspects of the case unfolding that require continued vigilance. Inevitably some issues remain confidential to avoid prejudicing the United Kingdom investigative and legal process. Analysis of current and emerging trends in these areas would be of considerable benefit when discussing the need for heightened security regimes worldwide in light of the recent United Kingdom terrorist threats.

1.4 The ICAO Council convened a special session on 17 August, at which it recognized the seriousness of the terrorist threat and mandated the Aviation Security Panel (AVSECP) to study the new threat with the highest priority. At the eighteenth meeting of the AVSECP (11 to 15 September 2006), the panel discussed in full the events in the United Kingdom and the wider consequences for aviation security. An extensive discussion took place on this item. An ad hoc working group was established by the panel to discuss this new threat and to formulate recommendations on appropriate steps to take for ICAO, taking into account relevant provisions such as rules on dangerous goods and safety. On the basis of contributions from panel members, observers and the Secretariat, the AVSECP reached a number of important conclusions about the implications of the foiled attack, and identified the actions to be taken at once and in the short, medium and the long term.

1.5 The AVSECP made a number of recommendations. The most important recommendations are the following:

a) the ICAO Ad Hoc Group of Specialists on the Detection of Explosives will be asked to provide technical advice on how to counter the new threat in the immediate and longer term in consultation with relevant national and regional fora;

b) in the short term, ICAO should send a State Letter to all Contracting States indicating the new threat, possible countermeasures (referring to current practices in some Contracting States) that should be effective, practicable and sustainable, and stressing the importance of the AVSEC Point of Contact Network. **One of the recommendations in this State Letter will be to remind Contracting States of the need to ensure that any new measures do not result in the improper placing of dangerous goods in the hold, so compromising aircraft safety**;

c) in the medium term, develop new guidance material to counter this new threat and review the list of prohibited items in this regard;

d) in the long term, review the ICAO *Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference* (Doc 8973) and the list of prohibited items in general, as well as review the existing measures to protect the integrity of airside security; and

e) ICAO will develop new interim guidance material for incorporation in Doc 8973. The AVSEC Panel Working Group on Training will review the training package for screeners taking into account this new threat. **It will thereby consult with experts of the Dangerous Goods Panel with regard to training on detection of Dangerous Goods**.

1.6 As a result of the recent events and the outcome of the AVECP it is clear that the focus of dangerous goods has diverted from an only safety issue to an also security issue.

1.7 Now that the focus of dangerous goods has diverted to an also security issue, the working group is invited to consider the need to instruct security personnel to a greater depth and to review the current trainings requirements as stated in Part 1;4 of the Technical Instructions. It is suggested to consider:

a) training in properties of dangerous goods;

b) focusing more on certain classes (for example Class 1);

c) extra focus on emergency procedures; and

d) differentiating training requirements for different kinds of security personnel.

2. ACTION BY THE DGP-WG

2.1 The DGP-WG is invited to consider the need to instruct security personnel to a greater depth and review the current trainings requirements.

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