AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN
AIR CHINA INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT 129
B767-200ER, B2552
MOUNTAIN DOTDAE, GIMHAE
APRIL 15, 2002

KOREA MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION
KOREA AVIATION—ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
According to Annex 13, Chapter 3, Paragraph 3.1, to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it is stipulated;

「The sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability。」

And in Chapter 5, Paragraph 5.4.1 of the same Annex, it is recommended as follows;

「Any judicial or administrative proceedings to apportion blame or liability should be separate from any investigation conducted under the provisions of this Annex。」

Thus, based on Annex 13 and the Aviation Act of the Republic of Korea, this accident investigation report, including findings herein, as the result of the investigation effort of Air China International Flight 129, shall not be used for any other purpose than to improve aviation safety.

If conflicts occur on the interpretation of this accident investigation report between the Korean version and English version, the Korean version takes priority over English version.
ARICRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Controlled Flight Into Terrain
Air China International Flight 129
B767–200ER, B2552
Mountain Dotdae, Gimhae
April 15, 2002
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT


The Korea Aviation-accident Investigation Board is an independent government agency, established on August 12, 2002. The Board conducts accident investigations in accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the Korean Aviation Act. The objective of the Board’s investigation into an accident or incident is to prevent accidents and incidents, not to apportion blame or liability. The main office is located near Gimpo International Airport, and the flight recorder analysis and wreckage laboratories are located inside the airport.

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<td>ACC</td>
<td>Area Control Center</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>Azimuth Change Pulse</td>
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<td>AIP</td>
<td>Aeronautical Information Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFDS</td>
<td>Automatic Flight Director System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALA</td>
<td>Approach and Landing Accident</td>
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<td>ALAR</td>
<td>Approach and Landing Accident Reduction</td>
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<td>ALPA-K</td>
<td>Air Line Pilots Association of Korea</td>
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<td>AMOS</td>
<td>Automatic Meteorological Observation System</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Air Operating Certificate</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/P</td>
<td>Autopilot</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARP</td>
<td>Azimuth Reference Pulse</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASR</td>
<td>Airport Surveillance Radar</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/T</td>
<td>Auto Throttle</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Air Traffic Control</td>
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<td>ATIS</td>
<td>Automatic Terminal Information Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDS</td>
<td>BRITE Display Subsystem</td>
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<tr>
<td>BECMG</td>
<td>Becoming</td>
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<tr>
<td>BKN</td>
<td>Broken</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRITE</td>
<td>Bright Radar Indicator Tower Equipment</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>Air China International</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAAC</td>
<td>General Administration of Civil Aviation of China</td>
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<td>CASA</td>
<td>Civil Aviation Safety Authority</td>
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<td>CAT</td>
<td>Category</td>
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<td>CCAR</td>
<td>China Civil Aviation Rules</td>
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<td>CDRS</td>
<td>Continuous Data Recording System</td>
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<td>CFIT</td>
<td>Controlled Flight Into Terrain</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Center of Gravity</td>
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<td>CMM</td>
<td>Component Maintenance Manual</td>
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<td>CRM</td>
<td>Crew Resource Management</td>
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<td>CVR</td>
<td>Cockpit Voice Recorder</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Decision Altitude</td>
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<td>DH</td>
<td>Decision Height</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>DME</td>
<td>Distance Measuring Equipment</td>
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<td>DPS</td>
<td>Data Processing System</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGPWC</td>
<td>Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Computer</td>
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<td>ENR</td>
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<td>ETOPS</td>
<td>Extended Range Operations with Two Engine Airplanes</td>
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<td>FAF</td>
<td>Final Approach Fix</td>
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<td>FCTM</td>
<td>Flight Crew Training Manual</td>
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<td>F/D</td>
<td>Flight Director</td>
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<td>FDAU</td>
<td>Flight Data Acquisition Unit</td>
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<td>Flight Data Recorder</td>
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<td>FPM</td>
<td>Feet Per Minute</td>
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<td>GCA</td>
<td>Ground Controlled Approach</td>
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<td>HDG</td>
<td>Heading</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDG</td>
<td>Integrated Driven Generator</td>
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<td>IIC</td>
<td>Investigator In Charge</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILS</td>
<td>Instrument Landing System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMC</td>
<td>Instrument Meteorological Conditions</td>
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<td>KAIB</td>
<td>Korea Aviation-accident Investigation Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>LA</td>
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<td>LDW</td>
<td>Landing Weight</td>
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<td>LLZ</td>
<td>Localizer</td>
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<td>LOFT</td>
<td>Line Oriented Flight Training</td>
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<td>LPC</td>
<td>Low Pressure Compressor</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mean Aerodynamic Chord</td>
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<td>MCAB</td>
<td>Multi-purpose Cabin</td>
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<td>MCP</td>
<td>Mode Control Panel</td>
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<td>MCT</td>
<td>Maximum Continuous Thrust</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>Mhz</td>
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<td>MOCA</td>
<td>Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude</td>
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<td>MOCT</td>
<td>Ministry Of Construction &amp; Transportation</td>
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<td>Minimum Sector Altitude</td>
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<td>Mean Sea Level</td>
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<td>Moving Target Indicator</td>
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<td>Nautical Mile</td>
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<td>Notice To Airmen</td>
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<td>National Transportation Safety Board</td>
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<td>Pilot Flying</td>
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<td>Pilot In Command</td>
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<td>Pilot Report</td>
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<td>Pilot Not Flying</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSR</td>
<td>Primary Surveillance Radar</td>
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<td>RDPS</td>
<td>Radar Data Processing System</td>
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<td>RMMS</td>
<td>Remote Maintenance Monitoring System</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic Of Korea</td>
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<td>RVR</td>
<td>Runway Visual Range</td>
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<td>Runway</td>
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<td>SB</td>
<td>Service Bulletin</td>
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<td>Secondary Surveillance Radar</td>
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<td>Standard Terminal Arrival Route</td>
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I. Title

Aircraft Operator : Air China International (中國國際航空公司)
Aircraft Manufacturer : The Boeing Company
Aircraft Type : B767-200 ER
State of Aircraft Registry : The People’s Republic of China
Registration : B2552
State of Occurrence : The Republic of Korea
Date and Time : April 15, 2002, 02:21:17(UTC), 11:21:17(Korea Standard Time)
Place of Accident : Near Gimhae International Airport, Busan
About 4.6km north of runway 18R threshold; on Mt. Dotdae (Elevation of 204 meters)
Latitude: N35° 13’ 57” 73, Longitude: E128° 55’ 40” 80

II. Executive Summary

On April 15, 2002, about 11:21:17, Air China flight 129, a Boeing 767-200ER, operated by Air China International (Air China hereinafter), en route from Beijing, China to Busan, Korea, crashed during a circling approach, on Mt. Dotdae located 4.6km north of runway 18R threshold at Busan/Gimhae International Airport (Gimhae airport hereinafter), at an elevation of 204 meters.2

The flight was a regularly scheduled international passenger service flight operating under instrument flight rules (IFR) within Korean airspace, according to the provisions of the Korean Aviation Act and Convention on International Civil Aviation. One captain, one first officer and one second officer, eight flight attendants, and 155 passengers were on board at the time of the accident.

The aircraft was completely destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Of the 166 persons on board, 37 persons including the captain and two flight attendants survived, while the remaining 129 occupants including two copilots were killed.3

Upon notification of the accident, the Korea Aviation-accident Investigation Board (KAIB) initiated an independent investigation, in accordance with the Korean Aviation Act. The investigation authorities of China (State of Registry and Operator) and the United States (State of Design and Manufacture) were notified of the accident and invited to assign Accredited Representatives and Advisors, in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all times herein are Korea Standard Time, based on a 24-hour clock.
2 669 ft above mean sea level.
3 Includes two persons who died within 30 days due to injuries from the accident.
The on-scene investigation was conducted jointly by investigators from Korea, the United States and China, with each investigation group led by KAIB investigators, from the day of the accident until May 2, 2002. The fact-gathering phase of the investigation continued, including visits by KAIB investigators to the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China (CAAC hereinafter) and Air China. All the factual data from the investigators were assembled into factual reports prepared by the KAIB group chairmen.

The KAIB held a public hearing for two days from November 25 to 26, 2002, in Busan to verify the factual information. It was attended by the participants from the KAIB, CASA, ROK Airforce (Airforce hereinafter), CAAC, Air China, NTSB, Boeing Company, Pratt & Whitney, ALPA-K, families of the victims, and media.

The analysis of this accident included examinations of issues related to weather, the accident sequence, flight crew training and performance, human factors, instrument approach procedures, including the circling approach procedure, air traffic control (ATC) facilities and services, rescue, and management and organizational safety oversight.

As a result of the investigation, the KAIB developed findings derived from the factual information and the analysis of the flight 129 accident. There are three different categories of findings: findings related to probable causes, findings related to risk, and other findings.

The findings related to probable causes identify elements that have been shown to have operated in the accident, or almost certainly operated in this accident. These findings are associated with unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or safety deficiencies associated with safety significant events that played a major role in the circumstances leading to this accident.

The findings related to risk identify elements of risk that have the potential to degrade aviation safety. Some of the findings in this category identify unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, and safety deficiencies, including organizational and systemic risks, that have the potential to degrade aviation safety; however, they cannot be clearly shown to have operated in the accident. Further, some of the findings in this category identify risks that are unrelated to this accident, but nonetheless were safety deficiencies that may warrant future safety actions.
Other findings identify elements that have the potential to enhance aviation safety, resolve an issue of controversy, or clarify an issue of unresolved ambiguity. Some of these findings are of general interest and are not necessarily analytical, but are often included in the ICAO format of accident reports for informational, safety awareness, education, and improvement purposes.

NOTE: Findings are a key part of this report and are published solely to identify safety deficiencies and risks for the prevention of future accidents. Any use of the findings to assign blame or liability would be a violation of international aviation law and international best practices, including those contained in Annex 13, Chapter 3, Paragraph 3.1, and Chapter 5, Paragraph 5.4.1, to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

Findings Related to Probable Causes

1. The flight crew of flight 129 performed the circling approach, not being aware of the weather minima of wide-body aircraft (B767-200) for landing, and in the approach briefing, did not include the missed approach, etc., among the items specified in Air China’s operations and training manuals.

2. The flight crew exercised poor crew resource management and lost situational awareness during the circling approach to runway 18R, which led them to fly outside of the circling approach area, delaying the base turn, contrary to the captain’s intention to make a timely base turn.

3. The flight crew did not execute a missed approach when they lost sight of the runway during the circling approach to runway 18R, which led them to strike high terrain (mountain) near the airport.

4. When the first officer advised the captain to execute a missed approach about 5 seconds before impact, the captain did not react, nor did the first officer initiate the missed approach himself.

Findings Related to Risk

1. The flight crew’s training for the circling approach was conducted with the simulator only for the Beijing Capital International Airport (Beijing airport hereinafter), and they had never been trained for the circling approach to Gimhae airport’s runway 18R.
2. The crew resource management (CRM) training of Air China was insufficient for the three flight crew complement.

3. Air China did not perform the improving action for Service Bulletin (SB) 767-34-0067 (May 31, 1989), which was issued by the Boeing Company for the reinforcement of the GPWS functions.

4. Air China provided one set of Jeppesen manuals to the flight crew, which the captain was using during the instrument approach, making it difficult for the other flight crew members to crosscheck the information in the manuals.

5. Instrument approach chart used by the flight crew of flight 129 did not depict the high terrain north of the airport.

6. During the circling approach, the flight crew of flight 129 did not use standard callouts defined by Air China.

7. Flight 129 was flown between 150 and 160 kt on the downwind leg, which exceeded the maximum speed of 140 kt of Gimhae airport’s circling approach category “C,” and the width of the downwind leg was narrower than normal, for which corrective actions were inappropriate.

8. The second officer, tasked with handling radio communications, did not reply correctly to controllers’ instructions a number of times, however, the captain and first officer did not correct the second officer’s inappropriate replies.

9. When the tower controllers lost visual contact with the flight 129 aircraft on the downwind and base legs, they tried to find the flight 129 aircraft visually, however, they did not use the tower BRITE, which is an aid to complement visual observations.

10. The flight crew did not reply appropriately to the local controller’s question when the controller asked them the possibility of landing, because the local controller did not have the flight 129 aircraft in sight after issuing the landing clearance.
11. The approach controller felt that the flight 129 aircraft was flying on a longer pattern than normal, so he asked the local controllers via intercom, “Does it seem go around?” however, the local controllers stated that they did not hear this question.

12. The local controller asked a question to the flight crew to confirm the position of the aircraft, however, the local controller did not issue any direct warning or advice based on his own subjective awareness of the situation.


14. The MSAW system installed in Gimhae tower at the time of the accident was designed only with the function of visual warning, which was not consistent with the ICAO recommendation to include an aural warning also. Thus, the low altitude (LA) warning would not have been noticed in a timely manner, unless the controller monitored the BRITE closely.

15. The MSAW activation area was programmed in the vicinity north of the circling approach area of Gimhae airport, which was set to be higher than the altitude of the circling approach pattern, and the MSAW would be activated in the case of a normal base turn in close proximity to the MSAW activation area within the circling approach area due to its predictive warning function.

16. When the aircraft disappeared from radar, and radio communication was lost between the tower and the aircraft, the tower controllers did not notify the search and rescue department in a timely manner.

17. The measuring equipment of runway visual range (RVR) of Gimhae airport’s runway (18R/36L) had been out of order for a considerable time period, thus it had not been operated appropriately for the purpose of category II runway-use.

Other Findings

1. The flight crew and flight attendants received training in accordance with the CAAC and Air China regulations and procedures, and they were certified and qualified for this flight.
2. The flight crew took an adequate rest before the flight.

3. There was no evidence of any medical problems that would have affected the flight crew’s performance.

4. Toxicological test results of the captain were negative for alcohol and drugs.

5. Autopsies performed on the victims of the accident revealed severe burn injuries, however, it could not be determined with a certainty whether the causes of death were from the impact trauma, fire, or a combination of both.

6. Airworthiness certificate of the flight 129 aircraft was valid, and its weight and balance were within the specified limits.

7. In the preflight aircraft maintenance inspection prior to departure from Beijing airport, no defects were found in the fuselage of the aircraft, or its systems and engines. During flight, the crew did not report any malfunction, and the examination of the aircraft wreckage did not show any possible malfunction.

8. The GPWS installed on the flight 129 aircraft operated as designed, and it did not generate any warning before the ground impact, because the aircraft was configured for landing, and the terrain closure rate was insufficient to trigger the Mode 2 warning.

9. The controllers handling flight 129 were properly qualified to perform their duties.

10. The weather forecast and ATIS broadcasts available to the flight crew were accurate and up to date.

11. The south wind was strong and there were low clouds and precipitation near Gimhae airport at the time of the accident, and the mountainous area in the north was covered with cloud and fog.

12. There were no international requirements that the aircraft’s approach category (ies) and/or weather minima for a circling approach should be informed officially to the air traffic control authority.
13. The pilot should determine the official or existing weather adequate for approach or landing based on the approach category and landing minima, and the controller should take actions such as issuing appropriate instructions to the aircraft to hold or proceed to another airport when reported by the pilot that the weather conditions are below the landing minima of the aircraft.

14. In accordance with Airforce regulations, it was a normal procedure for the approach controller to ask and confirm with flight 129 about its approach category in order to determine whether to issue the approach clearance, considering the weather conditions at that time.

15. When the approach controller issued flight 129 a control transfer instruction to the tower for the first time, the flight did not change to the tower frequency accordingly, of which the reason could not be confirmed. And 1 minute and 8 seconds after issuing the first control transfer instruction, the delayed initial contact with the tower was established upon receiving the second control transfer instruction, however, the landing clearance to flight 129 was issued by the tower controller at the usual position.

16. The local controller had flight 129 in sight briefly at the point passing nearly mid point on the downwind leg, and at the time of issuing the landing clearance, the flight disappeared from his sight. Thus, the local controller issued the landing clearance to the flight including the term, “Not in sight.”

17. The local controller could not be precisely aware that the aircraft was dangerously approaching mountainous terrain, as he lost visual contact with flight 129 from the time of landing clearance issuance until crash on the base turn, due to poor visibility.

18. All of the Korean, ICAO, and FAA procedures for the use of BRITE or Surveillance Radar describe that the local controller may use the BRITE optionally, as an aid augmenting “visual observation” function.

19. Circling approach is visual maneuvering, which the pilot has to confirm ground obstacles visually in the circling approach pattern, and is an extension of an instrument approach procedure which provides for visual circling of the aerodrome prior to landing.
20. The circling approach area and terrain in the vicinity were not depicted on the 
Gimhae radar video map. So the tower controller was in a poor environment to 
accurately identify the situation that an aircraft was flying outside the circling 
approach area and approaching dangerous obstacles, so he could issue a warning or 
advice by monitoring the BRITE.

21. The use of the certified BRITE was described in the Korean Standard Air Traffic 
Control Procedures. The certification standard of the BRITE installed in the tower 
at the time of the accident was not specifically described, however, the tower 
BRITE could be used as the technically certified BRITE, since it was certified for 
the completion of installation in accordance with the specifications and design 
drawing of the ordering authority (Seoul Regional Aviation Bureau), and was 
regularly maintained and inspected by qualified technicians.

22. The differences between the ICAO and Korean criteria for the flight procedure 
establishment of Gimhae airport were not described in the ROK AIP effective at the 
time of the accident.

23. The flight information material used by the flight crew of flight 129 was Jeppessen 
manual, and it was described in the manual that the circling approach procedure of 
Gimhae airport was established in accordance with the FAA criteria.

24. The procedure for the circling approach to runway 18R at Gimhae airport was a 
general circling approach procedure, without the prescribed circling approach track 
established using the ground visual references, which could cause difficulties in 
conducting a circling approach flight in poor visibility.

25. Gimhae airport has the instrument approach procedure only to runway 36, thus in 
the case of runway 18 in use, it requires more time to separate aircraft approaching 
runway 36 before making a circling approach to runway 18 from the aircraft 
departing from runway 18.

26. The visual weather observation site at Gimhae airport did not deviate from the 
establishment requirements of a weather observation site, but as its northern 
airspace was partially obscured, the weather observer had to move to the 
observation site located in the ramp to observe the weather, which could be 
considerably inconvenient.
27. At Gimhae tower operated by the Airforce, a Korea MOCT civil air traffic control coordinator was assigned to be on duty in accordance with a related mutual consent, however, the civil controller was not positioned in the tower at the time of the accident. And due to the system of non-authorization of relevant ratings for the substantial air traffic control services, the civil controller was not able to appropriately carry out the supervision of the regulatory compliance of civil aircraft pilots, and coordination with the civil aviation related organizations, which were described in the mutual consent.

28. The clock installed in the recording equipment of the automatic on-off lighting system of Gimhae airport had been running fast by 19 minutes, which no one was aware until the accident investigation.

29. Air China had not designated Gimhae airport as a “special airport,” which would have required the additional preflight training and procedures for the flight crew.

30. The Korea MOCT designated Gimhae airport as a special airport in Flight Safety Regulations, however, it did not include the detailed information in consideration of the characteristics and requirements of the airport, and the required pilot qualification for this information.

31. All the in-flight public announcements of flight 129 were conducted only in English and Chinese, not in Korean for many Korean-speaking passengers, who could not understand the meaning of those announcements clearly.

32. A local resident called 119 immediately after the accident, so the rescue guard could be dispatched expeditiously.

33. Because of no regulation specified for assisting accident victims and their families of aircraft operating to Korea, there were difficulties with assisting the victims and their families.

On the basis of these findings, the KAIB developed safety recommendations to Air China, the CAAC, the Korea Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the Korea Ministry of National Defense, the Korea Airports Corporation, and the International Civil Aviation Organization.
III. Body

1. Factual Information

1.1 History of Flight

On April 15, 2002, about 11:21:17 (02:21:17 UTC), Air China flight 129, a Boeing 767-200ER, Chinese registration B2552, operated by Air China, en route from Beijing, China to Busan, Korea, crashed on Mt. Dotdae, located 4.6 km north of runway 18R threshold at Gimhae airport, at an elevation of 204 meters Mean Sea Level (MSL). Flight 129 departed from Beijing airport, China, with one captain, two copilots, eight flight attendants and 155 passengers on board, and was conducting the circling approach to runway 18R at Gimhae airport, after it received its landing clearance.

Of the 166 persons on board, 37 persons including the captain and two flight attendants survived, while 129 occupants including two copilots were killed. The flight was a regularly scheduled international passenger service flight operating under instrument flight rules (IFR) within Korean airspace, according to the provisions of the Korean Aviation Act, China Civil Aviation Rules (CCAR hereinafter) and Convention on International Civil Aviation.

The captain stated that the flight crew reported for duty at 14:00 (Beijing time\(^4\)) on April 14, 2002. They received pertinent paperwork for flight operations in accordance with Air China regulations\(^5\), and after routine physical examinations, were declared fit for duty. On the night prior to the flight, the captain slept at the company sleeping quarters. On April 15, 1 hour 15 minutes prior to departure from Beijing, the captain received flight paperwork from the dispatcher at the flight operations office located in the terminal building. Flight 129 departed from Beijing airport about 08:37 (Beijing time), 17 minutes after the scheduled time of 08:20 (Beijing time).

According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, the flight crew obtained automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information “Oscar”\(^6\) at 10:49:55. However, after receiving information “Oscar” at 10:50:17, the second officer said, “I can’t hear it clearly.” At 10:50:25, the first officer\(^7\) said, “I can’t hear it clearly at all,” and then the first officer conducted an approach briefing which included the runway in

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\(^4\) Beijing time: UTC+8.
\(^6\) 0128 UTC, Weather: Wind 230 at 6 kt, visibility 2 miles RA FG, sky condition 3/005, 6/010, 8/025, temperature 16, dew point 13, altimeter 30.00, active R/W 36L, advisory R/W 36R or 18L will be used as taxiway and parallel taxiway will be closed.
\(^7\) The pilot who was seated on the right side.
use, type of approach, transition altitude, missed approach procedures, holding altitude, NAVAIDS (VOR, ILS) in use, and minimum sector altitude (MSA). Approach Checklist items were completed between 10:56:12 and 10:56:30.

At 10:57:25, the flight crew obtained Gimhae airport ATIS information “Papa.” At 11:01:02, the second officer said, “I will do communicating, others keep listening, I came to Busan not too often.” Thereafter, the second officer handled all the communications with ATC.

At 11:06:30, the second officer made his first contact with Gimhae approach controller, and the approach controller instructed flight 129, “Heading 190, descend to six thousand.” The flight was positioned about 32 NM northwest of Gimhae radar, at an altitude of 17,000 ft MSL (MSL for the altitude of aircraft hereinafter).

At 11:06:53, the Gimhae approach controller confirmed that flight 129 received ATIS “Papa.” At 11:07:01, the controller informed the crew that runway 36L was in use, and to expect a straight-in approach, which the second officer acknowledged at 11:07:07.

At 11:08:50, the controller queried flight 129 about its approach category, to which the second officer replied, “Please say again.” At 11:08:57, the controller then requested the approach category again, and the first officer stated, “Approach category Charlie” at 11:09:01, but the second officer at first said “What?” and then replied to the Gimhae approach controller with “Charlie, Air China 129” at 11:09:07.

At 11:08:56, the ATIS was broadcast as “Quebec,” but there was no recording of that on the CVR. At 11:09:10, the controller notified flight 129 that the runway was changed to 18R, with winds 210 at 17 kt, and to expect the circling approach to runway 18R.

At 11:09:21, after receiving the notification from the controller, the first officer announced to other crewmembers, “Circle approach runway 18 right,” and the second officer replied to the controller, “Circle approach 18 right, Air China 129.”

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8 0200 UTC, Weather: Wind 220/7 2 RAFG sky condition 1/8 of the sky obscured by fog 3/005 6/010 8/025 16/13 altimeter 30.00. Advisory R/W 36R & R/W 18L will be used as taxiway and parallel taxiway will be closed.
9 The pilot who was seated in the jump seat, handling radio communications.
10 02:09 UTC, Weather: Wind 210/12 2 RAFG Sky condition 1/8 of the sky obscured by fog 3/005 6/010 8/025 16/13 30.00. Active R/W 18R expect circle approach 18R. Weather minimum CAT “D” & “E” below landing minimum. Advisory R/W 36R & R/W 18L will be used as taxiway and parallel taxiway will be closed.
At 11:09:30, the controller asked whether the flight 129’s approach category was “Charlie” or “Delta,” and the captain replied, “Category Charlie.” The second officer replied to the controller, “Charlie, Air China 129, Charlie.”

From 11:10:19 until 11:12:29, the captain and first officer confirmed the landing runway to be 18R, discussed the circling (minimum descent altitude: MDA) to be 700 ft MSL for runway 18R, visual maneuvering and procedures for exiting the runway and the use of taxiways after landing, and the captain cautioned at 11:12:27, “We won’t enlarge the traffic pattern, the mountain is all over that side.”

At 11:13:01, the captain said, “It’s raining, we didn’t receive any information on rain?” and at 11:13:35, the first officer said “Flaps 1?” then the captain said “O.K, extend.” Thereafter, there was a sound resembling that of flap lever being lowered, recorded on the CVR.

At 11:13:59, after the aircraft reached 6,000 ft, the approach controller instructed flight 129 to turn left to heading 160 degrees, and to descend to 2,600 ft.

At 11:14:47, the captain said, “I’ll take off my sunglasses, let my sight adjust to outside, the visibility is not so good,” and at 11:15:15, the approach controller instructed flight 129 to turn left heading 090. At 11:15:28, the captain said again, “It’s the rainy area.” At 11:15:51, the captain said, “Extend,” to which the first officer replied, “Flaps 5,” and then, there was a sound possibly related to that of flap lever being lowered. The captain said, “The wind is so strong.”

At 11:16:33, the approach controller issued the following clearance: “Air China 129, turn left heading 030, cleared for ILS DME runway 36 left, then circle to runway 18 right, report field in sight.” The second officer read back, “Turn left heading 030, cleared [unintelligible] approach 18 right, Air China 129.”

At 11:16:50, the captain said, “Circle to land” and the first officer acknowledged, “Cleared for ILS approach 36 left, and then circle to land 18 right, report runway in sight.” The second officer replied, “OK, OK, I understand, circle to land 18 right, turn left 030.”
At 11:17:11, the first officer said, “Little more descent, position almost reached, ILS captured...” At 11:17:30, the captain said, “Do we have to maintain this altitude?” The first officer said, “Do not maintain, continue down to 700 ft.”

At 11:17:40, the first officer said, “Too strong wind, gear down?” and at 11:17:42, there was a sound similar to that of landing gear being extended. At 11:17:47, the captain said, “Gear down, flaps 20?” and at 11:17:49, the first officer said, “Flaps 20.” At 11:17:50, there was a click sound possibly related to that of lowering flap lever.

At 11:17:54, the controller instructed flight 129 to descend to 700 ft, to which the second officer replied, and then told the other crew members to descend to 700 ft. At this time, the aircraft altitude was at 2,208 ft, airspeed 175 kt (CAS, airspeed represents CAS hereinafter), and ground speed 222 kt.

At 11:18:29, the approach controller instructed flight 129 to report the runway in sight, and at 11:18:39, the captain stated that he had the runway in sight. At 11:18:41, the second officer then reported the runway in sight, at which time, the aircraft altitude was 952 ft, airspeed 158 kt and ground speed 187 kt.

At 11:18:44, the approach controller instructed, “Air China 129, contact tower one eighteen point one, circle west,” but the second officer replied only, “Circle, circle, 18 right, Air China 129” (The frequency change instruction was not read back, and the controller did not point it out). The captain directed, “Disconnect, turn left,” and at 11:18:53, the first officer said, “I have control(我来), heading select,” and then disconnected the autopilot, and flew manually.

After there were several beeping sounds at 11:18:55, the aircraft descended to 700 ft at 11:18:57, and the captain said, “OK, maintain 700 ft, watching the altitude.” At 11:18:58, the aircraft altitude was 672 ft, airspeed 158 kt, ground speed 182 kt, heading 347 degrees, with a left bank of 16.7 degrees.

At 11:19:08, there was a “Glide Slope” warning, and at 11:19:11, the first officer said, “Turn off the ILS.” The second officer replied, “OK, I have it turned off.” Then the first officer said, “OK.”

At 11:19:17, the captain said, “20 seconds,” and then at 11:19:33, said, “Keep watching the runway.” At 11:19:34, the first officer said, “Turning.” At 11:19:41, the first officer said, “Engage it again, maintain present altitude 700 ft, heading select,” and at 11:19:46, reengaged the autopilot.
At 11:19:52, the approach controller instructed again, “Air China 129, contact tower, one eighteen one,” and the second officer replied, “Contact tower one two one . . . one one eight decimal one, good day, Air China 129.”

While the primary local controller and approach controller were communicating on the direct line that flight 129 had not contacted the tower, at 11:20:00, the captain asked, “Can you see abeam end of runway?” and at 11:20:01, the first officer replied, “Abeam runway end.” At that time, the primary local controller said on the emergency frequency (121.5 Mhz), “This is Gimhae tower on guard, Air China 129, if you hear me, contact one one eight point one.”

At 11:20:02, the captain said, “Timing” to measure for the commencement of turning base. At this time, according to the aircraft track calculated from the FDR data, the aircraft was positioned about abeam the threshold of runway 18R, with an airspeed of 157 kt, ground speed 177 kt and heading 011 degrees.

At 11:20:13, the first officer said, “The wind is too strong, it is very difficult to fly,” and at this time, the second officer reported on the tower frequency 118.1, “Gimhae tower, Air China 129, circle approach 18 right.”

At 11:20:15, 13 seconds elapsed from the start of the time check for turning base, the captain said, “Turning base.” At 11:20:17, the captain said, “I have control (我來飛).” At 11:20:19, the primary local controller requested, “Air China 129, report turning base.” At 11:20:22, the captain said, “Turning right,” and at 11:20:23, the second officer replied to the controller, “Wilco, Air China 129.” At 11:20:24, the first officer urged, “Turn quickly, not too late.”

At 11:20:25, the primary local controller issued the landing clearance with, “Air China 129, check wheels down, wind two one zero at one seven knots, cleared to land runway 36 left, not in sight.”
At 11:20:32, the captain said, “Flaps 30, already extended,” and then the captain disconnected the autopilot, and manually started to bank right. At 11:20:33, the secondary local controller corrected and issued the landing clearance to read, “Cleared to land runway 18 right.” The whole landing clearance and its correction lasted 9 seconds. At 11:20:35, the second officer replied to the tower, “Circle, [unreadable] 18 right and QNH three thousand, Air China 129.”

In the mean time, at 11:20:34, the captain said, “Reduce speed,” and the first officer replied, “OK.” At that time, the airspeed was 158 kt, ground speed 170 kt, heading 350 degrees, and then the airspeed began to reduce.

At 11:20:41, when the secondary local controller asked, “Air China 129, can you landing?” the second officer replied at 11:20:47, “Roger, QFE three thousand, Air China 129.” At 11:20:47, the approach controller asked the tower on the intercom, “Does it seem go around?” According to the intercom records and tower controllers’ testimonies, there was no reply recorded from the tower controllers, and none of them heard the transmission from the approach controller. According to the FDR data, at 11:20:44, the airspeed was 152 kt, ground speed 165 kt, heading 007 degrees, and right bank 23.6 degrees. At 11:20:51, the secondary local controller asked, “Air China 129, say again your intention,” but there was no response from the flight crew.

At 11:20:54, the first officer cautioned, “Pay attention to the altitude keeping,” and the captain asked, “Assist me to find the runway.” At 11:20:59, the first officer said, “It’s getting difficult to fly, pay attention to the altitude.”

At 11:21:02, the secondary local controller queried, “Air China 129, say position now,” at 11:21:05, the second officer replied, “Air China 129, on base.” While the second officer was responding, at 11:21:07, the first officer interposed, “Turn on final,” and the second officer resumed his reply to the tower, “Turning on final, and QFE three thousand, Air China 129.”

At 11:21:09, the captain asked, “Have the runway in sight? (看到跑道了吗),” but at 11:21:10, the first officer replied, “No, I cannot see out (沒有, 看不着),” followed by saying, “Must go around (必須復飛)” at 11:21:12. The captain did not respond.

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11 Turning base: the third turning position.
12 Turning final: the fourth turning position.
At 11:21:15, the first officer said, “Pull up! Pull up! (拉起來!, 拉起來!)” at which time, according to the FDR data, the pitch attitude of the aircraft was increased to a positive 11.4 degrees, while engine thrust did not increase. At this time, the secondary local controller reissued the landing clearance, “Cleared to land 18 right, Air China 129.”

At 11:21:17, there was a sound of impact recorded on the CVR. The aircraft impacted the mountain located on a bearing of 354 degrees from the airport, about 4.6 km from the threshold of runway 18R, at an elevation of 204 meters MSL. The last data about the status of the aircraft recorded on the FDR showed altitude 704 ft, airspeed 125 kt, ground speed 133 kt, heading 149 degrees, right bank 26.8 degrees, and pitch angle 11.4 degrees.

Figure 1-1 (in Korean) and Figure 1-2 (in English) depict the flight track from the pertinent FDR data, with the communications of CVR and ATC tape recording transcripts, plotted on the chart, during the circling approach at Gimhae airport, until the time of accident.

The CVR transcript is contained in Appendix 1.
Figure 1-1 CVR & ATC Transcripts Plotted along the Flight Track from the FDR Data
(Korean Version)
Figure 1-2 CVR & ATC Transcripts Plotted along the Flight Track from the FDR Data (English and Chinese Version)
1.2 Injuries to Persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Injuries</th>
<th>Flight Crew</th>
<th>Cabin Crew</th>
<th>Passengers</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>166</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

The aircraft was completely destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. The value of the airframe was estimated to be US $11,740,000.\(^\text{13}\)

1.4 Other Damage

Damage to the forest on Mt. Dotdae of some 8,000 m\(^2\), including 12 grave sites, was caused by the aircraft’s impact with trees and the ground, along with the spread of the wreckage.\(^\text{14}\)

Figure 1-3 Site of Forest Damage

\(^\text{14}\) Assessment by the construction department of Gimhae City Hall.
1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 The Captain

The captain entered the Civil Aviation Flying University of China in September 1990, graduating in July 1994 to join Air China. He held an Airline Transport Pilot License issued by the CAAC, in accordance with the CCAR, with Ratification of Certification for the B767 aircraft type, and First Class Airman Medical Certificate.

In September 2001, he completed captain upgrade training in Air China training center, and qualification checks with Air China and the CAAC, respectively. He became a captain upon Ratification of Certification for Command issued by the CAAC on October 29, 2001, and thereafter, flew as a captain since March 30, 2002.

According to Air China’s records, the captain had accumulated a total of 6,497 hrs 23 min of flight time, 6,287 hrs 23 min of which were in the B767, with 500 hrs as a captain. He completed recurrent training from March 8 to 10, 2002.

In accordance with Air China regulations, the captain held a Flight Crew English Certificate, and passed the Simulated Air to Ground English Communication Test and Flight Specialty English Test. The captain was originally scheduled for a flight from Beijing to Moscow on April 12, 2002, but a week prior, he arranged for a schedule change to the accident flight of April 15, 2002, in order to take an English test on April 14.

He had flown roundtrip from Beijing to Narita on April 10, 2002 for a total of 7 hrs 40 min, and there were no flights from April 11 to 14, 2002.

At 14:00, April 14, 2002, the captain passed the routine physical examination.

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15 Age: 30 (born in Dec 1971)
17 Checkride date: Nov 2001, valid until May 2002, A/C type: B767
21 National Airman English Test Level II.
conducted by the internal aeromedical unit, in accordance with company regulations, and then slept in the company-provided sleeping quarters, prior to his flight duty on the day of the accident.

1.5.2 The First Officer

The first officer entered the Airforce Academy in August 1989, graduating in September 1993 to join Air China. He held an Airline Transport Pilot License issued by the CAAC, in accordance with the CCAR, with Ratification of Certification for the B767 aircraft type, and First Class Airman Medical Certificate.

In January 2002, he completed upgrade training in Air China Training Center, and qualification checks with Air China and the CAAC, respectively. That same month, he was issued the CAAC Ratification of Certification for first officer, and completed his first flight as a first officer on the B767-200 on February 23, 2002. The accident flight was his third flight as a first officer. Prior to becoming a first officer, he had flown twice into Gimhae airport.

According to Air China’s records, the first officer had accumulated a total of 5,295 hrs of flight time, 1,215 hrs 14 min of which were in the Boeing 767. He received recurrent training on December 12, 2001. In accordance with Air China regulations, the first officer held a Flight Crew English Certificate, passed the Simulated Air to Ground English Communication Test and Flight Specialty English Test.

He had flown roundtrip from Beijing to Phuket, Thailand, on April 11, 2002 for a total of 11 hrs 40 min. There were no flights from April 12 to 14, 2002.

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23 Age: 29 (born in Jan 1972).
27 A total of 23 flights in 2002.
At 14:00, April 14, 2002, he passed the routine physical examination conducted by the internal aeromedical unit, in accordance with company regulations.

1.5.3 The Second Officer

The second officer attended the Civil Aviation Flying University of China from September 1993 to June 1997, and was hired by Air China in August 1997. He held a Commercial Pilot License issued by the CAAC in accordance with CCAR, with Ratification of Certification for the Boeing 767 type, and First Class Airman Medical Certificate.

He completed his first copilot transition training and check, at the company level, on November 27, 2000, completing the second check on December 11, 2000, and periodic proficiency checks from June 25 to 27, 2001. The second officer had no flight experience into Gimhae airport in 2002.

According to Air China’s records, the second officer had accumulated a total of 1,775 hrs 5 min of flight time, 1,078 hrs 55 min of which were in the B767. He received recurrent training from June 25 to 27, 2001. In accordance with Air China regulations, the second officer held a Flight Crew English Certificate, and passed the Simulated Air to Ground English Communication Test and Flight Specialty English Test.

The second officer had flown roundtrip from Beijing to Singapore for a total of 13 hrs 15 min from April 12 to 13, 2002. He had no flight on April 14, 2002.

At 14:00, April 14, 2002, he passed the routine physical examination conducted by the internal medial unit, in accordance with company regulations.

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30 Age: 27 (born in Jun, 1974)
34 Information based on year 2002 data provided by Air China.
1.5.4 The Flight Attendants

A total of 8 flight attendants, all of whose nationality was the PRC, were on board. All of them were qualified for their duties, holding the cabin attendant license issued by the CAAC.

The chief purser (female, age 41) joined the company on January 1, 1979, and completed her initial training on February 28, 1979. Her last recurrent training was on June 11, 2001. One purser (male, age 35) was hired on November 1, 1985, completed initial training on December 23, 1985, and his last recurrent training was on July 31, 2001.

The other flight attendant (female, age 41) was hired on December 20, 1978, completed initial training on February 28, 1979, and her last recurrent training was on August 13, 2001. The remaining 5 flight attendants’ (1 male / 4 females, ages 23–30) dates of hire ranged from July 1, 1993 to February 1, 1998. All had completed their initial training, and the dates of their most recent recurrent training ranged from June 12, 2001 to April 1, 2002.

1.5.5 The Air Traffic Controllers

1.5.5.1 Gimhae Approach Control

The approach controller (age 31) obtained the air traffic controller certificate on November 16, 1993, from the Chief of Staff, Airforce, upon his completion of the initial level course at Communication and Electronics School, Airforce Education and Training Command. He did not obtain the air traffic controller certificate issued by the Minister of Construction and Transportation, R.O.K., however, according to the Korean Aviation Act, Article 27, Para 3, the military servicemen who are engaged in air traffic control services for civil aircraft at military control facilities used by civil aircraft can provide for air traffic control services without the certificate issued by the Minister of Construction and Transportation, ROK.

He was assigned to Gimhae approach control on March 21, 1995, and then obtained further credentials necessary to work as an approach controller. He was the Airforce duty chief at the time of the accident. Prior to Gimhae, he worked as an enroute controller at Daegu Area Control Center (presently, Incheon Area Control Center) from November 19, 1993 until March 21, 1995.

37 Flight Information, Non-radar Approach Control, Radar Approach Control.
1.5.5.2 Gimhae Tower

The primary local controller (age 22) in charge of aerodrome control at the time of the accident, obtained the air traffic controller certificate upon his completion of the initial level course at the Communication and Electronics School\textsuperscript{38}, Airforce Education and Training Command on June 2, 2000. He did not obtain the air traffic controller certificate issued by the Minister of Construction and Transportation, ROK, however, as stated above in 1.5.5.1, according to the Korean Aviation Act, Article 27, Para 3, he could provide for aerodrome control services to civil aircraft. He worked at Gimhae tower since June 3, 2000, and obtained the necessary credentials\textsuperscript{39} while working at the tower, and at the time of the accident, he was working at the primary local control position.

The secondary local controller (age 25) obtained the air traffic controller certificate upon his completion of the initial level course at Communication and Electronics School, Airforce Education and Training Command on March 28, 1997. He worked at Gimhae tower since February 1, 1998, and obtained the necessary credentials while working there. The secondary local controller was the duty chief at the time of the accident, working at the secondary local control position. Prior to being assigned to the tower, he worked as a radar controller with the approach control from April 7, 1997 until Jan 31, 1998. He also held an air traffic controller certificate issued by the Minister of Construction and Transportation, ROK in accordance with the Aviation Act, Article 26, on September 27, 2000.

1.5.6 Gimhae Airport Weather Observer

The weather observer on duty on the day of accident held a weather service qualification\textsuperscript{40}, and obtained a national technical certificate\textsuperscript{41} issued by the Human Resources Development Service of Korea.

1.6 Aircraft Information

The flight 129 aircraft\textsuperscript{42} was a B767-200ER built in 1985 by the Boeing company, and was introduced and commenced its operation by Air China\textsuperscript{43} on October 25, 1985.

The maintenance of Air China’s airframe, engines and components were being performed through the contracted\textsuperscript{44} maintenance with AMECO.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{38} MOCT designated & approved air traffic controller course.
\textsuperscript{39} Flight Information, Aerodrome Control.
\textsuperscript{40} Issued by the chief of the 73rd weather group, Airforce (Mar 16,1999), serial No: 94-35.
\textsuperscript{41} First class weather engineer, issued on Oct 14,1991.
\textsuperscript{42} Serial No: 23308.
\textsuperscript{43} As of Apr 16, 2002, possessed 9 B767aircraft in total: 4 B767-200s, 5 B767-300s.
\textsuperscript{44} Service agreement for airframe, engines, components between AIR CHINA and AMECO.
\textsuperscript{45} AMECO: Aircraft Maintenance & Engineering Corporation, Beijing.
Airworthiness of the flight 129 aircraft was certified by the CAAC through the Authorized Release Certificate/Airworthiness Approval Tag. Airworthiness certificate, nationality registration certificate and radio station license of aircraft were all valid, and the last scheduled inspection of the aircraft was made on March 7, 2002.

Scheduled inspection of the airframe was performed according to the Air China B767 Maintenance Schedule. The Process Manual was comprehensive and covered general procedures, quality assurance, airworthiness approval, general maintenance regulations, process management policy and procedures, maintenance planning management, records management, parts management, and technical training guides, etc.

By April 13, 2002, the total airframe time was 40,409 hrs, of which 16,729 hrs were since overhaul, with a total of 13,844 cycles, of which 6,407 cycles were since overhaul.

The flight 129 aircraft was equipped with Two Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7R4E engines. The left engine was installed on September 23, 2000, and its total time was 29,151 hrs, of which 4,676 hrs were since overhaul.

The right engine was installed on October 24, 2001, and its total time was 31,026 hrs, of which 1,858 hrs were since overhaul.

1.6.1 Aircraft Maintenance Discrepancies

During the preflight check performed in Beijing on the day of the accident, no defects were found in the airframe, engines, or any of the systems, and there were no maintenance deferred items in the maintenance records.

The FDR and CVR data showed the normal operation of the landing gear and flaps, and the captain also stated that during flight, all aircraft systems operated normally and were in good technical condition.

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46 Approval tag AAC-038, issued by the CAAC as a certificate of airworthiness.
47 The 3A Check (Aircraft log book, Maintenance check record 3-1).
50 Serial No, L/H: P716912, R/H: P716929.
51 Overhauled by the engine manufacturer, Pratt & Whitney, Dec 15, 1998.
52 Overhauled by the Eagle Services Asia (located in Singapore), Sep 24, 1998.
1.6.2 Flight Deck Instruments

The flight deck and the forward electronics bay were completely destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. One burnt airspeed indicator, with the needle indicating approximately 138 kt, was found at the accident site.

Figure 1-4 illustrates the captain’s and first officer’s instrument panels, located in front of the pilots’ seats, on the B767-200.
1.6.3 Weight and Balance

The following weight and balance data were valid at the time of departure.

- Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW): 97,360 kg (214,642 lb)
- Fuel On Board (FOB): 15,500 kg (34,171 lb)
- Trip Fuel (TIF): 8,010 kg (17,659 lb)
- Take-off Weight (TOW): 112,860 kg (248,811 lb)
- Landing Weight (LDW Planned): 104,760 kg (230,956 lb)
- Passenger Weight (including cabin baggage): 12,400 kg (27,337 lb, 155 pax)
- Baggage Weight: 1,840 kg (4,056 lb)
- Center of Gravity: 24.6% MAC

The actual weights were within the authorized maximum weights, the fuel on board was suitable for the flight from Beijing to Gimhae, and the CG was within limits.

1.7 Meteorological Information

1.7.1 Weather Conditions at Gimhae International Airport

At Gimhae airport, north and northwesterly winds prevail during autumn and winter, and south and southwesterly winds prevail during summer. Visibility is often partially poor due to sea fog, etc. from the south, since the southern part of the airport is located close to a sea. Mountainous terrain to the north, with strong southerly winds prevailing, may cause a mass of low clouds and fog to persist along the mountainous area north of the runway 18R, with a probability of increased precipitation in the area.

After the initial contact with Gimhae approach control, about 11:06:58, the flight crew of flight 129 acknowledged the receipt of ATIS information “Papa,” as follows:

“Gimhae international airport information Papa, time at zero two zero zero UTC, weather, wind two two zero at seven knots, visibility two miles rain fog, sky condition one eighth of the sky obscured by fog, sky condition three octas five hundred, six octas

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53 MZFW: 114,758 kg, MTOW: 156,489 kg, MLDW: 126,098 kg.
54 Legally required fuel on board: 14,080 kg.
55 T/O CG % MAC: 11.0 ~36.0.
Upon the change of runway to 18R at 11:09, the approach controller informed flight 129 of the runway change to 18R, and surface winds 210 degrees at 17 kt. The local meteorological observation taken by the Airforce Meteorological Office at Gimhae at 11:11, was broadcast as ATIS “Romeo” about 11:18:35, and at that time, flight 129 was on the instrument final approach course to runway 36L, however, it was not recorded on the CVR that ATIS “Romeo” was received by the crew. Information “Romeo” was as follows:

“Gimhae international airport information Romeo, time at zero two zero one UTC, weather, wind two one zero at one zero knots, visibility two and half miles with rain fog, sky condition three octas five hundred, six octas one thousand, eight octas two thousand five hundred, temperature one six, dew point one three, active runway one eight right, active runway one eight right, expect circle approach one eight right. Weather minimum category delta below landing minimum. Advisory runway three six right or one eight left will be used as taxiway and parallel taxiway will be closed. Advise you have information Romeo.”

The weather observation taken at 11:45 after the accident, was wind 210 at 10 kt (mean velocity for 2 min), gust 16 kt, visibility 4,000 m with RABR, sky condition SCT 005 BKN 010 OVC 025, temperature 16°C, dew point 13, altimeter 29.99 In Hg.

Analysis of the daily record of surface weather observation by the Gimhae Airforce Meteorological Office in the morning of the accident day from 08:00 until 12:00 revealed that the wind direction was almost steady between 200 and 220 degrees, with the wind velocity between 9 and 12 kt. Peak gust between 14 and 16 kt was observed from 11:45 to 12:00, after the accident.

The visibility was between 2 and 3 miles with light to moderate rain and mist. The visibility at 11:00 on ATIS “Papa” was 2 miles, and the visibility observed at 11:11 with the runway change to 18R was 2.5 miles which was a little bit better than the visibility on ATIS “Papa” that flight 129 received.
The sky was covered by low clouds; coverage over 3 octas of the sky with cloud base between 500 and 800 ft, 6 octas with cloud base between 1,000 and 1,500 ft, and 8 octas with cloud base at 2,500 ft.

The weather at Gimhae and its vicinity in the morning of the accident day showed the steady temperature, dew point and barometric pressure, generally south-southwesterly winds blowing relatively strong, poor visibility due to rain and mist, and very cloudy weather because of low and thick clouds.

The forecast of Gimhae airport valid at the time of the accident, issued by the Gimhae Airforce Meteorological Office at 08:28, was as follows:

“TAF AMD RKPK 142300Z 150024 20006G16KT 3200 –RABR BKN015 OVC030 BECMG 1112 20010KT 1600 BKN005 OVC010”

According to the upper air data at a height of 1 km, observed every 10 minutes between 09:00 and 12:00 on the day of the accident by the national weather radar network including the Korea Meteorological Administration weather radar installed on Mt. Gooduck located approximately 7-8 km southeast of Gimhae airport, about 09:00, there was a wide area of rain clouds of about 2 mm from the shores southwest of Gimhae airport to distant seas to the south and to the southeast as far as Japan, moving slowly to the east, so that at the time of the accident, about 11:20, rain clouds with less than 0.1 mm were remaining in the vicinity of the airport.

Satellite pictures of clouds between 09:00 and 12:00 on the day of the accident showed a very slow movement of wide and long cloud formations lying from east to west between Korea and Japan, with heavy clouds between the sea south of Gimhae and southwestern shores of Japan. According to the pictures, Gimhae aerodrome was placed in front of the cold front, in the southwest anticyclone.

Figure 1-5 shows the radar weather data observed every 10 minutes between 11:00 and 11:30.
1.7.2 Additional Weather Information

According to the PIREP by a military CN-235 pilot at 10:20 on the day of the accident, the cloud base was observed to be at 500 ft with the top at 8,000 ft. A military C-130 pilot who landed 10 minutes after the accident reported the base at 600 ft or 700 ft. Neither pilots reported the amount of clouds.

According to the report by the rescue squad, which arrived earliest at the site of the accident about 11:58, the mountain was covered in thick fog from halfway up, and the precipitation was described as heavier than drizzle.
1.8 Aids to Navigation

1.8.1 Radio Navigation Aids

Installation of the Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) used for air traffic control at Gimhae airport was completed\(^5\) on November 29, 1990, and the radar satisfied the special operational commencement flight check for the initial operation on December 4, 1990. The Seoul Regional Aviation Administration (Seoul Regional Aviation Bureau at that time) certified the radar for the completion of installation on December 24, 1990. The radar had been operational since January 15, 1991, and retained normal operation with scheduled maintenance and flight checks. There was no record of malfunction on the day of the accident.

The radar was manufactured by Toshiba, Japan, and consisted of a Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) and a Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR). A Radar Data Processing System (RDPS) is integral to the SSR. The ASR is Type TW1374A, and the RDPS is Type TP1121C.

The radar had the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) function, only with the visual warning. No acoustic warning was designed for or incorporated into the radar. The radar function was normal on the day of the accident, according to the radar image record data.

The ILS/DME (108.5 Mhz, IKMA) used by flight 129 for the approach to runway 36L was comprised of Localizer, Glide Path, Middle Marker, Inner Marker and DME, of which the operation was monitored real time by the Remote Maintenance Monitoring System (RMMS). Any malfunction would automatically alert the approach controller and remote maintenance technician.

The ILS/DME operation was routinely flight checked to be satisfactory, and the RMMS records between 11:00 and 12:00 on the day of the accident indicated normal values within allowable error tolerances.

The Gimhae VOR/DME (113.8 Mhz, KMH) is for instrument and missed approaches, and is monitored real time by the RMMS. Any malfunction would automatically alert the approach controller and remote maintenance technician.

The VOR/DME operation was routinely flight checked to be satisfactory, and the RMMS records before (about 05:40) and after (about 12:01) the time of the accident indicated the transmission output within the normal range.

\(^5\) Completion of Gimhae airport radar equipment installation (including a new BRITE Display).
Figures 1-6 and 1-7 illustrate respectively the radar track data and the circling approach area of flight 129 during the circling approach to runway 18R.

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<th>Time</th>
<th>Dir (N)</th>
<th>Dst. (NM)</th>
<th>A/S (GS)</th>
<th>All. (ft)</th>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>331.41</td>
<td>4.315</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>331.41</td>
<td>4.315</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>331.41</td>
<td>4.315</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>331.41</td>
<td>4.315</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>331.41</td>
<td>4.315</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>331.41</td>
<td>4.315</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1-6 CDRS Data

* Approximately 200 – 1,100 meters of difference existed from the final approach course to runway 36L to the crash point in the flight track on the drawing based on the CDRS data scaled one to 50,000, thus the CDRS data (distance) was multiplied by an invariable number 0.868976, and the revised the distance was calculated for the correction on the drawing. The flight track was composed on the basis of the revised data.
Figure 1-7 Circling Approach Radar Track of Flight 129 and Circling Approach Area

* For track data at each number, refer to Figure 1-6
1.8.2 Airport Lighting

According to the statement of the captain of flight 129, he observed the runway lights on the final approach course to runway 36L, however, he saw neither the runway lights on the downwind leg nor circling guidance lights during the circling approach. According to the record of the automatic aeronautical light switching system, and the testimony of the Gimhae tower duty chief in the public hearing, the runway, approach and circling guidance lights of runway 18R were on at the time of the accident.

The automatic light switching and recording systems, used to calculate lighting fees, were installed in the lighting control room. The lighting times are automatically calculated by the clock installed in the system computer. The investigation revealed that the clock had been running about 19 minutes “fast,” and the clock was reset correctly by an engineer about 20:30 on April 18, 2002.

![Figure 1-8 Circling Guidance Lights at Gimhae Airport](image)

1.9 Communications

From the time flight 129 entered the Incheon FIR on April 15, 2002, there were no records of communication problems during contacts with Incheon ACC, Gimhae approach control and Gimhae tower.

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57 Captain’s interview & public hearing.
58 Refer to Figure 1-8.
1.10 Aerodrome Information

1.10.1 Air Traffic Control Services for Gimhae International Airport

1.10.1.1 Gimhae Approach Control

Gimhae approach control was operated and managed by the Airforce, but the actual radar service was provided by a team comprised of both Airforce controllers and civilian controllers from the Busan Regional Aviation Administration.

At the time of the accident, the team on duty consisted of 6 controllers from the third shift and 2 daily controllers. The controller who handled the approach control of the accident flight was the Airforce duty chief. The assistant controller at the flight information position handled the flight information service. Both controllers were fully qualified for either approach control or flight information duties.

The ATC services provided to the accident flight by the controller at the approach control position began about 11:06, with the aircraft 15 miles northwest of KALDO on the route A-582, when Incheon ACC transferred control to approach control. The approach control services lasted until about 1.7 miles south of runway 36L threshold, when flight 129 began the circling approach to runway 18R, after the pilots had the runway in sight.

The approach controller stated that when the AMOS display began to show trends for tailwinds along the runway 36L, in preparation for a possible circling approach, he queried flight 129 on its approach category, and then reconfirmed the approach category after the runway was changed to 18R.

Upon receiving the report that flight 129 had the runway in sight at 1.7 miles from the end of runway 36L, the approach controller instructed the flight to fly the circling approach to runway 18R, and then transferred control to the tower. He stated that he verified the flight initiating the normal circling approach.

After the approach controller’s radio communication transfer to the tower, the tower asked for the flight to be transferred on the direct line, so the approach controller again instructed the flight to switch to the tower frequency. He saw the aircraft on the radar scope entering the normal downwind pattern, and asked the tower, “Does it seem go around?” having felt that the aircraft was flying on a longer pattern than normal. According to the controller’s testimony, thereafter, he heard from the tower controller that communication with the flight was lost, and as he heard the flight being called on the emergency frequency, he monitored intently the radar scope, but the target had disappeared.
1.10.1.2 Minimum Safe Altitude Warning System (MSAW)

The MSAW installed at Gimhae airport had been operational since January 15, 1991 concurrently with the Gimhae radar system, and was programmed only with a visual warning function.\textsuperscript{59}

The MSAW was programmed according to the standards described in the Airforce manual. The approach control area was divided into 2 NM square bins, for a total of 4,900 bins, where the minimum safe altitude of each bin was programmed with 700 ft above the highest obstacle. As shown on Figure 1-9, the minimum safe altitude of the airport’s northern bin where Mt. Shinuh\textsuperscript{60} is positioned was programmed to 2,800 ft in consideration of the height of that mountain (2,076 ft), and it was set to 1,000 ft for the west bin, and 4,700 ft for the east bin respectively.

The MSAW logic was designed such that the MSAW activates and generates a visual warning, alerting the controller with flashing letters “LA” on the ground speed portion of the target data block, anytime an aircraft is flying below the MSAW activation altitude within the bin programmed with the minimum safe altitude, or will be within the bin in 30 seconds or about 2 miles when approaching from outside the bin below the minimum safe altitude, based on a speed of 250 kt.

The minimum safe altitude was set at “0” ft in the area near the airport with takeoffs and landing traffic centered around the antenna, in order to inhibit frequent activation of nuisance warnings.

The MSAW activation bin north of the airport where Mt. Shinuh is located is very close (about 0.15 NM / 280 m) to the circling approach area for category D, thus the MSAW may be activated when an aircraft is flying on the base turn to runway 18R, below the altitude of 2,800 ft within the circling approach area for categories C or D.

Figure 1-9 illustrates possible MSAW activation areas\textsuperscript{61} along with circling approach area by the FAA and ICAO standards.

\textsuperscript{59} Note 2 to PANS-ATM 15.6.4 states, “When the level of an aircraft is detected or predicted to be less than the applicable minimum safe altitude, an acoustic and visual warning will be generated to the radar controller within whose jurisdiction area the aircraft is operating.”

\textsuperscript{60} A mountain adjacent to the north of Mt. Dotdae.

\textsuperscript{61} The areas where the predictive warning can be activated in accordance with flight distance by the aircraft heading and speed by means of MSAW predictive warning function (in the case of flight 129, the predictive warning was possible in front of about 1.4 NM, applying 170 kt of ground speed).
Figure 1-9 Possible MSAW Activation Areas and Circling Approach Area
1.10.1.3 Gimhae Tower

Aerodrome control services at Gimhae tower were provided by the Airforce. One air traffic controller from the Busan Regional Aviation Administration was assigned to the tower for coordination of civil aircraft control during daylight hours, based on a related mutual consent. This controller stated that at the time of the accident, he was not present in the tower control room because he was attending to other duties such as obtaining a signature on the duty log. He stated that he arrived in the control room 7 minutes after the accident occurred. Relevant ratings for aerodrome control services were not authorized to the controller.

At the time of the accident, the duty team consisted of 5 controllers from the second shift and 2 daily controllers, in accordance with the “Tower Duty Schedule for April.” Aerodrome control of flight 129 was handled by the primary and secondary local controllers, both of whom were duly qualified for aerodrome control.

Aerodrome control services provided to flight 129 by local controllers were from the commencement of the circling approach, after the pilots had the runway in sight, about 1.7 NM to the threshold of runway 36L, approaching by the ILS/DME RWY36L approach procedure, until the time of crash about 2.5 NM (about 4.6 km) from the threshold of runway 18R along the extended centerline.

In the attempt to contact flight 129, the primary local controller made two “radio checks.” as the aircraft entered the downwind leg for the circling approach. But as there was no response, he notified, by a direct line, the approach controller about the situation that flight 129 was not in contact, and asked the approach controller to transfer flight 129 to the tower frequency.

Thereafter, while the primary local controller was attempting to contact flight 129 on emergency frequency of 121.5 Mhz, the initial contact with flight 129 was established on the tower frequency of 118.1 Mhz by a calling of flight 129.

This initial contact between the tower and flight 129 was made slightly past the due west of the threshold of runway 18R, where the primary local controller requested, “Air China 129, report turning base,” and immediately thereafter, issued a landing clearance to flight 129. But mistakenly he issued the landing runway as “runway 36L” instead of “runway 18R.”

\[62\] Article 12 of the mutual consent on control tower operation between the Airforce Unit 5672, Busan Regional Aviation Administration, and Korea Airports Corporation Busan Branch Office.
The secondary local controller recognized this mistaken clearance and immediately reissued the landing clearance to runway 18R, to which flight 129 replied. The secondary local controller then asked, “Can you landing?” when flight 129 went out of sight, to which the second officer replied, “Roger, QFE three thousand, Air China 129.” To clarify the pilot’s intent, the secondary local controller asked, “Air China 129, say again your intention,” but there was no response from flight 129.

When flight 129 remained out of sight without a reply, the secondary local controller asked, “Say position now,” to confirm the aircraft’s position, to which the second officer replied, “Air China 129, on base, turning on final, and QFE three thousand, Air China 129.” The CVR recording during this time showed exchanges between the captain and the first officer as, “Have the runway in sight?” “No, I can not see out,” “Must go around,” “Pull up! Pull up!” Shortly thereafter, the aircraft crashed, but the secondary local controller was not aware of this crash, and reissued landing clearances with queries on the flight’s position 5 times.

Gimhae tower is located near the eastern boundary of the airport, about 1,276 m from the runway 36L/18R centerline, and about 2,129 m from the center of runway 36L threshold, about 1,967 m from the center of runway 18R threshold, respectively.

The console at the tower control room faces west toward the runway, and the local control position is situated at the center of the console, which is the position that the visual monitoring of the airspace under the local controller’s control, including both ends of the runway and the traffic pattern to the west, is possible, in weather conditions with no impediment to the visibility.

According to the statement of the secondary local controller, after being notified by approach control that flight 129 was the B767-200 type, the secondary local controller confirmed the aircraft’s approach category as “Charlie” and was prepared for flight 129. And he stated that he had the aircraft in sight on the western downwind about 11:19.

1.10.1.4 Tower BRITE Equipment

BRITE is a radar scope designed to be used also under bright conditions. At Gimhae tower, this equipment was installed concurrently with the ASR and operated, and the BRITE scope was installed at the center of the tower controller console.

63 Type: TP 1219A.
According to the manufacturer’s operating and maintenance instruction manual, the BRITE Display System (BDS) receives the following signals.

- MTI/Normal imaging and SSR decoded imaging from the ASR/SSR
- ACP, ARP and TRIGGER from the ASR/SSR
- Digital data (Target and Map) from the DPS

Based on the total loss measurement records, measured on July 28, 2001, of the optical fiber transmission cable from approach control (RAPCON) to tower, signals and digital data to the BRITE scope were being received with almost no loss.

The BRITE was installed on November 29, 1990, concurrently with the radar system, and was certified for the completion of installation by the Seoul Regional Aviation Administration (Seoul Regional Aviation Bureau at that time) on December 24, 1990. An operations instructor for the radar and BRITE stated that he conducted the training for BRITE operators on its use, and that BRITE begun its operation on January, 15 1991. The monthly and weekly inspection records for April, 2002 showed normal operation.

Individual statements by the controllers who provided aerodrome control services at the time of the accident and statements at the public hearing verified that the primary and secondary local controllers used the BRITE to observe flight 129 approaching about 20 NM northwest of the airport while under approach control. But thereafter, they did not use the BRITE in providing the control services to the aircraft through the circling maneuver until the estimated time of the accident. They, then, in the course of searching for the aircraft after crash, noted that the aircraft had disappeared on the BRITE.

The BRITE range is usually set at 20 NM, but the range scale could be adjusted as necessary from 6 NM to 60 NM.

The procedures applicable to the use of the BRITE at Gimhae tower were in accordance with the Standard Air Traffic Control Procedures (Sections 3-1-9 & 3-10-7), which both of civil and military air traffic control facilities apply to the control of all aircraft alike, and the “Gimhae Base Local Procedures” (Chapter 9, Section 4, Para1) applicable to aircraft on VFR arrival.

Article 75 of the Korean Aviation Act and its sub regulations describe the installation and technical standards for radar systems, however, the standards for the BRITE are not prescribed.
1.10.2 The Circling Approach Procedure at Gimhae International Airport

The circling approach procedure\textsuperscript{64} which flight 129 used was the “ILS/DME runway 36L, circle to runway 18R,” where the pilot would visually identify the runway at or above the 700 ft MDA on the straight in approach to runway 36L, and then enter the airport traffic pattern to the west by a visual flight maneuver to runway 18R.

The ILS/DME 36L instrument approach procedure for Gimhae airport and the circling approach procedure to runway 18R were published in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) by the Civil Aviation Bureau of the Korea MOCT, as well as in the Jeppesen Airway Manual.

The circling approach area for runway 18R at Gimhae airport is established by the FAA TERPS criteria. Approach category “C” is to be within a radius of 1.7 NM from the center of the threshold of runway 18R, and category “D” within a radius of 2.3 NM. The aircraft crashed at a point of about 2.48 NM (4.6 km) from the threshold of runway 18R, which was outside the circling approach area for category “D.”

ICAO, Aircraft Operations Procedure (PANS-OPS, Doc 8168-OPS/611), Vol I, Para 4.6 & 4.7 stipulate, 「A circling approach is a visual flight maneuver…After initial visual contact, the basic assumption is that the runway environment (i.e. the runway threshold or approach lighting aids or other markings identifiable with the runway) should be kept in sight while at MDA/H for circling. If visual reference is lost while circling to land from an instrument approach, the missed approach specified for that particular procedure must be followed…」

Articles 30 and 77 of the CAAC Order No. 98 stipulate, 「A circling approach is a visual flight maneuver after completion of an instrument approach. The pilot must continuously keep the runway threshold or approach lighting aids or other markings identifiable with the runway in sight, and maintain the flight within the visual circling approach area…If visual reference is lost, or successful landing is not attainable, the pilot must execute the missed approach, and attempt to land again…」

\textsuperscript{64} Established by the Busan Regional Aviation Administration, according to MOCT instruction directory "Air Traffic Control Regulation," and received approval from Gimhae Airforce Unit, operator of Gimhae Base.
The Gimhae Base Local Procedures, Chapter 10, Section 6, Para 3 states that the pilot is to proceed from an instrument approach to runway 36L to the western traffic pattern for the circling approach after making visual contact with the runway, and when the ceiling or the visibility will not allow maintaining the normal visual traffic pattern altitude, the pilot may descend to the circling MDA after receiving a clearance from the control tower. It also states that, if visual contact with the runway is lost during the circling approach, the immediate missed approach must be executed.

Gimhae Base Local Procedures also prescribe that the maximum tailwind for landing at the airport is less than 10 kt. At Gimhae airport, southwestern winds prevail during spring and summer, and the probability to conduct the circling approach to runway 18R was frequently used. In the operation records of the morning of the accident day, there were cases that aircraft on circling approaches conducted missed approaches.

1.10.3 Aeronautical Information

1.10.3.1 Aeronautical Information Publication

The approach procedure for ILS/DME RWY 36L, as shown on Figure 1-10, was depicted on the plan view of instrument approach chart of page RKPK AD 2-20 under Chapter 3 (Aerodrome) of the ROK AIP. It also marked three obstacles in the vicinity of the accident site, with the circling minima for each approach category on the lower part of the page.

Annex 15 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation specifies that the differences in the establishment criteria for flight procedures from those prescribed by ICAO are to be included under GEN 1.7 and ENR 1.5.1 of the AIP. As of April 15, 2002, the differences were not described in the ROK AIP.

There was no record of distribution of the ROK AIP to Air China during the period of one year prior to April 15, 2002.
Figure 1-10 ROK AIP Instrument Approach Chart Valid as of April 15, 2002

65 PANS-OPS (ICAO Doc 8168-OPS/611).
1.10.3.2 Approach Chart on Gimhae International Airport

The circling approach procedure of Gimhae airport was designed according to the FAA TERPS criteria, which could be determined by references to the introduction part, and lower portion exhibiting the speeds for each approach category of the instrument approach chart, in the Jeppesen Airway Manual, as shown on Figures 1-11A and 1-11B.

The instrument approach chart used by the flight crew of flight 129 as shown on Figure 1-11A (ILS DME Rwy 36L, effective SEP 25, 01), displayed the plan view with contour lines and different shades of color to show heights of the terrain, and obstacle symbols marked with the elevations. The enlarged depiction of the missed approach holding precluded showing the obstacles to the north of the circling approach area. The Jeppesen chart of the Busan, Korea ILS DME or LOC DME Rwy 36L published Oct 25, 2002 was revised according to the amended ROK AIP. Jeppesen took the opportunity in this revision to improve the plan view depiction by changing the plan view scale to include a larger area, including the terrain and obstacles in the vicinity of the accident as shown on Figure 1-11B.

The Jeppesen manual, page 19-1 of Gimhae airport, a visual topographic chart as shown on Figure 1-12, did contain detailed obstacle and topographic information.

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66 Based on Air China Operations Specifications A009, Article 2.
Figure 1-11A  RWY 36L Instrument Approach Chart (Issued date: SEP 25, 01)
Figure 1-11B  RWY 36L Instrument Approach Chart (Issued date: OCT 25, 02)
Depictions of the visual maneuvering area (circling approach) boundary are in the Air Traffic Procedures section of the Jeppesen Airway Manual.

1.10.3.3 Information on Aircraft Approach Category

Aircraft approach category is used to determine the radius of turn required for the circling maneuver and minimum descent altitude for that area, as described in 1.17.3.1, Air China Procedure for Application of Weather Minima.

There is no international standard (procedures or regulations) requiring a formal notification to air traffic control facilities of the approach category and the circling approach minima for wide-body aircraft.\(^{67}\) Therefore it is up to approach controllers to clear each aircraft for the approach in consideration of its category, and weather conditions.

At Gimhae airport, the ATC authority\(^{68}\) was notified of the approach category of each type of aircraft operating to Gimhae airport by air carriers through a formal report, but the data were incomplete and unreliable for controllers’ use, and no airline had provided the circling approach minima of wide-body aircraft. Therefore, the controllers

\(^{67}\) Wide-body aircraft (B747, DC10, L1011, A300/310, B767, IL86) as defined in ICAO Doc 9365-AN/910 “Manual of All Weather Operations.”

\(^{68}\) ROKAF (Gimhae Base) and Busan Regional Aviation Administration.
relied on the method of directly asking the pilot when the information was not provided in advance, as the controllers would not be able to know this information aforetime.

1.10.4 Weather Observation

According to a mutual agreement signed between the Airforce Gimhae Base Weather Office and Gimhae Civilian Weather Station of the Meteorological Department, the Airforce is responsible to provide the weather observation and weather forecast service for the Gimhae airport, for which the weather service standards of the Airforce is applied. The duty of Gimhae Civilian Weather Station is to edit the weather information provided by the Airforce to a civil meteorological notification format, and to issue the information to civil airlines.

1.10.4.1 Visual Weather Observation Site

The prevailing visibility and sky conditions (cloud distribution and height) were determined through the visual observation by a certified observer using the long and short range visibility charts. The primary observation site was located on the rooftop of the Airforce Weather Office building.

Views toward the lower skies north and north-northwest of the airport were blocked by the hangar located north of the observation site, including the direction of the final approach course to runway 18R and accident site.

An observer from the Gimhae Airforce Weather Office said that observations of this part of the sky had to be made from the ramp located west in front of the weather office, at a distance which required about five minutes round trip on foot between the weather office and ramp observation site.

There was an aircraft shelter, 5 m high to the north of the ramp observation site, partially blocking the view to the north. But data from the Airforce weather office showed that observations for Mt. Dotdae area from the ramp observation site were possible for heights more than about 225 ft above the elevation of Gimhae airport.

1.10.4.2 Weather Observation Equipment

The weather observation equipment located along the west runway (18R/36L) at Gimhae airport was installed according to ICAO standards, and consisted of an

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69 Installed in November 1970.
70 Height 3.4 m above the ground level.
71 Height 26 m above the ground level, constructed in Dec 1990.
72 Forward scatter method, installed by Korea MOCT Busan Regional Aviation Administration.
73 Annex 3 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Para 4.1.8 and 4.7.5.
anemoscope, an anemometer, a variometer, and a RVR measuring equipment, and had been operational since March 23, 2000, except for the RVR, which had stopped working (issued by NOTAM) since July 12, 2001, when it became unreliable. At the time of the accident, it was not operational.

The weather observation equipment located along the east runway (18L/36R) consisted of an anemoscope, an anemometer, a variometer, a RVR measuring equipment, and instruments for measuring temperature and dew point, cloud height, and a rain gauge. At the time of the accident, all equipment recorded normal operation.

1.11 Flight Recorders

1.11.1 Flight Data Recorder

The aircraft was equipped with a Solid-State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR), manufactured by AlliedSignal (presently, Honeywell). On the day of the accident, the FDR was recovered about 17:00 at the accident site. The external casing and internal circuit board were severely damaged by impact forces and fire, however, the flight data memory was properly preserved.

The circuit connector cable was burnt out. Therefore, the FDR was taken to Honeywell in Seattle, and all the recorded data were retrieved on April 22, 2002, after repairing the connectors.

The flight data memory contained the last 53 hours (18,800,732 bytes) of flight data before the accident. It recorded 275 parameters of the data, which were decoded by the KAIB for analysis in its analysis laboratory.

The KAIB used the Boeing Company’s specifications, as provided by Air China, in order to decode the data recorded on the FDR installed in the flight 129 aircraft. And for the investigation of this accident, major parameter values during the last 900 seconds (15 minutes) were used

The FDR recorded the data up to 11:21:21, and the recordings on the tower recorder were up to 11:21:17, which indicates that there was a 4 second difference. The KAIB determined that the crash time was 11:21:17, on the basis of the recordings on the CVR and tower recorder.

74 Model No: 980-4700-003, serial No: 3973.
75 First-written, first-removed method, 64 words per second.
76 Technical document No: D283T055-20.
77 Frame No: 184400 190640.
1.11.2 Cockpit Voice Recorder

The flight 129 aircraft was equipped with the CVR\textsuperscript{78} of A100 type, manufactured by Fairchild. The data retrieval circuit board was damaged, requiring the extraction of the recorded data by first removing the tape to be placed in another CVR of the same A100 type. The result of the verification made in the course of replaying the tape in comparison with the manufacturer’s manual\textsuperscript{79} revealed that the recordings were made with the CVR connector channel pins mis-matched. Thus, there were some difficulties to identify the voices of each pilot on the CVR, due to the cross wiring of the channels. The following explains the actual connections to the CVR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel No</th>
<th>Standard position from the Manufacturer's Manual</th>
<th>Actual Position Connected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Observer Seat</td>
<td>Cockpit (Area microphone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Copilot Seat</td>
<td>Observer Seat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pilot Seat</td>
<td>Copilot Seat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cockpit (Area microphone)</td>
<td>Pilot Seat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.11.2.1 CVR Transcript

The CVR transcript was prepared at the KAIB analysis laboratory, by joint efforts of the KAIB, CAAC, and NTSB.

At the public hearing held in Busan from November 25 to 26, 2002, some differences were noted between the ATC recordings of communications and CVR transcript, so the parties from the three countries agreed to hold a meeting at the NTSB to resolve these differences.

From February 25 to 28, 2003, the three parties had a meeting to consider the proposal to amend the transcript at the NTSB. As the result of the meeting, the three parties signed the minutes which specified the partially amended transcription would be appended to the final report, and the NTSB had no objection to the amended transcript.

Thereafter, a precision analysis for the verification of the CVR transcript was conducted by the KAIB investigators at the KAIB analysis laboratory, using a digital sound analysis program,\textsuperscript{80} and the result of which revealed that some timing and conversations in the transcript needed to be amended, thus the following changes were made.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{78} Model No: 93-A100-80, serial No: 60987.
\textsuperscript{79} CMM (Component Maintenance Manual).
\textsuperscript{80} A computer program which can determine precise timing (Cool Edit Pro).
\textsuperscript{81} The amended CVR transcript was delivered to the China investigation team during a CVR related technical meeting between the KAIB and CAAC held from Oct 30 to 31,2003.
The specific time and contents of the CVR transcript amended by the KAIB are appended as Appendix 1, and the amended transcript signed by three parties at the NTSB laboratory is contained in Appendix 1-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Before Change</th>
<th>After Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11:10:12 11:10:07</td>
<td>OBS (#2)</td>
<td>Turn left heading one eight zero Air China 129, descend to four thousand feet</td>
<td>Turn left heading one eight zero Air China 129, descend to four thousand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:16:35 11:16:33</td>
<td>Approach controller</td>
<td>... ILS DME runway three six left and circle to runway one eight right ...</td>
<td>... ILS DME runway three six left then circle to runway one eight right ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:16:43 11:16:42</td>
<td>OBS (#2)</td>
<td>... Cleared visual one eight right ...</td>
<td>... Cleared (unintelligible) approach one eight right ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:18:48 11:18:44</td>
<td>Approach controller</td>
<td>... Circle to ...</td>
<td>... Circle west</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:20:26<del>11:20:25</del></td>
<td>Tower controller</td>
<td>... Not in sight correction runway one eight right</td>
<td>... Not in sight cleared to land runway one eight right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:20:39 11:20:35</td>
<td>OBS (#2)</td>
<td>Circle approach one eight right and QNH three thousand Air China 129</td>
<td>Circle, (unintelligible) one eight right and QNH three thousand, Air China 129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

1.12.1 General Description

The investigation results on ground markings and the wreckage distribution pattern\(^2\) showed the initial contact with terrain of an elevation of 204m, where the right wing struck trees. As shown on the Figures 1-13 and 1-14, the wreckage was scattered in an area about 200 m long and 100 m wide.

About 30 m from the initial impact with trees, there was a hole about 3 m wide, 3.5 m long and 2 m deep. There was evidence of severe ground impacts from this point on with scattered parts from the flaps, landing gear, and engine inlets.

After the aircraft’s impact with the ground, the right wing, empennage, left wing including parts of the fuselage, and two engines were separated respectively. The forward fuselage including the cockpit was totally consumed by a post impact ground fire.

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\(^2\) Refer to Appendix 3, Wreckage Distribution Chart of Air China Flight 129 Aircraft.
Figure 1-13 Photograph of the Accident Site

Figure 1-14 Photograph of the Accident Site
1.12.2 Fuselage

The fuselage was found destroyed in the direction of flight, about 160 m from the point of the initial impact, and the aluminum and other metals of the fuselage were melted by the post impact fire.

The front part of the fuselage (section 41), including the flight deck, was completely destroyed from the impact forces and fire, making it difficult to recognize the shape including the flight instruments and switches.

The center fuselage parts (sections 43 & 45) and the aft cargo compartment (section 46) were burnt completely to the point of making the shape unrecognizable.

1.12.3 Empennage

The empennage (section 48) containing the APU, vertical and horizontal stabilizers was found separated from the fuselage by the impact forces, approximately 25 m northeast from the top of Mt. Dotdae, and there was no fire in this area.

Visual examinations of the ribs, skin and spar at the attachment points showed no evidence of corrosion or fatigue.

The left elevator was found with its trailing edge up and touching the ground, and the right elevator was broken by the ground impact forces.

Both elevator tips were sheared off, with the elevators lying flat on the ground supporting the tail section upright.
The horizontal stabilizer’s jackscrew extension was measured to be 14 inches between the lower gimbal assembly and the lower stop.

![Diagram of the remaining portion of the wreckage (inner area of red line)](image)

Figure 1-16 The Remaining Portion of the Wreckage (inner area of red line)

The front surface of the left horizontal stabilizer (as shown on Figure 1-16) was damaged and the tip was sheared off by an impact with the trees. While there were signs of the impact with trees on the front inner part of the left stabilizer, there was no sign of the preimpact skin corrosion or damage.

Front parts of the right horizontal stabilizer were found in a good shape, but the outer tip of horizontal stabilizer was partially sheared off from the impact with trees and the ground.

The left and right elevators were damaged by the ground impact, and there was no external damage to the actuators.

The APU was normally attached on the empennage section with no signs of fire.

1.12.4 Wings

The right wing was found separated from the fuselage and inverted by the ground impact, and the left wing was not separated from the burnt fuselage.
There was no fuel found in the right wing fuel tank, and the left wing fuel tank had remaining fuel of approximately 300 lb. There were no signs of fire.

The ailerons of both wings were severely damaged by the impact forces, and the spoilers were found in the closed position, damaged on their surfaces

1.12.5 Engines

The right engine impacted the ground in the direction of flight, about 30 m from the point of the initial aircraft impact with the trees, and was lying down 70 m further from that position in the same direction.

The left engine was found about 200 m forward in the direction of flight from the point of the initial impact.

Both engine inlets contained quantities of dirt and wood. Externally, there were no distortions to the high-pressure compressors, the combustion chambers and the turbines. Borescope examinations of both engines revealed normal conditions. The first stage blades of the low-pressure compressors (LPC) were all bent in the same direction with severe rotational damage.

1.12.6 Aircraft Systems

All of the aircraft systems were operated normally, and the examination on the wreckage revealed no evidence of preimpact damage or malfunction.

Flight deck instruments and controls for the primary and secondary flight control surfaces were damaged by the postcrash fire. Some parts of the flight control surfaces and actuators were found, but none showed evidence of preimpact damage or malfunction.

The flight control computers (FCC) were found with the electronic rack in the front part of the fuselage where the flight deck wreckage was located. The casing and connection ports were severely damaged by the postimpact fire.

83 Ailerons, elevators, rudders.
84 Flaps, spoilers, slats, speed brakes, stabilizers, etc.
85 P/N (Package No): 622-4591-512 (SCD S241T100-109), S/N (Serial No): 3338, 3892, 5656.
1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

1.13.1 Toxicological Analysis of the Captain

Blood samples were taken from the captain on the day of the accident at Gimhae St. Mary’s Hospital, where he was hospitalized. The hospital’s laboratory performed tests for blood type, biochemistry, hematography, serum immunology, and urinalysis. The liver function test had no special remarks, and there was no evidence of alcohol intake.

Drug testing for methamphetamine and MDMA was referred to a related agency on April 28, 2002, which used gas chromatography/mass spectrography to test hair samples. The results were negative.

1.13.2 Fatal Injuries

Of the 129 fatalities, 6 were identified through external means of recognition, and 121 of the remaining 123 occupants were identified through DNA testing by a relevant agency from a total of 186 gene samples collected, while 2 victims were not identified.

The direct cause of death for the 2 occupants who died after arriving at the hospital, was respectively recorded on the death certificates as cardiopulmonary arrest, and suspected heart failure & suspected kidney failure. The direct cause of death for the 4 passengers, who were identified by fingerprints, was respectively recorded on the death certificates as burns over the entire body, brain concussion and cranial fracture, with 2 cases of cardiopulmonary arrest.

Autopsies were performed on the remains of 123 victims for the purposes of identification. According to the opinions on the cause of death of medical specialists who

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86 3,4-MethylenedioxyMethamphetamine.
87 Died in the hospital subsequent to identification: 2, identified through fingerprint: 4.
88 Intervening antecedent cause of death: heart & breathing failure, antecedent cause of death: traumatic hemothorax.
89 Antecedent cause of death: 45% burn by fire.
90 Intervening antecedent cause of death: laryngeal contusion.
91 Intervening antecedent and antecedent causes of death: 1 multiple damage, 1 unknown damage.
conducted the autopsies, soot was found in 16 of the victims’ tracheas, suggesting that they may have been alive at the time of the fire. The medical specialists also reported that it was difficult to make conclusive judgment, because of severe burn injuries, whether the deaths of the victims were caused by impact trauma, fire, or a combination of both.

1.14 Fire

The on-scene investigation revealed no signs of fire on board the aircraft prior to crash. After the ground impact, the right wing and the empennage were separated from the fuselage. These items had no fire damage. The first sign of fire damage was found approximately 150 m from the initial point of impact.

At the accident site, it was raining with heavy fog. Fire fighters, soldiers and police struggled to apply dry chemical and halon fire extinguishing agents, and dirt to put out the fire, but the interiors of the cabin and flight deck were burnt completely, as shown on Figure 1-17. The fuselage fire, accompanied with exploding sounds and heavy smoke, was extinguished about 15:00 on the day of the accident.

Figure 1-17 Photograph of the Aircraft on Fire after Crash
1.15 Survival Aspects

1.15.1 General

The flight deck was fitted with seats for the captain, first officer, and two observers. In the passenger compartment, there were a total of 7 flight attendant jump seats, with 3 seats located in the front of the cabin facing the back of the aircraft, and 2 seats each located respectively in the middle and aft cabin facing forward.

There were a total of 214 passenger seats in the cabin, comprised separately of 18 for business class and 196 for economy class.

There was a total of 166 occupants on board, composed of 11 crewmembers and 155 passengers, including 5 children between the ages of 3 and 9. On the day of the accident, 39 occupants, including the captain, survived with serious injuries. But the next day, 1 passenger died, and on May 2, 2002, 17 days after the accident, another passenger died, bringing the total number of survivors to 37, the captain, 2 flight attendants, and 34 passengers.

Figure 1-18 shows that 8 of the 34 surviving passengers were seated in the economy class between rows 7 and 14, and out of these, 5 were seated on the left side and 3 in the middle seats. The seating for the other 26 surviving passengers was distributed from rows 19 to 33 in the back of the economy class, of which 3 were on the left side, 18 in the middle, and 5 on the right side.

The 2 surviving flight attendants were seated in jump seats located on the left (L2) and right (R2) in the back of the aircraft.

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92 Refer to 1.13 Medical and Pathological Information for the cause of death for the 2 passengers who died from crash wounds in the hospital.

93 * The seating chart was made using the passenger manifest and statements of survivors, so there was no way to determine the actual seat locations of the passengers.

* 11 of the dead passengers who changed seats during the flight were not depicted.
Figure 1-18 Seating Chart Showing the Location of the Occupants

* Seating chart is based upon assigned seating as listed on passenger manifest and survivors' statements.

* 11 non-survivors' seats are not located due to charging seats in-flight.
1.15.2 Survivor Statements

Investigators from the KAIB and NTSB interviewed all 37 survivors including the flight attendants, and questionnaires were sent to 34 passengers, of which 9 responded.

The interviews and responses to the questionnaire revealed that the accident occurred suddenly, with loud noise and violent shaking of the aircraft at the point of impact. All items inside the aircraft fell down, seats were thrust forward, and all lights went out, making it dark inside the aircraft, except for light streaming in through the broken fuselage. There was fire erupting throughout the cabin, filling it with heavy smoke and making it difficult to breathe, and people were screaming. Most of the passengers briefly lost consciousness during impact, with feet and legs of some passengers stuck under the seats in front of them.

A flight attendant who was seated at the aft right position (R2) stated that his body was crushed underneath something. He reached to open the door but could not find the handle. He crawled out of the cabin, giving assistance to a female passenger. He then shouted, “Go, Go” to the passengers to move far away from the aircraft, and was helped by a passenger to move away from the aircraft, due to sharp pains in his back and chest. The captain and the flight attendant from the aft left jumpseat position (L2) could not remember their process of escape from the aircraft after crash.

Most of the survivors escaped by walking or crawling through the gaps in the broken fuselage. Most of them stated that they were injured\(^\text{94}\) at the time of accident, and that they heard sounds of explosions large and small after escaping. Some passengers stated that they saw pillars of fire and smoke shooting up high from the exploding aircraft.

Some of the Korean passengers stated that they did not understand any of the in-flight announcements, including the predeparture passenger safety briefing, because they were made only in Chinese and English.

\(^\text{94}\) Hospital records (clinical assumptions) showed that most of the survivors suffered multiple lacerations and multiple contusions, brain contusion, brain concussion, facial contusion and laceration, lumbar sprain, lumbar fracture, and burns, etc.
1.15.3 Emergency Response

1.15.3.1 Notification of the Accident

Radio communication between the tower local controller and flight 129 was lost about 11:21:17. Although the crash site was located about 4.6 km from the threshold of runway 18R along the extended centerline, which was only about one minute in terms of flying distance, the controller was not able to confirm the crash due to an impediment to visibility.

The local controller tried to communicate with flight 129, 5 times over approximately two minutes to confirm the position of the aircraft when the aircraft remained out of view, calling 10 times on the emergency frequency, but there was no response.

Records of the tower hotline showed that the secondary local controller notified the lost communication situation individually, first to the Gimhae Airforce Base Operations about 11:25, and then to the Gimhae airport Flight Information Office about 11:27. Then the coordination controller confirmed whether there were any reports of crash with the MCRC (Master Control Reporting Center), Gyeongnam fire department and Gimhae fire station. About 11:41, the secondary local controller confirmed through the Incheon ACC whether there was any report of the missing flight.

Records indicated that Gimhae Airforce operation department received notification from the tower about 11:25 of lost communication with the flight, they then notified agencies outside the airport (Gyeongnam and Busan fire departments, etc.) about 11:40.

Crash-phone records showed that the tower secondary local controller, who was the duty chief at the time of the accident, made initial notification of the crash behind Mt. Shinuh, using the crash-phone and bell about 11:45, to relevant agencies of Gimhae Base, in accordance with the emergency notification system set up in the Gimhae Base Local Procedures.

Testimony by the air traffic control manager in air traffic control division of Busan Regional Aviation Administration showed that he received the information about lost radio communication with flight 129 from Gimhae approach control about 11:23, and received information about the crash from the Flight Information Station about 11:45. He then notified Busan City’s Central Emergency Management Office in accordance with the disaster management plan of the Busan Regional Aviation Administration.
1.15.3.2 Mobilization

About 11:22 on the day of the accident, the Gimhae fire station received a report from an apartment management staff living near the scene of the accident that he heard a loud explosion from the direction of Mt. Shinuh while a plane was flying by at low altitude. Immediately after receiving the call, the Gimhae fire station dispatched 8 persons on the first rescue team to the accident scene, and about 11:30, the second rescue team of about 40 members including the Gimhae fire chief was dispatched to the accident scene. About 11:31, the fire station received calls about an aircraft crash from two passengers using the mobile phone.

About 11:43, the rescue captain from the first team requested helicopter rescue support, but helicopters could not be mobilized due to poor weather conditions. The rescue teams from the Gimhae fire station arrived on the accident scene from about 11:58 on, and began the search and rescue work. The total number of rescue workers and firefighters mobilized from Gimhae and adjacent fire stations was 1,009 on the day of the accident.

The Gimhae police station received the report of crash about 11:43 from the “119” situation room of the Gimhae fire station. The rescue teams from the Gimhae police station arrived on the accident scene from about 12:12 on, and carried out the rescue work. The combat police unit #2502 received a mobilization instruction from the Gyeongnam Provincial Police Agency, and arrived on the accident scene from about 12:25, and began the rescue work. The total number of the police mobilized from the Gimhae police station, combat police unit #2502, surrounding area police stations and standing police units was approximately 2,000 on the day of the accident.

The Army’s 39th and 53rd infantry divisions and the 1116th field engineer regiment learned of the accident through a television (YTN) broadcast between about 11:40 and 11:50. The Army soldiers arrived on the scene of the accident from about 12:10 on, and carried out the rescue work. The total number of soldiers from the Army’s 39th and 53rd infantry divisions and the 1116th field engineer regiment was 1,071 on the day of the accident.

The Navy’s third fleet command learned of the accident through the YTN broadcast about 12:00, arrived on the accident scene from about 14:00 on, and carried out the rescue work. The total number mobilized from the Navy’s third fleet command was 226 on the day of the accident.

The fifth tactical airlift wing of the Airforce was notified of the accident by Gimhae control tower, arrived on the accident scene from about 12:30 on, and carried out the rescue work. The total number of airmen mobilized from the fifth tactical airlift wing of the Airforce was 213.
1.15.3.3 Rescue Operations

When the rescue team from the Gimhae fire station arrived on the accident site through a trail behind Dongwon apartment located in Ginae-Dong, Gimhae, the fuselage was engulfed in flames, and there were continual explosions from the front of the fuselage, with pillars of fire rising. It was raining at the accident site, with the visibility of about 10 m due to dense fog. They heard survivors’ screaming for help from a distance, but they were not able to see them because the hill was thickly wooded, so they searched for survivors by clearing the forest.

The fire brigade, police, and military jointly carried out the rescue operations. First aid for the injured and the rescue operations for survivors were completed about 13:21. The on-scene commander stated that there were three main trails to the accident site, but the paths were narrow and slippery due to rain, and it took about 20 to 30 min to climb, and about 30 min to come down the hill for transporting the injured.

About 12:30, three emergency field medical units were set up, since no ambulance could have access to the accident site which was near the summit of Mt. Dotdae. The injured were given simple first aid by the rescue team and medical staff at the accident site, and then were transported down to the emergency medical units.

The emergency field medical units divided the injured according to the seriousness of the injuries, and assigned the patients to nearby hospitals using ambulances. There were 17 urgent cases and 22 emergency cases.

Records from the 13 hospitals in Gimhae and Busan, where the survivors were treated, showed arrival times between 12:00 and 14:45. 6 survivors arrived between 12:00 and 13:00, 17 survivors arrived between 13:00 and 14:00, 15 survivors arrived between 14:00 and 14:30, and 1 survivor arrived at 14:45.

About 14:40, a command post was set up at a location approximately 1km from the accident site, and a communication network was operated thereafter. Starting on the day of the accident, joint conferences, attended by the fire brigade, police and military, were held as necessary at the accident site, and the search and rescue effort for the lost continued until 17:00 on May 13, 2002.

95 The fire chief of Gimhae fire station.
96 1. Jine-Dong Dongwon Apt, 2. To Jine-Dong Hyundai Maintenance, 3. To Daedong Myun Suan Li.
97 In front of Jine-Dong Dongwon Apt No.110 (about 0.9 km to the site).
   Next to the Command Post near Jine-Dong Dongwon Apt (about 1 km to the site).
   In front of Jine-Dong Hyundai Maintenance Factory (about 1.2 km to the site).
98 May differ from the actual time, since arrival time includes time expended for patient identification.
99 Near Jine-Dong Dongwon Apartment.
1.16 Tests and Research

1.16.1 CAB Demonstration

On October 2 and 3, 2002, simulations of the approach to Gimhae airport flown by flight 129 on the day of the accident were made at the Integrated Aircraft System Laboratory of the Boeing Company, located in Seattle, USA, using the B757/767 Engineering Cab,\(^{100}\) with the demonstrations carried out jointly by a total of 14 investigators\(^ {101}\) from the KAIB, NTSB, FAA and Boeing.

During the simulator demonstrations, the following types of evaluations were conducted:

- Backdrive Simulator Cab (no pilot in the loop) of the circle to land maneuver (starting time 6,100 seconds\(^ {102}\));
- Backdrive with pilot interrupt (the pilot taking control at his declaration) to hand fly the maneuver and demonstrate the pilot workload.
- A circle to land maneuver flown manually, adjusting heading and timing for the wind conditions from the initial start point (time 6.100 seconds) ending with touchdown on runway 18R.
- Starting the base turn (starting time 6,235 seconds\(^ {103}\)) and using the pilot interrupt function, initiated go around and terrain avoidance maneuver, 6, 4 and 2 seconds prior to impact.

The three tracks plotted on Figure 1-19 began from the same starting point, where:

1. manual circling approach maneuvering track with wind corrected heading and 20 seconds time check; 2. the backdrive cab track; and 3. the FDR track are shown.

(Note: The runway position is the same for all 3 tracks.)

\(^ {100}\) B757/767 Engineering Cab: A simulator equipment to test B757/767 aircraft systems.

\(^ {101}\) The Chinese party did not intend to participate, thus the demonstrations were not attended by the Chinese party.

\(^ {102}\) The time from the FDR data when the circling approach began, based on JT9D-7R4E engines.

\(^ {103}\) The time from the FDR data when the base turn began, based on JT9D-7R4E engines.
The go around maneuvers were flown by advancing the throttles to the forward stop, transitioning flaps from 30 to 20, and pitching the aircraft to 15° nose up, while maintaining the turn to the airport.

(Note: For the 6 seconds initiation of a go around, the throttles were advanced by the autothrottle TOGA function only.)

Terrain avoidance maneuvers were flown by advancing the throttles to the forward stop, pitching to 20° nose up while maintaining the turn to the airport. The backdrive for these maneuvers started at time 6,235 seconds which was the starting time of the base turn, with the pilot interrupt, flying manually, occurring ① 6, ② 4 and ③ 2 seconds prior to the approximate time of impact. Figures 1-20 and 1-21 show the climb performance data, including climb margins, for the go around and terrain avoidance maneuvers respectively. The relative mountain peak is shown graphically.

104 Takeoff and Go around.
Both go around and terrain avoidance maneuvers showed the aircraft clearing the mountain when either maneuver was performed 6 seconds prior to impact.

Figure 1-20 Climb Performance Data, Missed Approach Maneuver
1.16.2 Flight Management Computer

The flight management computer\textsuperscript{105} of the flight 129 aircraft was removed and taken to the manufacturer, Honeywell\textsuperscript{106} on July 25, 2002, in order to confirm whether or not there was any fault with the computer by extracting the data from the non-volatile memory (NVM).

\textsuperscript{105} P/N (Part No): 4052500-927, S/N (Serial No): 87090949.

\textsuperscript{106} Located in Seattle, WA. USA.
The examination revealed that all the data were lost because of a severe fire and water damage to 5 NVM chips and DC battery located in the IC panel (A-13 card), therefore, analysis on the NVM could not be conducted.

1.16.3 Ground Proximity Warning Computer (GPWC)

The flight 129 aircraft was equipped with the MK-III GPWC, which was manufactured by Honeywell, in Seattle, USA.

Detailed examination on the performance assessment of the GPWC was conducted by the relevant specialists and KAIB investigator at the manufacturer, Honeywell, on July 22 ~ 24, 2002, after the accident.

The examination results revealed that the aircraft was maintaining level flight at an altitude of about 700 ft with the landing gear and flaps extended, approaching Mt. Dotdae of about 230 m (755 ft), at a ground speed of about 133 kt, which was outside the MK-III GPWC’s warning envelope. Therefore, it was verified to be normal that a warning was not activated at the time of the accident.

1.16.4 Electronic Engine Controller (EEC)

Non-volatile memories (NVM) of the two EECs installed in the engines were analyzed at the manufacturer, Hamilton Sundstrand on September 4, 2002. The analysis results revealed that the EECs installed in the engines operated normally.

1.16.4.1 Left EEC

The NVM data of the Left EEC showed entries 7 hours before the accident, which were recorded as “MN (Mach Number), Total Pressure (P2) Leak, T2 Heater Required, J2 Not Installed.” These entries occurred during the ground maintenance.

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107 EEC type: EEC 103-1.
109 Operating time of only the EEC: 23,456 hrs.
engine test run, and were not related to the accident. No in-flight faults were recorded on the Left EEC.

1.16.4.2 Right EEC

The NVM data of the Right\textsuperscript{110} EEC showed entries 8 hours\textsuperscript{111} before the accident, and which were recorded as “J2 Not Installed, T2 Heater Required, P2 Leak.” These entries occurred during the ground maintenance engine test run, and were not related to the accident. No in-flight faults were recorded on the Left EEC.

1.16.5 Inertial Reference Unit (IRU)

Three inertial reference units\textsuperscript{112} of the flight 129 aircraft were found installed in their racks. Precision analysis of the units was made at the manufacturer, Honeywell, at Minneapolis, Minnesota, from September 11 to 13, 2002.

Examinations were conducted to determine whether there were any faults during the last 10 power cycles before the accident by extracting data from the non-volatile memory (NVM) units of 2 IRUs. The examination results showed that 2 IRUs operated normally, but the data from the other remaining IRU were lost due to a severe accident-induced damage.

1.16.6 Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Controller

Precision analysis of the APU controller’s\textsuperscript{113} NVM of the flight 129 aircraft, conducted on August 2, 2002, at the manufacturer, Honeywell, revealed that the APU was not operating in flight.

\textsuperscript{110} P/N: 780170-13, S/N: 0274, total operating time: 27,560 hrs.
\textsuperscript{111} Operating time of only the EEC: 27,552 hrs.
\textsuperscript{112} P/N: HG 1050AD04, S/N: 1548/01, 1727 and HG 1050AD09 (S/N: 5734).
\textsuperscript{113} P/N: 2117342-19, S/N: 36-619.
1.17 Organizational and Management Information

1.17.1 Air China Flight Crew Training

While the CAAC Order 77 (CCAR-62FS) requirement for Chinese airline operators’ ground school specified 25 hours of the academic instruction per year, no curriculum or lesson plan was mentioned separately in the regulation. Instead, the ground school requirements were met through seasonal safety education, instructions on revisions by the aircraft manufacturer, and different seminars. The flight crew of the accident flight received the ground school instruction\(^{114}\) during the simulator flight training.

According to Air China officials, during transition or upgrade training, evaluations (tests) were made upon completion of the ground school. The academic training for the existing line pilots was conducted by instructors prior to the recurrent simulator training, but the training center did not provide the KAIB with the lesson plans or the evaluation criteria.

The ground school and flight training were conducted at the Air China Training Center, and the upgrade and recurrent training on the B767-200 type were conducted using the B767-300 simulator.\(^{115}\)

The flight crews on the B767 type received proficiency training twice a year in accordance with the B767 Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM), and the recurrent training syllabus. The training consisted of four lessons, divided into 2 lessons respectively for the first\(^{116}\) and second\(^{117}\) half of each year. The contents of each lesson varied widely, where the circling approach training fell under the third lesson during the second half, with Beijing airport as the training airport.

\(^{117}\) 1 B757-767 dual type simulator, level D, 180° field of vision, CE manufactured & FAA approved Mar 1996, CAAC Approved for operator use.
\(^{116}\) The first lesson and second lesson.
\(^{117}\) The third lesson and fourth lesson.
1.17.1.1 Circling Approach Procedure Training

The circling approach procedure, as contained in the recurrent B767-200/300 FFS (Full Flight Simulator) training guide issued by the Air China Flight Training Center, was to be conducted as follows:

- Aircraft positioned 6 NM from runway 36L at Beijing airport with autopilot (A/P), auto-throttle (A/T) and flight directors (F/D) engaged; lateral control in LOC mode and vertical control in V/S mode; ceiling at or above 1,000 ft and visibility 5 km; lighting for runway 18R illuminated.

- Gear down, Flaps 20, call out A/P in use, and use LOC & V/S modes.
- Set missed approach altitude after reaching the MDA.
- Select heading offset 45° L/R, time for 20 seconds to enter downwind.
- Start timing for 20 seconds passing abeam the end of runway.
- Flaps 30, turn base, complete the landing checklist.
- Roll out on base, check runway visual glide path, disengage A/P and descend.
- Roll out on final, turn off both F/Ds, then turn on F/D on the PNF side.

Notes:

1. The above procedure was established with Beijing airport as an object referring to Boeing procedures, and is to be adopted only for training.
2. Apply MDA and visibility limits as the higher of the ceiling & visibility for either end of runway, in accordance with the operations manual and the airport weather minima criteria.
3. Maintain constant visibility for descent to the MDA. May approach and land in the opposite direction.
4. Correct for winds
5. Assuming visual contact with the runway during base turn, satisfy terrain, weather and local airport requirements.
6. If a missed approach is required during the circling approach, turn in the direction of the runway, not in the shorter direction, even if the turn requires more than 180° of change in heading. Maneuver with the flap setting for missed approach.

Additionally, the Air China Flight Crew Training Manual prescribed the following procedure for the circling approach:

- **Base Turn**
  - Set Landing Flaps
  - (If not already set)
  - Landing Checklist

- **Maintain MDA**
  - Gear Down
  - Flaps 20
  - Arm Speedbrakes

- **Go Around**
  - Press G/A Switch (AFDS)
  - Flaps 20 (Flaps 5 for 1 Engine)
  - Missed approach attitude
  - Missed approach thrust
  - Maintain normal climb rate
  - Engage AFDS roll mode > 400 ft
  - Retract flaps on schedule (2 Eng.)
  - After flaps up, select FLCH or VNAV
  - Set MCT (1 Eng.)
  - Verify tracking route and altitude capture
  - After T/O Checklist

- **Roll out on final**
  - Disengage A/P and A/T

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1.17.1.2 Crew Resource Management (CRM) Training Program

According to the CAAC Order No. 51\textsuperscript{118} and crew resource management section of the Air China’s B767 flight crew training handbook, company pilots were required to undergo 18 hours of CRM training over a three-day period.

\textsuperscript{118} Qualification Standards Regulation for Civil Aircraft Pilot and Instructor.
Instructional material included “Principles of Safe Flight,” “Judgment and Decision Making,” “Mistake and Prevention” and “Controlled Flight into Terrain.” Videotapes included titles such as “New Hire Orientation,” “What is your opinion?” “CFIT Prevention,” “Red Warning,” “Bird Strike,” “RTO Simplified,” “No Flap Landing” and “What?”

Following completion of training with test scores above 80 points, the training center would issue a certificate, but the training center did not provide the KAIB with certificates for the flight crew of flight 129.

1.17.2 Air China Preflight Procedures

According to Air China’s Operations Manual, crews scheduled for international flights were to report for duty on the day prior to the scheduled flight to obtain the various materials necessary for flight and to update them with the most current revisions. After checking the international flight related documentation and receiving various reporting forms, they were to study the departure and destination airports, enroute information, flight methods, special flight procedure for airport area, including responses for abnormal situations and crew resource management.

They also were required to receive checks from an aeromedical examiner, for a medical clearance to be included in the flight approval documentation. The flight crew of flight 129 was medically cleared for the flight through a physical exam about 14:00 (Beijing time) on April 14, and completed the flight preparation procedures.

The following items were specified for the flight crew briefing: “(1) The captain is to convene the preflight briefing, to be attended by all scheduled cockpit and cabin crew members, for a combined report on the status of all preparation. (2) The captain is to verify each of the activities. (3) He is to clarify division of duties for each respective crew member, to closely coordinate for teamwork, including specific provisions against unlawful activity. (4) He is to verify the validity of all certificates and documents required for flight. (5) He is to make request as necessary to ensure flight safety and service.”

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119 Flight Operations Manual 4.0.
The flight crew of flight 129 arrived at the dispatcher’s office located in the international terminal approximately an hour and half before departure time, and received five flight documents\textsuperscript{121} from the dispatcher. Fifteen minutes prior to departure, the load release sheet for the crew was released in the aircraft by an operations agent.

\textbf{1.17.3 Air China Descent and Approach Procedures}

Air China’s Operations Manual Section 4.3.8, which described descent and approach procedures, required the crew before each descent to be ready with (1) descent planning, (2) a STAR chart, (3) an approach profile, (4) an aerodrome chart, (5) the landing data, and (6) ATIS information. It stated that the detailed planning and approach clearances were the most important parts of a safe approach.

Prior to the Descent and Approach Checklist, the pilot-flying was to review briefly with the pilot-not-flying: (1) the type of approach and the name of the procedure, (2) the minimum sector altitude, (3) the airport elevation, (4) the MDA/DH, (5) applicable weather minima, (6) missed approach procedures, (7) taxi procedures and (8) the transition level. Each flight crewmember was required to become familiar with the planned approach procedure for recall as necessary.

According to Air China’s flight crew training manual,\textsuperscript{122} the approach briefing procedure was stated as follows:

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Thorough planning and briefing are the keys to ensuring a safe, unhurried, professional approach. Prior to the start of an instrument approach, the pilot-flying should brief the other pilot as to intentions in conducting the approach. Both pilots should review the approach procedure. All pertinent approach information, including minimum and missed approach procedures, should be reviewed and alternate courses of action considered.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Category (FAA)</th>
<th>Speed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>121 knots or more but less than 140 knots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>141 knots or more but less than 166 knots</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{121} ATC flight plan, computer flight plan, weather sheet, NOTAM, flight release sheet.
\textsuperscript{122} B757/767 Flight Crew Training Manual, Page 4.3 (published Dec 1, 1999).
The 767 is classified as a category “C” or “D” airplane, depending upon maximum landing weight, for straight in approaches. For circling approaches, use category “D” minima, or the minima associated with the anticipated circling speed.

The Boeing Flight Crew Training Manual stated the following on the approach briefing:

Thorough planning and briefing are the keys to ensuring a safe, unhurried, professional approach. Prior to the start of an instrument approach, the pilot-flying should brief the other pilot as to intentions in conducting the approach. Both pilots should review the approach procedure. All pertinent approach information, including minimum and missed approach procedures, should be reviewed and alternate courses of action considered.

As a guide, the approach briefing should include at least the following:

- weather & NOTAMS at destination and alternate, as applicable
- type of approach and the validity of the charts to be used
- navigation and communication frequencies to be used
- minimum safe sector altitudes for that airport
- approach procedure including courses and heading
- vertical profile including all minimum altitudes, crossing altitudes and minimum descent altitude (MDA)
- determination of the missed approach point (MAP) and the missed approach procedure
- other related crew actions such as tuning of radios, setting of course information, or other special requirements
- any appropriate information related to non-normal procedure
- managements of AFDS

According to flight crew training manuals of both Air China and Boeing, detailed approach planning and complete briefing were the conditions to ensure a safe, unhurried, and professional approach. Before starting an approach, the pilot-flying should inform the pilot-not-flying of his/her intentions for the approach to be flown, and both pilots should review the approach to become thoroughly familiar with the whole procedure.
1.17.3.1 Air China Procedure for Application of Weather Minima

The purpose of approach categorization of aircraft is to determine the approach weather minima under poor visibility conditions. The aircraft approach categorization standards of ICAO\(^{123}\) and FAA\(^{124}\) are equally based on 1.3 times of the stall speed in the landing configuration at maximum certificated landing weight (MLDW) of the aircraft, divided into categories A, B, C, D and E, with appropriate range of speeds, and only one approach category applies to the aircraft of the same type. The CAAC applies this same standard.

The approach category for each type of aircraft is determined by the aircraft manufacturer through certification testing. The approach category for the B767-200 aircraft type was authorized to be “C.” The CAAC approved the B767-200 as approach category “C\(^{125}\),” and Air China also applied the same standard. This approach category applies to straight-in approaches.

The circling approach category, as determined by ICAO, is applied differently from the range of speeds for the straight-in approach category. In other words, under the same category, the range of speeds for the circling approach was authorized to be higher than the range of speeds for the straight-in approach, to allow for aircraft maneuvering. For example, for category “C,” the range of speeds for the straight-in approach is between 121 and 140 kt, but the maximum speed for the circling approach is 180 kt.

According to the FAA standard, for a circling approach, the approach category may be different from that of the straight-in approach. For the circling approach categorization as authorized by the FAA, the range of speeds is not different from the straight-in approach category, but when higher speeds are required for maneuvering in excess of the speed authorized for the approach category, the next higher approach category is to be applied. For example, when the maximum speed of 140 kt for approach category “C” is to be exceeded, circling approach category “D” would be applied. Therefore, for circling approaches, the approach category established according to the aircraft type may be applied differently, as another category, depending upon the planned speed.

Air China's Operations Specifications established that the circling approach category is determined by that category appropriate to the speed to be flown by the

\(^{123}\) Doc 8168-OPS/611 Volume \(\text{Ⅱ},\) Aircraft Operations, 1.9 Categories of Aircraft.

\(^{124}\) 14 CFR, Part 97.

\(^{125}\) CCAR No. 98.
aircraft, and the certified operator is to apply the higher between the minima for circling approach to the required runway and the minima specified in the Operations Specifications. For wide-body aircraft, such as the B767-200 and larger, the minima for the circling approach are MDH 300 m, visibility 5 km.

Air China’s B767 manual included explanations on the range of speeds for the straight-in approach and the circling approach for the FAA approach categories “C” and “D.” It also states that during the circling approach, the minima for approach category “D” or the minimum criteria relevant to the anticipated circling approach speed are to be applied. But Boeing’s B767 flight crew training manual included explanations on the speed range under the FAA and ICAO circling approach categories “C” and “D.”

### 1.17.4 Air China Accident History

Air China was founded on July 1, 1988. At the time of the accident on April 15, 2002, it had 68 aircraft on scheduled operations to 43 destinations international and 71 domestic, for a total of 114 airports.

The investigation results showed that Air China did not have a record of any accidents prior to the flight 129 accident.

### 1.17.5 Oversight of Air China

#### 1.17.5.1 The CAAC

According to a manager at the CAAC’s standardization section, Air China had been delegated with its own oversight authority, until the time of enactment in May 1999 of the Act to regulate the operations approval for the public air transport operator certification. Once the statute became effective, the CCAR No. 83, Part 121.771 required Air China to undergo an approval procedure for the air operator certification within two years. However, the CAAC did not provide the KAIB with the documentation showing the air operator certification of Air China.

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126 Circling Approach Weather Minima (Air China Operations Specifications)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDA (m)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility (m)</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

127 FCTM 757/767, page 4.3 (Dec 1, 1999).
Since May of 1999, the CAAC has exercised its statutory oversight authority over Air China, developing annual plans and regularly conducting surveillance activities for each area, with on-going inspections on occasion.

In accordance with year 2001 audit plan, the North China Regional Administration of the CAAC, Flight Operations Division conducted an audit of Air China’s overall flight operations for a period of one month from February to March 2001.

Areas pointed out for improvement in the audit report include the following:

- No harmonious operation of management systems among flight operations related departments
- No record keeping systems and procedures
- Lack of human resources in flight operations related departments, and absence of procedure and standard of qualification and certification
- Lack of training and flight operations control working facilities
- Lack of standardization of flight operations by fleet types and flight deck duties
- No airport terminal operating procedures and no emergency procedure manual
- No oversight system and procedures for manuals revision by the operator

The major corrective actions to be taken and proposals include the following:

- Systematization of flight operations related departments
- Flight operations standardization and establishment of training record keeping system
- Manuals complement and revision
- Development of work plan for standardization of flight procedures
- Manuals editing and standardization of terminology
- Establishment of Instructor qualification and oversight systems

1.17.5.2 The Korea Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT)

Air China was approved for flight operations to Korea as an international foreign air carrier on December 20, 1994, in accordance with Article 147 of the Aviation Act and Article 320 of the Enforcement Regulations, and on December 22, 1994, Air China started to operate one daily flight between Beijing and Seoul\(^{129}\) using B767 aircraft, and four weekly flights between Qingdao and Seoul\(^{130}\) using B737 aircraft.

\(^{129}\) CA 123 / 124.

\(^{130}\) CA 127 / 128.
Air China’s request for change of service by an international foreign air operator was approved by the Minister of Construction and Transportation on May 13, 1996, to operate four weekly flights between Beijing and Busan\textsuperscript{131} using B737 aircraft starting on June 1, 1996, in accordance with Article 152 of the Aviation Act and Article 324 of the Enforcement Regulations.

On April 3, 2002, Air China’s request for change to the conditions of service (aircraft type) was approved by the Busan Regional Aviation Administrator to permit the operation of B767 aircraft for a period of 12 days\textsuperscript{132} starting on April 14, 2002, because of increased passenger demand for flights between Beijing and Busan, in accordance with Article 152 of the Aviation Act and Article 289 of the Enforcement Regulations.

In Article 16 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it is stipulated that, “The appropriate authorities of each of the contracting States shall have the right, without unreasonable delay, to search aircraft of the other contracting States on landing or departure, and to inspect the certificates and other documents prescribed by this Convention.”

The MOCT did not have a record of surveillance activities conducted on Air China’s aircraft, belonging to other contracting State, in accordance with the provisions of Article 16 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, and nor was there a record of formal coordination of surveillance activities for Air China between the CAAC and CASA. However, since June 2002, safety inspectors from the CASA have been conducting surveillance activities on foreign aircraft including Air China’s aircraft, in accordance with the provisions of Article 153, Para 3 (Demand for Reports, etc.) of the Aviation Act.

1.17.6 Air Carrier’s Assistance Plan for Aircraft Accident Victims and Their Families

The Korean Aviation Act does not require air carriers operating flights to Korea to submit to the government a plan for the assistance of victims and their families in preparation for an aircraft accident. Thus, the government of Korea, as the State of Occurrence, experienced many difficulties in its support of the accident victims and their families of flight 129.

\textsuperscript{131} CA 129 / 130.
\textsuperscript{132} April 14 ~ 18\textsuperscript{th}, 20 ~ 25\textsuperscript{th} & 27\textsuperscript{th}.
1.18 Additional Information

1.18.1 Public Hearing

A public hearing was held in connection with the accident of flight 129 at the Westin Chosun Hotel in Busan on November 25~26, 2002. It was attended by a total of 227 participants. They were 42 from the KAIB and CASA, 22 from the CAAC and Air China, 7 from the NTSB, Boeing Company and Pratt & Whitney, 24 from the Airforce ATC unit and fire fighting & rescue units, 10 from ALPA-Korea, 26 witnesses and 92 families of the victims, with members of the media present. The factual findings by the different investigation groups were made open to the public, and various opinions were heard through the testimonies of the witnesses related to the accident, etc.

A summary of the factual investigation of the accident was presented, and the witnesses’ testimonies for each group were as follows. The operations group confirmed the training related to the circling approach procedure, CRM and English education process, Air China record of the CAAC approval for the flight operations to Gimhae airport, actions by the operator prior to the flight operations to Gimhae airport, and the circling approach procedure as specified in Air China’s Operations Specifications. And the group confirmed the rationale behind the aircraft configuration of flaps 20 and landing gear down for the circling approach as pertaining to the aircraft manufacturer.

Verifications were made of the surviving captain’s testimony on the reasons for his selection of approach category “C” and the delay in turning base on the downwind leg, his awareness of the circling approach minima in the Operations Specifications and any differences between ICAO and FAA standards for the circling approach, the time and reason for his loss of visual contact with the runway, his reason for not executing a missed approach in the circumstance of losing the runway in sight, preparation activities of the day prior, and whether simulator training for terrain avoidance maneuver was practiced.

For the maintenance group, the verification was made with the maintenance personnel from Air China whether there was any aircraft malfunction prior to the departure from Beijing airport and at the time of the last periodic check, and also questions were asked to the aircraft manufacturer of the impact energy pertaining to the airframe damage, and verification was made.

133 Operations, Maintenance, ATC, and Survival Groups.
For the ATC group, verification was made on the reason of the tower controller’s telephone confirmation with the approach controller regarding the approach category of the flight 129 aircraft, the reason for the tower controller’s confirmation with the flight information office on the aircraft type and its approach category, the reason for the delayed initial radio contact between the tower controller and flight crew of the flight 129 aircraft, the correction about the landing runway at issuing the landing clearance, the reason for not issuing a safety alert, and whether there was any problem with the visual weather observation site.

For the survival group, verification was made on the initial arrival time of the Gimhae fire station rescue team, and the survivor rescue operations.

The CAAC investigation team presented opinions regarding the one Airforce controller, who provided air traffic control services to flight 129 without holding an air traffic controller certificate issued by the Minister of Construction and Transportation, the controller’s lack of English proficiency, and on the differences from ICAO standards not being noted in the ROK AIP.

The Airforce presented opinions on the frequent MSAW “LA” warnings produced during aircraft’s approaches at Gimhae airport, on the adequacy of the location of the visual observation site, and on English language training conducted for controllers.

Information that could not be confirmed at the hearing was to be obtained through additional visits to China. Review of the CVR transcript was agreed to be conducted jointly by the teams from Korea, China and USA, at the NTSB.

1.18.2 The Captain’s Testimony.

The captain was interviewed over eight occasions in a hospital where he was admitted, from April 16 through July 26, 2002. He also testified as one of the witnesses at the public hearing held in Busan in November 2002, where he answered questions related to the accident.

Verification was made on the captain’s personal history, matters related to the circling approach to runway 18R at Gimhae airport and the aircraft’s approach category, the accident sequence, whether there was any aircraft defect during flight, the situation at the time of the accident, and his evacuation from the aircraft.

As the sole flight crewmember to survive the accident, the major testimonies made by the captain during interviews and at the public hearing were as follows:

134 The joint team of investigators from Korea, China and US A reviewed the CVR transcript at the NTSB laboratory on Feb 26, 2003.
As to the flying career, his total flight time was approximately 7,000 hours, of which approximately 6,000 hours were on the B767. He was promoted to captain in October 2001, and his flight time as a captain was approximately 500 hours.

Three or four flight experiences to Gimhae airport as a captain, with no previous experience for the circling approach to runway 18R.

Flight preparation was completed under the captain’s supervision on the previous day to the flight, in accordance with the company regulations. During this activity, the circling approach was prepared, anticipating the use of runway 18R, and the approach procedure and tower frequencies described in the Jeppesen charts were also reviewed. He was aware of the approach category for the B767-200 to be “C,” the presence of mountains of approximately 700 ft elevation around Gimhae airport, the minimum safe altitude, and the short distance from the mountains to the runway.

For the flight duty assignment, the Beijing to Gimhae sector was to be handled by the first officer as PF, with the captain to take control of the aircraft under special circumstances. For the transfer of control between PF and PNF, the phraseology of “I have control” was to be used.

One set of Jeppesen manuals was on board, used by the captain during flight.

Briefing on the circling approach was conducted after the approach clearance to runway 18R had been issued, since the runway was changed. The duration was short, so the captain could not remember details on the specifics, but said that he briefed on the approach procedure, referring to Jeppesen charts. The briefing consisted of the need for an accurate time check, to keep watching the runway, and taxi procedures after landing and a missed approach procedure, etc.

Actual weather conditions at the time of the approach were sufficient to see the runway clearly at 700 ft on the ILS RWY 36L final approach course, with the visibility of approximately 10km and ceiling of approximately 700 ft. Upon entry into the downwind leg, he recalled visibility to have been approximately 6km, but the clouds gradually became lower on the downwind.

When the runway was changed during the descent for the approach, nothing was briefed by the first officer as pilot-flying. The “briefing card” used by Air China included the briefing procedure and checklist.

For a circling approach, he was aware that the Jeppesen charts, Air China’s Operations Manual, the procedure learned in the simulator had to be applied,
however, he did not know the weather minima of wide-body aircraft. He knew that the straight-in approach category for the B767 was the same as its circling approach category. And he answered that the speed on the approach charts was the speed to be maintained over the threshold [during the sixth interview], and said that it was the speed to be maintained from the start of circling approach to the base turn [during the eighth interview]. He took control of the aircraft on the downwind after calling out, “I have control.” After visual contact with the runway, he disengaged the A/P to fly manually. During the circling approach, he said that the runway was not clearly visible, but the vertical visibility was good.

- Rolled out on the downwind leg, he was concentrating on the runway, and therefore did not see any buildings or mountains ahead. He did not remember how he checked for the twenty seconds to have elapsed after pressing the timer button for the base turn, but rather thought that the twenty seconds had not elapsed. He was able to continually verify the runway on the downwind leg. The time of losing visual contact with the runway was when the aircraft entered clouds during the base turn.

- The base turn was started when twenty seconds past abeam the north end of runway 18R, with the ground visible, but without any point of reference. About two thirds of the base turn, the flight entered the clouds, and he saw a hill as the flight emerged from the clouds. Once the base turn was started, there were no words of advice from the first officer, with no comments on the altitude either, but only the callout, “Pull up! Pull up!” After entering the clouds, the captain intended to initiate a go around after rolling out on final to the direction of the runway.

- He did not hear tower transmissions of “Can you landing” “Say again your intention.” Just before crash, he did pull up, but the aircraft would not climb. He had no memory of the situation before or after his separation from the aircraft.

- There was no aircraft malfunction prior to departure from Beijing airport or during flight, nor any abnormal situations or instrument malfunction.

- The second officer is assigned for the observation and communication duties, and is required to advise all deviations, in accordance with the operator’s regulations

- The captain decided to take control of the aircraft, because the actual situation pertaining to the weather, the runway and etc. required him to take direct control of the flight. For urgent or special situations, it was also possible for the first officer to take control of the aircraft.
· The captain is required to listen and monitor communications with the headset on when the second officer is in contact with air traffic control, to pay attention and understand the contents of the communications. He said that it would be impossible not to monitor communications. While ATIS is required to be recorded, ATC clearances are selectively recorded, but the person assigned for communication duty is required to record the communications in detail.

· For circling approach training in the simulator, the weather conditions as selected by the instructor were applied, but it was difficult to speak on the specifics of the weather conditions. The operator’s simulator was a B767-300 type, which was for circling approaches under category “D”.

· When the aircraft was on the approach to runway 36, there was no memory of his hearing about the instruction to contact on the tower frequency after the runway was in sight.

· Between ICAO and FAA standards, the captain knew that the circling approach at Gimhae airport applied the FAA standard.

1.18.3 Information regarding Special Airports

According to a specialist from the training department of Air China, since Gimhae airport was not categorized by the company as a special airport, no special education or training was given to flight crew, and no special flight experience was required.

However, Articles 517 and 518 of the Korean Flight Safety Regulations describe the classifications and operation requirements of special airports, which captains of commercial air transport shall have experience, to be A, B and C, of which Gimhae airport was designated as a Grade “A” special airport due to its high terrain to the north.

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135 Air China designated Gimhae airport as a special airport after the accident.
136 Enacted on Oct 4, 2001 according to Article 74-2(newly inserted on Sep 12, 2001) of the Korean Aviation Act.
137 < Grade A Special Airport Requirements >
· Takeoffs and landings should be attempted with ceiling more than at least 1,000ft above MEA, MOCA or the initial approach fix altitude; and visibility more than at least 3miles.
· Captain must have takeoff & landing experience as an observer within the previous 12 months.
· Captain must be qualified through an audio visual training aid or special airport qualification requirements, etc. approved by the Minister of Construction and Transportation. within the previous 12 months.
and east. Thus, separate operational experience and education requirements for the captains are stipulated for the operations to the airport.

The designation criteria for special airports are as follows:

- Airports with terrain, obstacles or other restrictions, which may affect aircraft operations during takeoff, landing or go around.
- Airports requiring special arrival or departure procedures.
- High elevation (above 7,000 ft) airports requiring special aircraft performance.
- Airports with limited aeronautical facilities or available information.
- Any airport requiring special attention during takeoff and landing.

The CAAC Order 121.469 (Captain Requirements for Operations in Special Areas, Routes or Airports) describes the following on special airport operations:

- CAAC designates special airport based on terrain, obstacles, complex arrival or departure procedures, and requires the special operational qualifications for captains.
- The certified operator must ensure that captains have experience operating into the airport as a required crewmember within the previous 12 months, have received the training through audiovisual means or have qualified in a simulator approved by the CAAC. When the ceiling is above MEA or MOCA, or the initial approach altitude in the instrument approach procedure is more than at least 300 m (1,000 ft) or visibility is at least 4,800 m (3 miles), no special qualification is required for the captain to operate into the airport.

Air China’s Operations Specifications (C067) specifies the following factors for special airports:

- Hong Kong New Int’l Airport: Heavy traffic, busy communication, complex surrounding terrain, many obstacles, complex MET conditions (heavy wind including windshear, thunderstorms, heavy fog, low clouds, low visibility)
- Ulan-Bator, Mongolia: Complex surrounding terrain, airport in hilly area, many obstacles, poor obstacle-clearance conditions, one-way takeoff and landing only, complex MET conditions (heavy wind, sandstorm, low visibility, tailwind takeoff and landing, etc.)
- Wujiaba, Kunming: Heavy traffic, high-altitude airport in hilly areas, complex surrounding terrain, many obstacles, poor obstacle-clearance conditions, long landing-run distance, takeoff weight and climb gradient affected during high-temperature season, rare air density affecting engine power, altitude revision required for high-altitude airport (altitude adjustment or using zero altitude), complex MET conditions, heavy wind (including windshear), low clouds, low visibility, frequent thunderstorms, etc.
- San Francisco, USA: Heavy traffic, complex surrounding terrain, with special arrival/departure procedures
- Ontario, USA: Complex surrounding terrain, with special arrival/departure procedures

Captains shall be subject to ground training or demonstrations with respect to the use of instrument arrival/departure procedures, operations over complex terrain and under complex meteorological conditions prior to actual take off or landing operations at the above airports, or they shall have the experience in the past 12 months of operating to the above airports as a crewmember.

1.18.4 Controlled Flight Into Terrain Accident (CFIT) Information

Aviation accident statistics for a last ten year period ("Boeing’s 2000 Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents," June 2001) showed that among total 7,282 fatalities, 2,237 (30.7%) were caused by CFIT type accidents. In terms of hull losses, of 391 total, 37 (9.5%) were caused by CFIT type accidents, proving that the CFIT is one of the most frequent types of accidents with many casualties and severe aircraft damage.

By phase of flight, most CFIT accidents occurred from the beginning of descent for landing at the destination airport, until just before touchdown on the runway.

Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) data from 1986 to 1990 showed that most of the CFIT accidents occurred with the aircraft aligned in the direction of the landing runway, and some during missed approach, but others more than 15 NM outside the airport,
showing that CFIT accidents were not necessarily related to high terrain near an airport.

The causes of the accidents were mostly related to the flight crew, such as problems of communication, navigational error, procedural noncompliance, lack of situation awareness, aircraft handling error, decision-making error or negligence. Regarding equipment issues, traditional GPWS equipment (Modes 2 or 4) provides aural or visual warnings if terrain is approached while not in the landing configuration. If the aircraft is in landing configuration, in level flight, and terrain closure does not exceed 2,253 ft per minute, such as the case with flight 129, aural or visual warnings will not occur. Another equipment issue addressed by FSF was that MSAW was not in wide usage.

For environmental factors, FSF cited natural elements such as weather, terrain, temperature, wind, ice and fog. There are also artificial elements such as whether there are ATC radar services available to handle approach and departure, whether ATIS or VOLMET\(^{138}\) are available, airport equipment and facilities, such as the presence of circling lights, the approach lights, VASI\(^{139}\) / PAPI\(^{140}\), and approach procedures and approach charts.

### 1.18.5 ALAR (Approach and Landing Accident Reduction)

The FSF approach and landing accident reduction (ALAR) Task Force began Flight Safety Foundation-led efforts in 1991, in counsel with the International Civil Aviation Organization, to help reduce the leading causes of accidents\(^{141}\). Because controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) was the leading cause of fatalities in commercial jet aviation, initial work focused on CFIT.

By 1996, the task force work had resulted in more than a dozen important recommendations to help prevent CFIT accidents, and articles in FSF publications increased awareness of CFIT.

The task force used a variety of data. High-level analyses were conducted on one set of data that included 287 fatal accidents from 1980–1996 (inclusive). Detailed case studies were conducted on another set of data that included 76 accidents and serious

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\(^{138}\) Meteorological Information for Aircraft in Flight.

\(^{139}\) Visual Approach Slope Indicator.

\(^{140}\) Precision Approach Path Indicator.

\(^{141}\) In 1990 through Oct. 15, 2000, western-built large commercial jets have been involved in 42 CFIT hull-loss accidents and 137 hull-loss ALAs.
incidents from 1984–1997. Specific flight crew behavioral markers were isolated in the case studies and in line observations of 3,300 flights. The task force’s conclusions and recommendations were supported by the data.

Final recommendations of the FSF ALAR Task Force were published in the Flight Safety Digest article “Killers in Aviation: FSF Task Force Presents Facts About Approach-and-landing and Controlled-flight-into-terrain Accidents.” The ambitious objectives of the task force require the support of the entire aviation industry. The FSF ALAR Tool Kit is among the products developed by the task force to help reach the objectives.

Generally, inadequate situational awareness involved inadequate awareness of the vertical position of the aircraft and often resulted in CFIT. Enhanced ground-proximity warning systems (EGPWS)/terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) and radio altimeters, which provide predictive terrain-hazard warnings, are installed in thousands of aircraft, but many aircraft do not have this equipment.

The statistics do not imply increased risk when the captain is flying. Nevertheless, the task force found that inadequate crew resource management (CRM) was involved in several ALAs that occurred when the captain was the pilot-flying. The problem of transitioning from instrument flying to visual flying can be minimized by conducting a monitored approach.

The FSF ALAR Task Force believes that stabilized approaches are essential in preventing approach-and-landing accidents (ALA). The task force cited a list of Recommended Elements of a Stabilized Approach as follows:

1. The aircraft is on the correct flight path;
2. Only small changes in heading/pitch are required to maintain the correct flight path;
3. The aircraft speed is not more than $V_{REF} + 20$ kt indicated airspeed and not less than $V_{REF}$;
4. The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration;

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142 Inadequate situational awareness was a factor in 51% of ALAs.
143 Currently available safety equipment was not installed in 29% of the aircraft in ALAs.
5. Sink rate is no greater than 1,000 ft per minute; if an approach requires a sink rate greater than 1,000 ft per minute, a special briefing should be conducted;

6. Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration and is not below the minimum power for approach as defined by the aircraft operations manual;

7. All briefings and checklists have been conducted;

8. Specific types of approaches are stabilized if they also fulfill the following: instrument landing system (ILS) approaches must be flown within one dot of the glide slope and localizer; a category II or category III ILS approach must be flown within the expanded localizer band; during a circling approach, wings should be level on final when the aircraft reaches 300 ft above airport elevation; and,

9. Unique approach procedures or abnormal conditions requiring a deviation from the above elements of a stabilized approach require a special briefing.

During analyses of the 76 accidents and serious incidents mentioned earlier, several significant statistics regarding CRM, SOPs, and training emerged:

- 74% - Inadequate crew decision making
- 72% - Inadvertent non-adherence to procedures
- 63% - Failure in CRM (cross-check/coordination)
- 46% - Failures in company management
- 40% - Deliberate non-adherence to procedures
- 37% - Inadequate training

The ALAR Task Force addressed several specific elements for the prevention of ALAs (CFIT) as follows:

Standard Operating Procedures

- Establishing and adhering to adequate SOPs and flight crew decision-making processes improves approach-and-landing safety.
- States should mandate, and operators should develop and implement, SOPs for approach and landing operations.
- Operators should implement routine and critical evaluation of SOPs to determine the need for change.
- Operators should provide education and training that enhance flight crew decision making and risk management.
Communication Factors

- 33% of the ALAs and serious incidents involved incorrect or inadequate ATC instruction/advice/service.

Pilot-Controller Communication

- Improving communication and mutual understanding between controllers and pilots of each other’s operational environment will improve approach-and-landing safety.

Controllers and pilots must work together, but there is a gap in their understanding of each other’s challenges. The pilot is focused on one very complex airplane in the demanding environment of approach and landing. The controller is focused on traffic flow. Both are balancing safety and efficiency. They also push the ATC system to increase capacity of landing/takeoff runways, reduce landing intervals, reduce radar separation minimums, use complex multiple-runway combinations and use land-and-hold-short (LAHSO) procedures. In this demanding environment, flight safety depends on spoken communication. Remember: The captain has the final responsibility for the safety of the flight.

Terminal Area Infrastructure

- 21% of ALAs involved lack of ground aids.
- 12% of ALAs involved lack of ATC equipment (terminal approach radar, minimum safe altitude warning).
- The risk of ALAs during non-precision approaches is five times greater than the risk of ALAs during precision approaches.
- The risk of ALAs in the absence of terminal approach radar is three times greater than the risk of ALAs with terminal approach radar available.
- Precision approach capability and approach radar reduce the risk of ALAs.
- Encourage crews to use more precise approach guidance at all times such as ILS, GNSS\(^{144}\), PAPI and VASI.
- Develop precision approach capability to all runways by application of technology (e.g., GNSS and LAAS\(^{145}\)).
- Implement MSAW or equivalent on all approach radars for ATC terrain warning.

\(^{144}\) GNSS = Global Navigation Satellite System.
\(^{145}\) LAAS = Local Area Augmentation System.
Environment

- 59% of ALAs involved poor visibility.
- 21% of ALAs involved disorientation/visual illusion.
- 18% of ALAs involved runway condition:
  - 73% of ALAs involved overruns on contaminated runways.
- 37% of ALAs involved precipitation/winds.
- The risk of ALAs is higher in operations conducted in low light and poor visibility, on wet or otherwise contaminated runways, and with the presence of visual or physiological illusions.
- Flight crews should be trained in operations involving these conditions before they are assigned line duties.
- Flight crews should make operational use of a risk-assessment tool to identify approach and landing hazards. Appropriate procedures should be implemented to reduce the risks.

Safety Data Monitoring Programs

- Through the collection and analysis of in-flight parameters, FOQA\textsuperscript{146} programs identify performance trends that can be used to improve approach-and-landing safety.
- FOQA should be implemented worldwide in concert with information-sharing partnerships such as GAIN\textsuperscript{147}, BASIS\textsuperscript{148} and ASAP\textsuperscript{149}.
- Provisions should be made on aircraft for equipment to support data collection and analysis.

Aviation Safety Information

- Global sharing of aviation information decreases the risk of ALAs.
- FOQA data must be de-identified.
- Public awareness of the importance of information sharing must be increased.

\textsuperscript{146} FOQA = Flight Operational Quality Assurance.
\textsuperscript{147} GAIN = Global Aviation Information Network.
\textsuperscript{148} BASIS = British Airways Safety Information Service.
\textsuperscript{149} ASAP = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Action Program.
• Airlines and regions that share information have the lowest accident rates.
• Crews that are aware of an accident and its causes are less likely to repeat that type of accident.

ALAR Tool Kit

• Flight Safety Digest: “ALAR Briefing Notes”
• FSF ALAR Task Force Conclusions and Recommendations
• FSF ALAR Task Force Members
• Selected FSF Publications
• Approach-and-landing Risk Awareness Tool
• Approach-and-landing Risk Reduction Guide
• Standard Operating Procedures Template
• ALAR Information Posters
• CFIT Checklist
• CFIT Alert
• Flight Operations and Training
• Equipment for Aircraft and Air Traffic Control
• Air Traffic Control Communication
• Pilot Guide to Preventing CFIT
• Approach-and-landing Accident Data Overview
• An Approach and Landing Accident: It Could Happen to You
• CFIT Awareness and Prevention
• Links to Aviation Statistics on the Internet

ATC Recommendations

ATC controllers have a responsibility to use standard phraseology when communicating with pilots. They must maintain adequate language skills to do this effectively.

150 The ALAR tool kit was produced on a CDROM, which included numerous tools for the prevention of ALAs (CFIT). Copies of the tool kit were distributed widely to airlines and other safety organizations.
If a pilot receives a clearance that he is unable to comply with, he must advise ATC of his inability to comply with the clearance. If a pilot does not understand a clearance, he should request ATC to repeat it until he does understand it.

Pilots must also use the autopilot in the mode that facilitates compliance with ATC instructions. When in a terminal area, it is too late for one pilot to be “head-down” programming an approach into the FMC. Instead, fly using heading select or VOR/LOC. This keeps both pilots in the loop and allows both pilots to watch for traffic and monitor the airplane.

It is essential that pilots read back all clearances and that ATC verifies that the read back is correct. Both pilots listening to ATC clearances and practicing good CRM will help ensure that an accident does not occur because of a misunderstood clearance.
2. Analysis

2.1 General

The three flight crewmembers of flight 129 were certified and qualified in accordance with the requirements of the CCAR, Korean Aviation Act, ICAO Standards, and Air China manuals. They had sufficient rest prior to the scheduled flight, and no medical conditions were discovered which might have adversely influenced their performance.

The aircraft was properly certificated, equipped, and maintained in accordance with pertinent CCAR, ICAO Standards, and Air China procedures. The aircraft was authorized to operate within Korean airspace pursuant to the Korean Aviation Act.

The aircraft was loaded properly within the regulatory limitations of weight and balance. There was no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction of the aircraft structures, flight control systems, or engines.

The analysis of this accident examined weather factors at the time of the approach, the accident sequence, circling approach criteria, flight crew performance, flight crew training relevant to Air China’s circling approach procedure and crew resource management.

Maintenance factors, the role of the air traffic controllers, functions and operational criteria of the BRITE and the MSAW equipment were also reviewed. In addition, the CAAC oversight of Air China’s training programs, surveillance activities of the Korea MOCT over foreign air carriers, survival factors, including post-accident search and rescue, and the other factors relevant to the flight were examined.

2.2 Weather Factors on the Approach

Approximately 20 minutes prior to the accident, Gimhae weather was reported to be 500 ft (AGL) scattered, 1,000 ft broken, 2,500 ft overcast with light drizzle, and visibility 3,200 meters with winds 7 kt from the southwest. The winds from the southwest then increased to 12 kt, so that approximately 12 minutes prior to the accident, Gimhae tower changed the active runway to 18R. The official weather conditions were above the weather minimum for the circling approach of approach category “C” aircraft.

151 The sky condition is covered from 3/8 to 4/8 amount of clouds.
152 The sky condition is covered from 5/8 to 7/8 amount of clouds.
153 The sky condition is covered 8/8 amount of clouds.
After the runway change to 18R, local weather observations were made, which were the same in content as the earlier ATIS “Papa” routine observations, except the improved visibility of 4,000 meters. The information of the local observations were received by the approach control, where it began to be broadcast as ATIS “Romeo.” By this time, the flight was already on the final approach course to runway 36L. In such case, the controller was not required to inform the crew to obtain ATIS “Romeo.”

While the aircraft was on the circling maneuver at an altitude of about 700 ft (MSL), it was difficult for the tower controller to maintain visual contact. The controller testified that he visually acquired the aircraft briefly about midway on the downwind leg to the west. The KAIB presumes that the clouds were moving north toward the mountains, near the base turn area to runway 18R, covering the terrain around the elevation of the crash site down to the point of impact, with some clouds.

The KAIB also believes that the crew could not keep the runway in sight continuously during the base and final turns, and did not have sufficient forward visibility as a result of flying through the clouds.

2.2.1 Visual Weather Observation Site

The line of sight north and north northwest from the rooftop of the Gimhae airport Weather Office, which was designated for visual weather observations154, was obstructed due to the presence of a large hangar blocking the observer’s view of the sector for the base turn and final approach course to runway 18R.

To observe the blocked sector, the observer had to move to the ramp in front of the weather station. However, this weather observation arrangement did not deviate from the establishment requirement of a ground observation site described in the Airforce Manual 5-345(Section 2, Para 1) and the FAA(Order 7210.3S, Para 2-9-7), WMO “Guide to practices for meteorological offices serving aviation”(WMO-No.732, Para 6.1.8 & 6.2.1.1) and the requirements of Annex 3 (Para 4.1.6, Aeronautical meteorological observation) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. However, the site is not the ideal place where the observer can have an unobstructed view of weather conditions over the aerodrome.

Since approaches to runway 18R at Gimhae airport were frequent, including circling approaches under IMC, observations of visibility and sky conditions for the base turn area and its vicinity would have been required, and it would have been considerably inconvenient for the observer to walk down to the ramp for each observation.

154 Prevailing visibility and sky conditions (cloud coverage and height).
2.2.2. Runway Visual Range (RVR) Measurement System

Runway 36L/18R at Gimhae airport had lighting facilities and RVR installed, along with ILS for a category II instrument approach and landing, but the RVR system ceased operation, so that the runway was usable for only category I instrument approach and landing.

While the visibility was 4,000 meters at the time of the accident, since “prevailing visibility” was to be applied in the determination of circling approach weather minima, the KAIB believes that the non-operational RVR was unrelated to the accident. However, the RVR system was out of commission for an extended period of time and not in proper operation as planned.

2.3 Accident Sequence

2.3.1 Description of the Circling Approach and Required Flight Crew Procedures at Gimhae Airport

According to ICAO Doc 8168-OPS/611 Vol I, Para 4.6 & 4.7 and the CCAR 98, Articles 30 and 77, when flying a circling approach within the circling approach area for the approach category of the aircraft, the pilot may continue the circling approach as long as he maintains visual contact with the runway and its environment. If the runway and its environment are lost, the pilot must execute an immediate missed approach.

The circling approach procedure to runway 18R at Gimhae airport is a general circling approach procedure, without the prescribed circling approach track established using ground visual references or runway lead-in lights. Therefore, it requires a very close coordination among the flight crew when conducting a circling approach. Since the captain is seated on the left side for a right hand pattern, it is difficult to see the runway, so the first officer seated on the right side should assist the captain by calling out passing abeam the end of the runway, the time to base turn, runway position, and ground references.

Air China’s procedure for a circling approach, when using the A/P, A/T, and F/D,

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155 Gimhae Airport Operations Mutual Agreement, Article 26, Para 3A.
156 From Jul 12, 2001 until the time of this writing.
157 Runway threshold, approach lighting aids, other markings identifiable with the runway.
was to conduct an ILS approach to runway 36L, by using the localizer (LOC) mode for lateral navigation, and the vertical speed (V/S) mode for vertical control. Once reaching the circling MDA along the final approach course to runway 36L, the heading select (HDG SEL) mode would be used to turn left 45 degrees from the final approach course, and fly for twenty seconds to enter the downwind leg. Twenty seconds after passing abeam the approach end of runway 18R on the downwind leg, the pilot should turn base, set flaps to 30 degrees, complete the landing checklist, and with the landing assured, turn off the A/P to continue descent to landing.

In Boeing’s training manual\textsuperscript{159}, the following guidance is provided: 「Use the weather minima associated with the anticipated circling speed. As an option the approach may be flown with flaps 25 or 30. Maintain MDA using ALT HOLD mode and use HDG SEL or HDG HOLD for the maneuvering portion of the circling approach. If circling from an ILS approach, fly the ILS in LOC and VNAV or V/S modes.

Use of the APP mode for descent to a circling approach is not recommended for several reasons:

- The AFDS does not level off at MCP altitude
- Exiting the APP mode requires initiating a go around or disconnecting the autopilot and turning off the flight directors.

The circling approach procedure when transitioning from a precision approach (ILS) was identical in the training manuals of Air China and Boeing, that the LOC and other vertical mode should be used, not the APP mode. However, Air China’s training manual did not explain why the APP mode should not be used for a circling approach.

### 2.3.2 Circling Approach Pattern of Flight 129

According to the FDR data, as instructed by the Gimhae approach controller, flight 129 made the ILS final approach to runway 36L in the localizer and approach modes, and then initiated the circling approach to runway 18R. The minima for category “C” circling approach were used, of which the ceiling was 700 ft and visibility 3.2 km.

Flight 129 entered the final approach course at an altitude of 2,600 ft and heading of 030 degrees in the LOC mode of the AFDS lateral mode, and 7 seconds after entering the

\textsuperscript{159} FCTM 767, page 4.41(Oct 31,2001).
final approach course, the APP mode was engaged, however, the glide slope mode of the vertical mode was not engaged, and then flight 129 descended to about 1,000 ft in the vertical speed and flight level change modes.

Thereafter, the heading hold mode of the AFDS lateral mode was used, and after maintaining about 700 ft, the heading select mode was used during the circling approach for the entry into the downwind leg. Even if the flight crew of flight 129 used the APP mode on the final approach course to runway 36L, since the glide slope mode was not engaged, they could select other modes (HDG HOLD, HDG SEL) of the AFDS lateral mode without disconnecting the A/P, therefore, it is assumed that the flight directors would have properly displayed indications according to the modes selected by the flight crew.

Once the runway was identified about 1,100 ft, on the left turn for entry into the downwind leg, the first officer declared his intention to fly the aircraft using an expression, “I have control (我来),” and then apparently disconnected the A/P to fly the aircraft manually.

When flight 129 reported the runway in sight, the approach controller issued a frequency change instruction, “Air China 129, contact tower one eighteen point one, circle west,” to which the flight crew of flight 129 read back only, “Circle, circle, 18 right, Air China 129.”

The flight crew of flight 129 held English test certificates in accordance with the CCAR\textsuperscript{160}, but the second officer’s ATC communications including the frequency change to the tower instruction, etc. were not properly monitored by the captain or the first officer, resulting in untimely exchanges with the tower controllers. When the flight crew established contact with the tower, the actual position of the aircraft was nearly abeam the threshold of runway 18R.

According to the FDR data, the first officer as PF, upon initiating the turn for the circling approach from the final approach course to runway 36L, did not turn the aircraft left 45 degrees (HDG 315 degrees) using the standard rate turn\textsuperscript{161} for the entry into the downwind leg, instead he turned the aircraft in a shallow bank angle (5.3 \textasciitilde 19.9 degrees maximum), which resulted in a delay in turning the aircraft to the heading of 315 degrees. Thus, passing near abeam the threshold of runway 18R, the aircraft entered the

\textsuperscript{160} Number 51, Chapter 7, Article 67, Para 7.

\textsuperscript{161} A turn of three degrees per second (360 degrees in two minutes).
downwind leg. At this time, because of the adverse influence of the shallow bank angle, the wind direction and wind speed of 210 degrees at 17 kt, when passing abeam the threshold of the runway, the aircraft was located at a position of 1.1 nautical miles on the downwind width which was narrower than the normal downwind width\textsuperscript{162}, and the captain reengaged the A/P after the downwind entry.

According to the captain’s testimony, while timing 20 seconds after passing abeam the north end of the runway, being concerned with receiving the landing clearance from the controller, he was not able to make the base turn. But the analysis of the FDR data revealed that the heading of flight 129 changed to the left at this time, which is assumed that the captain probably turned the aircraft to the left, in order to widen the pattern. Simulation results showed that turning base on the downwind width that flight 129 had flown would have caused the aircraft to overshoot the final approach course.

Maintaining the correct indicated airspeed, altitude, continuous contact with visual references and timely base turn are the essential conditions for the circling approach and landing, however, the first and second officers did not aggressively advise the captain about the completion of base turn timing, and to make a go around earlier, when the runway or other visual references were not in sight.

According to FDR and CVR data, when the aircraft was passing abeam the threshold of runway 18R, the timing of the flight crew was correct. It was probably because the captain considered the effect of the tail wind, that 13 seconds (11:20:15) after the timing, he directed the first officer who was flying the aircraft at that time, to make the base turn, saying, “Turning base.” However, the KAIB believes that the captain, in consideration of the circumstances including the effect of the tailwind, visibility status, etc., decided to control the aircraft from 11:20:17 on, saying “I have control.”

Prior to the base turn, the aircraft was flown on the downwind at a speed of 150~160 kt, thus when passing abeam the threshold of runway 18R, the airspeed was in excess of 140 kt which was the maximum speed for category “C.” According to the FDR data, the indicated airspeed, when the aircraft passing abeam the threshold of runway 18R, was 158 kt, and the ground speed was 177 kt, which may have been a factor that caused the extended downwind leg.

At 11:20:02, the aircraft passed abeam the approach end of the runway on the downwind and began the time check. At 11:20:22, when the 20 seconds elapsed, the

\textsuperscript{162} Criteria of circling approach area for CAT “C”: 1.7 NM.
normal base turn did not begin. At 11:20:37, the captain disconnected the A/P at the heading of 351 degrees and began the delayed base turn, but not until 11:20:42, after approximately 40 seconds elapsed, did the aircraft heading finally pass through 360 degrees toward the south. This was a decisive factor in the aircraft flying outside the circling approach criteria for both categories “C” and “D.”

When the captain began the base turn at 11:20:37, he flew the aircraft manually, probably with his attention dispersed for crosschecking the cockpit instruments, runway and other references. With the reduced visibility, it would have been difficult to become aware of outside conditions.

At 11:20:54, the captain asked the first officer, “Assist me to find the runway,” but the first officer did not respond whether the runway or the other references were in sight, but at 11:20:59, the first officer said, “It’s getting difficult to fly.” The captain did not remember this remark. It cannot be determined why the first officer made this remark, but presumably it might have been when the flight entered the clouds.

At 11:21:02, without remarks regarding outside conditions, the first officer advised, “Pay attention to the altitude,” and at 11:21:09, when the captain again asked, “Have the runway in sight?” the first officer replied at 11:21:10, “No, I can not see out.” At 11:21:12, the first officer said, “Must go around.” Although the forward obstacles were seen through a gap in the clouds, and at 11:21:15, the first officer yelled, “Pull up! Pull up!” and the captain did a pull up action, it was too late. As a result, the aircraft impacted the mountain.

Flight 129 was equipped with traditional GPWS equipment, so with the landing gear down, flaps in the landing configuration (25 degrees or more), and maximum closure rate of 1,800fpm, there was no ground proximity terrain warning per design.

2.4 Flight Crew Performance

2.4.1 Approach and Circling Approach Briefing

According to a Human factors research report, a good approach briefing is important to develop a “shared mental model” to ensure “that all crewmembers are solving the same problem and have the same understanding of priorities, urgency, cue significance, what to watch out for, who does what, and when to perform certain activities.”

Between 10:54:54 and 10:55:47, the first officer as PF conducted a briefing on nine items for the approach to runway 36L. Some items were omitted, such as the DA/DH, and it was not clear where the briefing began or ended. No comments were made for the precise assignment of tasking for each crewmember, as per Air China’s B757/767 flight crew training manual.\textsuperscript{164}

After the runway change to 18R, between 11:10:19 and 11:12:29, there was a discussion type briefing between the captain and first officer on the MDA, taxiway entry after landing, circling approach pattern, and obstacles, etc. However, no mention was made of the priority, urgency, importance, items requiring a special attention or crew coordination during a circling approach. The briefing was insufficient for the crew to be precisely aware of the overall circling approach procedure and the items that they needed to be cautious of during an approach.

The KAIB believes that when a runway change or other situations require an additional briefing during flight, there is a need to devise a method ensuring enough time to conduct an additional briefing that the approach procedure can be sufficiently reviewed.

2.4.2 The Captain’s Performance

2.4.2.1 The Circling Approach as Conducted by the Captain

The captain testified that his plan for the circling approach was to visually identify the runway on the final approach course to 36L, then turn 45° left to the heading of 315°, fly for 20 seconds and turn right onto the downwind leg parallel with the runway direction (heading 360°), then after passing abeam the north end of the runway, time 20 seconds outbound for the base and final turns to landing.

However, the combination of strong southerly winds (210 degrees at 17 kt) with the shallow bank turn delayed the downwind leg entry, where the width of the pattern was approximately 1.1 NM\textsuperscript{165} (2.03 km) wide on the downwind leg, narrower\textsuperscript{166} than the normal downwind width. Flight simulations from this narrow downwind position to the...

\textsuperscript{164} FCTM 757/767, Page 4.3

"Thorough planning and briefing are the keys to a safe, unhurried, professional approach. Prior to the start of an instrument approach, the pilot-flying should brief the other pilot as to intentions in conducting the approach. Both pilots should review the approach procedure. All pertinent approach information, including minimums and missed approach procedures, should be reviewed and alternate courses of action considered."

\textsuperscript{165} Refer to Figure 1-7 Circling Approach Radar Track of Flight 129 and Circling Approach Area.

\textsuperscript{166} The width of downwind leg for visual approach (FCTM, Page 4.41): approximately 2 NM.
base turn and thereafter, consistently showed overshooting\textsuperscript{167} the final course. None of the crew, however, commented on the downwind width. Therefore, it is assumed that due to the narrow downwind width, it would have been difficult for the flight crew to confirm the runway visually during, or after the base turn.

At 11:20:02, when passing abeam the threshold of runway 18R, the captain began timing for the base turn. Fifteen seconds thereafter, at 11:20:17, he said, “I have control (我來飛),” and then began to fly the aircraft as PF.

Flight 129 did not adjust the base turn point for tailwinds, and after 20 seconds had elapsed, at 11:20:22, the captain called, “Turning right” (The FDR and radar data showed that the base turn was not commenced at this time). After 22 seconds (11:20:24), the first officer advised, “Turn quickly, not too late,” but the captain later did not remember hearing this advice. The recordings on the CVR indicate that both the captain and first officer were probably cognizant the timing for the base turn had expired.

From 11:20:25, 23 seconds elapsed from the beginning of the timing, until 11:20:33, the tower’s landing clearance was issued over nearly 8 seconds. According to the FDR, CVR and radar track data, it is assumed that flight 129 did not initiate the base turn during this time, and the captain was paying attention to the landing clearance issued by the tower controller while turning left to widen the pattern. At 11:20:24, the first officer may have realized the necessity for the base turn at this time, and advised the captain, “Turn quickly, not too late,” however, it is assumed that the captain was distracted by listening to the landing clearance during this time, and did not initiate the base turn. Therefore, the KAIB determines that the captain did not comply with the basic flying procedure to initiate the turn first, and then to pay attention to ATC communications.

Upon completion of the landing clearance to runway 36 at 11:20:32, the captain said, “Flaps 30, already extended.” At 11:20:33, the tower controller issued a corrected landing clearance to runway 18R, and the captain said at 11:20:34, “Reduce speed.” At 11:20:37, with the aircraft heading 351°, the autopilot was disconnected for the base turn.

Since the base turn was flown manually, the captain would have had to consign much of his attention to the attitude indicator and aircraft control, in addition to keeping external references and the runway in sight, which would have placed him under twofold workload. Therefore, it would have been difficult for him to become aware of the situation outside the aircraft.

\textsuperscript{167} When finishing the final turn, aircraft will be located outside (overshoot) of the runway centerline. [This case assumed civil aircraft using a normal bank angle (25~30 degrees) turn].
That may explain why he did not call the first officer for the completion of the landing checklist after the flaps were set to 30°, thereafter, with the second officer’s incorrect reply to the tower transmission being left uncorrected, and why he did not later remember the contents of the exchanges with the tower.

Since the captain was seated on the left side, it would have been difficult for him to have the runway in sight by himself during the base turn to the right. Therefore, at 11:20:54, he asked the first officer to help him locate the runway. And he queried at 11:21:09, whether the runway was in sight, but at 11:21:10, the first officer said, “No, I can not see out,” and then at 11:21:12, the first officer advised the captain to go around, however, there was no response from the captain. The captain later stated that during the base turn, they entered the clouds, but did not execute an immediate go around, having thought that he would go around after they rolled out on final (180°).

Therefore, the captain did not comply with the requirement to execute an immediate missed approach, if visual contact with the runway or ground references are lost, or if the flight enters a cloud. The KAIB determines that the failure to initiate a go around at this point is an important factor in the circumstances that led to the accident.

According to the captain’s testimony, he had no experience with the circling approach at Gimhae airport, and the circling approach training on B767 aircraft used only Beijing airport. Since Gimhae airport was not classified as a special airport requiring an additional training, the captain was probably unaware of the danger posed by terrain in the vicinity of the circling approach area north of the runway during the circling approach.

2.4.2.2 The Summary of Captain’s Performance on the Circling Approach

The captain had landing experience on runway 36L, however, it was his first circling approach to runway 18R. And the runway change occurred while on the radar approach pattern, not allowing sufficient time to prepare for the circling approach, which may have placed him under undue pressure.

Being unaware of Air China’s Operations Specifications for circling approach weather minima of wide-body aircraft, the captain attempted the circling approach below the weather minima of wide-body aircraft. While he selected and notified category “C” to

168 Flight Operations Manual 4.3.8.7 Missed approach and Go around, CCAR No. 98, Articles 30 & 77.
the controller, he actually flew the circling approach at the speeds appropriate for category “D” aircraft.

He said that the base turn point was missed while focusing his attention on the landing clearance. But the FDR data and simulation results showed that the downwind width as flown would have had the aircraft overshoot the final approach course, so it is likely that he turned left in order to widen the pattern. Furthermore, during the base turn, he entered the clouds and lost sight of the runway and other visual ground references, but did not execute an immediate missed approach.

In the exercise of his command authority over the other crewmembers, the captain failed to take into account the overall situation to make timely decisions. His knowledge of circling approach and execution of flight procedures were not according to the operations manual and procedures, and he did not clearly assign duties to his crew.

2.4.3 The First Officer’s Performance

According to the captain’s testimony, the first officer was assigned PF duty for the Beijing/Gimhae sector on the previous day to the flight. During the initial descent, the active runway was 36L, and the first officer conducted the approach briefing for landing, omitting some items.

When the approach controller asked for the approach category of the aircraft, he told the second officer “C,” but there was no discussion on the approach category even after the runway was changed to 18R. The captain and first officer then conducted a briefing for the circling approach, but nothing was said about the weather minima in the Operations Specifications, circling approach category, circling approach procedure, precise assignment of duties, or crew coordination procedure, etc.

The fact that major items specified in the procedures and flight manual were not covered during the briefing may have resulted from the approach briefing not being conducted in a systematic order using the guidance material, rather, it was left up to the PF’s judgment. The reason that Air China’s standard callouts were not made during the approach was probably due to the flight crew’s lack of understanding of the standard callout procedures.

As PF, the first officer disconnected the A/P to fly the aircraft manually when turning 45° (315°) to the left for the initiation of the circling approach on the final approach course to runway 36L. At this time, the first officer did not turn the aircraft at the appropriate bank angle, nor did the captain mention the width of the pattern and time check. Therefore, it is determined that the flight crew briefing on the circling approach
procedure and CRM were not adequate, and the flight crew’s performance of the approach was non-standard.

The CVR showed that at 11:20:24 (22 seconds elapsed from the beginning of timing), the first officer told the captain without mentioning that 20 seconds for measuring to keep in the circling approach criteria in accordance with Air China’s procedure had passed, “Turn quickly, not too late,” however the captain had no memory of hearing it. At 11:20:54, when the captain asked the first officer to help him find the runway, the first officer advised the captain to pay attention to the altitude at 11:20:54 and 11:21:02.

When the captain asked again “Have the runway in sight?” at 11:21:09, the first officer said “No, I can not see out,” and then at 11:21:12, he said, “Must go around,” but the captain did not attempt to go around immediately. In the light of the time that the sound of the ground impact recorded on the CVR at 11:21:17, if either the captain or first officer had executed an immediate go around, the ground impact may have been avoided. However, since the captain was PF, the first officer probably could not take over control.

As the first officer seated on the right side was in a better position than the captain to have the runway in sight during the downwind leg and base turn, he should have been more intent to keep the runway in sight, and aggressively advised the captain. But he said nothing about whether the runway was in sight or lost, until the captain asked him, “Have the runway in sight?” which indicates that the first officer did not perform his normal duty as PNF.

The first officer demonstrated less than an aggressive attitude toward his duties, and he neglected his duty of providing immediate advice, when becoming cognizant of deviations from procedures, such as the prohibition of entering clouds during a circling approach.

At 11:21:15, the first officer yelled, “Pull up! Pull up! (拉起來!, 拉起來!)” but by this time, the mountain was too close, and too late for any corrective action.

The KAIB believes that Air China needs to devise a means for standardization of the flight crew briefing procedures, standard callout procedures, checklist challenge and response procedures and checklist items, the altitude awareness procedures, and the various approach maneuvering guidance, and operating procedures, etc.
2.4.4 The Second Officer’s Performance

According to an Air China flight operations team manager, on international flights, typically the second officer is there to assist the first officer, by handling radio communications. At 11:01:02, when the second officer said that he would handle the communications, even though he had little experience of landing at Gimhae airport, the captain did not object, which shows that the captain was not particularly concerned with the second officer’s handling of radio communications.

After the runway was visually identified on the approach to runway 36L, the second officer read back only the circling approach instruction among the approach controller’s control transfer instructions to the tower frequency and to conduct the circling approach. And contact with the tower was not established until on the downwind leg, being instructed again on the approach frequency. To the controller’s question “Can you landing?” he replied “Roger, QFE three thousand, Air China 129,” which shows that he did not communicate accurately with ATC.

Judging from the second officer’s inappropriate responses in a number of communications with ATC and also in relaying information to other crew members, Air China may need to review its English language training program for flight crew on international flights.

Although it was incumbent on him as the second officer primarily to handle ATC communications, he did not advise the captain of any procedural deviations, such as entering the clouds during the circling approach, which may indicate his lack of knowledge, experience and positive attitude toward the proper performance of duties as a second officer.

2.5 Human Factors Issues—Situational Awareness and Crew Coordination

The KAIB believes that the flight crew of flight 129 lost situational awareness of danger posed by obstacles, etc. as they transitioned from the ILS approach to the circling approach, after reporting the airport in sight. A loss of situational awareness can be due to a failure to attend to and perceive the information that is necessary for people to understand a given situation. The acquisition and maintenance of situational awareness is particularly important for individuals in complex, dynamic, social-technical industries, such as aviation. Research has indicated that humans have limited working memories and
attention resources. Therefore, increased attention to some elements results in less attention to other elements.

A loss of situational awareness occurs due to high concurrent task load and environmental stressors. The ICAO Human Factors Training Manual, Doc 9683, 1st edition, 1998, (Para 3.3.3) states, in part, that “Loss of situational awareness occurs when a pilot develops, and fails to recognize, a lack of perception of the state of the aircraft and its relationship to the world. Loss of situational awareness occurs when a pilot is unaware of the basic capabilities and limitations of automated systems, or develops erroneous ideas of how systems perform in particular situations.”

Intracockpit conversations amongst the flight crew recorded on the CVR and radio communications with the tower indicate that the flight crew did not appreciate the seriousness of the situation and failed to perceive the danger of proceeding with the circling approach. It is readily apparent that the flight crew of flight 129 lost situational awareness about the position of the aircraft in relationship to the high terrain north of the airport, during the circling approach.

The KAIB believes that the loss of situational awareness was precipitated by the lack of a proper approach briefing when the runway was changed from 36L to 18R. Further, the flight crew failed to configure the aircraft correctly for the circling approach (APP mode for LOC), which increased the PF’s workload and led to a poorly conducted turn to the downwind leg. At this same time, there is evidence that the flight crew was not communicating properly among themselves or with ATC. For example, the flight crew failed to switch to tower frequency when they were cleared for the circling approach. They also misunderstood and responded incorrectly to other ATC communications. Nor did they respond to comments made by other crewmembers on several occasions: a classic symptom of loss of situational awareness.

As the flight progressed on the downwind and base legs for the circling approach, there were several examples of inappropriate intracockpit and pilot-to-tower communications. This indicates that the flight crew was distracted and probably overloaded with the workload to conduct the approach. In general, all the three flight crewmembers failed to maintain an awareness of the situation regarding the flight path of

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the circling approach to runway 18R and the aircraft’s proximity to high terrain. The evidence also indicates a breakdown in crew coordination.

ICAO Doc 9683 states, in part (Para 1.4.25), “Crew coordination is the advantage of teamwork over a collection of highly skilled individuals. Its prominent benefits are:

- an increase in safety by redundancy to detect and remedy individual errors; and
- an increase in efficiency by organized use of all existing resources, which improves the in-flight management.”

Doc 9683 continues (Para 1.4.26), in part, “The basic variables determining the extent of crew coordination are the attitudes, motivation, and training of the team members. Especially under stress (physical, emotional, or managerial), there is a high risk that crew coordination will break down. The results are a decrease in communication (marginal or no exchange of information), and increase in errors (e.g., wrong decisions), and a lower probability of correcting deviations either from standard operating procedures or the desired flight path…”

Doc 9683 adds (Para 1.4.27), in part, “The high risks associated with a breakdown in crew coordination show the urgent need for Crew Resource Management training,… This kind of training ensures that:

- the pilot has the maximum capacity for the primary task of flying the aircraft and making decisions;
- the workload is equally distributed among the crewmembers, so that excessive workload for any individual is avoided; and
- a coordinated cooperation, including the exchange of information, the support of fellow crewmembers, and the monitoring of each other’s performance, will be maintained under normal and abnormal conditions.”

The breakdown in crew coordination was also precipitated by the lack of an adequate approach briefing that did not prepare the flight crew to work as a team during the circling approach.

The crew did conduct an approach briefing for the ILS approach to runway 36L about 10:54:54, and they probably could have completed that approach successfully for several reasons. There would have been positive glide path guidance, the captain had flown that approach previously, and most of their line experience was in flying ILS approaches.
Proper crew coordination was certainly important because the flight crew had not conducted the circling approach to runway 18R previously. Early in the approach phase, at 11:01:05, the second officer, who was handling communications said, “Others keep listening, I came to Busan not too often.” This comment reflects an attempt at crew coordination by soliciting the other members of the team to maintain attention to his radio calls. The captain said to his crew at 11:06:11, “I feel it is seldom to be instructed to fly this traffic route, it is the first time.” This indicates a concern on his part about not having previous experience on this approach to runway 18R. The flight crew did not have experience in circling approaches to runway 18R at Gimhae airport.

The fact that the crew conducted the circling approach exceeding the airspeeds of category “C,” flying category “D” airspeeds illustrates a lack of understanding of the parameters for such approaches. There were virtually no communications among the flight crew to verify the proper conduct of the circling approach before they commenced it, which is another example of poor crew coordination.

Indications of mental overload, loss of situational awareness, and poor crew coordination were also illustrated by a comment at 11:13:01, when the captain said “It’s raining, we didn’t receive any information on rain?” The other flight crew did not answer this comment or clarify the situation, although the ATIS information they had received earlier did clearly contain information about rain. Apparently, the captain “did not hear” the comment about rain on ATIS, which suggests he was under high stress and his attention was dispersed.

Scores of aircraft accidents have occurred in the past because of a breakdown in crew coordination and loss of situational awareness on the part of flight crew. In particular, statistics reveal that non-precision instrument approaches are much more demanding than ILS approaches and result in a significantly higher number of accidents. Many of the previous accidents have occurred with very similar circumstances regarding the flight crew planning for an ILS approach and being changed to a non-precision instrument approach at the last minute. Consequently, training for circling approaches needs to be more intense and adherence to procedures and proper crew coordination are more necessary.

In summary, the KAIB believes that the crew coordination among the flight crew of flight 129 was not attained amicably by not conducting an adequate approach briefing, and the individual crewmembers did not point out errors made by the others. The breakdown in crew coordination led to a loss of situational awareness on the part of the flight crew, and they failed to detect the dangerous situation until it was too late.
2.6 Flight Crew Training

The KAIB reviewed Air China’s B767 flight crew training and proficiency check programs, which may have been relevant to the performance of the flight crew of flight 129.

Air China had been conducting biennial special training for medical emergency, with biannual recurrent simulator training oriented to improve crew handling of various abnormal situations.

2.6.1 Ground School

For the B767-200/300 crew, the recurrent training syllabus consisted of upgrade training\textsuperscript{170}, and recurrent training with four simulator profiles. The training included a ground school course with the following subjects\textsuperscript{171}:

- The CAAC regulations pertaining to flight operations
- The operator’s flight operations regulations and manuals
- Required knowledge pertaining to flight operations

The ground school will focus on the latest changes to the above subjects and new information.\textsuperscript{171} And it was also described in the Air China’s Flight Crew Training Guide that tests are required for each ground school subject.

Air China’s records showed that the flight crew of flight 129 had completed their ground school requirements, but no subjects were specified on the circling approach minima according to the Operations Specifications or Air China’s circling procedure, etc., leading the KAIB to conclude that Air China’s ground school program requires to be complemented.

\textsuperscript{170} The upgrade to captain was attained on Nov 26, 2001, and according to Air China’s Flight Crew Training Manual (B767) and records, the captain completed upgrade training (FFS training hours: 3 lessons / 6 hrs).

\textsuperscript{171} Air China’s Flight Crew Training Guide (B767) 5.7.2.1 Review Items of Ground School.
2.6.2 Circling Approach Procedure Training

Circling approach training was included as the third item among the four training events during the second half, with Beijing airport as the training airport, which has almost no ground obstacles in the vicinity. The applicable weather for training was 1,000 ft ceiling with 5 km visibility.

The training profile was as follows: from 6 NM on final to Beijing airport’s runway 36L, follow the localizer, descending to the MDA with landing gear down, flaps 20°, A/P and A/T engaged, then maintain MDA until the visual identification of the runway. Enter the downwind leg using the HDG SEL mode with the autopilot still engaged. Passing the downwind leg abeam the end of the landing runway, time 20 seconds, then lower flaps to 30°, and start the base turn. Perform the landing checklist. After completion of the base turn, visually check the runway, and when a normal glide path is established, disconnect the A/P for a manual descent to landing.

The actual weather conditions for the accident flight were worse than those used for training, and the flight and configuration operating procedures followed by the crew were different from those established through Air China’s training manual (B767), probably due to unawareness of the procedures and insufficient training for the circling approach.

A procedure of applying data from the collection and analysis of airport risk factors to flight crew training was insufficient. In the light of this accident, there was no terrain avoidance go around training for sudden obstacles that may appear during a circling maneuver. Therefore, the KAIB urges that risk factors at Gimhae airport, obtained from data collection and analysis, be applied to circling approach training.

2.6.3 Crew Resource Management Training

ICAO Assembly Resolution A26-9 of 1986 has resulted in the publication of a Digest in order to facilitate crew resource management training by the members States and air carriers. Training materials for CRM/LOFT are contained in Digest No. 2172.

172 ICAO Human Factors Digest No. 2 of 1986 for CRM & LOFT related training material contains: (1) Background information on CRM training (2) Phases of CRM training (3) Curriculum development standards (4) Course materials to be included (5) Training methodology and (6) Expected outcomes from CRM training. Since these guidelines for education and training do not specify learning contents or their course objectives, respective air carriers have adopted the spirit of the ICAO Resolution to take into consideration the particular traits and cultural background of its crews, in the development of CRM training methodology for application in parallel with flight operations.
The complete elimination of human error is implausible, since human performance is limited and mistakes will inevitably occur in almost any given situation. Reduction of error and thereby the achievement of safe operation will not be realized unless a culture of safety is first internalized. True safety culture results from an environment of open communication where safety initiatives are not intended to apportion blame or to find fault. CRM training based on such a safety culture will be able to effectively achieve goals of safety and efficiency.

It can be said that the primary purpose of CRM training is in the internalization of safety culture for safe operation. Air China’s Operations Manual also stated that crew resource management techniques are intended to improve crew communication and to standardize procedural compliance, and to integrate crew teamwork for flight safety based on common awareness, and to promote captain’s situational awareness toward good decision making.

But the contents of CRM training for respective training courses outlined in Air China’s training handbook were the same, irrespective of differences in the courses, with lectures and videos centered on theory and case studies. It was devoid of practical training courses with various scenarios possible from real-life situations during flight. Training in such real-life scenarios would enable crewmembers to more quickly, accurately and safely resolve problems by close participation in the problem-solving process from its awareness to its solution, through a systematic cooperation by each individual crewmember’s combined efforts.

Generally recommended CRM training courses cover the following areas:

· Specify individual roles and responsibilities during flight operations.
· Emphasize the importance of monitoring and good communication for verification.
· Recognize the availability of human resources from other crewmembers, ATC, flight dispatch, etc.
· Recognize the resource management is the responsibility of all crew, not just the captain.

Flight 129’s FDR and CVR data revealed that the flight crew’s intra communications and compliance with standardized procedures were insufficient, and that crew coordination for problem solving was not attained smoothly. It is determined that the reason for this is because the flight crew was ineffective in managing the available flight deck resources systematically.
Therefore, the KAIB believes that rather than CRM education centered on theory and lectures, Air China needs to develop a more realistic and effective CRM training program.

2.6.4 Standard Callout Procedures

The manufacturer’s flight crew training manual\textsuperscript{173} states the following: ‘Both crewmembers should be aware of altitude, airplane position and situation. Avoid casual and nonessential conversation during critical phases of flight, particularly during taxi, takeoff, approach and landing. …The pilot-not-flying makes callouts based on instrument indications or observations for the appropriate condition. The pilot-flying should verify the condition/location from the flight instruments and acknowledge. If the pilot-not-flying does not make the required callout, the pilot-flying should make it.

One of the basic fundamentals of the “Crew Coordination Concept” is that each crew member must be able to supplement or act as a back-up for the other crewmember. Proper adherence to standard callouts is an essential element of a well-managed flight deck. These callouts provide both crewmembers required information about airplane systems and about the participation of the other crewmember. The absence of standard callouts at the appropriate time may indicate a malfunction of an airplane system or indication, or indicate the possibility of incapacitation of the other pilot.’

However, the CVR data revealed that callouts between the PF and PNF during the approach were not consistent with Air China’s standard callout procedures. When the first officer recommended a go around, the captain was required to make an immediate go around in accordance with 4.3.8.6 of the operations manual, but he did not execute a go around.

2.7 Simulator Flight Test and Its Results

On October 2 and 3, 2002, the KAIB, NTSB, FAA and Boeing personnel participated in a simulator cab demonstration of the attempted circle to land accident profile of flight 129. The team also participated in the simulation of a circle to land approach, terrain avoidance and go around maneuver. The terrain avoidance and go around maneuvers were initiated 6, 4, and 2 seconds prior to impact and flown per standard procedure.

\textsuperscript{173} Chapter 1, page 1.18 Callouts.
The simulation exercise demonstrated a successful landing on runway 18 at Gimhae airport when adjusting the circle to land profile for given wind conditions. Also, it was verified that successful go around and terrain avoidance maneuvers, flown per standard procedure, could have been made, had they been initiated at least 6 seconds prior to impact.

2.8 Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)

In the establishment of procedures and programs to prevent deadly CFIT type accidents during the approach phase, the KAIB determines that the special management and oversight of those airports with higher risk factors during approach are required. Moreover, airlines need to include CFIT prevention measures into their procedures and training manuals, and civil aviation regulators need to institute programs for prevention of CFIT accidents.

The KAIB suggests the following improvement measures to be considered in the establishment of preventive procedures and programs.

- **Flight crew factors**
  - Implementation of specific training for correct situational awareness, mutual communication, decision making, actions, monitoring, and challenging under CRM training to maximize crew coordination for the problem solving in the cockpit
  - Compliance with standard operating procedure (SOP)
  - Proficiency training in response to GPWS warnings

- **Controller factors**
  - Positive advice to pilot errors in order to prevent an accident
  - Understandable message exchange with flight crew using simple, clear, and standard words

* English language training and evaluation of the flight crew and ATC controllers whose first language is not English

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· Equipment factors
  - Installation of EGPWS which improves upon the design of the GPWS
  - An addition of MSAW function to the airport radar
  - Constant update of the program with the latest data and consideration to minimize the uncovered areas
  - Credibility maximization through checks of the software and hardware errors
  - An establishment of the procedures for normal operation and emergency activation system

· Environment factors
  - In the case that weather conditions become worse below the approved minimum, abandon the approach and divert to another airport.
  - Controllers should advise of current weather status on a real time basis to the flying pilot. And the pilot should compare changes of barometric altitude with radio altitude.

· Airport equipment and facilities
  - In the case of a sudden advent of low pressure, altimeter settings should be frequently advised to pilots by controllers, and airport information including the latest weather information should be provided to pilots through VOLMET, or ATIS.
  - The highest operational quality of the equipment for approach and landing
  - The installation of circling guidance lights along the circling track at an airport which has CFIT accident risks.

· The design of the approach procedures and display on charts
  - The design of a non-precision instrument approach should ensure 3 degree descending angle to keep a constant rate of descent instead of a step down descent.
  - The instrument approach chart for flight crew should include contour lines to recognize terrain features and color coding for the flight crew to identify easily the altitude of FAF and MDA/DH. Domestic airports which have high risks of CFIT accidents with high mountains in the vicinity of an airport should have color-coded contour lines on a priority basis.
  - The dangerous obstacles or high terrain along the approach track should be indicated on the approach chart for flight crew to identify easily during flight.
Management factors

- Each operator should prepare standard operating procedure (SOP), of which the meanings are clear, precise and easily comprehensible. Flight crews should be educated and trained according to this SOP. Their compliance should be monitored and evaluated.
- All the pertinent information about special airports or airways with many risk factors of CFIT accidents should be provided to flight crews far in advance of flights.
- Flight crews should be trained in a simulator to be fully aware of the CFIT risk factors in the vicinity of the destination and alternate airports.

Development of the CFIT checklist and positive application

- Applying a CFIT checklist such as the one developed by the Flight Safety Foundation, flight crews should be aware of CFIT risk factors exiting along the approach path and touchdown area during precision and non-precision instrument approaches to each airport.

2.8.1 Instrument Approach Chart for Circling

The Jeppesen’s instrument approach chart (11-1), used by the captain of flight 129 who had no experience of the circling approach at Gimhae airport, had nothing wrong in its chart manufacture standard, but it did not show any reference point for the circling approach, circling approach area, or any mountains north of the runway. The instrument approach chart was developed for the details of the instrument approach, thus it would be difficult to include dangerous terrain and obstacles precisely in the limited space on the chart.

For airports with high terrain around, requiring caution during circling approaches, such as Gimhae airport, it is determined that a separate visual circling approach chart needs to be developed, in which visual references oriented to the runway, the radius of circling approach area, major ground references, warning messages about dangers, etc. are described.

2.8.2 The GPWS installed in the Flight 129 Aircraft

The GPWS installed in the flight 129 aircraft was a MK-III GPWC produced by Sundstrand Data Control, and was the first generation digital GPWC designed in the late 1970s.

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176 Honeywell Company (at the present time).
MK-III GPWC was designed to generate the basic warnings from Mode 1 to Mode 5 as follows;

- Mode 1 - Excessive Descent Rate
- Mode 2 - Excessive Closure Rate
- Mode 3 - Altitude Loss After Takeoff
- Mode 4 - Unsafe Terrain Clearance Not in Landing Configuration
- Mode 5 - Below Glide Slope Alert

Flight 129 was descending, in the landing configuration with the landing gear and flaps down. At the time when the altitude was about 700 ft, it was approaching Mt. Dotdae at a speed of about 133 kt. This profile was less than the Mode 2 (Excessive Closure Rate), which should generate the warning of excessive closure to terrain.

According to a close examination\textsuperscript{177} by Boeing of the radio altitude data of the FDR, the descent rate for the last 3 minutes from an altitude of 2000 ft until the ground impact increased from about 900 fpm to 1800 fpm, and at 700 ft on the circling approach, it decreased to 900 fpm. It again increased to 1800 fpm just before the impact, as shown in the figure 2-1.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2-1.png}
\caption{During the Last 3 Minutes of DFDR Data, GPWC Mode 2 Closure Rate}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{177} GPWC Performance Evaluation Report, Attachment 5 (GPWC Mode2 Closure Rate), August 27,2002, B-H200-17467-ASI.
Figure 2-2: Mode 2B Envelope for Barometric Rates < 400 FPM (Indication part)

The aircraft was in level flight and the baro rate was zero at the impact with Mt.Dotdae, which, as marked on the upper part of Figure 2-2, is applicable to Mode 2B-envelope for baro rate < 400fpm. According to the Figure, when the closure rate is 2, 253 fpm~3,000 fpm, Mode 2 warning will be generated per design. In the case of flight 129, the maximum closure rate was 1,800fpm, which was outside the Mode 2B-envelope to generate the warning. Therefore, it was confirmed to be normal that the MK-III GPWC installed in the aircraft did not generate any warning.

Boeing issued a service bulletin178 (SB No. Boeing 767-34-0067) to install the MK-V GPWC which had the capability to provide operator selected automated radio altitude callouts not available in the MK-III GPWC, and recommended to perform the SB. However, Air China’s maintenance contractor(AMECO, Beijing) stated that the bulletin had not been received, 179 and the GPWC installed in the flight 129 aircraft was not modified.

178 Issued date: May 31, 1989.
179 Based on replied letter from AMECO dated April 24, 2002.
Boeing officials\textsuperscript{180} stated that it had sent the bulletin to the CAAC and to Air China, but the dispatch records could not be verified, since they are maintained for only up to 6 years.

\subsection*{2.8.3 Safety Aspects of EGPWS}

EGPWS\textsuperscript{181} improved the basic functions of traditional GPWS with an addition of terrain threat information using the latest scientific technology. EGPWS was designed to generate aural and visual warnings for the flight crew 30 to 60 seconds prior to terrain contact to allow the flight crew adequate time to respond to the threat. Among the enhanced and added functions, dangerous terrain information was inserted into the TAWS, which recognizes dangerous terrain and provides warnings.

The traditional GPWS was susceptible to nuisance warnings and would provide little or no advance warning when the aircraft was configured for landing, due to design constraints of the technology available at the time of the design of the system. In order to improve upon the design, a Terrain Clearance Floor (TCF) was introduced into the EGPWS computer which creates an increasing terrain-clearance envelope around the intended destination airport runway directly related to the distance from the runway. TCF warnings are based on current aircraft location, nearest runway center point position and radio altitude. TCF is active during takeoff, cruise, and final approach. In the case of approaching this sector, Terrain Awareness and Warning System activates aural and visual warnings as shown in the Figure 2-3.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2-3.png}
\caption{Terrain Clearance Floor Alert Envelope, Centered on the Runway}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{180} Based on replied letter from Boeing dated August 8, 2003.
\textsuperscript{181} B767s manufactured after February 1999 have the EGPWS installed.
When an aircraft approaches an alert envelope, the EGPWS activates caution lights and generates an aural warning, “Too Low Terrain.” Both aural and visual warnings are generated 60 seconds prior to impact, and an aural “Pull Up” is generated 30 seconds before impact.

Through the Terrain Awareness Display (TAD) feature, EGPWS terrain information is displayed as visual and aural warning to the crew, as shown on Figure 2-4.

Terrain information is displayed on the weather radar screen in the cockpit. Terrain more than 2,000 ft above the aircraft is displayed in red, terrain between 2,000 ft above to 500 ft below (250 ft with gear down) the aircraft is displayed in yellow, and terrain that is 500 ft below (250 ft with gear down) to 2,000 ft below the aircraft is displayed in green.

![Figure 2-4: Terrain Display Criteria; Information Display on The Weather Radar](image)

When the aircraft is cruising, descending, or turning, sensors of terrain display are working and are capable of recognizing obstacles within the 30 degree cone from the flight path direction.

If the flight 129 aircraft had an EGPWS installed, it would have been a valuable tool to alert the flight crew about the approaching high terrain.

2.8.4 Special Airport Designation

The criteria to designate a special airport by the Korea MOCT and CAAC state pilot qualifications required for operation, and also general reasons for the designation as a special airport. However, they do not state detailed information, regarding approach
methods, runways, risk factors, and obstacles, etc. This information may not be sufficient for operators to use. For the categorization of an airport as a special airport, appropriate criteria should be developed, including detailed pilot qualification requirements, in consideration of characteristics and requirements of the airport.

For example, if the circle to land on runway 18R at Gimhae airport is a requirement to be designated as a special airport, it cannot be said that a requirement for the pilot’s flight experience is sufficed only with the precision instrument approach to land on runway 36L, or takeoff from runway 18R. Therefore, it is determined that the requirements of pilot qualification for a special airport should be specific.

2.9 Maintenance Factors

2.9.1 Fuselage

There was no evidence of explosion or sabotage in the case of the flight 129 accident.

A fire occurred in the fuselage after the ground impact. The left main gear and tires were burnt, which probably generated considerable smoke and toxic gases.

At the ground impact, the fuselage split into three parts of right wing, empennage, fuselage with left wing attached to, and the examination of the wreckage revealed no indication of corrosion or fatigues, nor any evidence of mechanical malfunction or fire in flight.

2.9.2 Engines

There were no deferred maintenance items by MEL of the engines installed in the flight 129 aircraft, and Airworthiness Directives (ADs) were complied with. Neither was there any preflight malfunction with engines.

The analysis of the flight crew’s conversations, based on the CVR and FDR data, showed no engine problems or fire during flight.

Examination of the engines revealed damage to the fan blades, compressor, and turbine sections, by the engine rotating force at the time of impact, which indicates that the engines were running normally at the time of impact.
2.9.3 Flight Control System

The FDR analysis and wreckage examination revealed no mechanical malfunction in association with the accident.

2.10 Air Traffic Control Factors

2.10.1 Confirmation and Information on Aircraft Approach Category

With the active runway 36L, the AMOS was displaying surface winds favoring a tailwind, and weather conditions were below circling minima for category “D” aircraft. Thus, the approach controller expected the circling approach to runway 18R, and asked flight 129 for their approach category to determine the possibility of an approach by the flight. But when the pilot responded that the flight was category “Charlie,” knowing that the active runway was 36L, it was possible that the pilot may have expected the straight-in approach to runway 36L.

The approach controller knew the approach category of B767-300 to be “D,” having been notified of the runway change to 18R from the tower controller, and the weather conditions at that time were below the circling approach minima for category “D.” Therefore, it is assumed that he again asked the pilot for the approach category, in order to verify the issuance of the approach clearance to flight 129, according to the Gimhae Base Local Procedures, Chapter 8, Section 8, Para 1.182

The pilot should determine the official weather notified by the ATIS or ATC facility, or existing weather adequate for approach or landing based on the approach category and landing minima of the aircraft, and the controller should take actions such as issuing appropriate instructions to the aircraft to hold or proceed to another airport when reported by the pilot that the weather conditions are below the landing minima of the aircraft.

There are no international standards or regulations requiring a formal notification of approach category or wide-body aircraft’s circling minima to the air traffic control facilities. When, without notification from the pilot, the controller requires such information, he/she has to inquire of the pilot directly, which increases the controller’s

182 ATC procedure for civil aircraft below approach weather minima: “The controller should not issue the approach clearance when the weather conditions at the base are below landing minima, even if the pilot requests to initiate the approach.”
workload. Therefore, in the case of applying a different approach category to the same aircraft for the straight-in approach and circling approach respectively, it may cause misunderstanding and error between the pilot and controller, in application of a correct approach category.

At Gimhae airport, the ATC Authority requests each air carrier operating to Gimhae airport to submit the approach categories of each aircraft type by means of an official document, but no air carriers have reported on the circling approach minima of wide-body aircraft. Therefore, since the controller would not be aware of the approach category or circling approach minima in advance, unless the pilot provides the information aforetime, the most accurate method would be for the controller to ask the pilot directly.

The KAIB determines that the flight plan format needs to be changed to include items for the approach category and circling approach minima in order for the controller to easily identify an aircraft’s approach category and circling approach minima, and to reduce unnecessary workload between the controller and the pilot.

2.10.2. ATC Communication Transferring Instruction and Readback

After the flight crew reported runway 36L in sight to the approach controller, while the approach controller was issuing a control transfer instruction to flight 129, the part which he pronounced the frequency as “one eighteen point one” was to be “one one eight point (or decimal) one” according to the standard ATC Procedures, Para 2-4-17. The crew did not read back perfectly against the control transfer instruction of the approach controller, nor did the controller point out the imperfect readback. At the request of the tower, about one minute eight seconds later, the approach controller again instructed flight 129 to switch to the tower frequency. The captain stated that he was not aware of the reason for the delay in switching to the tower frequency. Furthermore it was impossible to confirm the correct reason due to death of the second officer in charge of communications.

According to the regulations pertaining to transfer of control, frequency is not the item that shall always be read back by the pilot. However, according to the Enforcement Regulations of the Korean Aviation Act, Article 207, Para 2, the pilot of an aircraft shall confirm the correct instruction with the controller when the control transfer instruction

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183 Include wide-body aircraft minima.
184 Annex 11 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Para 3.7.3.1 & ICAO Doc4444, 4.5.7.5.1.
including the frequency received from the controller is not clear. Since the second officer replied with the ATC instruction and flight 129’s call sign, and he did not request to confirm the instruction including the frequency change, and the controller did not issue the control transfer instruction again right after the imperfect readback, it can be said that the controller did not know that the flight crew may not have heard the full control transfer instruction including the frequency.

Considering the fact that between the first and second ATC instructions to change the frequency, intracockpit conversations between the captain and first officer were limited to comments about flying the circling approach, it does not appear that the delays in transferring to the tower frequency resulted in a distraction for flying the circling approach. Nor did it prevent the crew from receiving the landing clearance at the normal position at the appropriate time, after the second frequency change instruction.

Circling approaches within an airport where a tower is in operation should normally be conducted after receiving a clearance from the tower, and the circling maneuver should be performed under tower control. For entry into the tower control zone, positive radio contact should be established with the tower, to follow its instructions.

But there was no record of dialogue among the crewmembers regarding the frequency change, from the entry into the downwind leg until the controller’s second instruction. All three crewmembers may have simply missed the control transfer instruction, or the captain and first officer may not have monitored ATC communications.

2.10.3 Air Traffic Control of an Aircraft on Circling Approach

The communication was not established with flight 129 from the time initiating the circling approach until the flight was in sight, passing slightly the mid way on the downwind leg. And the primary local controller requested the transfer of radio communication from the approach controller, attempting to contact on the tower and emergency frequency at the same time, which shows that the local controller provided normal control services.

The CDRS data\textsuperscript{185} and the CVR analysis showed that the initial radio contact was established when the second officer of flight 129 called the tower, passing slightly the

\textsuperscript{185} CDRS Data (Figure 1-6), CVR&ATC Transcripts Plotted along the Flight Track from the FDR Data (Figures 1-1, 1-2).
west of the approach end of runway 18R. The primary local controller instructed the flight to report turning base, but also issued the landing clearance before flight 129 reported “turning base,” after he visually recognized that flight 129 was already close to the point of turning base. The issuance of the landing clearance was proper according to the provisions of ICAO Doc 4444, Section 7.5.2. Because the aircraft was not in sight when he issued the landing clearance, he notified the flight “Not in sight,” which was a normal ATC instruction, in accordance with the Korean Standard ATC Procedures 3-10-7.

The local controller was not aware nor advised that flight 129 was in close proximity and approaching dangerously the mountainous terrain during the turning base, it was probably because the controller was not able to correctly determine the dangerous situation by visual confirmation under the poor visibility at that time obscuring both the aircraft and terrain north of the airport.

2.10.4 Radio Communication with the Tower

Having issued the revised landing clearance, the secondary local controller asked flight 129, “Can you landing?” probably in the attempt to determine whether the pilot considered the landing would be feasible, since he was not able to maintain visual contact with the aircraft. But the pilot replied, “Roger, QFE three thousand, Air China 129,” which is determined to be an inappropriate reply to the controller’s question.

It is expected that, with the aircraft still not in sight, the local controller may have been concerned as he was aware of high terrain near the base turn area. He may have also expected subconsciously that the pilot was flying the circling approach with the runway in sight, in accordance with the principle of the circling approach flight procedure. In addition, he may not have been aware of the situation to recognize clearly that the aircraft was dangerously in close proximity to the mountainous terrain. Therefore, it is determined that the local controller asked questions relying on the pilot’s judgment and determination.

When the aircraft flying in the base turn area near mountainous terrain was continuously out of sight after the landing clearance, it would have been far better for the local controller to have reminded like “Caution, Mountainous Area,” or he could have advised directly like “Check your position immediately” rather than asking questions such as “Can you landing?” and “Say position now.” Then, the intentions of the controller would have been understood more clearly by the pilot.

The provision of these warnings, advice or information pertain to additional air traffic control services, and according to Para 2-1-1 of the Korean Standard ATC
procedures, the ability to provide additional services is limited by many environmental factors including radar performance and each controller’s capability to detect the current situation, and to warn or advise the pilot by means of appropriate phraseology. When the factors stated above become inappropriate in the current service environment, it is recognized that these services cannot be provided.

After the controller issued the landing clearance until the time of crash, it is determined that the position of the aircraft was not in the final approach phase which is prescribed in ICAO Doc 4444 PANS-ATM, Section 7.5.2 and ICAO Doc 9157, Part 4, Para 1.4.13. Therefore, the KAIB believes that communications with flight 129 made by the local controller after the time of the landing clearance until crash were not deviated from radio communication minimizing regulation prescribed in Airforce manual 5-345, air traffic management, Chapter 4, Section 8, Para 2.\(^{186}\)

### 2.10.5 Issues Related to MSAW and BRITE

#### 2.10.5.1 Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) System

The air traffic control authority of Gimhae airport established the value of the MSAW in consideration of the height of Mt. Shinuh (2,076 ft) located to the north of the airport, and low altitude warnings may be displayed on the radar scope, even when an aircraft flies normally below the altitude of 2,800 ft in the vicinity of the airport. Comparing\(^ {187}\) the MSAW system with the circling approach area, the altitude of the MSAW activation bin which is about 2.5 miles from the end of runway 18R was 2,800 ft MSL. This grid was located in close proximity to the circling approach area for approach category “D” (approx. 0.15 NM / 280 m), so that it was possible for an aircraft in either approach category “C” or “D” to activate the visual predictive warning function of the MSAW while flying below 2,800 ft during a normal base turn maneuver to runway 18R.

Analysis of the radar track of flight 129 showed two low altitude predictive warnings as the aircraft passed outside the category “C” area, and three other warnings before impact with the mountain. There was no indication that there was any malfunction with the radar, MSAW, or other equipment that would have prevented the low altitude warnings from being displayed on the radarscopes. The analysis showed that those were normal warnings.

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\(^{186}\) When an aircraft is in the final approach, touchdown, landing roll, missed approach and initial takeoff ascending phase, the controller should minimize the communications provided they are not necessary control instructions.

\(^{187}\) Refer to Possible MSAW Activation Areas and Circling Approach Area (Figure 1-9).
Because of the terrain in the vicinity of Gimhae airport, the MSAW system may activate for aircraft both within and outside the circling approach area. Therefore, it would be necessary to depict the circling approach area or a safety line on the radar video map, in order for the controller to determine accurately whether an aircraft is flying outside the circling approach area. At the time of the accident, the Gimhae radar video map depicted the runway and its extended centerline, concentric distances from the radar antenna, major terrain, the approach control area, training areas and airways. However, there was no display of the circling approach area or high terrain in the vicinity. The KAIB believes that the circling approach area or similar information on the video map would be a useful tool to assist controllers in determining more precisely the location of the aircraft, validity of the warning, and whether safety alerts should be issued to a flight that may be approaching high terrain.

Flight 129 was under IFR, and did not cancel the IFR flight plan. The circling approach for landing is an extension of an instrument approach procedure which provides for visual circling of the aerodrome prior to landing after completion of the instrument approach.

The altitude of the circling approach area at Gimhae airport was set at “0” ft per the design of the MSAW system, and aircraft flying within the circling approach area is not the object of warnings. However, if the controller had been aware that flight 129 was flying into high terrain out of the circling approach area of approach category “C,” he should have issued safety alerts based on his judgment. The issuance of safety alerts can be limited by the capability of each controller and environmental factors such as the radar performance.

The MSAW system at Gimhae airport was designed and produced to display only visual warning, thus unless the controllers had been continuously monitoring the radar scope or BRITE display, they would not have been able to recognize warnings in progress, and thereby to provide safety alerts in a timely manner. However, it is a common practice in many other installations at domestic or overseas airports, as well as an ICAO recommendation that the MSAW incorporates both acoustic and visual warning functions. Human factors considerations regarding controller vigilance during monitoring of radar scopes dictate that the acoustic warning function should be included to complement the visual warning, particularly to alert the controllers and their supervisors to an impending problem that might otherwise be overlooked.

Note 2 to PANS-ATM 15.6.4 states, “When the level of an aircraft is detected or predicted to be less than the applicable minimum safe altitude, an acoustic and visual warning will be generated to the radar controller within whose jurisdiction area the aircraft is operating.”
2.10.5.2 The Use of BRITE

The primary and secondary local controllers stated that they used the BRITE to observe flight 129 approaching 20 NM northwest of the airport under approach control, and they realized that it disappeared from the radar in the course of search for the aircraft after radio communication was lost. Thus, they probably did not watch the BRITE while flight 129 was conducting the circling approach.

Para 3-1-9 of the Korean Standard Air Traffic Control Procedures states that tower controllers may use the certified BRITE for purposes of identifying an aircraft or its position, and for verifying traffic separation. ICAO Document 4444 ATM/501, Para 8.10.1 also specifies that aerodrome controllers may use Surveillance Radar under the authorization and conditions prescribed by the appropriate ATS authority, to radar monitor flight operations in the vicinity of the aerodrome.

Both of the above air traffic control procedures are primarily based on the continuous visual observation of the aircraft on or in the vicinity of the aerodrome, and stipulate the use of the BRITE as an aid to assist the controller to meet his/her responsibilities within the scope of his/her tasks, and not to disturb the principle of visual observation.

The tower log at the time of the accident showed that there was no other traffic under tower control except the accident aircraft, and the local controller was visually watching the location of the aircraft before and after the entry into the control zone. Thus, it is determined that the controller did not need to monitor the BRITE continuously for the purpose of identifying an aircraft, its position, or verifying traffic separation, as prescribed in the Korean Standard ATC Procedures, Para 3-1-9.

When visual monitoring of flight 129 became difficult and the aircraft went out of sight, the tower BRITE could have been used by the local controller(s) as an aid to determine its position. Since there was no other traffic under tower control, except flight 129, had one of the two, or both controllers referred to the BRITE screen, the MSAW low altitude warnings (LA) could also have been observed. An aural warning also would have been useful to alert the controllers to the situation.

The Gimhae radar video map depicted the runway and its extended centerline, concentric distances from the radar antenna, major terrain, the approach control area, training areas and airways. However, there was no display of the circling approach area or terrain in the vicinity, and accordingly it may have been somewhat insufficient for the
local controller to confirm by monitoring the BRITE whether an aircraft flying the circling approach to runway 18R was outside the circling approach area.

It is described in the Gimhae Base Local Procedures, Chapter 9, Section 4 that the tower takes over control of the aircraft under VFR from approach control by referring to the BRITE, after obtaining the inbound information. The primary and secondary local controllers stated that they became aware of flight 129 approaching Gimhae airport by observing the BRITE, positioned 20 NM northwest of the airport, while under approach control. They also stated that in their search effort, once radio contact was lost, they came to know that the aircraft had disappeared from the BRITE screen. Thus, it is determined that the tower controllers had experience of using the BRITE frequently to determine the location of aircraft approaching the airport.

The approach controller felt that the aircraft was flying on a longer pattern than normal, so he asked the tower at 11:20:47 via intercom whether the aircraft was making a go around. However, the tower controllers stated that they did not hear this question. It is assumed that the pilot’s reply, “Roger, QFE three thousand, Air China 129” and the approach controller’s asking, “Does it seem go around?” may have been transmitted through the two speakers almost concurrently, which would have led to interference, or the secondary local controller may not have been able to hear, as he was focusing on acquiring the aircraft visually while communicating with flight 129.

The tower BRITE range scale could be adjusted as necessary from 6 NM to 60 NM, but the tower controllers set it at 20 NM range at that time.

It is determined that for the prevention of future accidents, it is necessary to improve the MASW system to have the aural warning function, to reset the BRITE environment including the video map for the precise identification of the aircraft deviating from the circling approach area, to revise the operating procedure for the effective utilization of the BRITE when the tower controller provides the aerodrome control services, and to conduct the training of controllers in this regard.

2.10.6 ATC for Civil Aircraft by Military ATC

Gimhae aerodrome is under the jurisdiction of the Minister of National Defense, and air traffic control services to civil aircraft operating within the airspace of the aerodrome are performed under the authority and responsibility of the Minister of National Defense.
(the Chief of Staff, Airforce), designated by the Minister of Construction and Transportation, in accordance with the “No. 8, Article 8, Regulation for Delegation and Entrustment of Administrative Authority.” Qualification of Airforce controllers is maintained according to the relevant Airforce regulations.

The Aviation Act\textsuperscript{190} entitles Airforce controllers to provide ATC services to civil aircraft without a certification issued by the Minister of Construction and Transportation, ROK. Air traffic control services to flight 129 which was a civil aircraft provided by Airforce controllers who were duly qualified by relevant Airforce regulations met statutory requirements.

\textbf{2.10.7 The Role of ATC Coordinator for Civil Aircraft}

At Gimhae tower which also provides air traffic control services to civil aircraft, a civil air traffic control coordinator of Korea MOCT was retained in accordance with the related agreement and mutual consent to supervise the regulatory compliance of civil aircraft pilots, and to coordinate with the civil aviation related organizations\textsuperscript{191} for matters in association with air traffic control services, at the request of Airforce controllers. However, the coordinator was not authorized to provide substantial air traffic control services.

In the situation of not providing direct aerodrome control services, it would have been difficult for one coordinator to fully monitor real time for the regulatory compliance of civil traffic under military control during all duty hours. Only upon request by the military controller and not until after something happens, would the civil coordinator advise or take cooperative actions as necessary.

Gimhae airport is one of Korea’s major international airports with an average of about 180 to 200 flights daily by civil aircraft. Therefore it is determined that rather than one civil air traffic control coordinator supervising the regulatory compliance of numerous civil aircraft and coordinating with civil aviation related organizations, if a sufficient number of civil air traffic controllers provide the air traffic control services directly, such services will be provided more effectively.

\textsuperscript{190} Article 27, Para 1, Para 3
1. No person holding a certification of qualification shall be engaged in any air service other than that pertaining to the certification which he holds.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to servicemen who are engaged in the control service for civilian aircraft at military control facilities used by civilian aircraft.

\textsuperscript{191} Civil aviation related organizations excluding Airforce such as Busan Regional Aviation Administration, air carriers, etc.
2.11 Radar Facility

2.11.1 Installation and Certification of the Radar

When Seoul Regional Aviation Administration\(^{192}\) installed the BRITE in Gimhae tower, the same authority inspected and certified the BRITE for the completion of installation according to the purchase specifications of the BRITE Display System included in the design document, and the BRITE was regularly maintained and inspected by qualified radar technicians. Therefore it is determined that the BRITE was officially certified in terms of its technical requirements.

Signals from the primary and secondary surveillance radars, along with processed digital data, were being displayed on the tower BRITE with the same resolution as that of the approach control radar. Video recording of the radar screen showed that the aircraft’s flight number, altitude, speed and the MSAW warnings were displayed normally at the time of the accident.

The certificate issued by the government authority upon completion of installation, along with regular maintenance by radar technicians, officially certifies the BRITE in terms of its technical requirements. However, the KAIB determines that separate procedures/regulations\(^{193}\) for the completion of installation inspection, or certification and the regular maintenance of the BRITE need to be established, or the current regulations\(^{194}\) should be complemented.

2.12 Airport Lighting

In order to facilitate the pilot’s identification of the runway or circling maneuvering area, Annex 14 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Para 5.3.6 recommends the installation of circling guidance lights in addition to the runway and approach lights. At Gimhae airport, lights\(^{195}\) for the circling approach to runway 18R were installed in accordance with the related regulations.\(^{196}\) Automated recording of aviation lighting activation showed the lights were turned on at the time of the circling approach.

Since installation, the clock recording the activation of the aviation lights had been running fast by approximately 19 minutes, which no one was aware of until the accident.

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\(^{192}\) At that time, Seoul Regional Aviation Bureau, Ministry of Transportation.

\(^{193}\) Refer to FAA Order 6000.15C, Chapter 5.

\(^{194}\) Technical standards of NAVAIDS described in Enforcement Regulations of the Aviation Act related to the inspection of completion.

\(^{195}\) Runway lights, approach lights, circling guidance lights.

\(^{196}\) Enforcement Regulations of the Aviation Act, Article 225 & ICAO Doc 9157-AN/901, Part 4, Chapter 7.
It is determined that this resulted from the lack of operations and maintenance procedures for the equipment, thus, it is necessary to establish those procedures and operate the system accordingly.

In the light of the conditions at Gimhae airport where a circling approach must be made to runway 18R with terrain near the base turn area, a circling approach procedure may need to be developed with the visual track defined by the use of visual ground references. And in the case that the track is defined, the installation of runway lead-in lights would specifically aid the pilot-flying under IMC.

Further, according to the increment of civil air traffic volume at Gimhae airport, in order to resolve a problem that requires more time to separate aircraft approaching runway 36 before making a circling approach to runway 18 from the aircraft departing from runway 18, considerations should be given to the development of instrument approach and visual circling approach procedures to runway 18, with a radar monitoring system to facilitate terrain avoidance along the approach corridor, as well as the installation of runway lead-in lights.

2.13 Aeronautical Information Services

2.13.1 Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP)

Flight procedures for approaches to Gimhae airport were prescribed in the ROK Aeronautical Information Publication where the charts were depicted according to the ICAO Chart Manual.

It is required in GEN 1.7 and ENR 1.5.1 of the AIP that the differences should be described, should there be any difference between the Korean criteria and ICAO standards for flight procedure establishment including the departure, approach and holding. However, as of April 15, 2002, there were no differences for these items described in the AIP. Therefore, referring only to the AIP, there was no method to distinguish whether ICAO or FAA criteria had been applied in Korea. It would have been inconvenient for AIP users, because they would have to contact the respective ATC authority or FIS (Flight Information Service) in order to verify this information.

The AIP revision of February 20, 2003 included the flight procedure criteria (for departure, approach and holding) at eighteen airports in Korea to make the criteria more easily identifiable.
The Jeppesen manual used by the flight crew of flight 129 clearly showed the circling approach procedure of Gimhae airport had been developed based on the FAA TERPS criteria, so that the circling procedure of Gimhae airport would not have caused confusion with the ICAO standards.

An instrument approach chart for the AIP revision of August 8, 2002, as shown in Figure 2-5, now has an inset on the upper right corner with a magnified view of the base turn area for runway 18 with contour lines, ground references, and category “C” and “D” turn radius, in order to promote a better understanding of the circling procedure of Gimhae airport.

![Figure 2-5 Gimhae Instrument Approach Chart (revised, effective August 8, 2002)](image)

### 2.14 Emergency Response

After the local controller’s final communication with flight 129, since the aircraft was continuously out of sight, the local controller attempted the communication a number of times for about 2 minutes to confirm the flight’s position, and called the flight on the emergency frequency about 10 times, but there was no reply.
After the landing clearance, the aircraft was about one minute flying distance to the landing runway when radio contact was lost, and no visual or radar contact was established\textsuperscript{197}, but the controller did not determine the situation to be an emergency. The controller then individually informed the related departments using the hotline, but did not use wording to convey the urgency of the situation, probably due to the lack of experience and training in responding to an emergency situation.

About 11:45, approximately 24 minutes after the accident, the secondary local controller concluded that flight 129 had crashed behind Mt. Shinuh, and used the crash-phone and bell to make the initial notification to related departments within the airport according to the contingency plan specified in the Gimhae Base Local Procedures. It is determined that this resulted from a non-expeditious determination about the emergency situation.

Had the tower controller referred to the BRITE, and carefully pondered the location of his visual contact with flight 129, and also the flight’s last reported position, he may have been able to assume the location and time of the crash more expeditiously, subsequently to make the initial emergency notification more quickly using crash-phone and bell, and to notify the fire and rescue agencies concerned outside Gimhae airport earlier.

In the case of this accident, the location of the crash was close to the residential area of Gimhae, thus the first rescue team from Gimhae fire station was dispatched to the scene of the accident, based on a report by one of the local residents made about 11:22, immediately after the accident. Consequently, irrespective of the delayed initial notification from Gimhae airport, the initial emergency response could be attained relatively quickly.

2.15 Oversight Issues

2.15.1 Air China

2.15.1.1 Regulations of Air China

The circling approach minima described in Air China’s Operations Specifications\textsuperscript{198} and in its operations manual\textsuperscript{199} were not identical, which may have been a source of confusion for the flight crew to understand.

\textsuperscript{197} Standard ATC Procedures 10-2-5, Emergency situation.
\textsuperscript{198} Minima in Operations Specifications: MDH 300 m, visibility 5 km.
\textsuperscript{199} Wide-body A/C circling approach minima in Operations Manual: ceiling 300 m, visibility 4,800 m (3 miles).
Considering dialogues recorded on the CVR of flight 129, after the runway change to 18R was notified from the approach controller, none of the three crewmembers including the captain made comments on the circling weather minima of wide-body aircraft, except for the circling approach category “C” minima, prescribed on the instrument approach chart being used. This indicates that Air China’s training was insufficient for the flight crew on circling approach minima specified by the Operations Specifications.

Therefore, Air China should examine its system to establish various procedures and training programs in this regard, and to include oversight actions to verify application of those procedures by flight crewmembers.

2.15.1.2 Flight Crew Carry-on Manual of Air China

Most of air carriers around the world provide aeronautical charts according to the number of required flight crew prior to a flight’s departure in order for the flight crewmembers to individually confirm the data with the charts.

Air China provided a single set of the Jeppesen Airway Manuals to be carried in the flight deck for crewmembers of flight 129 to share. One set is deemed insufficient for crewmembers to crosscheck necessary information during a flight phase with time constraints such as the approach phase for landing.

Therefore, it is determined that Air China should provide the airway manuals with minimum of two sets to be carried in the cockpit, in order for the captain and first officer to crosscheck.

2.15.1.3 In-flight Public Announcement of Safety Information

Annex 6 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation\(^\text{200}\) specifies an operator to ensure that passengers are made familiar with the location and use of seatbelt, emergency exits, life vest, oxygen mask and other individual emergency equipment, including passenger emergency briefing card.

\(^{200}\) Part 1, Chapter 4 Flight Operations. 4.2.11.1.
While in the case of flight 129 accident, it precluded prior notification to passengers through an in-flight announcement, since the preflight safety briefing and all announcements during flight were conducted in Chinese and English languages only, most of the passengers who spoke only Korean would not have clearly understood the contents of the announcements.

For flights to Korea, for the sake of passenger safety, it is urged that Air China consider making in-flight announcements in languages including Korean for the majority of the passengers, in order to preclude language problems in understanding in-flight public announcements of safety information.

2.15.2 CAAC

In 1994, when Air China first began its operations to Korea, the CAAC did not conduct the pre-operational inspection, due to insufficient relevant legislation, therefore Air China conducted its own review prior to operation.

The relevant legislation was complemented after May 1999, and Air China, which had been in operation before then, was recognized to suffice the requirements of the pre-operational inspection, in accordance with Article 121.771 of the CAAC Order 83.

Records showed that in 2001, the CAAC conducted an operation status inspection of Air China, where measures were suggested to correct problems with flight operations. However, judging from the lack of understanding and application of the procedures on the minima of circling approach by the flight crew of flight 129, a program to check and supervise Air China’s flight crew’s knowledge and proficiency should be reviewed.

2.15.3 Korea MOCT

2.15.3.1 Air Carrier’s Assistance Plan for Aircraft Accident Victims and Their Families

ICAO has provided Guidance Material in Circular 285-AN/166, Guidance on Assistance to Aircraft Accident Victims and Their Families, which outlines the responsibilities and tasks for States regarding the provision of assistance to victims and families of the victims of aircraft accidents. Some States, including the US, have specific

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201 135 Korean of 155 passengers.
requirements\textsuperscript{202} for air carriers to establish and submit to the government the plans for assisting the aircraft accident victims and their families in a systemic manner. Thus, it is determined that relevant Korea Act and regulations should be developed for the air carriers operating to Korea to establish plans for assisting aircraft accident victims and their families, and submit them to the government for review and approval.

2.15.4 Korea Airports Corporation (KAC)

The warning function of the MSAW of the radar including the BRITE installed at Gimhae airport was limited to visual warning only, so that the controller had to continually monitor the display in order to be aware of the MSAW activation. This installation was not consistent with the ICAO recommendation that would include an aural warning. Therefore it is determined that effort should be made to augment the system with an aural warning function\textsuperscript{203}, which would reduce risk and enhance safety.

\textsuperscript{202} US Code, Title 49, Sec.41113, Plans to address needs of families of passengers involved in aircraft accidents, Sec. 41313, Plans to address needs of families of passengers involved in foreign air carrier accidents.

\textsuperscript{203} In accordance with a radar enhancement plan of Gimhae airport, the MSAW was exchanged to have aural warning function, after the accident.
3. Conclusions

As a result of the investigation, the KAIB developed findings derived from the factual information and the analysis of the flight 129 accident. There are three different categories of findings: *findings related to probable causes, findings related to risk, and other findings*.

The *findings related to probable causes* identify elements that have been shown to have operated in the accident, or almost certainly operated in this accident. These findings are associated with unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or safety deficiencies associated with safety significant events that played a major role in the circumstances leading to this accident.

The *findings related to risk* identify elements of risk that have the potential to degrade aviation safety. Some of the findings in this category identify unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, and safety deficiencies, including organizational and systemic risks, that have the potential to degrade aviation safety; however, they cannot be clearly shown to have operated in the accident. Further, some of the findings in this category identify risks that are unrelated to this accident, but nonetheless were safety deficiencies that may warrant future safety actions.

*Other findings* identify elements that have the potential to enhance aviation safety, resolve an issue of controversy, or clarify an issue of unresolved ambiguity. Some of these findings are of general interest and are not necessarily analytical, but are often included in the ICAO format of accident reports for informational, safety awareness, education, and improvement purposes.

NOTE: Findings are a key part of this report and are published solely to identify safety deficiencies and risks for the prevention of future accidents. Any use of the findings to assign blame or liability would be a violation of international aviation law and international best practices, including those contained in Annex 13, Chapter 3, Paragraph 3.1, and Chapter 5, Paragraph 5.4.1, to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
3.1 Findings Related to Probable Causes

1. The flight crew of flight 129 performed the circling approach, not being aware of the weather minima of wide-body aircraft (B767-200) for landing, and in the approach briefing, did not include the missed approach, etc., among the items specified in Air China’s operations and training manuals.

2. The flight crew exercised poor crew resource management and lost situational awareness during the circling approach to runway 18R, which led them to fly outside of the circling approach area, delaying the base turn, contrary to the captain’s intention to make a timely base turn.

3. The flight crew did not execute a missed approach when they lost sight of the runway during the circling approach to runway 18R, which led them to strike high terrain (mountain) near the airport.

4. When the first officer advised the captain to execute a missed approach about 5 seconds before impact, the captain did not react, nor did the first officer initiate the missed approach himself.

3.2 Findings Related to Risk

1. The flight crew’s training for the circling approach was conducted with the simulator only for Beijing airport, and they had never been trained for the circling approach to Gimhae airport’s runway 18R.

2. The crew resource management (CRM) training of Air China was insufficient for the three flight crew complement.

3. Air China did not perform the improving action for Service Bulletin (SB) 767-34-0067(May 31, 1989), which was issued by the Boeing Company for the reinforcement of the GPWS functions.

4. Air China provided one set of Jeppesen manuals to the flight crew, which the captain was using during the instrument approach, making it difficult for the other flight crewmembers to crosscheck the information in the manuals.

5. Instrument approach chart used by the flight crew of flight 129 did not depict the high terrain north of the airport.
6. During the circling approach, the flight crew of flight 129 did not use standard callouts defined by Air China.

7. Flight 129 was flown between 150 and 160 kt on the downwind leg, which exceeded the maximum speed of 140 kt of Gimhae airport’s circling approach category “C,” and the width of the downwind leg was narrower than normal, for which corrective actions were inappropriate.

8. The second officer, tasked with handling radio communications, did not reply correctly to controllers’ instructions a number of times, however, the captain and first officer did not correct the second officer’s inappropriate replies.

9. When the tower controllers lost visual contact with the flight 129 aircraft on the downwind and base legs, they tried to find the flight 129 aircraft visually, however, they did not use the tower BRITE, which is an aid to complement visual observations.

10. The flight crew did not reply appropriately to the local controller’s question when the controller asked them the possibility of landing, because the local controller did not have the flight 129 aircraft in sight after issuing the landing clearance.

11. The approach controller felt that the flight 129 aircraft was flying on a longer pattern than normal, so he asked the local controllers via intercom, “Does it seem go around?” however, the local controllers stated that they did not hear this question.

12. The local controller asked a question to the flight crew to confirm the position of the aircraft, however, the local controller did not issue any direct warning or advice based on his own subjective awareness of the situation.


14. The MSAW system installed in Gimhae tower at the time of the accident was designed only with the function of visual warning, which was not consistent with the ICAO recommendation to include an aural warning also. Thus, the low altitude (LA) warning would not have been noticed in a timely manner, unless the controller monitored the BRITE closely.
15. The MSAW activation area was programmed in the vicinity north of the circling approach area of Gimhae airport, which was set to be higher than the altitude of the circling approach pattern, and the MSAW would be activated in the case of a normal base turn in close proximity to the MSAW activation area within the circling approach area due to its predictive warning function.

16. When the aircraft disappeared from radar, and radio communication was lost between the tower and the aircraft, the tower controllers did not notify the search and rescue department in a timely manner.

17. The measuring equipment of runway visual range (RVR) of Gimhae airport runway (18R/36L) had been out of order for a considerable time period, thus it had not been operated appropriately for the purpose of category II runway-use.

3.3 Other Findings

1. The flight crew and flight attendants received training in accordance with the CAAC and Air China regulations and procedures, and they were certified and qualified for this flight.

2. The flight crew took an adequate rest before the flight.

3. There was no evidence of any medical problems that would have affected the flight crew’s performance.

4. Toxicological test results of the captain were negative for alcohol and drugs.

5. Autopsies performed on the victims of the accident revealed severe burn injuries, however, it could not be determined with a certainty whether the causes of death were from the impact trauma, fire, or a combination of both.

6. Airworthiness certificate of the flight 129 aircraft was valid, and its weight and balance were within the specified limits.
7. In the preflight aircraft maintenance inspection prior to departure from Beijing airport, no defects were found in the fuselage of the aircraft, or its systems and engines. During flight, the crew did not report any malfunction, and the examination of the aircraft wreckage did not show any possible malfunction.

8. The GPWS installed on the flight 129 aircraft operated as designed, and it did not generate any warning before the ground impact, because the aircraft was configured for landing, and the terrain closure rate was insufficient to trigger the Mode 2 warning.

9. The controllers handling flight 129 were properly qualified to perform their duties.

10. The weather forecast and ATIS broadcasts available to the flight crew were accurate and up to date.

11. The south wind was strong and there were low clouds and precipitation near Gimhae airport at the time of the accident, and the mountainous area in the north was covered with cloud and fog.

12. There were no international requirements that the aircraft’s approach category (ies) and/or weather minima for a circling approach should be informed officially to the air traffic control authority.

13. The pilot should determine the official or existing weather adequate for approach or landing based on the approach category and landing minima, and the controller should take actions such as issuing appropriate instructions to the aircraft to hold or proceed to another airport when reported by the pilot that the weather conditions are below the landing minima of the aircraft.

14. In accordance with Airforce regulations, it was a normal procedure for the approach controller to ask and confirm with flight 129 about its approach category in order to determine whether to issue the approach clearance, considering the weather conditions at that time.

15. When the approach controller issued flight 129 a control transfer instruction to the tower for the first time, the flight did not change to the tower frequency accordingly, of which the reason could not be confirmed. And 1 minute and 8 seconds after issuing the first control transfer instruction, the delayed initial contact with the tower was established upon receiving the second control transfer instruction, however, the landing clearance to flight 129 was issued by the tower controller at the usual position.
16. The local controller had flight 129 in sight briefly at the point passing nearly mid point on the downwind leg, and at the time of issuing the landing clearance, the flight disappeared from his sight. Thus, the local controller issued the landing clearance to the flight including the term, “Not in sight.”

17. The local controller could not be precisely aware that the aircraft was dangerously approaching mountainous terrain, as he lost visual contact with flight 129 from the time of landing clearance issuance until crash on the base turn, due to poor visibility.

18. All of the Korean, ICAO, and FAA procedures for the use of BRITE or Surveillance Radar describe that the local controller may use the BRITE optionally, as an aid augmenting “visual observation” function.

19. Circling approach is visual maneuvering, which the pilot has to confirm ground obstacles visually in the circling approach pattern, and is an extension of an instrument approach procedure which provides for visual circling of the aerodrome prior to landing.

20. The circling approach area and terrain in the vicinity were not depicted on the Gimhae radar video map. So the tower controller was in a poor environment to accurately identify the situation that an aircraft was flying outside the circling approach area and approaching dangerous obstacles, so he could issue a warning or advice by monitoring the BRITE.

21. The use of the certified BRITE was described in the Korean Standard Air Traffic Control Procedures. The certification standard of the BRITE installed in the tower at the time of the accident was not specifically described, however, the tower BRITE could be used as the technically certified BRITE, since it was certified for the completion of installation in accordance with the specifications and design drawing of the ordering authority (Seoul Regional Aviation Bureau), and was regularly maintained and inspected by qualified technicians.

22. The differences between the ICAO and Korean criteria for the flight procedure establishment of Gimhae airport were not described in the ROK AIP effective at the time of the accident.

23. The flight information material used by the flight crew of flight 129 was Jeppesen manual, and it was described in the manual that the circling approach procedure of Gimhae airport was established in accordance with the FAA criteria.

24. The procedure for the circling approach to runway 18R at Gimhae airport was a general circling approach procedure, without the prescribed circling approach track established using the ground visual references, which could cause difficulties in conducting a circling approach flight in poor visibility.
25. Gimhae airport has the instrument approach procedure only to runway 36, thus in the case of runway 18 in use, it requires more time to separate aircraft approaching runway 36 before making a circling approach to runway 18 from the aircraft departing from runway 18.

26. The visual weather observation site at Gimhae airport did not deviate from the establishment requirements of a weather observation site, but as its northern airspace was partially obscured, the weather observer had to move to the observation site located in the ramp to observe the weather, which could be considerably inconvenient.

27. At Gimhae tower operated by the Airforce, a Korea MOCT civil air traffic control coordinator was assigned to be on duty in accordance with a related mutual consent, however, the civil controller was not positioned in the tower at the time of the accident. And due to the system of non-authorization of relevant ratings for the substantial air traffic control services, the civil controller was not able to appropriately carry out the supervision of the regulatory compliance of civil aircraft pilots, and coordination with the civil aviation related organizations, which were described in the mutual consent.

28. The clock installed in the recording equipment of the automatic on-off lighting system of Gimhae airport had been running fast by 19 minutes, which no one was aware until the accident investigation.

29. Air China had not designated Gimhae airport as a “special airport,” which would have required the additional preflight training and procedures for the flight crew.

30. The Korea MOCT designated Gimhae airport as a special airport in Flight Safety Regulations, however, it did not include the detailed information in consideration of the characteristics and requirements of the airport, and the required pilot qualification for this information.

31. All the in-flight public announcements of flight 129 were conducted only in English and Chinese, not in Korean for many Korean-speaking passengers, who could not understand the meaning of those announcements clearly.

32. A local resident called 119 immediately after the accident, so the rescue guard could be dispatched expeditiously.

33. Because of no regulation specified for assisting accident victims and their families of aircraft operating to Korea, there were difficulties with assisting the victims and their families.
3.4 Consultation of Draft Final Report

In accordance with Annex 13, Paragraph 6.3, the KAIB forwarded copies of the Draft Final Report to China (State of Registry and Operator) and the United States (State of Design and Manufacture) inviting their significant and substantiated comments on June 8, 2004. The KAIB accepted all of the comments returned by the United States (NTSB) on August 8, and made appropriate revisions to the Draft Final Report.

The KAIB received comments from China (CAAC Aviation Safety Committee) on August 5, 2004, but the KAIB could not accept all of the comments returned by China. Therefore, the KAIB and CAAC held a technical meeting to discuss the differences from August 26 to 30, 2004. Following the meeting, the KAIB made several changes to the report. A second Draft Final Report was then forwarded to China (CAAC Aviation Safety Committee) for additional consultation in a technical meeting held from November 1 to 4, 2004.

China (CAAC Aviation Safety Committee) could not fully accept the KAIB’s second Draft Final Report, therefore, a second response was forwarded to the KAIB on December 19, 2004. The KAIB held a third technical meeting from February 17 to 18, 2005, and a fourth technical meeting from March 31 to April 1, 2005, on the second comments returned by China (CAAC Aviation Safety Committee). However, the KAIB and CAAC still could not reach agreement on certain parts of the factual information, analysis, and conclusions.

In spite of several technical meetings held by the KAIB of the State responsible for the conduct of the flight 129 accident investigation, the KAIB was not able to accept all of the comments returned by China (CAAC Aviation Safety Committee). Therefore, in accordance with Annex 13, Paragraph 6.3, the comments from China (CAAC Aviation Safety Committee) are included in Appendix 6 to this report.

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204 Although not required by Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, US transmittal letter is appended in Appendix 7 to this report for information purposes.
4. Safety Recommendations

As a result of the investigation of the flight 129 accident, the KAIB developed safety recommendations to Air China International, the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China, the Korea Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the Korea Ministry of National Defense, the Korea Airports Corporation, and International Civil Aviation Organization.

Air China International

1. Review the Air China training program for “Circling Approaches” to
   (1) assure the differences between PANS-OPS and TERPS instrument flight procedures are understood;
   (2) Boeing circling or Air China circling procedures are understood with attention to automatic flight and mode selections;
   (3) circling flap configurations and radius of turn are reviewed;
   (4) circling area, obstruction clearance altitude/height, and minimum obstruction clearance be reviewed;
   (5) review missed approach procedure if visual contact is lost while on the circle to land maneuver;
   (6) review procedures for wind correction and tracking on circling approaches.

2. Review a method to standardize the contents and procedures of various briefings used by the flight crew in flight, standard call-out procedure, checklist items for each stage and checklist execution procedure, mutual altitude awareness procedure and various application methods.

3. Review the ground school class subjects of the CRM curriculum to improve on the actual sense of the field and substantial effect through the theory and practice.

4. Examine the necessity for each required flight crew to possess their own approach charts for the flight.
5. Review the need to install EGPWS in aircraft, according to the recommendation by ICAO.

6. The establishment of the training procedure for understanding of CFIT accidents and avoidance, and the prevention program, should be examined. And a review is urged on a method of special management of the airports potentially having risk factors during the approach, and reinforcement of surveillance activities on such airports.

7. On flights to Korea, Korean language should be included in public announcements in-flight.

The General Administration of Civil Aviation of China

1. Review the Air China training program for “Circling Approaches” to assure;
   (1) differences between PANS-OPS and TERPS instrument flight procedures are understood;
   (2) Boeing circling or Air China circling procedures are understood with attention to automatic flight and mode selections;
   (3) circling flap configurations and radius of turn are understood;
   (4) circling area, obstruction clearance altitude/height, and minimum obstruction clearance are understood;
   (5) missed approach procedure if visual contact is lost while on the circle to land maneuver are understood;
   (6) procedures for wind correction and tracking on circling approaches are understood.

2. The establishment of training procedures for understanding of CFIT accidents and avoidance, and the prevention program, should be examined. And a review is urged on a method of special management of the airports potentially having risk factors during the approach, and reinforcement of surveillance activities on such airports.

3. Review the need for EGPWS installation in aircraft, according to the recommendation by ICAO.

4. On international flights, particularly to Korea, require airlines to include the respective local language in passenger public announcements.
Korea Ministry of Construction and Transportation (CASA)

1. A review is urged on a method to depict the circling approach area or safety line on the radar video map, in order for the local controller to be precisely aware of the aircraft approaching terrain, flying outside the circling approach area in IMC, and to provide safety alerts. And a method should be reviewed to complement the specific methods and procedures for the local controller to issue safety alerts to aircraft, consistent with the environmental features of the airport.

2. Because Gimhae Airport as a major international airport of which service is used by many scheduled civil aircraft, and the civil air traffic volume is expected to increase continuously, the related agreement and mutual consent with the Airforce authority should be reexamined, and a specific method should be reviewed for the civil air traffic control coordinator assigned at the tower to contribute substantially to air traffic services to civil aircraft, and to cooperation with civil aviation related organizations.

3. With regard to the installation of BRITE, apart from the certification system for completion of installation, a method should be reviewed to complement the procedure or regulation concerning the official certification and certification maintenance.

4. Describe the differences in the ROK AIP in case that the establishment criteria of instrument flight procedure used in Korea (airports) are different from the standard prescribed by ICAO (PANS-OPS).

5. Publish information and guidance associated with hazards in IMC or night operations in international and domestic publications, and develop a method to provide visual aids to pilots flying circling approaches by the installation of obstruction lights for the terrain in close proximity to the circling approach area, or runway lead-in lights.

6. The establishment of instrument approach procedures to runway 18 at Gimhae airport should be examined, and a method should be developed to introduce radar monitoring or other latest safety alert systems, in consideration of the terrain in the vicinity of the final approach course.

7. A method should be developed to conduct regular simulated emergency training in preparation for an accident outside the airport, in association with the regular simulated training under the airport's contingency plan.

8. A review is urged on a method that in the case of scheduled air carriers’ requesting operational change, documents such as operations and maintenance regulations should be included in the requesting papers to confirm the aircraft type’s suitability for the airport.
9. A method should be developed to include air carriers’ assistance plan for aircraft accident victims and their families in the related legislation, in preparation for accident occurrences.

10. A positive method should be developed to recover the function of runway visual range system at Gimhae airport, in order to operate the system to suit the purpose of CAT II runway-use.

Korea Airports Corporation

1. The Korea Airports Corporation should make it clear where the responsibility lies for the maintenance and management of the recording equipment of the automatic on-off lighting system, in cooperation with the authority concerned. To ensure records of the exact on/off time of the lighting system, the establishment and implementation of the maintenance and management procedure including the on/off time check is urged.

Korea Ministry of National Defense (ROK Airforce)

1. A review is urged on a method to depict the circling approach area or safety line on the radar video map, in order for the local controller to be precisely aware of the aircraft approaching terrain, flying outside the circling approach area in IMC, and to provide safety alerts. And a method should be reviewed to establish and implement the specific methods and procedures for the local controller to issue safety alerts to the aircraft, in cooperation with the authority concerned.

2. The related agreement and mutual consent with the Ministry of Construction and Transportation authority should be reexamined to allocate a role and responsibility suitable for the actual situation to the civil air traffic control coordinator assigned at Gimhae tower, and a review is urged on a method for civil air traffic control coordinator to contribute substantially to air traffic services to civil aircraft, and to cooperation with civil aviation related organizations.

3. The establishment of an instrument approach procedure to runway 18 should be examined with the cooperation of the related authority, and a review is urged on a method to introduce radar monitoring or other latest safety alert system, in the consideration of terrain in the vicinity of the final approach course.

4. Clarify where the responsibility lies for the maintenance and management of the recording equipment of the automatic on-off lighting system, and the procedure of the maintenance and management with on/off time check by the person in charge should be established to ensure records of the exact on/off time.
5. In order to disseminate information on the emergency situation effectively and rapidly to rescue and supporting organizations, the local air traffic control procedures should be complemented, and the training curriculum of the rapid judgment and dissemination system on emergency situations should be examined.

6. In consideration of the fact that, even in IMC, there have been frequent circling approaches to runway 18, a method should be developed to establish a visual observation site with an unobstructed view of both sides of the runway in order to observe weather with expedition in a convenient manner.

7. With regard to the installation or use of the BRITE, a review is required on a method to complement or newly establish the procedure or regulations of the official certification and certification maintenance, in cooperation with the authority concerned.

8. A method should be developed to recover expeditiously the function of runway visual range system at Gimahe airport in cooperation with the authority concerned, in order to operate the system to suit the purpose of CAT II runway-use.

**ICAO**

1. ICAO should consider the need to develop a standard that an approach category column of aircraft be added in the flight plan, and to record an appropriate term identifying wide-body aircraft for an air carrier, which has circling minimum of the wide-body aircraft, along with the approach category.
IV. Appendices

Appendix -1 Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcript

Appendix-1-1 The Amended CVR Transcript Signed by 3 Parties

Appendix -2 Flight Data Recorder Plot

Appendix -3 Wreckage Distribution Chart of Air China Flight 129 Aircraft

Appendix -4 Extraction and Analysis Data of EEC Non Volatile Memory of Air China Flight 129 Aircraft

Appendix -5 GPWS Performance Evaluation Report

Appendix -6 Comments from China (CAAC Aviation Safety Committee) on the KAIB’s Draft Final Report

Appendix -7 Comments from the United States (NTSB) on the KAIB’s Draft Final Report