International Civil Aviation Organization

Eighth Meeting of the Aerodromes Operations and Planning Sub-Group (AOP/SG/8)

Bangkok, Thailand, 15 to 19 July 2024

Agenda Item 4: Provision of AOP in the Asia/Pacific Region

— Reports of Working Group/Task Force Meetings

REPORT ON THE SIXTH MEETING OF ASIA/PACIFIC AERODROME ASSISTANCE WORKING GROUP (AP-AA/WG/6)

(Presented by Chairperson of AP-AA/WG)

SUMMARY

This paper presents the Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group (AP-AA/WG/6).

This paper relates to –

Strategic Objectives:

*A: **Safety** –Enhanced global civil aviation safety*
*B: **Air Navigation Capacity and Efficiency** – Increase Capacity and improve efficiency of the global civil aviation system*

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Sixth Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group (AP-AA/WG/6) was held in Bangkok, Thailand from 2 to 5 April 2024.

1.2 37 participants from 8 Member States and 1 International Organization attended the meeting.

1.3 There were 16 Working Papers, 11 Information Papers considered by the AP-AA/WG/6 Meeting.

1.4 The full report of the meeting was posted on the ICAO APAC Office website and can be accessed through the following link: https://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/Pages/2024-AP-AA-WG-6.aspx.

1.5 **Attachment A** to this Paper provides a Summary Report of the AP-AA/WG/6 for review by the AOP/SG/8.

1.6 Appendices referred in this Working Paper and **Attachment A** carry the same Appendix number as those in the Report of AP-AA/WG/6 for easy reference.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 Some important discussions of the AP-AA/WG/6 Meeting are summarized as below:

Certification of Aerodromes in the Asia/Pacific Region

2.2 AP-AA/WG/6 noted that out of **355** aerodromes used for international operations in Asia-Pacific Region **326** aerodromes had been certified corresponding to **91.83%** progress.

2.3 AP-AA/WG/5 urged States to provide periodic updates on the progress of the certification of aerodromes and publication of the status of certification in AIP AD 1.5 to the ICAO APAC Office.

2.4 Some States expressed that they have been facing challenges to certify Military aerodromes used for international operations. The Beijing Declaration mandates to certify all aerodromes used for international operations by 2020. States expect that these challenges would be highlighted at the Ministerial Conference of Civil Aviation Ministers to be held in India on 11 – 12 September 2024 for further deliberation and policy guidance.

Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation Tools and Guidance

2.5 During the AP-AA/WG/5 meeting, a new task was introduced with the aim of developing generic guidance for evaluating Aerodrome SMS. In a collaborative effort, Thailand, Australia, and Maldives jointly worked on developing a Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation Tool and Guidance.

2.6 AP-AA/WG/6 reviewed the Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation Tool and Guidance provided in **Appendix D** which was endorsed by the Meeting and formulated the following Draft Decision for consideration by AOP/SG/8:

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">Draft Decision AP-AA/WG/6 – 1: Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation Tool and Guidance</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">What: that, the Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation Tool in Appendix D to the Report of AP-AA/WG/6 endorsed by AP-AA/WG/6 for consideration by AOP/SG/8 and made available on the ICAO Asia/Pacific Regional Office Website for reference by States/Administrations.</td><td>Expected impact:
☐ Political / Global
☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical</td></tr>
<tr><td>Why: To provide CAA inspectors and the aerodrome operators with a more comprehensive set of guidelines for the evaluation of Aerodrome Safety Management System.</td><td colspan="2">Follow-up: ☐Required from States</td></tr>
<tr><td>When: 19-Jul-24</td><td colspan="2">Status: Draft to be adopted by Subgroup</td></tr>
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Runway Safety Team (RST) and Runway Safety Go-Team

2.7 AP-AA/WG/6 reviewed the Framework with RST questionnaires. After having a lengthy deliberation, the Meeting invited the participating States to provide comments/feedback on the RST questionnaire for its improvement before submission to the AOP/SG/8. The Meeting also agreed to formulate a new task to study the feedback received from the participating States and to improve and finalize the RST questionnaire by the end of May 2024 by the group of States volunteered to contribute to this new task.

2.8 The RST questionnaire, finalized by the participating States within the given deadline is attached in **Appendix E** to the AP-AA/WG/6 Report.

2.9 AP-AA/WG/6 agreed to endorse the following Draft Conclusion and submit to AOP/SG for its consideration at the Eight Meeting of the AOP/SG/8 in July 2024:

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">Draft Conclusion AP-AA/WG/6 – 02: Framework for Monitoring the Establishment and Implementation of Runway Safey Team (RST) at aerodromes in APAC States</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">What: That, the “Framework for Monitoring the Establishment and Implementation of Runway Safey Team (RST) at aerodromes in APAC States” provided in Appendix E of the AP-AA/WG/6 Report be circulated to States/Administrations after approval by AOP/SG/8. The Framework be also published on the ICAO APAC eDocuments Webpage under AGA Heading.</td><td>Expected impact:
☐ Political / Global
☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical</td></tr>
<tr><td>Why: To gather the information from the States/Administrations on the establishment and operation of the RST at aerodromes.</td><td colspan="2">Follow-up: ☒ Required from States</td></tr>
<tr><td>When: 19-Jul-2024</td><td colspan="2">Status: Draft to be adopted by Subgroup</td></tr>
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</table>

2.10 AP-AA/WG/6 also acknowledged the significance of the RSTs in promoting runway safety, encouraged collaborative efforts among stakeholders, and emphasized the value of seeking ICAO assistance through Runway Safety Go-Team Missions to enhance safety standards at aerodromes in the Asia/Pacific region.

Enhanced Global Reporting Format for Assessing and Reporting Runway Surface Conditions (GRF)

Publication of procedures for reporting of runway condition report and issuance of SNOWTAM in AIP

2.11 Recognizing the need for the promulgation of the procedures for the reporting of runway condition report and issuance of the new SNOWTAM format by States in their AIP in accordance with 6.3.1.2 of *Annex 15 Aeronautical Information Services (AIS)*, APANPIRG/33 adopted the Conclusion APANPIRG/33/2 formulated by AP-AA/WG/4 and endorsed by AOP/SG/6 which was also supported by ATM/SG/10 (17 – 21 Oct. 2022):

Conclusion APANPIRG/33/2: Publication of procedures for reporting of runway condition report and issuance of the SNOWTAM in AIP

That, Asia Pacific States/Administrations:

1) are urged to publish the procedures for reporting of runway condition report and issuance of SNOWTAM in their AIP in accordance with 6.3.1.2 of Annex 15 Aeronautical Information Services; and

2) may consider to publish above information in "AD 1.2.2 Snow plan" (refer to Appendix 2 of PANS-AIM (Doc 10066)).

2.12 AP-AA/WG/6 noted that only thirteen (13) States accredited to Asia and Pacific Region published the procedures in their national AIP.

2.13 AP-AA/WG/6 encouraged States/Administrations that had yet to implement the methodology for assessment and reporting of runway condition to implement GRF at the earliest possible opportunity and publish the procedures for assessment and reporting of runway condition report in AIP under "AD 1.2, 2 Snow plan" by States that have yet to publish in their AIP.

Status of Air Navigation Deficiencies in AOP Field

2.14 AP-AA/WG/6 noted the updated list of the APANPIRG Air Navigation Deficiency List in AOP Field as provided in **Appendix F** to the AP-AA/WG/6 Report.

ICAO USOAP and AGA Findings

2.15 AP-AA/WG/6 noted the USOAP Effective Implementation (EI) results in the APAC Region, taken from iSTARS 4.0, PQ Tester. APAC average EI in AGA area was 60.73 % as compared to the global average of 63.00% as of 25 March 2024.

2.16 The AP-AA/WG/6 Meeting urged APAC States/Administrations who has EI less than 75% to allocate more resources and efforts to improve EI to meet the 75% GASP target by 2024, to take actions required from States through USOAP CMA OLF and approach respective COSCAPs, Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO) or ICAO APAC Office, if State(s) require assistance in USOAP CMA.

The Requirements of Runway Side Stripe Marking & Taxi Side Stripe Marking

2.17 AP-AA/WG/6 acknowlagde the significance of runway side stripe markings and taxi side stripe markings, while also addressing the challenges encountered by Aerodrome Operators in meeting these requirements.

2.18 AP-AA/WG/6 noted the information shared by Malaysia and encouraged member States to share the relevant best practices on this matter. The AP-AA/WG would discuss in its next Meeting whether it would be required to develop a regional guidance for cases whereby the aerodrome does not have runway side stripe marking and taxi side stripe marking after having shared State's best practices and experiences in the next Meeting.

ICAO Initiative for Assistance to States in AGA Area

2.19 ICAO provided technical assistance to Asia Pacific States in AGA area through various platforms from 2015 to 2023 to improve States safety oversight capacities and enhance USOAP CMA EI:

a) ICAO APAC Combined Action Team (CAT)

b) ICAO Programme for Aviation Volunteers (IPAV)

c) Technical Assistance in Aerodrome Certification and SMS (RAS10801)

d) Capacity Building Programme for APAC States

2.20 AP-AA/WG/6 noted various initiatives taken by ICAO, COSCAPs, ACI and other ICAO Safety Partners in assisting Asia Pacific States to improve USOAP CMA EI, to overcome challenges associated with the certification of aerodromes in some States in Asia and Pacific Regions and encouraged States that need AGA assistance to approach respective COSCAPs, PASO, ACI and Champion States for their assistance and support in AGA area and put additional resources and efforts to enhance EI in AGA area.

Collaboration between COSCAP-SEA and Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group

2.21 AP-AA/WG/6 acknowlegde the technical assistance needed by South East Asia (SEA) States in the AGA area. COSCAP-SEA under Phase-V, COSCAP-SEA focuses on strategic priorities including risk mitigation, certification responsibilities, and enhancing safety oversight systems through training sessions, technical assistance missions, and coordination activities with an intent to enhance air transport safety and efficiency in Member States.

2.22 APANPIRG/34 had endorsed the Aerodrome Assistance Go-Team Methodology, established to provide such technical support in areas of aerodrome certification and safety oversight capacity building. Especially, there's a focus on addressing deficiencies in aerodrome certification among SEA States, with specific attention to those yet to meet the Beijing Declaration target

2.23 AP-AA/WG/6 acknowledged the importance of collaboration between COSCAP-SEA and Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group to identify the need for technical assistance in AGA area in coordination with COSCAP-SEA and best utilize the support offered by Aerodrome Assistance Go-Team.

AP-AA/WG Task List

2.24 AP-AA/WG/6 reviewed and updated the AP-AA/WG Task List presented by the Secretariat. 5 new tasks were added to the list. The updated Task List is placed in **Appendix H**.

Asia Pacific Generic Guidance Materials (GGMs) and Custodian

2.25 AP-AA/WG/6 reviewed and updated the list of GGMs developed by the AP-AA/WG including the *ICAO Asia-Pacific Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation and Guidance* presented at AP-AA/WG/6 Meeting (para 2.6 above refers) for endorsement by AOP/SG/8.

2.26 The AP-AA/WG/6 endorsed the following Draft Decision for consideration by AOP/SG/8:

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">Draft Decision AP-AA/WG/6 - 3: Updated List of Asia/Pacific Generic Guidance Materials Developed by the AP-AA/WG with Details of the Custodians</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">What: That, the Attachment A to the Procedure for periodic review and update of the Asia/Pacific Generic Guidance Materials (Appendix I to the Report of the AP-AA/WG/6) be published on the ICAO APAC Website at eDocuments Webpage under the AGA heading.</td><td>Expected impact:
☐ Political / Global
☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical</td></tr>
<tr><td>Why: To incorporate in the list the ICAO Asia-Pacific Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation and Guidance and with updated details of the custodian of the GGMs.</td><td colspan="2">Follow-up: ☐Required from States</td></tr>
<tr><td>When: 19-Jul-24</td><td colspan="2">Status: Adopted by Subgroup</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Who: ☒Sub groups ☐APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☐Other: AP-AA/WG</td></tr>
</table>

Information Papers

2.27 The following Information Papers were considered by AP-AA/WG/6:

1) ICAO HQ Update on AGA Matters (IP/03)
2) Aerodrome SMS Journey in the Maldives – Challenges & Opportunities (IP/04)
3) Major Expansion and Capability Building Without Hampering the Operations and Safety at Rajiv Gandhi International Airport Hyderabad (IP/05)
4) Runway Safety Implementation by AAI Airport (IP/06)
5) ARFF Exercises & Runway Safety (IP/07)
6) USOAP CMA Protocol Questions – 2020 Edition and State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment (IP/08)
7) Methodology for Marking of Runway Centerline Using Minimum Consumption of Paint (IP/09)
8) Cultivating a Just Culture: Initiatives and Challenges in Thailand (IP/10)
9) Greater Role of Runway Safety Team – Ground Operations Safety (IP/11)

3. ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

a) review the Summary Reports on the Sixth Meeting of AP-AA/WG (**Attachment A**);

b) review the **Draft Conclusion** presented in Paragraph 2.9 for endorsement by the AOP/SG/8 and further consideration by APANPIRG/35;

c) review the **Draft Decisions** presented in Paragraph 2.26 for adoption by the AOP/SG/8; and

d) discuss any relevant matters as appropriate.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Meeting

1.1 The Sixth Meeting of Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group (AP-AA/WG/6) was held in Bangkok, Thailand from 2 to 5 April 2024.

2. Attendance

2.1 37 participants from 8 Member States and 1 International Organisation attended the meeting.

3. Language and Documentation

3.1 The working language of the meeting and all documentation was English. There were 16 Working Papers and 11 Information Papers considered by the Meeting.

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Agenda Item 1: Adoption of Provisional Agenda (WP/01)

1.1 The Provisional Agenda (WP/01) was adopted by the Meeting without amendment.

Agenda Item 1:	Adoption of Provisional Agenda
Agenda Item 2:	Review Outcomes of Relevant Meetings
Agenda Item 3:	Aerodrome Certification and Safety Management System
Agenda Item 4:	Runway Safety and GRF Implementation
Agenda Item 5:	APANPIRG Air Navigation Deficiency in AOP Field
Agenda Item 6:	USOAP CMA in AGA
Agenda Item 7:	Technical Assistance/Cooperation in AGA Field
Agenda Item 8:	AP-AA/WG Task List
Agenda Item 9:	Any Other Business
Agenda Item 10:	Date and Venue of Next Meeting

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Agenda Item 2: Review Outcomes of Relevant Meetings

Action Items of 58th Conference of Directors General of Civil Aviation (WP/2)

2.1 AP-AA/WG/6 meeting reviewed the action items of 58th Conference of Directors General of Civil Aviation (DGCA/58, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 15 to 19 October 2023) relevant to AP-AA/WG.

Discussion Paper	Action Item	Description
Agenda Item 3: Aviation Safety		
DP/3/03	58/4	To ensure efficient and safe ground operations and prevent incidents and accidents, the Conference: a) Encouraged States/Administrations, International Organizations, Industries and Safety Partners to share their best practices, technologies, and procedures related to aircraft handling, apron management and ground support equipment for enhancing safety Standards; and b) Requested ICAO to continue assistance to the States/Administrations through Guidance Material, seminars, workshops, and training on Runway safety and Wildlife Hazard Management.
DP/3/19 DP/4/11	58/15	To facilitate the safe and efficient deployment of autonomous vehicles (AVs) at the airside, the Conference encouraged: a) States/Administrations to share the experience and information about AV trials and operations at the airside; and b) ICAO to consider the development of guidance materials and/or SARPs, as necessary.
DP/3/20	58/16	Noting the efforts in strengthening and supporting the safety management of ground handling in the region, the Conference encouraged States/Administrations and industry stakeholders to share their activities and challenges in the safety management of ground handling.
Agenda Item 6: Economic Development of Air Transport		
DP/6/06	58/33	To support safe, secure, efficient, and sustainable mobility solutions and harmonised standards, certifications, policy and framework to regulate the Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) sector, the Conference encouraged States/Administrations to consider AAM operations in airport master planning, undertake dialogue between all relevant stakeholders, and participate in the first ICAO Advanced Air Mobility Symposium (AAM 2024) from 9 to 12 September 2024, in Montreal, Canada.
Agenda Item 7: Aviation and Environment		
DP/7/05	58/36	To reduce operation and maintenance costs, improve the safety and efficiency of operations, and reduce environmental impacts associated with implementing approach lighting systems at airports in mountainous and waterfront locations, the Conference encouraged States/Administrations to consider implementing the prefabricated approach lighting system bridge and suggested that ICAO refer the paper to the Visual Aids Working Group of Aerodrome Design and Operations Panel (ADOP) for consideration.

Agenda Item 9: Updates		
DP/9b/01	58/43	The Conference encouraged States/Administrations to collaborate and work towards achieving the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and share implementation status with the ICAO Asia-Pacific Office to further report to the Second Asia Pacific Ministerial Conference on Civil Aviation in India in 2024.

2.2 AP-AA/WG/6 meeting reminded States/Administrations to take necessary actions in accordance with 58th DGCA Conference Action Items.

Relevant Outcomes of APANPIRG/34 (WP/03)

2.3 WP/03 provided a summary of the outcomes of the 34th Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group (APANPIRG/34) which was held in Hong Kong, China from 11 to 13 December 2023.

2.4 AP-AA/WG/6 acknowledged that APANPIRG/34 had adopted the following Conclusions related to aerodrome operations and planning:

i) *Conclusion APANPIRG/34/3: Runway Turn Pad Design and Marking;*

ii) *Conclusion APANPIRG/34/4: ICAO Asia-Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Go-Team Methodology;*

iii) *Conclusion APANPIRG/34/5: ICAO Asia/Pacific WHM Go-Team Methodology;* and

iv) *Conclusion APANPIRG/34/16 – Update of Information in APANPIRG Air Navigation Deficiencies Reporting Form.*

2.5 The Final Report of APANPIRG/34 published at https://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/Pages/2023-APANPIRG-34.aspx provided the detailed descriptions of the above Conclusions.

2.6 AP-AA/WG/6 noted that at APANPIRG/34 AOP Chairman highlighted the following challenges in AOP fields and prioritization for 2024 AOP/SG Work Programme:

a) Implementation of GRF in APAC Region: As of 2023, only 15 States implemented GRF.

b) Implementation of Aircraft classification rating-pavement classification rating (ACR-PCR) method of reporting bearing strength of aerodrome pavements: Applicable as of 28 November 2024.

c) Training on proposed new obstacle limitation surfaces.

d) Guidance and training in aeronautical studies.

e) Safety management of ground handling services.

f) Improvement of APAC USOAP EI in AGA from 61.2% (June 2023) to GASP 2022 – 2025 Target of 75%.

2.7 Pakistan apprised the AP-AA/WG/6 Meeting that they would be able to meet the ICAO applicability date of 28 November 2024 for the implementation of ACR-PCR method of reporting bearing strength of aerodrome pavements. Pakistan will publish PCR of aerodrome pavements of all major international airports in the next AIP Supplement.

Relevant Outcomes of AOP/SG/7 (WP/04)

2.8 The Secretariat presented the outcomes of the Seventh Meeting of the Aerodromes Operations and Planning Sub-group (AOP/SG/7, 3 to 6 July 2023, Bangkok, Thailand) relevant to AP-AA/WG.

2.9 AP-AA/WG/6 acknowledged that the following regional guidance materials developed by the Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group had been approved by AOP/SG/7:

i) *Generic Aerodrome Enforcement Policy and Procedures Manual*;

ii) *Generic Aerodrome Exemptions Policy and Procedures Manual*; and

iii) *Generic Aerodrome Inspector Handbook, Revision 1, 2023*.

and all documents had been published on the ICAO Asia/Pacific Regional Office eDocuments webpage: https://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/eDocs.aspx under AGA heading.

2.10 AP-AA/WG/6 also acknowledged that the AOP/SG/7 had adopted five Decisions as below:

i) *Decision AOP/SG/7-2: Proposal for Amendment to AP-ADO/TF's TOR*

ii) *Decision AOP/SG/7-7: Proposal for Amendment to AP-AA/WG's TOR*

iii) *Decision AOP/SG/7- 8: Updated List of Asia/Pacific Generic Guidance Materials Developed by the AP-AA/WG with Details of the Custodians*

iv) *Decision AOP/SG/7-9: Proposal for Amendment to AP-WHM/WG's TOR*

v) *Decision AOP/SG/7-11: Adoption of Annex 14 Recommendations as National Standards*

2.11 The Final Report of AOP/SG/7 published at https://www.icao.int/APAC/Meetings/Pages/2023-AOP-SG7.aspx provided the detailed descriptions of the above Conclusions.

2.12 The Second Amendment to the TOR of the AP-AA/WG approved by the AOP/SG/7 is provided in **Appendix A** to the Report of the AP-AA/WG/6.

2.13 AP-AA/WG/6 was informed that the AP-ADO/TF has taken initiative to develop a Regional Guidance on Transposition of ICAO Annex 14 Volume I Recommendations into National Aerodrome Standards.

ICAO HQ Update on AGA Matters (IP/03)

2.14 IP/03 updated the AP-AA/WG/6 Meeting with information related to aerodrome activities carried out by the Airport Operations and Infrastructure Section, Air Navigation Bureau, ICAO Montreal.

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Agenda Item 3: Aerodromes Certification and Safety Management System

Certification of Aerodromes in the Asia/Pacific Region (WP/05)

3.1 AP-AA/WG/6 noted that out of **355** aerodromes used for international operations in Asia-Pacific Region **326** aerodromes had been certified corresponding to **91.83%** progress as of 25 March 2024.

3.2 The list of the aerodromes yet to be certified in Asia-Pacific Region was provided in **Appendix B**.

3.3 The list of the States that had not published or partially published the status of certification of aerodromes in AIP AD 1.5 is placed in **Appendix C.**

3.4 The Meeting was reminded that the *Asia Pacific Regional Guidance on Aeronautical Information Publication – AD 1.5 Status of Certification of Aerodromes* approved by AOP/SG/4 (Video Teleconference, 10 – 13 November 2020) and published by ICAO Asia and Pacific Office, Bangkok on ICAO APAC Website eDocuments under AGA heading (https://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/eDocs.aspx) could be referred by States/Administrations for this purpose.

3.5 AP-AA/WG/6 urged States to provide periodic updates on the progress of the certification of aerodromes and publication of the status of certification in AIP AD 1.5 to the ICAO APAC Office.

3.6 Some States expressed that they have been facing challenges to certify Military aerodromes used for international operations, a Beijing Declaration mandates to certify all aerodromes used for international operations by 2020. States expect that these challenges would be highlighted at the Ministerial Conference of Civil Aviation Ministers to be held in India on 11 – 12 September 2024 for further deliberation and policy guidance.

Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation Tools and Guidance (WP/06)

3.7 During the AP-AA/WG/5 meeting, a new task was introduced with the aim of developing generic guidance for evaluating Aerodrome SMS. In a collaborative effort, Thailand, Australia, and Maldives jointly worked on developing a Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation Tool and Guidance.

3.8 Drawing insights from various established tools such as the SMICG SMS Evaluation Tool, CASA Safety Management System Evaluation Tool and Guidance, Maldives CAA Management System Assessment Tool, CAAT SMS Evaluation Tool, UK CAA SMS Evaluation Tool, and EASA Management System Assessment Tool, this comprehensive tool underwent tailored modifications to accommodate the specific assessment needs inherent to Aerodrome SMS, considering the unique terminology and requirements of aerodromes. For example, it replaces "organization" with "aerodrome" throughout and aligns with Annex 14 and Annex 19 SARPs, PANS-Aerodromes (Doc 9981), Safety Management Manual (Doc 9859) and Manual on Certification of Aerodromes (Doc 9774) for elements like emergency planning and interface management.

3.9 The aim of this tool is to evaluate how effective aerodrome SMS is by looking at both compliance and performance indicators. These indicators adhere to the structure outlined in the ICAO SMS Framework and are evaluated based on whether they are Present (P), Suitable (S), Operating (O), or Effective (E). The tool provides detailed definitions for these designations, ensuring clarity and consistency in assessment criteria. Aerodrome operators must explain how they reached each level for every indicator, providing references, evidence, or examples to back up their assessment.

After aerodrome operators evaluate their SMS, Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) step in to verify their evaluation results and assess the overall effectiveness of each SMS element further.

3.10 When it comes to addressing any findings or observations found during evaluation, the tool lays out clear steps. In the initial evaluation, all indicators must meet the criteria of being Present and Suitable for the aerodrome certificate to be issued. After SMS implementation, if an indicator isn't Operating, a finding is issued. If it's not Effective, observations are made for improvement suggestions. However, if something is Operating but not Effective, no findings are issued, showing a careful approach to improvement within the SMS framework.

3.11 AP-AA/WG/6 reviewed the Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation Tool and Guidance provided in **Appendix D** which was endorsed by the Meeting and formulated the following Draft Decision for consideration by AOP/SG/8:

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<tr><td>Why: To provide CAA inspectors and the aerodrome operators with a more comprehensive set of guidelines for the evaluation of Aerodrome Safety Management System.</td><td colspan="2">Follow-up: ☐Required from States</td></tr>
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</table>

Aerodrome SMS Journey in the Maldives – Challenges & Opportunities (IP/04)

3.12 Maldives presented IP/04 providing an overview of the Aerodrome SMS journey in the Maldives. A look back at the early understanding of SMS and the numerous challenges that they were still facing in implementation and highlighted significant opportunities and benefits of SMS.

Major Expansion and Capability Building Without Hampering the Operations and Safety at Rajiv Gandhi International Airport Hyderabad (IP/05)

3.13 Presented by India, IP/05 highlighted infrastructure development at Operational Airport without compromising safety and hampering operations as expanding or upgrading airport infrastructure requires substantial investments and coordination among multiple stakeholders.

3.14 The IP helped in understanding “how phase wise expansion works help in maintaining highest safety and minimum operational impact” and “how effective change management process helps in phase wise execution and commissioning of new Facilities”.

Cultivating a Just Culture: Initiatives and Challenges in Thailand (IP/10)

3.15 Presented by Thailand, IP/10 highlighted Thailand's commitment for enhancing aviation safety through the implementation of Just Culture, as a part of State Safety Policy and State Safety Programme (SSP).

3.16 Thailand aimed to enhance a positive safety culture and elevate safety management effectiveness at all levels by facilitating better sharing of safety data between Civil Aviation Operators (CAOs) and the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand (CAAT). This was intended to improve the quality and quantity of safety information for more efficient safety data analysis. As a part of the State Safety Policy and State Safety Programme (SSP), CAAT promoted the implementation of the Just Culture approach throughout the aviation sectors.

3.17 Thailand's safety initiatives involved a range of interactive actions, including distributing Just Culture surveys to the aviation industry, organizing safety events bringing together CAAT and stakeholders, and conducting training sessions to reinforce a safety culture for CAAT inspectors together with the Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (AAIC) personnel. These efforts were integral to achieving the State Safety Objectives outlined in the Thailand Aviation Safety Action Plan (TASAP).

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Agenda Item 4: Runway Safety and GRF Implementation

Runway Safety Team (RST) and Runway Safety Go-Team (WP/07)

4.1 AP-AA/WG/6 reviewed the Framework with RST questionnaires. After having a lengthy deliberation, the Meeting invited the participating States to provide comments/feedback on the RST questionnaire for its improvement before submission to the AOP/SG/8. The Meeting also agreed to formulate a new task to study the feedback received from the participating States and to improve and finalize the RST questionnaire by the end of May 2024 by the group of States volunteered to contribute to this new task.

4.2 The RST questionnaire, finalized by the participating States within the given deadline is attached in **Appendix E** to the AP-AA/WG/6 Report.

4.3 AP-AA/WG/6 agreed to endorse the following Draft Conclusion and submit to AOP/SG for its consideration at the Eight Meeting of the AOP/SG/8 in July 2024:

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">Draft Conclusion AP-AA/WG/6 – 02: Framework for Monitoring the Establishment and Implementation of Runway Safey Team (RST) at aerodromes in APAC States</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">What: That, the “Framework for Monitoring the Establishment and Implementation of Runway Safey Team (RST) at aerodromes in APAC States” provided in Appendix E of the AP-AA/WG/6 Report be circulated to States/Administrations after approval by AOP/SG/8. The Framework be also published on the ICAO APAC eDocuments Webpage under AGA Heading.</td><td>Expected impact:
☐ Political / Global
☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical</td></tr>
<tr><td>Why: To gather the information from the States/Administrations on the establishment and operation of the RST at aerodromes.</td><td colspan="2">Follow-up: ☒ Required from States</td></tr>
<tr><td>When: 19-Jul-2024</td><td colspan="2">Status: Draft to be adopted by Subgroup</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Who: ☒ Sub groups ☒ APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☐Other: AP-AA/WG/6</td></tr>
</table>

4.4 AP-AA/WG/6 also acknowledged the significance of the RSTs in promoting runway safety, encouraged collaborative efforts among stakeholders, and emphasized the value of seeking ICAO assistance through Runway Safety Go-Team Missions to enhance safety standards at aerodromes in the Asia/Pacific Region.

Enhanced Global Reporting Format for Assessing and Reporting Runway Surface Conditions (GRF) (WP/08)

Publication of procedures for assessment and reporting of runway condition report and issuance of SNOWTAM in AIP

4.5 Recognizing the need for the promulgation of the procedures for the reporting of runway condition report and issuance of the new SNOWTAM format by States in their AIP in accordance with 6.3.1.2 of Annex 15 Aeronautical Information Services (AIS), AP-AA/WG/6 recalled Conclusion APANPIRG/33/2:

Conclusion APANPIRG/33/2: Publication of procedures for reporting of runway condition report and issuance of the SNOWTAM in AIP

That, Asia Pacific States/Administrations:

1) are urged to publish the procedures for reporting of runway condition report and issuance of SNOWTAM in their AIP in accordance with 6.3.1.2 of Annex 15 Aeronautical Information Services; and

2) may consider to publish above information in "AD 1.2.2 Snow plan" (refer to Appendix 2 of PANS-AIM (Doc 10066)).

4.6 AP-AA/WG/6 noted that the following Asia - Pacific States had published procedures for assessment and reporting of runway condition report in AIP.

No.	States/Administrations	Procedures for assessment and reporting of runway condition report in AIP	Section of AIP
1	Australia	√	AD 1.2, 2. Snow Plan; 3. Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting (AIP, 23 Mar. 2022)
2	France (New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis & Futuna)	√	**POLYNÉSIE** AD 1.2.2 Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting and Snow Plan (AIP, 29 Dec. 2022) **NOUVELLE CALEDONIE, WALLIS ET FUTUNA** AD 1.2.2 Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting and Snow Plan (AIP, 26 Jan. 2023)
3	India	√	AD 1.2, 2 Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Report (AIP, 22 Feb 2024)
4	Japan	√	AD 1.2, 2.1. SNOWTAM (AIP, 24 Feb. 2022)
5	Maldives	√	AD 1.2, 2. Snow Plan, 2.1 Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting (AIP, 25 May. 2023)
6	New Zealand	√	AD 1.2, 2. Snow Plan, 2.1 Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting (AIP, 09 Feb. 2024)
7	Pakistan	√	AD 1.1, 5. Assessment and Reporting of Runway Surface Condition
8	Republic of Korea	√	AD 1.2, 2. Snow Plan, Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting, 2. Runway surface condition assessment and reporting (AIP, 09 Feb. 2023)

No.	States/Administrations	Procedures for assessment and reporting of runway condition report in AIP	Section of AIP
9	Singapore	√	AD 1.1, 6 Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting (AIP, 02 Dec. 2021)
10	Sri Lanka	√	AD 1.2, 2 Snow Plan, 2.1 Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting, (AIP, 21 Mar. 2024)
11	Thailand	√	AD 1.2, 3. Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting (AIP, 18 May 2023)
12	USA	√	ENR 1.1, 11. Runway Condition Reports (AIP, 16 July 2020)
13	Viet Nam	√	AD 1.2, 2. Runway Surface Condition Assessment and Reporting at the Airports of Viet Nam (AIP, 30 Nov. 2022)

Table 4 - 1 – States that had published procedures for assessment and reporting of runway condition report in AIP

4.7 AP-AA/WG/6 encouraged States/Administrations that had yet to implement the methodology for assessment and reporting of runway condition to implement GRF at the earliest possible opportunity and publish the procedures for assessment and reporting of runway condition report in AIP under “AD 1.2, 2 Snow plan” by States that have yet to publish in their AIP.

Runway Safety Implementation by AAI Airport (IP/06)

4.8 Presented by India, IP/06 discussed the issues/hazards identified by the Runway Safety teams at different airports operated by the Airports Authority of India (AAI), such as:

- Surface damage from 180-degree lock turn aeroplanes;
- Ensuring optimal runway utilization with TORA signages;
- Confusion between taxiways due to signage on the shoulder of the preceding taxiway;
- Pruning trees outside the airport premise;
- Reducing the visibility of Apron Marking during rainy seasons due to glare issue caused by Flood lights; and
- Use of mobile phones by ATCOs during watch hours.

4.9 The runway safety team at the concerned airports provided advised to the concerned operators and service providers on local conditions, issues, and developed mitigating measures to address above concerns on the runway and taxiways.

ARFF Exercises & Runway Safety (IP/07)

4.10 Presented by India, IP/07 highlighted the interrelation between ARFF exercises and runway safety and discussed about the requirement of exercising change management processes to ensure safe operations at any airport.

4.11 While looking deeply at the aircraft accident happened at Jorge Chavez International Airport, Lima, Peru involving LATAM Airlines Airbus 320 and Crash Fire Tenders (CFT) entering runway for response time check resulting in death of three fire fighters, the requirement of proper change management was evident. The paper also highlighted glaring aspects of the change management in the above accident.

4.12 The paper also discussed the biennial full-scale exercise 'Challenger 24' conducted at Kempegowda International Airport Bengaluru (KIAB) following the change management process for planning and implementation of hazards identification and mitigation measures. After the above exercise it was concluded that the meticulous planning, effective change management, involvement of stakeholders, hazard identification and risk assessment, effective supervision, following standard operating procedures even during emergency situations etc., were some of the tools to ensure runway safety during ARFF exercises.

Greater Role of Runway Safety Team – Ground Operations Safety (IP/11)

4.13 India presented IP/11 discussing about the requirement of greater role for the Runway Safety Teams in complex airports in order to support safety of ground operations. Further, the formulation, methodology and conduct of Runway Safety Team meetings at Kempegowda International Airport Bengaluru were presented along with some of the major achievements of runway safety team in the past few years.

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Agenda Item 5: APANPIRG Air Navigation Deficiency in AOP Field

Status of Air Navigation Deficiencies in AOP Field (WP/09)

4.1 The status of Air Navigation Deficiencies in the AOP field endorsed by APANPIRG/34 (Hong Kong, China, 11 to 13 December 2023) with updates provided by States/Administrations was presented to AP-AA/WG/6 and provided in **Appendix F** to the AP-AA/WG/6 Report.

4.2 AP-AA/WG/6 reminded that it is the responsibility of States concerned to establish action plan with defined target dates for resolution of identified deficiencies, update the status on the corrective action taken and report progress in the Reporting Form of Air Navigation Deficiencies in AOP field. The Regional Office would update the deficiency database based on written confirmation with evidence provided by the respective Administrations.

AOP Air Navigation Deficiency related to the Certification of Aerodromes used for International Operations and Publication of their Status in AIP AD 1.5

4.3 In connection with ***Conclusion APANPIRG/30/4*** and subsequent review by APANPIRG meetings, the States / Administrations / aerodromes identified as deficient from the perspective of certification and publication of their status in AIP AD1.5 had been included in the APANPIRG AOP deficiency list with effect from 1 January 2021.

4.4 Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Philippines had been certified and issued the Permanent Aerodrome Certificate on December 2023. Therefore, this Deficiency would be removed from the List of the Air Navigation Deficiencies in AOP field after endorsement by AOP/SG/8 and consideration by APANPIRG/35.

4.5 Samoa, Solomon Islands and Tonga resolved the Deficiencies related to the Publication of the Status of the Certification of Aerodromes in their AIP and subsequently they would be removed from the List of the Air Navigation Deficiencies in AOP field after endorsement by AOP/SG/8 and consideration by APANPIRG/35.

*Note:- Post AP-AA/WG/6 Meeting, on 2 April 2024 Viet Nam provided an update on their corrective action plan which was incorporated in the **Appendix F**.*

4.6 The updated list of the APANPIRG Air Navigation Deficiency List in AOP Field was provided in **Appendix F**.

AOP Focal Points

4.7 For effective and efficient communications between States / Administrations and ICAO APAC Office on AOP matters, including but not limited to the resolution of Air Navigation Deficiencies in the AOP field, AOP/SG maintained contact details of AOP Focal Points. The list of AOP Focal Points was provided in **Appendix G**.

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Agenda Item 6: USOAP CMA in AGA

ICAO USOAP and AGA Findings (WP/10)

5.1 AP-AA/WG/6 noted ICAO USOAP CMA activities conducted in APAC States in 2023 and those planned for 2024.

5.2 The Meeting also noted the USOAP Effective Implementation (EI) results in the APAC Region, derived from iSTARS 4.0, PQ Tester. APAC average EI in AGA area was **60.73 %** as compared to the global average of **63.00%** as of 25 March 2024.

5.3 Table 6.1 below illustrates the APAC Average AGA EI scores in all 8 Critical Elements from 2017 to March 2024:

Table 6.1: APAC Average AGA EI scores in all 8 Critical Elements

	APAC average EI in AGA (in %)	Critical Elements (CEs) – AGA Area							
		CE-1	CE-2	CE-3	CE-4	CE-5	CE-6	CE-7	CE-8
March 2024 (AP-AA/WG/6)	***60.73*** *[Global Average **63.00**]* *168 (2017 PQs)→143 (2020 PQs)*	63.89 (1→2)	67.22 (28→21)	61.32 (7→ 7)	42,33 (7→ 7)	63,98 (20→14)	63.21 (64→ 51)	58.97 (31→ 32)	46.59 (10→9)
June 2023 (AOP/SG/7)	***61.20*** *[Global Average 62.43]*	65.28	67.45	61.61	41.61	64,29	63.58	60.18	46.60
June 2022 (AOP/SG/6)	***60.97*** *[Global Average 63.37]*	72.22	71.53	61.61	40.88	67.46	64.28	57.14	45.69
June 2021 (AOP/SG/5)	***61.43*** *[Global Average 62.72]*	75.00	71.33	62.56	41.40	68.04	64.51	58.16	46.96
Oct. 2020 (AOP/SG/4)	*61.41* *[Global Average 62.65]*	75.00	68.64	64.44	42.73	58.61	63.26	58.11	38.42
June 2019 (AOP/SG/3)	*60.52* *[Global Average 61.59]*	75.68	66.80	62.13	42.30	58.14	63.87	58.87	39.77
June 2018 (AOP/SG/2)	*57.87* *[Global Average 59.5]*	68.57	65.78	55.71	38.18	49.60	60.45	53.01	~~51.13~~ [Error]
May 2017 (AOP/SG/1)	***56.29*** *[Global Average 57.99]*	68.57	63.3	53.65	33.17	51.9	59.78	55.2	39.44

5.4 AP-AA/WG/6 noted that there was a lower EI score (APAC average AGA EI and its corresponding CEs) for March 2024 compared to EI data for June 2021 despite of improvement in EI by some States that had received ICVM and Offsite Validation Activities in 2021 and 2022; however, lower EI Scores had been observed with States that underwent USOAP CMA audits in 2023. In addition to above, there was impact on EI Scores due to the adjustment of EI because of the reduction of AGA PQs from 168 (2017 AGA PQs) to 143 (2020 AGA PQs) numbers (please refer to AP-AA/WG/6-**IP/08** for USOAP CMA Protocol Questions – 2020 Edition).

5.5 The meeting urged APAC States/Administrations:

a) to take actions required from States through USOAP CMA OLF;

b) with EI less than 75% to put more resources and efforts to improve EI to meet the 75% of GASP target by 2024; and

c) to approach respective COSCAPs, Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO) or ICAO APAC Office, if State(s) require assistance in USOAP CMA.

USOAP CMA Protocol Questions – 2020 Edition and State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment (IP/08)

5.6 IP/08 introduced the 2020 edition of the AGA Protocol Questions (PQs) of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme Continuous Monitoring Approach and provided the information on the State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment.

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Agenda Item 7: Technical Assistance/Cooperation in AGA Field

The Requirements of Runway Side Stripe Marking & Taxi Side Stripe Marking (WP/11)

6.1 Presented by Malaysia, the WP/11 underlined the significance of runway side stripe markings and taxi side stripe markings, while also addressing the challenges encountered by Aerodrome Operators in meeting these requirements. Additionally, the paper seeked to explore best practices implemented by other States in the Asia-Pacific Region on this matter.

6.2 It had been observed that there were some aerodromes that had not provided with runway side stripe markings due to the initial design of the aerodrome where the view of the consultants or contractors that there was a clear distinction between the runway edges and the shoulders or the surrounding terrain.

6.3 Similarly, taxi side stripe marking was not provided because the consultant or contractor believed that the pavement of the taxiway and turfed area had clearly shown a clear distinction between load-bearing and non-load-bearing surfaces.

6.4 The paper also discussed on the common challenges faced by the Aerodrome Operator in the event the aerodrome was not complying to these requirements due to some specific reasons and further highlighted certain critical measures require heightened attention.

6.5 AP-AA/WG/6 noted the information shared by Malaysia and encouraged member States to share the relevant best practices on this matter. The AP-AA/WG would discuss in its next Meeting whether it would be required to develop a regional guidance for cases whereby the aerodrome does not have runway side stripe marking and taxi side stripe marking after having shared State's best practices and experiences in the next Meeting.

ICAO Initiative for Assistance to States in AGA Area (WP/12)

6.6 ICAO provided technical assistance to Asia Pacific States in AGA area through various platforms from 2015 to 2023 to improve States safety oversight capacities and enhance USOAP CMA EI:

a) ICAO APAC Combined Action Team (CAT)

b) ICAO Programme for Aviation Volunteers (IPAV)

c) Technical Assistance in Aerodrome Certification and SMS (RAS10801)

d) Capacity Building Programme for APAC States

6.7 AP-AA/WG/6 noted various initiatives taken by ICAO, COSCAPs, ACI and other ICAO Safety Partners in assisting Asia Pacific States to improve USOAP CMA EI, to overcome challenges associated with the certification of aerodromes in some States in Asia and Pacific Regions and encouraged States that need AGA assistance to approach respective COSCAPs, PASO, ACI and Champion States for their assistance and support in AGA area and put additional resources and efforts to enhance EI in AGA area.

Collaboration between COSCAP-SEA and Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group (WP/16)

6.8 CTA/PC of COSCAP-SEA Programme presented a working paper highlighting the technical assistance needed by SEA States in the AGA area. COSCAP-SEA under Phase-V, COSCAP-SEA focuses on strategic priorities including risk mitigation, certification responsibilities, and

enhancing safety oversight systems through training sessions, technical assistance missions, and coordination activities with an intent to enhance air transport safety and efficiency in Member States.

6.9 APANPIRG/34 had endorsed the Aerodrome Assistance Go-Team Methodology, established to provide such technical support in areas of aerodrome certification and safety oversight capacity building. Especially, there's a focus on addressing deficiencies in aerodrome certification among SEA States, with specific attention to those yet to meet the Beijing Declaration target.

6.10 AP-AA/WG/6 acknowledged the importance of collaboration between COSCAP-SEA and Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group to identify the need for technical assistance in AGA area in coordination with COSCAP-SEA and best utilize the support offered by Aerodrome Assistance Go-Team.

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Agenda Item 8: AP-AA/WG Task List

AP-AA/WG Task List (WP/13)

7.1 The meeting reviewed and updated the AP-AA/WG Task List presented by the Secretariat. The updated Task List placed in **Appendix H**.

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Agenda Item 9: Any Other Business

Asia Pacific Generic Guidance Materials and Custodian (WP/14)

8.1 Procedure for periodic review and update of the Asia/Pacific Generic Guidance Materials approved by the AOP/SG/7 and published on ICAO APAC Website at eDocuments under AGA heading could be accessed using URL: https://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/eDocs.aspx. The list of the GGMs developed by the AP-AA/WG was provided as **Attachment A** to the above procedural document.

8.2 The updated list of GGMs developed by the AP-AA/WG including the following Draft GGM presented at this Meeting was incorporated in the above **Attachment A** (**Appendix I** to the AP-AA/WG/6 Report) for endorsement by this Working Group and for further consideration by AOP/SG/8:

i) ICAO Asia-Pacific Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation and Guidance;

8.3 The list (**Attachment A** to **Appendix I**) was also updated with the contact details of the custodian(s) of the GGMs as volunteered by States/International Organizations.

8.4 The AP-AA/WG/6 endorsed the following Draft Decision for consideration by AOP/SG/8:

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">Draft Decision AP-AA/WG/6 - 3: Updated List of Asia/Pacific Generic Guidance Materials Developed by the AP-AA/WG with Details of the Custodians</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">What: That, the Attachment A to the Procedure for periodic review and update of the Asia/Pacific Generic Guidance Materials (Appendix I to the Report of the AP-AA/WG/6) be published on the ICAO APAC Website at eDocuments Webpage under the AGA heading.</td><td>Expected impact:
☐ Political / Global
☐ Inter-regional
☐ Economic
☐ Environmental
☒ Ops/Technical</td></tr>
<tr><td>Why: To incorporate in the list the ICAO Asia-Pacific Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation and Guidance and with updated details of the custodian of the GGMs.</td><td colspan="2">Follow-up: ☐Required from States</td></tr>
<tr><td>When: 19-Jul-24</td><td colspan="2">Status: Adopted by Subgroup</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Who: ☒Sub groups ☐APAC States ☒ICAO APAC RO ☐ICAO HQ ☐Other: AP-AA/WG</td></tr>
</table>

Methodology for Marking of Runway Centerline Using Minimum Consumption of Paint (IP/09)

8.5 Presented by India, IP/09 shared that many aerodrome operators intend to provide runway centre line markings consisting of uniformly spaced stripes of length 30m and gaps of length 20m as per Figure 5-2 of Annex 14; however, compliance to Para 5.2.3.3 of Annex 14 is not adhered to. Para 5.2.3.3 states that "*A runway centre line marking shall consist of a line of **uniformly spaced stripes and gaps**. The length of a stripe plus a gap shall be not less than 50 m or more than 75 m. The length of each stripe shall be at least equal to the length of the gap or 30 m whichever is greater*."

8.6 A methodology is formulated, to ensure compliance with the Annex 14 provisions with respect to the marking of runway centre line along with minimum consumption of paint. A step-wise formulation and calculation of length of stripes and gaps with least consumption of paint was provided in the Information Paper (IP/09).

8.7 Using this methodology an aerodrome operator might save the paint during every marking/remarking/maintenance of runway centerline and after overlay of runway.

List of Experts of the Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group

8.8 The updated list of experts of the Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group provided in **Appendix J**.

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Agenda Item 10: Date and Venue of Next Meeting

Provisional Agenda, Date and Venue of Next Meeting (WP/15)

9.1 The Meeting reviewed the draft agenda proposed by the Secretariat and agreed on the following Provisional Agenda for the AP-AA/WG/7:

AP-AA/WG/7

DRAFT PROVISIONAL AGENDA

Agenda Item 1: Adoption of Provisional Agenda

Agenda Item 2: Review Outcomes of Relevant Meetings

Agenda Item 3: Aerodrome Certification and Safety Management System

- Lessons learnt from ARFF Trainings, Aerodrome Emergency Exercises and Removal of Disabled Aircraft;
- Indicators and Examples of Good Safety Culture in Aerodrome Operations;
- State's practices in safety data/information sharing among aerodromes;
- Sharing of State's Practices in the evaluation of aerodrome SMS and areas of improvements;
- Aerodrome safety vis-as-vis environmental protection;
- Aerodrome safety vis-as-vis land use planning.

Agenda Item 4: Runway Safety and GRF Implementation

- Lessons learnt from Runway Safety Team establishment and implementation of GRF;
- Measures taken by aerodromes to mitigate runway incursions and excursions;
- Sharing of State's practices in implementation of RESA Requirements (90 m versus 240 m) at aerodromes;

Agenda Item 5: APANPIRG Air Navigation Deficiency in AOP Field

- State's update on APANPIRG Air Navigation Deficiency in AOP Field;

Agenda Item 6: USOAP CMA in AGA

- Sharing by States their preparation for forthcoming USOAP CMA Activity and lessons learnt for improving the outcomes (EI) of USOAP CMA Audit;

Agenda Item 7: Technical Assistance/Cooperation in AGA Field

- Collaboration among ICAO and other Safety Partners and various platforms for assistance to States in AGA area

Agenda Item 8: AP-AA/WG Task List

Agenda Item 9: Any Other Business

Agenda Item 10: Date and Venue of Next Meeting

9.2 The next AP-AA/WG Meeting will be held in First/Second Week of April 2025 for three to five days.

9.3 The meeting determined that AP-AA/WG/7 should be in the form of face-to-face meeting. State/Administration interested to host the AP-AA/WG/7 was requested to contact the Secretariat. The venue of the AP-AA/WG/7 would be communicated to States/Administrations through ICAO APAC Invitation Letter.

Closing of the Meeting

9.4 Mr Srivastava, Chairperson of AP-AA/WG congratulated the meeting on the achievements and thanked all participants and members of the Working Group for their contribution to the tasks of the Working Group and cooperation during the meeting. Mr. Srivastava also expressed his sincere gratitude to CAA Thailand and Airports of Thailand for organizing an airside visit at Suvarnabhumi International Airport on 4th April 2024.

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Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group (AP-AA/WG)

TERMS OF REFERENCE
(Second Amendment to AP-AA/WG's TOR approved by AOP/SG/7

Objective:

The main objective of the establishment of AP-AA WG is to realize the commitment of the "Beijing Declaration" - to certify all aerodromes used for international operations by 2020, fulfil the objectives of the AOP/SG to address identified AOP deficiencies listed in APANPIRG database for their resolution and to improve the AGA EI resulting from USOAP CMA activities and meet Global Aviation Safety Plan 2023 – 2025 targets.

Scope of works:

To meet the above objective the AP-AA WG shall carry out the following tasks:

(1) **Conduct** a survey on States which have not completed the implementation of aerodrome certification for all international aerodromes, with an AGA EI below 75%, and/or AOP air navigation deficiencies to establish the requirements for assistance;

(2) **Review** the air navigation deficiencies in the field of AOP (as listed in the APANPIRG air navigation deficiencies database) and assist the concerned State(s) to develop corrective action plans;

(3) **Assist** States which have not implemented aerodrome certification, with non-satisfactory aerodrome certification related PQs, and/or aerodrome certification related air navigation deficiencies to establish an aerodrome certification process including developing specific operating regulations, training programme and training plan, guidance material for all technical areas, aerodrome inspector handbook with checklists, procedures for accepting non compliances, and surveillance programme, establishing runway safety programme and implementation of Global Reporting Format (GRF) using existing platforms, such as COSCAPs, PASO and introducing a new methodology, such as, Asia Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Go-Team;

(4) **Assist** in conducting seminars/workshops/trainings for the aerodrome regulatory and aerodrome operator staff in APAC region; provide experts to deliver presentations at the seminars/workshops in aerodrome certification, implementation of SMS and other technical areas such as aerodrome emergency planning, runway safety, etc.; and

(5) **Maintain** the register of AGA Experts nominated by States and Industry Partners in accordance with *Conclusion APANPIRG/33/3 - Assistance to APAC States that require assistance in AGA area including certification and surveillance of aerodromes*.

Composition: The AP-AA WG would be composed of subject matter experts nominated by APAC States/Administrations and International Organizations, familiar with Annex 14, PANS-Aerodromes (Doc 9981) and its guidance materials and in particular on aerodrome certification procedures and ICAO USOAP CMA.

Working Methods: As far as practicable, the work should be carried out through electronic correspondences and web-conferences. The Working Group will hold at least one face-to-face meeting a year. The AP-AA WG may be assembled on need basis to assist States. Onsite assistance may be provided to States, if required, on cost-recovery basis through Asia Pacific Aerodrome

Assistance Go-Team platform. The ICAO APAC Office would do necessary coordination. The ICAO COSCAPs will support the implementation of Tasks.

Time frame: The tenure of the AP-AA WG would last until September - 2026.

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List of Aerodromes used for International Operations in APAC Region that have to be certified

S. No	Sub-region	State / Admin	ICAO Code	Name of City	Name of Aerodrome	Type
1	SA	Afghanistan	OAHR	Herat	Herat Intl	UNK
2	SA	Afghanistan	OAKB	Kabul	Kabul Intl	RS
3	SA	Afghanistan	OAKN	Kandahar	Kandahar Intl	AS
4	SA	Afghanistan	OAMS	Mazar-e-Sharif	Mazar-e-Sharif	UNK
5	SEA	Brunei	WBSB	Brunei	Brunei Intl	RS
6	NA	China	RCYU	Hualien	Hualien	UNK
7	NA	China	RCMQ	Taichung	Cingcyuangang	UNK
8	NA	China	RCNN	Tainan	Tainan	UNK
9	SA	India	VICG	Chandigarh		UNK
10	SA	India	VOGO	Goa		UNK
11	SA	India	VOPB	Port Blair		UNK
12	SA	India	VAPO	Pune		UNK
13	SA	India	VISR	Srinagar		UNK
14	PAC	Kiribati	PLCH	Kiritimati	Christmas I.	RS
15	PAC	Kiribati	NGTA	Tarawa	Bonriki Intl	RS
16	SEA	Lao PDR	VLLB	Luangprabang	Luangprabang Intl	RS
17	SEA	Lao PDR	VLSK	Kaisonphimvihan	Savannakhet Intl	RS
18	SEA	Lao PDR	VLPS	Pakse	Pakse Intl	RS
19	SEA	Malaysia	WMKD	Kuantan	Haji Ahmad Shah	RNS
20	SEA	Malaysia	WBKL	Labuan		RNS
21	PAC	Micronesia	PTPN	Pohnpei I.	Pohnpei Intl	RS
22	PAC	Micronesia	PTKK	Weno I.	FM Chuuk Intl	RS
23	PAC	Micronesia	PTYA	Yap I.	Yap Intl	RS
24	PAC	Micronesia	PTSA	Kosrae I.	Kosrae	UNK
25	PAC	Nauru	ANYN	Nauru I.	Nauru intl	RS
26	SEA	Philippines	RPVK	Kalibo, Aklan	Kalibo Intl*	RS
27	SEA	Philippines	RPVP	Puerto Princesa City	Puerto Princesa Intl*	RS
28	SEA	Philippines	RPSP	Panglao	Bohol-Panglao Intl*	RS
29	SEA	Philippines	RPLC	Pampanga	Diosdado Macapagal Intl*	RS
30	SEA	Thailand	VTSG	Krabi		RS
31	SEA	Thailand	VTSB	Surat Thani		RS
32	SEA	Timor Leste	WPDB	Suai	Commander-in-Chief of the FALINTIL – Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão Intl	RNS
33	PAC	Tuvalu	NGFU	Funafuti	Funafuti Intl	RS

* Airports granted with temporary aerodrome certificates

States / Administrations that have yet to publish (partially or wholly) the status of certification of aerodromes in AIP AD 1.5.

States	**North Asia (5 States & 2 SARs)**	**South East Asia (11 States)**	**South Asia (8 States)**	**Pacific (15 States & 8 OTs)**
No aerodromes listed in AD 1.5/ AD 1.5 missing in AIP	--	1) Brunei Darussalam	1) Afghanistan	1) Kiribati 2) Nauru ~~3) Samoa~~ ~~4) Tonga~~ 5) Tuvalu 6) Vanuatu
Some but not all aerodromes listed in AD 1.5	1) China	1) Viet Nam		--
AIP cannot be located	--	--	--	1) Marshall Is. 2) Micronesia (Federated States of) 3) Palau
Total (11 States)	**1 State**	**2 States**	**1 State**	**7 States / OTs**

Notes:-

The following States that have published the status of Certification of Aerodromes in other Section of AD in AIP as below are encouraged to publish the same in AIP AD 1.5:

1) Solomon Islands - AD 1.1, 1.1.5
2) US Territories (American Samoa, Guam and Norther Mariana Islands) – AD 2.6.

Generic Aerodrome Safety Management System (SMS) Evaluation Tool and Guidance

[Document Control No.]

Revision: XX

Date: DD MMM YYYY

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Aerodrome SMS Evaluation Tool and Guidance

To be completed by the Accountable Executive or Safety Manager of the aerodrome:

Aerodrome: Click here to enter text.	Approval/Certificate Reference(s): Click here to enter text.
SMS Manual Revision: Click here to enter text.	Evaluator(s): Name: Click here to enter text. Department: Click here to enter text. Position: Choose an item.
Date of completion of the assessment by aerodrome operator: Click here to enter a date.	

To be completed by CAA staff:

Name: Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text.	Position: Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text. Click here to enter text.	Department: Click here to enter text. Date of completion of the assessment by CAA: Click here to enter a date.

Introduction

The Annex 19 of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standardizes an approach to Safety Management applicable to various domains within aviation. As a result, the Safety Management International Collaboration Group (SM ICG) has developed an Safety Management Systems (SMS) Evaluation Tool to directly align with this approach. The tool has been adopted and customized for use by numerous States worldwide, including Australia, Thailand and others.

During the AP-AA/WG/5 meeting, a new task was introduced, aiming to develop a generic guidance for the evaluation of Aerodrome SMS. In a collaborative effort, Thailand, Australia and Maldives jointly worked on the development of the Aerodrome SMS Evaluation Tool and Guidance. Drawing insights from various established tools such as the SM ICG SMS Evaluation Tool, CASA Safety Management System Evaluation Tool and Guidance, Maldives CAA Management System Assessment Tool, CAAT SMS Evaluation Tool, UK CAA SMS Evaluation Tool, and EASA Management System Assessment Tool, this comprehensive tool underwent tailored modifications to accommodate the specific assessment needs inherent to Aerodrome SMS.

SMS Evaluation Tool Instructions for use

This tool assesses the overall effectiveness of aerodrome SMS by considering compliance and performance indicators derived from ICAO Annex 19 and the Safety Management Manual (Doc 9859). These indicators are structured according to the ICAO SMS Framework, with assessments made on whether each indicator is *Present (P)*, *Suitable (S)*, *Operating (O)*, or *Effective (E)*, as outlined in the accompanying definitions and guidance.

PSOE definitions for individual indicator (assessed and completed initially by the aerodrome operator and verified by CAA):

Present (P):	There is evidence that the indicator is clearly visible and is documented within the aerodrome's SMS documentation.
Suitable (S):	The indicator is suitable based on the size, nature, complexity and the inherent risk in the activity.
Operating (O):	There is evidence that the indicator is in use and an output is being produced.
Effective (E):	There is evidence that the indicator is effectively achieving the desired outcome and has a positive safety impact.

Element summary definitions (as used by CAA in the element summary assessment):

Initiating:	Not all of the indicators in this element are present and suitable.
Present and suitable:	All indicators in this element are at least present and suitable but not all are operating. This level is required for initial certificaton of an aerodrome.
Operating (but not effective):	All compliance and performance indicators are at least operating but the overall effectiveness for that element is not achieved.
Effectiveness achieved:	All compliance and performance indicators are at least operating and the overall effectiveness for that element is achieved.
Excellence:	Effectiveness is achieved as above and there are signs of best practice and excellence in how the aerodrome has implemented this element.

This concept of evaluating SMS effectiveness supports the move from traditional, compliance-based oversight to performance-based oversight that focuses on how the SMS is performing. It establishes a shared standard for assessing SMS effectiveness, fostering mutual acceptance of SMS practices.

The aerodrome operators should use the "How it is achieved" box to describe how they have achieved the PSO or E level for the indicator, detailing any documentation references, evidence or examples to support their self-assessment. Once these indicators are evaluated by the aerodrome operator, CAA will verify each indicator and assess the overall effectiveness assessment of each SMS element.

For the **initial** approval of an SMS all indicators must be **Present** and **Suitable** before the aeorodrome certificate is issued.

For **continued** approval, all indicators must be at least **Operating** for all of the elements.

Due to the continuously changing and dynamic nature of aviation, during ongoing or subsequent evaluations the **Suitable** designation should be re-evaluated considering any changes to the aerodrome and its activities.

An indicator cannot be considered **Operating** or **Effective** if it is **not Present**, and it cannot be considered as **Present** if it is not documented – documentation ensures consistent repeatable and systematic outcomes.

What to look for

This section guides the aerodrome's evaluators or CAA inspectors when looking at each individual indicator and is not meant to be a checklist. The items listed are not specific to an individual Present, Suitable, Operating, or Effective level, but remind the evaluators or CAA inspectors of areas they may want to consider. Some items in this column may not be relevant depending on the size, type, or nature of the aerodrome.

Addressing findings and observations

For the initial evaluation, all processes should be **Present** and **Suitable**. If not, then the aerodrome certificate should not be granted. Once an SMS is functioning, a finding should be issued if a process is found not to be **Operating** during the evaluation.

Where an indicator is found not to be **Effective**, CAA inspector may consider issuing an observation to give rise to suggested improvements. However, findings should not be issued if the process is **Operating** but **not Effective**.

1 Safety Policy and Objectives (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.)

1.1 Management Commitment (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.1)

1.1.1 Safety policy, sign off and periodical review (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.1.1 e) and g), *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.1.1	There is a safety policy, signed by the accountable executive, which observes all applicable legal requirements and standards; and considers best practices and it is reviewed periodically to ensure it remains relevant to the aerodrome.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for			
- Interview the accountable executive to assess his/her knowledge and understanding of the safety policy. - Check evidence that the accountable executive takes informed decisions in accordance with the safety policy. - Confirm the safety policy is relevant and meets applicable national regulations. - Check that 'safety' is key to the policy and remains a highest priority. - Interview staff to determine to what extent the safety values and objectives from the safety policy are known, as well as how readable and understandable they are. - Check evidences that all employees and key stakeholders contribute to the safe operations of the system in accordance with the safety policy. - Check that the safety policy is reviewed periodically for content and currency. - Check that the safety policy includes a commitment to continuous improvement; observes all applicable legal requirements and standards; and considers best practices.			
Present	**Suitable**	**Operating**	**Effective**
There is a safety policy, signed by the accountable executive, which includes a commitment to continuous improvement; observes all applicable legal requirements and standards; and considers best practices.	The safety policy is easy to read. The content is customised to the aerodrome.	The safety policy is reviewed periodically to ensure it remains relevant to the aerodrome.	The accountable executive has a clear understanding of the safety policy and is fully engaged in implementing it.

1.1.2 Safety policy and resources (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.1.1 b), *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.1.2	The safety policy includes a clear statement about the provision of the necessary resources for the implementation of the safety policy.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for			
- Review available, appropriate resources including staff, equipment, and finance. - Review how the aerodrome manages resources by anticipating and addressing any shortfalls. - Check there are sufficient and competent personnel and review how the aerodrome assesses it. - Review targeted resources vs actual resources. - Guarantee that strategy is not only defined according to the current resources but is also based on the needed resources and ways of working to appropriately mitigate the key safety risks. - Check whether the resources are discussed with the accountable executive or during the safety committee meeting (or equivalent), as appropriate. - Check whether any fatigue issues, lack of resources, human performance weaknesses are reported, notably through the internal safety reporting scheme. - Check whether the principles of 'management of changes' are applied to anticipate the resources in case of changes.			
Present	**Suitable**	**Operating**	**Effective**
The safety policy includes a statement to provide appropriate resources.	There is a process for assessing resources and addressing any shortfalls; needs are discussed at the right level of management. Volume and significance of the contracted activities (to and from) are properly factored for the determination of the resources to deliver safe operations.	The aerodrome is assessing the resources being provided to deliver a safe service and taking action to address any shortfalls.	The aerodrome is reviewing and taking action to address any forecasted shortfalls in resources. Needs are anticipated and forecasted, notably using the principles of the 'management of changes'.

1.1.3 Communication of the safety policy (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.1.1 f), *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.1.3	The safety policy is communicated, with visible endorsement, to all staff including relevant contracted staff and third-party organisations.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for			
- Review how the safety policy is communicated. - Safety policy is clearly visible (or reachable, depending on the structure and size of the aerodrome) to all staff including relevant contracted staff and third-party organisations. - Question managers and staff regarding knowledge of the safety policy and its associated objectives. - All managers are familiar with the key elements of the safety policy and its associated objectives. - Evidence that senior management involved in safety activities participate to safety meetings, training, conferences, etc.			
Present	**Suitable**	**Operating**	**Effective**
There is a means in place for the communication of the safety policy and its associated objectives. The management commitment to safety is documented within the safety policy.	The safety policy and its associated objectives are clearly visible (or reachable) to all staff including relevant contracted staff and third-party organisations. The safety policy is understandable (consider multiple languages).	The safety policy and its associated objectives are communicated to all personnel (including relevant contracted staff and organisations). The accountable executive and the senior management team are promoting their commitment to the safety policy through active and visible participation in the safety management system.	People across the aerodrome are familiar with the safety policy and its associated objectives and can describe their obligations in respect of the safety policy.

1.1.4 Safety policy, commitment, and positive safety culture (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.1.1 a) and c), *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.1.4	The safety policy reflects aerodrome's commitment regarding safety, including the promotion of a positive safety culture and the encouragement of safety reporting.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for

- The managers involved in safety activities are familiar with the key elements of the safety policy and its associated objectives, including the positive safety culture.
- Senior management involved in safety activities are efficiently participating in the safety management system and proactively managing safety policy, fostering a safety culture, and implementing objective processes set forth by the aerodrome to proactively manage risks.
- Evidence of senior management participation in safety meetings, training, conferences etc. where positive safety culture is promoted.
- Check how a positive safety culture is encouraged and impacts the overall effectiveness, notably for the safety reporting system and the actions thereof.
- Evidence of proactive behaviours by the managers involved in safety activities, demonstrating continuous leadership and continuous improvement.
- Relationship building with CAA and other key stakeholders (e.g. feedback, trust, exchange of information).
- Feedback from safety surveys that include specific just culture aspects. Confirmation that the internal safety reporting scheme is known and used without fears of reprisal.
- Review how a positive safety and just culture are promoted.
- Evidence that people do not fear to report in respect of the internal safety reporting scheme.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
The safety policy is documented including the promotion of a positive safety culture and the encouragement of safety reporting. The safety policy highlights the primary responsibility for safety of all employees to proactively manage risks. The safety policy contains the main attributes of a positive safety culture,	The safety policy describes the commitment of all relevant staff involved in safety activities.	The safety policy and associated positive safety culture are operationally implemented and promoted at working level by the accountable executive and the key managers involved in safety activities.	The safety policy, its implementation and commitment are reviewed with the accountable executive and senior management on a regular basis. The aerodrome's commitment to safety addresses interactions with key external stakeholders.

	including a commitment to safety leadership and to a just culture across the aerodrome.			The internal safety reporting scheme is known and used without fears of reprisal.

1.1.5 Safety policy and Just culture (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.1.1 d), *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.1.5	The safety policy clearly indicate which types of behaviours are unacceptable related to the aerodrome's aviation activities and include the circumstances under which disciplinary action would not apply.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for			
- Check that guidance and governance are developed on how to apply the just culture policy - Evidence of when the just culture principles have been applied following an event. - Evidence of interventions from safety investigations addressing organisational issues rather than focusing only on the individual. - Review how the aerodrome is monitoring voluntary reporting rates and review the number of aviation safety reports appropriate to the activities. - Safety reports include the reporter's own errors and events they are involved in (events where no one was watching). - Check that staff are aware of the just culture policy and principles. - Interview staff representatives to confirm that they agree with just culture policy and principles. - Consider feedback on how the "just culture" policy is applied and perceived from staff.			
Present	**Suitable**	**Operating**	**Effective**
A just culture policy and principles have been defined.	The just culture policy (or in any other related document) clearly identifies acceptable and unacceptable behaviours. The principles ensure that the policy can be applied consistently across the aerodrome. The just culture policy and principles are understandable and clearly visible (or reachable). Decision-making process related to the implementation of the just culture is	There is evidence of the just culture policy and supporting principles being applied and promoted to staff.	The just culture policy is applied in a fair and consistent manner and people trust the policy. There is evidence that the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour has been determined in consultation with staff representatives.

		designed according to the size of the aerodrome (e.g. involvement of staff representatives, staff committee, Unions, etc.)		

1.1.6 Safety objectives (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.1.2, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.1.6	Safety objectives have been established that are consistent with the safety policy and they are communicated throughout the aerodrome.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

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Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for

- Assess whether the safety objectives are appropriate, relevant and in line with safety policy.
- Through the safety performance measurement and monitoring, check whether the safety objectives are being measured to monitor achievement through qualitative and quantitative means, such as SMART SPIs and SPTs. Check whether the safety objectives, as a minimum, target 'continuous improvement'.
- Check the minutes of the Safety Review Board (or equivalent) how the safety objectives are monitored.
- Safety objectives are defined that will lead to an improvement in processes, outcomes, and the development of a positive safety culture.
- Assess how safety objectives are communicated throughout the aerodrome. Check how these safety objectives as well as their associated metrics are visible (or reachable) to all staff involved in safety activities.
- Assess if the safety objectives have considered relevant documentation such as Industry sector risk profiles, State risk profiles, State safety objectives in the SSP and/or the NASP.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
Safety objectives that have been established are consistent with the safety policy and are communicated throughout the aerodrome. Associated qualitative and quantitative measures are in place.	Safety objectives are relevant to the aerodrome and its activities. Safety objectives are understandable and clearly visible. Safety objectives are aligned with the SSP and/or the NASP, when appropriate.	Safety objectives are being measured and regularly reviewed, are relevant and are communicated throughout the aerodrome. They are monitored through the Safety Review Board (or equivalent) and adjusted, when needed.	Achievement of the safety objectives is being monitored by senior management and action taken to ensure they are being met. Safety objectives are not only aligned with the SSP and/or the NASP, but they are also compared with those of the risk profile sector. They are updated based on the latest relevant safety information available.

				The aerodrome is sometimes involved in the elaboration of the SSP and/or the NASP. Continuous improvement of safety is effectively measured.

For CAA use only

Summary Assessment on 1.1 'Management Commitment'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

1.2 Safety Accountability and Responsibilities (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.2)

1.2.1 Identification of the Accountable Executive (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.2 a), *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.2.1	An accountable executive has been appointed with full responsibility and accountability to ensure the SMS is properly implemented and performing effectively.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

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Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for

- Evidence that the accountable executive has the authority to provide sufficient resources for relevant safety improvements.
- Evidence that the accountable executive is fully aware of his/her SMS roles and responsibilities.
- Evidence of decision making on risk acceptability.
- Review SMS activities are being carried out in a timely manner and the SMS is sufficiently resourced.
- Evidence of activities being stopped due to unacceptable level of safety risk.
- Look for evidence that accountable executive actions are consistent with the active promotion of a positive safety culture within the aerodrome.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
An accountable executive has been appointed with full responsibility and ultimate accountability for the SMS.	The accountable executive has control of resources.	The accountable executive ensures that the SMS is properly resourced, implemented and maintained and has the authority to stop the operation if there is an unacceptable level of safety risk. The accountable executive is fully aware of his/her SMS roles and responsibilities. The accountable executive is accessible to the staff in the aerodrome.	The accountable executive ensures that the performance of the SMS is being monitored, reviewed and improved. Beyond his/her SMS roles and responsibilities, the accountable executive continuously promotes the safety policy, safety standards, and safety culture of the aerodrome.

1.2.2 Safety accountabilities, responsibilities, and authorities (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.2 b) to e), *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.2.2	Safety accountabilities, responsibilities, and authorities are defined and documented throughout the aerodrome and staff understand their own responsibilities.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

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Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for

- Question managers and staff regarding their roles and responsibilities.
- Confirm senior managers are aware of the aerodrome's safety performance, its most significant risks, and its safety objectives.
- Evidence of managers having safety related performance targets.
- Look for active participation of the management team in the SMS.
- Evidence of appropriate risk mitigation, action, and ownership.
- The levels of management authorised to make decisions on risk acceptance are defined and applied.
- Acceptance of risk is aligned with authorisations.
- Check for any conflicts of interest and that they have been identified and managed.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
The safety accountability, responsibilities, and authorities are clearly defined and documented.	Key safety roles have been identified for safety accountability, responsibilities, and authorities (for example, through job descriptions, job family descriptions, or organisational charts).	Individuals have been identified to fill key safety roles, and they are aware of and fulfil their safety accountabilities, responsibilities, and authorities, and are encouraged to contribute to the SMS.	The accountable executive and the senior management team are aware of the substantive/significant risks faced by the aerodrome, and safety management system principles exist throughout the aerodrome so that safety is given the highest priority.

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Summary Assessment on 1.2 'Safety Accountability and Responsibilities'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

1.3 **Appointment of key safety personnel** (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.3)

1.3.1 Identification of the Safety Manager (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.3, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.3.1	A competent safety manager who is responsible for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS has been appointed with a direct reporting line to the accountable executive.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance	What to look for
	- Check the availability of the safety manager (and supporting staff, if appropriate) to allocate sufficient time to the implementation and maintenance of the SMS - Check for any conflicts of interest and that they have been identified and managed. - Consider whether the responsibilities for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS should be given to a full-time person or to a safety manager supported by a team, enough empowered to advocate safety in case of conflict of interest (e.g. avoiding a person having functional activities both in production and surveillance); - Review safety manager role including credibility, competence, and status. - Review the training that the safety manager has received. - Evidence of maintained competency. - The safety manager has an appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of human factors. - Review how the safety manager gets access to internal and external safety information. - Review how the safety manager communicates and engages with operational staff and senior management. - Review the safety manager's workload/allocated time to fulfil role. - Check there are sufficient resources for SMS activities in a timely manner such as safety investigation and surveys, analysis, assessing, safety meeting attendance, SMS implementation's coherence (notably for the assessment of risks and the mitigation measures), periodic reports on safety performance, communication processes including identification and dissemination of safety related information (internally and externally), and safety promotion. - Check the need for Safety Action Group(s) to assist or act on behalf of the safety manager or the safety committee. - Review of safety report action and closure timescales. - Review staffing and competence levels for those involved in SMS activities; - Interviews with the accountable executive and the safety manager.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
A safety manager who is responsible for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS has been appointed with a direct reporting line with the accountable executive.	The safety manager is competent. Sufficient time and resources are allocated to maintain the SMS, but not limited to, competent staff for safety investigation, analysis, auditing, and promotion. *See Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.3 Note: Depending on the size of the service provider and the complexity of its aviation products or services, the responsibilities for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS may be assigned to one or more persons, fulfilling the role of safety manager, as their sole function or combined with other duties, provided these do not result in any conflicts of interest.*	The safety manager has implemented and is maintaining the SMS. The safety manager is in regular communication with the accountable executive and escalates safety issues when appropriate. The safety manager is accessible to staff in the aerodrome.	The safety manager is competent in managing the SMS and identifying improvements in a timely manner. There is an established reporting scheme between the accountable executive and the safety manager to timely and regularly report on the safety issues.

1.3.2 Establishment of the safety committee (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.3, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.3.2	The aerodrome has established appropriate safety committee(s), which includes the accountable executive and the heads of functional areas, to discuss and address safety risks and compliance issues.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

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Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for
- Review safety committee and meeting structure and Terms of Reference for each committee/meeting. - Review meeting attendance levels. - Review meeting records and actions. - Check that outcomes are communicated to the rest of the aerodrome. - Evidence of safety objectives, safety performance, and compliance are being reviewed and discussed at meetings. - Participants challenge what is being presented when there is limited evidence. - Senior management are aware of the most significant risks faced by the aerodrome and the overall safety performance of the aerodrome.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
The aerodrome has established appropriate safety committees(s).	Safety committee(s)' structure and frequency support the SMS functions across the aerodrome. The scope of the safety committee(s) includes safety risks and compliance issues. The attendance of the highest-level safety committee includes at least the accountable executive and the heads of functional areas.	There is evidence of meetings taking place detailing the attendance, discussions, and actions. The safety committee(s) monitor the effectiveness of the SMS and compliance monitoring function by reviewing there are sufficient resources. Actions are being monitored.	Safety committees include key stakeholders. The outcomes of the meetings are documented and communicated, and all actions are agreed, taken and followed up in a timely manner. The safety performance and safety objectives are reviewed and actioned as appropriate.

			SPIs and qualitative means have been established to measure and monitor the established safety objectives	

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Summary Assessment on 1.3 'Appointment of key safety personnel'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

1.4 Coordination of aerodrome emergency plan (Annex 14 9.1 and Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.4) *(cross references to aerodrome manual/aerodrome emergency plan and aerodrome internal audit report)*

1.4.1 Aerodrome emergency planning (Annex 14 9.1.1 to 9.1.3, 9.1.6 and 9.1.14, and Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.4, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.4.1	An appropriate aerodrome emergency plan, which defines the procedures, roles, responsibilities, and actions of all existing agencies (both on and off the aerodrome) and key personnel, commensurate with the aircraft operations and other activities conducted at the aerodrome, has been established and distributed.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Note: cross references to CAA audit report for initial certification/ continued surveillance

Guidance

What to look for

- Review the aerodrome emergency plan and how the procedures, roles, responsibilities, and actions of the all existing agencies (both on and off the aerodrome) are defined.
- Review how coordination with all existing agencies (both on and off the aerodrome) is planned.
- Review how the aerodrome emergency plan is distributed and where copies are held.
- Review when and how the aerodrome emergency plan was last reviewed, as well as any actions taken as a result.
- Interview key personnel and check they have access to the relevant parts of the aerodrome emergency plan.
- Check that different types of foreseeable emergencies have been considered.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
An appropriate aerodrome emergency plan has been developed and distributed.	The aerodrome emergency plan defines the procedures, roles, responsibilities, and actions of all existing agencies (both on and off the aerodrome) and key personnel, commensurate with the aircraft operations and other activities conducted at the aerodrome. The appropriate coordination of all existing agencies which, in the opinion	The aerodrome emergency plan is reviewed to make sure it remains up to date. Changes to the aerodrome emergency plan are communicated. There is evidence of coordination (such as meetings, communication, trainings, etc.) with all existing agencies as appropriate.	The results of the aerodrome emergency plan review are assessed and actioned to improve its effectiveness. There is evidence of coordination with all existing agencies, which are analysed for further improvement.

		of the appropriate authority, could be of assistance in responding to an emergency occurring at an aerodrome or in its vicinity is defined with appropriate means. Key personnel have easy access to the relevant parts of the aerodrome emergency plan at all times.		

1.4.2 Aerodrome emergency exercise (Annex 14 9.1.12 to 9.1.13 and Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.4, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.4.2	The aerodrome emergency plan is periodically tested for the adequacy of the plan and the results reviewed to improve its effectiveness.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	
Note: cross references to CAA audit report for initial certification/ continued surveillance		

Guidance

What to look for

- Check how the frequency and methods for testing the aerodrome emergency plan are defined.
- Review when and how the aerodrome emergency plan was last tested, as well as any actions taken as a result.
- Verify that variations of the different scenarios are regularly considered to test the robustness of the aerodrome emergency plan.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
The procedures for periodic testing of the adequacy of the aerodrome emergency plan and for reviewing the results in order to improve its effectiveness are defined.	The frequency and methods for testing the aerodrome emergency plan are defined in accordance with *[national]* regulations.	The aerodrome emergency plan is tested as defined frequency and methods. Different scenarios with variations test the robustness of the aerodrome emergency plan. There is evidence of reviewing the results of the aerodrome emergency	The results of the aerodrome emergency plan testing are assessed and actioned to improve its effectiveness.

			plan exercise with all agencies involved.	

For CAA use only

Summary Assessment on 1.4 'Coordination of aerodrome emergency plan'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

1.5 SMS documentation (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.5)

1.5.1 SMS Manual (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.5.1, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.5.1	The SMS manual, which describes the safety policy and objectives, SMS requirements, SMS processes and procedures, as well as accountability, responsibilities, and authorities for SMS processes and procedures, has been developed and maintained, and it is readily available to all staff.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for			
- Review how safety policies, processes and procedures are documented and amended. - The SMS manual includes a system description including SMS interfaces. - Check for easy access to the SMS Manual. - Check the manner and format of the SMS manual. - Check for cross references to other documents and procedures. - Check availability of SMS manual to all staff. - Check if staff knows who to contact (when needed) or where to find safety related documentation including procedures appropriate to their role. - Review the supporting SMS documentation (hazard logs, meeting minutes, safety performance reports, risk assessments, etc.).			
Present	**Suitable**	**Operating**	**Effective**
The SMS documentation includes the policies and processes that describe the aerodrome's SMS and processes.	The scope of the activities under the SMS is clearly defined. SMS documentation is comprehensible. SMS documentation is consistent with other internal management systems and is representative of the actual processes in place. The manner and format of the SMS documentation is appropriate to the aerodrome and readily available to all relevant personnel.	Changes to the SMS documentation are managed. Key personnel involved in SMS implementation is familiar with and follows the relevant parts of the SMS documentation, whereas employees are familiar with the content of the SMS documentation relevant to their activities	SMS documentation is proactively reviewed for continuous improvement.

		See Annex 19 Appendix 2 Note: Depending on the size of the service provider and the complexity of its aviation products or services, the SMS manual and SMS operational records may be in the form of stand-alone documents or may be integrated with other organisational documents (or documentation) maintained by the service provider.		

1.5.2 SMS operational records (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.5.2, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	1.5.2	SMS documentation, including SMS related records, are regularly reviewed and updated with appropriate version control in place.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				

	Click here to enter text.

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for			
- Check how safety records are stored and version controlled. - Data protection and confidentiality rules have been defined and are consistently applied. - Check if appropriate staff is aware of the records control processes and procedures. - Check that the SMS records include the decisions taken during the Safety Review Board (or any other high-level safety committee) are supported by evidence.			
Present	**Suitable**	**Operating**	**Effective**
The SMS documentation defines the SMS outputs and which records of SMS activities will be stored. Records to be stored, storage period, and location are identified.	Data protection and confidentiality rules have been defined.	SMS activities are appropriately stored and found to be complete and consistent with appropriate data protection and confidentiality control rules.	SMS records are routinely used as inputs for safety management related tasks and continuous improvement of the SMS.

				SMS documentation, including SMS related records, are regularly reviewed and updated with appropriate version control in place.

For CAA use only

Summary Assessment on 1.5 'SMS documentation'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

2 Safety Risk Management (Annex 19 Appendix 2 2.)

2.1 Hazard Identification (Annex 19 Appendix 2 2.1)

2.1.1 Safety Occurrence Reporting (Annex 19 Appendix 2 1.1.1 c), *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	2.1.1	There is a confidential reporting system in place to capture mandatory occurrences and voluntary reports that is simple to use and accessible to all staff working at the aerodrome. It also provides appropriate feedback to the reporter, and, where appropriate, to other aerodrome personnel and aerodrome users.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	

Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for			
- Review the reporting system for access and ease of use [appropriateness of the reporting systems]. Depending on the size and complexity, the appropriateness of the reporting system can range from simple secured boxes to a digital system, including Apps to install on mobile devices. - Check if staff trusts the reporting system, are familiar with it and know what should be reported. - Check relevant staff are aware of which occurrences should be mandatory. - Evidence that people do not fear to report in respect of the internal safety reporting scheme. - Review reporting timescales. - Review how data protection and confidentiality is achieved. - Evidence of feedback to reporter (or a feedback loop addressing the aggregation of reports with their analysis, depending on the volume of occurrences) - Assess volume and quality of reports including self-reporting. - Review report closure rates. - Check availability to contracted organisations and other organisations to make reports. - Confirm responsibilities with regards to occurrence analysis, storage and follow-up are clearly defined. - Assess how the operational managers and the senior management engage with the outputs of the reporting system.			
Present	**Suitable**	**Operating**	**Effective**
There is a confidential reporting system to capture mandatory occurrences and voluntary reports that includes a feedback system and stored on a database.	The reporting system is accessible and easy to use for the personnel involved in the safety activities of the aerodrome. There is an appropriate means to capture issues from contracted	The reporting system is being used by all personnel. There is feedback to the reporter of any actions taken (or not taken), where	There is a healthy reporting system based on the pertinence of reports received. Safety reports are acted on in a timely manner.

	The process identifies how reports are actioned and timescales specified.	organisations and other organisations operating on the aerodrome. Data protection and confidentiality is ensured.	appropriate, and to the rest of the aerodrome. Reports are evaluated, processed, analysed, and stored. People are aware and fulfil their responsibilities in respect of the reporting system Reports are processed within the defined timescales.	Personnel express confidence and trust in the aerodrome's reporting policy and process. The reporting system is being used to influence management decisions and continuous improvement of the aerodrome performance.

2.1.2 Safety Investigation (Annex 19 Appendix 2 2.1.1, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	2.1.2	Safety investigations are carried out by appropriately trained personnel to identify root causes (why it happened, not just what happened).	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				

	Click here to enter text.

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance	What to look for
	- Review methods for carrying out investigations. - Sample recent investigations. - Safety investigations are carried out to identify root causes (why it happened, not just what happened). Check for evidence of root cause analysis and assess the quality of the analysis. - Evidence of rectification action. - Investigations of safety occurrences establish causal/contributing factors and identify human and organisational contributing factors. - Check the training of the staff carrying out the investigations. Investigators should be trained in human factors (HF) and investigation techniques.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective

	The methodology to define the criteria for safety investigations is documented.	The level of sign-off for safety investigations is defined and adequate to the level of risk.	The criteria for safety investigations are identified and applied. Safety investigations are carried out and recorded by appropriately trained personnel to identify root causes (why it happened, not just what happened).	The criteria for safety investigations are continuously updated to include internal and external sources as required. Safety investigations identify causal/contributing factors that are acted upon.

2.1.3 Identification of hazards (Annex 19 Appendix 2 2.1, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)	Indicator of compliance and performance		P	S	O	E
	2.1.3 (1)	There is a process that defines how hazards are identified from multiple sources through reactive and proactive methods (internal and external).	☐	☐	☐	☐
	How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)					
	Click here to enter text.					
	Comments					
	Click here to enter text.					

Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)						
	2.1.3 (2)	There is a process in place to analyze safety data and safety information to look for trends and gain useable management information.	☐	☐	☐	☐
	How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)					
	Click here to enter text.					
	Comments					
	Click here to enter text.					

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance	What to look for
	- Review how hazards are identified, analysed, addressed, and recorded. - Consider hazards related to:

o Possible accident or serious incident scenarios

o Technical factors as well as human and organisational factors

o Business decisions and processes,

o Third party organisations.

- Review what internal and external sources of hazards are considered such as: safety reports, audits, safety surveys and/or studies, investigations, inspections, brainstorming, management of change activities, security, cybersecurity, sanitary crisis, environmental, commercial and other external influences, etc.
- Assess to which extent the process is not limited to the reactive part (i.e. occurrences) but also considers the proactive approach (as proposed above).
- Review structure and layout of hazard log.
- Is there a mechanism in place to document the hazard log in a way that enables its evolution over time? Is the hazard log periodically reviewed?
- There is a process in place to analyse safety data and safety information to look for trends and gain useable management information.
- Data is being analysed and results shared with the safety committee(s).
- Evidence of management decisions based on data analysis and reporting system outputs which determines any appropriate, corrective or preventive action required to improve aviation safety.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
There is a process that defines how hazards are identified through reactive and proactive methods, using multiples sources. There is a process in place to analyse safety data and safety information to look for trends and gain useable management information.	Multiple sources of hazards (internal and external) are considered and reviewed, as appropriate. Hazards are documented in an easy-to-understand format. The data analysis process enables gaining useable safety information.	The hazards are identified and documented. Technical, human, and organisational factors related hazards are being considered. Data is being analysed and results shared with the safety committee(s)	There are processes and means that capture hazards (technical, environmental, human, and organisational factors related), which are maintained and reviewed to ensure they remain up to date. The aerodrome is continuously and proactively identifying hazards

				(technical, environmental, human, and organisational factors related) related to its activities and operational environment and involves all key personnel and relevant stakeholders. Hazards are assessed in a systematic and timely manner. management decisions are made based on the analysis of data and outputs from the reporting system which determines any appropriate, corrective or preventive action required to improve aviation safety.

For CAA use only

Summary Assessment on 2.1 'Hazard Identification'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

2.2 Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation (Annex 19 Appendix 2 2.2)

2.2.1 The analysis and assessment of safety risk (Annex 19 Appendix 2 2.2, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	2.2.1 (1)	There is a process for the management of risk that includes the analysis and assessment of risk associated with identified hazards expressed in terms of likelihood and severity (or alternative methodology).	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	2.2.1 (2)	There are criteria for evaluating the level of risk the aerodrome is willing to accept and risk assessments and ratings are appropriately justified.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				

	Comments
	Click here to enter text.

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance	What to look for
	- Review risk classification scheme and procedures. - Check the methodology used to assess the risks; how this is documented, accurately defined, and used; check how the staff using that methodology is trained. - Check any assumptions made and whether they are reviewed. - Check that the process defines the level of risk that the aerodrome is willing to accept and who can accept what level of risk. - Severity and likelihood definitions and criteria are sufficiently defined (or that an alternative methodology is described) and adapted to the activities. Severity 'of what' ('possible worst scenario' and consequence) is also described. Differentiation between 'likelihood' and 'frequency' is understood. - Review whether risk assessments are carried out consistently and coherently across the aerodrome (e.g. consideration of various safety perspectives and views to make the relevant decision).

- Review how issues are classified when there is insufficient quantitative data available. When expert judgement is used, a collaborative risk assessment process is used (e.g. various expert judgement through cross-functional disciplines), taking into account different safety perspectives and views to make the relevant decision, to ensure the reproducibility of the assessment.
- Verify whether the risk assessments are updated when new data from the safety reporting system are available. Review what triggers a risk assessment and its review over time. Check that the risk register is being reviewed and monitored by the appropriate safety committee(s), where appropriate. Verify how experience, feedback and monitoring of recently published safety information serves that regular update.
- Review layout of risk register e.g. initial assessment, residual risk, mitigation actions, ownership, associated safety performance and follow-up.
- Sample identified hazards and how these are processed and documented.
- Check which safety committee(s) or person(s) oversee the 'acceptability'. Check the availability of instructions about implementation of 'As Low As Reasonably Practical' (ALARP). Check the right level of authority for decision-making.
- Evidence of risk reduction, evaluation of residual risk and risk acceptability, when appropriate, being applied in the data-driven decision-making.
- Evidence that risks, including those that are not generated by the aerodrome itself, are analysed and mitigated, without further transfer of risks.
- Check how trends and emerging issues are identified and managed.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
There is a process for the analysis and assessment of safety risks. The level of risk the aerodrome is willing to accept is defined.	The risk assessment methodology, including 'severity' and 'likelihood' usable criteria are defined and fit the aerodrome's actual environment, including consideration to the expert judgement when data are not available. The risk matrix and acceptability criteria are clearly defined and usable.	Risk analysis and assessments are carried out in a consistent manner based on the defined process. The defined risk acceptability is being applied. Understanding of external inputs and outputs of safety risk management that should be addressed.	Risk analysis and assessments are reviewed for consistency and to identify improvements in the processes. Risk assessments are regularly reviewed to ensure they remain current. Risk acceptability criteria are used routinely, consistently applied in

		The used definitions are sufficiently explicit or detailed. For the acceptance of the risk's level, the right level of authority within the aerodrome (responsibilities) in cooperation with the stakeholders is clearly defined.		management decision making processes, and are regularly reviewed.

2.2.2 Applying risk controls (Annex 19 Appendix 2 2.2, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)	Indicator of compliance and performance		P	S	O	E
	2.2.2 (1)	The aerodrome has a process in place to make decisions and apply appropriate and effective risk controls.	☐	☐	☐	☐
	How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)					
	Click here to enter text.					
	Comments					
	Click here to enter text.					

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	2.2.2 (2)	Senior management have visibility of medium and high-risk hazards and their mitigation and controls.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for
- Risk controls are clearly identified. Evidence of risk controls being actioned and follow up. - Evidence of mitigation including ownership and timeline. - Mitigations are implemented in an appropriate time scale. - Aggregate risk is being considered. - Check whether the risk controls have reduced the residual risk. - Check that new risk controls do not create additional risks. - Check how the policy considers ALARP – verify the implementation of it. - Check whether the acceptability of the risks is made at the right management level. - Operational managers and senior management have visibility of medium and high risk as well as their mitigation and controls. - Review the use of risk controls that rely solely on human intervention. - Risk controls consider human performance and organisational factors.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
The aerodrome has a process in place to decide and apply the risk controls.	Responsibilities and timelines for determining and accepting the risk controls are defined. Appropriate risk mitigation strategies and perspectives are considered.	Appropriate risk controls are being applied to reduce the risk to an acceptable level including timelines and allocation of responsibilities agreed with the stakeholders.	Risk controls are practical and sustainable, applied in a timely manner and do not create additional risks. Risk Controls take Human Performance into consideration.

			The aerodrome follows the process in place to make decisions and apply appropriate and effective risk controls. Operational, technical, human and organisational factors are considered as part of the development of risks controls. Senior management is actively involved in medium and high risks and their mitigation and controls.	

For CAA use only

Summary Assessment on 2.2 'Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

3 Safety Assurance (Annex 19 Appendix 2 3.)

3.1 Safety performance monitoring and measurement (Annex 19 Appendix 2 3.1)

3.1.1 The means to verify the safety performance and to validate the effectiveness of safety risk controls (Annex 19 Appendix 2 3.1.1 and Doc 9774 Chapter 3 3D.5, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	3.1.1	There is a process in place to measure the safety performance of the aerodrome and to measure the effectiveness of safety risk controls. Note: An internal audit process is one means to monitor compliance with safety regulations, the foundation upon which SMS is built, and assess the effectiveness of these safety risk controls and the SMS	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance	What to look for
	- Check if there is a mechanism in place to ensure that the aerodrome utilises all relevant data feeding sources, to get a true picture of their risks, evaluate its safety performance; and, in time take appropriate actions and check their effectiveness. - Evidence of responsibilities, methods, and timelines to assess whether the risk controls are applied and effective. - Evidence of risk controls being assessed and monitored for effectiveness (e.g. audits, surveys, reviews, qualitative and/or quantitative means to measure and monitor safety performance such as SPIs, SPTs, alert levels, wherever appropriate, reporting systems). - Evidence that the aerodrome's risk assessment processes, including residual risks, are evaluated regularly. - Safety assurance takes into account activities carried out at the interfaces internally and externally: evidence of risk controls applied by other departments, contracted organisation, or other aerodrome users being assessed and overseen (e.g. quality check, reviews, and regular meetings). - Information from safety assurance activities feeds back into the safety risk management process. - Review where risk controls have been changed as a result of the assessment.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
There is a documented process to assess whether the appropriate risk controls are applied and effective. The aerodrome has a documented internal audit programme with a link to a management review process. A person or group of persons with responsibilities for the monitoring function have been identified and they have direct access to the accountable executive.	Responsibilities, methods, and timelines for assessing risk controls are appropriately defined. The internal audit programme covers all applicable regulations and includes details of the schedule of audits. Independence of the internal audit function is achieved. The contribution of contracted organisations should be considered in the safety performance process, considering the potential effect it may have on the safety performance of the aerodrome. Safety assurance takes into account activities carried out at the interfaces internally and externally.	Appropriate risk controls are being verified to assess whether they are applied and effective. The internal audit programme is being followed and regularly reviewed. Internal and external audit results are reported to the accountable executive and senior management. Follow-up of the corrective/preventive actions plan is evidenced and reviewed by the relevant SMS governance body. The status of corrective/preventive actions is regularly communicated to relevant senior management and staff. The interface between internal audits and the safety risk management processes is described and operating.	Appropriate risk controls are assessed, and actions taken to ensure they are effective and delivering a safe service. The reasons for ineffectiveness of risk controls are investigated. The accountable executive and senior management actively seek feedback on the status of internal and external audit activities. Aerodrome personnel are proactively identifying and reporting potential non-compliance. The effectiveness of the SMS processes are reviewed on a regular basis.

3.1.2 Safety Performance Indicators (Annex 19 Appendix 2 3.1.2, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	3.1.2	Safety performance indicators (SPIs) linked to the aerodrome's safety objectives have been defined, promulgated, and are being monitored and analyzed for trends.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for			
– Evidence that SPIs are based on reliable sources of data. - Evidence of when SPIs were last reviewed. – The defined SPIs and targets are appropriate to the aerodrome's activities, risks, and safety objectives. – SPIs are focused on what is important rather than what is easy to measure. – Consideration of any State safety objectives from the SSP/NASP. – Review whether any action has been taken when an SPI is indicating a negative trend (reflecting a risk control or an inappropriate SPI). – Evidence that results of safety performance monitoring are discussed at the senior management level. – Evidence of feedback provided to the accountable executive.			
Present	**Suitable**	**Operating**	**Effective**
There is a process in place to measure the safety performance of the aerodrome including SPIs and targets linked to the aerodrome's safety objectives and to measure the effectiveness of safety risk controls.	SPIs are focused on what is important rather than what is easy to measure. Reliability of data sources is considered in the design of SPIs. SPIs are linked to the identified risks and safety objectives. Frequency and responsibility for the trend monitoring of SPIs are appropriate. Realistic targets have been set, wherever appropriate.	The safety performance of the aerodrome is being measured through meaningful SPIs, which are being continuously monitored and analyzed for trends, wherever appropriate. The result of the trend monitoring of SPIs supports actionable decisions.	SPIs are demonstrating the safety performance of the aerodrome and the effectiveness of risk controls based on reliable data. SPIs are reviewed and regularly updated to ensure they remain relevant. Where the SPIs indicate that a risk control is ineffective, appropriate action is taken.

		State safety objectives from the SSP/NASP are taken into consideration, as applicable.		

For CAA use only

Summary Assessment on 3.1 'Safety performance monitoring and measurement'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

3.2 **The management of change** (Annex 19 Appendix 2 3.2 and Doc 9981 PANS – Aerodromes 2.4.4)

3.2.1 Identification and management of change (Annex 19 Appendix 2 3.2 and Doc 9981 PANS – Aerodromes 2.4.4, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	3.2.1	The aerodrome has a procedure to identify whether changes have an impact on safety of the aerodrome operations and to manage any identified risks in accordance with existing safety risk management processes.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for

- Key stakeholders are involved in the process. This may include individuals from other departments of the aerodrome and/or external organisations.
- Review what triggers the 'management of changes' process. Consider organisational, financial, commercial factors etc. as well as any other change that may affect safety (e.g. security, cybersecurity, environment, sanitary crisis, sickness, or staff retirement & transfer of knowledge).
- Review recent changes that have been through the risk assessment process.
- Check that change is signed off by an appropriately authorised person.
- Transitional risks are being identified and managed.
- Review follow up actions such as whether any assumptions made have been validated.
- Review whether there is an impact on previous risk assessments and existing hazards.
- Review whether consideration is given to the cumulative effect of multiple changes.
- Review that business-related changes have considered safety risks (organisational restructuring, upsizing, or downsizing, IT projects, etc.).
- Evidence of Human Performance (HP) issues being addressed during changes.
- Assess whether the risk mitigation actions resulting from these changes are evident and consistent with positive performance monitoring trends.
- Review impact of change on training and competencies.
- Review previous changes to confirm they remain under control.
- Consider how the reasons for these changes are communicated and how the changes are planned and communicated to those people affected by the change externally and internally. Consider how stakeholders (other departments, contractors, organisations, and Authorities) affected by the changes are involved in the process.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
The aerodrome has established a change management process to identify whether changes have an	Triggers for the change management process and types of changes that	The aerodrome is using a defined change management process to identify whether substantive changes	The management of change process considers the accumulation or impact of multiple changes, and the change

	impact on safety of the aerodrome operations and to manage significant, identified risks in accordance with existing safety risk management processes. Methods, responsibilities, and timelines are defined in the process.	have to be assessed through the safety risk management process are defined. The process also considers business related changes and interfaces with other organisations/departments, having an impact on safety.	have an impact on safety of the aerodrome. Any identified risks are managed in accordance with existing safety risk management processes and are monitored through safety assurance. Internal and external factors such as Technical, Environmental, Human and Organisational related hazards are being considered, as appropriate.	and impact to safety-related functions are communicated with other organisations, including internal and external stakeholders. There is a means to share information with respect to management of change impact with external stakeholders. Safety risks are being managed consistent with the scope and time scale associated with the change. Risk mitigation actions resulting from management of change are part of the safety performance monitoring.

For CAA use only

Summary Assessment on 3.2 'The management of change'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

3.3 **Continuous improvement of the SMS** (Annex 19 Appendix 2 3.3)

3.3.1 Continuous improvement of the SMS (Annex 19 Appendix 2 3.3, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	3.3.1	The aerodrome is continuously monitoring and assessing its SMS processes to maintain or continuously improve the overall effectiveness of the SMS.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for

– Review the information and safety data used for management decision making and continuous improvement.

– Evidence of:

- o Lessons learnt being incorporated into SMS and operational processes;
- o Best practices being sought and embraced;
- o Surveys and assessments of organisational culture being carried out and acted upon;
- o Data being analyzed and results shared with Safety Committees; and
- o Follow-up actions.

– Information from external occurrences, investigation reports, safety meetings, hazard reports, audits, and safety data analysis all contribute towards continuous improvement of the SMS.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
There is a documented process in place to monitor and review the effectiveness of the SMS using the available data and information.	The SMS is periodically reviewed, and the review is supported by safety information and safety assurance activities. Senior management and different departments are involved. The decision-making is data informed. External information is considered in addition to internal information.	There is evidence of the SMS being periodically reviewed to support the assessment of its effectiveness and appropriate action being taken. The SMS is being periodically reviewed by the senior management team to support the assessment of its effectiveness and that appropriate actions are being taken.	The assessment of SMS effectiveness uses multiple sources of information including the safety data analysis that supports decisions for continuous improvements. The measurement of the aerodrome's safety performance addresses the continuous improvement of the SMS in a proactive manner, as well as the

			The aerodrome is using SMS and safety data to develop and assess effectiveness of the SPIs to enhance safety and continuous improvement of SMS processes.	safety objectives, which are regularly updated.

For CAA use only

Summary Assessment on 3.3 'Continuous improvement of the SMS'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

4 Safety Promotion (Annex 19 Appendix 2 4.)

4.1 Training and education (Annex 19 Appendix 2 4.1)

4.1.1 Safety training programme (Annex 19 Appendix 2 4.1.1, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	4.1.1	There is a training programme for SMS in place that includes initial and recurrent training. The training covers individual safety duties (including roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities) and how the aerodrome's SMS operates.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for

– Review the SMS training programme including course content and delivery method.

- Check that the training covers individual safety duties (including roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities) and how the aerodrome's SMS operates.

– Ask staff when they last received SMS training and what they remember from it.

– Check training records against the training programme.

– Training considers feedback from external occurrences, investigation reports, safety meetings, hazard reports, audits, safety data analysis, training, course evaluations, etc.

– Review how training is assessed for new staff and changes in position.

- Check whether there is a process in place to measure the effectiveness of training and to take appropriate action to improve subsequent training. How the effectiveness of the training is rated?

– Review any training evaluation.

– Check that the training includes human and organisational factors.

– Ask staff about their own understanding of their role in the aerodrome's SMS and their safety duties.

– Check that all staff are briefed on compliance.

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
There is a training programme for SMS in place that includes initial and recurrent training. There is a process in place to measure the effectiveness of training and to take	The training covers individual safety duties (including roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities) and how the aerodrome's SMS operates.	The SMS training programme is delivering appropriate training to the different staff in the aerodrome and is being delivered by competent personnel.	SMS training is evaluated for all aspects (learning objectives, content, teaching methods and styles, tests) and is linked to the competency assessment.

	appropriate action to improve subsequent training.	Training material and methodology are adapted to the audience and include human performance when relevant. All staff requiring training are identified.	There is evidence of measuring the effectiveness of training and taking appropriate action to improve subsequent training.	Training is routinely reviewed to take into consideration feedback from different sources.

4.1.2 Competence (Annex 19 Appendix 2 4.1.1, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)	Indicator of compliance and performance		P	S	O	E
	4.1.2 (1)	There is a process that individually evaluates the competence of all aerodrome operations personnel related to their SMS responsibilities and takes appropriate remedial action when necessary.	☐	☐	☐	☐
	How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)					
	Click here to enter text.					
	Comments					
	Click here to enter text.					

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	4.1.2 (2)	The competence of SMS instructors/trainers is defined and assessed and appropriate remedial action taken when necessary.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for
- Review how is competence assessment carried out on initial recruitment and recurrently. - Is there a process that evaluates the individual's SMS competence and takes appropriate remedial action when necessary? Does it consider 'human performance'? - Check whether the competence assessment includes competence assessment safety duties and responsibilities, as well as compliance management. - Is the competence of trainers defined and assessed? - Are appropriate remedial actions taken when necessary?

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
A competency framework is defined for the staff having an impact on safety, including trainers.	There is a process in place to periodically assess the actual safety competency of personnel against the framework.	There is evidence of the competency assessment process being used and being recorded.	The competence assessment programme and process are routinely reviewed and improved. The competence assessment takes appropriate remedial action when necessary and feeds into the training programme.

For CAA use only

Summary Assessment on 4.1 'Training and education'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

4.2 **Safety communication** (Annex 19 Appendix 2 4.2)

4.2.1 Safety Communication (Annex 19 Appendix 2 4.2, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	4.2.1	There is a process to determine what safety critical information needs to be communicated and how it is communicated throughout the aerodrome to all personnel, as relevant. This includes contracted organisations and personnel where appropriate.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance

What to look for

- Review the sources of information used for safety communication.
- Review the methods used to communicate safety information e.g., meetings, presentations, briefings, videos, emails, websites, newsletters, leaflets, bulletins, posters etc.
- Assess whether the means of communication is appropriate, based on the aerodrome's structure and the audience. The communication should be simple and concise so that it is easily understood.
- Is the means for safety communication being reviewed for effectiveness and material used to update relevant training?
- Check that lessons learned, significant events, changes and investigation outcomes are being communicated.
- Check that a positive safety culture is regularly promoted, enhancing 'reporting culture' (where, how, when etc.) and the principles of 'just culture'.
- Check accessibility to safety information.
- Ask staff about any recent safety communication.
- Review whether information from occurrences is timely communicated to key stakeholders (internal and external) and whether it has been appropriately dis-identified.
- Does the aerodrome extend safety communication, as appropriate, to external key stakeholders?
- Check whether the staff know where to find the safety objectives and associated safety performance monitoring? Check whether the staff know the safety objectives in their domain of competence? Does the aerodrome communicate the status of safety objectives' achievement or monitoring?

Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
There is a process to communicate safety critical information.	The process determined what, when, and how safety information needs to be communicated. The process includes contracted organisations and personnel, where appropriate.	Safety critical information is being identified and communicated throughout the aerodrome to all personnel, as relevant, including contracted organisations and personnel where appropriate.	The aerodrome analyses and communicates safety critical information effectively through a variety of blended methods, as appropriate, to maximise it being understood.

		The means of communication are adapted to: • The size and complexity of the aerodrome; • the audience and the significance of what is being communicated.		Safety communication is assessed to determine how it is being used and understood, and to improve it where appropriate. The promotion of the safety policy and its positive safety culture is visible. Decision making, actions, and communication reflect a positive safety culture and safety leadership demonstrating commitment to the safety policy.

For CAA use only

Summary Assessment on 4.2 'Safety communication'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

5 **Interface Management** (Annex 19 Appendix 2 Note 2, Doc 9774 Chapter 3 3D.4.2 and Doc 9981 Pans – Aerodromes 2.4.2)

5.1 Interface Management (Annex 19 Appendix 2 Note 2, Doc 9774 Chapter 3 3D.4.2 and Doc 9981 Pans – Aerodromes 2.4.2)

5.1.1 Identification and Management of Internal and External Interfaces (Annex 19 Appendix 2 Note 2, Doc 9774 Chapter 3 3D.4.2 and Doc 9981 Pans – Aerodromes 2.4.2, *[Add national regulation(s)]*)

Evaluation (for aerodrome operator use)		Indicator of compliance and performance	P	S	O	E
	5.1	The aerodrome has identified and documented the relevant internal interfaces (within other departments) and external interfaces (contracted organisations and all users of the aerodrome, including fixed-base operators, ground handling agencies and other organisations that perform activities independently at the aerodrome in relation to flight or aircraft handling) and the critical nature of such interfaces.	☐	☐	☐	☐
		How it is achieved (including relevant evidences)				
		Click here to enter text.				
		Comments				
		Click here to enter text.				

For CAA use only

Verification of the evaluation result		Remarks
Present (P)	☐	Click here to enter text.
Suitable (S)	☐	
Operating (O)	☐	
Effective (E)	☐	

Guidance	What to look for
	- Review how interfaces internally (with other departments) and externally (e.g. contracted organisations and all users of the aerodrome, including fixed-base operators, ground handling agencies and other organisations that perform activities independently at the aerodrome in relation to flight or aircraft handling) have been identified and documented. Review the system description of the interfaces, should it be documented in the SMS manual or any other equivalent document. - Evidence that: ○ Safety critical issues, areas and associated hazards are identified; ○ Safety occurrences are being reported and addressed; ○ Risk controls actions are applied and regularly reviewed; ○ Interfaces are reviewed periodically. - The aerodrome's SMS covers hazard identification for the external services, activities and internal interfaces. - Training and safety promotion sessions are organised with relevant external organisations. - External organisations participate in SMS activities and share safety information. - Review how positive safety culture is promoted at the interfaces. - The aerodrome's occurrences reporting system needs to extend to the external organisations, wherever appropriate. - Management of changes impacting safety are appropriately addressed through the contracts.

	Present	Suitable	Operating	Effective
	The aerodrome has identified and documented the relevant internal and external interfaces and the critical nature of such interfaces.	The way the interfaces are managed is appropriate to the criticality in terms of safety. The means for communicating safety information is defined. The contracts adequately addressed the safety critical nature of the interfaces and the need to appropriately feed the Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA), including the risk mitigations.	The aerodrome is managing the interfaces through hazard identification and risk management. There is assurance activity to assess risk mitigations being delivered by external organisations.	The aerodrome has a good understanding of interface management and there is evidence that the safety critical nature of the interface risks is being identified and acted upon. Interfacing organisations are sharing safety information, management of changes and take actions when needed. Evidence shows that a positive safety culture is promoted with interfacing organisations.

For CAA use only

Summary Assessment on 5.1 'Interface Management'				
☐ Initiating	☐ Present and Suitable	☐ Operating	☐ Effectiveness Achieved	☐ Excellence
Remarks: Click here to enter text.				

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Appendix

Suggested list of evidences

The following list is to help aerodrome operators in preparation for an Aerodrome SMS evaluation and the types of evidence CAA inspectors will be expecting to see. *Note: While the following list provides examples, it is not exhaustive, and there could be more to be considered.*

Area	Evidences
Management commitment	- Safety policy - Just Culture Policy and supporting processes
Safety accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities	- Safety accountabilities and responsibilities in job descriptions - Organisational chart with safety accountabilities
Appointment of key safety personnel	- Training records for safety manager, safety officer (if any) and management team - Safety committee meeting composition and the terms of reference - Safety committee meeting minutes
Aerodrome emergency planning	- Aerodrome emergency plan and evidence of aerodrome emergency exercise
SMS Documentation	- Access to the SMS Manual - SMS Operational records (such as hazard register, submitted safety reports, etc.) - Document control system
Hazard Identification (inculding Safety reporting system)	- Hazard log or risk register - Safety reporting system (including feedback to reporters)

	- Safety data and information analysis - Evidence of safety investigations - Evidence of investigator training
Risk Assessment and Mitigation	- Safety risk management reports
Safety Performance Monitoring and Measurement	- Safety objectives - Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) - Audit programme and reports - Auditing of contracted organisation - Audit closure tracking and monitoring reports
Management of Change;	- Examples of safety risk management reports or safety cases
Continuous Improvement of SMS	- Safety committee meeting minutes - Safety performance reports
Training & Education	- SMS training programme - SMS training material - SMS training records - Competence assessment records
Safety Communication	- Recent safety communications - Latest safety briefings, newsletters or bulletins.

SMS Interfaces	- Examples of internal and external interfaces

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FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING THE ESTABLISHMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RUNWAY SAFEY TEAM (RST) AT AERODROMES IN APAC STATES

State / Administration:

No.	Questions	Option
1	Has the airport established the Runway Safety Team (RST)?	• Yes • No
2	If the answer to Question 1 is "Yes", then when was the RST established?	• Specify year
3	If the answer to Question 1 is "No", is runway safety formally included in the agenda of another aerodrome forum?	• Yes, please specify • No
4	Has the airport established the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the RST?	• Yes • No
5	If the answer to Question 4 is "Yes", is the TOR in line with the recommended TOR in the State Runway Safety Programme or as per TOR provided in the ICAO Runway Safety Team Handbook?	• Yes • No
6	Has the RST developed the Runway Safety Team Handbook?	• Yes • No
7	What is the frequency of RST Meetings?	• 1 time/year • 2 times/year • 3 times/year • 4 times/year • Others, please specify
8	Does the CAA also participate in the RST?	• Yes • No • Upon request
9	Does the RST prepare and maintain the record of discussion of the RST Meetings?	• Yes • No
10	Has the RST prepared the Register/Log of the RST Action Plan with the responsible entity for taking action within the defined timeline?	• Yes • No
11	Does the RST review and update the implementation of the RST Action Plan in the meeting?	• Yes • No
12	Does the aerodrome operator provide training on Runway Safety and other relevant Runway Safety matters to RST members?	• Yes • No

FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING THE ESTABLISHMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF RUNWAY SAFEY TEAM (RST) AT AERODROMES IN APAC STATES
State / Administration:

No.	Questions	Airport name
1	Has the airport established the Runway Safety Team (RST)?	
2	If the answer to Question 1 is "Yes", then when was the RST established?	Specify year
3	If the answer to Question 1 is "No", is runway safety formally included in the agenda of another aerodrome forum?	
4	Has the airport established the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the RST?	
5	If the answer to Question 4 is "Yes", is the TOR in line with the recommended TOR in the State Runway Safety Programme or as per TOR provided in the ICAO Runway Safety Team Handbook?	
6	Has the RST developed the Runway Safety Team Handbook?	
7	What is the frequency of RST Meetings?	
8	Does the CAA also participate in the RST?	
9	Does the RST prepare and maintain the record of discussion of the RST Meetings?	
10	Has the RST prepared the Register/Log of the RST Action Plan with the responsible entity for taking action within the defined timeline?	
11	Does the RST review and update the implementation of the RST Action Plan in the meeting?	
12	Does the aerodrome operator provide training on Runway Safety and other relevant Runway Safety matters to RST members?	

AIR NAVIGATION DEFICIENCIES IN AOP FIELD IN THE ASIA/PACIFIC REGION
Endorsed at APANPIRG/34, 11 – 13 December 2023, Hong Kong, China
[Updated by AP-AA/WG/6 on 4 April 2024]

Updated on 16 Dec. 2020

Identification		**Deficiencies**			**Corrective Action**			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	<u>Afghanistan</u>							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Herat International Airport**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
	Kabul International Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
	Kandahar International Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
	Mazar-e-Sharif Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	AIP	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.				A

Updated on 22 June 2023

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	Bangladesh							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport, Dhaka**	**Runway/ Taxiway**	**ICAO mission April 2009**	Runway strip width insufficient (280m strip not available for the full length of runway);	runway strip in accordance with Annex 14, volume I will be provided	CAABD	Runway strip width 280m available for the full length of runway (Mitigation measures for storm water drain on the western side strip, is being replaced with concrete hollow pipes into graded surface. 45% of the construction work has been done and total work will be completed by June 2024. No obstructions on graded area).	A

Updated on 16 Dec. 2020

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
Annex 14 Volume I	**Brunei Darussalam** **Brunei International Airport**	**Taxiway**	ICAO Mission of April 2011	non provision of enhanced taxiway centre line marking in accordance with Para 5.2.8 of Annex 14, Volume I Objects on taxiway strips; vegetation on pavement joints and maintenance of joints	Both Northern Parallel Taxiway and Southern Parallel Taxiway Centre line have been repainted yellow and enhanced with black borders on each side.	Airport Operator (DCA Aerodrome Division)		A A
		Apron		non provision of ICAO compliant signage in accordance with section 5.4 Annex 14, Volume I	Airfield signages have always been provided at BIA that follow ICAO standards and measurement. Recent replacement of old and faded labels have also been completed in 2018.	Airport Operator (DCA Aerodrome Division)		A
		Rescue and Fire Fighting (RFF):		non provision of direct access for the rescue and fire fighting vehicles from the fire station into the runway;	Duly noted that there is no direct access for fire fighting vehicles to the runway at the moment, but one will be concluded within the second phase of the Airfield Pavement Rehabilitation Project.	Airport Operator (DCA Aerodrome Division)	4th Qtr. 2022	A

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
		Wildlife Hazards:		Establishing a national bird control committee in accordance with APANPIRG Conclusion 18/1.	Aerodrome Division headed by Head of Aerodrome to firstly establish an in-house committee and will cooperate with Regulatory Division	Airport Operator (DCA Aerodrome Division)	4th Qtr. 2021	B
	Brunei International Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	AIP	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.				A

Updated on 16 Dec. 2020

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	<u>China</u>							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Hualien Airport**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
	Taichung Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
	Tainan Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	AIP	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of some of the aerodromes used for international operations yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.				A

Updated on 25 June 2023

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	India							
Annex 14, Volume I	**Mumbai International Airport**	**Runway**	**AGA mission January 2009**	Runway strip is insufficient 300m strip width is not available for the full length of runway 09/27 in accordance with 3.4.3 of Annex 14, Volume I.	280m strip width for full length of runway 09/27 will be made available	MIAL	**31 Dec 2026** Land acquisition in progress. MIAL has filed temporary exemption with DGCA for non-compliance. Due to presence of slum in beginning of RWY 09/27 south – RWY strip 280m not available.	A
Annex 14 Volume I	**Chandigarh Airport**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified. – Defence Aerodrome				A
Annex 14 Volume I	**Goa Airport**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified. – Defence Aerodrome				A
Annex 14 Volume I	**Port Blair Airport**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified. – Defence Aerodrome				A
Annex 14 Volume I	**Pune Airport**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified. – Defence Aerodrome				A
Annex 14 Volume I	**Srinagar Airport**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified. – Defence Aerodrome				A

Updated on 16 June 2023

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
Annex 14 Volume I	**<u>Kiribati</u>** **Christmas Island Airport, Kiritimati**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.	Issued with the Interim Certificate since the Operator is not yet fully complied to the requirements	Airport Kiribati Authority	31 Dec 2023	A
	Bonriki International Airport, Tarawa	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.	The Aerodrome Operator is not yet fully complied to the requirements	Airport Kiribati Authority	31 Dec 2023	A
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	AIP	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.	The AIP will be amended to include this deficiency	Civil Aviation Authority of Kiribati (CAAK)	15 Oct 2023	A

Updated on 11 July 2023

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
Annex 14 Volume I	**<u>Lao PDR</u>** **Wattay International Airport**	**Taxiway**	**ICAO Mission of March 2011**	Provision of stop bars at runway-holding position in accordance with Para 5.3.20 of ICAO Annex 14, Volume I	AOL request exemption to DCAL and proposed to install in Long Term Plan.	Airport of Laos (AOL)	DCA exempt of runway hold position lights in accordance to AOL and mention in the Certification.	A
		Wildlife Hazards:		Establishing a national bird control committee in accordance with APANPIRG conclusion 18/1.	DCAL to propose prime minister decree and establish national committee accordingly.	Department of Civil Aviation of Lao PDR (DCAL)	To be completed in 2024	B
	Luang Prabang International Airport	**Taxiway**		Provision of runway hold position lights in accordance with Para 5.3.19 of ICAO Annex 14, Volume I on new taxiways	Under consideration by Airports of Laos to purpose for support the budgets and installation	AOL	We have planned budgets and installation during 2021 to 2025	A
		Aerodrome Certification	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.		DCAL and AOL	Aerodrome Certification will be completed in December 2023 (on Process)	A
	Savannakhet International Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.		DCAL and AOL	Aerodrome Certification will be completed in December 2024	A

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	Pakse International Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.		DCAL and AOL	Aerodrome Certification will be completed in December 2024	A

Updated on 29 June 2022

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	<u>Malaysia</u>							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Kuantan Haji Ahmad Shah Airport**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.	Coordination among Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Defense and Airport Operator are being conducted to get the aerodrome certified	Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Defense	31 December 2021	A
	Labuan Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.	Coordination among Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Defense and Airport Operator are being conducted to get the aerodrome certified	Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Defense	31 December 2021	A

Updated on 16 Dec. 2020

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	Marshall Islands							
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	AIP	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.				A

Updated on 16 Dec. 2020

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	Micronesia (Federated States of)							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Pohnpei International Airport**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
	FM Chuuk International Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
	Yap International Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
	Kosrae Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	AIP	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.				A

Updated on 16 Dec. 2020

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	<u>Nauru</u>							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Nauru International Airport**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.				A
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	AIP	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.				A

Updated on 16 Dec. 2020

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	Palau							
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	AIP	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.				A

Updated on ~~26 June 2023~~ 27 March 2024

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	Philippines							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Kalibo International Airport, Akla**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Permanent aerodrome certificate yet to be issued.			~~Temporary Aerodrome Certificate issued with validity from 31 Dec. 2022 until 30 June 2023 as per Aerodrome Certificate issued on 22 Dec. 2022.~~ Temporary Aerodrome Certificate issued with validity from 2 Jan. 2024 until 30 June 2024 Status of Aerodrome Certification as of 22 Feb. 2024 (As per CAAP Website)	A
	Puerto Princesa International Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Permanent aerodrome certificate yet to be issued.			~~Temporary Aerodrome Certificate issued with validity from 8 Jun 2023 – 9 Dec 2023 issued on 9 Jun 2023~~. Temporary Aerodrome Certificate issued with validity from 10 Dec. 2023 – 10 Jun. 2024. Status of Aerodrome Certification as of 22 Feb. 2024 published in CAAP Website.	A
	Bohol-Panglao International Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Permanent aerodrome certificate yet to be issued.			~~Temporary Aerodrome Certificate issued with validity from 28 Jun 2023 – 29 Dec 2023 (Awaiting the approval of the Director General of Temporary Certificate).~~	A

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
							Temporary Aerodrome Certificate issued with validity from 30 Dec. 2023 – 29 Jun. 2024. Status of Aerodrome Certification as of 22 Feb. 2024 published in CAAP Website.	
	Ninoy Aquino International Airport RPLL	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 8 March 2022	Permanent aerodrome certificate yet to be issued.			~~Temporary Aerodrome Certificate issued with validity from 1 May 2023 – 30 Nov 2023 issued on 28 Apr 2023.~~ Permanently certified on 22 Dec. 2023. As per CAAP Website. Note: AIP AD 1.5 is yet to be amended. **Resolved**	A
	Diosdado Macapagal International Airport RPLC	**Aerodrome Certification**	6 March, 2023	Permanent aerodrome certificate yet to be issued.			~~Temporary Aerodrome Certificate issued with validity until 23 Jun 2023.~~ Temporary Aerodrome Certificate issued with validity from 7 Jan. 2024 until 7 Jul. 2024. Status of Aerodrome Certification as of 22 Feb. 2024 published in CAAP Website.	A

Updated on 16 Dec. 2020

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	Mongolia							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Buyant-Ukhaa Airport**	**Taxiway**	**ICAO Mission of July 2011**	provision of runway hold position lights in accordance with Para 5.3.19 of ICAO Annex 14, Volume I.	The runway hold position lights will be provided in accordance with Para 5.3.19 of ICAO Annex 14, Volume I.	Civil Aviation Authority of Mongolia	The RWY hold position marking and mandatory signs were provided to avoid runway incursions on the maneuvering area. Because of the existing International scheduled flights will be transferred to new airport in 2020, the additional runway hold position lights are unrequired to install.	A
		Apron: Airfield signage		Provision of ICAO compliant signage in accordance with section 5.4 Annex 14, Volume I and to cut the vegetation in front of the signs.	The signage will be provided in accordance with section 5.4 Annex 14, Volume I. The vegetation in front of the signs will be cut	Civil Aviation Authority of Mongolia	The work on cutting the vegetation in front of the signs was completed in 2017 within the totally 119560 m² area including, taxiway strip, glide path antenna and apron area, as per Aerodrome manual of, in scope of Aerodrome maintenance plan. [Note: Partially completed]	A

Updated on 15 June 2021

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	<u>Myanmar</u>							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Yangon International Airport**	**Runway/ Taxiway**	**ICAO mission April 2010**	Provision of RESA in accordance with Section 3.5 of Annex 14, Volume I requirements;	RESA will be provided	Yangon Aerodrome Company Limited	(Risk Assessment conducted by the operator submitted on 10 Aug 2018.) RESA for RWY 21 was completed on 15 Nov 2018. _____ Revised date- **31 Dec 2021**	A
		Bird Hazard		Establishment of a national bird committee in accordance with APANPIRG Conclusion 18/1.	Establish National Bird Committee	Department of Civil Aviation	Guideline for Wildlife Hazard Management at Aerodromes, DCA-GM-AGA 08 has been developed and published on 29 Oct 2018) Revised date- **30 Nov 2021**	B

Updated on 8 June 2021

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
Annex 14, Volume I	**<u>Nepal</u>** **Tribhuvan International Airport**	**Runway/ taxiways**	**ICAO Mission of February 2008**	Insufficient runway strip, refer recommendations given in section 3.4 of Annex 14, Volume I.	Provide runway strip as per ICAO recommendations		Construction works to provide sufficient strip towards runway 20 already started with target of completion in 2023.	A

Updated on ~~16 Dec. 2020~~ 27 March 2024

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
Annex 14 Volume I	**Samoa** **Faleolo International Airport**	**Runway Strip**	**ICAO Mission of Oct. 2015**	Insufficient Runway Strip				A
		Aerodrome Pavements		Lack of maintenance of aerodrome pavements in accordance with Annex 14, 10.2				U
~~**Annex 14 Volume I PANS Aerodromes PANS AIM**~~	~~**AIP**~~	~~**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**~~	~~Effective from 1 Jan 2021~~	~~Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.~~			Published the status of certification in AIP AD with effect from 30 Nov. 2023. Resolved	A

Updated on ~~16 Dec. 2020~~ 27 March 2024

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
Annex 14 Volume I	**Solomon Islands** **Honiara International Airport/Henderson Field**	**Runway Strip**	**ICAO Mission of Oct. 2015**	Insufficient Runway Strip				A
		RESA		RESA at both ends of runway not provided				U
		Aerodrome Pavements		Lack of maintenance of aerodrome pavements in accordance with Annex 14, 10.2				U
~~**Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM**~~	~~**AIP**~~	~~**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**~~	~~Effective from 1 Jan 2021~~	~~Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.~~			Published the status of certification in AIP AD 1.1.5 with effect from 8 Sep. 2022. **Resolved**	~~A~~

Updated on 15 June 2022

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	Sri Lanka							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Bandaranaike International Airport**	**Runway/ Taxiway**	**ICAO mission April 2010**	Provision of 280m strip width for the full length of precision approach CAT I runway in accordance with the standard 3.4.3, Annex 14, Volume I; remove obstacles from runway strip; flush the strip with the adjacent runway shoulder.	runway strip in accordance with Annex 14, Volume I will be provided, obstacles from strip will be removed and flush strip with adjacent runway shoulder.	CAASL	Statistical analysis submitted by AASL has been accepted in 2021. Request made to submit the improved risk assessment with necessary amendments within 2022.	A
				Establishment of a national bird committee in accordance with APANPIRG Conclusion 18/1.	National Bird Committee will be established.		A meeting to be held with all stakeholders to establish the Committee and to ratify the TOR by end of September 2022.	A

Updated on 1 June 2023

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
Annex 14, Volume I	**Thailand** **Phuket International Airport**	**Runway**	**AGA mission of July 2009**	RESA to satisfy Section 3.5 of Annex 14, Volume I requirements.	RESA will be provided at the end of both RWY09 and RWY27 to satisfy Section 3.5 of Annex 14, Volume I requirements. Remark: - Dimension of RESA RWY09 is 150x190 m. - Dimension of RESA RWY27 is 150x120 m.	Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited	The construction is expected to be completed in 2024. Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited already has had the contractor for this construction's project and the safety assurance and project management documentation has been approved by the Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand to ensure that the aerodrome can continue to operate safely during the project. Currently, the construction progress is 44.67%	U
				Runway strip width insufficient (280m runway strip for precision approach runways in accordance with Para 3.4.3 of Annex 14, Volume I.	300m runway strip width will be made available. Except 111.4m length at the beginning of RWY09 (60m strip length before RWY09 threshold plus 51.4m length beyond the threshold), the runway strip width will be extended 150m on the right	Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited	The construction is expected to be completed in 2024. Airports of Thailand Public Company Limited already has had the contractor for this construction's project and the safety assurance and project management documentation has been approved by the Civil	A

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
					side of RWY09 centre line and 90.27m on the left side of the runway centre line (due to the marsh near the runway).		Aviation Authority of Thailand to ensure that the aerodrome can continue to operate safely during the project. Currently, the construction progress is 44.67%	
	Krabi Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.	Certify the aerodrome in accordance with aerodrome certification requirements	The Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand and Department of Airports	31 December 2023	A
	Surat Thani Airport	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.	Certify the aerodrome in accordance with aerodrome certification requirements	The Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand and Department of Airports	31 December 2023	A

Updated on 14 June 2023

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	Timor-Leste							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Commander-in-Chief of the FALINTIL – Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão International Airport, Suai**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.	To be certify for its designed category (3C) the significant safety issue relating to AD strip (local houses and habitants must be relocated!) should be resolved. Currently AD is occasionally in use for domestic general aviation and helicopters only.	Gov. TL and ANATL as AD operator	Estimated date: 31 December 2023	A

Updated on ~~16 Dec. 2020~~ 27 June 2023

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	<u>Tonga</u>							
Annex 14 Volume I	**Fua'amotu International Airport**	**Runway Strip**	**ICAO Mission of Oct. 2015**	Insufficient Runway Strip	1. File of difference to ICAO Annex 14 Volume I 3.4.4 through CMA-OLF and the publication of significant difference in the AIP Tonga - CAR 139.C.2.2 details that the strip width for aerodrome reference code number 4, non-precision runway must extend laterally on each side of the centre line of the runway and its extended centre line throughout the length of the strip to the minimum distance of 75m. 2. Provide 240m runway strip width at Fuaámotu International Airport.	CAD Office	1. 28 December 2023 2. 31 December 2030	A

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	**AIP**	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.	1. Collate and update status of certification of Aerodromes in Tonga into the AIP Tonga.	TAL	28 December 2023 (AIRAC Effective Date) Published the status of certification in AIP AD 1.5 with effect from 2 Nov. 2023. **Resolved**	A

Updated on 1 Nov. 2022

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
Annex 14 Volume I	**<u>Tuvalu</u> Funafuti International Airport**	**Aerodrome Certification**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Aerodrome yet to be certified.	Aerodrome yet to be certified.		Part 139 Aerodrome Certification in progress for 2023	A
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	**AIP**	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.	Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.		Update Tuvalu AIP Info	A

Updated on 16 Dec. 2020

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	Vanuatu							
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	AIP	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of aerodromes yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.				A

Updated on ~~01 August 2023~~ 02 April 2024

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
	Viet Nam							
Annex 14 Volume I PANS-Aerodromes PANS-AIM	AIP	**Status of Certification of Aerodromes in AIP**	Effective from 1 Jan 2021	Status of certification of one of the aerodromes used for international operations yet to be published in AIP AD 1.5.	Certify aerodromes used for international operations	CAAV	**WORK IN PROGRESS** Lien Khuong is a domestic aerodrome used for international operation under the Article 80 of the revised Civil Aviation Law of Vietnam. Up to now, CAAV only permits charter flights to Lien Khuong aerodrome. CAAV does not permit to operate scheduled commercial flights to Lien Khuong aerodrome because the aerodrome has not been recognized as an international aerodrome. CAAV published the status of certification of 13 domestic aerodromes in AIP, AD 1.5 in the AIP Amendment No 03/2020, issued on November 30th 2020 (including Lien Khuong aerodrome). **Corrective Action Plan (CAP):** - The Prime Minister agreed on adding Lien Khuong aerodrome in the list of international aerodromes of master planning of network of aerodromes of Viet Nam (Decision 648/QD-TTg dated June 07th 2023).	A

Identification		Deficiencies			Corrective Action			
Requirements	**States/facilities**	**Description**	**Date first reported**	**Remarks**	**Description**	**Executing body**	**Target date of completion**	**Priority for action****
							- ~~CAAV is coordinating with Airports Corporation of Viet Nam (ACV) to develop a plan to upgrade Lien Khuong into an international aerodrome.~~ CAAV approved a plan of Airports Corporation of VietNam (ACV) to upgrade Lien Khuong into an international aerodrome (Document 100/CHK-QLC dated 05/01/2023). - It is intended to complete the procedure for upgrading, publishing Lien Khuong as an international aerodrome in AIP by the Quarter II of 2024. **Target date of completion:** Quarter II of 2024	

* Priority for action to remedy the shortcoming is based on the following safety assessments:

"U" priority = Urgent requirements having a direct impact on safety and requiring immediate corrective actions. Urgent requirement consisting of any physical, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedures specification, the application of which is urgently required for air navigation safety.

"A" priority = Top priority requirements necessary for air navigation safety. Top priority requirement consisting of any physical, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedures specification, the application of which is considered necessary for air navigation safety.

"B" priority = Intermediate requirements necessary for air navigation regularity and efficiency. Intermediate priority requirement consisting of any physical, configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedures specification, the application of which is considered necessary for air navigation regularity and efficiency.

APANPIRG
AERODROMES OPERATIONS AND PLANNING SUB-GROUP (AOP/SG)

LIST OF AOP FOCAL POINTS [Updated on ~~12 September 2023~~ 4 April 2024]

	NAME		TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
1.	**AFGHANISTAN**				
	1.	Engineer Najibullah	Head of Aerodrome Standardization Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority	–	najib0107@gmail.com;
2.	**AUSTRALIA**				
	2.	Mr. Dan Parsons	Senior Standards Officer (Aerodromes & Heliports) Flight Standards Branch National Operations and Standards/CASA 180 Ann Street Brisbane QLD 4000 GPO Box 2005 Canberra ACT 2601	Tel: +61 7 3144 7426	Dan.Parsons@casa.gov.au;
	3.	Mr. Rodney Evans	ARFF Standards Lead Airservices Australia Eastern Avenue Bilinga Coolangatta Airport, PO Box 300 Coolangatta QLD 4225	Tel: +61 7 5599 5909 Fax: +61 7 5590 2718	Rodney.Evans@airservicesaustralia.com;
3.	**BANGLADESH**				
	4.	Mr. MD. Ayub Khan	Assistant Director (SAR) Directorate of Flight Safety & Regulations Civil Aviation Authority of Bangladesh Civil Aviation Authority Headquarters Kurmitola, Dhaka-1229	Tel: +880 2 8901406	ayubcaab@gmail.com;
4.	**BHUTAN**				
	5.	Mr. Sangay Wangdi	Head of Aerodrome Bhutan Civil Aviation Authority Paro International Airport, Paro, Bhutan	Tel: +975-8-271 911 Mob: +975-17119277 Fax: +975-8-271 909	swangdi@bcaa.gov.bt;

LIST OF AOP FOCAL POINTS

	NAME		TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
5.	**BRUNEI DARUSSALAM**				
	6.	Mr. Mohamad Fauzi bin Mohamad Sidek	Acting Deputy Director (Regulator) Department of Civil Aviation Brunei Darussalam	Tel: +673 233 0142 Mob: +673 816 8909	ddca.regulatory@dca.gov.bn;
	7.	Mr. Pg Rasman bin Pg Sulaiman	Aerodrome Inspector Department of Civil Aviation Brunei Darussalam	Tel: +673 233 0142 Mob: +673 885 4714	rasman.sulaiman@dca.gov.bn;
	8.	Ms. Norhidayah Haji Ismail	Air Traffic Control Officer (ANS Inspector) Department of Civil Aviation Brunei Darussalam	Tel: +673 233 0142 Mob: +673 883 4614	norhidayah.ismail@dca.gov.bn;
6.	**CAMBODIA**				
	9.	Mr. Cheav Vin	Director (Chief Aerodrome Inspector) Department of Airport Standards and Safety State Secretariat of Civil Aviation #44, Phnom Penh International Airport, Russian Blvd., Phnom Penh	Tel: + 855 23 890198	vincheav@gmail.com; sovicha.pp@gmail.com;
	10.	Mr. Eng Samreth	Deputy Director (Aerodrome Inspector) Airport Standards and Safety State Secretariat of Civil Aviation #44, Phnom Penh International Airport, Russian Blv., Phnom Penh	Tel: +855 98 628811	engsamreth@gmail.com;
	11.	Mr. Sok Sithpisey	Chief Bureau (Aerodrome Inspector) Department of Airport Standards and Safety State Secretariat of Civil Aviation #44, Phnom Penh International Airport, Russian Blvd., Phnom Penh	–	soksithpisey@gmail.com;

LIST OF AOP FOCAL POINTS

	NAME		TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
7.	**CHINA**				
	12.	Mr. Ma Zhigang	Deputy Director General Department of Airport Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) No.155 Dongsi Xidajie, Dong Cheng Dist., Beijing	Tel: +8610 64091804 Fax: +8610 64019967	zhg_ma@caac.gov.cn;
	13.	Ms. Lyu Qing	Deputy Assistant Division Chief Civil Aviation Administration of China No. 155, Dongsi Xidajie, Beijing 100710	Tel: +8610 6409 2804	lvqing@caac.gov.cn;
	14.	Mr. Liang Shixin	Intermediate Engineer CAAC General Station of Quality Supervision of Specialized Engineering No. 6 Yutong East St., Chaoyang Dist., Beijing,	Tel: +86 18801 297577	liangshixin@caac.gov.cn;
	15.	Mr. Guo Jingcheng	Deputy Consultant Airport Division, Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) Beijing, China	Tel: +86 010-64092854	guojingcheng@caac.gov.cn;
	16.	Mr. Yu Yali	Department of Airport Civil Aviation Administration of China	–	yl_yu@caac.gov.cn;
	HONG KONG CHINA				
	17.	Mr. Raymond NG	Assistant Director-General of Civil Aviation (Airport Standards), Civil Aviation Department Civil Aviation Department Headquarters 1 Tung Fai Road, Hong Kong Int'l Airport, Lantau, Hong Kong China	Tel.: +852-2910 6196 Fax: +852-2795 8469	rcong@cad.gov.hk;
	18.	Ms. Amy POON	Chief Safety Officer (Airport and Safety Regulation) Civil Aviation Department Civil Aviation Department Headquarters Lantau, Hong Kong China	Tel.: +852-2910 6968 Fax: +852-2795 8469	aympoon@cad.gov.hk;

	NAME		TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
	19.	Ms. Rosa YIP	Senior Safety Officer (Airport), Civil Aviation Department, Civil Aviation Department Headquarters, 1 Tung Fai Road, Hong Kong International Airport, Hong Kong China	Tel.: +852-2910 6973 Fax: +852-2795 8469	rmlyip@cad.gov.hk;
	20.	Mr. Steven PANG	Acting Senior Safety Officer (Airport) Civil Aviation Department Civil Aviation Department Headquarters 1 Tung Fai Road, Hong Kong Int'l Airport, Lantau, Hong Kong China	Tel.: +852-2910 6970 Fax: +852-2795 8469	khpang@cad.gov.hk;
	MACAO CHINA				
	21.	Mr. LAM Tat Ming (Taft)	Director of Airport Infrastructure & Air Navigation Civil Aviation Authority Macao, China	Tel: +853 2851 1213 +853 8796 4120 Fax: +853 2833 8089	taftlam@aacm.gov.mo;
8.	**COOK ISLANDS**				
	22.	Mr. John Hosking	Ministry of Transport PO Box 61 | Avarua, Rarotonga, Cook Islands	Tel: +(682) 28810	john.hosking@cookislands.gov.ck;
	23.	Mr. Dennis Hoskin	Ministry of Transport PO Box 61 | Avarua, Rarotonga, Cook Islands	Tel: +(682) 28810	dennis.hoskin@cookislands.gov.ck;
9.	**DPR KOREA (1)**				
	24.	Mr. Rim Chong Il	Deputy Director of Aerodrome Department General Administration of Civil Aviation DPR of Korea	Tel: +850 2 18111 Ext. 8108 Fax: +850 2 3814410 Ext. 4625	gaca@silibank.net.kp;

LIST OF AOP FOCAL POINTS

NAME			TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
10.	**FIJI (1)**				
	25.	Mr. Ratu Maibulu Q. Laliqavoka	Technical Officer Aerodromes, Ground Safety Dept. Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji Private Mail Bag NAP 0354, Nadi International Airport, Nadi	Tel: +679 672 1555 Mob: +679 992 8949	maibulu.laliqavoka@caaf.org.fj ;
11.	**INDIA**				
	26.	Mr. Dinesh Chand Sharma	Joint Director General of Civil Aviation Directorate General of Civil Aviation Aerodrome Standards Directorate, DGCA Hqrs., New Delhi 110003	Tel: +91 11 2465 3883	dcsharma.dgca@nic.in;
	27.	Mr. Amit Srivastava	Deputy Director of Operations Directorate General of Civil Aviation Aerodrome Standards Directorate, DGCA Hqrs., Opp. Safdarjung Airport, New Delhi 110003	Tel: +91 11 2462 2495	amits.dgca@nic.in;
12.	**INDONESIA**				
	28.	Ms. Ade Trisetyo	Aerodrome Inspector Directorate of Airport - Airport Standardization Directorate General Civil Aviation Medan Merdeka Barat No. 8, Jakarta 10110	Tel: +62 350 6661	adeth_rossi@yahoo.com;
	29.	Mr. Agung Wibowo	Airport Inspector Directorate of Airport Directorate General Civil Aviation Sinath Tower, Jl. Silangit Blok B, Jakarta 10610	Tel: +62 822990 05421	agungwibowost@yahoo.com;
	30.	Mr. Petrus Hery Tris Cahyono	Airport Inspector, Directorate of Airport Directorate General Civil Aviation Sinath Tower, Silangit Blok B, Jakarta 10610	Tel: +62 81213992467	herytris07@gmail.com;

	NAME		TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
	31.	Mr. Alexander	Aerodrome Inspector Directorate General Civil Aviation Medan Merdeka Barat No. 8, Jakarta 10110	Tel: +62 350 6661	alex.dgca@gmail.com;
13.	**JAPAN**				
	32.	Mr. YOKONO Hideaki	Director for Airport Operations Safety Planning and Coordination, Airport Safety Office, Aviation Safety and Security Planning Division, Japan Civil Aviation Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism	–	yokono-h2dy@mlit.go.jp;
	33.	Mr. HAYASHIDA Futoshi	Chief Coordinator of Airport Safety Information Japan Civil Aviation Bureau 2-1-3 kasumigaseki, Chiyodaku, Tokyo100-8918	–	hayashida-f117f@mlit.go.jp;
14.	**KIRIBATI**				
	34.	Mr. Tiamwa Teaiwa	Civil Aviation Authority Ministry of Information, Communications, Transport and Tourism Development Tarawa, Kiribati	–	ans.ai@micttd.gov.ki;
15.	**LAO PDR**				
	35.	Mr. Sengsangouane Chanthavong	Deputy Director of Aerodrome Safety and Standards Division, Department of Civil Aviation Ministry of Public Works and Transport	Tel: +85620 2222 8823	ngouane2008@yahoo.com;
	36.	Ms. Malaythong Phimmasone	Deputy Director of Aerodrome Safety and Standards Division, Department of Civil Aviation Ministry of Public Works and Transport	Tel: +85620 5414 4354	malaythong@dcal.gov.la; thong.dca@gmail.com;
	37.	Mr. Komack Keochampa	Officer, Aerodrome Safety Inspector Department of Civil Aviation Ministry of Public Works and Transport	Tel: +85620 2223 9498	komack@dcal.gov.la; okidkcp@gmail.com;

	NAME		TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
16.	**MALAYSIA**				
	38.	Mr. Mahyuddin Bin Sajuri	Deputy Director, Aerodrome Standards Div. Civil Aviation Authority of Malaysia Block Podium, No. 27 Persiaran Perdana, Precint 4, 62618 Putrajaya	Tel: +603 8871 4042 Fax: +603	mahyuddin@caam.gov.my;
17.	**MALDIVES**				
	39.	Ms. Fathimath Ramiza	Director Air Navigation and Aerodrome Maldives Civil Aviation Authority Velaanaage, Ameer Ahmed Magu, Male' 20096	Tel: +960 334 2984 Fax: +960 332 3039	ramiza@caa.gov.mv;
	40.	Ms. Aminath Shiznee	Senior Aerodrome Inspector Maldives Civil Aviation Authority, Velaanage 11th Floor, Ameer Ahmed Magu, Male' 20096	Tel: +960 3324983 Fax: +960 3323039	civav@caa.gov.mv; shiznee@caa.gov.mv;
18.	**MARSHALL ISLANDS**				
	41.	Mr. Alice John	Principal AVSEC/FAL/AGA Inspector Directorate of Civil Aviation P.O. Box 1114, Majuro, Marshall Islands 96960	Tel: 011(692)625-6179 Fax: 011(692)625-6170	alcapelle@yahoo.com; alcapelle68@gmail.com;
19.	**MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)**				
	42.	Mr. Ryan L. Donre	Airport Safety Inspector FSM Transportation, Communications & Infrastructure, Division of Civil Aviation	–	ryan.donre@tci.gov.fm;
	43.	Mr. Glenn Harris	Assistant Secretary FSM Transportation, Communications & Infrastructure, Division of Civil Aviation	–	glenn.harris@tci.gov.fm;

	NAME		TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
20.	**MONGOLIA**				
	44.	Mr. Munkhbold Ganbold	Aerodrome inspector, Air Navigation Division Safety Regulation Department Civil Aviation Authority of Mongolia Buyant-Ukhaa, Khan-Uul District, Ulaanbaatar	Tel: +976-11-285048 Mob: +976-11-88013779	munkhbold.g@mcaa.gov.mn;
21.	**MYANMAR**				
	45.	Mr. Kyaw Soe	Director (Aerodrome Standards & Safety) Department of Civil Aviation Headquarters Building, Airport Road, Mingalardon Tsp., 11021, Yangon, Myanmar	Tel: +951 533002 +951 533013 Fax: +951 533000	kyawsoedca@gmail.com;
	46.	Mr. Hla Phone Zaw	Deputy Director, Aerodrome Standards & Safety Div. Department of Civil Aviation Headquarters Building, Yangon, Myanmar	Tel: +951 533002 +951 533013 Fax: +951 533000	hpzdca28@gmail.com;
	47.	Mr. Khin Maung Myint	Adviser, Department of Civil Aviation Headquarters Building, Airport Road, Mingalardon Tsp., 11021, Yangon, Myanmar	Tel: +951 533002 +951 533013 Fax: +951 533000	kmm.dca@gmail.com;
	48.	Mr. Tin Maung Thein	Deputy Director, Aerodrome Standards & Safety Div. Department of Civil Aviation Headquarters Building, Yangon, Myanmar	Tel: +951 533002 +951 533013 Fax: +951 533000	aktttaaviation@gmail.com;
	49.	Mr. Tun Zaw	Executive Engineer, Aerodrome Standards & Safety Division, Department of Civil Aviation Headquarters Building, Yangon, Myanmar	Tel: +951 533002 +951 533013 Fax: +951 533000	tunzawdca@gmail.com;
22.	**NAURU**				
	50.	Mr. Dominic Tabuna	Director, Civil Aviation Authority of Nauru 1st Floor, Nauru International Airport, Yaren, Nauru	Tel: +674 557 3122 Mob: +674 557 3091	djtabuna@gmail.com;

	NAME		TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
23.	**NEPAL**				
	51.	Mr. Deo Chandra Lal Karn	Director, Aerodrome Design and Operations Panel Wildlife Hazard Management Expert Group-Member Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal Head Office, Babarmahal, Kathmandu	Tel: +977 1 426 2324	d_karna@hotmail.com;
	52.	Mr. Babu Ram Paudel	Director, Aerodrome Safety & Standards Department Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal Head Office, Babarmahal, Kathmandu	Tel: +977 1 448 5787 Mob: +98510 96733	paudelbabu@gmail.com;
	53.	Mr. Dipendra Shrestha	Manager Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal Head Office, Babarmahal, Kathmandu	Tel: +977 1 426 2387	dpndrs@gmail.com;
24.	**NEW ZEALAND**				
	54.	Mr. Sean Rogers	Manager Aeronautical Services Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand PO Box 3555, Wellington, New Zealand 6140	–	Sean.Rogers@caa.govt.nz;
	55.	Mr. John McKinlay	Senior Technical Specialist - Aeronautical Services (CAA Editor AIPNZ) Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand Level 15, Asteron Centre, 55 Featherston St., Wellington, 6011 New Zealand	Tel: +64 (0) 4560 9627 Ext 4627 Mob: +64 (0) 274 428 463	John.McKinlay@caa.govt.nz;
25.	**PAKISTAN**				
	56.	Engr. Muhammad Asjad	Senior Assistant. Director Aerodrome Standards Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority	–	muhammad.asjad@caapakistan.com.pk;

	NAME		TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
26.	**PALAU**				
	57.	Mr. Richard Alonz	Acting Administrator Palau National Aviation Administration Palau International Airport Compound P.O. Box 6051, Koror, Republic of Palau	–	pnaa@palaunet.com; palaudgca@gmail.com; pnaa.safety@gmail.com; richalonz4@gmail.com;
27.	**PAPUA NEW GUINEA**				
	58.	Mr Percy Sukbat	Senior Aerodrome Inspector, Civil Aviation Safety Authority	Tel: +675 3027541 Mob: +70306849	psukbat@casapng.gov.pg;
28.	**PHILIPPINES**				
	59.	Mr. Arnel F. Borlado	Department Manager III, Aerodromes Development and Management Service Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines	Tel: +639162193221	arnelfb_67@yahoo.com;
	60.	Mr. Erwin G. Jamero	Division Chief IV, Aerodromes and Air Navigation Safety Oversight Office Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines	Tel: +632 944 2286	egjamero@gmail.com;
29.	**REPUBLIC OF KOREA**				
	61.	Mr. Jaehong Jung	Assistant Director Ministry of Land Infrastructure & Transportation No.11 Doum 6ro, Sejong self-governing city	Tel: +82 44 201 4343 Fax: +82 44 201 5635	pans2021@korea.kr;
30.	**SAMOA**				
	62.	Mr. Aussie Tanuvasa	Operations Officer l, Civil Aviation Division Ministry of Works, Transport & Infrastructure l Level 4, TATTE Building, SOGI	Tel: (0685) 21 611 ext 228 I Fax: (0685) 23 565	aussie.tanuvasa@mwti.gov.ws;
	63.	Ms. Malagamaalii Tamara Keti Fuimaono Michael	Operations Officer l, Civil Aviation Division Ministry of Works, Transport & Infrastructure l Level 4, TATTE Building, SOGI	Tel: +685 21 611 ext. 228 I; +685 7588038 Fax: +685 23 565	tamara.michael@mwti.gov.ws;

	NAME		TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
31.	**SINGAPORE**				
	64.	Ms. Wong Qi Wen	Deputy Head (Aerodrome Operation Regulation) Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore Singapore Changi Airport, PO Box 1, Singapore	Tel: +65 6541 3037 Fax: +65 6542 3869	wong_qi_wen@caas.gov.sg;
	65.	Mr. Teo Tian Hong	Senior Chief (Aerodrome)/Chief (Changi Tower West) Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore Singapore Changi Airport, PO Box 1, Singapore	Tel: +65 6422 7636	Teo_tian_hong@caas.gov.sg;
32.	**SOLOMON ISLANDS**				
	66.	Mr. Rex Alafa	Coordinator (Aerodromes) Civil Aviation Authority of Solomon Islands	–	alafa_r@caasi.com.sb;
33.	**SRI LANKA**				
	67.	Ms. Shereena Casseer	Director Aerodromes & Facilitation Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka No. 152/1, Minuwangoda Road, Katunayake	Tel: +94112355800	daf@caa.lk;
	68.	Mr. H. M. Rangana Samanpriya	Senior Civil Aviation Inspector – Aerodromes Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka No. 152/1, Minuwangoda Road, Katunayake	Tel: +9411 2358844 Fax: +9411 2257166	scaiae@caa.lk;
34.	**THAILAND**				
	69.	Mr. Thittaya Sangathai	Head of Aerodrome Standards Division Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand 333/105 Laksi Plaza, Khampheng Phet 6 Rd. Talad Bangkhen, Laksi, Bangkok 10210	Tel: +66 2 568 8827	thittaya.s@caat.or.th;
	70.	Ms. Angsana Panmongkon	Senior Public Aerodrome Standards Division Officer Civil Aviation Authority of Thailand	Tel: +66 2 568 8827	angsana.r@caat.or.th;

	NAME		TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
35.	**TIMOR-LESTE**				
	71.	Mr. Armando Da Silva	Civil Aviation Authority of Timor-Leste (AACTL) Ministry of Transports and Telecommunications Caicoli Dili, Timor-Leste	Tel: +670 78572600	asilva@aactl.gov.tl;
36.	**TONGA**				
	72.	Mr. Sosaia Maáke	Assistant Secretary Technical Ministry of Infrastructure - Civil Aviation Division (MOI/CAD) ByPass Rd.Fanga-o-Pilolevu/ Nukualofa/ Tonga	Tel: +676 28024	szmaake@gmail.com;
37.	**TUVALU**				
	73.	Mr. Uinga Paelate	Director, Civil Aviation of Tuvalu	–	dca.tuvalu@gmail.com;
38.	**UNITED STATES**				
	74.	Mr. Michael Watkins	Senior Air Traffic Representative, Asia Pacific Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic Organization, System Operations US Embassy, Singapore	–	michael.w.watkins@faa.gov;
	75.	Mr. Khalil Elia Kodsi	Sr. Foreign Affairs Specialist Office of Airports, Suite 616 800 Independence, Avenue S.W. Washington D.C. 20591	–	Khalil.kodsi@faa.gov;
	76.	Ms. Lilian Miller	Foreign Affairs Specialist Office of Airports, Suite 616 800 Independence, Avenue S.W. Washington D.C. 20591	Tel: +202-267-3367	Lillian.Miller@faa.gov;

NAME			TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
39.	**VANUATU**				
	77.	Ms. Jackie Langati Trief	Director Civil Aviation Authority of Vanuatu	–	civav@vanuatu.com.vu; jlangati.civav@vanuatu.com.vu;
	78.	Ms. Naiany Karu	Assistant Director / Aerodromes Officer Civil Aviation Authority of Vanuatu	–	naiany.civav@vanuatu.com.vu;
40.	**VIET NAM**				
	79.	Mr. Nguyen Duong	Deputy Director - Airport Management Dept., Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam (CAAV) 119 Nguyen Son Str., Long Bien Dist., Ha Noi	Tel: +0913211115	nguyenduong@caa.gov.vn;
	80.	Mr. Nguyen Huu Duc	Official Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam 199 Nguyen Son, Long Bien, Ha Noi	Tel: +84 906 528 884	nguyenhuuduc@caa.gov.vn;
	INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS				
41.	**ACI**				
	81.	Mr. S. L Wong	Head - Technical Affairs, Safety, Capacity and ATM, Airports Council International	–	sl@aci-asiapac.aero;
	82.	Mr. Ken Lau	Senior Manager – Environment and Airport Information Technology, ACI Asia-Pacific Airports Council International Hong Kong International Airport, Hong Kong	–	ken@aci-asiapac.aero;
42.	**COSCAPs**				
	83.	Capt. Marie Zubryckyj	Programme Coordinator COSCAP-South Asia Dhaka-1229, Bangladesh	Tel: +880 2 8901497 Fax: +880 2 8901498	mzubryckyj@icao.int;

NAME			TITLE/ORGANIZATION	TEL/FAX NUMBER	E-MAIL
	84.	Ms. Susan	COSCAP-NA Beijing 100600, P.R. China	Tel: +86-10-84001671 Fax: +86-10-84024554	sun.qun.susan@coscap-icao.org;
43.	**PACIFIC AVIATION SAFETY OFFICE**				
	85.	Mr. Mike Haines	AGA Technical Advisor PASO	–	mhaines@paso.aero;

Note:-
Representative of DCA, Niue (For reference and communication):
Mr. Bill McGregor
Director, Civil Aviation
Department of Transport
Ministry of Infrastructure
Government of Niue
Alofi, NIUE
E-mail: wkl.macgregor@gmail.com

AP-AA/WG TASK LIST (Updated at AP-AA/WG/6)

	ACTION ITEM/PLANNED ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTY	TIME FRAME	STATUS	REMARKS
1/1	Develop a survey on States which have not completed the implementation of aerodrome certification for all international aerodromes, with an AGA EI below 75% and/or AOP air navigation deficiencies to establish the requirements for assistance	India to lead Bangladesh, Nepal and Thailand to assist	December 2019	Closed	From TOR **Conclusion AOP/SG/4-8** agreed to circulate the survey to APAC States / Administrations Circulated through SL AN 3/3 – AP258/20 (AGA) dated 18 December 2020 Interim results presented in AP-AA/WG/3 WP/12 [Continued in Task 3/1]
1/2	Review the status of air navigation deficiencies in the field of AOP (as listed in the APANPIRG air navigation deficiencies database) and assist the concerned State(s) to develop corrective action plans	States COSCAPs to support	Continuous	Open	From TOR
1/3	To assist States which have not completed the implementation of aerodrome certification for all international aerodromes and/or with an AGA EI below 75% in establishing an aerodrome certification	Thailand to lead (c & d) Philippines – item (c) Bangladesh – item (d) India – item (e) & (f) Nepal – item (g) Malaysia (lead), India and Nepal – item (a),	January 2020	Closed – Item (a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (g) & (h) Closed - Item (d) and (h)	From TOR Tasks 1/3 (a), (b), (c) and (g) completed and documents are posted on APAC Website https://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/eDocs.aspx Agreed by **Decision AOP/SG/4-7** SL AN 3/3 – AP257/20 (AGA) dated 18

	ACTION ITEM/PLANNED ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTY	TIME FRAME	STATUS	REMARKS
	process, develop a set of generic documents, such as: (a) specific operating regulations; (b) organization structure of the aerodrome regulatory unit; (c) aerodrome certification procedure manual; (d) generic aerodrome inspector handbook with checklists; (e) generic template of the aerodrome manual; (f) training programme and training plan; (g) procedures for accepting non compliances; and (h) surveillance programme.	(b) & (h) Secretariat to support Request support from TCB/IPAV Thailand – item (d) Malaysia (lead), India and Nepal - item (h)	 May 2021 December 2021		December 2020 Task 1/3 (a), (b), (d), (e), & (f) completed and documents are posted on APAC Website https://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/eDocs.aspx Task 1/3 (h) completed (AP-AA/WG/4 – WP/08) and document will be posted after approval by AOP/SG/6 on APAC Website https://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/eDocs.aspx
3/1	For the aerodrome assistance survey questionnaire: (a) Recirculate to States / Administration which have yet to respond (b) Conduct analysis and recommend way forward	Secretariat India and Nepal	May 2021 December 2021	Closed	Task 3/1 (a): SL Ref.: AN 3/3 - AP075/21 (AGA), dated 5 May 2021 Task 3/2 (b): AP-AA/WG/4-WP/09 Task 3/1 (a) & (b) completed.

	ACTION ITEM/PLANNED ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTY	TIME FRAME	STATUS	REMARKS
4/1	Develop Generic Enforcement Policy and Procedure Manual	Malaysia (Lead), India	December 2022	Completed	AP-AA/WG/5-WP/09 Task 4/1 completed.
4/2	Develop Generic Exemption Policy and Procedure Manual	Australia (Lead), Nepal	December 2022	Completed	AP-AA/WG/5-WP/10 Task 4/2 completed.
AP-AA/WG/5 [13 – 16 March 2023]					
5/1	Develop a Generic Guidance for the evaluation of Aerodrome SMS	Australia, Maldives, Thailand (Lead)	First draft GM by December 2023	Completed	AP-AA/WG/6-WP/06
AP-AA/WG/6 [02 – 05 April 2024]					
6/1	Share State's experiences of operation and maintenance of aerodromes without runway side stripe marking at AP-AA/WG/7	**Lao PDR** to share experiences at AP-AA/WG/7	AP-AA/WG/7		
6/2	Review and improvise the RST Questionnaire presented through AP-AA/WG/6-**WP/07**	**Thailand** (Lead), Pakistan, Philippines, Malaysia, Maldives, India, Cambodia	End of May 2024.		
6/3	Share State's experiences, and mechanism established to resolve conflicts between Aviation Authorities and Environmental and/or Land Use Authorities.	**Pakistan** to share its experience for land use vis-à-vis aviation safety at Islamabad Airport. India (TBC)	AP-AA/WG/7		
6/4	Share State's Challenges and Mechanism established for certification of Military Aerodromes used for international Operations.	**India** and **Malaysia** to share its challenges and proposed/possible solution derived for certification of Military	AP-AA/WG/7		

	ACTION ITEM/PLANNED ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTY	TIME FRAME	STATUS	REMARKS
		Aerodromes used for international Operations			
6/5	Share State's Experience, challenges and/or practices for safety oversight of Ground Handling Services.	**India, Malaysia** and **Thailand** to share experiences and practices at AP-AA/WG/7	AP-AA/WG/7		

ASIA PACIFIC GENERIC GUIDANCE MATERIALS AND CUSTODIANS

Procedure for periodic review and update of the Asia/Pacific Generic Guidance Materials in the area of Aerodromes and Ground Aids

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 In accordance with the TORs and task lists of the various Working Groups and Task Forces of AOP/SG, a number of Generic Guidance Materials (GGMs) were developed by these Working Groups/Task Forces and approved by AOP/SG and APANPIRG. All Generic Guidance Materials are published on ICAO APAC Website at eDocuments Webpage under AGA heading for use/reference by States/Administrations and can be accessed using URL: https://www.icao.int/APAC/Pages/eDocs.aspx.

1.2 The list of Asia/Pacific GGMs developed by various Working Groups and Task Forces and approved by AOP/SG and APANPIRG including the details of the Custodians is provided in **Attachments A to D**.

2. PROCEDURE

2.1 The Working Groups/Task Forces identify a custodian of the individual Asia/Pacific GGM from State(s)/ International Organization(s)/Industries with the responsibility to review and update the respective Asia/Pacific GGM(s) in coordination with ICAO APAC Office whenever it becomes necessary.

2.2 For periodic review and update of the Asia/Pacific GGMs in the area of AGA in future, the following process should be followed by the Custodians and the Secretariat:

a) The Secretariat would inform to the respective custodian(s) of the Asia/Pacific GGM(s) once ICAO approved amendments to ICAO SARPs and PANS-Aerodromes (Doc 9981), revisions to Airport Services Manuals and other relevant ICAO documents that may necessitate the review and update of the GGM(s);

b) The Secretariat/Custodian(s) exchange information about newly developed States/Industries good practices relevant to Asia/Pacific GGM(s) as soon as they become aware of their availability;

c) The custodian of the respective GGM coordinates with the relevant subject matter experts of the respective Working Group/Task Force and the Secretariat to initiate the review of the GGM;

d) Once the review and revision of the GGM is completed the custodian would present the revised GGM through the Working Paper at the respective WG/TF meeting for its endorsement with a draft conclusion for adoption by the AOP/SG; and

e) After the adoption of the draft conclusion by the AOP/SG the revised GGM(s) should be uploaded by the Secretariat on the ICAO APAC Website on eDocuments Webpage under AGA heading.

Attachment A

List of GGMs developed by AP-AA/WG and approved by AOP/SG with details of the custodians

S. No	APAC Generic Guidance Materials	Edition/Version, Date	States involved in the Development of Generic Guidance Materials	Custodian (Responsible party for future review and updates)
1	Asia Pacific Regional Guidance on AIP – AD 1.5 Status of Certification of Aerodromes	Version 1.0, Dec 2020	Secretariat	**Secretariat** apac@icao.int pshakya@icao.int
2	Generic Aerodrome Certification Procedure	Version 1.0, Dec 2020	Thailand (lead) and Philippines	**Thailand** - Mr. Teeravee Yongwattanajiaranon (Ling) teeravee.y@caat.or.th
3	Generic Procedures for Accepting Non-compliance in Aerodromes	Version 1.0, Dec 2020	Nepal (lead) and Malaysia	**Nepal** - Mr. Babu Ram Paudel paudelbabu@gmail.com
4	Generic Training Programme and Training Plan for Aerodrome Inspectors	Version 1.0, 2 July 2021	India	**India** - Mr. Amit Srivastava amits.dgca@nic.in
5	Generic Aerodrome Inspector Handbook	Version 2.0, 2023	Thailand (lead) and Bangladesh	**Thailand** - Mr. Teeravee Yongwattanajiaranon (Ling) teeravee.y@caat.or.th
6	Generic Aerodrome Manual	Version 1.0, 2 July 2021	India	Mr. Amit Srivastava amits.dgca@nic.in
7	Generic Aerodrome Certification Specific Operating Regulations	Version 1.0, 2 July 2021	Malaysia (lead), India and Nepal	**Malaysia** - Mr. Mahyuddin Bin Sajuri mahyuddin@caam.gov.my
8	Generic Organization Structure of the Aerodrome Regulatory Unit	Version 1.0, 2 July 2021	Malaysia (lead), India and Nepal	**Malaysia** - Mr. Mahyuddin Bin Sajuri mahyuddin@caam.gov.my
9	Generic Surveillance Programme by Aerodrome Operators	Version 1.0, 2 July 2021	Malaysia (lead), India and Nepal	**Malaysia** - Mr. Mahyuddin Bin Sajuri mahyuddin@caam.gov.my
10	Generic Surveillance Programme for Certified Aerodromes	Version 1.0, August 2022	Malaysia (lead), India and Nepal	**Malaysia** - Mr. Mahyuddin Bin Sajuri mahyuddin@caam.gov.my
11	ICAO Asia-Pacific Aerodrome	Draft, March 2023	ACI	**ACI** - Mr. SL Wong sl@aci-asiapac.aero

	Assistance Go-Team Methodology			ICAO Secretariat apac@icao.int
12	Asia-Pacific Generic Aerodrome Enforcement Policy and Procedures Manual	Draft, March 2023	Malaysia (Lead) and India	**Malaysia** - Mr. Mahyuddin Bin Sajuri mahyuddin@caam.gov.my
13	Asia-Pacific Generic Aerodrome Exemptions Policy and Procedures Manual	Draft, March 2023	Australia (Lead) and India	**Australia [TBC]**
14	Asia-Pacific Generic Aerodrome SMS Evaluation Tool and Guidance	First Edition, 2024	Thailand (Lead), Australia, and Maldives.	**Thailand** - Angsana Panmongkon angsana.r@caat.or.th

Attachment B

List of GGMs developed by AP-WHM/WG and approved by AOP/SG with details of the custodians

S. No	APAC Generic Guidance Materials	Edition/Version, Date	States involved in the Development of Generic Guidance Materials	Custodian (Responsible party for coordination for future review and updates)
1	Composition of National Wildlife Hazard Management Committee	Sep. 2019	Nepal, Bhutan, Lao PDR	**Nepal** Mr. Deo Chandra Lal Karna, d_karna@hotmail.com
2	Terms of References of National Wildlife Hazard Management Committee	Sep. 2019	Nepal, Bhutan, Lao PDR	**Nepal** Mr. Deo Chandra Lal Karna, d_karna@hotmail.com
3	Asia Pacific Guidance for Evaluation of Aerodrome Wildlife Hazard Management Programme	First Edition, 2 July 2021	WBA, Australia, Bangladesh, India, Thailand and ACI	**WBA** Ms. Lalita Vaswani lalita@worldbirdstrike.com
4	Asia Pacific Guidance for Establishment of National Procedure for Recording and Reporting Wildlife Strikes to Aircraft	First Edition, 2 July 2021	Philippines, Sri Lanka, Nepal, WBA, IFALPA	**WBA** Ms. Lalita Vaswani lalita@worldbirdstrike.com
5	Asia Pacific Guidance on Development and Implementation of Airport Wildlife Hazard Management Programme	First Edition, August 2022	Australia, Fiji, India, WBA, AAPA	**WBA** Ms. Lalita Vaswani lalita@worldbirdstrike.com

Attachment C

List of GGMs developed by AOPC/SWG and approved by AOP/SG

S. No	APAC Generic Guidance Materials	Edition/Version, Date	States involved in the Development of Generic Guidance Materials	Custodian (Responsible party for coordination for future review and updates)
1	Asia/Pacific Regional Guidance on Aerodrome Operations Personnel Competency Requirement Framework	Version 1.0 – December 2020	Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Macao, China (Lead), Maldives, Myanmar Singapore, ACI	Mr. Pedro Cavem (Yangon International Aerodrome, Myanmar) Email: Pedro.Cavem@yangon.aero

Attachment D

List of GGMs developed by WA/SWG and approved by APANPIRG

S. No	APAC Generic Guidance Materials	Edition/Version, Date	States involved in the Development of Generic Guidance Materials	Custodian (Responsible party for coordination for future review and updates)
1	Sample APAC Regulations for Water Aerodromes	First Edition (unedited version) — March 2015	Indonesia, Maldives (Lead), Sri Lanka, New Zealand and USA	CAA Maldives Ms. Fathimath Ramiza Email: ramiza@caa.gov.mv
2	Asia Pacific Regional Guidance on Requirements for the Design and Operations of Water Aerodromes for Seaplane Operations	First Edition — January 2019	Indonesia, Maldives (Lead), Sri Lanka, New Zealand and USA	CAA Maldives Ms. Fathimath Ramiza Email: ramiza@caa.gov.mv

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International Civil Aviation Organization

Sixth Meeting of the Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group (AP-AA/WG/6)

Bangkok, Thailand, 2 to 5 April 2024

List of Experts

Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group (AP-AA WG)

[As of 18 April 2024]

	State/Administration and Name		Organization/Title	E-mail and Telephone Numbers
1.	**China**			
	~~1.~~	Mr. DONG Lei	Principal Staff Member of Division of Airport of North China Regional Administration, Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)	jr_yang@caac.gov.cn;
	~~2.~~	Mr. LI Qiang	Deputy Director of Division of Airport of Beijing Safety Supervision Bureau, Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC)	jr_yang@caac.gov.cn;
2.	**India**			
	~~3.~~	Mr. Amit Srivastava	Deputy Director of Operations, Aerodrome Standards, Directorate General of Civil Aviation	Amits.dgca@nic.in Tel: +91-11-24653883 Mobile+91-8750591592
3.	**Nepal**			
	~~4.~~	Mr. Babu Ram Paudel	Director – Aerodrome Spector Aerodrome Safety & Standards Dept. Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal	paudelbabu@gmail.com;
	~~5.~~	Mr. Hari Prasad Adhikari	Deputy Director Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal	er.hariadhikari@gmail.com;
4.	**Thailand**			
	~~6.~~	~~Mr. Boosapa Tavichai~~	~~Director of Aerodrome Safety Division, Aerodrome Standardization and Safety Dept. Airports of Thailand PLC.~~	~~boosapa.t@airportthai.co.th;~~
5.	**COSCAP-SEA**			
	~~7.~~	Mr. Sudhir Kumar Singh	Programme Coordinator COSCAP-SEA	sksingh@icao.int

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