



ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

**The Combined Tenth Meeting of the South Asia/Indian Ocean ATM Coordination Group (SAIOACG/10) and Twenty—Seventh Meeting of the South East Asia ATS Coordination Group (SEACG/27)**

Bangkok, Thailand, 30 March – 03 April 2020

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## Agenda Item 7: ANSP Coordination and Civil-Military Cooperation

### CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION UPDATE

(Presented by the Secretariat)

#### SUMMARY

This paper presents information on Asia/Pacific's civil-military cooperation issues and initiatives.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Civil-military cooperation remains one of the highest priority items in the Asia/Pacific Region, as evidenced by the eleven Seamless ATM elements on this subject. Given that the Asia/Pacific is now the largest aviation market in the world by several measures and the fact that the Region does not have the same civil-military cooperation structures in place that North America and Europe do, progress in this area is considered vital. The *Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan's* elements are as follows:

- a) **Strategic Coordination.** This element emphasised the creation of a permanent body, facilities and procedures to facilitate long and medium-term planning for optimal civil and military operations, and the tactical coordination element. This element features the establishment of a national body that encompasses military (and State aircraft operators) and civil stakeholders, to develop high level Civil-Military cooperation policy.
- b) **Tactical Coordination.** The establishment of facilities and procedures derived from the high level strategic coordination body for the daily, safe and efficient tactical management of operations. Tactical coordination features participation of military officers at appropriate civil ATM meetings, airspace scheduling through interaction and communications between civil and military units, and military representation within civil ATC Centres where necessary.
- c) **Airspace Review.** The regular review of SUA and controlled airspace, to ensure that the means and notice of activation provide adequate warning for other airspace users, the SUA types reflect the usage, and the lateral and vertical limits are the minimum required to safely contain the activity therein (Annex 11 2.19.2.1 (b) refers). The review of airspace should be conducted by an airspace authority independent or a collaboration of civil and military airspace users.
- d) **Flexible Use Airspace.** Mechanisms to ensure the minimisation of airspace being exclusively assigned for civil or military use in accordance with FUA principles, assessed by the percentage of military SUA within a Flight Information Region (FIR).

- e) **International Airspace.** The minimisation of SUA and other military entities that may adversely affect international airspace. Restricted and prohibited areas must not be designated within international airspace or airspace of undefined sovereignty.
- f) **Integrated Civil-Military ATM Systems.** The integration of civil and military ATM systems where practicable, including the management of civil and State UAS aircraft, policies and procedures to manage State aircraft that are non-compliant with civil requirements, systems to manage civil and military SAR units, and joint procurement of systems where possible.
- g) **Joint Civil-Military Aerodromes and Navigation Aids:** The operation of joint civil-military aerodromes if possible, and the provision of navigation aids that could be utilised by both civil and military aircraft where practical.
- h) **Shared Civil-Military Data:** The provision of ATS surveillance data from civil surveillance systems to military units to improve monitoring (thereby minimising the need for individual defence identification authorisation), trust and confidence. The provision of surveillance data from military surveillance systems where this would enhance ATS surveillance coverage and redundancy; suitably filtered as appropriate.
- i) **Common Civil-Military Training and Procedures.** The familiarisation of civil and military ATM personnel with each other's systems and procedures, where national security allows. Training and licensing of civil and military air traffic controllers to equivalent standards. The implementation of the same or equivalent standards, procedures and policies for the provision of ATS and the management of air traffic.
- j) **Ballistic Launch and Space Re-entry.** Effective coordination mechanisms established by States responsible for ballistic launch and space re-entry activities to ensure the safety of civil air navigation in the air and on the ground, with particular emphasis on how such activity affects other States in terms of safety and efficiency.

1.2 Regional policy elements related to civil-military cooperation are copied from the Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan (Version 3.0) as follows:

*7.16 Civil-Military Airspace expectations are as follows:*

*a) SUA should only be established after due consideration of its effect on civil air traffic by the appropriate Airspace Authority to ensure it will be:*

- *used for the purpose that it is established;*
- *used regularly;*
- *as small as possible, including any internal buffers, required to contain the activity therein;*
- *if applicable, operated in accordance with FUA principles; and*
- *activated only when it is being utilised; and*

*b) SUA should be regularly reviewed to ensure the activities that affect the airspace, and size and timing of such activity are accurately reflected by the SUA type, dimensions, activation notice and duration of activation.*

*7.44 Civil-Military ATM expectations are as follows:*

- a) a national Civil-Military body should be formed to coordinate strategic civil-military activities (military training should be conducted in locations and/or at times that do not adversely affect civilian operations, particularly those associated with major aerodromes);*
- b) formal civil-military liaison should take place for tactical responses by encouraging military participation at civil ATM meetings and within ATC Centres;*
- c) integration of civil and military ATM systems using joint procurement, and sharing of ATS surveillance data (especially from ADS-B systems) should be provided as far as practicable;*
- d) joint provision of Civil-Military navigation aids and aerodromes;*
- e) common training should be conducted between civil and military ATM units in areas of common interest; and*
- f) civil and military ATM units should utilize common procedures as far as practicable.*

*Note: the term ‘military’ in this context may include other State functions such as customs, police, and paramilitary activities.*

*7.45 All States with organisations that conduct ballistic launch or space re-entry activities should ensure:*

- a) the development of written coordination agreements between the State civil aviation authority and the launch/re-entry agency concerned;*
- b) that strategic coordination is conducted between the State civil aviation authority and any States affected by the launch/re-entry activity at least 14 days prior to the proposed activity, providing notice of at least:*
  - i) three days for the defined launch window; and*
  - ii) 24 hours for the actual planned launch timing;*
- c) that consideration of affected airspace users and ANSPs is made after consultation, so that the size of the airspace affected is minimized and the launch window is optimized for the least possible disruption to other users ; and*
- d) that communication is established with affected ANSPs to provide accurate and timely information on the launch/re-entry activity to manage tactical responses (for example, emergencies and activity completion) (Priority 1).*

*Note 1: increasingly, ballistic launch and space re-entry activity is being conducted by commercial organisations, so this element applies equally to State or private operations.*

*Note 2: guidance for States on ballistic launch and space re-entry activity is available on the ICAO Asia/Pacific eDocuments webpage.*

1.3 Noting the commitment in the Beijing Declaration by Asia/Pacific Ministers of Civil Aviation to enhance civil-military cooperation (paragraph 2.1 d)), APANPIRG/29 (03 – 05 September 2018) had agreed to the following Conclusions:

<b>Conclusion APANPIRG/29/10: Minimizing the Impact of Non-ICAO Procedures and Requirements for Military Activities Affecting Civil Aviation</b>	
<p><b>What:</b> That, where the imposition of non-ICAO military requirements and procedures affecting international civil aviation is either planned or likely, States are urged to ensure that civil aviation interests are taken into account by:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) ensuring military authorities are fully informed of the obligations of all States that are signatory to the Convention on International Civil Aviation;</li> <li>2) conducting full and timely consultation with airspace users, adjacent States and ICAO;</li> <li>3) implementing the capability to tactically share FPL and ATS messages, civil ATC surveillance data and other relevant information between the ANSP and military authorities;</li> <li>4) implementing direct communications facilities between military organizations and the ANSP to permit the coordination of requests for information on any unknown aircraft;</li> <li>5) establishing civil-military coordination functions within civil air traffic control centres;</li> <li>6) promulgating timely, clear and unambiguous information on the requirements and procedures, and accurate, detailed charts in accordance with the requirements of ICAO Annex 4 and Annex 15; and</li> <li>7) where pre-authorizations for individual civil flights in affected areas are necessary, States are urged to either consider:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) issuing authorizations with the seasonal schedule approval; or</li> <li>ii) developing and rigorously test clear and, ideally, automated procedures for compliance such as the use of flight plan data.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>	<p><b>Expected impact:</b></p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Political / Global</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Inter-regional</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Economic</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Environmental</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ops/Technical</p>
<p><b>Why:</b> To avoid confusion increased workload and increased risk of military intervention for civil flights operating in airspace where non-ICAO military requirements and procedures are imposed.</p>	<p><b>Follow-up:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Required from States</p>
<p><b>When:</b> 5-Sep-18</p>	<p><b>Status:</b> Adopted by PIRG</p>
<p><b>Who:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Sub groups <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> APAC States <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ICAO APAC RO <input type="checkbox"/> ICAO HQ <input type="checkbox"/> Other:</p>	

1.4 APANPIRG/29 also agreed to the use of set procedures for ballistic launch and space re-entry management with the following Conclusion:

<b>Conclusion APANPIRG/29/9: Procedures for Ballistic Launch/Space Re-entry Management</b>	
<p><b>What:</b> That, States are urged to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) ensure adoption and sensitisation of the ballistic launch/space re-entry expectations contained with the <i>Asia/Pacific Seamless ATM Plan</i>; and</li> <li>(2) institutionalise the related guidance and State Planning Checklist provided at <b>Appendix A to the Report on Agenda Item 3.2</b>.</li> </ol>	<p><b>Expected impact:</b></p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Political / Global</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Inter-regional</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Economic</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Environmental</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ops/Technical</p>
<p><b>Why:</b> To improve State planning and preparation for ballistic launch and space re-entry activities, in order to reduce adverse effects on airspace users and Air Navigation Service Providers.</p>	<p><b>Follow-up:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Required from States</p>
<p><b>When:</b> 5-Sep-18</p>	<p><b>Status:</b> Adopted by PIRG</p>
<p><b>Who:</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Sub groups <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> APAC States <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ICAO APAC RO <input type="checkbox"/> ICAO HQ <input type="checkbox"/> Other:</p>	

## 2. DISCUSSION

### Ballistic Launch and Space Re-Entry

2.1 During 2015 and 2016, IATA had brought to the attention of the ATM/SG problems being by ballistic launch and space re-entry activities that had affected civil air traffic. States had also raised concerns about the danger of debris from ballistic activities affecting the safety of aircraft, aerodromes and people on the ground in the period from 2017 – 2019. Some of these activities were likely to be conducted by military or State agencies, and some by civil organisations in coordination with the State (including commercial operations).

2.2 With respect to endangerment of persons and property on the ground, the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 are relevant. Specifically, space activity must be considered in the context of Article VII, which states that:

*...each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is **internationally liable for damage** to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.*

2.3 Furthermore, Article VIII establishes that:

*A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall **retain jurisdiction and control** over such object...*

2.4 The *Asia/Pacific Seamless ATM Plan* has specific guidance regarding the minimisation of disruption to civil traffic, so that a launch window is refined to a much lesser timing closer to the actual operation. Moreover, the *Plan* expects States to consider minimising the size and the position of the affected airspace to reduce the effect on civil operations (paragraph 7.45 c) referred).

2.5 States should also note that coordination of activities hazardous to civil aircraft being effected early enough to permit timely promulgation of information, as provided for by paragraphs 2.18 and 2.19 of Annex 11 — *Air Traffic Services*, is of paramount importance to achieve the best arrangements to avoid hazards.

2.6 The procedures for ballistic launch and space re-entry management are available on the ICAO Regional Office website at:


<https://www.icao.int/APAC/Documents/edocs/Ballistic%20Launch%20and%20Space%20Re-entry%20Management.pdf>

2.7 There had been no serious reports of ballistic launch/space re-entry debris impacting on other States' territory since late 2019. ICAO appreciated the effort undertaken by States conducting ballistic launches to ensure the safety of life, both in the air and on the surface.

### International Airspace and Civil-Military Cooperation

2.8 The ATM/SG/6 and ATM/SG/7 had both discussed international airspace and how this related to both civil and military operations. The following guidance material and an enlargement of **Figure 1** is available on the ICAO Regional Office website at:

<https://www.icao.int/APAC/Documents/edocs/International%20Airspace%20and%20Civil-Military%20Cooperation.pdf>



**Figure 1:** Maritime and Airspace Volumes as Defined by UNCLOS (white/red = UNCLOS, purple = CC)

2.9 Key aspects related to the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (UNCLOS) and the *Convention on International Civil Aviation* ('Chicago Convention' or 'CC') for civil and military operations from the guidance material are reproduced as follows.


- Although UNCLOS is titled as a 'Law of the Sea', its provisions also affect airspace and the operation of aircraft!
- In particular, UNCLOS defines volumes of airspace that are sovereign and international (where States may make laws and where States may not make universal laws\* respectively). The terms 'national airspace' and 'international airspace' are descriptive in nature, but do not appear in UNCLOS or the CC.  
*\*Note: notwithstanding this, States may enact laws for their own citizens and aircraft registered in those States for operations within international airspace.*
- The volumes of airspace are dependent on the definition of 'baselines' in UNCLOS, which are generally based on the maritime shoreline, whether the shore is continental in nature or the outermost part of a chain of islands (an archipelago). However, not all island groups are archipelagos, as the islands must be no more than 100NM apart to meet the definition of being an archipelago (except for 3%, 125NM apart).
- Archipelagic Waters and the airspace above them are sovereign and part of the territory of the State concerned, which is relevant for Article 28 of the CC (provision of air navigation services). However, the sovereignty of archipelagic airspace is not the same as other territorial airspace, as aircraft have the right of 'continuous and expeditious' passage, so cannot be denied transit through this area (UNCLOS Article 53).
- Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) only have material effect on maritime resources, including the sea bed, and do not have any legal consequences for aviation (UNCLOS Articles 57 and 58).
- The CC and Annex 2 is not considered to use the same definition of 'High Seas' as the 1994 iteration of UNCLOS, deferring to the earlier version (1962)\*. Article 2 of the CC is clear that 'National Airspace' only composes the land and territorial waters; therefore, the non-sovereign portion of airspace is beyond this, as far as aviation is concerned (i.e.: beyond 12NM). In addition, not all States have ratified the latest version of the UNCLOS.

*Article 2: For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.*

- While the CC and its Annexes, including Annex 2, are not applicable to State aircraft (military, police or customs) in general, the Convention does place requirements upon States regarding the interaction between military and civil aircraft. For example, State aircraft may not overfly the territory of another State without permission, and regulations must be enacted to require State aircraft to have ‘due regard’ for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft (Article 3 of the Convention).
- In addition, Article 3 *bis* of the CC requires States to ensure that military aircraft do not endanger civil aircraft, but these are only for two specific situations – use of weapons and interception.
- There are no requirements for State aircraft to comply with civil requirements in international airspace (thus a State aircraft operating on a flight plan in such airspace is complying with civil requirements voluntarily, including an ATC clearance to enter controlled airspace, and may not legally be denied an ATC clearance to transit).

#### Article 3 bis compliance

2.10 **Figure 2** indicates States which had ratified Article 3 bis of the *Convention on International Civil Aviation*. This Article urges States to refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft and to ensure that the lives of people on an intercepted aircraft are not endangered.



**Figure 2:** Article 3 bis Status

### Bangladesh Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ)

2.11 In 2018, the ad hoc establishment by Bangladesh of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) had been discussed by the ATM/SG. ICAO was not aware of any specific progress to minimize the impact of the ADIZ, which had no basis in international law.

2.12 It should be noted that while matters of sovereignty are addressed in Articles 1, 2 and 3 bis of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it did not make any reference to ADIZ.

2.13 ADIZ are referenced in Annex 4 – *Aeronautical Charts* and Annex 15 – *Aeronautical Information Services* solely to ensure that, where established, any necessary information is included in the State AIP and aeronautical charts. While ICAO Annex 2 – *Rules of the Air* provides standards and recommended practices (SARPS) relating to the interception of aircraft, there are no ICAO SARPS or procedures for the establishment and operation of ADIZ.

2.14 Regarding Air Defence Codes (ADCs), ICAO had noted at the ATM/SG and APANPIRG these should not be necessary when data is readily available to military authorities from flight plans. APAC States that currently require an ADC are therefore urged to discuss the establishment of appropriate data sharing with their military authorities in accordance with the expectations of the *Asia/Pacific Seamless ANS Plan*, so that the need for an ADC can be superseded by more efficient arrangements.

2.15 Bangladesh and India were understood to require an ADC for each flight, irrespective of the flight plan status. Bangladesh and India are therefore reminded to consider alternative, less disruptive measures used by other Asia/Pacific States.

### ATM Delays Emanating from Chinese Airspace

2.16 As long ago as the Third Air Traffic Management Subgroup (ATM/SG/3, Bangkok, 03 – 07 August 2015) major delays emanating from Chinese airspace had been discussed. While recognising that not all delays were caused by civil-military cooperation issues, the continuing reports of problems related to Chinese airspace led to China's commitment in 2017 to implement some ATFM measures to better manage traffic.

2.17 APANPIRG/27, APANPIRG/28, APANPIRG/29 and APANPIRG/30 had noted the Subgroup reports on delays affecting many Asia/Pacific Flight Information Regions, and had urged China to address these.

2.18 In 2018, the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA) had issued several Deficiencies related to delays and capacity issues within Chinese airspace. These were significant because they identified that delays occurred even on a 'normal' day with no airspace or weather issues. However, IFALPA had recently reported some improvement in its 2020 reports, which would appear to indicate some improvements by China.

2.19 ICAO extended its appreciation to the Air Traffic Management Bureau (ATMB) of the China Civil Aviation Administration (CAAC) for these efforts, and urged China to continue these positive developments, including closer cooperation between the military and State authorities, and the ATMB.

**A461 & A470 (BEIJING & SHANGHAI)**

**DEFICIENT [April 2020]**

The Air Traffic Flow Management within the People's Republic of China is still saturated however, there has been some improvement to the significant delays to scheduled services between Hong Kong and the Mainland, specifically on the air routes A461 and A470 (Beijing and Shanghai). Airspace management problems that, in the past, have led to delays in excess of 6 hours for flights departing from Hong Kong to Shanghai and/or Beijing seem to have decreased somewhat.

Authorities have yet to adopt a visible Slot Allocation System (SLAS) for departure operation. Authorities should implement more air routes and flexible tracking, specifically between Hong Kong and Beijing/Shanghai. The routings should be unidirectional (one northbound and one southbound as a minimum) and designed for RNAV/RVSM, taking full advantage of the navigation capabilities of modern airliners.

Air Traffic Management have yet to be more flexible with respect to weather deviations. Radio frequencies across China are becoming congested making requests difficult to get through in an appropriate time frame. Extended conversations between Chinese aircraft and ATC Controllers or other aircraft in Mandarin make other important transmissions on the radio more difficult.

The use of the International Guard frequency – 121.5 MHz still remains a problem for aircraft flying in Mainland airspace and even in the Hong Kong FIR. Aircrew who are monitoring the Guard frequency often have to switch it off due to the continual chatter on the Channel in Chinese.

M503, has alleviated some of the congestion but ad-hoc military airspace closure makes weather avoidance extremely difficult with limited deviations allowed toward the East near Taiwanese airspace.


**Editorial note:** Minor improvements are being made with the introduction of M503, but it should be noted there is NOTAM action indicating that a 7nm right offset is required.

Special Use Airspace

2.20 In 2018, an example of a poor notification processes for activation of military Special Use Airspace (SUA) used by Myanmar was discussed at the ATM/SG/7. The NOTAM promulgated by Yangon did not meet the standard expected of Annex 15 in terms of timeliness. This example was discussed with the Myanmar military authorities from 17 – 18 December 2019 at a Myanmar Civil-Military Cooperation Seminar/Workshop.

2.21 An example of danger areas being improperly designated by Bangladesh within or partly within India’s airspace of responsibility was also highlighted at the ATM/SG/7 (**Figure 3**). States are only permitted to designate airspace within international airspace that was delegated to that State for the purposes of provision of ATS. The provisions of Annex 2 – *Rules of the Air* applied:

*2.1.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the provision of aeronautical data and aeronautical information covers its own territory and those areas over the high seas for which it is responsible for the provision of air traffic services (ATS).*



**Figure 3:** Bangladesh AIP Depiction of Danger Areas

2.22 APANPIRG/30 had agreed to a Deficiency for the establishment of the Bangladesh danger areas in question. Even though Bangladesh had taken the positive step of enacting a coordination agreement for these danger areas with India, the designation was still non-compliant with SARPs.


2.23 Moreover, restricted areas were being designated in international airspace, despite restricted areas and prohibited areas being defined by Annex 2 as only being able to be designated ‘above the land areas or territorial waters of a State’. This had resulted in APANPIRG/30 issuing a formal Deficiency to Australia, India and Indonesia, as the UNCLOS provisions did not allow States to impose restrictive measures on aircraft within international airspace, other than the State’s own aircraft.

2.24 The only means of imposing restrictions on international airspace is for a Regional Air Navigation Agreement to be enacted by a Proposal for Amendment (PFA) to the Regional Air Navigation Plan, or to ICAO Doc. 7030 – *Regional Supplementary Procedures*. In the case of SUA, the only ICAO-recognized entity that can be designated in international airspace is a danger area.

2.25 There were a number of other States which had apparently designated restricted areas within international airspace. **Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7** are examples from China, Japan, Republic of Korea and Malaysia that could be subject for consideration of an APANPIRG Conclusion, unless the airspace was re-designated as a danger area or disestablished before APANPIRG/31.







**Figure 7:** Malaysia Restricted Area Example Within International Airspace

2.26 ‘Warning Areas’ have been established by the United States in various parts of the Oakland Oceanic FIR, both within national and international airspace (example near Guam: **Figure 8**). New Zealand also use the term ‘military operating areas’ (MOA) to define airspace where intensive military operations may be present in national and international airspace. These airspace types, although not formally recognized by ICAO, within international airspace are similar to a danger area as defined in Annex 2, thus pilots may proceed if they are cognizant of the activities that may be dangerous to the aircraft.



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Civil-Military Cooperation Seminars/Workshops

2.31 In a joint effort between the ICAO Regional Sub-Office (RSO) and the Regional Office, Civil-Military Cooperation Conferences and Workshops were conducted in Bangladesh (22 – 23 October 2019), Indonesia (30 – 31 October 2019), Myanmar (17 – 18 December 2019) and the UAE (09 – 13 December 2019).

2.32 When appropriate, the Regional Office hoped to conduct such events at China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the future.

**3. ACTION BY THE MEETING**

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

- a) note the information contained in this paper;
- b) in accordance with the Beijing Declaration and Conclusion APANPIRG 29/10, discuss the need for greater consultation with affected parties by States conducting military and State activities to reduce the effect of such operations in accordance with the *Asia/Pacific Seamless ATM Plan* and the associated procedures approved by APANPIRG;
- c) note the requirements from the CC, UNCLOS and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 related to State aircraft activity;
- d) discuss the proposed APANPIRG Deficiencies related to military SUA for China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand;
- e) discuss the minimization of onerous military requirements such as ADIZ and the establishment of data sharing arrangements with military authorities to eliminate the need for ADCs;
- f) appreciate China’s efforts to improve civil-military cooperation to reduce air traffic delays and minimize the instances of ballistic launch/space reentry activity adversely affecting other States or endangering people’s lives;
- g) support planning for civil-military cooperation workshops/seminars once the pandemic situation allows this;
- h) provide an update on civil-military cooperation activities and problems; and
- i) discuss any relevant matters as appropriate.

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