DANGEROUS GOODS

Chapter 1.4 of UN	ICAO Security Manual	Comments/ proposals
NOTE 1: *This Chapter provides requirements intended to address the security of dangerous goods in transport in all modes. Mode specific security provisions can be found in Chapter 7.2. National and modal authorities may apply additional security provisions which should be considered when offering or transporting dangerous goods.*	No equivalent	Not applicable
NOTE 2: *For the purposes of this Chapter security means measures or precautions to be taken to minimise theft or mis-use of dangerous goods that may endanger persons or property.*	Chapter 1 DEFINITIONS: ***Security***. A combination of measures and human and material resources intended to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.	**If added to the Technical Instructions**: The text would conflict with that contained in the ICAO Security Manual. UK CAA legal opinion is that theft and mis-use are of no relevance to the safety of the aircraft and would not be expected to be specified in the Technical Instructions.
1.4.1 General provisions 1.4.1.1 All persons engaged in the transport of dangerous goods shall consider security requirements for the transport of dangerous goods commensurate with their responsibilities.	Appendix 25: 10. – 20. contain detailed responsibilities for "known consignor", "regulated agent" (the wording of which would encompass handling agent) and "aircraft operator". Further information contained in Appendix 1 under VII;H "Air cargo"	No action required – ICAO Security Manual addresses this issue in much greater depth **If added to the Technical Instructions:** Industry would be presented with a less restrictive requirement than that contained in the ICAO Security Manual
1.4.1.2 Consignors shall only offer dangerous goods to carriers that have been appropriately identified.	No equivalent	It is understood this means a consignor must verify that the carrier (operator) is a legitimate company. Whilst this might be appropriate for dangerous goods offered for carriage by road, it is queried whether it is appropriate for air transport. **If added to the Technical Instructions:** What would be expected of a consignor?

1.4.1.3 Transit sites, such as airside warehouses, marshalling yards and other temporary storage areas shall be properly	Appendix 25: 27 – 31 contain more detailed provisions under the headings of "Secure premises", "Stand-alone security" and	ICAO Security Manual addresses this issue in much greater depth, although does not make mention of areas being "well lit".

Chapter 1.4 of UN	ICAO Security Manual	Comments/ proposals
temporary storage areas shall be properly secured, well lit and, where possible, not be accessible to the general public.	"Access control".	**Proposal** It is proposed to suggest to ICAO AVSEC that they extend Appendix 25 to require the areas identified to be "well lit". **If added to the Technical Instructions:** With the exception of lighting, industry would be presented with a less restrictive requirement than that contained in the ICAO Security Manual.
1.4.2 Security Training 1.4.2.1 The training specified for individuals in 1.3.2 (a), (b) or (c) shall also include elements of security awareness. 1.4.2.2 Security awareness training shall address the nature of security risks, recognising security risks, methods to address and reduce such risks and actions to be taken in the event of a security breach. It shall include awareness of security plans (if appropriate) commensurate with the responsibilities of individuals and their part in implementing security plans. 1.4.2.3 Such training shall be provided or verified upon employment in a position involving dangerous goods transport and shall be periodically supplemented with retraining. 1.4.2.4 Records of all security training undertaken shall be kept by the employer and made available to the employee if requested.	Appendices 6 and 7 contain detailed provisions for the training of security personnel. Mention is also made under 32., 38., 39. and 41 in Appendix 25.	Both VII; H and 41. of Appendix 25 only make reference to staff engaged in the preparation and delivery of air cargo intended to be carried on a passenger carrying aircraft **Proposal** It is proposed to suggest to ICAO AVSEC that they extend these requirements to include cargo carried on all cargo aircraft. **If added to the Technical Instructions:** Security training of staff of the operators would become subject to the approval of the State of the operator if added to the "Training" section of the Technical Instructions; it would be recommended that states approve training of other categories of staff.

Chapter 1.4 of UN	ICAO Security Manual	Comments/ proposals
1.4.3 Provisions for high consequence dangerous goods 1.4.3.1 In implementing national security provisions competent authorities shall consider establishing a programme for identifying consignors or carriers engaged in the transport of high consequence dangerous goods for the purpose of communicating security related information. An indicative list of high consequence dangerous goods is provided in Table 1.4.1. **Table 1.4.1: INDICATIVE LIST OF HIGH CONSEQUENCE DANGEROUS GOODS** High consequence dangerous goods are those which have the potential for mis-use in a terrorist incident and which may, as a result, produce serious consequences such as mass casualties or mass destruction. The following is an indicative list of high consequence dangerous goods: Class 1, Division 1.1 explosives Class 1, Division 1.2 explosives Class 1, Division 1.3 compatibility group C explosives Class 1, Division 1.5 explosives Division 2.1 flammable gases in bulk Division 2.3 toxic gases (excluding aerosols) Class 3 flammable liquids in bulk of packing groups I and II	No equivalent.	**Proposal** The text applies to any quantity of the types of dangerous goods specified. However, some high consequence dangerous goods are allowed in excepted quantities i.e. class 3/ division 4.1 desensitized explosives in PGII (16 substances) and 6.1 in PGI (dermal and oral toxicity only) which would exclude them from any new provisions. Similalry Division 6.2 substances of category A are permitted in air mail and so the operator would not know they were carrying them and consequently could not comply with the new provisions; It is proposed to suggest to ICAO AVSEC that suitable text be developed for inclusion in Part 4.6 “Security Measures for Air Cargo” and/ or Appendix 25, for example: “States shall consider establishing a programme for identifying consignors or carriers engaged in the transport of high consequence dangerous goods for the purpose of communicating security related information. High consequence dangerous goods are those which have the potential for mis-use in a terrorist incident and which may, as a result, produce serious consequences such as mass casualties or mass destruction. The following is a list of dangerous goods which should be regarded as being of high consequence: Class 1, Division 1.1 explosives Class 1, Division 1.2 explosives Class 1, Division 1.3 compatibility group C

Chapter 1.4 of UN	ICAO Security Manual	Comments/ proposals
groups I and II Class 3 and Division 4.1 desensitised explosives Division 4.2 goods of packing group I in bulk Division 4.3 goods of packing group I in bulk Division 5.1 oxidizing liquids in bulk of packing group I Division 5.1 perchlorates, ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate fertilisers, in bulk Division 6.1 toxic substances of Packing Group I Division 6.2 infectious substances of Category A Class 7 radioactive material in quantities greater than 3000 A1 (special form) or 3000 A2, as applicable, in Type B and Type C packages. Class 8 corrosive substances of packing group I in bulk **NOTE 1**: For the purposes of this table 'in bulk' means transported in quantities greater than 3000 kg or 3000 l in portable tanks or bulk containers. *NOTE 2**:*** ***For purposes of non-proliferation of nuclear material the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material applies to international transport supported by IAEA INFCIRC/225(Rev.4)."***		explosives Class 1, Division 1.5 explosives Division 2.3 toxic gases (excluding aerosols) Class 3 and Division 4.1 desensitised explosives Division 6.1 toxic substances of Packing Group I Division 6.2 infectious substances of [Category A] Class 7 radioactive material in ~~quantities~~ activities greater than 3000 A1 (special form) or 3000 A2, as applicable, in Type B and Type C packages. *NOTE 1: For purposes of non-proliferation of nuclear material the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material applies to international transport supported by IAEA INFCIRC/225(Rev.4).".* *<u>NOTE 2: The Civil Aviation Security Policy and Regulatory Section should, if necessary, liaise with the Civil Aviation Authority to obtain the above information.</u>* **Editorial note**: all dangerous goods "in bulk" have been deleted since this is inappropriate for air transport. It should also be noted that the only dangerous goods which could be carried in normal circumstances i.e. without exemption are: 1. Division 1.3C (UN2075 and UN0186);

Chapter 1.4 of UN	ICAO Security Manual	Comments/ proposals
		2. Division 2.3 (UN1005, UN1016, UN1023, UN1040, UN1048, UN1064, UN1071, UN1079, UN1859, UN2191, UN2204, UN2418, UN2420, UN3168, UN3169, UN3300, UN3318); 3. Class 3 and Division 4.1 desensitised explosives (UN1204, UN1310, UN1320, UN1321, UN1322, UN1336, UN1336, UN1337, UN1344, UN1348, UN1354, UN1355, UN1356, UN1357, UN1517, UN1571, UN2555, UN2556, UN2852, UN2907, UN3317, UN3364, UN3364, UN3365, UN3365, UN3366, UN3366, UN3367, UN3368, UN3369, UN3370.) 4. Division 6.1 packing group I (all); 5. Division 6.2 infectious substances of category A (all); 6. Class 7 radioactive material greater than 3000 A1 or 3000 A2, as applicable, in Type B and Type C packages (all)
1.4.3.2 Security plans 1.4.3.2.1 Carriers, consignors and others (including infrastructure managers) engaged in the transport of high consequence dangerous goods (see 1.4.1) shall adopt, implement and comply with a security plan that addresses at least the elements specified in 1.4.3.2.2. 1.4.3.2.2 The security plan shall comprise at least the following elements: (a) specific allocation of responsibilities for security to competent and	No equivalent, although Appendix 5 "A Risk Assessment Model" addresses suggested security measures for baseline, intermediate and high threat conditions for Air cargo, courier and express parcels.	**Proposal** It is suggested that suitable text be developed in conjunction with ICAO AVSEC for inclusion in Part 4.6 and/ or Appendix 5 and/ or Appendix 25. Note – it is suggested that "infrastructure manager" is not relevant to air transport and could be deleted

Chapter 1.4 of UN	ICAO Security Manual	Comments/ proposals
qualified persons with appropriate authority to carry out their responsibilities; (b) records of dangerous goods or types of dangerous goods transported; (c) review of current operations and assessment of vulnerabilities, including inter-modal transfer, temporary transit storage, handling and distribution as appropriate; (d) clear statements of measures, including training, policies (including response to higher threat conditions, new employee/employment verification etc.), operating practices (e.g. choice/use of routes where known, access to dangerous goods in temporary storage, proximity to vulnerable infrastructure etc.), equipment and resources that are to be used to reduce security risks; (e) effective and up to date procedures for reporting and dealing with security threats, breaches of security or security incidents; (f) procedures for the evaluation and testing of security plans and procedures for periodic review and update of the plans; (g) measures to ensure the security of transport information contained in		

Chapter 1.4 of UN	ICAO Security Manual	Comments/ proposals
the plan; and (h) measures to ensure that the security of the distribution of transport documentation is limited as far as possible. (such measures shall not preclude provision of transport documentation required by Chapter 5.4 of these Regulations.). ***NOTE:*** *Carriers, consignors and consignees should co-operate with each other and with appropriate authorities to exchange threat information, apply appropriate security measures and respond to security incidents*		

General Issues

- ICAO AVSEC may amend/ introduce security requirements. There will inevitably be a delay in reflecting these in the Technical Instructions; this delay would not occur if all security requirements were consolidated in the ICAO Security Manual.

- Given that material related to security is regarded as “restricted” by the ICAO Security Manual, could such material be placed in a public document such as the Technical Instructions?

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