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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Foreword


Therefore, the State Plan for Aviation Safety of Republic of Latvia (SPAS LV) is entirely consistent with the European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS).

SPAS LV describes States’ safety priorities, objectives, safety performance indicators and associated actions Latvia wants to work on for the next year with the sole aim of further improving safety across the civil aviation industry of Latvia.

SPAS LV allows the State to clearly communicate its strategy for improving safety at the national level to all stakeholders, including other government branches and the travelling public. It provides a transparent means to disclose how the State Agency “Civil Aviation Agency” (CAA LV) and other entities involved in civil aviation will work to identify hazards and manage operational safety risks and other safety issues.

1.2. Applicability

CAA LV includes the EPAS actions assigned to the Member States (MST) in the SPAS LV.

Based on the assessment of relevant safety information, CAA LV, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, identifies in SPAS LV the main safety risks affecting national civil aviation safety system and sets out the necessary actions to mitigate those risks.

CAA LV informs EASA of the risks and actions identified in EPAS that it considers not to be relevant for its national aviation safety system and the reasons thereof.

SPAS LV is to be considered as the primary tool used by CAA LV to report EASA on EPAS MST actions implementation annually, although, if the plan is not updated annually, a report on the implementation of EPAS MST actions shall be produced.

Aviation stakeholders must process, document and implement the actions where applicable.

Consequently, each aviation stakeholder is responsible for the safety of its own operations. The organisations must address in their Safety Management Systems the threats identified by them and those identified through the aviation safety risk management process at State level in respect of their own operations, assess the associated risks and, if necessary, implement actions aiming to reduce the risks to an acceptable level. The organisations must process the actions assigned to them in the SPAS LV. As part of its oversight activities, CAA LV assesses how the organisations have addressed the threats relevant to them described in the SPAS LV in their safety management.
1.3. Development and implementation of plan

Application of sound safety management principles is essential for continuous improvement of civil aviation safety in the Union, anticipating emerging safety risks, and making best use of limited technical resources. It is therefore necessary to establish a common framework for planning and implementing safety improvement actions by all stakeholders involved.

SPAS LV is a working document which is mostly technical and operational in nature.

SPAS LV is administered by CAA LV.

A project-based approach is followed in the development and execution of this working document. Consideration is given to how stakeholders should be involved, and which of the existing structures and/or consultations should be used to address the issue and action. Account is taken of the existing roles, responsibilities and consultation structures, both within the CAA LV and beyond. The existing structures/roles and responsibilities are described in the SSP. The actor named first is the initiator of the action, unless otherwise agreed.

For the SSP and the SPAS LV development it is also important that all parties involved have appropriate competence in relation to the action. This is an ongoing process and a key issue for all the organisations involved.

The implementation of the shared responsibility for civil aviation safety is achieved by:

— implementing this action plan through dedicated projects;
— exchanging knowledge and experiences through domain consultation within the aviation area;
— an annual interim evaluation of the progress of projects and regular prioritisation sessions with the aviation area.

The last insights and developments of EPAS are taken into account. Amendments during the year are possible, since the SPAS LV is a living document. The version date is to be used as a reference.

The effectiveness of desired outcomes as specified in SPAS LV will be monitored as part of aviation safety risk management and safety assurance at State level (ref. to Chapter 2).

1.3.1. Identification and prioritisation of potential action points

Based on relevant sources and documents, a number of potential action points or issues are identified, which are considered relevant for the aviation safety management in Latvia (ref. to Chapter 3).

The potential action points are assessed with organisations – for example, from the Commercial Aviation sector, from General Aviation etc.

The objective of these assessments is to get a shared picture of the priority of the considered potential action points or issues, and to produce an order of action points for this action plan.

The proposed candidate issues are recorded and managed through the CAA LV Risk Register, which contains all the information concerning safety issues and assessed risk levels. Priority list is developed based on the information in CAA LV Risk Register and EPAS. The prioritised candidate issues are further assessed with a view to finding the most effective approach to tackle them. The outcome is a Flight Safety Follow-up report, which is consulted with the involved stakeholders for addressing the issue and action. After the stakeholders’ validation of the actions proposed in the report become SPAS LV actions.

A new proposal, such as a new issue or a proposal for a new SPAS LV action can be submitted at any time during the programming cycle.
1.3.2. Project-based approach

Project-based approach is used for the initiating, planning, executing, controlling, and closing the work of a team to achieve specific goals and meet specific success criteria at the specified time related to the issue or action point.

Therefore, the issues or action points set out in SPAS LV will be addressed by project teams. Team composition shall be in line with the issue to be resolved (ref. to Chapter 4).

Safety management tasks of the project team:

(1) Identification and assessment of safety issues in key risk areas through analysis of occurrence data and supporting information from the oversight programme (i.e. full list of identified safety issues is established and continually monitored for the definition and programming of safety actions).

(2) Definition and programming of safety actions, such as:
   - identification of weak controls for which potential safety actions can be proposed;
   - assessment of possible implications and benefits of the proposed actions and issue of recommendations on the actions to be included in SPAS, considering that proposed actions should be discussed and agreed with the air operators.

(3) Implementation and follow-up of the actions, considering that a monitoring mechanism is implemented to verify the effectiveness of any necessary SPAS action (e.g. these may include focused oversight of air operators’ SMS).

(4) Safety performance measurement:
   - to monitor the changes that have resulted from the implementation of safety actions;
   - to monitor the aviation system so that new safety issues can be identified.

The following safety management subtasks are to be performed by the project team:

(1) collect data from oversight activities and occurrence reporting;
(2) identify hazards from the data collected in the State;
(3) assess risks of identified hazards in the State;
(4) identify and implement mitigation measures at European level and at National level;
(5) implement proposed safety recommendations to avoid recurrence;
(6) conduct safety studies and provide safety reports;
(7) propose and implement improvement actions.

Project team develops plan of actions related to issue or action point.

Items to be addressed in the plan of actions by the dedicated project team:

   - nominating the team leader or project manager;
   - composition of the project team and participating stakeholders;
   - actions to be executed considering the issues or action points in risk areas, SPIs and targets (ref. to Chapter 4);
   - timetable for the duration of this action item in total as well as intermediate results for the reporting on progress twice a year.

The project teams report on meetings using a list of agreements and actions. The project team is free to identify and include additional action points or issues to be addressed. The frequency of each project team meeting is agreed within the team. For efficiency reasons, it is proposed that where possible in terms of timing, meetings should be arranged to coincide with already existing meetings, thereby saving travel time and expenses.

The project team leader reports to the Chair Person of the Safety Management Coordination Group.
1.3.3. **Stakeholder consultation**

CAA LV prioritises and designs the SPAS LV actions through a transparent process carrying out regular exchange of safety information via different channels and for different purposes, to be used as means for the performance of collective safety functions and capacity utilisation among multiple authorities, without altering the respective roles of the State’s aviation organisations or their normal interaction with one another.

Safety culture, reporting culture and just culture are addressed during the stakeholder consultation.

Consultation is managed by project team leader, taking into account the assigned safety management tasks.

1.3.4. **Planning cycle**

SPAS LV covers a five-year timeframe.

The SPAS LV is updated annually and can be accessed on CAA website:


There are two planning phases, each with a dedicated stakeholder consultation.

Phase one - achievement of desired outcomes together with a number of ongoing projects from the previous planning cycle is discussed and agreed with the Safety Management Coordination Group (SMCG) on the implementation and maintenance of the SSP.

Phase two - based on selected priorities, a new draft version SPAS LV is developed and provided to the SMCG for detailed comments.

Following SMCG consultation, the final draft SPAS LV is consolidated and presented for approval to the Director CAA LV. Following its formal approval by the Director CAA LV, it is published on the CAA LV website.

1.4. **Document version history**

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>30 August 2021</td>
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**Underlying international standards, recommendations and other documents:**

- Regulation (EU) 2018/1139
- Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 19 (Safety Management)
- Law on Aviation
- State Safety Programme (SSP)
- Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP)
- ATM Master Plan and GANP
- The European Aviation Safety Programme
- European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) 2022 – 2026
- ICAO Doc 9859

**Reference number:**

**Revision details:**

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<td>30/05/2022</td>
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2. SAFETY PERFORMANCE

SPAS LV is published as a high-level document to facilitate communication with the public and other entities external to the CAA LV.

This section presents an outline for SPAS LV safety performance metrics reflecting the EPAS strategic priorities in the area of safety and the high-level safety objective set out in the Regulation No 2018/1139 (BR) to ‘establish and maintain a high uniform level of civil aviation safety in the Union’. SPAS LV is subordinated to EPAS safety performance goals, indicators and targets, considering the 2021-2025 GASP goals and targets as relevant in the EASA system.

SPAS LV supports the EPAS proposed ‘aspirational goal’ overarching the different EPAS indicators, as an alternative to the GASP aspirational goal of ‘zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond’, as follows: ‘achieve constant safety improvement with a growing aviation industry’.

In accordance with Article 6 of the Regulation No 2018/1139, EPAS shall specify the level of safety performance in the Union, which the MSs, EC and EASA shall jointly aim to achieve.

The level of safety performance shall be determined on the basis of the EPAS SPIs and where relevant, associated safety performance targets, as well as considering the safety-related indicators and targets defined in the SES ATM Performance Scheme.

SPAS LV is defined having regard for higher level strategic guidance and, therefore, establishes the acceptable level of safety performance (ALoSP) to be achieved through implementation and maintenance of the SSP and implementation and maintenance of SPIs and SPTs, i.e. expresses the safety level Latvia expects of its aviation system, including the targets that each sector needs to achieve and maintain in relation to safety, as well as measures to determine the effectiveness of their own activities and functions that impact safety.

ALoSP reflects what Latvia considers important, representing the agreement between all State aviation authorities of the expected level of safety performance that its aviation system should deliver and demonstrates to internal and external stakeholders how the State is managing aviation safety.

2.1. Safety performance indicators and safety performance targets

SPIs and targets monitor both safety outcomes (such as accidents, incidents and injuries) and the enablers, in terms of systems and processes (system-level) required to maintain effective safety management at authority and organisation levels.

Safety performance targets are set for process-based indicators, to drive positive system behaviours.

For safety-outcome-related metrics, which are derived from occurrence data, instead of setting safety performance targets, ‘baseline performance’ is defined to monitor the system against this baseline performance.

Outcome-based indicators shall consider as main inputs:

- number of fatal accidents;
- number of fatalities; and
- number of non-fatal accidents and serious incidents.

Outcome-based indicators related to key risk areas are identified through the European SRM process and as described in the EASA Safety Risk Portfolios, which are considered by SPAS LV.

Operational safety indicators are monitored at State operational-level taking into account continuing monitoring through the European SRM process.
SPAS LV uses data included in EPAS 2022-2026 and Annual Safety Review published by EASA.

The summaries listed below as Appendices comprise the SPIs and SPTs for Latvian aviation. Aviation organisations shall go through the summary applicable to their activities and assess the suitability of the indicators and targets from the perspective of their operations. The organisations shall integrate the SPIs and SPTs compatible with their activities in their safety management processes.

The organisations should also go through the national SPIs and SPTs monitored by CAA LV. CAA LV summary covers safety objectives that concern national-level safety work in the entire aviation sector. Both CAA LV and the organisations contribute to the success of this work and objective achievement.

2.1.1. Safety performance indicators and targets – CAA LV obligations

Specifying State safety performance, the safety objectives set at the EU level are taken into consideration.

Safety performance indicators and targets monitored by CAA LV consist of system-level, operational-level and SSP implementation and maintenance (compliance) level.

CAA LV determines the continued appropriateness of the ALoSP. The periodic review of the ALoSP is focused on:

— identifying critical safety issues within aviation sectors, ensuring inclusion of SPIs that allow safety performance management in these areas;
— identifying SPTs that define the safety performance level to be maintained or the desired improvement to be achieved for relevant SPI in each sector, with a view to enhancing safety performance management throughout the entire aviation system of the State;
— identifying triggers when an SPI reaches a point that requires some action; and
— reviewing SPIs to determine whether modifications or additions to existing SPIs, SPTs and triggers are needed to achieve the agreed ALoSP.

A State’s safety performance as indicated by its SPIs and SPTs demonstrate the ALoSP achieved.

2.1.2. Safety performance indicators and targets – organisations’ obligations

Each aviation organisation is responsible for the safety of their own activities. Organisations’ safety management includes safety performance monitoring and measurement. During the development of SPIs and SPTs, organisation should consult with CAA LV or any related information that the State has published. National SPIs complement the safety level monitoring carried out by the organisations and are a link between national and organisation-level safety management. In addition to national indicators, each organisation shall specify any other indicators and targets required for their own safety management. CAA LV oversees the organisations’ safety management performance. Using national SPIs in their safety management is part of the organisations’ safety management performance.

2.2. SPI/SPT summaries for CAA LV and aviation organisations

Headings used in the summaries:

— Safety objective: the SPI in question, and the concrete SPT specified for it, have been determined to monitor the implementation of this objective.
— Identifier: the identifier of the SPI in question.
— Safety performance indicator (SPI): description/heading of the indicator and, if necessary, a more detailed definition.
— Safety performance target (SPT) set for the indicator: the concrete target set for the indicator in question and, if necessary, a more detailed definition.
— Source: source of information obtained.

1) Appendix A: national level aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by CAA LV:
   — System-level;
   — Operational-level;
   — SSP compliance level.

2) Appendix B: national aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by CAT & NCC airplane operators (FW).

3) Appendix C: national aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by flight training organisations.

4) Appendix D: national aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by air navigation service providers (ANS) and, where applicable, meteorological service providers (MET).

5) Appendix E: national aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by airport operators (ADR).

6) Appendix F: national aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by ground handling service providers (GH).

7) Appendix G: national aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by rotary wing (RW) and SPO-FW operators.

8) Appendix H: national aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by General Aviation operators (GA).

9) Appendix I: national aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by aviation airworthiness and maintenance organisations (AIR).
Appendix A

### Appendix A: National level aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by CAA LV

#### System-level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety objective</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Safety performance indicator (SPI)</th>
<th>Safety performance target (SPT)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective implementation of the authority requirements and addressing of deficiencies in oversight capabilities.</td>
<td>SYS-SPI-1</td>
<td>Authority’s SRM process identifies the risks that could impact CAA LV ability to perform its tasks.</td>
<td>Inspectors are operating within the scope of their authorisations. Technical staff turnover is managed.</td>
<td>CAA LV management data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actively react to any short-comings noted and take corrective measures to make continuous improvements.</td>
<td>SYS-SPI-2</td>
<td>Findings detected during ICAO audits and EASA standardisation inspections are corrected within the agreed time period.</td>
<td>Produced performance outcome is above EASA MS average Standardisation Rating or ICAO State average Effective Implementation Indicator.</td>
<td>ICAO USOAP &amp; EASA CMR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve internal and external training, communication, and dissemination of safety information.</td>
<td>SYS-SPI-3</td>
<td>Implemented safety promotion material developed by the European Safety Promotion Network, the Safety Management International Collaboration Group (SMICG) and other relevant sources of information on the subject of safety management.</td>
<td>Updated SMS Training material. Continuously maintained communication on effective implementation of SMS in organisations, resulting from the activities during the oversight cycle.</td>
<td>Oversight data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure usage of competency-based training and assessment concept (i.e. that competencies are transferable across multiple and varied contexts) and methodology.</td>
<td>SYS-SPI-4</td>
<td>Ongoing inspector’s competence is monitored through the identification and collection of assessment data.</td>
<td>Inspector achieves a level of performance that enables them to work independently and effectively or inspector’s performance gaps are identified.</td>
<td>CAA LV management data (qualification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that each organisation’s activities are duly assessed, known to the relevant authorities and that those activities are adequately overseen, either with or without an agreed transfer of oversight tasks.</td>
<td>SYS-SPI-5</td>
<td>Sharing of data on SAFA/SACA, EUROCONTROL warnings and alerts, occurrences data, service providers' information.</td>
<td>The data is assessed to determine the extent of the hazard whether it is a “one-of-a-kind”, or it is a systemic issue with a negative trend.</td>
<td>Oversight data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### STATE PLAN FOR AVIATION SAFETY

#### LATVIA

**Chapter 2**  
**SAFETY PERFORMANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYS-SPI-6</th>
<th>Direct communication between competent authorities of safety measures to prevent accidents, serious incidents, high-risk occurrences and incidents.</th>
<th>Safety communication is assessed to determine how it is being used and understood and to improve it where appropriate.</th>
<th>Oversight data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS-SPI-7</td>
<td>Mutual information on findings and inspections or audits regardless who initiated the exchange of information.</td>
<td>Appropriate corrective action by the organisation is implemented in a timely manner.</td>
<td>Oversight data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS-SPI-8</td>
<td>Joint organisations’ audits shared between the competent authorities, where the activity takes place.</td>
<td>Adequate measures taken by the competent authority to address the safety problem.</td>
<td>Oversight data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS-SPI-9</td>
<td>Performance of oversight tasks formally assigned to another MS, where the activity takes place, under the oversight agreement.</td>
<td>Areas of greater safety concern are prioritised.</td>
<td>Oversight data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ensure that the “Change management” process is established, focussing at least on the changes affecting the capability to perform tasks and discharge responsibilities.</strong></td>
<td><strong>SYS-SPI-10</strong></td>
<td>Improve management of CAA LV internal risks affecting its oversight capabilities through Safety Risk Management (SRM) process.</td>
<td>Changes with potential for significant impact to the safety risks of the State are addressed at appropriate level and actions are identified, assigned and followed to full implementation.</td>
</tr>
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### National level aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by CAA LV

#### – Operational-level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety objective</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Safety performance indicator (SPI)</th>
<th>Safety performance target (SPT)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No accidents occur in CAT/NCC and GA areas due to systemic safety issues.</td>
<td>OPER-SPI-1</td>
<td>EASA-MS accident rate (accidents per 100 000 flight hours) - 6.09 (2019). Latvian GA operators: accident rate (accidents per 2000 flight hours) – 0.00 (2020).</td>
<td>Latvian CAT &amp; NCC operators: no accidents. Downward trend of accident rate must be achieved in GA.</td>
<td>Safety analysis data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No fatal accidents occur in CAT/NCC and GA areas due to systemic safety issues.</td>
<td>OPER-SPI-2</td>
<td>EASA-MS fatal accident rate (fatal accidents per 100 000 flights) - 5.41 (2019).</td>
<td>Latvian CAT &amp; NCC operators: no fatal accidents.</td>
<td>Safety analysis data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPER-SPI-3</td>
<td>Latvian GA operators: fatal accident rate (fatal accidents per 3000 flightss) – 0.00 (2020).</td>
<td>Latvian CAT &amp; NCC operators: no fatal accidents. Downward trend of five-year average fatal accident rate must be achieved in GA.</td>
<td>Safety analysis data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPER-SPI-4</td>
<td>EASA-MS serious incident rate (serious incidents per 10 000 flight hours) - 0.067. Latvian CAT &amp; NCC operators: serious incident rate (serious incidents per 10 000 flight hours) – 11.55 (2020).</td>
<td>Downward trend of five-year average serious incident rate must be achieved in CAT/NCC and GA.</td>
<td>Safety analysis data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPER-SPI-5</td>
<td>Latvian GA operators: serious incident rate (serious incidents per 2000 flight hours) – 2.31 (2020).</td>
<td>The result of the assessment is documented to identify weak controls for which potential actions are identified. Actions are measured to monitor their effectiveness.</td>
<td>Oversight data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| OPER-SPI-6 | Key risk areas:  
- Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I);  
- Runway safety (runway excursions, runway incursions and collisions);  
- Airborne conflict (Mid-air collisions);  
- Ground safety (aircraft loading, de-icing, refuelling, ground damage, etc.);  
- Terrain collision;  
- Aircraft environment;  
- Helicopter operations (helicopter upset in flight and terrain and obstacle conflict);  
- General Aviation (systemic enablers, staying in control, coping with weather, preventing mid-air collisions, managing the flight). | There is effective means to measure and monitor trends and take appropriate action when necessary. Downward trend of “FTL exceedance more than 1 hour per 10 000 flights” shall be achieved (1.45 in 2020). | Oversight data |
| OPER-SPI-7 | Number of fatigue reports in relation to other voluntary hazard reports.  
Frequencies of fatigue reports associated with a specific duty or pattern of duty. | Senior management takes the lead in implementing HF practices. | CAA LV management data |
| OPER-SPI-8 | Competence of inspecting staff related to the use of scientific principles of fatigue management. | | |
### National level aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by CAA LV

– SSP compliance level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety objective</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Safety performance indicator (SPI)</th>
<th>Safety performance target (SPT)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective coordination between State authorities having a role in safety management.</td>
<td>SSP-SPI-1</td>
<td>SMCG group is appointed to facilitate good communication, avoid duplication of effort and conflicting policies and ensure effective and efficient SSP implementation.</td>
<td>Q2 2022</td>
<td>CAA LV management data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSP-SPI-2</td>
<td>State authorities are sharing safety information and take actions when needed.</td>
<td>Interface risk management illuminates the risk, clarifies the mutual expectations and mitigates unwanted consequences through mutually agreed boundary checks.</td>
<td>CAA LV management data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a common understanding of a risk-based environment.</td>
<td>SSP-SPI-3</td>
<td>Policies and procedures are in place for risk- and performance-based oversight, including a description of how an SMS is accepted and regularly monitored.</td>
<td>Planning of oversight activities as well as determination of the oversight cycles in each oversight area are carried out yearly to allow for the adjustment of the audits and inspections schedule, if applicable.</td>
<td>CAA LV management data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that relevant staff have the right competencies to support the evolution towards risk- and performance-based oversight.</td>
<td>SSP-SPI-4</td>
<td>There is a process that evaluates the individual’s competence and takes appropriate remedial action when necessary.</td>
<td>Inspectors’ competencies are up to date.</td>
<td>CAA LV management data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve identification and assessment of safety issues in key risk areas through analysis of occurrence data and supporting information from the oversight programme.</td>
<td>SSP-SPI-5</td>
<td>Availability of Policies and procedures for safety data collection, analysis, exchange and protection in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, is ensured.</td>
<td>Full list of identified safety issues is established and continuously monitored for the definition and programming of safety actions.</td>
<td>CAA LV management data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuously monitor applied Just Culture policy in a fair and consistent manner.</td>
<td>SSP-SPI-6</td>
<td>SPIs and ‘baseline performance’ are established.</td>
<td>There is evidence that the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour has been determined in consultation with staff and staff representatives.</td>
<td>CAA LV management data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve definition and programming of safety actions.</td>
<td>SSP-SPI-7</td>
<td>Identification of weak controls, for which potential safety actions can be proposed, is ensured.</td>
<td>Assessment of possible implications and benefits of the proposed actions are discussed and agreed with stakeholders.</td>
<td>CAA LV management data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gain detailed understanding of the gap between the existing State structures and processes, and those required for an effective SSP implementation in the State. | SSP-SPI-8 | Gap analysis is conducted. SSP implementation plan is developed. | SSP implementation plan and SSP document itself are made readily accessible to all relevant personnel to ensure everyone involved is aware of the SSP and its plans for implementation. | CAA LV management data |

Ensure that the SSP is regularly reviewed and that the SSP effectiveness is regularly assessed. | SSP-SPI-9 | SSP maturity assessment is carried out at various stages, looking initially for the presence and suitability of key elements. At a later stage, the SSP will be assessed to understand how well it is operating and how effective it is at achieving its objectives. | Approved SSP document is made available and shared with other Member States and EASA. | CAA LV management data |
Appendix B

Appendix B: National aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by CAT & NCC airplane operators (FW)

The main Key Risk Areas are defined by their accident outcome that needs to be prevented:

- **Aircraft upset.** It includes uncontrolled collisions with terrain following an aircraft upset, but also occurrences where the aircraft deviated from the intended flight path or intended flight parameters, regardless of whether the flight crew realised the deviation and whether it was possible to recover or not. It also includes the triggering of stall warning and envelope protections.

- **Runway excursion (RE).** It covers materialised runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off-centred or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during landing.

- **Runway incursion (RI)** refers to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection.

- **Airborne conflict** refers to both actual collisions as well as near-misses in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisories or airspace infringements. Airspace infringement, also known as “unauthorised penetration of airspace” is a major operational hazard that can result from the division of airspace into different classes and structures, with their associated procedures and services, and its joint use by different categories of users, often with competing objectives and different operational requirements and capabilities.

- **Terrain Collision.** This risk area includes the controlled collision with terrain together with undershoot or overshoot of the runway during approach and landing phases. It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc.

- **Ground safety.** This risk area includes all ground handling and apron management-related issues (aircraft loading, de-icing, refuelling, ground damage, etc.) as well as collision of the aircraft with other aircraft, obstacles or vehicles while the aircraft is moving on the ground, either under its own power or being towed. It does not include collisions on the runway.

The safety issues identified as the main contributors are defined as follows:

- **Monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes.** It is the inadequate monitoring of the main flight parameters and automation modes, potentially leading to the upset of the aircraft, runway excursion or controlled collision with terrain. It covers the relevant SOPs and trainings of the flight crew. It also includes the considerations related to human factors, especially to the human-machine interface (HMI) of aircraft systems and indications.

- **Approach path management.** Ineffective or incorrect management of the approach path (i.e. not stable and/or compliant) that may lead to go-arounds, hard landings or runway excursions.

- **Convective weather.** It is the situation where the aeroplane flies within atmospheric convective phenomena, potentially leading to aircraft upset (uncontrolled collision with terrain) and injuries to passengers or crews. The safety issue covers the main convective phenomena affecting the safe flight, such as convective turbulence, up/down-drafts, wind shear, hail precipitation, lightning and icing.

The main threat posed by this safety issue is the loss of control of the aircraft after being forced out of its flight envelope by a severe atmospheric phenomenon or after a system failure not adequately handled by the flight crew.
This safety issue may also lead to injuries mainly due to the sudden encounter with turbulences. The safety issue covers the detection, avoidance and flying-in convective weather during the flight, and all the support to flight crews to deal with it before (e.g. flight planning, meteorological information) and during the flight (e.g. on-board detection systems, ATS vectoring). It especially covers the SOPs and training of the flight crew to maintain or recovering the safe flight. The safety issue also considers the robustness of the aeroplane to conduct a flight in convective atmospheric conditions, as per its initial certification and its in-service experience (i.e. continuous airworthiness process).

- **In flight icing.** It is the situation where the aeroplane flies within icing conditions, potentially leading to aircraft upset (uncontrolled collision with terrain) due to ice accretion on the aeroplane. The main threat posed by this safety issue is the contamination of aircraft surfaces or systems that may severely impact the performance or controllability of the aircraft. It covers the detection, avoidance and flying-in icing conditions during the flight, and all the support to flight crews to deal with it before (e.g. flight planning, meteorological information) and during the flight (e.g. on-board detection systems, de/anti-icing systems). It especially covers the SOPs and training of the flight crew to maintain or recovering the safe flight. The safety issue also considers the robustness of the aeroplane to conduct a flight in icing conditions, as per its initial certification and its in-service experience (i.e. continuous airworthiness process). This safety issue partially overlaps with the Convective Weather.

- **Handling of technical failures.** It is the ineffective handling of a non-catastrophic technical failure by the flight crew. Technical failures are those not rendering the aircraft uncontrollable and for which the flight crew are trained to manage them. It includes the human factors playing a role in the realisation and processing of the failure information and the later reaction of the crew to handle the issue. It covers the related SOPs and trainings of the flight crew.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety objective</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Safety performance indicator (SPI)</th>
<th>Safety performance target (SPT)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Ensure that the Aircraft Upset in Flight (LOC-I) risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of loss of control. The process is appropriately documented. | FW-SPI-1 | • Monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes.  
• Approach path management.  
• Convective weather.  
• In flight icing.  
• Handling of technical failures. | Desired outcome of implemented actions is specified and achieved. Organisation’s Risk Register or database contain all the information concerning safety issues, assessed risk levels, as well as monitoring the efficiency of these actions. | Organisation’s Risk Register or database |
| Ensure that the Runway Safety (runway excursions, runway incursions and collisions) risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of runway safety. Reduce the number of runway excursion incidents where a contaminated runway was a contributing factor. | FW-SPI-3 | • Approach path management.  
• Monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes.  
• Handling of technical failures. | Agreed set of actions, including actions suggested by the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE) and European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions (EAPPRI), are to be effectively implemented and continuously monitored (through Organisation’s Risk Register or database). | |
### FW-SPI-5
Problems with landing gear rate (incidents per 10 000 movements) – 2.17 (2020).

- Downward trend shall be achieved.

### FW-SPI-6
Aborted TO rate (incidents per 10 000 movements) – 1.45 (2020).

- Downward trend shall be achieved.

### FW-SPI-7
Un-stabilised approach rate (incidents per 10 000 movements) – 5.07 (2020)

- Downward trend shall be achieved.

### FW-SPI-8
RI rate (incidents per 10 000 movements) – 0 (2020).

- Downward trend shall be achieved.

Ensure that the **Airborne Conflict (Mid-air collisions)** risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of airborne conflict.

### FW-SPI-9
- Perception and Situational Awareness.
- Monitoring of Flight Parameters and Automation Modes.

- Actions of the European Action Plan for Airspace Infringement Risk Reduction are implemented.
- Actions that have been taken to address the issues as well as the measures that are in place are monitored for their effectiveness.

### FW-SPI-10
Separation minima infringements rate (incidents per 10 000 movements) – 0.36 (2020).

- Downward trend shall be achieved.

### FW-SPI-11
ACAS RA rate (incidents per 10 000 movements) – 0 (2020).

- Downward trend shall be achieved.

Ensure that the **Terrain Collision** risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of terrain collision.

### FW-SPI-12
- Approach path management.
- Monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes.
- Perception and Situational Awareness.

- Actions that have been taken to address the issues as well as the measures that are in place are monitored for their effectiveness.

Ensure that the **Ground Safety (aircraft loading, de-icing, refuelling, ground damage, etc.)** risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of ground safety.

### FW-SPI-13
Approval effectively covers the contracted activities and it is valid.

- All contracted activities are subject to safety risk management and to compliance monitoring.

Ensure that the **Aircraft Environment** risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of fire, smoke and fumes.

### FW-SPI-14
Number of events which could involve or involved Fire, Smoke & Fumes

- Downward trend shall be achieved.
Appendix C

Appendix C: National aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by flight training organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety objective</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Safety performance indicator (SPI)</th>
<th>Safety performance target (SPT)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Ensure that pilots could communicate in English at least at operational level of language proficiency both in the use of phraseologies and plain language. | ATO-SPI-1   | 1) SAFA reports of pilots unable to communicate in English.  
2) Failed English language operational level proficiency examinations. | Downward trend shall be achieved.                                    | SAFA reports; English LP examination results.                           |
| Reduce incidents during training flights.                                        | ATO-SPI-2   | Incidents during training flights.                                                                | 1 incident on 1000 flights. Downward trend shall be achieved.         | Safety reports.                                                        |
| Reduce number of ATC clearance violation during training flights.                 | ATO-SPI-3   | ATC clearance violation.                                                                          | 1 ATC clearance violation on 1000 flights. Downward trend shall be achieved. | Safety reports.                                                        |
| Reduce number of Airspace restrictions violation and entering into military zones during training flights. | ATO-SPI-4   | 1) Number of airspace restriction violations.  
2) Number of entering into military zones.                                                | 1 case on 1000 flights. Downward trend shall be achieved.             | Safety reports.                                                        |
| Reduce number of close to mid-air collisions due to lack of radio communication.  | ATO-SPI-5   | Number of reported safety reports.                                                                | 1 case on 1000 flights. Downward trend shall be achieved.             | Safety reports.                                                        |
# Appendix D

**Appendix D**: National aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by air navigation service providers (ANS) and, where applicable, meteorological service providers (MET)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety objective</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Safety performance indicator (SPI)</th>
<th>Safety performance target (SPT)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By 31 December 2021 at the latest, air navigation service providers shall achieve at least Level D for the management objectives ‘safety policy and objectives’, ‘safety risk management’, ‘safety assurance’, and ‘safety promotion’ and at least Level C for the management objective ‘safety culture’.</td>
<td>ANS-SPI-1</td>
<td>Level of Effectiveness of Safety Management</td>
<td>Level D by the end of 2021</td>
<td>National ANS Performance Plan</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANS-SPI-2</td>
<td>deleted</td>
<td>deleted</td>
<td>deleted</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANS-SPI-3</td>
<td>deleted</td>
<td>deleted</td>
<td>deleted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that a high level of performance of meteorological service in terms of accuracy of aerodrome forecasts and warnings is maintained</td>
<td>ANS-SPI-4</td>
<td>Serious problems, errors or shortcomings of meteorological service related to aerodrome forecasts and warnings.</td>
<td>Service provider has processed threats related to service technical systems and functions -downward trend shall be achieved.</td>
<td>Organisation’s Risk Register or database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that a high level of performance of meteorological service in terms of accuracy of aerodrome observations is maintained</td>
<td>ANS-SPI-5</td>
<td>Serious problems, errors or shortcomings of meteorological service related to aerodrome observations</td>
<td>Service provider has processed threats related to service technical systems and functions -downward trend shall be achieved.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E

Appendix E: National aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by airport operators (ADR)

The key risk areas and underlying safety issues will continue to be monitored as part of the joint safety risk portfolio for ADR:
- Runway Safety (RE, RI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety objective</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Safety performance indicator (SPI)</th>
<th>Safety performance target (SPT)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduce number of Runway Incursions</td>
<td>ADR-SPI-1</td>
<td>RI rate (incidents per 10 000 movements in Latvia) – 0.40 (2018-2020).</td>
<td>Downward trend shall be achieved.</td>
<td>Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce the number of runway excursion incidents where a contaminated runway was a contributing factor.</td>
<td>ADR-SPI-2</td>
<td>RE rate (incidents per 10 000 movements in Latvia) – 0.17 (2018-2020).</td>
<td>Downward trend shall be achieved.</td>
<td>Database</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix F

Appendix F: National aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by ground handling service providers (GH)

The key risk areas and underlying safety issues will continue to be monitored as part of the joint safety risk portfolio for GH:

- Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety objective</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Safety performance indicator (SPI)</th>
<th>Safety performance target (SPT)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verify that ground collision events are monitored and controlled by Aerodrome operators to prevent damaged aircraft departure</td>
<td>GH-SPI-1</td>
<td>Aerodrome Vehicle/Equipment Operations incident rate (incidents per 10,000 movements in Latvia) – 0.34 (2018-2020).</td>
<td>Downward trend shall be achieved.</td>
<td>Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify that incorrect loading events are monitored and controlled by Aerodrome operators to prevent Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I) risk</td>
<td>GH-SPI-2</td>
<td>Baggage &amp; Cargo Handling and Loading incident rate (incidents per 10,000 movements in Latvia) – 0.48 (2018-2020).</td>
<td>Downward trend shall be achieved.</td>
<td>Database</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix G

Appendix G: National aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by rotary wing (RW) and SPO-FW operators

Helicopter Operations
The main Key Risk Areas by their accident outcome that needs to be prevented:
- offshore operations – n/a;
- other CAT Helicopters - Other than Offshore Helicopters (Aircraft Upset; Obstacle Collision; Terrain Collision);
- SPO Helicopters (Obstacle Collision in Flight; Aircraft Upset);
- NCO Helicopters (Aircraft Upset; Obstacle Collision; Terrain Collision).

SPO Aeroplane
The type of operations with the highest number of accidents and serious incidents in Europe:
- parachute drop;
- towing;
- air-show/race;
- agricultural.

The highest risk safety issues in this domain all relate to human factors.
The main Key Risk Areas by their accident outcome that needs to be prevented:
- aircraft upset;
- airborne collision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety objective</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Safety performance indicator (SPI)</th>
<th>Safety performance target (SPT)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that the <strong>Helicopter Operations</strong> risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of helicopter upset in flight (Loss of Control) and terrain and obstacle conflict.</td>
<td>RW-SPI-1</td>
<td>CAT:</td>
<td>Actions that have been taken to address the issues as well as the measures that are in place are monitored for their effectiveness. Improve overall Helicopter safety in Europe by 50% within the next 10 years. Make positive and visible changes to Helicopter Safety trends within the next 5 years.</td>
<td>Organisation’s database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Perception and Situational Awareness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Helicopter Obstacle See and Avoid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Operations in Degraded Visual Environments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Decision Making and Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Software and Configuration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Flight Path Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Experience, Training and Competence of Individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### RW-SPI-2

**SPO:**
- Perception and Situational Awareness
- Helicopter Obstacle See and Avoid
- Flight Path Management
- System Reliability
- Development and Application of Rules and Procedures
- Adverse Weather
- Experience, Training and Competence of Individuals
- Handling of Technical Failures
- Operations in Degraded Visual Environments
- Decision Making and Planning

### RW-SPI-3

**NCO:**
- Perception and Situational Awareness
- Flight Path Management
- System Reliability
- Experience, Training and Competence of Individuals
- Decision Making and Planning
- Flight Planning and Preparation
- Helicopter Obstacle See and Avoid
- Operations in Degraded Visual Environments
- Human Performance

Ensure that the “SPO Aeroplane” risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of aeroplane upset in flight (Loss of Control) and Airborne Collision.

### SPO-FW-SPI-1

**Perception and Situational Awareness**
**Human Performance**
**Experience, Training and Competence of Individuals**

Actions that have been taken to address the issues as well as the measures that are in place are monitored for their effectiveness.

Organisation’s database
Appendix H

Appendix H: National aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by General Aviation operators (GA).

GA Fixed-Wing Aeroplanes
The main Key Risk Areas by their accident outcome that needs to be prevented:
- Aircraft Upset;
- Terrain Collision;
- Obstacle Collision in Flight;
- Runway Excursion.

For sailplanes apparent immediate cause of the accident (i.e. safety issues or accident categories) are:
- Collision with hill;
- Winch launches;
- Stall/Spin;
- Mid-Air collision.

Key risk areas in balloon operations are as follows:
- Balloon landings;
- Obstacle Collision in Flight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety objective</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Safety performance indicator (SPI)</th>
<th>Safety performance target (SPT)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensure that the Airspace Infringement risk area in General Aviation is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risks of mid-air collision, loss of separation and disruption to flight operations.</td>
<td>GA-SPI-1</td>
<td>Aircraft flying outside controlled or restricted airspace, etc. enters the airspace without clearance or without awareness as a result of adverse weather avoidance or as a result of misunderstanding or misinterpretation of ATC instructions or clearance. (number of incidents per 3000 flights - 9.03 in 2020).</td>
<td>Downward trend shall be achieved.</td>
<td>Organisation’s database</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I

### Appendix I: National aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) monitored by aviation airworthiness and maintenance organisations (AIR)

- Misleading, incorrect or insufficient applicable maintenance data or procedures that could lead to significant maintenance errors, including language issue
- Incorrect control or application of aircraft maintenance limitations or scheduled maintenance
- Releasing an aircraft to service from maintenance in case of any non-compliance which endangers the flight safety
- Serious damage caused to an aircraft during maintenance activities due to incorrect maintenance or use of inappropriate or unserviceable ground support equipment that requires additional maintenance actions
- Identified burning, melting, smoke, arcing, overheating or fire occurrences
- Any occurrence where the human performance, including fatigue of personnel, has directly contributed to or could have contributed to an accident or a serious incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safety objective</th>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Safety performance indicator (SPI)</th>
<th>Safety performance target (SPT)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduce number of aircraft damage during maintenance</td>
<td>AIR-SPI-1</td>
<td>Serious damage caused to an aircraft during maintenance activities due to incorrect maintenance or use of inappropriate or unserviceable ground support equipment that requires additional maintenance actions</td>
<td>Reduce number of ground occurrences</td>
<td>Organisation’s database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce the number of maintenance errors during maintenance activities, including violation of procedures</td>
<td>AIR-SPI-2</td>
<td>Misleading, incorrect or insufficient applicable maintenance data or procedures that could lead to significant maintenance errors, including language issue</td>
<td>Reduce number of incorrect Maintenance</td>
<td>Organisation’s database</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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3 ACTIONS

SPAS LV is an outcome of the activities described in the State Safety Programme (SSP) and European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS), and the work undertaken by stakeholders in the development and implementation of their SMS.

3.1 Systemic Safety – Safety Management

Safety management is a strategic priority. Despite the fact that last years have clearly brought continued improvements in safety across every operational domain, recent accidents underline the complex nature of aviation safety and the significance of addressing human factor aspects. Authorities and aviation organisations should anticipate more and more new threats and associated challenges by developing SRM principles.

These principles will be strengthened through SMS implementation supported by ICAO Annex 19 and Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 (reporting reinforcement).

3.1.1 SYS.001 State Safety Programme of Republic of Latvia (SSP LV)

EPAS action number and title: MST.0001 Member States to give priority to the work on SSPs

Rationale:

Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 Article 7. Member State shall, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, establish and maintain a State safety programme for the management of civil aviation safety in relation to the aviation activities under its responsibility (the ‘State Safety Programme’). That programme shall be commensurate with the size and the complexity of those activities and shall be consistent with the European Aviation Safety Programme.

The State Safety Programme shall include at least the elements related to State safety management responsibilities described in the international standards and recommended practices.

The State Safety Programme shall specify, taking into account the objectives set out in Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 Article 1 and the level of safety performance referred to in Article 6(3), the level of safety performance to be achieved at national level in respect of the aviation activities under the responsibility of the Member State concerned.

Stakeholder responsible for the implementation and maintenance:

Civil Aviation Agency of the Republic of Latvia (CAA LV).

Aviation organisations are processing the SSP LV with reference to their operations.

Desired outcomes/Actions:

- Ensure effective implementation of the authority requirements and address deficiencies in oversight capabilities, as a prerequisite for effective SSP implementation.

Actions:

- SYS.001.1
  Lay down Cabinet Regulation on the “State Safety Programme”, to describe SSP LV structure and associated programmes, how its various components work together, as well as the roles of the different State aviation authorities.
CAA LV has achieved improvements in the definition of the management processes, clearly specifying safety accountabilities and responsibilities as documented in CAA LV Management Manual – Processes Management.

- SYS.001.2
  Conduct a gap analysis. The gap analysis aims to gain a detailed understanding of the gap between the existing State structures and processes, and those required for an effective SSP implementation in the State.

- SYS.001.3
  Develop an SSP LV implementation plan. The SSP LV implementation aims to progressively enhance the existing State safety oversight and safety management processes.

- SYS.001.4
  Establish Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) and ‘baseline performance’ to monitor the system against this baseline performance to measure the effectiveness of achieved outcome, i.e. effective SSP LV and effective implementation of SMS in aviation organisations.

- Ensure effective coordination between State authorities having a role in safety management.

Actions:

- SYS.001.5
  Establish a suitable coordination group with representation from the impacted aviation authorities with responsibilities related to the implementation and maintenance of the SSP LV, including Accident Investigation Authority as well as Military Aviation Authority (requirement established by Cabinet Regulation No 755 (2021) “Regulation on State Safety Programme”).

- SYS.001.6
  To enhance safety within the State CAA LV carries out regular exchange of information on the implementation of the SSP LV, i.e. engages with its stakeholders via different channels and for different purposes, to be used as means for the performance of collective safety functions and capacity utilisation among multiple authorities, without altering the respective roles of the State’s aviation organisations or their normal interaction with one another.

- SYS.001.7
  CAA LV prioritises and designs the SPAS LV actions through a transparent process carrying out regular exchange of safety information.

- Ensure that inspectors have the right competencies to support the evolution towards risk- and performance-based oversight (RBO / PBO).

Actions:

- SYS.001.9
  CAA LV identifies and addresses the competencies required for effective implementation of SSP LV, taking into account the roles and responsibilities under the SSP LV performed by its personnel. These competencies are in addition to those required for the conduct of compliance oversight and are addressed by training existing staff or by hiring additional staff.

- SYS.001.10
  To ensure that all relevant technical staff in the State are properly qualified, CAA LV determines the most appropriate training provisions for senior management, inspectors,
personnel responsible for data analysis, safety objectives, SPIs and SPTs, aviation medical examiners and medical assessors, as well as for service provider safety investigators.

- SYS.001.11
  CAA LV develops internal training policies and procedures, and SSP and SMS training programme for relevant staff.

- SYS.001.12
  Usage of safety training programmes for personnel involved in SSP-related duties are to be coordinated among State organisations, as appropriate. The aim is to ensure that a person or team addresses each aspect of the SSP, and that they are trained to perform the allocated role. This will allow inspectors as well as staff from different State aviation authorities to better understand safety risks across various sectors.

- Ensure that policies and procedures are in place for risk- and performance-based oversight (RBO / PBO), including a description of how an SMS is accepted and regularly monitored.

Actions:

- SYS.001.13
  Link the RBO / PBO approach to the objectives of the SSP LV and of the management system of the competent authority.

- SYS.001.14
  Establish a common understanding of a risk-based environment.

- SYS.001.15
  Establish mechanisms to ensure the capture and storage of data on hazards and safety risks for each overseen organisation, as well as at aggregated State level. Mechanisms to develop information from the stored data, and to actively exchange safety information with service providers and/or other States as appropriate should also be considered.

- SYS.001.16
  Perform a detailed training needs analysis in order to support the CAA LV oversight teams to deliver, further refine and standardise the PBO process across the aviation entities it is applied to.

- SYS.001.17
  Provide a central planning function to create and maintain a sequence of actions related to the development of organisations PBO programmes.

- SYS.001.18
  Establish means to determine whether service providers’ SMS is acceptable.

- SYS.001.19
  Review and ensure that the service provider’s SMS remains effective.

- Establish policies and procedures for safety data collection, analysis, exchange and protection, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 376/2014.

Action:

- SYS.001.20
SPIs and ‘baseline performance’ are to be established to monitor applied Just Culture policy in a fair and consistent manner. There is evidence that the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour has been determined in consultation with staff and staff representatives.

- Establish a process to determine SPIs at State level addressing outcomes and processes.

Action:

- SYS.001.21
  Establish, maintain and continuously improve the process on the selection and definition of SPIs and SPTs at State level.

  “Outcome-based SPIs” measure events that have already occurred. Type 1 “Low probability / high severity”: outcomes such as accidents or serious incidents. Type 2 “High probability/low severity”: outcomes that did not necessarily manifest themselves in a serious accident or incident, these are sometimes also referred to as precursor indicators.

  “Activity or process SPIs” measure processes and inputs being implemented to improve or maintain safety.

- Ensure that an approved SSP document is made available and shared with other Member States and EASA.

Action:

- SYS.001.22
  Upload SSP LV, SPAS LV and any other relevant material using EASA online platform for MSs.

  Provide an up-to-date SPAS LV at least annually or, where the SPAS LV is not updated annually, a report on the implementation of EPAS actions.

- Ensure that the SSP is regularly reviewed and that the SSP effectiveness is regularly assessed.

Action:

- SYS.001.23
  Conduct an SSP maturity assessment that can be carried out at various stages, looking initially for the presence and suitability of key elements. At a later stage, the SSP will be assessed to understand how well it is operating and how effective it is at achieving its objectives.

Timetable:

- Updated SSP LV document is planned to be available in 2022.
- Effective SSP LV is planned to be implemented in 2025.

Deliverable:

SSP LV version 4 issued in 2023.

3.1.2 SYS.002 Promotion of SMS

EPAS action number and title: MST.0002 Promotion of SMS

Rationale:
Encourage implementation of safety promotion material developed by the European Safety Promotion Network, the Safety Management International Collaboration Group (SMICG) and other relevant sources of information on the subject of safety management.

Stakeholder responsible for the implementation:
CAA LV

Desired outcome / Actions:
Common understanding of safety management and SMS / SSP principles and requirements, facilitating their implementation across the international aviation community.

Action:
- SYS.002.1
  Improve internal and external training, communication, and dissemination of safety information.

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
- Updated SMS Training material.
- Continuously maintained communication on effective implementation of SMS in organisations, resulting from the activities during the oversight cycle.
- Usage of CAA LV homepage and public relations to disseminate safety information.

3.1.3 SYS.003 Flight data monitoring

EPAS action number and title: MST.0003 Member States should maintain a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) programmes.

Rationale:
States should maintain a regular dialogue with their operators on FDM programmes, with the objectives of:
- promoting the operational safety benefits of FDM and the exchange of experience between subject matter experts,
- encouraging operators to make use of good-practice documents produced by EOFDM and similar safety initiatives.

Stakeholder responsible for the implementation:
CAA LV as organiser of the information event.

Operators using practical guidance on integrating an FDM programme with the operator’s SMS, and in particular on linking FDM with other data sources.

Desired outcome/Actions:
Effective performance of FDM programme, i.e. FDM programme is performing at an optimal level depending on the size and structure of the organisation, the human resource invested, the degree of
participations from unions and, most importantly, the level of maturity of the organisation’s safety culture.

Actions:
- SYS.003.1
  Publish on CAA LV website, as part of SMS-related information, general information on EOFDM activities.
- SYS.003.2
  Update the FDM programme assessment process, taking into account information on the principal issues, as well as industry best practices and advice on how to best prepare a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Key performance indicators (KPI), designed to monitor the performance of an operator’s FDM programme, are to be considered.
- SYS.003.3
  Organise an information event to present EOFDM good-practice documents to their CAT operators. Safety managers and FDM programme managers of all the operators concerned should be invited.

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
Correct integration of an FDM programme with other safety data collection processes and into the SMS, i.e. proactively used FDM data for monitoring of operational trends and behaviors, and FDM programme performance is monitored by KPI.

3.1.4 SYS.004 SMS performance assessment

EPAS action number and title: MST.0026 SMS assessment

Rationale:
Without prejudice to any obligations stemming from the SES ATM Performance Scheme, MSs should make use of the EASA management system assessment tool to support risk- and performance-based oversight. MSs should provide feedback to EASA on how the tool is used for the purpose of standardisation and continual improvement of the assessment tool.

MSs should regularly inform EASA about the status of compliance with SMS requirements and SMS performance of their industry.

Stakeholder responsible for the implementation:
CAA LV as oversight authority.

Desired outcome/Actions:
Maintained and continuously improved risk- and performance-based oversight and use of harmonised SMS evaluation criteria among MSs.

Actions:
- SYS.004.1
Maintain, continuously review and improve technical guidance on the implementation of SMS. It is important to have useful guidance material to help both organizations and authority understand the intent and application of the regulation.

- SYS.004.2
  Facilitate the identification by the operator a number of key risk areas for which an in-depth analysis should be carried out to determine the completeness of safety issues that have contributed to those risk areas and to assess the level of control of over the most relevant safety issues. This assessment would consider the increase/decrease of exposure to the relevant hazard, the effectiveness of existing controls and the expected risk reduction by committed safety actions.

- SYS.004.3
  Develop and review the relevance of SPIs consulting with industry. Determine appropriate metrics at a State level.

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
- Maintained and continuously improved technical guidance on the implementation of SMS.
- Improved Management System assessment tool, based on EASA Management System Assessment Tool.
- Maintained and continuously improved risk-based oversight programme, including oversight schedule development tool, that utilizes the organisation’s risk profile and overall safety performance to determine an appropriate oversight planning cycle.

3.1.5 SYS.005 SPAS LV

EPAS action number and title: MST.0028 Member States to establish and maintain a State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS).

Rationale:
Member States shall ensure that a SPAS is maintained and regularly reviewed. Member States shall identify in SPAS the main safety risks affecting their national civil aviation safety system and shall set out the necessary actions to mitigate those risks. In doing so, Member States shall consider the pan-European safety risk areas identified in EPAS for the various aviation domains as part of their SRM process and, when necessary, identify suitable mitigation actions within their SPAS. In addition to the actions, SPAS shall also consider how to measure their effectiveness. MSs shall justify why action is not taken for a certain risk area identified in EPAS.

Stakeholder responsible for the implementation:
CAA LV: SPAS LV development and implementation.
Aviation organisations: SPAS LV implementation in their operations.

Actions:
- SYS.005.1
Reflect the EPAS actions on the issues that concern an individual organisation, a system element or the entire aviation system (systemic issues). In most scenarios, these problems are related to human factors, human performance limitations, competence of personnel, socioeconomic factors or to deficiencies in organisational processes and procedures, whether at authority or industry level. This area also includes the impact of security on safety.

- SYS.005.2
  Reflect the EPAS actions to reduce the probability of events that result in incidents and accidents and mitigate the seriousness of their consequences (operational issues), i.e. grouping of all actions in the area of CAT by aeroplane, NCC (Business Aviation), SPO aeroplanes, rotorcraft operations and General Aviation (operational issues).

- SYS.005.3
  Define actions to address safety issues related to key risk areas in individual domains of aviation.

- SYS.005.4
  Reflect the EPAS actions to improve safety emerged drones, security risks that affect aviation safety, new business models as well as new products, systems, technologies and operations (emerging issues).

- SYS.005.5
  Reflect the EPAS safety actions addressing issues emerging from standardisation activities, with focus on the safety oversight responsibilities of the MSs.

Timetable:
Continuous, annual update.

Deliverable:
Developed, endorsed and published SPAS LV, including safety objectives, goals, indicators and targets. SPAS LV reflects the EPAS actions as applicable to the State and identifies the main safety risks at national level in addition to the ones identified in EPAS.

### 3.1.6 SYS.006 Oversight and Standardisation

EPAS action number and title:

- MST.0032 Oversight capabilities/focus area.
- MST.0033 Language proficiency requirements - share best practices, to identify areas for improvement for the uniform and harmonised LPR implementation.
- MST.0034 Oversight capabilities/focus area: flight time specifications schemes.
- MST.0035 Oversight capabilities/focus area: fraud cases in Part-147.
- MST.0037 Foster a common understanding and oversight of Human Factors.

Rationale:
Authority requirements, introduced in the rules developed under the first and second extension of the EASA scope, define what MSs are expected to implement when performing oversight of the organisations under their responsibility. In particular, they introduced the concept of risk-based oversight with the objective of addressing safety issues with a consideration to efficiency.
The safety actions in this area are aimed at addressing issues emerging from standardisation activities, with focus on the safety oversight responsibilities of the MSs. The conclusions of the EASA 2019 SAR are also taken into account.

The identified areas of concern are considered enablers of a robust safety oversight system, as expected to be in place according to the requirements in force:

1. ability and determination to conduct effective oversight;
2. ability to identify risks through a process to collect and analyse data;
3. ability to mitigate the identified risks in an effective way, implying measurement of performance and leading to continuous improvement;
4. willingness and possibility to exchange information and cooperate with other CAs;
5. ability to ensure the availability of adequate personnel, where ‘adequate’ includes the notion of sufficient training and proper qualification; and
6. focus on the implementation of effective management systems in industry, wherever required by the regulations in force.

Stakeholder responsible for the implementation:

CAA LV

Desired outcomes/Actions:

- Availability of adequate personnel in CAA LV

Actions:

- SYS.006.1
  Take necessary measures to ensure that qualified personnel, performing safety oversight functions, are recruited and retained.

- SYS.006.2
  Ensure usage of competency-based training and assessment concept (i.e. that competencies are transferable across multiple and varied contexts) and methodology.

- Cooperative oversight in all sectors.
  MSs to ensure that the applicable authority requirements are adhered to in all sectors. The objective is to ensure that each organisation’s activities are duly assessed, known to the relevant authorities and that those activities are adequately overseen, either with or without an agreed transfer of oversight tasks.

Action:

- SYS.006.3
  Ensure that the oversight scope is supplemented by those activities performed by persons or organisations established or residing in another MS on the basis of the safety priorities, as well as of past oversight activities. Activities are carried out in accordance with principles of cooperative oversight.

- Organisations’ management system in all sectors.
  MSs to foster the ability of CAs to assess and oversee the organisations’ management system in all sectors. This will focus in particular on safety culture, the governance structure of the organisation, the interaction between the risk identification/assessment process and the organisation’s monitoring process, the use of inspection findings and safety information such
as occurrences, incidents, and accidents. This should lead CAs to adapt and improve their oversight system.

Actions:

- SYS.006.4
  
  Ensure that CAA LV management system, according to the established policy and the area of competence, identifies changes that affect CAA LV capability to perform its tasks and discharge its responsibilities as defined in BR and the delegated acts and implementing acts adopted on the basis thereof. This system shall enable it to act as appropriate to ensure that its management system remains adequate and effective.

- SYS.006.5
  
  Establish and maintain Safety Risk Management (SRM) process for managing CAA LV internal risks affecting its oversight capabilities. Ensure that changes affecting oversight capabilities are addressed through the same SRM process.

- SYS.006.6
  
  Assess CAA LV internal organisation’s safety culture and how it affects CAA LV oversight capabilities, in order to know if and where improvements are required. Based on outcome results, consider need of changes to integrate and harmonize organisations’ SMS oversight across own oversight divisions.

- English Language Proficiency.
  
  MS to focus on the implementation of language proficiency requirements, to identify areas for improvement for the uniform and harmonised implementation and identify best practices to be shared with industry and other Member States.

Action:

- SYS.006.7
  
  Provide feedback to EASA on how the LPRI is implemented, including the uptake by ATOs to deliver training in English, for the purpose of harmonisation and uniform implementation.

- Flight time specifications schemes.
  
  MSs to ensure that the CAs possess the required competence to approve and oversee the operators’ flight time specifications schemes, in particular those including fatigue risk management. CAs should focus on the verification of effective implementation of processes established to meet operators’ responsibilities requirements and to ensure an adequate management of fatigue risks. CAs should consider the latter when performing audits of the operator’s management system.

Action:

- SYS.006.8
  
  Carry out ongoing monitoring of operators’ safety assurance outcomes, considering that these outcomes are to be an indicator of the effective implementation of the SMS/FRMS processes.

- Focused oversight on cases of fraud in Part-147 organisations.
  
  MSs to focus on the risk of fraud in examinations, including by adding specific items in audit checklists and collecting data on the actual cases of fraud.
Action:
  - SYS.006.9
    Add specific items in audit checklists to focus on the risk of fraud in examinations. Collect data on the actual cases of fraud.
  
  - Implementation of the competency framework, and plan and conduct the training for the respective regulatory staff in the area of Human Factors.

Action:
  - SYS.006.10

The task includes some preparatory activities which will be performed by EASA with the support of the Human Factor Collaborative Analysis Group (HF CAG) in terms of:

  — development of guidance and tools for the competency assessment of regulatory staff before and after training;
  — guidance for the appropriate level of Human Factors competency for Human Factors trainers;
  — development of promotion material to be provided as guidance to Member States and encourage implementation.

These guidance and tools will be provided to the MS competent authorities to organise the implementation of the competency framework, and plan and conduct the training for the respective regulatory staff.

Timetable:
Continuous, annual update.

Deliverable:

Oversight and standardisation action points are included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendix A (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

3.1.7 SYS.007 Safety Promotion Campaigns

EPAS action number and title: MST.0039 Safety promotion to support ramp-up / safe return to operations

Rationale:
As the result of COVID-19 there was a significant reduction of traffic in the airports. Taking into consideration the long-lasting impact of COVID-19 to the aviation, new safety related risks have been created or the existing ones reduced or changed.

Even though the reduction of amount of aviation related activities (for example flights) during pandemic (March 2020 - till 2022) it is important to remember that in some domains the amount of activities increased (for example use of distance learning for theoretical training). It means the risk profile for each organisation is very different to that of the system as a whole.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV

Desired outcome/Actions:
Support to the aviation organizations of safe ramp-up / return to operations by using EASA safety promotion campaign materials - guidelines, training materials, best practice provided by EASA.

Action:
- SYS.007.01
  A dedicated safety promotion campaign (guidelines, training materials, best practice provided by EASA) in support of safe ramp-up / return to operations.

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
- The support of resilient management system to mitigate the most significant safety risks.
- Usage of CAA LV homepage and public relations to disseminate safety information.

3.1.8 SYS.008 Safety of Information
EPAS action number and title: MST.0040 Safety and security reporting coordination mechanism

Rationale:
Without prejudice to the obligations stemming from Regulation (EU) No 376/2014, Member States shall ensure that appropriate coordination mechanisms are established between safety and security reporting systems in order to allow for an integrated approach to the management of risks.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV

Desired outcome/Actions:
To increase the level of safety by management of security impact on safety, at the same time reducing the risks including risks associated with overflying conflict zones.

Action:
- SYS.007.01
  To establish the coordination mechanism between reporting systems in order to allow for an integrated approach to the management of risks.

Timetable:
July 2023

Deliverable:
Protection of information from cybersecurity threats and resilience of cybersecurity of information.

3.2 Operational issues, actions addressing several domains of aviation
Compared to systemic issues, operational level themes have more direct links with the actions of an individual person, organisation or operational area or environmental factors, including weather...
phenomena. Operational level threats may have direct links with a situation developing into an incident or an accident.

Operational level threats, risks and safety factors are often identified by analysing data from occurrence reports as well as carrying out risk assessments. Under each action described in section 3.2, responsibilities are assigned not only to CAA LV but also stakeholders in several domains of aviation. The parties responsible for implementation are described after each action.

3.2.1 OPER.001 Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)

EPAS action number and title: MST.0028 Include LOC-I in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS).

Rationale:
Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime which is outside its normal envelope, usually, but not always, at a high rate, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved. Prevention of loss of control is a strategic priority.

Aircraft upset or loss of control is the most common accident outcome for fatal accidents in CAT by aeroplane & NCC operations. It includes uncontrolled collisions with terrain, but also occurrences where the aircraft deviated from the intended flight path or aircraft flight parameters, regardless of whether the flight crew realised the deviation and whether it was possible to recover or not. It also includes the triggering of stall warning and envelope protections.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.
Aviation organisations: Processing of LOC-I threat in their operations.

Desired outcome/Actions:
Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of LOC-I.

Action:
- OPER.001.1
Ensure that the risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of LOC-I. Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, such as: monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes, approach path management, convective weather, in-flight icing, and handling of technical failures, established and measured to monitor their effectiveness.

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
LOC-I risk area is included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A & B (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

3.2.2 OPER.002 Runway safety (runway excursions, runway incursions and collisions)

EPAS action number and title: MST.0028 Include Runway Safety in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS).
Rationale:
Runway excursion covers materialised runway excursions, both at high and low speed, and occurrences where the flight crew had difficulties maintaining the directional control of the aircraft or of the braking action during landing, where the landing occurred long, fast, off-centered or hard, or where the aircraft had technical problems with the landing gear (not locked, not extended or collapsed) during landing.

Runway incursion refers to the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on an active runway or in its areas of protection.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.
Aviation organisations: Processing of runway safety threat in their operations.

Desired outcome/Actions:
Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of REs and RIs.

Actions:
- OPER.002.1
  Ensure that the risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of REs and RIs. Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, such as: monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes, approach path management, and handling of technical failures, established and measured to monitor their effectiveness. Ensure that the implementation of actions suggested by the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE) and European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions (EAPPRI) are considered.

- OPER.002.2
  Ensure implementation of the New Global Reporting Format (GRF) for Runway Surface Conditions – ICAO EUR Region.

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
Runway safety risk area is included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A & B (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

3.2.3 OPER.003 Airborne conflict (Mid-air collisions)
EPAS action number and title:
- MST.0028 Include Airborne conflict in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS).
- MST.0024 Loss of separation between civil and military aircraft.
- MST.0030 Implementation of SESAR solutions aiming to reduce the risk of mid-air collision en-route and TMA.
- MST.0038 Airspace complexity and traffic congestion.
Rationale:

Airborne conflict refers to both actual collisions as well as near-misses in the air. It includes direct precursors such as separation minima infringements, genuine traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) resolution advisories or airspace infringements.

The term ‘airspace infringement’ refers to the unauthorised entry into controlled, prohibited or restricted airspace, or an active Danger Area (where clearance to enter is required), by an aircraft. It occurs when aircraft fly into notified airspace without previously requesting and obtaining approval from the controlling authority of that airspace.

Related to the loss of separation between civil and military aircraft EASA issued a number of recommendations for the MS (ref. to Chapter 4).

MS should evaluate together with ANSPs delegated to provide services in their airspace the needs for implementing SESAR solutions such as those related to enhanced Short-Term Conflict Alerts (STCA)/enhanced safety nets. These SESAR solutions designed to improve safety should be implemented as far as it is feasible.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:

CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.

Aviation organisations: Processing of airborne conflict threat in their operations.

Desired outcome/Actions:

Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of airborne conflict (Mid-air collisions).

Actions:

- OPER.003.1
  Ensure that the risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of airborne conflict. Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, such as: perception and situational awareness, monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes, established and measured to monitor their effectiveness. Ensure that the implementation of actions suggested by the European Action Plan for Airspace Infringement Risk Reduction, are considered.

- OPER.003.2
  Ensure implementation of EASA recommendations related to the loss of separation between civil and military aircraft

- OPER.003.3
  Ensure implementation of SESAR solutions.

- OPER.003.4
  Consider ‘airspace complexity’ and ‘traffic congestion’ as safety-relevant factors in airspace changes affecting uncontrolled traffic, including the changes along international borders.

Timetable:

Continuous

Deliverable:
Airborne conflict (Mid-air collisions) risk area is included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A & B (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

### 3.2.4 OPER.004 Ground safety (aircraft loading, de-icing, refueling, ground damage, etc.)

EPAS action number and title: **MST.0028 Include Ground safety in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)**.

**Rationale:**
This risk area includes all ground handling and apron management-related issues (aircraft loading, de-icing, refueling, ground damage, etc.) as well as collision of the aircraft with other aircraft, obstacles or vehicles while the aircraft is moving on the ground, either under its own power or being towed. It does not include collisions on the runway.

**Stakeholder responsible for implementation:**
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.
Aviation organisations: Processing of threats to ground safety in their operations.

**Desired outcome/Actions:**
Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk in ground safety area.

**Action:**
- **OPER.004.1**
  - Ensure that the risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of ground safety. Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, are established and measured to monitor their effectiveness.

**Timetable:**
Continuous

**Deliverable:**
Ground safety risk area is included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A, B & G (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Safety action plan, and stakeholders’ safety management.

### 3.2.5 OPER.005 Terrain collision

EPAS action number and title: **MST.0028 Include terrain collision in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)**.

**Rationale:**
This risk area includes the controlled collision with terrain together with undershoot or overshoot of the runway during approach and landing phases. It comprises those situations where the aircraft collides or nearly collides with terrain while the flight crew has control of the aircraft. It also includes occurrences which are the direct precursors of a fatal outcome, such as descending below weather minima, undue clearance below radar minima, etc.

**Stakeholder responsible for implementation:**
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.
Aviation organisations: Processing of threats to terrain collision in their operations.

Desired outcome/Actions:
Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of terrain collision.

Action:
- OPER.005.1
  Ensure that the risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of terrain collision. Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, are established and measured to monitor their effectiveness.

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
Terrain collision risk area is included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A & B (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

3.2.6 OPER.006 Aircraft environment
EPAS action number and title: MST.0028 Include aircraft environment in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS).

Rationale:
Uncontrolled fire on-board an aircraft, especially when in flight, represents one of the most severe hazards in aviation. Post-crash fire is also addressed in this section.
In-flight fire can ultimately lead to loss of control, either as a result of structural or control system failure, or again as a result of crew incapacitation.
Fire on the ground can take hold rapidly and lead to significant casualties if evacuation and emergency response is not swift enough.
Smoke or fumes, whether they are associated with fire or not, can lead to passenger and crew incapacitation and will certainly raise concern and invite a response. Even when they do not give rise to a safety impact, they can give rise to concerns and need to be addressed.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.
Aviation organisations: Processing of threats to the risk of fire, smoke and fumes in their operations.

Desired outcome/Actions:
Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of fire, smoke and fumes.

Action:
- OPER.006.1

Ensure that the risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of fire, smoke and fumes. Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, are established and measured to monitor their effectiveness.

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
Fire, smoke and fumes risk area is included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A & B (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

3.2.7 OPER.007 Rotorcraft operations:

- Helicopter upset in flight (Loss of Control)
- Terrain and obstacle conflict

EPAS action number and title:

- MST.0028 Include rotorcraft operations in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS).
- MST.0015 Helicopter safety events.
- CAs, in partnership with industry representatives, to organise helicopter safety events annually or every two years. The EHEST, IHST, CA, Heli Offshore or other sources of safety promotion materials could be freely used and promoted.
- MST.0031 Implementation of SESAR solutions aiming to facilitate safe IFR operations.
- MSs together with their ANSPs and their flight procedures designers (if different from ANSPs) should evaluate the possibility to establish a network of low level IFR routes in their airspace to facilitate safe helicopter operations.
- These SESAR solutions designed to improve safety should be implemented as far as it is feasible.

Rationale:

Rotorcraft operations are a vital part of the European aviation system. Helicopters perform a wide range of important tasks that involve the carriage of passengers including offshore commercial air transport, Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS), air taxi or sightseeing. They are also involved in many specialised operations such as agricultural work, sling/load operations or photography. Additionally, helicopters also fly in non-commercial roles such as General Aviation and for training/instructional purposes.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.

Aviation organisations: Processing of threats to the risk of the helicopter upset in flight (Loss of Control) and terrain and obstacle conflict in their operations.

Desired outcome/Actions:
Continuously assess and improve risk controls in the helicopter upset in flight (Loss of Control) and terrain and obstacle conflict areas.

Actions:
- OPER.007.1
  Ensure that the risk areas are continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of rotorcraft operations. Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, are established and measured to monitor their effectiveness.

- OPER.007.2
  Organise helicopter safety events annually or every two years.

- OPER.007.3
  Ensure implementation of SESAR solutions aiming to facilitate safe IFR operations.

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
Helicopter upset in flight (Loss of Control) and terrain and obstacle conflict risk areas are included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A & H (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

3.2.8 OPER.008 General Aviation - Systemic enablers

EPAS action number and title:
- MST.0025 Improve the dissemination of safety messages.
- MST.0027 Promotion of safety culture in GA

Rationale:
This section addresses system-wide or transversal issues that affect GA as a whole and are common to several safety risk areas. In combination with triggering factors, transversal factors can play a significant role in incidents and accidents. Conversely, they also offer opportunities for improving safety across risk domains.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.
Aviation organisations (training organisations, federations, clubs, associations, aviation colleges and institutes) - committed to safety performance in GA.

Desired outcome/Actions:
Reduce the number of fatalities in GA through the implementation of systemic enablers.

Actions:
- OPER.008.1
  Improve the dissemination of safety promotion and training material by authorities, associations, flying clubs, insurance companies targeting flight instructors and/or pilots through means such as safety workshops and safety days/evenings.

- OPER.008.2
Include provisions to facilitate and promote safety culture (including just culture) in GA as part of State safety management activities in order to foster positive safety behaviours and encourage occurrence reporting.

**Timetable:**
Continuous

**Deliverable:**
GA risk areas are included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A & I (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

Provisions for safety culture (including just culture) in GA included in SSP LV.

### 3.2.9 OPER.009 General Aviation - Staying in control

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0028 Include General Aviation - Staying in control in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS).

**Rationale:**
This section addresses subjects such as flying skills, pilot awareness and the management of upset or stall at take-off, in flight, or during approach and landing, flight preparation, aborting take-off and going around. Staying in control prevents loss of control accidents. Loss of control usually occurs because the aeroplane enters a flight regime outside its normal envelope, thereby introducing an element of surprise for the flight crew involved. Loss of control accidents are both frequent and severe.

**Stakeholder responsible for implementation:**
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.

Aviation organisations (training organisations, federations, clubs, associations, aviation colleges and institutes) - committed to safety performance in GA.

**Desired outcome/Actions:**
Reduce the risk of Loss of Control accidents.

**Action:**
- **OPER.009.1**
  Carry out focused oversight of instructors and examiners performance during the pilots’ training and proficiency checking to ensure that staying in control risk mitigation actions cover topics such as aircraft performance, flight preparation and management, role of angle of attack, threat and error management (TEM), upset and stall avoidance and recovery, and startle and surprise management.

**Timetable:**
Continuous

**Deliverable:**
GA risk areas are included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A & I (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

3.2.10 OPER.010 General aviation - Coping with weather

EPAS action number and title: MST.0028 Include General Aviation – Coping with weather in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS).

Rationale:
This section addresses subjects such as entering IMC, icing conditions, carburetor icing, and poor weather conditions. Weather is an important contributing factor to GA accidents, often related to pilots underestimating the risks of changing weather conditions prior to take-off and during the flight, as weather deteriorates. Dealing with poor weather may increase pilot workload and affect situational awareness and aircraft handling. Decision-making can also be impaired, as a plan continuation bias may lead pilots to press on to the planned destination despite threatening weather conditions.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.
Aviation organisations (training organisations, federations, clubs, associations, aviation colleges and institutes) - committed to safety performance in GA.

Desired outcome/Actions:
Increase safety by reducing the number of weather-related accidents.

Actions:
- OPER.010.1
  For the weather awareness of pilots ensure access to produced safety promotion material (video) addressing subjects such as weather awareness, flight preparation, management and debrief, the use of flight information services (FIS), the benefits of using modern technology including cockpit weather information systems (including GPS integrated, mobile/4G connected apps, etc.), communication with ATC, inadvertent entry into IMC, TEM, and Human Factors (HF).

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
GA risk areas are included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A & I (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

3.2.11 OPER.011 General aviation - Preventing mid-air collisions

EPAS action number and title:
- MST.0028 Include General Aviation – Preventing mid-air collisions in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS).

SPAS action number and title:
MAC/GA Airspace infringement risk in General Aviation. National authorities should play the leading role in establishing and promoting local implementation priorities and actions.

**Rationale:**
This section addresses subjects such as airspace complexity, airspace infringement and use of technology. Statistics show that MAC risks affect both novice and experienced pilots and can occur in all phases of flight and at all altitudes. However, the vast majority of them occur in daylight and in excellent meteorological conditions. A collision is more likely where aircraft are concentrated, especially close to aerodromes. Airspace infringements by GA aircraft into controlled airspace is an important related safety risk.

**Stakeholder responsible for implementation:**
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.
Aviation organisations (training organisations, federations, clubs, associations, aviation colleges and institutes) committed to safety performance in GA.

**Desired outcome/Actions:**
Increase safety by reducing the risk of MACs and airspace infringements in GA.

**Actions:**
- **OPER.011.1**
  Develop and implement suitable risk mitigation actions for preventing airspace infringement and reducing the risk of MAC by raising the quality of support provided to GA flights by air navigation service providers (ANSPs) through focused oversight.
- **OPER.011.2**
  Establish clear and open communication at state and stakeholder level on roles, responsibilities, and management of reducing the airspace infringement risks considering three potential major consequences, such as mid-air collision, loss of separation and disruption to flight operations.

**Timetable:**
Continuous

**Deliverable:**
GA risk areas are included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A & I (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

3.2.12 OPER.012 General aviation – Managing the flight

EPAS action number and title: **MST.0028 Include General Aviation – Managing the flight in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS).**

**Rationale:**
This section addresses subjects such as navigation, fuel management, terrain and obstacle awareness, and forced landings. Most accidents are the result of the pilot’s actions, including decisions made while preparing the flight or due to changing circumstances during the flight. Pilot
decisions including their ability to prioritise workload affect safety and survival of the aircraft and its occupants.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.
Aviation organisations (training organisations, federations, clubs, associations, aviation colleges and institutes) - committed to safety performance in GA.

Desired outcome/Actions:
Reduce the number of fatalities and serious injuries in GA.

Action:
- OPER.012.1
  Improve the dissemination of produced safety promotion material and ensure access to it addressing subjects such as navigation, fuel management, terrain and obstacle awareness, and forced landings by means of safety workshops, instructors/examiners seminars.

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
GA risk areas are included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendices A & I (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and stakeholders’ safety management.

3.2.13 OPER.013 PPL/LAPL learning objectives in the Meteorological Information part of the PPL/LAPL syllabus

EPAS action number and title: MST.0036 PPL/LAPL learning objectives in the Meteorological Information part of the PPL/LAPL.

Rationale:
Address key learning objectives

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.
Aviation organisations (PPL/LAPL pilots, training organisations) - committed to safety performance in GA.

Desired outcome/Actions:
Reduce the number of fatalities and serious injuries in GA.

Action:
- OPER.013.1
  Develop proportionate learning objectives in the ‘Meteorological Information’ part of the PPL/LAPL syllabus.
Such learning objectives to be of a basic, non-academic nature and address key learning objectives in relation to:

— practical interpretation of ground-based weather radar, strengths and weaknesses;
— practical interpretation of meteorological satellite imagery, strengths and weaknesses;
— forecasts from numerical weather prediction models, strengths and weaknesses.

Timetable:
Continuous

Deliverable:
Learning objectives, with related question bank.

3.3 Actions on safety issues related to key risk areas in individual domains of aviation

These actions are specified considering EPAS safety issues related to key risk areas in EASA Annual Safety Review (ASR) and the results of the CAA LV aviation safety risk management process.

3.3.1 Aerodromes

EPAS action number and title: MST.0029 Implementation of SESAR runway safety solutions.

Rationale:
Actions in this Chapter address safety, as well as efficiency/proportionality in terms of developing and maintaining of a legal framework commensurate with the complexity of ADR activities and management of potential risks. This Chapter also includes actions to ensure a level playing field on the basis of the regulatory requirements stemming from the Regulation (EU) 2018/1139.

MSs should evaluate together with the ADR operators and ANSPs the needs for implementing the related SESAR solutions such as those related to ground situational awareness, airport safety net vehicles and enhanced airport safety nets.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
Air navigation service provider, airports.

Desired outcome/Actions:

Actions:
- ADR.001.1
  Propose evaluate in RWY Safety Team the SESAR solutions (solutions #01, #02, #04, #26, #47, #48, #70) designed to improve runway safety should be considered as far as it is feasible.

Timetable:
Ongoing

Deliverable:
SESAR solutions designed to improve runway safety are implemented as far as it is feasible.

3.3.2 Ground handling

EPAS action number and title: RMT.0728 Development of requirements for groundhandling.

Rationale:

This risk area includes all ground handling and apron management-related issues (aircraft loading, de-icing, refueling, ground damage, etc.) as well as collision of the aircraft with other aircraft, obstacles or vehicles while the aircraft is moving on the ground, either under its own power or being towed. It does not include collisions on the runway.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:

Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division.

Desired outcome/Actions:

Actions:

- ADR.001.2
  Follow the IR/AMC & GM developments and prepare for their application to ensure compliance with the essential requirements contained in Annex VII to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139.
  This will consider operational requirements, organisational requirements and authority requirements, as deemed necessary. Detailed objectives and actions are defined by a Ground handling Roadmap which was subject to a focused consultation in Q1/2019.

Timetable:

Ongoing

Deliverable:

Ensure oversight capabilities

3.4 Emerging issues

Emerging issues are about attempting to anticipate issues that may pose a threat to different areas of aviation in the immediate or near future. They often concern changes in the operating environment. The change may be associated with the advancement of technology, new operating methods, societal changes or such phenomena as climate change. Increasing attention must be paid to environmental issues in aviation and their reconciliation with safety issues in the future.

At European level, as key target areas for actions to improve safety emerged drones, security risks that affect aviation safety, new business models as well as new products, systems, technologies and operations.

3.4.1 EME.001 New business models

EPAS action number and title: MST.0019 Better understanding of operators’ governance structure.

CAs to have a thorough understanding of operators’ governance structure. This should in particular apply in the area of group operations.
Aspects to be considered include:

- extensive use of outsourcing,
- the influence of financial stakeholders, and
- controlling management personnel, where such personnel are located outside the scope of approval.

Note: EASA will support this MST by providing guidance on how to effectively oversee group operations based on an overall concept for the oversight of such operations. This will consider work ongoing at ICAO level (cross-border operations) and include continuing airworthiness management aspects.

Rationale:

This section addresses risks related to new and emerging business models arising from the increased complexity of the aviation industry, the number of interfaces between organisations, their contracted services and regulators. Some new business models are emerging: the increased demand for flying in the cities, urban air mobility; the increased digitalisation in aviation systems, the introduction of more autonomous vehicles, platforms starting for single pilot operations and completely autonomous cargo aircraft. These will challenge the way authorities regulate and oversee the aviation system. CAs should work better together and EASA should evaluate whether the existing safety regulatory system adequately addresses current and future safety risks arising from new and emerging business models.

Managing current and future safety risks arising from new and emerging business models is a strategic priority.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:

CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.

Operators: Identification of safety issues and safety risk management by operator’s SMS, including timely processing the management of change.

Desired outcome/Actions:

Increase safety by continuously assessing and mitigating risks posed by new and emerging business models.

Actions:

- EME.001.
  Make sure that operator’s management system is focused on identification of safety issues and safety risk management as regards contracting of safety-critical services and wet lease-in agreements.

- EME.001.2
  Make sure that operator’s management system is focused on identification of safety issues and safety risk management as regards impact of interoperability arrangements on safety, i.e. interoperability refers to those cases where a holding or parent company wants to streamline its operations across several different AOCs of several Member States belonging to the same holding or parent company and to exchange aircraft and possibly crews freely.

- EME.001.3
Make sure that operator’s management system is focused on identification of safety issues and safety risk management as regards different contractual arrangements amongst crews, i.e. an operator’s management system systematically captures the correlation between the operator’s various employment types (e.g. temporary employment models, employment via employment agencies, pay-to-fly employment schemes, self-employed) and the number of reports of occurrences obtained by the operator.

- **EME.001.4**
  Make sure that operator's management system is focused on identification of safety issues and safety risk management to address increased mobility of flight crew and to assess the safety impact of a higher turnover rate. Increased mobility of flight crew could result in a reduction in experience levels and adversely affect the efficiency of recurrent training, particularly the training of all major failures over a 3-year period. Where pilots are more likely to leave the operator after less than 3 years, flight crew training and in particular the operator’s conversion course of the subsequent operator should be adapted.

**Timetable:**
Continuous

**Deliverable:**
Emerging issue is included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendix A (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and the stakeholders’ safety management.

**3.4.2 EME.002 Cybersecurity**

**Rationale:**
This risk area includes all Cyber security related issues and provision of continuity and protection of information systems operation (airports, air carriers, air navigation service providers, etc.).

**Stakeholder responsible for implementation:**
CAA LV Security Division, airports, air carriers, air navigation service providers.

**Desired outcome/Actions:**

**Actions:**
- **EME.002.1**
  Coordinate the working group of Nominated persons in Cyber security from aviation organisations.
- **EME.002.2**
  In accordance with International and National legislation ensure compliance with the requirements contained in Chapter 18 of Cabinet Regulation No. 397 (2010), Regulation (EU) 1998/2015 and ICAO Annex 17. That means oversight activities such as inspections and audits in accordance with Cabinet Regulation No. 415 (2010) and approved oversight action plan.

**Timetable:**
Ongoing
Deliverable:
Ensure oversight capabilities.

3.4.3 EME.003 Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Rationale:
The current situation in the sector points the fact that the industry and the use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are developing more rapidly than regulations. Based on identifiable targets UAS are used for various types of inspection, search and rescue, surveying, low-altitude specialised works, filming etc. in the future, human and cargo transport in view of the above UAS may pose risks to the public and to manned aviation.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV Unmanned aircraft flight safety section.

Desired outcome/Actions:

Actions:
- EME.003.1
- EME.003.2
  Ensure the exchange of information with the public, UAS operators, pilots and industry. Promote public awareness on existing and upcoming UAS legal provisions and rules.

Timetable:
Ongoing

Deliverable:
Ensure oversight capabilities, information for public, UAS operators and pilots.

3.4.4 EME.004 Lasers

Rationale:
The CAA LV co-ordinates industry/CAA group to identify risks, agree and deliver actions to prevent laser attacks and mitigate their consequences.

Stakeholder responsible for implementation:
CAA LV: Safety risk management at state level.
Aviation organisations: Safety risk management at organisation’s level.

Desired outcomes:
• Identification of and engagement with national and international key stakeholders with the aim to capture best practice for implementation in Latvia and sharing lessons learned.
• Introduction of tighter measures against laser attacks into legislation.
• Increase the public's awareness of the risk associated with laser attacks.

Actions:
- EME.004.1
  Coordinate the working group with the view to develop consistent and effective prevention and mitigation plans which address the risk of laser attacks in the aviation environment.
- EME.004.2
  Engage with organisations outside the aviation environment, such as the Police and Department of Health, in order to find effective measures for the protection of aviation.

Timetable:
Continuous.

Deliverable:
Emerging issue is included in SPAS LV Chapter 2 Appendix A (SPIs/SPTs), Chapter 4 Plan of actions, and the stakeholders’ safety management.

3.4.5 EME.005 Potential hazards posed by unmanned aircraft systems

EPAS action number and title: EME.005 The potential hazards posed by unmanned aircraft systems at aerodromes

Rationale:
UA may pose a risk to the public and piloted aircraft. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent and manage incidents related to unauthorized UAS operations at the aerodrome.

Stakeholders responsible for the implementation and maintenance:
CAA LV-Aviation Security Division, Air Navigation Division, Unmanned Aircraft, European Union and Foreign Affairs Division, Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division, air navigation and air traffic management service providers, airports, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Defense.

Desired outcome/actions:
Ensuring acceptable flight safety as a minimum for aerodromes providing air traffic services.

Actions:
- EME.005.1 Formalized paraphrase
  Initial risk assessment
- EME.005.2 Formalized paraphrase
  Implementation of coordination measures
- EME.005.3
  Development and implementation of the plan for unauthorized UAS activities in the vicinity of aerodromes.
Timetable:
- EME 005.1; EME 005.2 - Ongoing
- EME 005.3 – December 2023

Deliverable:
The responsible parties have been identified and their responsibilities have been determined. They have approved changes to the manuals of the participating aviation organizations to provide the processes and mechanisms for ensuring flight safety by identifying unauthorized UAS flights in the airspace of aerodromes.
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## 4 PLAN OF ACTIONS

### 4.1 SYS.001 State Safety Programme of Republic of Latvia (SSP LV)

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<th>MST.0001 Member States to give priority to the work on SSPs</th>
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<td>Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:</td>
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<td>— Heads of CAA LV Divisions,</td>
<td>— Safety Managers of organisations, representatives of Public Authorities (i.e. Accident Investigation,</td>
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<tr>
<td>— Safety Managers of organisations, representatives of Public Authorities (i.e. Accident Investigation,</td>
<td>— Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development, Military, Border Guard, Search and Rescue).</td>
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**Desired outcome:** Ensure effective implementation of the authority requirements and address deficiencies in oversight capabilities, as a prerequisite for effective SSP implementation

**Responsible:** Head of Legal oversight of aviation safety division

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<tr>
<td><strong>SYS.001.1</strong> Lay down Cabinet Regulation on the “State Safety Programme”, to describe SSP LV structure and associated programmes, how its various components work together, as well as the roles of the different State aviation authorities.</td>
<td>Cabinet Regulation on the “State Safety Programme”. CAA LV has improved the processes identifying the responsibilities and duties related to aviation safety, documented in CAA LV Management System Manual.</td>
<td>December 2021</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYS.001.2</strong> Conduct a gap analysis.</td>
<td>Existing safety management capabilities are identified.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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### Specify, modify, and reinforce existing capabilities (i.e. the elements or processes identified as requiring action - form the basis of the SSP implementation plan).

Mature foundation is established to support effective SSP implementation (i.e. foundation is comprised of the aspects of a safety oversight system that are needed to support a more performance-based approach).

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#### SYS.001.3
Develop an SSP implementation plan.

The appropriate tasks/subtasks are prioritized and documented in an action plan.

SSP implementation plan, together with the SSP top-level (exposition) document are made readily accessible to all relevant personnel to ensure everyone involved is aware of the SSP and its plan for implementation.

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#### SYS.001.4
Establish Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) and ‘baseline performance’ to monitor the system against this baseline performance to measure the effectiveness of achieved outcome, i.e. effective SSP and effective implementation of SMS in aviation organisations.

National level aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) are established, that are monitored by CAA LV.

National aviation safety performance indicators and targets (SPIs/SPTs) are established, that are monitored by organisations.

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#### Desired outcome: Ensure effective coordination between State authorities having a role in safety management

**Responsible:** Ministry of Transport, CAA LV
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<td>SYS.001.5</td>
<td>Establish a suitable coordination group (i.e. Management Group) with representation from the impacted aviation authorities with responsibilities related to the implementation and maintenance of the SSP LV.</td>
<td>Cabinet Regulation on the “State Safety Programme” is established.</td>
<td>February 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Terms of Reference of Safety Management Coordination Group (SMCG) are established.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>SMCG is operational – meetings being recorded</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS.001.6</td>
<td>CAA LV carries out regular exchange of information on the implementation of the SSP LV.</td>
<td>Communications plan is established, which includes the mapping of interested members of the aviation community, the messages and information conveyed to each of its groups, and the means by which this information will be transmitted.</td>
<td>March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Procedure on the internal communication and dissemination of information is established and maintained (i.e. SSP documentation, policies, and procedures; SPIs; sector safety performance information; sector organizational safety risks profiles; communication of system safety responsibility; lessons learned from accidents and incidents; and concepts and best practices of safety management).</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Procedure on the external communication and dissemination of safety information is established and maintained (i.e. guidance material for the implementation of SMS; importance of reporting; identification of available safety training for the</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Desired outcome:
Ensure that inspectors have the right competencies to support the evolution towards risk- and performance-based oversight.

### Responsible:
Human resources planning, development and qualification compliance division, Heads of CAA LV Divisions

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.001.9</td>
<td>Competencies (i.e. competency units and elements) related to the assessment of the SSP’s maturity are defined. Performance criteria and observable behaviours are established. Periodical personnel competency assessment is performed.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### SYS.001.7
CAA LV prioritises and designs the SPAS LV actions through a transparent process carrying out regular exchange of safety information.

- Relevant sources and documents are identified.
- Risk Register, which contains all the information concerning safety issues and assessed risk levels, is established and maintained.
- Priority list is established.

#### SYS.001.10
CAA LV identifies and addresses the competencies required for effective implementation of SSP, taking into account the roles and responsibilities under the SSP performed by its personnel. These competencies are in addition to those required for the conduct of compliance oversight and are addressed by training existing staff or by hiring additional staff.
To ensure that all relevant technical staff in the State are properly qualified, CAA LV determines the most appropriate training provisions for senior management, inspectors, personnel responsible for data analysis, safety objectives, SPIs and SPTs, aviation medical examiners and medical assessors, as well as for service provider safety investigators.

Training provisions for all relevant technical staff in the State are defined. CAA LV provides training by its own or through another qualified training source to support, within the State aviation organisations, the development of an organisational culture that fosters an effective and efficient SSP.

| SYS.001.11 | CAA LV develops internal training policies and procedures, and SSP and SMS training programme for relevant staff. | Initial and recurrent training programme is established and maintained. A training record is maintained for relevant staff. An annual training plan is in place. Training exercises and methods for relevant staff are kept current to reflect new techniques, technologies, results of investigations, corrective actions and regulatory changes. | Ongoing |
| SYS.001.12 | Usage of safety training programmes for personnel involved in SSP-related duties are to be coordinated among State organisations, as appropriate. The aim is to ensure that a person or team addresses each aspect of the SSP, and that they are trained to perform the allocated role. This will allow inspectors as well as staff from different State aviation authorities to better understand safety risks across various sectors. | Safety training programmes for personnel involved in SSP-related duties are defined to support, within the State organisations, the safety performance at State level. Different levels of SSP maturity are assessed by SMCG – records maintained. | Ongoing |

March 2023
**Desired outcome:** Ensure that policies and procedures are in place for risk- and performance-based oversight, including a description of how an SMS is accepted and regularly monitored

**Responsible:** Heads of CAA LV Divisions, Head of the Safety Statistics section

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.001.13</td>
<td>Link the risk- and performance-based oversight (PBO) approach to the objectives of the SSP LV and of the management system of the competent authority.</td>
<td>Revised SSP LV and Management Manual – Processes management.</td>
<td>February 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS.001.14</td>
<td>Establish a common understanding of a risk-based environment.</td>
<td>Reasons for implementing risk-based oversight (RBO) triggered at Political level (i.e. ensure that the rate of accidents continues to decline in order to counterbalance the predicted growth in the number of flights - one tool to achieve this is risk-based oversight, and at Staff Resources’ level (i.e. more effective use of the available oversight resources), are included in SSP LV State Safety Assurance. Reinforce data management capabilities at State level (i.e. to ensure improved understanding of the risks across the aviation system) and Organisational level (i.e. for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the organisation’s management system and an assessment on the maturity of the organisation’s management system), to ensure State has reliable and comprehensive data upon which to base its (data-driven) decisions.</td>
<td>August 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Definition of safety issues, key risk areas and their prioritisation, outlining the most effective means of addressing them - becomes a targeted action plan based on the analysis from both State and the service provider.

#### SYS.001.15
Establish mechanisms to ensure the capture and storage of data on hazards and safety risks for each overseen organisation, as well as at aggregated State level. Mechanisms to develop information from the stored data, and to actively exchange safety information with service providers and/or other States as appropriate, should be considered.

| Ongoing | December 2021 - initial; hereinafter ongoing |

#### SYS.001.16
Perform a detailed training needs analysis in order to support the CAA LV oversight teams to deliver, further refine and standardise the PBO process across the aviation entities it is applied to.

| December 2022 Partly completed |

#### SYS.001.17
Provide a central planning function to create and maintain a sequence of actions related to the development of organisations PBO programmes.

| December 2022 Started |

#### SYS.001.18
Establish means to determine whether service providers’ SMS is acceptable.

| Ongoing |
providers’ SMS). Markers are evaluated according to the defined criteria allowing assessment of compliance and their effectiveness.

**SYS.001.19**  
Review and ensure that the service provider’s SMS remains effective.  
Periodical review of each service provider’s SPIs and SPTs. The review takes into consideration the performance and effectiveness of each SPI and SPT. The review may show the need to make adjustments to support the continuous safety improvement.  
Ongoing

**Desired outcome:** Establish policies and procedures for safety data collection, analysis, exchange and protection, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 376/2014

**Responsible:** Head of the Safety Statistics Section

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</table>
| SYS.001.20    | SMS successes and challenges discussed with the industry. Monitoring of behavioural indicators by both the organisations and the authority, to determine if the behaviours show they are moving in the right direction.  
There is evidence that the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour has been determined in consultation with staff and staff representatives. | Ongoing   |        |
|               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Ongoing   |        |
|               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Ongoing   |        |
**Desired outcome:** Establish a process to determine SPIs at State level addressing outcomes and processes

**Responsible:** Head of the Safety Statistics Section

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.001.21</td>
<td>Establish, maintain and continuously improve the process on the selection and definition of SPIs and SPTs at State level.</td>
<td>March 2023</td>
<td>March 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop methodology on the selecting and defining SPIs and SPTs.</td>
<td>March 2023</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acceptable level of safety performance (ALoSP) to be achieved is established.</td>
<td>Annually</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Periodic review of SPIs and ALoSP, achieving the ALoSP (i.e. A State’s safety performance as indicated by its SPIs and SPTs demonstrate the ALoSP achieved. If any of the SPTs are not met, an evaluation may be needed to better understand why and to determine what actions should be taken.</td>
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**Desired outcome:** Ensure that an approved SSP document is made available and shared with other Member States and EASA

**Responsible:** Head of Legal Oversight of Aviation Safety Division

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.001.22</td>
<td>Upload SSP LV, SPAS LV and any other relevant material using EASA online platform for MSs.</td>
<td>Annually</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide an up-to-date SPAS LV or a report on the implementation of EPAS actions.</td>
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**Desired outcome:** Ensure that the SSP is regularly reviewed and that the SSP effectiveness is regularly assessed
### Responsible
Head of Safety and Compliance Monitoring Division

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.001.23</td>
<td>Conduct an SSP maturity assessment that can be carried out at various stages, looking initially for the presence and suitability of key elements. At a later stage, the SSP will be assessed to understand how well it is operating and how effective it is at achieving its objectives.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSP maturity assessment tool is developed. The tool is used by CAA LV to perform internal audits for the continuous improvement of the SSP. Evidence of SSP maturity assessment.</td>
<td>December 2022</td>
<td>December 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.2 SYS.002 Promotion of SMS

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0002 Promotion of SMS

**Team Leader:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** Aircraft Operations Division inspectors, Safety Managers of organisations (air operators)

**Desired outcome:** Common understanding of safety management and SMS/SSP principles and requirements, facilitating their implementation across the international aviation community

**Responsible:** Heads of CAA LV Divisions

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<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.002.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve internal and external training, communication, and dissemination of safety information.</td>
<td>Improved guidance material for inspectors to assist interpretation of the regulatory framework and to define how the SMS should be implemented. Changes to requirements or guidance material, including those from SMS, consider impacts on the inspector training programme. Processing of key safety topics (Annual Safety Recommendations Review 2018 - European Safety Promotion Network):</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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<td>• Erroneous take-off performance parameters (SIB 2016-02)</td>
<td>• Restraint systems for parachutists (SIBs 2018-18 and 18R1)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Balloon operations (SIB 2018-14)</td>
<td>• Airframe ice contamination (SIB 2017-11 and 2018-12)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Flight crew training and simulators (UPRT - Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 ANNEX I (Part-FCL); ANNEX VII (Part-ORA)</td>
<td>• Fuel management (SIB 2018-08)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Runway surface condition (SIB 2018-02)</td>
<td>• Helicoter gearboxes</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Flight plan deviations and missed approach procedures</td>
<td>• System status messages</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

4.3 **SYS.003 Flight data monitoring**
**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0003 Member States should maintain a regular dialogue with their national aircraft operators on flight data monitoring (FDM) programmes

**Team Leader:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** FDM National Coordinator, Safety Managers of organisations (air operators)

**Desired outcome:** Effective performance of FDM programme, i.e. FDM programme is performing at an optimal level depending on the size and structure of the organisation, the human resource invested, the degree of participations from unions and, most importantly, the level of maturity of the organisation’s safety culture

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.003.1</td>
<td>Publish on CAA LV website, as part of SMS-related information, general information on EOFDM activities.</td>
<td>Information on EOFDM published in the SMS section of CAA LV website</td>
<td>February 2023</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FDM forum has been set up to support key SMS processes, in particular risk identification and assessment.</td>
<td>Twice a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS.003.2</td>
<td>Update the FDM programme assessment process, taking into account information on the principal issues, as well as industry best practices and advice on how to best prepare a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Key performance indicators (KPI), designed to monitor the performance of an operator’s FDM programme, are to be considered.</td>
<td>Updated FDM programme assessment process. Continuing oversight of FDM programme as part of the SMS.</td>
<td>January 2023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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## 4.4 SYS.004 SMS performance assessment

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0026 SMS assessment

**Team Leader:** Head of Safety and Compliance Monitoring Division

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** Heads of Divisions CAA LV, Aircraft Operations Division inspectors, Safety Managers of organisations

**Desired outcome:** Maintained and continuously improved risk- and performance-based oversight and use of harmonised SMS evaluation criteria between Member States

**Responsible:** Heads of CAA LV Divisions

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.004.1</td>
<td>Improved technical guidance for the CAA LV inspectors on the implementation of SMS in different oversight areas is established</td>
<td>December 2021</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYS.004.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitate the identification by the operator a number of key risk areas for which an in-depth analysis should be carried out to determine the completeness of safety issues that have contributed to those risk areas and to assess the level of control of over the most relevant safety issues. This assessment would consider the increase/decrease of exposure to the relevant hazard, the effectiveness of existing controls and the expected risk reduction by committed safety actions.</td>
<td>CAA LV oversight methodology is reassessed to consider that it is performance based that allows SMS effective evaluation within its operating context. CAA LV data collection and storage process and data protection rules are re-evaluated and the gaps analysed to define corrective actions. CAA LV inspectors SMS competency-based training provisions are implemented. Foster a dialogue with organisations at a senior management level to discuss SMS successes and challenges.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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**SYS.004.3**
Develop and review the relevance of SPIs consulting with industry. Determine appropriate metrics at a State level.

Relevance of safety performance indicators (SPIs) in conjunction with organisations is reviewed. Organisation data can be used to validate the suitability of SPIs.

Ongoing

4.5 **SYS.005 SPAS LV**

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0028 Member States to establish and maintain a State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)

**Team Leader:** Head of Safety and Compliance Monitoring Division CAA LV

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** Heads of CAA LV Divisions, Safety Managers of organisations, representatives of Public Authorities (i.e. Accident Investigation, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development, Military, Boarder Guard, Search and Rescue).
**Deliverable:** Developed, endorsed and published SPAS LV, including safety objectives, goals, indicators and targets. SPAS LV reflects the EPAS actions as applicable to the State and identifies the main safety risks at national level in addition to the ones identified in EPAS

**Responsible:** Heads of CAA LV Divisions and Head of the Safety Statistics section

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYS.005.1</strong></td>
<td>Reflect the EPAS actions on the issues that concern an individual organisation, a system element or the entire aviation system (systemic issues).</td>
<td>December 2022</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full list of identified systemic issues is established and continuously monitored.</td>
<td>December 2022</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Definition and programming of safety actions are completed.</td>
<td>December 2022</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation and follow-up of the actions are monitored.</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safety performance measurement is conducted.</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SYS.005.2</strong></td>
<td>Reflect the EPAS actions to reduce the probability of events that result in incidents and accidents and mitigate the seriousness of their consequences (operational issues).</td>
<td>January 2023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full list of identified operational issues is established and continuously monitored.</td>
<td>January 2023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Definition and programming of safety actions are completed.</td>
<td>January 2023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementation and follow-up of the actions are monitored.</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safety performance measurement is conducted.</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYS.005.3</strong></td>
<td>Define actions to address safety issues related to key risk areas in individual domains of aviation.</td>
<td>January 2023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full list of identified safety issues related to key risk areas in individual domains of aviation is established and continuously monitored.</td>
<td>January 2023</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Definition and programming of safety actions are completed.  
Implementation and follow-up of the actions are monitored.  
Safety performance measurement is conducted.  

| SYS.005.4 |  
|---|---|---|---|
| Reflect the EPAS actions to improve safety emerged drones, security risks that affect aviation safety, new business models as well as new products, systems, technologies and operations (emerging issues). | Full list of identified emerging issues is established and continuously monitored. | January 2023 | Yearly |
| | Definition and programming of safety actions are completed. | January 2023 | Yearly |
| | Implementation and follow-up of the actions are monitored. | Yearly |  |
| | Safety performance measurement is conducted. | Yearly |  |

| SYS.005.5 |  
|---|---|---|---|
| Reflect the EPAS safety actions addressing issues emerging from standardisation activities, with focus on the safety oversight responsibilities of the MSs. | Full list of identified issues emerging from standardisation activities is established and continuously monitored. | January 2023 |  |
| | Definition and programming of safety actions are completed. | January 2023 |  |
| | Implementation and follow-up of the actions are monitored. | Yearly |  |
| | Safety performance measurement is conducted. | Yearly |  |

4.6 **SYS.006 Oversight and Standardisation**
**EPAS action number and title:**
- MST.0032 Oversight capabilities/focus area
- MST.0033 Language proficiency requirements - To share best practices, to identify areas for improvement for the uniform and harmonised LPR implementation
- MST.0034 Oversight capabilities/focus area: flight time specifications schemes
- MST.0035 Oversight capabilities/focus area: Fraud cases in Part-147

**Team Leader:** Head of Safety and Compliance Monitoring Division CAA LV

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** Heads of CAA LV Divisions

**Desired outcome:** Availability of adequate personnel in CAA LV

**Responsible:** Human resources planning, development and qualification compliance division and Heads of CAA LV Divisions

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| SYS.006.1  
Take necessary measures to ensure that qualified personnel, performing safety oversight functions, are recruited and retained. | Established recruitment policies, terms of employment and practices are periodically assessed through the SRM process.  
Methodology is applied to determine staffing needs for personnel performing safety oversight functions, taking into account the size and complexity of aviation activities in the State.  
Guidance that addresses ethics, personal conduct and the avoidance of actual or perceived conflicts of interest in the performance of official duties, is provided. | Ongoing | Ongoing |
| | | | |
### STATE PLAN FOR AVIATION SAFETY

#### LATVIA

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**SYS.006.2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ensure usage of competency-based training and assessment concept (i.e. that competencies are transferable across multiple and varied contexts) and methodology.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long-standing policies regarding remuneration of qualified technical personnel are reassessed and, if applicable, revised, so that competent authority becomes competitive employer.</td>
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<td>Ongoing</td>
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| Develop or reinforce a competency framework for the inspectors operating in different technical domains within a performance-based environment (i.e. EASA proposal for a Competency Framework for the Competent Authorities’ Inspectors adopted to the organisational set-up of CAA LV). |
| Ongoing |
| Training is based on the competencies identified. |
| Ongoing |
| Assessment procedures are developed to determine whether these competencies have been achieved (i.e. development of the components of competency-based training and assessment). |
| Ongoing |

---

**Cooperative oversight in all sectors**

**Desired outcome:** MSs to ensure that the applicable authority requirements are adhered to in all sectors. The objective is to ensure that each organisation’s activities are duly assessed, known to the relevant authorities and that those activities are adequately overseen, either with or without an agreed transfer of oversight tasks.

**Responsible:** Head of the Safety Statistics Section

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<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.006.3</td>
<td>Extent of foreign operators’ activities in Latvia under the CAA LV oversight obligations, including</td>
<td>December 2021</td>
<td>Completed</td>
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established or residing in another MS on the basis of the safety priorities, as well as of past oversight activities. Activities are carried out in accordance with principles of cooperative oversight. Identification and mitigation of the hazards associated with their activities, are defined. Ramp inspections and exchange of safety information are applied.

Organisations’ management system in all sectors

**Desired outcome:** MSs to foster the ability of CAs to assess and oversee the organisations’ management system in all sectors. This will focus in particular on safety culture, the governance structure of the organisation, the interaction between the risk identification/assessment process and the organisation’s monitoring process, the use of inspection findings and safety information such as occurrences, incidents, and accidents. This should lead CAs to adapt and improve their oversight system

**Responsible:** Head of Safety and Compliance Monitoring Division and Head of the Safety Statistics section

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<tr>
<td><strong>SYS.006.4</strong>&lt;br&gt;Ensure that CAA LV management system, according to the established policy and the area of competence, identifies changes that affect CAA LV capability to perform its tasks and discharge its responsibilities as defined in BR and the delegated acts and implementing acts adopted on the basis thereof. This system shall enable it to take action as appropriate to ensure that its management system remains adequate and effective.</td>
<td>“Change management” process is applied, focussing at least on the changes affecting the capability to perform tasks and discharge responsibilities</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SYS.006.5</strong>&lt;br&gt;Establish and maintain Safety Risk Management (SRM) process for managing CAA LV internal risks affecting its oversight capabilities. Ensure that SRM process is applied.</td>
<td>SRM process is applied.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
### English Language Proficiency

**Desired outcome:** MS to focus on the implementation of language proficiency requirements, to identify areas for improvement for the uniform and harmonised implementation and identify best practices to be shared with industry and other Member States

**Responsible:** Head of Personnel Licensing Division

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<tr>
<td>SYS.006.6</td>
<td>Provide feedback to EASA on how the LPRI is implemented, including the uptake by training organisations to deliver training in English, for the purpose of harmonisation and uniform implementation.</td>
<td>Official communication, learning materials and examination provided by flight training organisations are in English.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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established to meet operators’ responsibilities requirements and to ensure an adequate management of fatigue risks. CAs should consider the latter when performing audits of the operator’s management system.

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

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<tr>
<td><strong>SYS.006.8</strong></td>
<td>Carry out ongoing monitoring of operators’ safety assurance outcomes, considering that these outcomes are to be an indicator of the effective implementation of the SMS/FRMS processes.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Perform regular inspector’s performance (i.e. qualifications and competencies) assessment based on defined performance criteria (i.e. What to do? How to act?)</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perform continuing oversight of operator’s management system, focused on assessment of operator’s ability to carry out internal auditing of Individual Flight Time Specification Scheme (IFTSS) and, especially, internal assessment of maturity level achieved by Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS), if applicable.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carry out focused monitoring of operator’s selected and defined fatigue safety performance indicators (SPIs) and safety performance targets (SPTs).</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Focused oversight on cases of fraud in Part-147 organisations**

**Desired outcome:** MSs to focus on the risk of fraud in examinations, including by adding specific items in audit checklists and collecting data on the actual cases of fraud

**Responsible:** Head of Airworthiness Division
### Foster a common understanding and oversight of Human Factors

**Desired outcome:** Implementation of the competency framework, and plan and conduct the training for the respective regulatory staff in the area of Human Factors

**Responsible:** Human resources planning, development and qualification compliance division and Heads of CAA LV Divisions

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<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.006.10</td>
<td></td>
<td>2023</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Implementation of the competency framework, and plan and conduct the training for the respective regulatory staff in the area of Human Factors. The task includes some preparatory activities which will be performed by EASA with the support of the Human Factor Collaborative Analysis Group (HF CAG) in terms of: —development of guidance and tools for the competency assessment of regulatory staff before and after training; —guidance for the appropriate level of Human Factors competency for Human Factors trainers; | Guidance for competency assessment of regulatory staff
Guidance for competency for trainers | | |
—development of promotion material to be provided as guidance to Member States and encourage implementation. These guidance and tools will be provided to the MS competent authorities to organise the implementation of the competency framework, and plan and conduct the training for the respective regulatory staff.

### 4.7 SYS.007 Safety Promotion Campaigns

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0039 Safety promotion to support ramp-up / safe return to operations

**Team Leader:** Head of Legal oversight of aviation safety division

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** Heads of CAA LV Divisions

**Desired outcome:** Support to the aviation organizations of safe ramp-up / return to operations by using EASA safety promotion campaign materials - guidelines, training materials, best practice provided by EASA.

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

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<th>Intermediate results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.007.1</td>
<td>A dedicated safety promotion campaign (guidelines, training materials, best practice provided by EASA) in support of safe ramp-up / return to operations.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>new</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.8 SYS.008 Safety of Information
EPAS action number and title: MST.0040 Safety and security reporting coordination mechanism

Team Leader: Head of Legal oversight of aviation safety division

Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders: Heads of CAA LV Divisions

Desired outcome: To increase the level of safety by management of security impact on safety, at the same time reducing the risks including risks associated with overflying conflict zones.

Responsible: Head of Aircraft Operations Division

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<th>Actions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SYS.008.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 2023</td>
<td>new</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To establish the coordination mechanism between reporting systems in order to allow for an integrated approach to the management of risks.

4.9 OPER.001 Aircraft upset in flight (LOC-I)

EPAS action number and title: MST.0028 Include LOC-I in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)

Team Leader: Head of Aircraft Operations Division

Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders: Aircraft Operations Division inspectors, Safety Managers of organisations (air operators)
**Desired outcome:** Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of LOC-I

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

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<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPER.001.1</td>
<td>Ensure that the risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of LOC-I. Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, such as: monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes, approach path management, convective weather, in-flight icing, and handling of technical failures, established and measured to monitor their effectiveness.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.10 OPER.002 Runway safety (runway excursions, runway incursions and collisions)

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0028 Include Runway Safety in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)

**Team Leader:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division and Head of Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** Aircraft Operations Division inspectors, Safety Managers of organisations (air operators)

**Desired outcome:** Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of REs and RIs

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division and Head of Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division

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<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
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<tr>
<td>OPER.002.1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Ensure that the risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of REs and RIs.

Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, such as: monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes, approach path management, and handling of technical failures, established and measured to monitor their effectiveness. Ensure that the implementation of actions suggested by the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE) and European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions (EAPPRI) are considered.

| OPER.002.2 | Ensure implementation of the New Global Reporting Format (GRF) for Runway Surface Conditions – ICAO EUR Region. | Oversight coordinated GRF implementation (which would include CAA, aerodromes, ATC, AIS, METEO, operators, including business aviation and military). Follow effective GRF implementation plan execution by responsible operators to implement GRF within the specified deadline. | Ongoing | December 2021 | Completed |

4.11 OPER.003 Airborne conflict (Mid-air collisions)

**EPAS action number and title:**
- MST.0028 Include Airborne conflict in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)
- MST.0024 Loss of separation between civil and military aircraft
- MST.0030 Implementation of SESAR solutions aiming to reduce the risk of mid-air collision en-route and TMA
- MST.0038 Airspace complexity and traffic congestion

**Team Leader:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division and Head of Air Navigation Division
Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders: CAA LV inspectors, Safety Managers of organisations

Desired outcome: Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of REs and RIs

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division and Head of Air Navigation Division

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<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPER.003.1</strong></td>
<td>Ensure that the risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of airborne conflict.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, such as: perception and situational awareness, monitoring of flight parameters and automation modes, established and measured to monitor their effectiveness. Ensure that the implementation of actions suggested by the European Action Plan for Airspace Infringement Risk Reduction, are considered.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPER.003.2</strong></td>
<td>Ensure implementation of EASA recommendations related to the loss of separation between civil and military aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Endorse and fully apply Circular 330 “Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management”.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Closely coordinate to develop, harmonise and publish operational requirements and instructions for state aircraft to ensure that ‘due regard’ for civil aircraft is always maintained.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>support the development and harmonisation of civil/military coordination procedures for ATM at EU level.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Report relevant occurrences to EASA.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Plan of Actions

**OPER.003.3**
Ensure implementation of SESAR solutions.

**OPER.003.4**
Consider ‘airspace complexity’ and ‘traffic congestion’ as safety-relevant factors in airspace changes affecting uncontrolled traffic, including the changes along international borders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EPAS action number and title</th>
<th>MST.0028 Include Ground safety in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td>Head of Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division CAA LV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders</td>
<td>CAA LV inspectors, Safety Managers of organisations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired outcome</th>
<th>Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risks in the area of Ground safety</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsible</td>
<td>Head of Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division CAA LV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPER.004.1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### 4.13 OPER.005 Terrain collision

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0028 Include terrain collision in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)

**Team Leader:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** Aircraft Operations Division inspectors, Safety Managers of organisations (air operators)

**Desired outcome:** Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of terrain collision

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

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<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPER.005.1</td>
<td>Ensure that the risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of terrain collision.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, are established and measured to monitor their effectiveness.</td>
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</table>

### 4.14 OPER.006 Aircraft environment

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0028 Include aircraft environment in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)

**Team Leader:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division
Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders: Aircraft Operations Division inspectors, Safety Managers of organisations (air operators)

**Desired outcome:** Increase safety by continuously assessing and improving risk controls to mitigate the risk of fire, smoke and fumes

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPER.006.1</td>
<td>Ensure that the risk area is continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of fire, smoke and fumes.</td>
<td>Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, are established and measured to monitor their effectiveness.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.15 **OPER.007 Rotorcraft operations:**

- helicopter upset in flight (Loss of Control)
- terrain and obstacle conflict

EPAS action number and title:

- MST.0028 Include rotorcraft operations in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)
- MST.0015 Helicopter safety events. CAs, in partnership with industry representatives, to organise helicopter safety events annually or every two years. The EHEST, IHST, CA, Heli Offshore or other sources of safety promotion materials could be freely used and promoted
- MST.0031 Implementation of SESAR solutions aiming to facilitate safe IFR operations. MSs together with their ANSPs and their flight procedures designers (if different from ANSPs) should evaluate the possibility to establish a network of low level IFR routes in their airspace to facilitate safe helicopter operations. These SESAR solutions designed to improve safety should be implemented as far as it is feasible

**Team Leader:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division and Head of Air Navigation Division

Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders: CAA LV inspectors, Safety Managers of organisations
**Desired outcome:** Continuously assess and improve risk controls in the helicopter upset in flight (Loss of Control) and terrain and obstacle conflict areas

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division and Head of Air Navigation Division

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<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPER.007.1</td>
<td>Ensure that the risk areas are continuously assessed and risk controls improved to mitigate the risk of rotorcraft operations.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agreed set of actions related to identified, captured, and formally assessed safety issues, are established and measured to monitor their effectiveness.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPER.007.2</td>
<td>Organise helicopter safety events.</td>
<td>August 2022</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Develop a plan of activities together with Military and Boarder Guard aviation departments.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performance of safety workshops, seminars, meetings to exchange the information on safety promotion materials.</td>
<td>Annually or every two years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPER.007.3</td>
<td>Ensure implementation of SESAR solutions aiming to facilitate safe IFR operations.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4.16 OPER.008 General Aviation - Systemic enablers

**EPAS action number and title:**
- MST.0025 Improve the dissemination of safety messages.
- MST.0027 Develop safety culture in GA
**Team Leader:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division and Head of Air Navigation Division

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** CAA LV inspectors, Representatives from aviation organisations (training organisations, federations, clubs, associations, aviation colleges and institutes) - committed to safety performance in GA.

**Desired outcome:** Reduce the number of fatalities in GA through the implementation of systemic enablers

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division and Head of Air Navigation Division

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<th>Timeframe</th>
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</table>
| **OPER.008.1**  
Improve the dissemination of safety promotion and training material by authorities, associations, flying clubs, insurance companies targeting flight instructors and/or pilots through means such as safety workshops and safety days/evenings. |  
CAA LV will provide its General Aviation Safety Promotion Platform hosted on the CAA LV site and work with the GA community to raise awareness on important safety topics.  
Performance of safety workshops, seminars, meetings to exchange the information on safety promotion materials. | Ongoing |  |
| **OPER.008.2**  
Include provisions to facilitate and promote safety culture (including just culture) in GA as part of State safety management activities in order to foster positive safety behaviours and encourage occurrence reporting. |  
Include provisions for safety culture (including just culture) in GA in SSP LV.  
Continue collecting of data on Latvian GA fleet, as well as on flight hours.  
Measure the safety performance (i.e. pilots’ qualifications and competencies) in GA. | Ongoing | Ongoing |

4.17 **OPER.009 General Aviation - Staying in control**
**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0028 Include General Aviation - Staying in control in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)

**Team Leader:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** Aircraft Operations Division inspectors, Representatives from aviation organisations (training organisations, federations, clubs, associations, aviation colleges and institutes) - committed to safety performance in GA

**Desired outcome:** Reduce the risk of Loss of Control accidents

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

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<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPER.009.1 Carry out focused oversight of instructors and examiners performance during the pilots’ training and proficiency checking to ensure that staying in control risk mitigation actions cover topics such as aircraft performance, flight preparation and management, role of angle of attack, threat and error management (TEM), upset and stall avoidance and recovery, and startle and surprise management.</td>
<td>Improved procedures, including checklists, are established. Definition and programming of safety actions are completed. Implementation and follow-up of the actions are monitored. Safety performance measurement is focussed on improving flying skills, pilot awareness and the management of upset or stall to prevent accidents caused by a loss of control, which is the most significant operational key risk area in GA.</td>
<td>December 2021 Yearly Yearly</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4.18 OPER.010 General aviation - Coping with weather**

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0028 Include General Aviation – Coping with weather in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)
Team Leader: Head of Aircraft Operations Division

Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders: Aircraft Operations Division inspectors, Representatives from aviation organisations (training organisations, federations, clubs, associations, aviation colleges and institutes) - committed to safety performance in GA.

Desired outcome: Increase safety by reducing the number of weather-related accidents

Responsible: Head of Aircraft Operations Division

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<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPER.010.1</td>
<td>Establish GA Safety Action Group (GA SAG) and its Terms of Reference.</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Improve the content of safety information and access to it on CAA LV site.</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide guidance material for GA pilots.</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
<td></td>
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<td>OPER.010.2</td>
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4.19 OPER.011 General aviation - Preventing mid-air collisions

EPAS/SPAS action number and title:

- MST.0028 Include General Aviation – Preventing mid-air collisions in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS).
- MAC/GA Airspace infringement risk in General Aviation. National authorities should play the leading role in establishing and promoting local implementation priorities and actions
Team Leader: Head of Aircraft Operations Division or Head of Air Navigation Division

Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders: CAA LV inspectors, Representatives from aviation organisations (training organisations, federations, clubs, associations, aviation colleges and institutes) - committed to safety performance in GA.

Desired outcome: Increase safety by reducing the risk of MACs and airspace infringements in GA

Responsible: Head of Aircraft Operations Division or Head of Air Navigation Division

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPER.011.1</td>
<td>Develop and implement suitable risk mitigation actions for preventing airspace infringement and reducing the risk of MAC by raising the quality of support provided to GA flights by air navigation service providers (ANSPs) through focused oversight.</td>
<td>GA risk area is identified and full list of issues are established and continuously monitored. Definition and programming of safety actions are completed. Implementation and follow-up of the actions are monitored. Safety performance measurement is conducted.</td>
<td>December 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPER.011.2</td>
<td>Establish clear and open communication at state and stakeholder level on roles, responsibilities, and management of reducing the airspace infringement risks considering three potential major consequences, such as mid-air collision, loss of separation and disruption to flight operations.</td>
<td>Performance of safety workshops, seminars, meetings. Declared training organisations (for non-commercial licenses only) should be involved in the safety risk management process.</td>
<td>6-months cycle</td>
</tr>
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</table>

4.20 OPER.012 General aviation – Managing the flight
**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0028 Include General Aviation – Managing the flight in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)

**Team Leader:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** Aircraft Operations Division inspectors, Representatives from aviation organisations (training organisations, federations, clubs, associations, aviation colleges and institutes) - committed to safety performance in GA.

**Desired outcome:** Reduce the number of fatalities and serious injuries in GA

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

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<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPER.012.1</td>
<td>CAA LV makes available an online platform hosted on the CAA LV site to facilitate the dissemination of safety promotion material.</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Provide guidance material for GA pilots.</td>
<td>May 2023</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conduct of GA SAG meetings</td>
<td>3-months cycle</td>
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4.21 **OPER.013 PPL/LAPL learning objectives in the Meteorological Information part of the PPL/LAPL syllabus**

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0036 Include PPL/LAPL learning objectives in the Meteorological Information part of the PPL/LAPL syllabus in State Plan for Aviation Safety (SPAS)

**Team Leader:** Head of PEL CAA LV

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** PEL inspectors, Representatives from aviation organisations (PPL/LAPL pilots, training organisations, federations, clubs, associations, aviation colleges and institutes) - committed to safety performance in GA
Desired outcome: Reduce the number of fatalities and serious injuries in GA.

**Responsible:** Head of PEL CAA LV

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</table>
| OPER.013.1 | Develop proportionate learning objectives in the ‘Meteorological Information’ part of the PPL/LAPL syllabus. | Learning objectives, with related question bank. Such learning objectives to be of a basic, non-academic nature and address key learning objectives in relation to:  
  — practical interpretation of ground based weather radar, strengths and weaknesses;  
  — practical interpretation of meteorological satellite imagery, strengths and weaknesses;  
  — forecasts from numerical weather prediction models, strengths and weaknesses. | May 2022 | Completed |

### 4.22 ADR

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0029 Implementation of SESAR runway safety solutions

**Team Leader:** Head of Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division CAA LV

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division, Air navigation service provider, Airports

**Desired outcome:** SESAR solutions designed to improve runway safety are implemented as far as it is feasible.

**Responsible:** Head of Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division CAA LV
### ADR.001.1

Propose evaluate in RWY Safety Team the SESAR solutions (solutions #01, #02, #04, #26, #47, #48, #70) designed to improve runway safety should be considered as far as it is feasible.


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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADR.001.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intermediate results</td>
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<tr>
<td>SESAR solutions for runway safety discussed at RWY Safety Teams.</td>
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<td>Timeframe</td>
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<td>Ongoing</td>
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#### 4.23 GH

**EPAS action number and title:** RMT.0728 Development of requirements for groundhandling

**Team Leader:** Head of Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division CAA LV

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division

**Desired outcome:** Ensure oversight capabilities

**Responsible:** Head of Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division CAA LV

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADR.001.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intermediate results</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop a plan of activities following the regulation developments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timeframe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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This will consider operational requirements, organisational requirements and authority requirements, as deemed necessary. Detailed objectives and actions are defined by a Ground handling Roadmap which was subject to a focused consultation in Q1/2019.

4.24 **EME.001 New business models**

**EPAS action number and title:** MST.0019 Better understanding of operators’ governance structure

**Team Leader:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** CAA LV inspectors, Safety Managers of organisations

**Desired outcome:** Increase safety by continuously assessing and mitigating risks posed by new and emerging business models

**Responsible:** Head of Aircraft Operations Division

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<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
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</table>
| EME.001.1  
Make sure that operator’s management system is focused on identification of safety issues and safety risk management as regards contracting of safety-critical services and wet lease-in agreements. | The existing operator’s SRM process captures safety issues, identified through the systematic hazard identification, introduced by outsourcing of safety critical services (e.g. flight planning, engine servicing, navigation chart providers, de-icing) and wet lease-in agreements.  
Safety issues are risk assessed to determine what actions, if any are needed.  
All actions are managed through the Register. | Ongoing | Ongoing | Ongoing |
### EME.001.2
Make sure that operator’s management system is focused on identification of safety issues and safety risk management as regards impact of interoperability arrangements on safety, i.e. interoperability refers to those cases where a holding or parent company wants to streamline its operations across several different AOCs of several Member States belonging to the same holding or parent company and to exchange aircraft and possibly crews freely.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The existing operator’s SRM process captures safety issues, identified through the systematic hazard identification, introduced by interoperability, where several AOC holders belong to the same parent company or holding.</td>
<td>Safety issues are risk assessed to determine what actions, if any are needed. All actions are managed through the Register.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EME.001.3
Make sure that operator’s management system is focused on identification of safety issues and safety risk management as regards different contractual arrangements amongst crews, i.e. an operator’s management system systematically captures the correlation between the operator’s various employment types (e.g. temporary employment models, employment via employment agencies, pay-to-fly employment schemes, self-employed) and the number of reports of occurrences obtained by the operator.

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<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The existing operator’s SRM process captures safety issues, identified through the systematic hazard identification, introduced by different employment models within an individual operator.</td>
<td>Safety issues are risk assessed to determine what actions, if any are needed. All actions are managed through the Register.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EME.001.4
Make sure that operator’s management system is focused on identification of safety issues and safety risk management to address increased mobility of flight crew and to assess the safety impact of a higher turnover rate. Increased mobility of flight crew could result in a reduction in experience levels and adversely affect the

<table>
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<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The existing operator’s SRM process captures safety issues, identified through the systematic hazard identification, introduced by increased mobility &amp; turnover of pilots.</td>
<td>Safety issues are risk assessed to determine what actions, if any are needed.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
efficiency of recurrent training, particularly the training of all major failures over a 3-year period. Where pilots are more likely to leave the operator after less than 3 years, flight crew training and in particular the operator’s conversion course of the subsequent operator should be adapted.

| Efficiency of recurrent training | All actions are managed through the Register. | Ongoing |

### 4.25 EME.002 Cybersecurity

**National action number and title:** EME.002 Preventive work in Cyber related issues

**Team Leader:** Head of Aviation Security Division CAA LV

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** CAA LV inspectors, Representatives from aviation and Cyber security related organisations (airports, air carriers, air navigation service providers, CERT, etc.)

**Desired outcome:** Increase the security by reducing the risk of being involved in Cyber related events

**Responsible:** Head of Aviation Security Division CAA LV

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actions</th>
<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EME.002.1</td>
<td>Coordinate the working group of Nominated persons in Cyber security from aviation organisations.</td>
<td>Organise meetings in cooperation with National CERT and Eurocontrol.</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME.002.2</td>
<td>Preventive work to mitigate risks in Cyber security ensuring compliance with the requirements contained in Chapter 18 of Cabinet Regulation No 397/2010, Regulation (EU) 1998/2015 and ICAO Annex 17.</td>
<td>Inspections and audits in accordance with Cabinet Regulation No 415 (2010) and approved National oversight action plan approved by CAA LV Aviation security division.</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.26  **EME.003 Unmanned Aircraft Systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National action number and title: EME.003 Unmanned Aircraft Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Team Leader:</strong> Head of EU and International Affairs Division CAA LV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:</strong> CAA LV Unmanned aircraft flight safety section</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Desired outcome:** Compliance and exchange of information

**Responsible:** Head of Unmanned Aircraft flight safety Section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Intermediate results</th>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EME.003.2</strong> Ensure the exchange of information with the public, UAS operators, pilots and industry. Promote public awareness on existing and upcoming UAS legal provisions and rules.</td>
<td>Information for public, UAS operators and pilots.</td>
<td>December 2022</td>
<td>In Process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.27  **EME.004 Lasers**
**National action number and title:** EME.004 Lasers

**Team Leader:** Head of Air Navigation Division and Head of Aviation Security Division

**Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders:** CAA LV: Safety risk management at national level. Aviation organisations: Safety risk management at organisation level

**Desired outcome:**

- Identification of and engagement with national and international key stakeholders with the aim to capture best practice for implementation in Latvia and sharing lessons learned.
- Introduction of tighter measures against laser attacks into legislation.
- Increase the public's awareness of the risk associated with laser attacks.

**Responsible:** Head of Air Navigation Division and Head of Aviation Security Division

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EME.004.1</td>
<td>Coordinate the working group with the view to develop consistent and effective prevention and mitigation plans which address the risk of laser attacks in the aviation environment.</td>
<td>Establishment of a working group</td>
<td>December 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME.004.2</td>
<td>Engage with organisations outside the aviation environment, such as the Police and Department of Health, in order to find effective measures for the protection of aviation.</td>
<td>Involvement of organisations outside the aviation environment</td>
<td>December 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.28 **EME.005 Potential hazards posed by unmanned aircraft systems**
### National action number and title: EME.005 The potential hazards posed by unmanned aircraft systems at aerodromes

### Team Leader: Head of Aviation Security Division, Air Navigation Division, Unmanned Aircraft, European Union and Foreign Affairs Division, Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division

### Composition of the project team and participating stakeholders: Aviation Security Division, Air Navigation Division, Unmanned Aircraft, European Union and Foreign Affairs Division, Aerodrome Standards and Safety Division, air navigation and air traffic management service providers, airports, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Defense.

### Desired outcome: Ensuring acceptable flight safety as a minimum for aerodromes providing air traffic services.

### Responsible: Head of Unmanned Aircraft flight safety Section

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EME.005.1 Implementation of coordination measures</td>
<td>The responsible parties have been identified. Their responsibilities have been determined.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>New</td>
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<tr>
<td>EME.005.2 Initial risk assessment</td>
<td>Identified and evaluated potential risks</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME.005.3 Development and implementation of the plan for unauthorized UAS activities in the vicinity of aerodromes</td>
<td>A common understanding of the systematic approach to corrective and preventive actions. Coordinated and clear action on unauthorised UAS activities in the vicinity of aerodromes.</td>
<td>December, 2023</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>