

**61ST CONFERENCE OF
DIRECTORS GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION
ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION**

*Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
7 – 11 September 2026*

**AGENDA ITEM 5: AVIATION SECURITY AND
FACILITATION**

**PRESENTATION: MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS
(MANPADS) THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION**

(Presented by the United States)

SUMMARY

This discussion paper accompanies a presentation that provides the United States view on the threat posed to civil aviation by Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).

PRESENTATION: MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (MANPADS) THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The threat posed by Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) to international civil aviation is highlighted in the ICAO *Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement* (RCS). Preventing the proliferation of MANPADS is a key U.S. national security priority, as these weapons present significant risks to passenger, commercial, and military aircraft if acquired by non-state actors. This presentation offers a global and regional overview of civil aviation challenges specific to MANPADS, highlighting the significance of the Asia and Pacific (APAC) Directors General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) meeting as a collaborative forum to advance regional security.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 This discussion paper accompanies a presentation that provides an overview of MANPADS, the threat, MANPADS activity in conflict zones, a regional threat assessment for Asia-Pacific, and potential emerging threats. The recommendations encourage APAC DGCA Member States to use available ICAO information to remain apprised of the dynamic threat environment and to consider available ICAO guidance material to develop and support national programs and policies to counter the threat posed by MANPADS.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1 Civil aviation continues to be an attractive target to those who seek to harm or cause damage for nefarious purposes. It is imperative that Asia-Pacific civil aviation authority leadership, staff, and international organizations maintain domain awareness relative to both the global and regional threat and risk posed by MANPADS. The United States is eager and willing to engage with our partners, including on a bilateral and multilateral basis, on aviation security training, vulnerability assessments, and the development of MANPADS national action plans.

4. ACTION BY THE CONFERENCE

4.1 The Conference is invited to:

- a) fully implement MANPADS-related Standards and Recommended Practices in Annex 17 – *Aviation Security*;
- b) review the ICAO *Addendum to the 3rd Edition of the RCS* (Restricted) for more detailed risk assessment and trend information, especially regarding MANPADS, missiles and other attacks from a distance;
- c) review the ICAO *Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) – First Edition* (Restricted) and *Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) – Information and Airport Vulnerability Assessment Guide* (Restricted) to develop or enhance your State's ability to mitigate the MANPADS threat;
- d) consider the information presented to develop and support national programs and policies to counter the threat posed by MANPADS; and
- e) encourage APAC Member States to engage their TSA representatives with any questions or concerns related to MANPADS mitigation efforts or assistance.

— END —



MANPADS Threats to Civil Aviation

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Agenda

- Current MANPADS Threat Context
- Introduction to Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)
- Global MANPADS Threat
- MANPADS Activity in Conflict Zones
- Regional Threat Assessment for the Asia-Pacific Region
- Potential Emerging Threats
- Recommendations




Current MANPADS Threat Context

- Conflict and arms sales are on the rise globally.
- MANPADS are increasingly found in the hands of non-state actors.
- Russian manufactured MANPADS continue to be a source of concern.
- Advent of drones for civil and military purposes increases risk.
- Transportation Security Administration's MANPADS Assist Visit (MAV) Program can assist civil aviation authorities and airport operators in countering the threat.



Introduction to Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)



Global MANPADS Threat



- **MANPADS are military weapons that can threaten civil aviation.**
- Significant military stockpiles
- Attractive to non-state actors
- Possessed by non-state armed groups
- Acquired through multiple means
- Relevant to industry:
 - Insurance
 - Tourism
 - Trade

MANPADS Activity in Conflict Zones

- **Persistent MANPADS proliferation risks and threats to aviation are highest in conflict zones.**
- Examples:
 - Ukraine
 - Iran
 - Lebanon
 - Sudan
 - Syria
 - Yemen




Regional Threat Assessment for the Asia-Pacific Region



- **There are few cases of illicit MANPADS and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) activity in this region, but destabilization and irresponsible arms sales could increase risks of weapons acquisition and use.**
- Documented possession of MANPADS by armed groups
- Large government stockpiles of MANPADS

Potential Emerging Threats

- **Low-end and high-end innovations and trained fighters could pose a salient threat to airlines over time.**
- Foreign fighters and terrorists
- 3D printing




Recommendations – Mitigating the Risk of Diversion

Strengthen export controls
and border security

Strengthen law enforcement
to deter, detect, and interdict
weapons trafficking

Improve physical security of
weapons storage facilities

Destroy excess or at-risk
stockpiles



Recommendations – Aviation Sector

ICAO Annex 17

- Fully implement SARPs, particularly on MANPADS, information sharing, and cooperation.

ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973)

- Guidance to implement Annex 17 SARPs.

ICAO MANPADS Toolkit

- Updated guidance coming soon from ICAO.

ICAO Global Risk Context Statement (Doc 10108)

- Refer back regularly as local conditions may change.

Flight Restrictions

- Limit aircraft exposure.





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