



MANPADS Threats to Civil Aviation

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Agenda

- Current MANPADS Threat Context
- Introduction to Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)
- Global MANPADS Threat
- MANPADS Activity in Conflict Zones
- Regional Threat Assessment for the Asia-Pacific Region
- Potential Emerging Threats
- Recommendations




Current MANPADS Threat Context

- Conflict and arms sales are on the rise globally.
- MANPADS are increasingly found in the hands of non-state actors.
- Russian manufactured MANPADS continue to be a source of concern.
- Advent of drones for civil and military purposes increases risk.
- Transportation Security Administration's MANPADS Assist Visit (MAV) Program can assist civil aviation authorities and airport operators in countering the threat.



Introduction to Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)



Global MANPADS Threat



- **MANPADS are military weapons that can threaten civil aviation.**
- Significant military stockpiles
- Attractive to non-state actors
- Possessed by non-state armed groups
- Acquired through multiple means
- Relevant to industry:
 - Insurance
 - Tourism
 - Trade

MANPADS Activity in Conflict Zones

- **Persistent MANPADS proliferation risks and threats to aviation are highest in conflict zones.**
- Examples:
 - Ukraine
 - Iran
 - Lebanon
 - Sudan
 - Syria
 - Yemen




Regional Threat Assessment for the Asia-Pacific Region



- **There are few cases of illicit MANPADS and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) activity in this region, but destabilization and irresponsible arms sales could increase risks of weapons acquisition and use.**
- Documented possession of MANPADS by armed groups
- Large government stockpiles of MANPADS

Potential Emerging Threats

- **Low-end and high-end innovations and trained fighters could pose a salient threat to airlines over time.**
- Foreign fighters and terrorists
- 3D printing




Recommendations – Mitigating the Risk of Diversion

Strengthen export controls
and border security

Strengthen law enforcement
to deter, detect, and interdict
weapons trafficking

Improve physical security of
weapons storage facilities

Destroy excess or at-risk
stockpiles



Recommendations – Aviation Sector

ICAO Annex 17

- Fully implement SARPs, particularly on MANPADS, information sharing, and cooperation.

ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973)

- Guidance to implement Annex 17 SARPs.

ICAO MANPADS Toolkit

- Updated guidance coming soon from ICAO.

ICAO Global Risk Context Statement (Doc 10108)

- Refer back regularly as local conditions may change.

Flight Restrictions

- Limit aircraft exposure.





Transportation Security Administration

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