



WORKING PAPER

ASSEMBLY — 40TH SESSION

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Agenda Item 12: Aviation Security – Policy

AIRPORT SECURITY SCREENING DIFFERENTIATION

(Presented by the State of Qatar)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Working Paper addresses the subject of differentiation of airport screening for passengers and non-passengers and advocates that more work needs to be undertaken by the Aviation Security (AVSEC) Panel to achieve a more effective and efficient screening system that reflects the current and future challenges facing the aviation system.

Action: The Assembly is invited to request that Council direct the AVSEC Panel to consider the issues raised in this paper with a view to reaching consensus on the future concept for screening activities and provide for its harmonized implementation through appropriate specifications in Annex 17 and appropriate guidance material.

<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	This Working Paper relates to the <i>Security and Facilitation</i> Strategic Objective.
<i>Financial implications:</i>	No financial implications
<i>References:</i>	Annex 17 – <i>Security</i> Doc 10108, <i>Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP)</i> Report of the High-level Conference on Aviation Security (HLCAS) (2012) Report of the Second High-level Conference on Aviation Security (HLCAS/2) (2018) Assembly Resolution A39-18 <i>Consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security</i> A40-WP/27 <i>Consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security</i> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017)

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Nearly fifty years ago, the screening of passengers and their cabin baggage was introduced as a measure intended to prevent and deter future hijackings, which appeared to be a rising trend. At the time of its introduction, since no specific screening equipment was available, the screening process consisted of a visual examination of the passenger's cabin baggage and a physical search of the passenger. The physical search of the passenger was based on a procedure carried out by law enforcement officers when detaining a person suspected of committing a criminal offence and designed to detect any weapons carried by the suspect. This process was known as a "pat down" which has since become a term in common usage within the screening industry.

1.2 Since its first introduction, screening has expanded to include an examination of passenger hold baggage and staff entering security-restricted areas of airports (together with items they may carry) and has evolved into a multi-billion-dollar industry providing screening equipment and technology R&D to meet an ever-increasing perception of threat vectors attacking civil aviation. Screening is now accepted as a cornerstone of baseline measures to protect civil aviation from acts of unlawful interference. Despite this evolution of screening into a fundamental aviation security concept, the actual implementation of the screening concept has changed very little from that earlier model of fifty years ago, with all passengers and staff being treated equally irrespective of the risk they may pose, a "one-size-fits-all" approach.

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 Two very important concepts have been introduced into Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), namely the use of security risk assessments in determining the implementation of measures and the use of unpredictability and randomness. The term Risk Assessment appears in nine Standards and two Recommended Practices, and so it could easily be considered a mature and sensible concept that is enshrined within the fabric of Annex 17. The concept of randomness and unpredictability is somewhat newer and is currently a Recommended Practice (RP 4.1.2); however, the Thirtieth Meeting of the AVSEC Panel (AVSECP/30) made a recommendation to the Council that this Recommended Practice be elevated to a Standard, again in recognition of it as a mature and sensible concept to be applied to the implementation of aviation security measures.

2.2 Since the first High-level Conference on Aviation Security (HLCAS) in 2012, and reiterated by the second HLCAS in 2018, ICAO and its Member States have promoted the importance of risk-based approaches to aviation security. The outcomes of HLCAS/2 include the recommendation that "ICAO and Member States should continue to develop risk assessments to identify vulnerabilities within their aviation security systems and implement the most effective security measures to mitigate threats."

2.3 In 2015, Amendment 15 to Annex 17 included Recommended Practice 2.5.3, stating that "Each Contracting State should consider implementing innovative processes and procedures to allow operational differentiation of screening and security controls based on clearly defined criteria." While many States and operators have pursued security regimes based upon risk, discussion in various ICAO working groups and at the Panel have illuminated that clarity is lacking on how to employ baseline security measures most effectively. The issue of how to address differentiation was most recently included in ICAO's Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP), developed to provide a strategic direction and implementation plan to aid States in increasing the effective implementation of Annex 17 SARPs. Priority outcome #1 in the GASeP focuses on "enhancing risk awareness and response" while priority action #3, "improve technological resources and foster innovation", includes specific

action 3.7: “consider and evaluate the use of passenger information to inform and assist aviation security.”

2.4 A risk-based differentiated approach to screening is reliant on the aviation security ecosystem, which is comprised of complementary layers. While differentiated screening should primarily be driven by data analysis and a data-driven approach helps to achieve further segmentation of the “unknown” traveller population, other techniques (to include anomalous behaviour detection, the use of explosive detection canines, unpredictability and randomness in the deployment of security measures) are both complementary and integral to successfully implementing differentiation. Randomness and unpredictability are key components of aviation security regimes and must be included in efforts to segment populations for differentiated screening.

2.5 Risk assessments supporting differentiated screening must be informed by data. Datasets must address threats to aviation as well as information about the passengers or those undergoing screening. To identify “known” individuals, the appropriate authority must be able to perform vetting of personal information and the vetting must include national security components. Identity is a critical element of any differentiated screening regime, one which will only increase in importance over time. With the Advanced Passenger Information (API) Standard recently coming into effect in Annex 9 - *Facilitation*, and the current effort to develop a Standard on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data, as directed by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2396, ICAO must assert a leadership role in assisting Member States in developing a framework to combine physical screening and identity vetting and verification, and to effectively use risk assessments to inform relevant policy decisions and empower risk-based screening operations.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 AVSECP/30 deliberated the concept of differentiated screening during debate on proposed amendments to Annex 17 concerning the screening of staff, but did not reach consensus on the way forward. A majority opted for a non-flexible approach, arguing that 100% screening of non-passengers should be the baseline for all States, particularly when making efforts to mitigate against the insider threat. A minority of the Panel argued for a more flexible approach consisting of a combination of some level of screening of non-passengers along with various other security control measures and vetting processes, which can be just as effective. This minority view also opined that there is no clear evidence that 100% screening of non-passengers will improve security within the aviation system or that it is the only effective method of combatting insider threat.

3.2 Decisions made concerning staff screening will also affect passenger screening in the fullness of time, which is why the concept of differentiated screening should be a priority issue for ICAO and the AVSEC Panel. The Panel should seek consensus on the future approach to screening activities and provide for harmonized implementation through appropriate provisions of Annex 17 and guidance material. Further deliberation of this important concept should be pursued with vigour.