



**WORKING PAPER**

**ASSEMBLY — 40TH SESSION**

**TECHNICAL COMMISSION**

**Agenda Item 30: Other issues to be considered by the Technical Commission**

**ENSURING CERTIFICATION COVERAGE AT AERODROMES WHERE OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES ARE SHARED BETWEEN INDEPENDENT ORGANISATIONS**

(Presented by Qatar)

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The aerodrome certification system required under ICAO Annex 14 — *Aerodromes*, is an essential component of the aviation safety system. The language of the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and associated guidance material generally describes a singular aerodrome operator responsible for all aspects of aerodrome operations. However, in some States some essential aviation safety services are provided by non-aerodrome-operator entities.

Because ICAO SARPs and related guidance documents are worded to address the oversight of a single aerodrome operator solely responsible for the safety at the aerodrome, their strict transposition into national legislation does not allow for recognition during the certification and oversight of the several entities that may provide services covered by the certification and that need to have separate but coordinated activities to ensure safety at the aerodrome.

While the ICAO SARPs of Annex 14, Volume I — *Aerodrome Design and Operations*, and related documents focus on the aerodrome operator as the single entity responsible for safety at the aerodrome, Doc 9981, *Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) – Aerodromes* paragraph 2.1.4 acknowledges that in some States not all aspects of aerodrome scope of certification may be the responsibility of the aerodrome operator. However, there is little guidance on the systemic implications of this approach. For example, if a safety deficiency is identified in a non-aerodrome-operator entity, who would be the entity responsible for the implementation of measures that restore an acceptable level of safety?

A different drafting of ICAO guidance documents would assist States to adapt their regulations to better address the cases in which the aerodrome operator is not the only entity that provides services covered by the certification, and it would be important for safety at the aerodrome.

**Action:** The Assembly is invited to:

- a) recognise the need for flexibility in achievement of the goals of the aviation safety oversight system; and
- b) request the Council to review SARPs and guidance material relating to certification of aerodromes with a view to amending provisions to provide flexibility in the certification process for both aerodrome operators and non-aerodrome-operating entities, as per paragraphs 2.1 to 2.4 of this paper.

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This paper relates to Strategic Objective: Safety.
<i>Financial implications:</i>	No additional resources required.
<i>References:</i>	Annex 14, Volume I – <i>Aerodrome Design and Operations</i> Doc 9981, <i>Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) – Aerodromes</i> Doc 9774, <i>Manual on Certification of Aerodromes</i>

## 1. BACKGROUND

1.1 The requirement for aerodrome certification is enshrined in Annex 14, Volume I, 1.4.1, with a following note providing direction to consider *Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) – Aerodromes* and the *Manual on Certification of Aerodromes* (Doc 9774).

1.2 PANS-Aerodromes 2.1.2 outlines clearly the scope of certification, which is reinforced in further sections and in Doc 9774 through the requirements relating to the aerodrome manual and the certification process.

1.3 The language of these provisions generally establishes two parties in this system: the aerodrome operator and the oversight authority (the civil aviation authority or other entity as named).

1.4 While the ICAO SARPs of Annex 14, Volume I, and related documents focus on the aerodrome operator as the single entity responsible for safety at the aerodrome, PANS-Aerodromes 2.1.4 acknowledges that in some States not all aspects of aerodrome scope of certification may be the responsibility of the aerodrome operator. However, there is little guidance on the systemic implications of this approach. For example, if a safety deficiency is identified in a non-aerodrome-operator entity aspect, who would be the entity responsible for the implementation of measures that restore an acceptable level of safety?

## 2. POSSIBLE EVOLUTION OF THE AERODROME CERTIFICATION PROCESS AND THE AVIATION SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEM

2.1 To address such a situation, several actions should be performed by the concerned States.

2.2 The State regulatory authority should recognize in its regulations the possibility that service providers different from the aerodrome operator may perform activities included in the scope of the aerodrome certification.

2.3 Such regulations should require these service providers to participate in safety compliance activities and in the processes related to the certification, oversight, and finding resolution, in full coordination with the aerodrome operator, defined as the organisation primarily responsible for the safety and operation of the aerodrome.

2.4 The certification process should verify the compliance of the service provider's activities with the requirements. It should also ensure that the relations and the cooperation between the aerodrome operator and the service providers are formalized through service level agreements or other working arrangements.

2.5 As a result, the service providers may be listed on the aerodrome certificate and thus become subject to its terms and conditions. This certificate would become the basis for continuing oversight activities conducted.

### 3. CONCLUSION

3.1 Given that the responsibility for aerodrome safety activities may be shared between an aerodrome operator and non-aerodrome-operator entities in some States, it is essential that those States' safety oversight systems cover all of the entities involved. The guidance related to the certification system should account for this and be flexible in its application.

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