INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

GENERIC PROCEDURES FOR ACCEPTING NON-COMPLIANCES

IN AERODROMES

VERSION 1.0 – DECEMBER 2020

Introductory Notes This generic document was developed by the ICAO Asia/Pacific Aerodrome Assistance Working Group (AP-AA/WG) for reference by States in the APAC Regions. When referring to this generic document, States are expected to customize the content in accordance to the States’ legislations, regulations and situations. It was approved by AOP/SG/4 (Video Teleconference, 10 – 13 November 2020) and published by ICAO Asia and Pacific Office, Bangkok. ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), Procedures for Air Navigation Services and Guidance Material shall take prevalence in the event of any conflict between the aforementioned provisions and this generic document. Enquiries and feedbacks regarding this generic document can be made to ICAO APAC Office at apac@icao.int.

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENTS	AMENDMENTS
No.	Date applicable	Date entered	Entered by	No.	Date applicable	Date entered	Entered by

INTRODUCTION

An Aerodrome certificate holder is expected to comply with the national rules and standards, as well as the Standards and Recommended Practices of ICAO Annex 14, Volume I, the procedures in ICAO PANS-Aerodrome (Doc 9981) and guidance materials in relevant ICAO documents. The generic procedures in this document do not substitute or circumvent the provisions contained in the aforementioned publications.

There may be some circumstances where requirements have not been practically possible to follow at an existing aerodrome due to physical constraints, infrastructure development, changes to requirements, temporary accommodation of aircraft larger than the aerodrome design aircraft, etc. Similarly, in some cases, compliance is not possible even for a new aerodrome due to physical constraints, technical or economic difficulties.

At existing aerodromes where full compliance with standards cannot be achieved, alternative measures will be required to achieve an equivalent level of safety performance. The aerodrome regulators and operators need to follow the specified procedures to be applied to both initial aerodrome certification and continuous aerodrome safety oversight, as well as aerodrome compatibility studies where full compliance with the SARPs in Annex 14, Volume I, cannot be achieved.

Non-Compliances

Non-compliances are usually found in infrastructural elements and in operational elements. The infrastructural elements concerned include aeronautical data, obstacle limitation surfaces, visual and non-visual aids, electrical power supply systems for air navigation services, and physical characteristics (such as runway / taxiway / apron design, runway end safety area [RESA], runway strip, fencing, etc.). Similarly, operational elements concerned include aerodrome emergency planning, aerodrome maintenance, rescue and firefighting, low visibility operations etc. A number of non-compliances exist because of the lack of standardized procedures for the systematic recording of deviations from the design and operating requirements.

Some common non-compliant elements to the ICAO SARPs at medium and large aerodromes are runway strips, RESA, separation between runway and parallel taxiways, approach surface, and mandatory instruction signs. There may be further non-compliances in relation to aerodrome maintenance, aerodrome emergency planning, electrical power supply system, aeronautical data specifications and obstacle limitation surfaces. Aerodrome operators sometimes are not aware of possible infringements of the obstacle limitation surfaces as per ICAO SARPs. The main reasons are the lack of well-defined responsibility for the assessment of obstacles and the relative complexity of the task.

The tools most frequently used to evaluate non-compliance to international or any relevant national regulations are either audits by the regulatory authorities (e.g. Civil Aviation Authority) during the certification process or internal SMS audits by the aerodrome operators.

Purpose

The purpose of the procedure is to harmonize the acceptance of non-compliance for aerodromes which do not conform to all SARPs contained in the Annex 14, Volume I / national requirements during the aerodrome certification process.

When non-compliances are present, the effect on safety needs to be analyzed, and measures and/or limitations on its use to mitigate any non-compliance have to be established. The harmonization of this aspect of the certification process is therefore important for ensuring safety. Safety risk assessment should be conducted before the regulatory authorities grant exemptions for non-compliances.

The abovementioned situations require procedures for accepting non-compliance in respect of a certified or to-be certified aerodrome.

Procedure for accepting NON-COMPLIANCES

One of the aims of a certification of aerodrome process is to ensure compliance with all relevant and applicable legal requirements, technical requirements and procedures. Ensuring compliance with the requirements for aerodrome design, organizational factors, operations, and approved procedures, programmes and plans, is a key element of maintaining acceptable level of safety at an aerodrome. The goal is to require the non-compliances to be corrected and to deal with the situations where correction is not possible, either due to physical constraints such as terrain etc.

The managing of non-compliances/deviations, generally jointly by the CAA and the aerodrome operator, has the following major considerations:

Affected parameters (Standards or Recommended Practices);

Differences between ICAO and national requirements;

Extent and duration of deviation;

Traffic density of the aerodrome;

Whether an effective SMS is in place in the aerodromes;

Safety culture at aerodromes and within the CAA; and

Capability for evaluating the impact of deviations e.g. safety risk assessments.

When non-compliances are present, the effects on safety need to be analyzed, and measures and/or limitations on its use to mitigate any non-compliance have to be established. The harmonization of this aspect of the certification process is therefore important for ensuring safety. Safety risk assessment should be conducted before granting exemptions for non-compliances, which is specified in ICAO Annex 14 Volume I, ICAO Safety Management Manual (Doc 9859) and PANS-Aerodromes (Doc 9981). Non-compliances are only accepted after mitigation measures have been established and implemented to the satisfaction of CAA, so that an equivalent level of safety performance could be achieved.

The aerodrome certificate holder shall submit separate application for each non-compliance in the prescribed format for seeking exemption. (Refer to Appendix I). The application for exemption shall be made through the submission of a comprehensive safety risk assessment report, supported with the reasons for non-compliance, means of mitigation and indication as to when compliance can be achieved. Furthermore, the following points should be considered while requesting the exemption for non-compliances:

Ensure that the exemption application is given proper consideration;

Ensure that an exemption is absolutely necessary rather than a convenient method of circumventing the requirements;

The reasons why the applicant needs the exemption. The reasons provided should be detailed and fulsome;

If the application is for a renewal of an existing exemption, the application need not contain information which has been previously supplied. However, the application must include reasons why a renewed exemption is required; and

Considerable research and investigation is often required.

In considering an application for exemption from an ICAO Standard or Recommended Practices / Procedures which have been incorporated into the national legislation / regulations, CAA needs to consider aviation safety as the paramount consideration. Keeping this in mind, CAA may ask the applicant to provide further information, a copy of specific documents and undertake a test or tests of competence.

Operational restrictions are the most often mitigation measures for non-compliances. Safety risk assessments are mostly conducted to analyze the impact on safety. In aerodromes with less traffic throughput, non-compliances may be accepted with a simplified procedure. The same simplified procedure may be applied for very minor non-compliances at busier aerodromes which may only have minimal effect on aviation safety.

When CAA is satisfied with the application, CAA will issue an exemption to the aerodrome operator. Examples of exemption is available in Appendix IV.

Note – Refer to paragraph 3 for the approval / acceptance of safety risk assessment.

In the meantime, the aerodrome operator shall be required to conduct annual review to ascertain that the mitigation measures are in place and effective. The review should also consider whether the non-compliance could be removed from CAA findings. The outcomes of the review are required to be documented in the report to be submitted to CAA for consideration.

Furthermore, the accepted non-compliances shall be published in the AIP if it is related to ICAO Standards, Recommended Practices or Procedures, in accordance with Annex 15 Chapter 5. An example is available in Appendix V.

APPROVAL OR ACCEPTANCE OF A SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT

The safety risk assessment conducted by the aerodrome operator is a core SMS function. Management approval and implementation of the safety risk assessment, including future updates and maintenance, are the responsibility of the aerodrome operator. The CAA may, depending on the need and complexity of the application, require the submission of the specific safety risk assessment for approval/acceptance.

The safety risk assessment process is as per Appendix II.

The CAA establishes the type of safety risk assessments that are subject to approval or acceptance and determines the process used for that approval/acceptance.

In connection with paragraph 3.1, where required, a safety risk assessment shall be submitted by the aerodrome operator to CAA for approval/acceptance prior to the acceptance of non-compliances.

The CAA analyses the safety risk assessment and verifies that:

appropriate coordination has been satisfactorily performed among the concerned stakeholders;

the risks have been properly identified and assessed, based on documented arguments (e.g. physical or Human Factors studies, analysis of previous accidents and incidents);

the proposed mitigation measures adequately address the risk and bring the risk to an acceptable level; and

the time frames for planned fully compliance are acceptable.

Note. — It is preferable to work with a team of the CAA operational experts in the areas considered in the safety risk assessment.

On completion of the analysis of the safety risk assessment, the CAA:

either gives formal approval or acceptance of the safety risk assessment to the aerodrome operator as specified in paragraph 3.1; or

if some risks have been underestimated or have not been identified, coordinates with the aerodrome operator to reach an agreement on safety acceptance; or

if no agreement can be reached, rejects the proposal for possible resubmission by the aerodrome operator.

The CAA may also opt to impose additional conditions to ensure safety.

The CAA should ensure that the mitigation and/or additional conditions imposed as per paragraph 3.7 are properly implemented and that they fulfil their purposes.

Appendix I

APPLICATION FOR SEEKING EXEMPTION

(In duplicate)

DETAILS OF APPLICANT

Name of Aerodrome:

Airport Certificate Number:

Full name of applicant (in capital letters):

DETAILS OF EXEMPTION SOUGHT

Relevant provisions of [national requirement / ICAO Annex 14 Volume I SARPs] for which exemption is sought:

The category under which exemption sought (TEMPORARY/ PERMANENT):

Reasons why the exemption is needed (The reasons provided should be detailed and self-explanatory):

Period for which exemption is required:

If the exemption will affect a particular kind of operation, the details thereof:

For temporary exemption, the action plan for rectification and review of non- compliance, including the mitigation measures adopted for ensuring the safety during the exemption period:

For permanent exemption, the mitigation measures adopted to ensure safety of aircraft operation. Complete safety assessment report shall be enclosed:

I hereby certify that the forgoing information is correct in every respect and no relevant information has been withheld. I also undertake the responsibility for annually reviewing the conditions or mitigation measures and any other resultant non-compliance in particular when any significant changes in the aerodrome activity and development are proposed.

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT

DATE……………………………………..

NAME…………………….……………………………………………..

(in capital letters)

POSITION HELD………………………………………………………

(with official seal) Note:

It is an offence to make any false representation with the intent to deceive, for the purpose of procuring exemption.

CAA may request the applicant to submit a safety assessment in association with the application for approval / acceptance. If so requested, the applicant shall submit the safety assessment within [5] working days from the date of request.

Application not completed in all respect and not accompanied with relevant enclosures will be rejected.

Appendix II

SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Introduction

The primary objective of a safety risk assessment is to assess the impact of a safety concern, such as a design change or deviation in operational procedures at an existing aerodrome.

Such a safety concern can often impact multiple stakeholders; therefore, safety assessments often need to be carried out in a cross-organizational manner, involving experts from all the involved stakeholders. Prior to the assessment, a preliminary identification of the required tasks and the organizations to be involved in the process is conducted.

A safety assessment is initially composed of four basic steps:

definition of a safety concern and identification of the regulatory compliance;

hazard identification and analysis;

risk assessment and development of mitigation measures; and

development of an implementation plan for the mitigation measures and conclusion of the assessment.

Definition of a safety concern and identification of the regulatory compliance

Any perceived safety concerns are to be described in detail, including timescales, projected phases, location, stakeholders involved or affected as well as their potential influence on specific processes, procedures, systems and operations.

The perceived safety concern is first analysed to determine whether it is retained or rejected. If rejected, the justification for rejecting the safety concern is to be provided and documented.

An initial evaluation of compliance with the appropriate provisions in the regulations applicable to the aerodrome is conducted and documented.

The corresponding areas of concern are identified before proceeding with the remaining steps of the safety risk assessment, with all relevant stakeholders.

If a safety risk assessment was conducted previously for similar cases in the same context at an aerodrome where similar characteristics and procedures exist, the aerodrome operator may use some elements from that assessment as a basis for the assessment to be conducted. Nevertheless, as each assessment is specific to a particular safety concern at a given aerodrome the suitability for reusing specific elements of an existing assessment is to be carefully evaluated.

Hazard identification

Hazards related to infrastructure, systems or operational procedures are initially identified using methods such as brain-storming sessions, expert opinions, industry knowledge, experience and operational judgement. The identification of hazards is conducted by considering:

accident causal factors and critical events based on a simple causal analysis of available accident and incident databases;

events that may have occurred in similar circumstances or that are subsequent to the resolution of a similar safety concern; and

potential new hazards that may emerge during or after implementation of the planned changes.

Following the previous steps, all potential outcomes or consequences for each identified hazard are identified.

The appropriate safety objective for each type of hazard should be defined and detailed. This can be done through:

reference to recognized standards and/or codes of practices;

reference to the safety performance of the existing system;

reference to the acceptance of a similar system elsewhere; and

application of explicit safety risk levels.

Safety objectives are specified in either quantitative terms (e.g. identification of a numerical probability) or qualitative terms (e.g. comparison with an existing situation). The selection of the safety objective is made according to the aerodrome operator’s policy with respect to safety improvement and is justified for the specific hazard.

Risk assessment and development of mitigation measures

The level of risk of each identified potential consequence is estimated by conducting a risk assessment. This risk assessment will determine the severity of a consequence (effect on the safety of the considered operations) and the probability of the consequence occurring and will be based on experience as well as on any available data (e.g. accident database, occurrence reports).

Understanding the risks is the basis for the development of mitigation measures, operational procedures and operating restrictions that might be needed to ensure safe aerodrome operations.

The method for risk evaluation is strongly dependent on the nature of the hazards. The risk itself is evaluated by combining the two values for severity of its consequences and probability of occurrence.

Note. — An example of risk categorization tool in the form of a safety risk matrix is available in Appendix III.

Once each hazard has been identified and analysed in terms of causes, and assessed for severity and probability of its occurrence, it must be ascertained that all associated risks are appropriately managed. An initial identification of existing mitigation measures must be conducted prior to the development of any additional measures.

All risk mitigation measures, whether currently being applied or still under development, are evaluated for the effectiveness of their risk management capabilities.

Note. — The exposure to a given risk (e.g. duration of a change, time before implementation of corrective actions, traffic density) is taken into account in order to decide on its acceptability.

In some cases, a quantitative approach may be possible, and numerical safety objectives can be used. In other instances such as changes to the operational environment or procedures, a qualitative analysis may be more relevant.

States should provide suitable guidance on risk assessment models for aerodrome operators.

In some cases, the result of the risk assessment may be that the safety objectives will be met without any additional specific mitigation measures. This is likely to take place for cases where the level of risk falls into the green zone of the risk matrix.

Note – See Appendix III for an example of risk matrix.

Development of an implementation plan and conclusion of the assessment

The last phase of the safety assessment process is the development of a plan for the implementation of the identified mitigation measures.

The implementation plan includes time frames, responsibilities for mitigation measures as well as control measures that may be defined and implemented to monitor the effectiveness of the mitigation measures.

SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT FLOWCHART

Documenta-tion Safety concern perceived Define safety concern	No Yes Risk assessment (probability/severity) End Is the risk acceptable? No Can the risk be eliminated? No Can the risk be mitigated? Yes Yes Yes No Documentation Eliminate Cancel operation Documentation Documentation End End End Documentation Regular review Promulgation Implement mitigating measures Define mitigation Hazard identification and consequences Retain Reject Retain or reject

Attachment to Appendix II

Template of Safety Risk Assessment Report

Note – This template is meant for providing an example of safety risk assessment report for States / aerodromes. The content of this example is only for illustration, and should not be copied to an aerodrome safety risk assessment even if the subject is the same.

Project / Subject: Aircraft parking stand operations for a new Code E aircraft type (at a parking stand certified for Code E)

Generic Component of Hazard	Specific components of Hazard (Safety Events)	Ultimate Consequences	Existing Mitigation Measures	Risk Index	Proposed Mitigation Measures	Residual Risk Index	Last Review Date	Next Review Date
Docking of new Code E aircraft type at aircraft parking stand certified for Code E aircraft [Organizational]	Visual docking guidance system (VDGS) could not recognize the new Code E aircraft type	Aircraft overshooting or undershooting the correct parking position Delay in arrival operations	Marshaller on scene to monitor the docking and provide hand signal if needed	2D	Nil (as the risk level is acceptable)	2D	1 Aug 2020	1 Oct 2020
VDGS shows STOP signal to pilot if unable to recognize type
Parking stand under remote surveillance by Apron Control Centre
ditto	Operator of passenger loading bridge (PLB) unfamiliar with the docking position of new Code E aircraft type	Minor aircraft damage Minor damage to PLB Delay in aircraft turn around operations	PLB operator received briefing on precautions for the new Code E aircrafts before duty	3D	PLB operations supervisor assigned on scene to provide additional guidance for operators during their first 5 docking	2D	1 Aug 2020	1 Oct 2020
Proximity and pressure sensors on PLB
Enhanced lighting from PLB control position for night operations
ditto	Servicing equipment unable to serve aircraft due to new location / design of doors and servicing pods	Minor aircraft damage Minor equipment damage Delay in turn around operations	Equipment operator received briefing on precautions for the new type before duty	4D	Apron service contractors will assign supervisors / trainers to provide additional guidance	2D	1 Aug 2020	1 Oct 2020
Proximity and pressure sensors on equipment	Airport operator will conduct random inspections on equipment operations for this new type for 1 month
[other items]

Prepared and Assessed by:	(Signature)	Recommended by:	(Signature)
Name and Post (Appropriate Officer / Manager of Airport Operator) (Could be a group of personnel relevant to the project / subject)	Name and Post (Safety Manager of Airport Operator)
Date:	Date:
Approved by:	(signature)
Name and Post (Accountable Executive of Airport Operator)
Date:

Appendix III

Note – The content of this Appendix is extracted / adapted from ICAO Safety Management Manual (Doc 9859) as an example. CAAs are expected to customize the risk matrix to suit their needs.

Example Safety Risk Matrix

Risk Severity
Catastrophic	Hazardous	Major	Minor	Negligible
Risk probability	A	B	C	D	E
Frequent	5	5A	5B	5C	5D	5E
Occasional	4	4A	4B	4C	4D	4E
Remote	3	3A	3B	3C	3D	3E
Improbable	2	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E
Extremely Improbable	1	1A	1B	1C	1D	1E

Example of Safety Risk Tolerability

Safety Risk Index Range	Safety Risk Description	Recommended Action
5A, 5B, 5C, 4A, 4B, 3A	Intolerable	Take immediate action to mitigate the risk or stop the activity. Perform priority safety risk mitigation to ensure additional or enhanced preventative controls are in place to bring down the safety risk index to tolerable.
5D, 5E, 4C, 4D, 4E, 3B, 3C, 3D, 2A, 2B, 2C, 1A	Tolerable	Can be tolerated based on the safety risk mitigation. It may require management decision to accept the risk.
3E, 2D, 2E, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E	Acceptable	Acceptable as is. No further safety risk mitigation required.

Severity Classification Scheme with Examples

Severity	Meaning	Value	Example
Catastrophic	Equipment destroyed Multiple deaths	A	– collision between aircraft and/or other object during take-off or landing
Hazardous	A large reduction in safety margins, physical distress or a workload such that the operators cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely Serious injury Major equipment damage	B	runway incursion, significant potential for an accident, extreme action to avoid collision attempted take-off or landing on a closed or engaged runway take-off/landing incidents, such as undershooting or overrunning
Major	A significant reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the ability of the operators to cope with adverse operating conditions as a result of an increase in workload or as a result of conditions impairing their efficiency Serious incident Injury to persons	C	runway incursion, ample time and distance (no potential for a collision) collision with obstacle on apron/ parking position (hard collision) person falling down from height missed approach with ground contact of the wing ends during the touchdown large fuel puddle near the aircraft while passengers are on-board
Minor	Nuisance Operating limitations Use of emergency procedures Minor incident	D	hard braking during landing or taxiing damage due to jet blast (objects) expendables are laying around the stands collision between maintenance vehicles on service road breakage of drawbar during pushback (damage to the aircraft) slight excess of maximum take-off weight without safety consequences aircraft rolling into passenger bridge with no damage to the aircraft needing immediate repair Forklift that is tilting Complex taxiing instructions/ procedures
Negligible	– Few consequences	E	slight increase in braking distance temporary fencing collapsing because of strong winds cart losing baggage

Probability Classification Scheme

Probability Class	Meaning
5 Frequent	Likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently)
4 Reasonably probable	Likely to occur sometimes (has occurred infrequently)
3 Remote	Unlikely to occur (has occurred rarely)
2 Extremely remote	Very unlikely to occur (not known to have occurred)
1 Extremely improbable	Almost inconceivable that the event will occur

Appendix IV

Sample Exemption issued by CAA

CASA

Website hosting exemptions:

https://www.casa.gov.au/rules-and-regulations/current-rules/legislative-and-non-legislative-instruments/non-legislative-instruments

Some examples from CASA relevant to aerodrome are summarized in the following table. It should be noted that this table and the relevant attachments are prepared for easy reference and should not be seen as endorsing, implying or in any way recommending that certain aspects of aerodromes warrant or do not warrant exemption.

Topic	URL	Reference
Slopes on Aprons	https://www.casa.gov.au/files/casa-ex4718	Attachment 1 to Appendix IV
Taxiway Centreline Lights Spacing	https://www.casa.gov.au/sites/default/files/casa-ex102-20-taxiway-centreline-lights-spacing-sydney-airport.pdf	Attachment 2 to Appendix IV
High Intensity Approach Light System	https://www.casa.gov.au/sites/default/files/casa-instrument-exemption-25-2019-high-intensity-approach-lighting-system-gold-coast-airport.pdf	Attachment 3 to Appendix IV

New Zealand CAA

Website hosting exemptions: https://www.aviation.govt.nz/rules/exemptions/

Attachment 1 to Appendix IV

Attachment 2 to Appendix IV

Attachment 3 to Appendix IV

Appendix V

EXAMPLE:

AIP	GEN 1.7-1

(State Name)	27 Feb 2020

GEN 1.7 DIFFERENCES FROM ICAO STANDARDS, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

A list of significant non-compliances/differences between national regulations and practices of the State and related ICAO Standards, Recommended Practices and Procedures should be published, including:

1) Provision affected (Annex/PANS and edition number, paragraph); and

2) Non-compliances/difference in full text.

Guidance Note:

Each non-compliances/difference should be notified in the following form:

a) Reference: Cite the paragraph or subparagraph of the Annex or PANS in respect of which the non-compliance/difference exists.

b) Description of the non-compliance/difference: Describe the non-compliance/difference precisely and include any additional information necessary to make its effect clear.

c) Remarks: Indicate the reason for the non-compliance/difference or, if the non-compliance/difference is likely to be eliminated in the future, indicate the date by which conformity with the ICAO provision may be expected.

The following non-compliance (s) has been introduced: (Example only)

ANNEX 14, Vol I – Aerodrome Design and Operations: 8th edition, 2018

Description of non-compliance	Reason for non-compliance	AIP section	Notes/remarks

Note:

The primary purpose of notifying non-compliances/differences is to promote safety, efficiency and regularity in air navigation by ensuring that all stakeholders concerned with international civil aviation are aware of all national rules and practices insofar as they differ from those prescribed in SARPs. Therefore, lack of information on non-compliances/differences creates uncertainty and poses a potential hazard to the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation.

Dissemination of non-compliances/differences enhances transparency of safety information, and, consequently, facilitates States’ decisions specifically within the context of the management of safety. Incorrect notification of non-compliances/differences may also potentially lead to misunderstandings and could result in undesirable operational situations, or in other potential negative consequences in terms of recognition of certificates and licences, ramp inspections, and ultimately traffic rights.

The notification of non-compliances/differences is, therefore, an important and useful action that contributes to ensuring the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation.