

Liberté Égalité Fraternité



# **EGNOS** benefits in France B Roturier – DGAC/DSNA France direction générale de l'Aviation civile





### Introduction

- DSNA, the French ANSP, is involved in a 3 step Performance Based Navigation (PBN) implementation process
  - <u>First step</u> was compliance with A37/11 ICAO resolution, aiming in particular to generalize approaches with vertical guidance + specific ILS rationalization. Completed.
  - <u>Second step</u> is implementation of PBN all phases of flight in compliance with **EUR PBN regulation (PBN IR)**. Nearly completed (target end 2025).
  - Third step aims to derive new benefits from PBN, in particular related to greener aviation, by implementing specific projects in close consultation with airspace users (CDO, RNP VPT, PBN to ILS) In progress.

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


Performant vertical guidance + ILS rationalisation





### **Category I ILS rationalization (2010-2020)**



116 ILS over 79 airports

64 ILS over 38 airports












## **Step 2: Current European PBN Implementing Rule**



2018



**Transition context towards** exclusive use of PBN

- All APCH/SID/STAR/ **Routes are PBN**
- Aispace users complete their PBN equipement
- **ASNPs** finalize rationalisation of ground navaids (MON)

2030

**EGNOS** becomes the main landing system in Europe (Cat I)



**Use of BaroVNAV** if not EGNOS equipped

ILS Cat I serviceable only under contingency







# The regulation requires a detailed implementation plan by ANSPs:

- DSNA in charge of 70 to 80 airports for PBN implementation
- in addition, DSNA was also involved in many France AFIS airports RNP APCH publications
- DSNA is the EUR ANSP involved in the largest number of RNP APCH/SID/STAR design and implementation (regulation virtually implies publication of 865 PBN



PLAN DE LA DIRECTION DES SERVICES DE LA NAVIGATION

AERIENNE POUR LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA

(PBN)

(PBN)

Seconde édition (final)

V2.7 du 14 mars 2022





# PBN current publications status @ AIRAC cycle 07/25

• RNP APCH: 70 airports, 174 IREs

100% PBN IR conformity achieved by Nov 2025

• EASA criteria: 100 % implemented for 2020 target, 98% for 2024

- SID: 80 airports, 194 IREs
  - EASA criteria: 90 % implemented
- STAR: 80 airports, 192 IREs
  - EASA criteria: 93 % implemented

100% PBN IR conformity achieved by May 2026












## Step 3. DSNA Green Aviation policy










## RNP AR @ NICE




AD 2 LFMN IAC RWY22R RNP Z (AR) FRANCE APPROCHE AUX INSTRUMENTS NICE COTE D'AZUR Procédure réservée aux exploitants munis d'une approbation spécifique Instrument approach Procedure reserved for operators holding a specific approval : voir/see AD 2 LFMN 22 CATABCD RNP Z RWY 22R (AR) ALT AD: 12. DTHR: 10 (1 hPa) FREQ: voir / see AD 2 LFMN COM 01 RNP AR APCH TCH: 49 2° E (2020)J WHILE 25 NW AG FINAV HLDG NERAS MAX IAS 230 kg T 1 min GNSS PAPI 3.2° (5.6%) MEHT 67 (1) AZR 109.65 Ch 33 Y F. 26 é (60 s) Building MAX IAS 240 kg **AVERTISSEMENTS / WARNINGS**  PAPI RWY 22L/R: divergence axe de piste 5° et surface de protection obstacles limitée à 6 km / offset 5" from FIWY centerline and obstacle clearance guaranteed up to 6 km. Mirino Haio Procédure inutilisable de nuit si indisponibilité des feux suivants / Procedure unavailable at night if following lighting out of order: - toux d'identification de souil / THR lighting des Anges R 225 - foux mont Boron / lights an mount Boron - foux mont Alban / lights on mount Alban SFC - 500 Baro-VNAV : T\* > 41°C : VPA > 3.5° SOTOX < Pour systèmes sans compensation de température / for uncompensated Baro VNAV systems T\* MNM : -10°C ALT/HGT:h Distances: NM Distance FROP - OCH - 0.2 NM. Hautour au / Height at FROP : 138 m/452 ft. Inclinaison MAX dans le RF de finale / Max bank angle in final RF : 26° F.2 é. (10 s) Aé. TA:5000 303 API : Monter dans l'axe vers 3000 (2988) puis suivre les instructions du contrôle. En cas de panne radio, monter dans l'axe à 3000 (2968) puis direct NERAS pour pour intégrer l'attente NERAS. Missed APCH: Climb straight ahead up to 3000 (2988) then follow ATC instructions. In case of radio failure, climb straight ahead up to 3000 (2988) then direct NERAS to join NERAS holding. 8.8 REF HGT : ALT DTHR MNM AD : distances verticales en pieds, RVR en mètres / vertical distances in feet, RVR in metres. RNP 0.3 DA (H) RVR OCH 360 (350) 1500 349 370 (360) 1500 358 380 (370) 1700 368 390 (380) 1700 378 Observations/Remarks: Panne de guidage GNSS lors de l'approche / Loss of GNSS guidance during approach: voir / see ENR 1.5





## RNP VPT @ BORDEAUX



APPROCHE AUXINSTRUMENTS
Instrument approach

BORDEAUX MERIGNAC

CATABOD RNP A RWY 05 (VPT ALT AD: 166 THR: 160 (6 HPs) ATIS: MERIGNAC: 131.155 RNP avec Manoeuvre à Vue sur Trajectoire Prescrite WAR RDH/ APP: AOUTAINE Approach (29.875 (1) 119.275 (2) 126.730 (s) RMP with Visual Manoeuvring on Prescribed Track MERIGNAC Approach / Approach 121, 200 (3) TCH O' Fonctionnalité Attente RNAY requise/ TWR: MERIGNAC Tour / Tower 118.300 49 (2020) RMAY Holding Austionally required (1) Sectour / Sector BW (2) Sectour / Sector BE (3) Surject nuction du CTL / On ATC instruction Procédure à suivre uniquement avec néférence visuelle du soi une fois le Visual Fix FD05A passé i Procedure must be ETRAR MAX IAS 220 ld flown only with ground visual reference when reaching 2700 165° Left Le pilote doit suivre la trajectoire latérale publiée / Pilote FL 120 5000 shall adhere to the published leteral trajectory. Absence ATS: procédure intendite / Procedure prohibited. QNH local seulement /Local QNH only 2500 ASF0 ETPAR MAX JAS 220 M R318 3000 ASF 2000 ASFC 800 ASFC RNAV HLDG VAGNA MAXIAS 220 M 2257 Left 46NM FL 120 3000 2000 Consider le syntole +3006 FL 195 1000 ASFC ALT/HGT Distances: NM TA:5000 API : En absence de référence visuelle à FD05A, monter à 5000 (4540) at suivre la trajectoire prescrite jusqu'à BD65C (MAX IAS 185kt) puis continuer vers RW65 puis vers B0650 (MAX MS 200kt). Viver RF gauche vers B0650 (MAX IAS 200kl) on maintenent 5000 (4840). Poursuivre vers ETPAR ou suivre les instructions du CTL Missed APCH: without ground visual reference at FD05A, maintain 5000 (4840) and follow prescribed track until BD09C (MAX IAS 185kt) then continue RMS and to BD050 (MAX IAS 200ks). RF ture left to BD05D MAX IAS 200kg meintoning 5000(4840). Proceed to ETPAR or comply with ATC instructions. MNM AD: distances verticales en pieds, RVR en mêtres / vertical distances in faut. RVR in metres REFHOT: ALT THE Visibilité / Visibility ≥ 10 km Platond / Ceiling z 4500 ft

Observations / Remarks : Parme de guidage GNSS lors de l'approche / Loss of GNSS guidence during approach : voir / see AIP ENR 1.5





## **Status of RNP VPT and RNP AR publications**

	RNP AR	RNP VPT		
St Denis la Réunion	Published			
Ajaccio	Published			
Bordeaux	Published	Published		
Nice	Published			
Marseille	Under study	Under study		
Chambery Calvi St Nazaire Pointe à Pitre Bale Mulhouse Paris CDG Nantes	Published Under study Under study Under study To be launched Under study Under study	Under study To be launched		











## Main PBN REX: Paris CDG may 2022 near-CFIT






#### Final report summary

**Serious incident** to the AIRBUS A320 registered **9H-EMU** and operated by Airhub Airlines on Monday 23 May 2022 on approach to Paris-Charles de Gaulle airport (Val-d'Oise)

Transmission of incorrect altimeter setting (QNH) by air traffic service, near-collision with ground during satellite approach procedure with barometric vertical guidance





# EUR OPS BULLETIN

Serial Number: 2023\_001 Effective: 27 July 2023

Subject: Risks related to altimeter setting errors during APV Baro-VNAV and non-precision approach operations

#### 1. Introduction and scope

1.1 Recent incidents have highlighted that an erroneous altimeter setting can have serious consequences on flight safety during final approach operations. After recalling how aircraft barometric altitude is determined and used in certain approach operations, this bulletin lists a set of recommendations to mitigate altimeter setting errors.

### Safety first

The Airbus Safety magazine

# Use the Correct BARO Setting for Approach



Using an erroneous barometric reference setting during approach may cause the aircraft to fly lower than the published approach



#### **Safety Information Bulletin**

Operations - ATM/ANS

SIB No.: 2023-03

Issued: 09 March 2023

Subject: Incorrect Barometric Altimeter Setting

#### Ref. Publications:

None.

#### Applicability:

Aircraft operators and Air Navigation Service Providers.

#### **Description:**

Recent serious incidents have highlighted a concern on the effects of incorrect barometric altimeter settings when operating below the transition level. Operating with an incorrect altimeter



## DGAC SAFETY LEAFLET N° 2023/02

A safety Info Leaflet is a document widely distributed by DSAC, without regulatory obligation, whose purpose is to draw the attention of certain actors in the aviation sector to an identified risk or to promote best practices. This safety Info Leaflet is available on: <a href="https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/info-securite-daac">https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/info-securite-daac</a>

Operators	
concerned	

Aircraft operators
Instrument rated pilots

Air Navigation Service Providers

Topic


Risks related to altimeter setting errors, in particular during APV baro-VNAV and non-precision approach operations





# Issue with the absence of geometrical vertical guidance

What we observed in the case of Paris CDG near-CFIT:




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# DSNA study: how really serious is the issue of QNH mis-setting?

- A DSNA study was conducted in 2024 over **QNH data** recorded from **2019 to 2023** over **6 main airports** in France, which involved **1 694 266 flights** during this period.
  - 2269 occurrences of mis-settings with a discrepancy larger than 2 hPa were found in the data base.
- As a consequence, one of the main findings of this study is that the statistics of the integrity risk of QNH mis-setting at landing is at the very low level of 10-3/approach,
  - with a 10-4/approach risk to have an undetected erroneous airborne QNH mis-setting larger that 10 hPa (i.e. 280 ft vertical error).








# Impact of this very low 10<sup>-3</sup>/approach integrity risk over ICAO defined TLS (Target Level of safety)

For SBAS/GBAS the integrity risk is by design around 10<sup>-7</sup> /app, to meet the 10<sup>-8</sup>/app TLS

For BaroVNAV the integrity risk is measured around 10<sup>-3</sup>/app, meaning that the TLS is impacted by a factor 10 000!





# A 2025 independent Eurocontrol Study confirms DSNA findings on the high level of barometric risk

An Algorithm for Identifying Altimeter Setting Errors from ADS-B Data

Nikolaos Mourousias

EUROCONTROL

Brussels, Belgium
nikolaos.mourousias@eurocontrol.int

Emilien Robert EUROCONTROL Brussels, Belgium emilien.robert@eurocontrol.int David De Smedt EUROCONTROL Brussels, Belgium david.de-smedt@eurocontrol.int

Abstract—This study introduces an algorithm designed to detect barometric pressure setting (BPS) errors in large-scale flight data. The algorithm leverages Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data to detect deviations from the expected BPS values. A statistical model incorporating pilot-selected QNH contrast, is the true vertical distance above a reference surface such as the WGS84 ellipsoid. While geometric altitude is more unbiased [2], barometric altitude remains a primary reference due to its historical adoption and standardized procedures in

- The study analyzed landing operations over 378 EU airports during 31 days (which represented 747 353 flights)
- The study found 196 occurrences of QNH mis-setting higher than 5 hpa, over 747353 flights, thus a > 5hPa integrity risk of the order of 10-4 per approach





# Also a qualitative analysis shows why, in Europe (and possibly other ICAO regions), the QNH risk seems significantly higher that in North-America.

- NAM: The altimeter setting is given as inches of mercury (in Hg), not as hectopascals (hPa): the vertical impact of most significant errors is reduced by a factor 3.
- NAM:Transition level is FL180: reducing the risk of inserting the QNH during a lower and higher workload phase of flight.
- NAM:The language used (English) is the mother tongue of air traffic controllers and of a large proportion of pilots: reducing the risk of transmission errors, read-back errors or incorrect information not being detected.
- NAM:The PBN approach procedure are designed with TERPS criteria: more conservative in term of LNAV/VNAV minima, alternatively to PANS-OPS

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
# France surveillance authority (DSAC) now considers that too low DH of barometric based PBN ops is a safety issue

 DSAC safety assessment was conducted + DSAC checked the distribution of LNAV/VNAV minima (DH) obtained with TERPS in the USA and ICAO PANS

**OPS** in France

29 % LNAV/VNAV minima in USA are inferior to 350 ft

65 % LNAV/VNAV minima in France are inferior to 350 ft







# Consultation to raise all barometric based PBN minima in France

- As a consequence, DSAC has issued a consultation on 28 July 2025, informing of its plan to raise all France airports barometric operational minima as follows:
  - The published minimum descent heights (MDH) for LNAV approach procedures will be raised to 400ft where they are currently below this value.
  - The decision heights (DH) of LNAV/VNAV approach procedures will be raised to the higher of the following two values: 400 ft or the current value increased by 100 ft, without however being able to exceed the value of the MDH of an LNAV procedure on the same QFU.
  - The minimum DH value for RNP AR procedures will be increased to 350ft.
  - The runway visual range (RVR) values for LNAV and LNAV/VNAV procedures will be updated on the basis
    of these new DH values. The minimum RVR value for these procedures will be increased to 1500m.
- An impact study in term of airport accessibility has also been provided
- Consultation closed 19th September, final decision to be published in the AIP by Q4 2025, decision implemented by DSNA from 2026

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reference de l'Assistance de l





# Consultation to raise all barometric based PBN minima in France

Aéroport	QFU	LNAV	LNAV/VNAV	LNAV	LNAV/VNAV	LNAV	LNAV/VNAV
		MDH actuelle	DH actuelle	MDH future	DH future	hausse MDH	Hausse DH
Paris CDG	08L	430	340	430	430		90
	08R	450	340	450	440		100
	09L	460	340	460	440		100
	09R	390	340	400	400	10	60
	26L	420	340	420	420		80
	26R	490	340	490	440		100
	27L	490	340	490	440		100
	27R	490	340	490	440	197	100
Paris ORY	02	400	300	400	400		100
	06	430	310	430	410		100
	07	440	300	440	400		100
	20	400	290	400	400		110
	24	430	330	430	430		100
	25	420	310	420	410		100
Nice	04L (API 2,5%)	660	620	660	660		40
	04L (API 3%)	490	480	490	490		10
	04L (API 4%)	380	360	400	400	20	40
	04R (API 2.5%)	610	580	610	610		30
	04R (API 3%)	420	440	420	440		0
	04R (API 4%)	380	350	400	400	20	50
٠	13L API 2,5%)	540	460	540	540		80
	13R (API 2,5%)	590	500	590	590		90
Marseille	31L	1170	470	1170	570		100

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### Conclusion

- EASA has also now taken France surveillance authority barometric concerns onboard, and has launched its own analysis of barometric safety issues.
- We now collectively know that the barometric PBN landing technology cannot match the Target Level of Safety (TLS) for approaches in EU: this is a major PBN paradigm change, which strongly increases in contrast the landing safety importance of SBAS.
- The too low barometric operational minima designed through ICAO PANS-OPS (vs. TERPs) increases the risk: the proposed France authority raise of minima will increase the role of SBAS to maintain the best airport accessibility, for PBN landings.
- We need as a consequence a faster adoption of SBAS by commercial aviation. We need everyone help: this is a EU safety issue.
- We also need industry to workout SBAS vertical guidance solutions for the most complex PBN landing applications, such as RNP AR and RNP VPT.

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