



ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization
**Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Regional Airspace Safety
Monitoring Advisory Group (RASMAG/25)**

Video Teleconference, 27 – 30 July 2020

Agenda Item 3: Reports from Asia/Pacific RMAs and EMAs

JASMA AKARA LHD MITIGATIONS

(Presented by JASMA)

SUMMARY

This paper presents mitigation measures of Large Height Deviation (LHD) that occurred in the AKARA corridor airspace by the Japan Airspace Safety Monitoring Agency (JASMA).

1. INTRODUCTION

The Pacific Approvals Registry and Monitoring Organization (PARMO) was requested to provide analyses of the AKARA corridor airspace using the Traffic Sample Data (TSD) and Large Height Deviation (LHD) reports. The China RMA, Japan Airspace Safety Monitoring Agency (JASMA), Monitoring Agency for Asia Region (MAAR) provide the relevant reports of LHDs to PARMO.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 According to a report from PARMO, there were 29 LHD events occurred in the AKARA corridor airspace in 2019.

2.2 There were 7 category D LHD events, ATC system loop error, reported to JASMA from the Fukuoka Area Control Center (ACC) in 2019.

- 4 category D LHD events were caused by a communication error that an aircraft misunderstood and responded altitude clearance for the other aircraft. In these cases, Fukuoka ACC could not realize that a wrong aircraft made readback of the altitude clearance for the other aircraft.
- 3 category D LHD events were caused by an error that an aircraft misunderstood expected altitude information that the aircraft would climb after passing AKARA corridor airspace as altitude clearance from Fukuoka ACC.

2.3 The ATC division of the Head Quarters in the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) took these LHD events seriously, the ATC division ordered Fukuoka ACC to make a handout which was paid attention to the aircraft operators. **Attachment A** is the handout.

2.4 To decrease the number of the category D LHD events, ATC system loop error, in the AKARA corridor airspace, the handout was distributed from the ATC division of JCAB to the Airline Operators' Committee of Narita International Airport and Kansai International Airport and from JASMA to IATA and IFALPA in December 2019.

2.5 It was emphasized the need for China RMA and JASMA to share safety reports in the AKARA corridor airspace at the Twenty-Forth Meeting of the Regional Airspace Safety Monitoring Advisory Group (RASMAG/24). Safety reports such as LHD events that occurred in the AKARA corridor airspace have been exchanged and shared between China RMA and JASMA by email on monthly basis.

2.6 **Attachment B** describes Air Traffic Control (ATC) operations in the AKARA corridor airspace. Because of the unique ATC agreements in the AKARA corridor airspace, the analysis of the LHD reports of category E and F, ATC transfer of control coordination errors, are particularly tricky and complex.

2.7 Sharing safety reports in the AKARA corridor airspace between China RMA and JASMA by email can exchange the occurrence of LHD timely. On the other hand, there are some limitations to share the detail of the LHD event such as duration, crossing flight level, or background.

2.8 For the sharing detail of the safety reports in the AKARA corridor airspace, JASMA proposes to discuss the implementation of other measures such as using a customized excel spreadsheet or MAAR’s online LHD reporting system instead of an email exchange at the next 8th Meeting of the Monitoring Agency Working Group (MAWG/8) meeting.

3. ACTION BY THE MEETING

3.1 The meeting is invited to:

- a) note the information contained in this paper; and
- b) discuss any relevant matters as appropriate.

.....

Attachment A

ATC are having many altitude deviations because of miscommunication! (Main cause is callsign confusion.)

Confidential

Back ground

ATC in Japan have experienced many communication errors in 2019, especially altitude deviation in Fukue-AKARA corridor.

Request for cooperation

- ◆ ATC must pay attention to miscommunication. Additionally, please confirm the things below, before you(the pilots) read back the clearance.
 - Was the clearance really for me?
 - Didn't I have any callsign confusions?
 - The numbers (e.g. level or heading.)
- ◆ When you have any questions even if it's a slight one, poor radio reception, or the clearance is not what you have requested, ***please don't hesitate to ask ATC.***

Example



ATC: Climb instruction for aircraft "A"
Pilot "B": Roger. Climb and maintain ...

The controller and the pilot "A" didn't notice.

TCAS RA was issued between B and C.

Note: B's callsign is completely different from A's.
B was requesting higher level.

IMPORTANT

ATC won't issue any clearances to change the level in Fukue-AKARA Corridor, unless in contingency.

For reducing communication errors , let's make effort each other,
thank you for your understanding and cooperation.

Attachment B

ATC operations in the AKARA corridor airspace

Flight 1: A593 Eastbound (e.g. From Shanghai to Tokyo)

Shanghai ACC sends transfer information to Fukuoka ACC verbally, then Shanghai ACC instructs aircraft to contact Fukuoka ACC.

Flight 2: A593 Westbound (e.g. From Tokyo to Shanghai)

Fukuoka ACC sends transfer information to Shanghai ACC verbally, then Fukuoka ACC instructs aircraft to contact Shanghai ACC.

Flight 3: A593 Eastbound, then B576/Y722 Northbound (e.g. From Shanghai to Incheon)

Shanghai ACC sends transfer information to Fukuoka ACC verbally, Fukuoka ACC inputs the information on their ATC system, then the ATC system sends the information to Incheon ACC by AIDC automatically. Shanghai ACC instructs aircraft to contact Fukuoka ACC, then Fukuoka ACC instructs the aircraft to contact Incheon ACC after the aircraft joined B576/Y722.

Flight 4: Y711 Southbound, then A593 Westbound (e.g. From Incheon to Shanghai)

Incheon ACC sends transfer information to Fukuoka ACC by AIDC, then Fukuoka ACC sends the information to Shanghai ACC verbally. Incheon ACC instructs aircraft to contact Shanghai ACC directly.

