INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

[DRAFT]

REPORT OF THE ELEVENTH MEETING OF THE ASIA/PACIFIC SEARCH AND RESCUE WORKGROUP (APSAR/WG/11)

BANGKOK, THAILAND, 5 – 8 MAY 2026

The views expressed in this Report should be taken as those of the Meeting and not the Organization

Approved by the Meeting
Published by the ICAO Asia and Pacific Office, Bangkok

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APPENDICES TO THE REPORT

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INTRODUCTION

Meeting

1.1 The Eleventh Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Search and Rescue Workgroup (APSAR/WG/11) was held from 5 to 8 May 2026, at the Kotaite Wing of the ICAO Asia and Pacific (APAC) Office, Bangkok, Thailand.

1.2 A SAR Workshop was conducted in conjunction with the APSAR/WG/11 on 5 May 2026.

Attendance

2.1 There were 64 participants registered for the Meeting, from 21 Administrations, one industry expert and three international organizations, including Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong China, France – New Caledonia, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States, Viet Nam, Airbus, Cospas-Sarsat Programme, EUROCONTROL and ICAO.

2.2 A list of participants is provided at **Appendix A** to the report.

Officers and Secretariat

3.1 Mr. Tai Kit, Head Air Traffic Control Specialist (Search and Rescue), Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, presided over the APSAR/WG/11, as Chairperson.

3.2 Mr. Mior Adli Bin Mior Sallehhuddin, Regional Officer Air Traffic Management (ATM) was Secretary for the Meeting. He was supported by Mr. Hiroyuki Takata, Regional Officer ATM and Dr. Prakayphet Chalayonnawin, Programme Analysis Associate ATM.

Language and Documentation

4.1 The APSAR/WG met as a plenary throughout the Meeting. The working language of the meeting was English for all documentation and this Report. A total of 12 Working Papers (WPs), ten Information Papers (IPs) and seven presentations considered by the Meeting.

4.2 The list of working and information papers is at **Appendix B** to the report.

4.3 **DISCLAIMER:** The presentation of material in this report does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of ICAO, Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group (APANPIRG) or ATM Sub-Group of APANPIRG or APSAR/WG concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

Opening of the Meeting

Chairperson of APSAR/WG

5.1 Mr. Tai Kit welcomed participants to the Meeting.

ICAO Regional Office

5.2 On behalf of Mr. Tao Ma, Regional Director of the ICAO APAC Office, Mr. Mior Adli Bin Mior Sallehhuddin welcomed all participants to the Meeting.

Draft Conclusions, Conclusions, Draft Decisions and Decisions of APSAR/WG – Definition

6.1 The APSAR/WG recorded its actions in the form of Draft Conclusions, Conclusions, Draft Decisions and Decisions within the following definitions:

a) **Draft Conclusions** of the APSAR/WG deal with matters that, according to APANPIRG terms of reference, require the attention of States, or action by the ICAO in accordance with established procedures;

b) **Conclusions** of the APSAR/WG deal with matters of a technical nature relating to regional guidance material for publication on the ICAO APAC Office website.

c) **Draft Decisions** of the APSAR/WG deal with the matters of concern only to APANPIRG and its contributory bodies; and

d) **Decisions** of the APSAR/WG relate solely to matters dealing with the internal working arrangements of APSAR/WG.

List of Draft Conclusions, Conclusions, Draft Decisions and Decisions

7.1 List of Draft Conclusions

Nil.

7.2 List of Draft Decisions

Nil.

7.3 List of Conclusions

Nil.

7.4 List of Decisions

Nil.

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REPORT ON AGENDA ITEMS

Agenda Item 1: Adoption of Agenda

Adoption of Agenda (WP/01)

1.1 The provisional agenda was adopted by the Meeting.

Agenda Item 2: Review Outcomes of Related Meetings

Relevant Meetings Outcomes (WP/02)

2.1 The Meeting was informed of SAR-related outcomes from the:

a) Thirty-Sixth Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group (APANPIRG/36), held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 24 to 26 November 2025; and

b) Thirteenth Meeting of the Air Traffic Management Sub-Group (ATM/SG/13) of APANPIRG, held in Singapore, from 25 to 29 August 2025.

2.2 The APANPIRG/36 agreed to the removal of Thailand from the list of Administrations with APANPIRG Air Navigation Deficiencies List for SAR plan implementation, as Thailand had reported achieving 92 percent implementation. As a result, there were now 15 Administrations that reported a SAR Plan implementation of 90 percent or more.

ATM/SG/13 Conclusions

2.3 To streamline data collection and enhance monitoring and analysis of APAC States/Administrations' annual submissions on regional plan implementation, ATM/SG/13 adopted ***Conclusion ATM/SG/13-3: The Use of Digital Form to Collect Annual Regional ANS-related Monitoring and Reporting Data***. APAC Administrations were reminded to submit the annual *Regional SAR Plan Monitoring and Reporting Form* via the MS Forms platform (https://forms.office.com/r/fw1ZmCwypG), by 28 February each year.

2.4 Following a review of the *Asia/Pacific SAR Plan* by a small intersessional group consisted of Australia, New Zealand, United States and the ICAO APAC Office, and its subsequent endorsement by APSAR/WG/10, ATM/SG/13 adopted ***Conclusion ATM/SG/13-9: Revised Asia/Pacific SAR Plan***. The *Asia/Pacific SAR Plan version 5.0* was posted on the ICAO APAC Office eDocuments webpage (https://www.icao.int/APAC/apac-electronic-documents). APAC Administrations were reminded to update their national SAR plans to align with the *Asia/Pacific SAR Plan version 5.0*.

2.5 ATM/SG/13 noted that APSAR/WG/10 had considered Australia's proposal to replace "SAR capability" with "Search and Rescue (SRU) capability" in the *Asia/Pacific SAR Plan* and that APAC Administrations would report SRU capability to APSAR/WG rather than annually exchange SRU information with neighbouring States. The APSAR/WG/10 had observed that SRU capability information aided Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) decision-making but could be sensitive (e.g. military). Accordingly, submissions of SRU capability information were voluntary, did not oblige Administrations to deploy capabilities, and were to be limited to SRUs authorized and capable of operating in neighbouring SRRs. ATM/SG/13 adopted ***Conclusion ATM/SG/13-10: Proposal Annual Submission of Asia/Pacific Search and Rescue Unit (SRU) Capability***.

2.6 The Chairperson and ICAO Secretariat commended Thailand for its efforts to enhance SAR Plan implementation and for its removal from the APANPIRG Air Navigation Deficiencies List.

Outcomes of the ICAO/IMO Joint Working Group on SAR Meeting (WP/03)

2.7 The United States provided an overview of the outcomes of the Thirty-Second Meeting of the ICAO/International Maritime Organization (IMO) Joint Working Group on Harmonization of Aeronautical and Maritime SAR (JWG 32, Sydney, Australia, 3 – 7 November 2025).

2.8 JWG 32 discussions and decisions included:

a) reports on outcomes of ICAO and IMO from the viewpoint of the respective headquarters (HQs);

b) proposed amendments to the ICAO Doc 9731 *International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual*, such as psychology of emergency and search planning and evaluation concepts;

c) development of a strategic outlook for the global SAR operating environment; and

d) assistance to States in implementing improvements in SAR service, quality, capacity and capability, and in the use of ICAO and IMO technical cooperation activities.

2.9 Outcomes from JWG 32 included:

a) search planning and evaluation concepts: the JWG agreed to specific amendments to IAMSAR Manual Volume II, including appendices associated with Chapter 4 *Search planning and evaluation concepts*. The ad hoc correspondence group, coordinated by New Zealand, was continued and its scope of work was expanded to include additional measures to improve the use of, and content within, IAMSAR Manual Volume II;

b) Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) and other autonomous craft: the ICAO Council was developing an interim framework to address the extensive legal concerns associated with the use of this technology and the basis on which compliant operations could be conducted. The JWG continued active discussions to enable effective use of this capability for SAR and to provide related guidance within the IAMSAR Manual;

c) Autonomous Distress Tracking (ADT): the ADT system had become operational, but many States were still resolving the working relationships between SAR services and Air Traffic Services (ATS). Attention was focused on resolving non-distress activations of the ADT device. Mitigating non-distress activations of the Emergency Location Transmitter [ELT(DT)] required coordinated efforts from Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs), airline operators, aircraft manufacturers and maintenance facilities;

d) general SAR overview: Australia led an initiative to establish and maintain a strategic outlook on new and emerging issues that might impact the global aeronautical and maritime SAR system environment. As a result, the JWG website on the secure portal would host a “General SAR Overview” for posting of relevant matters;

e) aeronautical SAR oversight: results of ICAO’s Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) Continuous Monitoring Approach (CMA) indicated that SAR continued to represent a major challenge for States in performing their safety oversight function. To help address these challenges, Australia coordinated an ad hoc correspondence group to consider proposals for possible aeronautical SAR service oversight systems; and

f) JWG 33 was scheduled to convene from 9 to 13 November 2026 in Malmo, Sweden. Its invitation letter was to be issued in late June 2026 and made available on the IMO website as a circular letter or upon request. ICAO HQ published an invitation as a memorandum, which could be provided upon request. APAC States/Administrations could also request a JWG representative to forward the invitation for participation.

2.10 APAC States/Administrations were encouraged to participate in JWG 33, to submit working papers and information papers to the meeting, and to contribute to the JWG's ongoing work in developing an interim framework on RPAS and other autonomous craft.

2.11 The Chairperson highlighted that there had been no discussion on System-Wide Information Management (SWIM) within the SAR community prior to the SAR Workshop held on 5 May 2026. The Meeting agreed to the suggestion that the SWIM topic should be included on the agenda of the next JWG meeting for broader global discussion and information exchange with other ICAO regions.

2.12 The Meeting was informed of the Pacific Search and Rescue (PACSAR) Workshop held in Fiji, from 10 to 14 November 2025, which had contributed to sustained SAR improvements across Oceania. APAC States/Administrations were encouraged to participate in the next PACSAR workshop, scheduled for 2027 in French Polynesia. [ACTION ITEM]

Agenda Item 3: Global Update

Status of the Cospas-Sarsat Programme (WP/04, SP/07)

3.1 The paper presented a status report on the Cospas-Sarsat Programme, covering system operations, notable developments, space and ground segments, beacons, false alerts, RCC reporting on use of distress-alert data, and the results of Cospas-Sarsat Mission Control Centre (MCC) – SAR Point of Contact (SPOC) communication tests.

System Operation

3.2 In 2024, the most recent year for which statistics were compiled and reviewed, Cospas-Sarsat alert data assisted in 1,171 distress incidents (compared with 1,076 in 2023), and 3,211 persons were rescued (compared with 3,109 in 2023).

3.3 Since September 1982, the Cospas-Sarsat System had provided assistance in rescuing at least 67,000 people in more than 21,000 SAR events (**Figure 1**).



Figure 1: SAR Events with the Assistance of Cospas-Sarsat Data (Jan. 1994 – Dec. 2024)

3.4 The geographic distribution of all reported SAR events for which Cospas-Sarsat alert data were used in 2024 was presented in **Figure 2**. The distribution was 17 percent for aviation, 42 percent for land and 41 percent for maritime.



Figure 2: 2024 Geographic Distribution of SAR Events

406 MHz Beacons

3.5 Based on estimates derived from beacon-registration data and the number of activated registered beacons, approximately 3,354,000 Cospas-Sarsat beacons were deployed worldwide at the end of 2024, representing an increase of about 12 percent over 2023. It was estimated that more than 80% of globally deployed beacons were equipped with Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers, enabling beacon location to be included in the distress message in addition to independent localization processed by the Cospas-Sarsat System.

3.6 The Cospas-Sarsat Programme maintained the International Beacon Registration Database (IBRD) as an online portal used by 167 Administrations. As of April 2026, the IBRD contained 127,000 registrations (compared with 118,000 in May 2025). The redesigned IBRD (https://www.406registration.com/), deployed in 2022, accommodated new beacon types [e.g. ELT(DT)s and Second-Generation Beacons (SGBs)], provided Application Programming Interface (API) access for SAR software. The Meeting noted that Version 2.0 of the IBRD was in development.

Space and Ground Segments

3.7 Cospas-Sarsat relied on three satellite-constellation types, with three Low-altitude Earth Orbiting (LEO) satellites, 11 Geostationary Earth Orbiting (GEO) satellites, and 50 latest technology payloads on Medium-altitude Earth Orbiting (MEO) satellites were in operation.

3.8 As of April 2026, 38 MEO earth stations, known as Medium Earth Orbit Local User Terminals (MEOLUTs), capable of tracking up to 400 satellites simultaneously, had been commissioned for MEO Search and Rescue satellite payloads (MEOSAR), with planned to deploy at least eight additional MEOLUTs with multiple antennas and channels between 2026 and 2027.

3.9 The Meeting noted that MEOSAR had transitioned to Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in April 2023, and that Full Operational Capability (FOC) was anticipated in 2026. Cospas-Sarsat also advanced developments to initiate operational phases for SGBs, which transmitted more information and offered improved location accuracy.

SPOC Communications

3.10 Since 2008, Cospas-Sarsat had conducted regular testing of communications links between MCCs that distributed distress alerts to their supported SPOCs. **Table 1** provides a summary of MCC/SPOC communication test results for the period from 2020 to 2024. Some MCCs did not support SPOCs outside of their country and therefore were not required to conduct these tests.

Table 1: SPOC Communication Test Results (2020 – 2024)

	2020	**2021**	**2022**	**2023**	**2024**
Number of SPOCs tested by MCCs	166	171	171	161	165
Non-responsive SPOCs (no response to tests)	7.23%	8.19%	5.26%	4.97%	6.66%
Rarely responsive SPOCs (less than 20% successful tests)	6.02%	3.51%	5.85%	4.97%	4.84%
SPOCs with low success ratio (between 20 and 50% successful tests)	7.23%	9.94%	8.19%	11.18%	10.30%
Insufficiently responsive SPOCs	**20.48%**	**21.64%**	**19.30%**	**21.12%**	**21.80%**

3.11 The list of Cospas-Sarsat MCC and SPOC agreements/arrangements, copies of which were held by Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat, were provided in **APSAR/WG/11 WP/04**.

New Format of the SIT 185 Distress Alert Message

3.12 Distress-alert messages were sent to SAR authorities in the human-readable "SIT 185" format. Beginning in 2023, the message was revised for greater clarity with two key changes:

a) "MCC Reference position" replaced "Confirmed position" to avoid implying a "best" position, the former serving as a processing reference used by MCCs; and

b) "GNSS position" replaced "Encoded position".

3.13 Full details of the revised SIT 185 format were provided in the RCC Handbook (https://www.cospas-sarsat.int/en/documents-pro/system-documents/system-documents) under "G. Series" then "G.007".

In-Flight Distress Tracking

3.14 Cospas-Sarsat announced FOC for First-Generation Beacon (FGB) ELT(DT) in January 2023, and for SGB ELT(DT) in January 2024. While ELT(DT) deployments sometimes replaced Emergency Locator Transmitter (Automatic Fixed) [ELT(AF)] and could initially resulted in the loss of the 121.5 MHz homing signal, a recent ICAO regulation update required that at least one automatic ELT on commercial aircraft, including crash-survivable ELT(DT), include a 406 MHz beacon that also transmitted on 121.5 MHz.

3.15 The Meeting was reminded of the utmost importance for all aircraft operators of ELT(DT)-equipped aircraft, ATS units, RCCs responsible for aeronautical distress response, and any national aviation agencies (if desired), to ensure they were properly registered in the OPS Control Directory to be notified of ADT activations of interest and to access position data stored in the Location of an Aircraft in Distress Repository (LADR) in a timely manner, if necessary.

3.16 Cospas-Sarsat developed guidance for RCCs on handling alerts from ELT(DT)s and made it available on the Cospas-Sarsat website and was also provided in ICAO Doc 10165 *Manual on Global Aeronautical Distress and Safety System*.

Return-Link Service (RLS) and Two-Way Communication (TWC) Beacons

3.17 The Meeting noted that the RLS, which acknowledged receipt and location of a beacon's distress signal, reached FOC in March 2021. In addition, Cospas-Sarsat had begun designing 406 MHz beacons to enable TWC between beacon users and RCCs. Based on the RLS technology, TWC was viewed as an enhancement of RLS – Type 1. The new service for SGBs was expected to improve understanding of emergency situations.

3.18 Cospas-Sarsat had held several dedicated experts working group meetings since January 2024 to advance TWC matters. APAC States/Administrations were invited to join the correspondence working group on TWC to monitor, contribute to, and assist further development of the planned TWC capability for RLS SGBs.

3.19 In response to an enquiry, the Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat clarified that the initial automatic questions prompted to users were preset and not configurable. RCCs could establish a communication channel with users through a web interface, enabling them to submit follow-on questions; however, it was recommended that follow-on questions be used only for important messages, as excessive use could drain the battery more quickly.

Training Materials

3.20 Development of video material continued with the creation of a series of video frequently asked questions (FAQs). All videos were available free-of-charge (on YouTube® at 406.org/en/search-and-rescue/programme-videos-en and at https://moodle.406.org/) in English with subtitles in French or Russian languages.

3.21 In response to a query on how RCCs could avoid responding to false alerts, the Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat provided several suggestions, including that RCCs should first attempt to establish contact with the user and act in accordance with their established procedures. It also clarified that the SGB was capable of sending cancellation messages, which would help reduce responses to false alerts if an inadvertent activation was cancelled by the user.

Agenda Item 4: Asia/Pacific and Inter-regional SAR Planning, Coordination and Cooperation

Regional Air Navigation Plan Update (WP/05)

4.1 ICAO Secretariat presented an update on the *APAC Air Navigation Plan (ANP) Volume I*, which was available on the ICAO APAC Office website at:

https://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/APAC-eANP.aspx

4.2 Proposals for Amendment (PfAs) to the *APAC ANP Volume I* were necessary to enable the establishment by States of Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs) under the provisions of ICAO Annex 12 *Search and Rescue* and required approval by the Council of ICAO. The PfA template was also provided on the ICAO APAC Office website.

4.3 The exercise to review the *APAC ANP Volume I* on Flight Information Region (FIR) and SRR coordinates should be based on ICAO historical records and not new proposal for changes. Some States had submitted major amendments to their FIRs during the review process. These would only be considered if it was a change that only affected the national airspace and not the neighbouring airspace, or if all parties agreed with the change proposal before submission to ICAO. **Figure 3** illustrated the status of SRR verification.



Figure 3: SRR Review Status, as of March 2026

4.4 15 SRRs were approved by President of the Council and incorporated in the Table SAR I-1 of the *Asia/Pacific ANP Volume I* and 17 PfAs had been submitted to the ICAO APAC Office that required further clarifications/justifications from States, in coordination with their neighbouring States.

Regional SAR Status (WP/06)

4.5 ICAO Secretariat presented records of information submitted by the respective Administrations regarding SAR status for reporting to APANPIRG.

USOAP Analysis

4.6 The Meeting was informed that the 2024 edition of Protocol Questions (PQs) became applicable to all USOAP CMA activities starting after 1 July 2025, except for the State Safety Programme (SSP) and the Safety Management System (SMS) related PQs (collectively, the Safety Management PQs).

4.7 The new Safety Management PQs would become applicable to all USOAP CMA activities starting after 1 August 2026. The Revision 2 of the 2024 edition of the PQs could be found at the USOAP CMA online framework (OLF) (https://www.icao.int/usoap) under the heading "CMA Library".

4.8 The total number of PQs relating to SAR remained 16. An analysis of the 16 USOAP SAR-related PQs in April 2026 indicated that the overall Effective Implementation (EI) for SAR had slightly increased when compared to the previous year's assessment. States that had not undergone any USOAP CMA activities since the revised PQs would still see the previous edition results in the USOAP OLF.

a) May 2022 – 55%
b) May 2023 – 55%
c) April 2024 – 54%
d) April 2025 – 55%
e) April 2026 – 59%

4.9 From the PQ analysis, there were still weakness in the major areas of SAR indicated by USOAP, in the areas of:

a) **CE-3**: 7.517 (34%) – [SAR service provider] SAR coordination agreements;
b) **CE-4**: 7.499 (37%) – [SAR regulatory oversight] Implementation of training plan for SAR inspectors; and
c) **CE-7**: 7.505, 7.543 and 7.545 (49%, 45% and 43%) – [SAR regulatory oversight] effective regulatory surveillance oversight of SAR, detailed plans of SAR operations and checks that SAR operational personnel have regular training, including the conduct of SAR exercise.

SAR Agreements

4.10 States/Administrations were reminded to provide any updated information on SAR agreements to the ICAO APAC Office.

4.11 The records of SAR Agreements List and SAR Agreements Matrix, as updated at the Meeting, were provided in **Appendix C** and **Appendix D** to the Report, respectively.

4.12 In response to an enquiry regarding the absence of a SAR agreement with a neighbouring State and its potential impact during a USOAP CMA audit, the ICAO Secretariat clarified that USOAP auditors would consider the relevant information and circumstances that led to the situation and might not necessarily result in a "Not Satisfactory" finding.

Asia/Pacific SAR Plan Implementation Status

4.13 As of 16 April 2026, 23 Administrations had submitted the annual *Regional SAR Plan Monitoring and Reporting Form* over the MS Forms platform (https://forms.office.com/r/fw1ZmCwypG).

4.14 **Figure 4** illustrated the *Asia/Pacific SAR Plan* implementation status as of 16 April 2026, noting that the majority of States/Administrations had achieved compliance of 70% or higher.



Figure 4: *Asia/Pacific SAR Plan* Implementation Status, as of 16 April 2026

4.15 Regional policy had established that States/Administrations with an implementation status below 90 percent were to be considered as having an APANPIRG Air Navigation Deficiency for *Asia/Pacific SAR Plan* implementation. Only 15 States/Administrations reported implementation of 90 percent or higher:

Australia, China, Hong Kong China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, United States and Viet Nam.

4.16 States/Administrations were encouraged to conduct periodic reviews of SAR Plan implementation and to annually submit the *Regional SAR Plan Monitoring and Reporting Form* via MS Forms to the ICAO APAC Office by 28 February, ensuring up-to-date, accurate information for APANPIRG reporting. [ACTION ITEM]

Asia/Pacific SRU Capability

4.17 In accordance with ***Conclusion ATM/SG/13-10: Proposal Annual Submission of Asia/Pacific Search and Rescue Unit (SRU) Capability***, States/Administrations were requested to submit, annually by 28 February, updates to their SRU capability information for units with the capability and necessary approvals to operate in neighbouring SRRs, to the ICAO APAC Office.

4.18 As of 16 April 2026, only 12 Administrations had responded to the annual *Asia/Pacific Search and Rescue Unit (SRU) Capability* survey:

Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Hong Kong China, Fiji, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Singapore and Thailand.

4.19 Australia highlighted a discrepancy in the **APSAR/WG/11 WP/06 Appendix D**. ICAO Secretariat would update the working paper and upload the revised version to the Meeting webpage.

4.20 The Meeting noted that submission of SRU capability information was not mandatory and did not constitute a commitment to provide those capabilities during a SAR operation. States/Administrations were requested to notify the ICAO APAC Office if submission of SRU capability information had not been feasible due to sensitivity, and to indicate "Not Applicable (NA)" when submitting the annual *Regional SAR Plan Monitoring and Reporting Form*. [ACTION ITEM]

4.21 The submitted data, as updated at the Meeting, was provided in **Appendix E** to the report and was to be posted on the ICAO APAC Office webpage.

Addressing SAR Oversight Challenges Under the ICAO USOAP CMA (WP/07)

4.22 The ICAO USOAP CMA continued to report that, among the services in air navigation, SAR represented the major challenge for States in performing their safety oversight function. The paper provided information on actions underway by the JWG, which were intended to assist in improving this situation.

4.23 The Meeting reviewed the main implementation challenges described in the paper, including fragmented institutional arrangements, the involvement of multiple entities, including Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), CAAs, maritime authorities, coast guards, and military organizations, and unclear regulatory roles. It was noted that differing ICAO and IMO audit requirements for Joint Rescue Coordination Centres (JRCCs), the lack of SAR-specific guidance in the ICAO Doc 9734 *Safety Oversight Manual*, and shortages of suitably qualified SAR inspectorate personnel further complicated compliance. States with historically strong SAR operational performance but without independent oversight were observed to have faced difficulties in justifying additional oversight layers and associated resourcing in the absence of clearer guidance on expected benefits.

4.24 As agreed by JWG 32, an ad hoc correspondence group, coordinated by Australia, was formed to develop proposals for possible alternative aeronautical SAR service oversight systems. The ad hoc correspondence group was in the initial stages of its work and aimed to present a working paper with high-level proposals for consideration by JWG 33, which broadly included:

a) oversight within a SAR service provider by an internal department which is independent and separate from the SAR operations and RCC function;

b) oversight by an external agency making use of temporary secondments of SAR specialists from the SAR service provider;

c) multi-State or regional SAR oversight, possibly aligned with the ICAO Regional Safety Oversight Organization (RSOO) model;

d) hybrid aeronautical and maritime SAR oversight; and

e) CAA oversight of organisations that provide SAR services other than ANSPs, for example maritime agencies.

4.25 Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea supported the above proposals. Considering that other APAC States/Administrations required internal consultations, it was requested to provide feedback on the proposed alternative aeronautical SAR service oversight systems to Australia, preferably by September 2026, for inclusion in the working paper to be presented at JWG 33 in November 2026. [ACTION ITEM]

Asia/Pacific Regional Implementation for Autonomous Distress Tracking (WP/08)

4.26 The Meeting recalled that APSAR/WG/10 had agreed *Action Item 10/2*, calling on APAC Administrations to intensify efforts to complete the actions required for ADT implementation.

4.27 To assess anticipated improvements in APAC Administrations' capabilities to receive, process and manage ADT notifications, the ICAO APAC Office conducted a follow-up survey in 2026. 17 APAC Administrations responded, and the analysis of their responses was provided in **APSAR/WG/11 WP/08 Appendix B**.

4.28 The 2026 follow-up survey results (**Figure 5**) indicated measurable progress in APAC Administrations' readiness to implement ADT across all four categories (i.e. States, aircraft operators, SAR service provider and ANSP), with overall positive responses increased from 48% to 61%. However, implementation remained incomplete, particularly in procedural development, coordinated response to ADT notifications, and personnel training across all categories.



Figure 5: Overall Responses Rate for All Questions

4.29 In conclusion, the limited participation in the 2026 survey and consistently low levels of completion in procedure promulgation and training underscored the need for sustained and coordinated efforts. APAC Administrations were urged to accelerate regulatory, procedural and training actions, to achieve full and effective ADT implementation.

4.30 The Meeting was informed that Indonesia would provide an updated survey response to the ICAO APAC Office as soon as possible.

Use of Space-based ADS-B during SAR Operations (IP/02)

4.31 The paper described New Zealand's use of space-based Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) by the Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand (RCCNZ) to enhance location and situational awareness during SAR operations. It was noted that, prior to the availability of space-based ADS-B, RCCNZ frequently experienced limited situational awareness for several hours following a loss of communications, particularly in remote oceanic and polar regions, resulting in prolonged emergency phases and extensive SAR planning.

4.32 With access to ADS-B data, RCCNZ was able to obtain an aircraft's Last Known Positions (LKPs) and confirm whether aircraft were continuing along planned tracks, enabling earlier resolution of uncertainty phases and the stand-down of unnecessary SAR efforts. The paper also indicated that space-based ADS-B provided continuous global surveillance, significantly reduced search areas and response times, and materially improved the ability to promptly locate aircraft after a loss of communication.

Extended Diversion Time Operations (IP/03)

4.33 The United States presented an overview of Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO) and its applicability to remote Indo-Pacific aerodromes, referencing ICAO Annex 6 *Operation of Aircraft Part I*, on operational and regulatory aspects. It was noted that EDTO-designated en-route alternate aerodromes could serve as critical landing sites and staging areas for SAR and emergency response, and that interagency discussions had identified specific remote airports for this purpose.

4.34 EDTO-designated aerodromes, as determined by the aircraft operator and its State regulator, provided key services essential to the safety of long-range Pacific flights and to in-flight emergency responses when distant from fully developed aerodromes. A partial list of aerodromes the United States Coast Guard would consider as EDTO alternate sites for SAR and emergency response was provided in **APSAR/WG/11 IP/03**.

Development of National SOP on ADT/ELT(DT) Notification Handling in Indonesia (IP/04)

4.35 Indonesia shared its experience in developing a joint Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for handling ADT and ELT(DT) notifications through a multi-stakeholder process that involved the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) Indonesia, AirNav Indonesia, BASARNAS, airline operators and other relevant entities. The SOP was created in response to gaps identified at APSAR/WG/10 and was agreed following coordination meetings. The SOP established a standardized coordination framework linking Operations Control Centres (OCCs) of aircraft operators, the Indonesia Network Management Center of AirNav Indonesia and the RCC, and it defined roles, responsibilities and clear information flows from initial notification to SAR activation.

4.36 The SOP further detailed operational processes to support GADSS implementation and to ensure timeliness, accuracy and consistency in handling alerts received via the LADR system. As a way forward, Indonesia planned to develop technical guidance and implementation manuals, conduct training and simulation exercises, continuously evaluate and refine the SOP based on operational experience, and enhance integration with regional and global SAR frameworks.

4.37 The Meeting commended Indonesia for having established a common SOP as a single reference for all relevant stakeholders. States/Administrations were suggested to approach Indonesia if they required assistance in developing their own SOPs.

False Alerts/Non-Distress Alerts from Emergency Locator Transmitters (IP/05)

4.38 The paper presented by Singapore emphasized that reducing false alerts was essential to preserve the effectiveness, efficiency and integrity of the global SAR system, as high volumes of false alerts would impose significant processing loads on MCC and could lead to unnecessary SAR deployments by SAR responders. It therefore advocated that States and aircraft maintenance crew implemented procedures and training to minimize the receipt of non-distress alerts by MCCs, including proper registration enabling quick identification and verification when required

4.39 The paper also set out several recommended best practices to reduce false alert, including the use of ELT self-test mode for routine checks, prior notification and approval for any live/operational testing by aircraft maintenance teams, immediate reporting of accidental activations to the RCC to cancel alerts, and proper disposal and registration of ELTs with national authorities. A structured education and briefing programme for aircraft maintenance personnel was likewise recommended to reinforce correct testing procedures and to highlight the operational impacts of non-distress activation, noting that ELT(DT) devices and the MEOSAR system had increased detection sensitivity and therefore required proper handling protocol.

4.40 The Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat supported the paper and recommended that States/Administrations take actions in accordance with the best practices shared in the paper.

4.41 New Zealand suggested for States/Administrations consider including the best practices described in the paper in their national Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP).

Initiatives to Promote Proper Registration of 406 MHz ELT (IP/06)

4.42 The paper highlighted Japan's initiatives to promote the proper and accurate registration of 406 MHz ELTs, and the timely updating of associated registration information. By ensuring registration data were complete, accurate, and up to date, the time required to identify an aircraft in distress could be significantly reduced, thereby facilitating a prompt and efficient SAR response.

4.43 The Meeting was informed that the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau had implemented outreach and awareness programmes, including nationwide Safe Operation Seminars at six locations, distribution of informational leaflets, dissemination of ELT registration guidance via a safety-promotion e-mail newsletter, and reinforced verification through operator meetings. As a result, overall operator awareness improved: ELT registrations recorded from October 2025 to March 2026 increased by 49% compared with the preceding six months, inquiries for confirmation and updating of registration data rose, and Tokyo RCC commenced more active verification of records.

4.44 The Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat commended Japan for its initiative in promoting registration of 406 MHz ELTs and timely updating of registration information, which had significantly increased Japan's 406 MHz ELT registration rate to 75 percent, above the global average. The Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat invited Japan to consider presenting a similar paper at the upcoming Cospas-Sarsat Joint Committee meeting scheduled for June 2026.

2025 ELT True Alerts within the Manila SRR (IP/07)

4.45 The Philippines informed the Meeting that, following effective collaboration with the regulatory body and issuance of an Aeronautical Information Circular (AIC), ELT registrations had increased significantly. This improvement had been reinforced by annual workshops on ELT, GADSS, alerting procedures and SAR developments that enhanced coordination among PARCC, SRUs, ATS units, aircraft operators, beacon owners, ELT testing facilities and airport personnel.

4.46 The Meeting was provided with information on the 2025 ELT true distress alerts handled within the Manila SRR.

SAREX JASAR 2025: Offshore Joint Aeronautical Search and Rescue Exercise in Malaysia (IP/08)

4.47 Malaysia presented the conduct and outcomes of SAREX JASAR 2025, a national-level Offshore Joint Aeronautical Search and Rescue exercise led by the Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia (CAAM) in collaboration with Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS). The exercise aimed to strengthen multi-agency coordination and interoperability among national SAR authorities, aviation stakeholders and offshore oil and gas operators for helicopter-related incidents within the Kota Kinabalu SRR.

4.48 The exercise was held from 12 to 14 August 2025 and comprised a Table-Top Exercise (TTX-Dialogue) and a full-scale Field Training Exercise (FTX) based on a simulated ditching of a helicopter about 130 nautical miles (NM) offshore from Miri, Sarawak. Operational highlights included successful implementation of the Offshore Joint Aeronautical SAR (Offshore-JASAR) concept whereby private sector assets conducted initial response prior to activation and coordination by the aeronautical RCC, the establishment of a unified command through deployed Liaison Officers, coordinated deployment of SAR assets and validation of multiple communication channels.

4.49 The exercise demonstrated a whole-of-government and whole-of-industry approach and achieved the successful simulated rescue and evacuation of all survivors within the designated timeframe. Based on the exercise outcomes, several improvements were proposed to enhance future SAR operations and exercises.

4.50 Australia commended Malaysia on the successful conduct of SAREX JASAR 2025, noting that one of the recommendations in the paper could be useful for inclusion into the guidance material in IAMSAR Manual relating to the conduct of SAREX, and therefore recommended that Malaysia participate in and submit a working paper to the JWG 33 meeting scheduled for November 2026.

MALINDOPURA Trilateral SAR Cooperation Initiative (IP/09)

4.51 The paper described the MALINDOPURA trilateral SAR cooperation initiative led by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The initiative had progressed from bilateral engagements among the three States to the formal establishment of the MALINDOPURA SAR Working Group in 2025. This trilateral initiative supported the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)'s "Programme of Actions" for capacity building among ASEAN Member States. Its objectives were to promote knowledge sharing, enhance SAR personnel competency, facilitate regular coordination and strengthen operational interoperability for cross-border aeronautical emergencies.

4.52 Planned activities and exercises were presented, including the MALINDOPURA International SAR Workshop conducted on 30 April 2026, which had covered ICAO Annex 12 *Search and Rescue*, GADSS requirements and joint cross-border procedures for SAR. A - TTX had been planned for September 2026 to simulate an in-flight emergency and test aircraft operators, ATS units and RCC responses with a focus on GADSS ADT and ELT(DT) procedures. A Field Training Exercise (FTX) had been planned for October 2026 to validate real-time multi-agency coordination and readiness, with intended participation from aircraft operators, SAR organizations, ANSPs, government agencies, industry stakeholders, invited ASEAN members and ICAO.

4.53 The Meeting noted that the MALINDOPURA International SAR Workshop, held on 30 April 2026 in a hybrid format and hosted by BASARNAS at its Jakarta headquarters, successfully attracted more than 2,800 participants, including aircraft operators from the three States.

Aeronautical Search and Rescue Mechanism in Sri Lanka (IP/10)

4.54 Sri Lanka presented progress in strengthening its aeronautical SAR framework through implementation of the National Aeronautical Search and Rescue Plan (NASARP) and establishment of the National Aeronautical Search and Rescue Committee (NASC). It was noted that NASARP had been promulgated (Rules No. 1 of 2023) as the primary framework to ensure an effective and coordinated response capability for aircraft-related emergencies within the Colombo SRR. NASC had been established with senior representatives from key ministries and agencies to provide strategic oversight, and its inaugural meeting, held on 21 May 2025, reviewed SAR plans, agreed to conduct a national workshop and SAREX, and pursued bilateral arrangements with neighbouring States.

4.55 The Meeting was informed of capacity-building activities conducted to test and enhance inter-agency coordination and operational readiness. A national SAR workshop was held on 3 November 2025 and a large-scale TTX on 6 November 2025, involving approximately 70 participants from some 20 stakeholder organizations, including the armed forces and police. The exercises evaluated coordination mechanisms, communications procedures and response capabilities across land and high-sea scenarios, identified areas for further improvement (particularly regional cooperation and continuous capacity building) and demonstrated measurable improvements in stakeholder understanding and national SAR preparedness.

4.56 The Meeting congratulated Sri Lanka for strengthening its national aeronautical SAR framework.

Agenda Item 5: Asia/Pacific Regional SAR Plan

Aerodrome Emergency Plans and SAR Response in Vicinity of Aerodromes (WP/09)

5.1 The paper presented Australia's review of Aerodrome Emergency Plans (AEPs) and SAR coordination for aircraft emergencies occurring in the vicinity of, but outside, aerodrome boundaries, including adjacent waterways. It noted that various ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), including ICAO Annex 12 *Search and* Rescue and ICAO Annex 14 *Aerodromes*, and ICAO guidance documents, including ICAO Doc 9137 *Airport Services Manual* and ICAO Doc 9731, required integration and clear cooperation between AEP stakeholders and RCCs, and that these references had been used to assess Australia's national arrangements.

5.2 The review identified a gap in Australia's national SAR arrangements. The Australian National SAR Manual had not explicitly referenced AEP arrangements, which had created ambiguity over roles and coordination responsibilities for incidents near aerodromes. The review also found that ICAO materials and sampled national AEPs did not provide a single, clear definition of an "aerodrome boundary," resulting in varied interpretations of the distance or area for which AEPs should assume coordination or rescue responsibility.

5.3 Consequently, the review determined that a clearer, locally tailored understanding was required among aerodrome emergency stakeholders, State/Territory police SAR authorities, national SAR authorities [Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) for civil aircraft; Australian Defence Force (ADF) for military], and other responding agencies regarding who would assume overall coordination and who would act in support, noting that the "best placed" coordinating authority could vary by environment and scenario.

5.4 Following AMSA's proposal, amendments were published in the Australian National SAR Manual to address the identified gaps. The Manual was revised to include AEP information and ICAO/IAMSAR context, to clarify response roles for on-aerodrome versus vicinity incidents, and to align national SAR arrangements with State/Territory and local emergency management systems under the "best placed SAR authority" principle.

5.5 The Meeting acknowledged that there was no clear definition of the boundary, and guidance for cooperation and coordination between response teams addressing emergencies occurring in the vicinity of an aerodrome, including adjacent waterways. The Meeting shared that one consideration for defining the boundary for response by airport emergency service in the vicinity of an aerodrome, including the adjacent waterways, would be the SRU's capability and range, including sea rescue capability in the case of waterways in the vicinity of an aerodrome. Procedures would need to be in place to ensure clear definition of roles and responsibilities for the airport emergency services leading the rescue operations with other agencies providing support to the incident. These procedures form part of the AEP, which serves as a sub-plan or integrated into the national SAR Plan, ensuring seamless coordination with local and national emergency agencies. The AEP functions as the localized immediate response mechanism for incidents at an airport while the national SAR Plan serves as a comprehensive framework providing oversight and specialized capabilities in the event when the emergency exceeds local capacity.

5.6 APAC States/Administrations were encouraged to submit, at the next APSAR/WG meeting, information on the integration of AEPs and SAR coordination arrangements within their SRR(s) for aircraft emergencies occurring in the vicinity of, but outside, aerodrome boundaries, including adjacent waterways. [ACTION ITEM]

Agenda Item 6: Any Other Business

SAR Workshop

Overview of SWIM

6.1 The presentation provided an overview of the SWIM concept, describing it as a standardized end-to-end framework to support the secure, reliable and interoperable sharing of ATM related information across the aviation community. It noted the core components of SWIM, including common information services, service metadata and registries, technical infrastructure and interoperability profiles, discovery mechanisms, and governance and security arrangements, and explained how these elements collectively enabled timely, machine readable and traceable real-time data exchange to support operational decision making and collaborative air traffic management.

6.2 It was noted that the timeframe for SWIM implementation in the APAC Region was between 2024 and 2030, with 2030 as the target for completion, to support regional readiness for the planned global sunset of ICAO 2012 Flight Plan in 2034 and the transition to Flight and Flow – Information for a Collaborative Environment Release 1 (FF-ICE/R1) services in 2032.

SWIM Information Services

6.3 The presentation defined SWIM as a digital, standards-based, secure information-sharing framework that connected ANSPs, users and systems, and emphasized that SWIM would enable real-time, standardized information exchange to improve interoperability and situational awareness across the aviation system. It contrasted pre-SWIM fragmented point-to-point communications with the SWIM global interoperability model and summarized the primary information-exchange models supported by SWIM:

a) Aeronautical Information Exchange Model (AIXM): for aeronautical information (airspace, navigation aids, NOTAM transition);

b) Flight Information Exchange Model (FIXM): for flight-related data (flight plans, trajectories); and

c) ICAO Meteorological Information Exchange Model (IWXXM): for meteorological information (observations, forecasts, warnings).

6.4 In response to a query, it was clarified that there was not yet a standardized information exchange model for the exchange of surveillance information, and the APAC SWIM Task Force was working in coordination with the ICAO Surveillance Panel to identify an appropriate model for surveillance data sharing.

6.5 It was explained that there were three mechanisms in place for users to verify they had the latest information and detect missed updates: submission response; timeout; and versioning (shared data included version identifiers/timestamps so users could detect and request the latest version).

6.6 Considering that the SWIM topic was relatively new to the APSAR/WG, it was noted that an offline session between the Chairpersons of APSAR/WG and the APAC SWIM Task Force would be convened to explore in greater depth the potential collaboration mechanisms and to establish a clearer way forward on the development and implementation of SAR information services.

GADSS and ELT(DT)

6.7 Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat provided a brief overview of the GADSS concept, describing the phases from normal tracking through abnormal operations, autonomous distress tracking, and flight data recovery. It was recalled ICAO Annex 6 *Operation of Aircraft* standards that, as of 1 January 2025, all aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass of over 27,000 kg for which the individual certificate of airworthiness was first issued on or after 1 January 2024, shall autonomously transmit information from which a position could be determined by the operator at least once every minute, when in distress.

6.8 Cospas-Sarsat Secretariat explained that ELT(DT) devices had been designed to autonomously detect in-flight emergencies (e.g. unusual attitude, engine loss or depressurization) and to transmit distress signals to the Cospas-Sarsat MEOSAR satellite system. It was clarified that ADT transmissions could only be deactivated by the same mechanism (manual or automatic) that had activated them.

6.9 The presentation concluded by noting concerns about inappropriate activations of ELT(DT). Although ELT(DT) units had been designed to produce very low false activation rates, multiple manual or inappropriate activations had been detected since 2023, and discussions with manufacturers and operators were underway to address and mitigate the issue. It was noted that self-test mode was recommended for routine checks or maintenance to verify the internal electronics and battery of the ELT(DT), and that activating the self-test function would prevent a live distress signal from being transmitted to the satellites.

SIT185

6.10 The Meeting was presented with a SAR training scenario involving an aircraft whose ELT(DT) had activated automatically following depressurization at FL350. The scenario enhanced the understanding of how to interpret the basic event information contained in ELT(DT) SIT185 messages and of the data available in the LADR. It was noted that the RCC was expected to review beacon fields (ICAO 24-bit address and operator 3LD), log into the LADR to obtain the aircraft's LKPs, coordinate with the relevant ATS units and the aircraft operator to obtain further information about the potential distress event, monitor LKPs in the LADR to determine whether the aircraft was a fixed or moving target, request additional MCC data when required, and prepare for and, if necessary, launch SAR operations in accordance with national procedures while monitoring for cancellation messages.

LADR, OPS Control and Demo

6.11 The OPS Control Directory provided a mechanism to establish contact among aircraft operators, ATS units and RCCs in cases of uncertainty regarding an aircraft's safety, and access to LADR was available via the OPS Control Directory (https://ladr.eurocontrol.int/ops/frontend). Each organization (aircraft operator, ATS unit, RCC or State) in the OPS Control Directory was required to nominate a single focal point user to enable LADR access. The focal point was responsible for maintaining the organization's operational contact details and for authorizing additional users within the organization. Requests for focal point registration were to be sent to aircrafttracking@icao.int.

6.12 A demonstration was provided on registering with and accessing information from LADR, the OPS Control Directory, and other functional blocks to enhance participants' knowledge and operational familiarity. Administrations requiring detailed information should consult the LADR Manual or to contact Helpdesk by phone at +3227451997 or by email at nm.cso.help-desk@eurocontrol.int, and for ICAO DNA and LADR Ops Control Organisation & User Management to contact aircrafttracking@icao.int.

6.13 It was clarified that FIR boundaries were displayed in the LADR event map rather than SRR because no single agreed source of SRR boundaries existed. SRR and FIR were represented as separate organization types when registering in LADR, with SRR organizations (RCCs) able to view events globally while FIR organizations (ANSPs) could view only events within their FIR plus an 80 NM buffer.

ADT Equipage in Aircraft

6.14 It was noted that Airbus had installed ELT(DT) as the standard means for ADT on its A320neo family, A330-800, A330-900, A350-900 and A350-1000 aircraft. The Airbus ELT(DT) system had been integrated into the cockpit display system and the central maintenance system. Airbus monitored all ELT(DT) activations on its aircraft using Cospas-Sarsat activation data received from the French MCC and reports from aircraft operators.

6.15 Operational data through 31 December 2025 were reported. A total of 3,550 transmission events had been detected since first deliveries in April 2023 across 1,385 ELT(DT)–equipped aircraft, with most unintended transmissions had originated on the ground, primarily due to erroneous detection of flight status and/or inappropriate handling of the system during maintenance and ground operations. It was noted that Airbus had launched several enhancements to significantly reduce the number of unwanted activations.

APANPIRG ATM and Airspace Safety Deficiencies in the SAR Field (WP/10)

6.16 The Meeting reviewed and updated SAR-related APANPIRG ATM and Airspace Safety Deficiencies.

6.17 29 Administrations had ATM and Airspace Safety Deficiencies in the SAR Field recorded in 2025 (APANPIRG/36). Deficiencies were recorded for Administrations that had not reported implementation of 90 percent or higher of the 42 elements of the *Asia/Pacific SAR Plan*.

6.18 Deficiencies remain listed for the following APAC Administrations:

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Macao China, Cook Islands, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Caledonia, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

6.19 The Meeting was informed that Papua New Guinea had submitted its progress to the ICAO APAC Office on addressing APANPIRG Air Navigation Deficiencies in Aviation Meteorology and SAR areas. Progress in addressing ATM and Airspace Safety Deficiencies in the SAR field included:

a) establishment of RCC through the Ministerial Directive, dated 12 March 2025;

b) conclusion of SAR agreements with Australia and Indonesia, with ongoing efforts to finalize additional agreements with Nauru, Solomon Islands and the United States; and

c) development of the National SAR Plan under the State SAR Corrective Action Plan, with the target completion date of 30 November 2026.

6.20 The updated list of APANPIRG ATM and Airspace Safety Deficiencies in the SAR Field was provided in **Appendix F** to the report.

Aeronautical SAR Points of Contact (WP/11)

6.21 The consolidated ATM Points of Contact (POC) List was circulated to all APSAR/WG/11 participants for review and update of SAR POC details. All Administrations were reminded to inform the ICAO APAC Office if at any time there was a change to their Administrative SAR POC.

6.22 The list was not to be confused with any listings of SAR Points of Contact (SPOCs) which were used for 24-hour SAR emergency contact purposes associated with RCCs and the Cospas-Sarsat distress beacon system.

Agenda Item 7: APSAR/WG Task List

APSAR/WG Terms of Reference and Task List (WP/12)

7.1 The APSAR/WG Terms of Reference and Task List were presented for review by the Meeting.

7.2 The Task List, as updated by the Meeting, was provided in **Appendix G** to the report.

Agenda Item 8: Date and Venue of Next Meeting

8.1 The Twelfth Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Search and Rescue Workgroup (APSAR/WG/12) was tentatively scheduled for May 2027, in Bangkok, Thailand.

Closing of the Meeting

9.1 In closing the Meeting, the Chairperson thanked and congratulated the efforts made by the participants for their contributions to the Meeting.

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