



ICAO

*International Civil Aviation Organization*Sixth Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance
Working Group (AP-AA/WG/6)*Bangkok, Thailand, 2 to 5 April 2024***Agenda Item 4: Runway Safety and GRF Implementation****RUNWAY SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION BY AAI AIRPORTS**

(Presented by India)

SUMMARY

This paper presents the few scenarios/problems and the solutions used at airports under the management of the Airports Authority of India when the Runway Safety Team was established.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The primary role of a runway safety team is to advise relevant operators and service provider's management and operational staff on prevailing local conditions on the runway, taxiways and adjacent areas, other issues of concern and develop mitigating measures and solutions to identified issues.

2. DISCUSSION

A successful Runway Safety Team requires all key stakeholders to cooperate in a collaborative manner. Through this information paper, few scenarios/problems and the solutions used at airports under the management of the Airports Authority of India when the Runway Safety Team was put into place, are presented with an intention to serve as a reference for aerodrome operators, air traffic services organizations, commercial air operators, organizations representing the general aviation community, the regulatory authority, and other stakeholders interested in improving runway safety.

2.1 At one of the airports, the Runway Safety Team noticed surface damage as a result of aeroplanes at their airport doing a 180-degree lock turn. To mitigate the associated risks, airline operators were advised to use the turn-pads that are provided at the end of the runway rather than doing 180-degree lock turn procedures on the runway, which can damage the pavement.

2.2 At another airport the Runway Safety Team observed non-availability of Remaining take-off run available (TORA) signages at taxiway intersections for intersection take-offs, which could help in reducing runway occupancy time for departing aircrafts. To mitigate the same intersection take-off signs for respective taxiway intersections were provided by the station, resulting in optimum Runway utilization.

2.3 The Runway Safety Team at different airport noticed a single runway edge light fixture obstructing the free flow of CFT and fire vehicles to and from the runway to the fire station, at their airport. The concerned light was replaced by inset type fitted light as mitigation.

2.4 Another Runway Safety Team observed, signage board of one of the taxiways placed on the shoulder of preceding taxiway, as these taxiways are situated at close proximity, which could have led to confusion to the pilots during runway vacation due to possibility of using incorrect taxiway. To mitigate the confusion appropriate information has been published in the AIP. As a preventative measure, ATC keeps a careful eye on aircraft taxiing at the airport and offers extra RT assistance/Follow me services as needed.

2.5 The Runway Safety Team noted few trees, outside their airport premises obstructing the view of the ATC Tower, as mitigation, station pruned the said trees with the help of district administration.

2.6 The Runway Safety Team at another airport noted that the glare of Flood lights made the Apron Marking invisible when Apron was damp, especially during the rainy season. Because of the NOC restriction, the station was unable to raise the AFL's height. In order to lessen the glare effect without lowering the intensity level throughout Apron, the hazard was mitigated by slight change in siting angles of the AFLs.

2.7 At one airport, Runway Safety Team observed during inspection that on occasions ATCOs on watch using the mobile phones posing a potential safety hazard. As mitigation management has instructed ATCOs on watch not to use any electronic device capable of communication, social media, videos watching etc. In addition, management also discouraged ATC officers from using official cell phones to communicate with other ATC centers, saying it should be allowed only when there is severe degradation of communication system causing coordination difficulties as the coordination done on mobile phone is not recorded and therefore, it has inherent disadvantage for purpose of quality control and investigation of an accident.

3. ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

- a) note the information contained in this paper;
- b) encourage members State to share their knowledge and experience on Runway Safety; and
- c) discuss any relevant matters as appropriate.

—END—