



International Civil Aviation Organization

**THE ELEVENTH MEETING OF PERFORMANCE BASED NAVIGATION
IMPLEMENTATION COORDINATION GROUP (PBNICG/11)**

Bangkok, 27 - 29 March 2024

Agenda Item 4: GNSS Interference and its impact to GBAS & SBAS

ICAO RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDANCE ON GNSS VULNERABILITY

(Presented by the Secretariat)

SUMMARY

This paper presents an overview of ICAO's Recommendations and Guidance on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) vulnerability, including the Resolution COM5/5 (WRC-23), ongoing work in NSP and regional efforts in APAC.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) plays as a technical enabler supporting improved services that meet the objectives outlined in the Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP) towards the achievement of the performance ambitions.

1.2 GNSS supports positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) applications. GNSS is already the foundation of performance-based navigation (PBN), automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) and automatic dependent surveillance – contract (ADS-C). GNSS also provides a common time reference used to synchronize systems, avionics, communication networks and operations, and supports a wide range of non-aviation applications.

1.3 GNSS signals from satellites are very weak at the receiver antenna, so are vulnerable to interference. Current GNSS approvals in civil aviation use a single frequency band, this makes it easier to intentionally deny GNSS services by jamming GNSS signals and it also makes unintentional interference more likely to deny GNSS service.

1.4 GNSS typically serves more aircraft simultaneously and the interference may affect wider geographic areas than the services provided by conventional aids which can also be disrupted by interference.

1.5 The civil aviation community has been continuously working on mitigation guidelines to address GNSS vulnerability.

2. DISCUSSION

11th Air Navigation Conference (ANConf/11)

2.1 In 2003, the 11th Air Navigation Conference (ANConf/11) developed *Recommendation 6/2* to States, based on GNSS vulnerability studies conducted by the GNSS Panel, the predecessor of Navigation Systems Panel (NSP), and accompanied by a detailed Appendix on mitigation methods.

The Appendix addressed spoofers but did not provide specific mitigations, considering that spoofing was not a significant threat in its own right (ie, as distinct from jamming) as it was felt that it was “difficult” to implement (which was indeed the case at that time) and that it could be detected by normal procedures. The text of *Recommendation 6/2* is provided in **Attachment A** to this paper.

Electronic Bulletin on Interference to GNSS Signals

2.2 In 2011, the EB 2011/56 is published to describe potential sources and types (intentional or unintentional) of interference to GNSS and recalls the essential role that ICAO Member States have in ensuring protection of GNSS signals from interference. It also contains a list of documents that can be used as guidance for States in developing a regulatory framework.

2.3 Of note, the EB was primarily triggered by the first widely recognized occurrences of (unintentional) spoofing (although not named as such in the EB) encountered by civil aviation, namely those caused by the rebroadcasting of real GNSS systems by repeaters/re-radiators, typically experienced in equipment testing/maintenance setting at or near airports. This is believed to be the same technical mechanism used by intentional spoofers in at least some of the spoofing cases identified during the recent (2023) upsurge in spoofing incidents. The text of this EB is provided in **Attachment B** to this paper.

12TH Air Navigation Conference (ANConf/12)

2.4 In 2012, ANConf/12 developed *Recommendation 6/8* to States, which largely reiterates the main points of ANConf/11 Recommendation 6/2, and explicitly mentions spoofers. The text of *Recommendation 6/8* is also provided in **Attachment A** to this paper.

Memorandum of Cooperation with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

2.5 In 2012, pursuant to ANConf/12 Recommendation 6/7 (which addressed various actions on ICAO to assist States in mitigating GNSS vulnerabilities), ICAO and the international telecommunication union (ITU) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) for “providing a framework for advanced cooperation regarding the protection of the GNSS from harmful interference with a potential on aviation safety”. The MoC delimits the respective fields of responsibility of the two agencies and defines a formal cooperation procedure.

2.6 In practice, the main benefit of the MoC, beyond the institution of the formal cooperation procedure (only rarely considered for application), has been the development of constructive informal relations between the respective entities responsible for GNSS RFI matters within the two Secretariats, which have proved to be of significant help in facilitating investigation and analysis of some RFI cases.

ICAO NSP Liaison Statements to RTCA and EUROCAE on Increased Protection of GNSS Receivers

2.7 In 2014, following the issuance of EB 2011/56 (see 2.2, 2.3 above), further investigation within NSP revealed that the problems associated with GNSS RFI in general and repeaters (=unintentional spoofers) in particular were still far from being solved. Accordingly, liaison statements were sent by NSP to the relevant technical groups within RTCA and EUROCAE, describing the problem and encouraging those groups to include improved capabilities for resistance against interference (or, as a minimum, capabilities to detect the presence of interference) in their development of future GNSS avionics.

2.8 Replies were received from both groups in 2015. One group stressed the difficulty standardizing improved capabilities for the resistance to interference but expressed willingness to cooperate in defining a minimum detection capability, while pointing out that definition of the threat was a sensitive task. The other informed ICAO that it had updated its Terms of Reference to include the following item: “5. *New MOPS should address, to the extent practicable, the threats of intentional interference and spoofing.*”.

2.9 Following the exchange, both RTCA and EUROCAE have recently published avionics minimum operation performance standards (MOPS) supporting enhanced resistance to interference (eg RTCA DO-384, *MOPS for GNSS Aided Inertial Systems*; EUROCAE ED-259A/RTCA DO-401, *MOPS for Dual-Frequency Multi-Constellation Satellite-Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment*). However, the general introduction of compliant equipment is unlikely to take place in the short term.

GNSS Manual (DOC 9849)

2.10 In 2017, the third edition of the GNSS Manual was published, which significantly extended the coverage of RFI matters, by updating Chapter 5 (GNSS vulnerability) and Chapter 7 (Implementation of GNSS-based services, sections 7.12 (Anomaly reporting) and 7.13 (GNSS vulnerability: mitigating the impact on operators)).

2.11 Most importantly, it introduced a new Appendix F (GNSS Radio Frequency Interference Mitigation Plan), with over 20 pages of new material. The framework recommended to implement the mitigation plan includes a continuous three-step process, comprising threat monitoring, risk assessment and deployment of mitigation measures. Checklists of preventive and reactive measures aimed at mitigating the interference risk, as far as practicable, are also provided.

2.12 The 4th edition of the GNSS Manual was published in 2023, which introduced further updates.

40th Session of the Assembly / State Letter 2020/89 / ITU Circular Letter 488

2.13 During the 40th Session of the Assembly (2019), a number of papers called for actions to strengthen CNS systems resilience and mitigate interference to GNSS. The Assembly agreed with the proposals and recommended that the Council act with urgency on measures aimed at elimination of harmful interference.

2.14 As a follow-up, State letter 2020/89 conveyed to States the content of the Assembly agreement, and in particular the elements that were relevant for action by States. In summary they include:

- reinforcing CNS system resilience to interference;
- preventing the use of illegal interfering devices;
- increasing collaboration with radio regulatory and enforcement authorities;
- reinforcing civil-military coordination to address interference risks associated with GNSS testing and conflict zones;
- increasing coordination between aviation and radio-regulatory authority and military;

- retaining essential conventional navigation infrastructure for contingency support in case of GNSS outages;
- and developing mitigation techniques for loss of services.

2.15 Consistently with the Assembly agreement, SL 2020/89 letter also stresses the importance of applying the GNSS radio frequency interference mitigation plan outlined in the GNSS Manual (Doc 9849)¹.

2.16 The elements of SL 2020/89 reported above were also quoted in ITU Circular Letter CR/488 (2022), in which the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau noted with great concern the increasing number and range of impact of harmful interference on safety-of-life radiocommunication services used for the navigation of aircraft, and reported on related decisions by the ITU Radio Regulations Board (RRB). In the context of the ITU letter, those elements appear as “additional measures to address this critical issue”, in conjunction with the applicable provisions of the ITU’s own legal instruments invoked by the RRB in its decisions.

2.17 ICAO APAC Office issued State Letter T 8/5.10 : AP099/22 (CNS) on 21 July 2022 with Subject: *Prevention of harmful interference to Radio Navigation Satellite Service Receivers in the 1559 – 1610 MHz frequency band* to circulate the ITU RB Circular Letter CR/488 and the ICAO State Letter Ref.: AN 7/5-20/89. The ICAO APAC State Letter is provided in **Attachment C** to this paper.

41st Session of the Assembly

2.18 In 2022, just as at the 40th Session of the Assembly, a number of papers at the 41st Session of the Assembly called for actions to strengthen CNS systems resilience and mitigate interference to GNSS. In particular, one paper presented/co-sponsored by over 100 States provided information on the growing number of occurrences of GNSS RFI events, notwithstanding the actions agreed by the 40th Session of the Assembly and reiterated in State letter 2020/89. Accordingly, the paper called for further action to mitigate GNSS and strengthen CNS system resilience. The Assembly agreed with the proposals and recommended that the Council act with urgency on measures aimed at elimination of harmful interference.

2.19 The Assembly further adopted the proposed new **Appendix C to Assembly Resolution 41-8** (reproduced in **Attachment D** to this paper). The new Appendix effectively constitutes the latest and most authoritative statement of ICAO policy on GNSS (and more generally CNS systems) resilience, and directly addresses both jamming and spoofing.

Amendment 93 to Annex 10, Volume I

2.20 Amendment 93 to Annex 10, Volume I (applicable from 2 November 2023) introduces dual-frequency, multi-constellation (DFMC) GNSS. DFMC GNSS, by introducing additional frequencies of GNSS operation and additional GNSS constellations, enhances resistance to GNSS RFI insofar as interference, both intentional and unintentional, targeting only one GNSS frequency or one constellation, can potentially be mitigated by the use of alternative GNSS frequencies and/or constellation. Avionics standards (MOPS) supporting DFMC GNSS have been

¹ Most of the elements of SL 2020/89 reported above were also explicitly quoted in [ITU Circular Letter CR/488 \(2022\)](#), in which the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau noted with great concern the increasing number and range of impact of harmful interference on safety-of-life radiocommunication services used for the navigation of aircraft, and reported on related decisions by the ITU Radio Regulations Board (RRB). In the context of the ITU letter, those elements appear as “additional measures to address this critical issue”, in conjunction with the applicable provisions of the ITU’s own legal instruments invoked by the RRB in its decisions.

published (EUROCAE ED-259A/RTCA DO-401, mentioned in section above) or are under development. However, as mentioned in section 5 above, general introduction of compliant equipment is unlikely to take place in the short term.

Ongoing NSP Work

2.21 Ongoing NSP work related to GNSS RFI mitigation is driven mainly by Job cards NSP.003 (GNSS Evolution – SBAS); NSP.006 (GNSS RFI) and NSP.008 (Alternative Position Navigation and Timing (APNT)).

2.22 Under Job card NSP.003, an additional optional authentication feature in the SBAS SARPs is being developed. The purpose of the feature is to prevent spoofing of SBAS signals¹.

2.23 Under Job card NSP.006, planned deliverables include an update of the existing GNSS RFI-related guidance in Doc 9849 (see 2.10, 2.11, 2.12) and Doc 8071, and a concept of operation for next generation equipment functions to improve navigation service robustness in the presence of RFI to GNSS.

2.24 A significant recent development triggered by the NSP work under this Job card was the approval by the ITU World Radiocommunications Conference (2023) (WRC-23) of a **Resolution on prevention and mitigation of harmful interference to GNSS (Resolution COM 5/5 (WRC-2023))**² (reproduced in **Attachment E** to this paper).

2.25 Under Job card NSP.008, planned deliverables include guidance as appropriate to maintain safe and efficient operations in case of GNSS outages (to be coordinated with other panels³); a report on APNT, including consideration of the feasibility of a long-term replacement or enhancement of DME as the main APNT system); and amendments to DME and other provisions in Annex 10, Volume I, to optimize APNT functions while preparing for an efficient transition.

APANPIRG Conclusions and Actions

2.26 With the introduction of GNSS-based operations in 1990s, Asia & Pacific Regions have been discussing various challenges and resolving measures for GNSS interference, some APANPIRG Conclusions were developed and adopted, including **APANPIRG Conclusion 8/43** - GNSS Frequency Based Interference (1997), **Conclusion 9/32** - GNSS Frequency Protection (1998), **Conclusion 22/28** - Protection of aviation utility of GNSS (2011), **Conclusion APANPIRG/27/36**: Protection of GNSS signal against jamming (2016).

2.27 Promoting awareness on GNSS RFI was identified as a key action in dealing with CNS Challenges in 2024 by the APANPIRG/34, the meeting urged States and airspace users (through

¹ An optional authentication feature for GBAS signals was introduced in Annex 10, Volume I in 2009 (Amendment 86).

² The process that led to the approval of the Resolution started with the agreement reached by NSP/7 that an ITU WRC resolution on GNSS RFI would be highly desirable. In this connection, the meeting also agreed that the Frequency Spectrum Management Panel (FSMP) should also be approached to ensure that the formal ICAO position for WRC-23 recognize that a WRC-23 ITU resolution was desirable. NSP/7 also encouraged aviation stakeholders to coordinate this matter with State radio regulatory authorities. Although FSMP could not agree to modify the ICAO position, it created a correspondence group (CG) on the issue. The purpose of the CG would be to help collect the relevant information that may be helpful for national Administrations to submit to the relevant ITU technical bodies in preparation for WRC-23. The output of the CG was submitted to ITU Working Party 4C and to the European regional body responsible for the development of the European proposals for ITU WRC-23. Triggered, inter alia, by this material, the European proposals for ITU WRC-23 included a draft Resolution on prevention and mitigation of harmful interference to GNSS, which was eventually adopted by the WRC with some modifications as the above mentioned Resolution COM5/5 (WRC-23).

³ In particular, coordination with FLTOPSP has been initiated recently.

IATA) to report GNSS occurrences to ICAO APAC Office using the reporting templates which would be circulated in a State Letter. With reference to Doc 9849, the Eighth Meeting of Spectrum Review Working Group (SRWG/8) proposed and adopted the example forms for GNSS Interference Reporting in APAC, which is provided in **Attachment F** to this paper.

3. ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

- a) note the information contained in this paper;
- b) share above mentioned information with all stakeholders;
- c) sensitize the national radio regulatory Authority to this issue; and
- d) take actions to address this critical issue as appropriate.

Recommendation 6/2 of the 11th Air Navigation Conference (ANConf/11) in 2003

Recommendation 6/2 — Guidelines on mitigation of GNSS vulnerabilities

That States in their planning and introduction of GNSS services:

- a) assess the likelihood and effects of GNSS vulnerabilities in their airspace and utilize, as necessary, the mitigation methods as outlined in the guidelines contained in Appendix A to the report on Agenda Item 6;
- b) provide effective spectrum management and protection of GNSS frequencies to reduce the possibility of unintentional interference;
- c) take full advantage of on-board mitigation techniques, particularly inertial navigation;
- d) where determined that terrestrial navigation aids need to be retained as part of an evolutionary transition to GNSS, give priority to retention of DME in support of INS/DME or DME/DME RNAV for en-route and terminal operations, and of ILS or MLS in support of precision approach operations at selected runways; and
- e) take full advantage of the future contribution of new GNSS signals and constellations in the reduction of GNSS failures and vulnerabilities.

Recommendation 6/8 of the 12TH Air Navigation Conference (ANConf/12) in 2012

Recommendation 6/8 – Planning for mitigation of global navigation satellite system vulnerabilities

That States:

- a) assess the likelihood and effects of global navigation satellite system vulnerabilities in their airspace and apply, as necessary, recognized and available mitigation methods;
- b) provide effective spectrum management and protection of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) frequencies to reduce the likelihood of unintentional interference or degradation of GNSS performance;
- c) report to ICAO cases of harmful interference to global navigation satellite system that may have an impact on international civil aviation operations;
- d) develop and enforce a strong regulatory framework governing the use of global navigation satellite system repeaters, pseudolites, spoofers and jammers;
- e) allow for realization of the full advantages of on-board mitigation techniques, particularly inertial navigation systems; and
- f) where it is determined that terrestrial aids are needed as part of a mitigation strategy, give priority to retention of distance measuring equipment (DME) in support of inertial navigation system (INS)/DME or DME/DME area navigation, and of instrument landing system at selected runways.



International Civil Aviation Organization

ELECTRONIC BULLETIN

For information only

EB 2011/56
AN 7/5

21 November 2011

INTERFERENCE TO GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS) SIGNALS

1. Aviation operations increasingly rely on the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) to improve navigation performance and to support air traffic control surveillance functions.
2. However, the full benefits of GNSS can only be achieved if GNSS signals are adequately protected from electromagnetic interference which can cause loss or degradation of GNSS services.
3. Potential sources of interference to GNSS include both systems operating within the same frequency bands as GNSS and systems operating outside those bands. Interference can be intentional (“jamming”) or unintentional.
4. ICAO Member States have an essential role in ensuring protection of GNSS signals from interference. This can be achieved through cooperation of national aviation and telecommunication authorities in the introduction and enforcement of appropriate regulations controlling the use of the radio spectrum.
5. Attachment A briefly describes some sources of interference to GNSS and discusses regulatory means available to States to deal with them. Attachment B contains a list of documents that can be used as guidance for States in developing a regulatory framework.

Enclosures:

- A — Sources of interference to GNSS
- B — References

Issued under the authority of the Secretary General

**SOURCES OF INTERFERENCE TO THE
GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS)**

**1. INTERFERENCE TO GNSS CAUSED BY SYSTEMS
TRANSMITTING IN GNSS FREQUENCY BANDS**

1.1 GNSS repeaters and pseudolites

1.1.1 Certain non-aeronautical systems transmit radio signals intended to supplement GNSS coverage in areas where GNSS signals cannot be readily received (e.g. inside buildings). These systems include GNSS repeaters and pseudolites.

1.1.2 GNSS repeaters (also known as “re-radiators”) are systems that amplify existing GNSS signals and re-radiate them in real-time. Pseudolites are ground-based systems that generate ranging signals similar to those transmitted by GNSS satellites.

1.1.3 When these systems do not operate under appropriate conditions, harmful interference may be caused to the reception of the original GNSS signals by aircraft and other aeronautical systems (such as the reference receivers used in augmentation systems). This may disrupt a wide range of GNSS applications.

1.1.4 To prevent this disruption, a State needs to create a regulatory framework for the sale, ownership and operation of these systems. The framework must include regulations to ensure that use of the systems be permitted only where they have a legitimate application and their operation is not harmful to existing primary users of GNSS-based services. Additional measures may be necessary when repeaters and pseudolites are used on or in the vicinity of airports (e.g. in hangars, for testing/maintenance purposes).

1.1.5 Attachment B contains a list of documents that can be used as guidance for States developing a regulatory framework. They include interference analyses and examples of regulations currently in force in Europe and the United States.

1.2 GNSS jammers

1.2.1 GNSS jammers are devices which intentionally generate harmful interference to GNSS signals to impair or deny their reception. They may be employed for various reasons, typically with the intent of disabling devices that record and/or relay GNSS position information (e.g. for tracking or fee collection purposes). However, the interference they generate can potentially affect all users of GNSS, not only the intended targets of the jamming. Thus, they may have an impact far greater than intended by their operator.

1.2.2 Usage of GNSS jammers may proliferate further if GNSS-based fee collection or tracking services are not adequately designed, e.g. if the simple use of a jamming device enables the avoidance of the charge or tracking.

1.2.3 To prevent degradation of GNSS services due to GNSS jammers, States should implement and enforce policies and regulations that forbid the sale, export, purchase, ownership and use of GNSS jammers, and they should prohibit all actions that lead to an interruption of GNSS signals¹. Adequate means of enforcement of such policies and regulations require the availability of GNSS signal monitoring capabilities. Furthermore, GNSS-based services should be designed in such a way that simple jamming does not result in denial of the service.

2. **INTERFERENCE TO GNSS CAUSED BY SYSTEMS TRANSMITTING OUTSIDE THE GNSS FREQUENCY BANDS**

2.1 In addition to the threats described above, systems operating outside the GNSS frequency bands that are not properly designed or are inappropriately regulated and operated may interfere with GNSS.

2.2 GNSS frequencies are protected by international agreements (*ICAO Convention on International Civil Aviation* and *ITU Radio Regulations*), and enable aviation services that have significant economical and societal benefits. However, there is also significant demand for electromagnetic spectrum for new applications, such as mobile phone and broadband data services, which may compromise spectrum compatibility. States should require that any such application will not interfere with GNSS signals through execution of adequate spectrum management practices.

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¹ In some States, military authorities test their equipment by occasionally transmitting jamming signals that deny service in a specific area. This activity should be coordinated with State spectrum authorities and air navigation service providers to enable them to determine the airspace affected, advise aircraft operators and develop any required contingency procedures.

REFERENCES

ECC Report 129: “Technical and operational provisions required for the use of GNSS repeaters”, Dublin, January 2009 (available at: <http://www.ecodocdb.dk/>, see under “ECC Reports”)

ECC Report 145: “Regulatory framework for Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) repeaters”, St. Petersburg, May 2010 (available at: <http://www.ecodocdb.dk/>, see under “ECC Reports”)

ECC Recommendation (10)02, “A framework for authorization regime of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) repeaters” (available at: <http://www.ecodocdb.dk/>, see under “ECC Recommendations”)

United States National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management (Redbook), sections 8.3.28 – 8.3.30 (available at: <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/2011/manual-regulations-and-procedures-federal-radio-frequency-management-redbook>)

Note.— The relevant sections of the NTIA Redbook only apply to the United States Federal Government users. Use of repeaters by non-government users is prohibited in the United States.

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منظمة الطيران
المدني الدولي

国际民用
航空组织

Ref.: T 8/5.10 : AP099/22 (CNS)

21 July 2022

Subject: Prevention of harmful interference to Radio
Navigation Satellite Service Receivers in the
1559 – 1610 MHz frequency band

Action Required:

- 1) Note the information contained in the ITU RB Circular Letter CR/488;
- 2) Note the information contained in the ICAO State Letter Ref.: AN 7/5-20/89; and
- 3) Take actions as appropriate.

Dear Sir/Madam,

I wish to draw your attention to the prevention of harmful interference to Radio Navigation Satellite Service Receivers in the 1559 – 1610 MHz frequency band.

The Radiocommunication Bureau (RB) of International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has been informed of a significant number of cases of harmful interference to the radio navigation satellite service (RNSS) in the 1559 – 1610 MHz frequency band affecting receivers onboard aircrafts, causing degradation or total loss of the service for passenger, cargo and humanitarian flights, and leading to misleading information provided by RNSS receivers to pilots in some cases. Based on in-flight monitoring of air transport category aircraft global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers by one major aircraft manufacturer, 10843 radio-frequency interference events were detected globally in 2021. The majority of these events occurred in the Middle East region, but several events were also detected in the European, North American, and Asian regions.

With great concern about the increasing number and range of impact of such harmful interference on safety-of-life radiocommunication services used for the navigation of aircraft, the ITU RB issued the Circular Letter CR/488 with the subject of *Prevention of harmful interference to Radio Navigation Satellite Service Receivers in the 1559 – 1610 MHz frequency band* on 8th July 2022 which is provided in **Attachment A**.

The Circular Letter also highlighted the recommendations and measures on prevention and mitigation of harmful interference to GNSS agreed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) at 40th Assembly in October 2019 and disseminated by ICAO State Letter Ref.: AN 7/5-20/89 dated 28th August 2020 with Subject of *Strengthening of communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) systems resilience and mitigation of interference to global navigation satellite system (GNSS)* provided in **Attachment B**.

Your State/Administration is strongly encouraged to share above mentioned information with operators, service providers and all stakeholders, sensitize the national radio regulatory Authority to the risk encountered by the civil aviation, and take actions to address this critical issue as appropriate.

Accept, Sir/Madam, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Tao Ma
Regional Director

Enclosures:

Attachment A – ITU RB Circular Letter CR/488

Attachment B – ICAO State Letter Ref.: AN 7/5-20/89



Radiocommunication Bureau (BR)

Circular Letter
CR/488

8 July 2022

To Administrations of Member States of the ITU

Subject: **Prevention of harmful interference to Radio Navigation Satellite Service Receivers in the 1559 – 1610 MHz frequency band**

Following its initial report to the 2019 World Radiocommunication Conference, the Radiocommunication Bureau has been informed of a significant number of cases of harmful interference to the radionavigation-satellite service (RNSS) in the 1 559 – 1 610 MHz frequency band affecting receivers onboard aircrafts and causing degradation or total loss of the service for passenger, cargo and humanitarian flights. In some cases, this has also led to misleading information provided by RNSS receivers to pilots. Based on in-flight monitoring of air transport category aircraft GNSS receivers by one major aircraft manufacturer, 10 843 radio-frequency interference events were detected globally in 2021. The majority of these events occurred in the Middle East region, but several events were also detected in the European, North American and Asian regions.

The Bureau has noted with great concern the increasing number and range of impact of such harmful interference on safety-of-life radiocommunication services used for the navigation of aircraft (see No. **4.10¹**). In accordance with RR No. **13.2**, the Bureau reported such cases to the Radio Regulations Board (RRB), together with its recommendations.

At its 89th meeting in March 2022, the ITU Radio Regulations Board (RRB) considered the situation and instructed the Bureau to issue a circular letter to the Member States to disseminate its decisions and other background information about the prevention of harmful interference to RNSS receivers.

Following this instruction, the Bureau has prepared the present circular letter. It summarizes the RRB's decisions on the issue, formulates recommendations concerning mitigation of harmful interference to the radionavigation-satellite service and provides the list of the relevant ITU-R reference documents.

¹ “Member States recognize that the safety aspects of radionavigation and other safety services require special measures to ensure their freedom from harmful interference; it is necessary therefore to take this factor into account in the assignment and use of frequencies.”

The relevant decisions of the 89th RRB meeting

In accordance with No. 13.2, the Board decided to request Member States to ensure that their operating agencies complied with the applicable provisions of the ITU legal instruments, as emphasized below:

- *“All stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Member States or of recognized operating agencies, or of other duly authorized operating agencies which carry on a radio service, and which operate in accordance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations.”* (Article 45 of the ITU Constitution)
- *“to take the steps required to prevent the transmission or circulation of false or deceptive distress, urgency, safety or identification signals, and to collaborate in locating and identifying stations under their jurisdiction transmitting such signals.”* (Article 47 of the ITU Constitution)
- *“1 Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations.*

2 Nevertheless, these installations must, so far as possible, observe statutory provisions relative to giving assistance in case of distress and to the measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference, and the provisions of the Administrative Regulations concerning the types of emission and the frequencies to be used, according to the nature of the service performed by such installations.

3 Moreover, when these installations take part in the service of public correspondence or other services governed by the Administrative Regulations, they must, in general, comply with the regulatory provisions for the conduct of such services.” (Article 48 of the ITU Constitution)

- *“Recognizing that transmissions on distress and safety frequencies and frequencies used for the safety and regularity of flight (see Article 31 and Appendix 27) require absolute international protection and that the elimination of harmful interference to such transmissions is imperative, administrations undertake to act immediately when their attention is drawn to any such harmful interference.”* (RR No. **15.28**)

The Board further decided to request Member States to continue to exercise their utmost goodwill and mutual assistance in the application of the provisions of Article 45 of the Constitution and of Section VI of Article **15** of the Radio Regulations.

Recommendations on prevention and mitigation of harmful interference to RNSS

With respect to unnecessary transmissions, which represent one of the important sources of interference to RNSS, the Bureau would like to point out that the use of devices commonly referred as “GNSS jammers” or any other illegal interfering equipment, which may cause harmful interference to aircraft, are prohibited by provision No. **15.1** of the Radio Regulations:

*15.1 § 1 All stations are forbidden to carry out unnecessary transmissions, or the transmission of superfluous signals, or the transmission of false or misleading signals, or the transmission of signals without identification (except as provided for in Article **19**).*

In addition, the administrations are encouraged to consider the following additional measures to address this critical issue:

- a) reinforcing navigation systems resilience to interference;
- b) increasing collaboration between radio regulatory and enforcement authorities;
- c) reinforcing civil-military coordination to address interference risks associated with RNSS testing and conflict zones;
- d) increasing coordination between aviation, military and radio-regulatory authorities;
- e) retaining essential conventional navigation infrastructure for contingency support in case of RNSS outages, and developing mitigation techniques for loss of services.

The above measures were decided by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) at its 40th Assembly in October 2019 and disseminated by ICAO State Letter AN 7/5-20/89 dated 28 August 2020.

Relevant ITU-R reference documents

In order to get an overview of the usage and protection requirements of systems operating in the radionavigation-satellite service, administrations may consult the following ITU-R Recommendations and Reports:

- [Recommendation ITU-R M.1787-4 – Description of systems and networks in the radionavigation-satellite service \(space-to-Earth and space-to-space\) and technical characteristics of transmitting space stations operating in the bands 1 164-1 215 MHz, 1 215-1 300 MHz and 1 559-1 610 MHz](#)
- [Recommendation ITU-R M.1901-3 – Guidance on ITU-R Recommendations related to systems and networks in the radionavigation-satellite service operating in the frequency bands 1 164-1 215 MHz, 1 215-1 300 MHz, 1 559-1 610 MHz, 5 000-5 010 MHz and 5 010-5 030 MHz](#)
- [Recommendation ITU-R M.1903-1 – Characteristics and protection criteria for receiving earth stations in the radionavigation-satellite service \(space-to-Earth\) and receivers in the aeronautical radionavigation service operating in the band 1 559-1 610 MHz](#)
- [Report ITU-R M.2458-0 – Radionavigation-satellite service applications in the 1 164-1 215 MHz, 1 215-1 300 MHz and 1 559-1 610 MHz frequency bands](#)

The Bureau thanks Administrations for disseminating this information among their different operating agencies to raise awareness of the situation and to remind them of their obligation to prevent any harmful interference in accordance with ITU's Legal Instruments.



Mario Maniewicz
Director

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28 August 2020

Subject: Strengthening of communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) systems resilience and mitigation of interference to global navigation satellite system (GNSS)

Action required: Note the criticality of the issue and the importance of action by States to address it by making use of the ICAO guidance provided in Doc 9849, *Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Manual* and by taking any other measures as appropriate

Sir/Madam,

1. I have the honour to inform you that the Council, at the ninth meeting of its 220th Session on 22 June 2020, agreed with the proposal to bring to the attention of States the actions agreed by the 40th Session of the Assembly (24 September – 4 October 2019) with regard to communications, navigation, and surveillance (CNS) systems resilience and mitigation of harmful interference to global navigation satellite system (GNSS).

2. The agreed actions were pursuant to proposals contained in Assembly working papers A40-WP/82, A40-WP/352 and A40-WP/188, presented respectively by Finland on behalf of the EU and its Member States¹, by Saudi Arabia and jointly by the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA), the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA). The papers identified issues related to the evolution of CNS systems and the associated threats and vulnerabilities, with particular regard to satellite-based CNS systems, such as GNSS. They highlighted, in particular, the impact from harmful interference to GNSS on the safety and efficiency of aircraft and ATM operations, and identified the need to strengthen the protection of GNSS signals from harmful interference and degradation of performance through actions by States and ICAO in coordination with industry.

¹ Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.

3. The Assembly noted the essential commonality of purpose among the three papers and agreed with the proposals contained therein (*Assembly Fortieth Session, Technical Commission Report*, Doc 10137, A40-TE, 30.15 refers). The attachment to this letter compiles the proposals that are relevant for action by States. In summary, they include: reinforcing CNS system resilience to interference, preventing the use of illegal interfering devices, increasing collaboration with radio regulatory and enforcement authorities, reinforcing civil-military coordination to address interference risks associated with GNSS testing and conflict zones, increasing coordination between aviation and radio-regulatory authority and military, retaining essential conventional navigation infrastructure for contingency support in case of GNSS outages, and developing mitigation techniques for loss of services.

4. In particular, all three papers stress the importance of applying the GNSS radio frequency interference mitigation plan outlined in the ICAO *Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Manual* (Doc 9849). The framework recommended to implement the mitigation plan includes a continuous three-step process, comprising threat monitoring, risk assessment and deployment of mitigation measures. Checklists of preventive and reactive measures aimed at mitigating the interference risk, as far as practicable, are also provided.

5. May I request that you note the criticality of the issue and the importance of action by States to address it by making use of the ICAO guidance provided in Doc 9849, and by taking any other measures, as appropriate.

Accept, Sir/Madam, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Fang Liu
Secretary General

Enclosure:

Actions agreed by the 40th Session of the Assembly to strengthen CNS systems resilience and mitigate interference to GNSS

**Actions agreed by the 40th Session of the Assembly
to strengthen CNS systems resilience and mitigate interference to GNSS**

From A40-WP/82, States are urged to:

- “1) transition from a CNS system-based concept towards secure CNS services, mainly based on a satellite-based infrastructure while addressing its resiliency to interference through independent minimum operational networks based on ground and/or airborne components;
- 2) apply necessary measures to avoid the commercialisation / proliferation and the use of illegal transmitters such as jammers which may impact satellite-based CNS systems;
- 3) ensure, considering that the use of radio frequency spectrum by aeronautical safety services requires special measures, close collaboration between aviation authorities, service providers, radio regulatory and spectrum enforcement authorities to ensure that this spectrum is free from harmful interference;
- 4) reinforce civil-military collaboration regarding global navigation satellite system (GNSS) testing and other activities, which may impact satellite-based CNS systems, with the air navigation services provider (ANSP) responsible for the affected airspace; and
- 5) consider, when assessing the interference risks associated with conflict zones, that the use of satellite-based CNS systems can potentially be impacted beyond that zone.”

From A40-WP/352, States are urged to:

- “1) assess the likelihood and effects of global navigation satellite system vulnerabilities in their airspace and apply, as necessary, ICAO mitigation methods;
- 2) provide effective spectrum management and protection of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) frequencies to reduce the likelihood of unintentional interference or degradation of GNSS performance; and
- 3) cooperate for design, development and realization of Ground and on-board mitigation techniques of GNSS loss of service;”

From A40-WP/188, the Assembly is invited to:

- “a) to implement appropriate mitigation measures as contained in the *Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Manual* (Doc 9849) as a matter of high priority and to report progress and any difficulties to ICAO;
- b) to recognize the unintended impact of harmful interference to civil flight operations and to exercise caution to the maximum extent possible to protect the safety of civil aircraft during military exercises and operations;
- c) to establish and ensure appropriate frequency regulations are in place and maintained to protect allocated GNSS frequencies from harmful interference in line with ITU Radio Regulations;
- d) to ensure that contingency procedures are established in coordination with air navigation service providers and airspace users and that essential conventional navigation infrastructure, such as Instrument Landing System (ILS), are retained when operationally beneficial; and
- e) to support the multi-disciplinary development of alternative positioning, navigation and timing (APNT) strategy and solutions to complement the use of GNSS in aviation in coordination with ICAO and airspace users.”

Assembly Resolutions in Force Relevant to GNSS RFI

(as of 7 October 2022)
Extracted from Doc 10184.

**A41-8: Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies
and practices related to a global air traffic
management (ATM) system and communications,
navigation, and surveillance/air traffic management
(CNS/ATM) systems**

**APPENDIX C
Ensuring the resilience of ICAO CNS/ATM systems and services**

Whereas the CNS/ATM systems are evolving and so are the associated CNS threats and vulnerabilities;

Whereas the occurrences of interferences against satellite-based CNS systems and global navigation satellite system (GNSS), in particular, have significantly increased;

Whereas CNS resiliency to interference needs to be addressed at a global level with a holistic approach, ensuring an efficient and coordinated evolution between the infrastructure architecture, improved technological capabilities, civil and military operational procedures, radio regulatory authorities and civil-military coordination;

Recognizing that resiliency to interference needs to be improved by maximizing the integration of all suitable ground infrastructure, space infrastructure and airborne components in a complementary and cooperative manner to be as robust as possible to cases of satellite-based service disruption or environments where false or deceptive signals are present;

Recognizing that both the aircraft on-board and ground infrastructure complementing the satellite-based CNS systems need to be adapted to include, where appropriate, interference detection, mitigation and reporting functions to support the resolution of operationally encountered performance anomalies;

Believing that, combined with the use of the appropriate legal framework, such capabilities and measures will allow for the relevant authorities to act upon harmful interferences caused by the illegal operation of transmitters and avoid the proliferation and the use of such illegal transmitters and the misuse of test and maintenance equipment;

Believing that, with appropriate coordination and application of best practices, military and State authorities can conduct GNSS-related testing and other interventions using radio equipment as necessary and without causing an undue impact on civil aviation;

Believing that civil-military coordination should facilitate the sharing of relevant information with airspace users, especially when flying in the vicinity of a conflict zone; and

Acknowledging that loss of crew's situational awareness from malicious origin is classified as a cyber-security threat and cannot be tolerated in civil aviation; and that intentionally sending misleading signals to replace the accurate signal is a far more serious threat to flight safety than the loss of this signal.

The Assembly:

1. *Encourages* States to transition towards optimized, secure CNS systems based on complementary integration of suitable and independent aircraft capabilities, satellite- and ground-based infrastructure which maximize resiliency and robustness to any type of interference;
2. *Encourages* standardization bodies and industry to develop appropriate interference detection, mitigation and reporting capabilities for the aircraft on-board, satellite- and ground-based CNS system components, in order to ensure higher CNS resiliency, continuity of operations and prevent any cascading effects from the use of compromised position, velocity or time data;
3. *Encourages* States to ensure that sufficient terrestrial CNS capabilities remain available to ensure safe operations and complement aircraft-level integration of position, velocity and time with independent surveillance information;
4. *Invites* ICAO to develop high-level principles on how to integrate CNS ground, space and on-board systems and capabilities to obtain more resilient positioning and timing services;
5. *Urges* States to apply necessary measures to avoid the commercialization/proliferation and the use of illegal transmitters such as jammers and the misuse of test and maintenance equipment which may impact CNS systems;
6. *Urges* States to ensure close collaboration between aviation authorities, military authorities, service providers, radio regulatory and spectrum enforcement authorities to put in place any special measures required to ensure that spectrum used by all CNS systems, and GNSS in particular, is free from harmful interference;
7. *Urges* States to refrain from any form of jamming, or spoofing affecting civil aviation;
8. *Urges* States to coordinate and notify to the maximum extent possible in advance with the air navigation services provider (ANSP) responsible for the affected airspace in case of military or other State-authorized security or defence-related operations or training, potentially causing any form of jamming, or spoofing affecting civil aviation; and
9. *Urges* States and operators, when assessing the interference risks associated with conflict zones, to consider that the use of satellite-based CNS systems can potentially be impacted beyond those zones.

RESOLUTION COM5/5 (WRC-23)

Prevention and mitigation of harmful interference to the radionavigation-satellite service in the frequency bands 1 164-1 215 MHz and 1 559-1 610 MHz

The World Radiocommunication Conference (Dubai, 2023),

considering

- a) that the radionavigation-satellite service (RNSS) in the frequency bands 1 164-1 215 MHz and 1 559-1 610 MHz is used in several aeronautical and maritime communication, navigation and surveillance safety-of-life systems;
- b) that the RNSS is used for safety-of-life applications, for scientific applications and in many applications and devices around the world and across all sectors of the global economy, as described in Report ITU-R M.2458;
- c) that harmful interference to the RNSS has potential consequences for safety systems used by aeronautical and maritime applications, and for the regularity and efficiency of civil aviation operations;
- d) that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has taken action to reinforce the resilience to interference of aeronautical positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) systems (see ICAO Assembly Resolution 41-8, Appendix C);
- e) that ICAO has established a strategy for retaining essential conventional PNT infrastructure for contingency support in case of RNSS outages, and for developing mitigation techniques for loss of services (see Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 10, Vol. I, Att. H); however, such infrastructure and mitigation techniques may not be available in some areas (for example, over the high seas);
- f) that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) through its Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), despite actions taken to mitigate the impact of harmful interference on RNSS and its applications, has recognized that harmful interference impacting RNSS poses a substantial risk to the safety of navigation, the safety of life and property, and the protection of the marine environment (see MSC.1/Circ. 1644);
- g) that harmful interference to RNSS may be difficult to detect and trace to origin,

recognizing

- a) that disruption to RNSS has been identified globally by the aeronautical community and the maritime community;
- b) that there are different types of activities, notably the use of unauthorized transmitters, which may cause the disruption;
- c) that ICAO decided at its 40th Assembly in October 2019 to take measures to prevent and avoid interference to RNSS;
- d) that the Radiocommunication Bureau, in response to a decision of the Radio Regulations Board, issued Circular Letter CR/488, containing recommendations to Member States concerning mitigation of harmful interference to the RNSS;
- e) that Article 45 of the ITU Constitution states that “All stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Member States or of recognized operating agencies, or of other duly authorized operating agencies which carry on a radio service, and which operate in accordance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations”;
- f) that Article 47 of the Constitution states that “Member States agree to take the steps required to prevent the transmission or circulation of false or deceptive distress, urgency, safety or identification

signals, and to collaborate in locating and identifying stations under their jurisdiction transmitting such signals”;

g) that No. **4.10** states that “the safety aspects of radionavigation and other safety services require special measures to ensure their freedom from harmful interference”;

h) that No. **5.328A** states that “Stations in the radionavigation-satellite service in the band 1 164-1 215 MHz shall operate in accordance with the provisions of Resolution **609 (Rev.WRC-07)** and shall not claim protection from stations in the aeronautical radionavigation service in the band 960-1 215 MHz. No. **5.43A** does not apply. The provisions of No. **21.18** shall apply”;

i) that prevention, identification, reporting and handling of cases of harmful interference, are subject to the provisions of Article **15**;

j) that there are other RNSS applications in the frequency bands 1 164-1 215 MHz and 1 559-1 610 MHz and that there are other RNSS applications operating in other frequency bands that need to be protected and that are not within the scope of this Resolution,

resolves to urge administrations

1 to apply necessary measures to avoid the proliferation, circulation and operation of unauthorized transmitters that cause or have the potential to cause harmful interference to RNSS systems and networks operating in the frequency bands 1 164-1 215 MHz and 1 559-1 610 MHz, including possible measures that might need to be taken with respect to *recognizing j*);

2 to take the following actions to prevent and mitigate harmful interference affecting RNSS operating in the frequency bands 1 164-1 215 MHz and 1 559-1 610 MHz without prejudice to the right of administrations to deny access to RNSS, for security or defence purposes:

2.1 to encourage collaboration between spectrum regulators, enforcement authorities and RNSS stakeholders, in particular in the aeronautical and maritime domains;

2.2 to encourage cooperation between aeronautical, maritime and security authorities, as well as spectrum regulators, as appropriate, to address interference risks to RNSS systems that may stem from the activities of these security authorities;

3 to report cases, as the affected administration deems appropriate, of harmful interference to RNSS in accordance with Article **15**,

instructs the Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau

to provide, on request, assistance to administrations in accordance with No. **13.2**,

instructs the Secretary-General

to bring this Resolution to the attention of ICAO and IMO.

— END —

ICAO APAC Example Forms for GNSS RFI Reporting to States

1.Example form for use by ATS Personnel

GNSS RFI REPORTING FORM FOR USE BY ATS PERSONNEL	
Originator of report	
Organization	
Department	
Street address	
Zip code/city	
Name/surname	
Phone number	
E-Mail	
Date and time of report	
Description of interference	
Source of initial interference report	☐ Pilot ☐ Engineer/technician ☐ Other
Observability of the interference	Interference was noticeable: ☐ only on board the aircraft (flying, not on the ground)

GNSS RFI REPORTING FORM FOR USE BY ATS PERSONNEL	
	☐ only on the ground (aircraft parked/taxiing) or by means of ground detection systems available ☐ both
Number of received reports	
Coordinates of the area of occurrence/time (UTC)	UTC: ____Lat: ____Long: ____FL/Altitude: ____
Problem duration:	Days, hours, minutes, seconds _____ ☐ continuous ☐ intermittent
Affected GNSS element	☐ GPS ☐ GLONASS ☐ GALILEO ☐ BDS ☐ Other constellation ☐ EGNOS ☐ WAAS ☐ BDSBAS ☐ Other SBAS ☐ GBAS (VHF data-link for GBAS)
Affected constellation frequency	☐ L1 ☐ L5 ☐ Both
Used GNSS contingency procedure	☐ Radar vectoring ☐ Switch to procedures based on conventional navaids (e.g. DME/DME or VOR/DME-based PBN, DME and VOR-based conventional, ILS) ☐ Diversion to another airport ☐ Missed approach ☐ Use of alternate means for communication (e.g. VHF) ☐ Other: ____
In case of report by pilot	
Airline name	
Aircraft type and registration	
Flight number	
Airway/route flown	
Reported on-board failure	☐ Total loss of navigation capabilities ☐ Need to change the navigation procedure ☐ Inability to fly RNP and request for radar vectoring ☐ Inability to fly a GNSS-based approach (GLS, SLS) ☐ GNSS fault (1 or 2) ☐ TAWS/EGPWS warnings or loss of terrain and surface functionalities ☐ Loss of ADS-B ☐ Wind and ground speed wrong presentations ☐ Aircraft clock anomaly ☐ Loss of situational awareness (SVS, Cockpit Display of Traffic Information)

GNSS RFI REPORTING FORM FOR USE BY ATS PERSONNEL	
	☐ Loss of communication functions (CPDLC, ACARS) ☐ AHRS failure ☐ Map shift ☐ Other: ____
Information on presumed source of interference	
Presumed location of interference source	Lat: ____ Long: ____ or Nearest city or landmark:
Interfering frequency (if known)	
Signal strength and reference bandwidth (if known)	
Further descriptions of the interference case	☐ Spectrum plot ☐ Map ☐ Other material:

2.Example form for use by pilots

GNSS RFI REPORTING FORM FOR USE BY PILOTS	
Originator of report	
Organization	
Department	
Street address	
Zip code/city	
Name/surname	
Phone number	
E-mail	
Date and time of report	
Description of interference	
Reported failure and operational impact	☐ Total loss of navigation capabilities ☐ Need to change the navigation procedure ☐ Inability to fly RNP and request for radar vectoring ☐ Inability to fly a GNSS-based approach (GLS, SLS) ☐ GNSS fault (1 or 2) ☐ TAWS/EGPWS warnings or loss of terrain and surface functionalities

	☐ Loss of ADS-B ☐ Wind and ground speed wrong presentations ☐ Aircraft clock anomaly ☐ Loss of situational awareness (SVS, Cockpit Display of Traffic Information) ☐ Loss of communication functions (CPDLC, ACARS) ☐ AHRS failure ☐ Map shift ☐ Other: ____
Used GNSS contingency procedure	☐ Request for radar vectoring ☐ Switch to another mean of navigation (e.g. DME/DME, VOR/DME, ILS) ☐ Diversion to another airport ☐ Missed approach ☐ Use of alternate means for communication (e.g. VHF) ☐ Other: ____
Affected GNSS element	☐ GPS ☐ GLONASS ☐ GALILEO ☐ BDS ☐ other constellation ☐ EGNOS ☐ WAAS ☐ BDSBAS ☐ other SBAS ☐ GBAS (VHF data-link for GBAS)
Affected constellation frequency	☐ L1 ☐ L5 ☐ Both
Aircraft type and registration	
Flight number	
Airway/route flown (airport RWY/gateway/parking gate in case of on-ground detection)	
Coordinates of the area of occurrence/time (UTC)	UTC: ____Lat: ____Long: ____FL/Altitude: ____
Problem duration	Days, hours, minutes, seconds _____ ☐ continuous ☐ intermittent