



SAFE SKIES.  
**SUSTAINABLE  
FUTURE.**



| ICAO



# ICAO APAC Regional Office Workshop on Unmanned Aircraft System Integration in National and High Seas Airspace

Bangkok, Thailand

November, 2025

# UAS Operational Risk Assessment

# Objectives

- Understand the importance of a Safety Management System;
- Understand the Operational Risk Assessment; &
- Usable Methodologies.




**Disclaimer:**  
This presentation doesn't  
substitute the necessity to  
have training and be  
capacitated in the  
methodologies.


# Reference Material

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## Annex 19 – Safety Management.



## Doc 9859 – Safety Management Manual.



## UAS for Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Response Guidance (U-AID)

# The Evolution of Safety Concept




## Safety

The state in which **risks** associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are **reduced** and **controlled to an acceptable level**.


Annex 19 – Safety Management

# The Evolution of Safety Concept

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# The Evolution of Safety Concept





# The Evolution of Safety Concept

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# Safety Concepts



# Safety Concepts

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**HAZARD**

# Safety Concepts

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


# Safety Concepts


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**RISK**



**RISK**

# Safety Concepts




# Safety Concepts


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



**LATENT HAZARD**











# Safety Concepts


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## HAZARD

A condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident

## RISK


Likelihood to be harmed by a hazard.



## EXPOSURE


# Safety Concepts

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
# Safety Concepts

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# Safety Concepts

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# Safety Concepts

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## Organization

## Environment





# SAFETY MANAGEMENT

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✈ **Safety Management seeks to proactively mitigate safety risks before they result in aviation accidents and incidents.**



## STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME (SSP)

- The SSP is developed and maintained by each State as a structured approach to assist in managing its aviation safety performance.
- Annex 19 – Chapter 8



## SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)

- A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures



# SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)

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Strengthened safety culture

Documented, process-based approach to assure safety

Better understanding of safety-related interfaces and relationships

Enhanced early detection of safety hazards

Safety data-driven decision-making

Enhanced communication of safety

Evidence that safety is a priority

Possible financial savings


Improved efficiencies

Cost avoidance

## **BENEFITS OF SMS**

# SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

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
# SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT

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✈️ **Safety Risk Management (SRM) is a key component of safety management and includes hazard identification, safety risk assessment, safety risk mitigation and risk acceptance.**

✈️ **SRM is a continuous activity because the aviation system is constantly changing, new hazards can be introduced and some hazards and associated safety risks may change over time.**

✈️ **In addition, the effectiveness of implemented safety risk mitigation strategies must be monitored to determine if further action is required.**




# HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

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✈ Hazard identification focuses on conditions or objects that could cause or contribute to the unsafe operation of aircraft or aviation safety-related equipment, products and services.

✈ Hazard identification may also consider hazards that are generated outside of the organization and hazards that are outside the direct control of the organization, such as extreme weather or volcanic ash. Hazards related to emerging safety risks are also an important way for organizations to prepare for situations that may eventually occur.



# SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT

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## RISK LIKELIHOOD

LIKELIHOOD	MEANING	VALUE
FREQUENT	Occurs Many Times	5
OCCASIONAL	Occurs Sometimes	4
REMOTE	Unlikely to Occur, But Possible	3
IMPROBABLE	Very Unlikely to Occur	2
EXTREMELY/IMPROBABLE	Almost Inconceivable that the Event Will Occur	1

# SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT

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## RISK SEVERITY

LIKELIHOOD	MEANING	VALUE
CATASTROPHIC	Destruction/Fatalities	A
HAZARDOUS	Large Reduction in Safety Margins/Serious Damage/Serious Injuries	B
MAJOR	Significant Reduction in Safety Margins/Serious Incident/ Injury to People	C
MINOR	Limitations/Emergency Procedures/Minor Incident	D
NEGLIGIBLE	Few Consequences	E

# SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT

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Safety Risk		Severity				
Probability		Catastrophic A	Hazardous B	Major C	Minor D	Negligible E
Frequent	5	5A	5B	5C	5D	5E
Occasional	4	4A	4B	4C	4D	4E
Remote	3	3A	3B	3C	3D	3E
Improbable	2	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E
Extremely improbable	1	1A	1B	1C	1D	1E



# SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT

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Safety Risk		Severity				
Probability		Catastrophic A	Hazardous B	Major C	Minor D	Negligible E
Frequent	5	<b>INTOLERABLE</b>			5D	5E
Occasional	4	4A	4B	4C	4D	4E
Remote	3	3A	3B	3C	3D	3E
Improbable	2	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E
Extremely improbable	1	1A	1B	1C	1D	1E

# SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT

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Safety Risk		Severity				
Probability		Catastrophic A	Hazardous B	Major C	Minor D	Negligible E
Frequent	5	5A	5B	5C	5D	5E
Occasional	4	4A	4B	4C	4D	4E
Remote	3	3A	3B	TOLERABLE		3E
Improbable	2	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E
Extremely improbable	1	1A	1B	1C	1D	1E

# SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT

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Safety Risk		Severity				
Probability		Catastrophic A	Hazardous B	Major C	Minor D	Negligible E
Frequent	5	5A	5B	5C	5D	5E
Occasional	4	4A	4B	4C	4D	4E
Remote	3	3A	3B	3C	3D	3E
Improbable	2	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E
Extremely improbable	1	1A	1B	1C	ACCEPTABLE	

# SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT

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## INTORELABLE

- **Immediate action** to **mitigate** the risk or **stop the activity**
- Perform **priority safety risk mitigation** to ensure additional or enhanced preventative controls are in place to **bring down the safety risk index to tolerable**.

## TORELABLE

- Can be tolerated **based on the safety risk mitigation**.
- It may require **management decision** to accept the risk.


## ACCEPTABLE

- Acceptable as is.
- **No further safety risk mitigation required.**

# OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT

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
## Safety risk management decision aid



# REFERENCES OF METHODOLOGIES

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## OPERATION TAKE-OFF



**SORA Methodology -  
Specific Operation Risk  
Assessment**

## SYSTEM-THEORETIC PROCESS ANALYSIS


### STPA

1) Define Purpose of The Analysis

2) Model The Control Structure

3) Identify Unsafe Control Actions

4) Identify Loss Scenarios



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# Thank You

