



ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Regional Airspace Safety
Monitoring Advisory Group (RASMAG/27)

Video Teleconference, 22 – 25 August 2022

Agenda Item 2: Review Outcomes of Related Meetings

RELATED MEETINGS OUTCOMES

(Presented by the Secretariat)

SUMMARY

This paper presents a brief overview of outcomes from relevant ICAO regional meetings conducted since the last RASMAG meeting.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Ninth Meeting of the Air Traffic Management Sub-Group (ATM/SG/9) of the Asia/Pacific Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group (APANPIRG) was held by video teleconference from 01 to 05 November 2021.

1.2 The Thirty-Second Meeting of APANPIRG (APANPIRG/32) was held by video teleconference from 01 to 03 December 2021.

2. DISCUSSION

ATM/SG/9

2.1 ICAO informed ATM/SG/9 of relevant discussion outcomes from the RASMAG/26 meeting (20 to 23 September 2021). Further discussion of matters related to RASMAG/26 outcomes was also

AKARA – FUKUE Corridor Airspace

2.2 ATM/SG/9 was informed of RASMAG consideration of a Japan Airspace Safety Monitoring Agency (JASMA) update on progress and proposals of the safety improvement plan for the AKARA – FUKUE Corridor.

2.3 Phase 1 of the improvement plan had been implemented on 25 March 2021. All Air Traffic Control (ATC) responsibility for (Air Traffic Services) ATS route A593 between ONIKU and SADLI had been handed over to Incheon Area Control Centre (ACC).

2.4 As at August 2021 the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 of the improvement plan had been discussed between China and Republic of Korea, but the transition date had not yet been determined.

2.5 The Flight Level Allocation Scheme (FLAS) that applied in the AKARA – FUKUE Corridor airspace was also discussed under **ATM/SG/9 Agenda Item 6, WP/25 and Flimsy 03**. Japan presented updates of safety improvement, and a proposal for the elimination of the FLAS. **Figure 1** depicted the operation of the FLAS.




Figure 1: Flight Level Allocation Scheme (FLAS) in the AKARA Corridor airspace

2.6 The meeting was informed of discussion at RASMAG/26 relating to Seamless ANS Plan element 7.35, and the discussion outcomes of the RASMAG/26 breakout session on the AKARA corridor airspace.

2.7 Japan requested that ICAO consider looking into how ATS surveillance covered the AKARA corridor airspace, and whether paragraph 7.35 of the Seamless ANS Plan justified the use of the FLAS. ICAO was also asked to comment on the rationale for the Seamless ANS Plan 50 NM parameter for determining whether a FLAS should be implemented.

2.8 Responding to WP/25, Republic of Korea provided information discussing the small scale of improvement in the airspace technical risk that would result from removal of the FLAS. The non-sharing of ATS surveillance data, surveillance coverage of the Incheon FIR, some matters of procedure for traffic handling on ATS routes A593 and Y590/Y591, the current LOA between Japan and Republic of Korea were also discussed.

2.9 Republic of Korea stated that the consensus on 25 December 2020 was that Republic of Korea would consider Japan in ensuring fair and equitable use of optimum flight levels. The new single ATC unit at crossing points in the Incheon FIR was applying the increased use of non-FLAS flight levels, and the FLAS issue should be discussed in a bilateral meeting.

2.10 Responding to the requests for ICAO comments, the meeting was informed as follows:

- The Seamless ANS Plan paragraph 7.35 had initially been developed in the consultative process used by the Asia/Pacific Seamless ATM Planning Group (APSAPG) when drafting and finalizing the first version of the Seamless ATM Plan in 2012/2013. ICAO considered FLAS did not meet expectations for seamless airspace, particularly in airspace that was well-served by surveillance and VHF communications coverage. The inclusion of the FLAS element and its limitations in the Seamless ANS Plan (formerly the Seamless ATM Plan) was a compromise reached after considerable offline discussion;
- ICAO did not have information to hand on how the 50 NM from the boundary parameter in element 7.35 had been arrived at, but it seemed likely that it was related to the 50 NM lateral separation minimum for RNAV 10/RNP 10-capable flights;

- The intent of the statement in Seamless ANS Plan element 7.35 b) was that FLAS in Category S airspace should only be utilized for safety and efficiency reasons where crossing track conflicts occurred within 50 NM of the FIR boundary. However, if surveillance coverage or surveillance data sharing was available to provide the State with surveillance covering the boundary airspace, then FLAS should not be applied.
- ICAO agreed that further discussion of the FLAS should be conducted in bilateral meetings between the affected States. However, the meeting noted that Japan considered trilateral discussion of the matter between China, Japan and Republic of Korea should be considered;

2.11 While ICAO considered FLAS in Category S airspace should not be necessary, the current AKARA airspace project was the primary consideration. Completion of Phase 2 of that project should be the first priority, with the FLAS issue addressed separately and at a later time.

Draft Conclusion RASMAG/26-3

2.12 ATM/SG/9 was informed of the paper presented to RASMAG/26 by the RASMAG Chair addressing an action item from the RMACG/14 meeting. The action item had asked all RMAs to request clarification from their respective PIRGs on responsibilities of the RMA regarding verification of the approval status of State aircraft (military and other government aircraft performing non-commercial, sovereign functions) and their relation to civil authorities. The ‘rogue’ aircraft (those that included ‘W’ in flight plans but did not have matching RVSM approval) that persistently remained on the list were mostly State aircraft. In order for the rogue State aircraft to be removed from the list either the State aircraft’s approval data had to be provided to the designated RMA, or the State aircraft operator had to stop using ‘W’ in item 10 of the ICAO flight plan.

ATM/SG/9 was invited to endorse the following Draft Conclusion proposed by RASMAG/26.

Draft Conclusion RASMAG/26-3: RVSM Approvals Data and Filing of RVSM Indicator in Flight Plans of State Aircraft

That, States are urged to:

1. *liaise with their State aircraft operators to:*
 - a. *share State aircraft RVSM approval data with the designated RMA where State aircraft RVSM approval processes are implemented;*
 - b. *confirm the RVSM approval status of State aircraft when queried by the RMA; and*
 - c. *not file ‘W’ in item 10 of the ICAO flight plan of aircraft that are not approved for RVSM; and*
2. *respond to a survey on RMA and State responsibility on the matter of RVSM approvals of State aircraft.*

2.13 While noting the need for RVSM approval for all aircraft that included the RVSM indicator in flight plans, for the safety of operations in the airspace, the meeting considered that there would be considerable difficulty in sharing data on State aircraft outside the State. Items 1a. and 1b. of the Draft Conclusion were not supported by ATM/SG, but the remainder was acceptable.

APANPIRG/32

RASMAG/26 Conclusions

2.14 APANPIRG/32 was informed of the airspace safety monitoring outcomes of RASMAG/26, and the following technical conclusions:

Conclusion RASMAG/26-1: FANS1/A CPDLC Latency Timer Value

Conclusion RASMAG/26-2: RVSM MMR Update

Identification of Non-Approved Airframes Operating in RVSM Airspace

2.15 APANPIRG/32 also discussed the matter of the identification of non-approved airframes operating in RVSM airspace, as also raised at ATM/SG/9 (and also reported to APANPIRG/32 under Agenda Item 3.2). **Draft Conclusion RASMAG/26-3** was presented for APANPIRG/32 discussion.

2.16 APANPIRG/32 was informed that the States that did not support the Draft Conclusion at ATM/SG/9 had been present at RASMAG/26 and had

2.17 India stated that, while best efforts would be made to liaise with military authorities on this matter, it did not support the inclusion of items 1a and 1b. The following Conclusion, revised from the original Draft Conclusion in order to reach consensus, was agreed by the meeting:

Conclusion APANPIRG/32-6: RVSM Approvals Data and Filing of RVSM Indicator in Flight Plans of State Aircraft

That, States are urged to:

1. *Liaise with their State aircraft operators to not file ‘W’ in item 10 of the ICAO flight plan of aircraft that are not approved for RVSM; and*
2. *Respond to a survey on RMA and State responsibility on the matter of RVSM approvals of State aircraft.*

2.18 APANPIRG/32 agreed to the following recommended updates to the APANPIRG ATM and Airspace Safety Deficiency List:

- a) deletion of the Deficiency for Fiji related to PRs not being provided to the Central Reporting Agency (CRA);
- b) deletion (provisional) of the Deficiency for Afghanistan related to non-provision of safety related data; and
- c) amendment of the Deficiency for India related to non-reporting of data link performance monitoring and analysis, to remove reference to Kolkata FIR.

3. ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

- a) note the information contained in this paper;
- b) Note the discussion of the AKARA – FUKUA Corridor airspace and FLAS;
- c) Note that **Conclusion APANPIRG/32-6** does not:
 - i) adequately address the need for RVSM monitoring of State aircraft that flight plan ‘W’ in their ICAO Flight Plan by the competent regional airspace safety monitoring organization; or
 - ii) support identification and resolution of ‘rogue’ RVSM operations by State aircraft; and
- d) discuss any relevant matters as appropriate.

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