



**Fifth GREPECAS–RASG-PA Joint Meeting (GREPECAS-RASG-PA/5) and
Twenty-Third Meeting of the CAR/SAM Regional Planning and Implementation Group
(GREPECAS/23)**

Virtual Phase (Asynchronous, 19 January to 17 February 2026)
In-Person Phase (Mexico City, Mexico, 4 to 6 March 2026)

Agenda Item 8: CAR/SAM Air Navigation Implementation

PBN LANDINGS SAFETY

(Presented by France)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At GREPECAS/21, France presented WP/09 “PBN Implementation in France, a return of experience” and at GREPECAS/22 WP/42 “PBN landings safety recommendations”. These papers highlighted that France benefits from an important return of experience in PBN approach operated through Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) and Barometric Vertical Guidance Navigation (BaroVNAV) and identified potential safety impacts related to BaroVNAV operations and QNH errors.

Following the publication by the French Accident and Investigation Bureau, Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA), in June 2024 of the final report on one of the most serious safety incidents occurring within French airspace for the last 10 years, this paper provides an update on the studies in France and in Europe regarding QNH errors and the changes to the minima adopted in France as risk mitigation measures to ensure greater resilience to these errors.

Action:

GREPECAS is invited to:

- a) Note the content of this working paper,
- b) Consider the BEA final report on “Serious incident to the AIRBUS A320 registered 9H-EMU and operated by Airhub Airlines on Monday 23 May 2022 on approach to Paris-Charles de Gaulle airport”,
- c) Consider the studies by the French ANSP DSNA and Eurocontrol showing that the nominal integrity value set by the ICAO (2.10-7/approach) is not met by PBN approaches with a barometric guidance, with a factor of 1,000 to 10,000 times higher,
- d) Consider the integrity and precision capabilities of SBAS and the latent safety issues of BaroVNAV in the implementation and operations of PBN approaches in the CAR/SAM region.

<i>Strategic Objectives 2026-2050:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Every flight is safe and secure • Aviation is environmentally sustainable • Aviation delivers seamless, accessible, and reliable mobility for all • No country left behind • The International Civil Aviation Convention and Other Treaties, Laws and Regulations Address All Challenges • The Economic Development of Air Transport Assures the Delivery of Economic Prosperity and Societal Well-Being for All
<i>References:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ICAO Annex 10 Volume I • PBN Manual • GANP ASBU element NAVS

1. Introduction

1.1 The implementation of Performance Based Navigation (PBN) is of great interest to support precise and advanced trajectories within airspaces. ICAO has defined a specific strategy for approaches in its Annex 10 Volume I: “*e) promote the use of Approach with Vertical Guidance (APV) operations, particularly those using Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) vertical guidance, to enhance safety and accessibility*”.

1.2 France fully subscribes to the ICAO specific strategy for approaches in the implementation of PBN and has published PBN approaches for a majority of its IFR runway-ends following EU regulation. France has the largest number of IFR runway-ends in Europe. Consequently, France benefits from a wide return of experience on the use of both SBAS and BaroVNAV in PBN approach operations.

1.3 One of the major known risks on Baro-VNAV approaches is altimeter setting error. Some pilots refer to this as “the killer item on Baro-VNAV procedures”. The flight profile is significantly impacted and can cause a CFIT (Control Flight Into Terrain) when the error reduces the aircraft’s actual altitude.

1.4 In 2021 in Nantes and in 2022 in Paris CDG, two Baro-VNAV approaches brought aircraft below the minimum procedure altitude. In the incident at CDG, the aircraft’s height at the time of the go-round was recorded as 2 meters above the ground. The crew and passengers owe their survival to a 50-foot increase in the minimums made by the company in charge of instrument flight procedures for this airline.

1.5 Several actions like raising the minimum, reminding the crew of the QNH on final approach were taken to prevent another incident, and a national workshop was held in France with a large number of operators to put in place effective measures to prevent the risk of error. At the same time, the DSNA; the French ANSP, decided to conduct a study on altimeter setting errors during approach.

2. Studies conducted by the French ANSP DSNA and Eurocontrol

2.1. Data and methodology of DSNA

2.1.1 The first step was to study the available data and use it to validate an analysis method. The solution chosen was to collect altitude data provided by aircraft using Mode S, in particular the ‘selected QNH’, and compare this value with the QNH available on ATC systems.

2.1.2 Then, this method was implemented by collecting data from six major French airports over the period 2019-2023 in order to obtain a representative sample and provide conclusive results.

2.1.3 The sample collected comprises approximately 1.7 million landings (1,694,266) for the selected period. This sample represents all approaches at the selected airports, regardless of the type of final approach performed by the crew. The ‘non-distinction’ of the type of final approach does not affect the results obtained in the context of the study.

2.2. Studies results

2.2.1 Based on the data collected by DSNA, initial results show that:

- There is a probability of error of 10^{-3} per approach for a QNH error equal to or greater than 2 hPa; and
- There is a probability of error of 10^{-4} per approach for an error equal to or greater than 10 hPa.

2.2.2 The analysis of the information by DSNA through the collected data made possible to quantify the two most common types of error regarding QNH.

2.2.3 The first type of error is forgetting to switch to the local QNH at the transition altitude. This error has variable consequences and depends on the difference between 1013.25 hPa and the local QNH.

2.2.4 The second is the 10 hPa error. In unfavourable cases (+10 hPa), this error causes the aircraft to deviate 280 ft from the published vertical profile, and it is currently impossible to detect this error on board. This error corresponds to the incident at CDG in 2022.

2.2.5 In addition, the effect of these errors was measured by replaying the trajectories of several aircraft from the study. The trajectories showed a vertical offset in the approach before intercepting the descent path or throughout the final approach.

2.2.6 Finally, the study by DSNA shows that altimeter setting errors occur on both ILS/LPV approaches and PBN approaches with a barometric guidance source. It has been clearly identified that the impact is greater on PBN approaches with a barometric guidance source than on ILS/LPV approaches, as the entire geometry of the descent path is affected. The nominal integrity value set by the ICAO (2.10^{-7} /approach) is not met, with a factor of 1,000 to 10,000 times higher.

2.2.7 These results are confirmed by a study by Eurocontrol¹ that analysed landing operations over 378 EU airports during 31 days representing 747 353 flights. The study found 196 occurrences of QNH mis-setting higher than 5hpa, over 747353 flights, thus a higher than 5hPa integrity risk of the order of 10^{-4} per approach.

2.2.8 For SBAS/GBAS, the integrity risk is by design around 10^{-7} per approach, to meet the 10^{-8} per approach ICAO defined Target Level of Safety (TLS).

2.2.9 For BaroVNAV the integrity risk is measured around 10^{-3} per approach, meaning that the TLS is impacted by a factor 10, 000.

¹ An Algorithm for Identifying Altimeter Setting Errors from ADS-B Data by Nikolaos Mourousias, Emilien Robert; David De Smedt (Eurocontrol)

2.3. Raising the minima as a measure adopted by the French supervisory authority

2.3.1 In France, the supervisory authority approves the published minima and the regulator requires from procedure design offices to provide minima in addition to OCHs (Obstacle Clearance Height). This is not mandatory in many countries and the ICAO only requires the determination of an OCH for each published procedure.

2.3.2 In order to limit the risk of incidents or accidents caused by altimeter setting errors, the French supervisory authority has adopted the following risk mitigation measures to be implemented in 2026 by DSNA:

- the Decision Heights (DH) for LNAV/VNAV approach procedures will be increased by 100 ft, without exceeding the Minimum Decision Height (MDH) value for an LNAV procedure on the same QFU
- the minimum DH value for RNP AR procedures will be set at 350 ft
- the Runway Visual Range (RVR) values for LNAV/VNAV procedures will be updated based on the new DH values.

2.3.3 These measures were defined following the result of studies carried out by the French supervisory authority analysing OCHs published in other countries such as the United States of America.

2.3.4 The main differences with the United States are:

- The altimeter setting is given as inches of mercury (inHg), not as hectopascals (hPa)
- The transition level is FL180
- The language used, English, is the mother tongue of air traffic controllers and of a large proportion of pilots
- The PBN approach procedures are designed with Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) criteria, more conservative in terms of LNAV/VNAV minima, alternatively to PANS-OPS.

2.3.4 The United States has been using BaroVNAV procedures for years. They have already identified inconsistencies in airborne altimeter settings, but the effects of these errors are mitigated by their altimeter setting unit (inches of mercury) and OCH values that are higher than those found in France.

3. Conclusion

3.1 Altitude setting errors can have dramatic consequences, particularly when using BaroVNAV procedures. The incident at Paris CDG should remind us that there is no such thing as zero risk and that measures must be put in place to mitigate this risk so that such a situation does not happen again.

3.2 Some ANSPs have implemented tools like Barometric Pressure Setting Advisory Tool (BAT) to alert air traffic controllers to altimeter setting errors. Alternatively, an additional margin could be included in the definition of minima.

3.3 Aircraft manufacturers are currently developing on-board solutions to alert pilots to altimeter setting errors.

3.4 The document published by the French supervisory authority, provided in the **Appendix**, details the results of the study conducted by the French ANSP DSNA.

3.5 It may be interesting to assess the impact of the possible altimeter setting errors in the CAR/SAM region.

4. Suggested actions

4.1 The GREPECAS is invited to:

- a) Note the content of this working paper;
- b) Consider the BEA final report on “Serious incident to the AIRBUS A320 registered 9H-EMU and operated by Airhub Airlines on Monday 23 May 2022 on approach to Paris-Charles de Gaulle airport”;
- c) Consider the studies by the French ANSP DSNA and Eurocontrol showing that the nominal integrity value set by the ICAO (2.10-7/approach) is not met by PBN approaches with a barometric guidance, with a factor of 1,000 to 10,000 times higher; and
- d) Consider the integrity and precision capabilities of SBAS and the latent safety issues of BaroVNAV in the implementation and operations of PBN approaches in the CAR/SAM region.



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ANALYSIS OF QNH INCONSISTENCIES IN APPROACH

IMPACT ON THE INTEGRITY OF NAVIGATION SYSTEMS WITH
BAROMETRIC VERTICAL GUIDANCE

Data 2019 - 2024

TLP GREEN

Direction de la Sécurité de l'aviation civile (safety directorate)
Mission Evaluation et Amélioration de la sécurité (State Safety Programme implementation unit)

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Introduction

After the serious incidents in Nantes (October 2021)¹ and CDG (May 2022)² during which errors in the selection of altimeter settings brought aircraft to heights well below the required minimums, the DSAC led a working group within the France Aviation Safety Network (RSAF, for Réseau Sécurité Aérienne France), the main lessons of which are described in the [2022 safety report](#).

In addition, a number of actions have been launched, both on the DSAC side³ and on the DSNA and EASA sides, and avenues still to be explored have been identified.

The following may be mentioned:

- An analysis of safety occurrence reports (see below)
- Publication of a safety info leaflet
https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/documents/Safety_information_Leaflet_2023-02.pdf
- A publication in the 2022 safety report
https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/publications/rapport_securite_aerienne_2022.pdf
developed on page 44 et seq.
- A contribution to the EASA SIB <https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2023-03>
- An incentive for aircraft operators to measure these deviations through flight data monitoring (FDM)
- On the DSNA side, an instruction to controllers to remind the QNH at the first contact with aerodrome control (see details below)
- An educational publication on TCAS and MSAW
https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/documents/Note_TAWS-MSAW.pdf
- The decision to dedicate the DSAC 2025 symposium in part to this topic
- Contributions to a reflection launched within EASA on PBN-IR.

The present study seeks to quantify the frequency of altimeter setting errors in approach using the down-link information from the Mode S frames and the QNH information provided to controllers.

1) Data in reports

The analysis of the safety occurrence reports described in section 1.18.1.2 of the BEA report revealed that altimeter setting errors for aircraft in approach were regularly reported. This analysis has identified some 150 cases in a few years. These cases have several notable characteristics: most of the errors were detected once on the ground and then reported, mainly after an ILS approach, and therefore without consequence on the trajectory⁴.

¹ https://bea.aero/fileadmin/user_upload/F-HMLD_EN.pdf

² https://bea.aero/fileadmin/uploads/9HEMU/9H-EMU_EN.pdf

³ DSAC: Direction de la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile, (Civil Aviation Safety Directorate), competent authority in France

DSNA: Direction des Services de la navigation aérienne, Air navigation service provider in France

⁴ These errors had consequences for the decision altitude and could have had consequences in the event of a go-around, with no effect on safety due to favourable weather conditions

The two most frequently encountered factors (but not exclusively) were a failure to change from 1013 to the local QNH and a representation error with error peaks at +10 and -10 hPa in particular. The count of such errors or omissions was previously based only on the notification under Regulation (EU) 376/2014. This point was developed in Part 5 of the 2022 safety report⁵.

2) Data and methodology of the study conducted by the DSNA

To measure the objective frequency of these discrepancies, an exhaustive analysis of all available data was undertaken by the Directorate of Air Navigation Services (DSNA), using the data transmitted by the aircraft (and recorded) by mode S, in particular the parameter "selected QNH", and comparing it to the available ground QNH on the control positions.

After validation of the technical feasibility of identifying a discrepancy between on-board and ground-based QNH, in particular by comparing the measured deviation with the deviation obtained by other means (comparison with a sample of safety occurrence reports notified by the DSNA and operators to DSAC), the study set out to quantify the frequency of inconsistencies between the on-board barometric setting and the "ground" QNH.

The study collected adequate data regarding its objectives for six major French airports (Paris CDG, Paris Orly, Paris Le Bourget, Nice, Marseille and Toulouse) over a period covering 5 years from 2019 to 2023.

The aeroplane barometric setting is measured from the down-link aeroplane parameters transmitted by the aircraft's S Mode transponders, detected and collected (when recorded) by the secondary radars of the air navigation services. This is assumed to be the barometric setting selected by a crew as part of the aircraft trajectory management.

The "ground" QNH setting is obtained through ATC systems data and corresponds to the QNH information as presented on the dedicated control position displays.

In total, over the perimeter of the 6 airports and over the 5-year period for which adequate data are available, the measurements are usable for 1,694,266 landings. It should be noted, however, that the study does not allow to know directly what types of approaches were flown (ILS or RNP 2D or 3D) in the identified cases or which minima (LNAV, LNAV/VNAV or LPV) were applied, but this uncertainty does not affect the ability to measure the object of the study.

For each identified approach path, the deviation between the on-board setting and the "ground" QNH is measured, in particular when the aircraft flies over the runway threshold.

3) Study results

The study conducted by the DSNA on a wide basis of observations makes it possible to estimate that the average probability of significant inconsistency (greater than or equal to 2 hPa) on the on-board QNH setting at the time of landing is of the magnitude of 10^{-3} per approach, and that the probability of occurrence of very significant inconsistency (greater than or equal to 10 hPa) is of the magnitude of 10^{-4} per approach.

The study shows that out of 7328 inconsistencies detected in the vicinity of the transition altitude, about 31% of these inconsistencies are still observed up to heights of 1000 ft, or even until touchdown, (resp. 2312 then 2269 cases).

⁵ https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/publications/rapport_securite_aerienne_2022.pdf

More precisely, these 2269 inconsistencies detected at runway threshold greater than or equal to 2hPa contain 387 inconsistencies greater than or equal to 10 hPa. The singular value of 10 hPa is found in 202 cases.




Figure 1. Barometric ground-board inconsistency rate greater than 2 hPa. On the left, the overall rate by year, on the right, the overall rate by year and by airport.

Beyond this general result, disparities between the inconsistency rates by aerodrome appear. There is a factor of 3 between Paris Le Bourget and Paris CDG, which are very close geographically, but in which very different fleets⁶ operate. These differences could be analysed in more detail to understand their origin, but as the level of inconsistency remains statistically high, it is important to note that the most serious incident known to date occurred during approach to Paris-Charles de Gaulle airport, even though it is the airport for which the frequency of inconsistencies found is the lowest among the 6 airports in the study.

The study also analyzed the statistical distribution of inconsistencies and quantified the occurrence of two most common types of errors.

- The lack of transition from the standard 1013.25 hPa setting to the QNH during the approach: Figure 2 shows that nearly 27% of the inconsistencies correspond to cases where the on-board setting is at 1013.25. Of these cases, in 85% of occurrences, there was no change in the BPS (Barometric Pressure Setting) during the approach. The latter cases (therefore about a quarter of the cases of inconsistencies) result a priori from a omission to change the altimeter setting when passing the transition level.

The effect of these "1013 omission" on the vertical offset of the trajectory is random: it depends on the local atmospheric pressure with respect to the standard setting.

- The 10 hPa error: Figure 3 shows the distribution of inconsistencies values. It is notable that: A clear peak appears for values of +/- 10 hPa of inconsistency, this peak alone representing about 10% of the inconsistency values.

The cumulative inconsistencies of at least +/- 10 hPa represent almost a quarter of the cases recorded.

These cases correspond to high risk situations where an inconsistency of at least 10 hPa results in an vertical error of 280 ft or more – the case of the serious incident that led to the present study.

⁶ The inconsistency rate between the on-board BPS and the ground QNH at the time of the landing threshold overflight is 1×10^{-3} for the approaches at Paris CDG and 3×10^{-3} for those at Paris Le Bourget.




Figure 2. Share of inconsistencies as a function of the value of the on-board BPS. Nearly 27% of the inconsistencies noted in the study are the result of a failure to change the altimeter setting from the standard setting to the QNH during the approach




Figure 3. Distribution of the on-board BPS – QNH ground inconsistencies as a function of the value of the latter, at 1000 ft AGL and at the runway threshold resp. Approximately 17% of inconsistencies have an error of 10 hPa or higher

Finally, the study focused on highlighting the measured effect on trajectories of the identified inconsistencies. Thus, for a few cases listed, the replay of the radar trajectories confirmed that the inconsistencies resulted in vertical shifts in the final approach path.

In some cases, the entire final approach path was offset above or below the expected slope, with a return to the nominal path only in the short final phase. In these cases, it is likely that the aircraft were following barometric guidance approach procedures. In others, the intermediate approach segment (interception of the plane before the final) is shifted above or below the desired altitude, before the plane follows the nominal final approach path. In these cases, it is inferred that the aircraft are following procedures with geometric vertical guidance (ILS or LPV).

4) Lessons learned from the study.

This study confirms that QNH inconsistencies occur on both ILS and RNP approaches, but for ILS approaches the safety impact⁷ for the conduct of the approach is greatly mitigated by the following of a geometric path. Only the operational minima dependant on the baro-altimeter are really affected, and for ILS approaches, there are also operational procedures such as the comparison of altitude vs remaining distance at 1000 ft AGL that make it possible to detect barometric errors at the time of the start of the final descent.

On the other hand, for an RNP approach guided by barometric reference, any error in the altimeter setting results in a systematic geometric error in the descent path actually flown. What is more, no confirmation point of the follow-up of the correct descent plan is possible, unlike the ILS procedures.

These orders of magnitude make it possible to confirm experimentally laboratory studies that had already estimated [Ref. 3] the error rate related to the memorization then restitution by the crews of messages delivered by the controllers.

These data show an integrity deficit of a factor of 1,000 (10^3) to 10,000 (10^4) with respect to what ICAO considers to be the nominal integrity value (2.10^{-7} /approach) to meet the target level of safety (TLS) of approaches, which represents a very significant differential. In concrete terms, this means that if the BaroVNAV technology were used systematically, the other assumptions for the geometric guidance remaining unchanged (incident/accident ratio, risk mitigation by crew actions, etc.) the safety objective of the approaches could be reduced by a factor of 1000 to 10,000, due to the direct relationship between the integrity of the navigation system and the TLS, explained in Table 1 of the Appendix.

Finally, it should be noted that the risk of accidents will increase with the increase in the use of RNP approaches (mainly based on barometric guidance, due to the equipment of aircraft fleets) instead of ILS approaches as a result of the current European PBN strategy.

5) Additional mitigation measures put in place by DSNA

Following the quasi-CFIT of AirHub at CDG, on July 11, 2022, the Direction of Operations took a precautionary measure requesting, during RNP approaches among other things, on first contact with the LOC controller, that the latter recall the value of the QNH in force. This instruction was intended to reduce the occurrence of barometric inconsistencies by announcing the QNH in addition to the announcement that had already been made during the approach.

This temporary instruction has been made permanent and extended, so that since 15 September 2023, for all approach control centres and aerodrome control towers:

"On first contact with the LOC controller, the latter recalls the QNH value by direct reading on the dedicated HMI for all approach procedures except ILS and LPVs.

With a view to harmonising working methods, the control centres have the possibility of extending this principle to all instrument approach procedures. »

Conclusion

The precise quantification of the cases of barometric setting inconsistencies between the airplane and the ground revealed by this data collected by the DSNA, relating to a large base of observations (almost 1,700,000 landings) and which owes its robustness in particular to the original on-board source, represents a very important advance in the understanding and objectification of the level of risk provided by vertical barometric guidance.

The study confirms that the barometric integrity risk in the context of the operational implementation of these approaches in France (and in Europe) prior to the AirHub near-CFIT in CDG is very high, leading to a level of safety of approaches with barometric vertical guidance reduced by 3 to 4 orders of magnitude compared to the safety objective of approaches sought by ICAO.

In Europe, France is probably the country most exposed to the risk to date due to the large number of aerodromes that have published RNP approaches with barometric vertical guidance.

The effect of the announcement of the QNH on first contact with the aerodrome control set up by the DSNA after the serious incident of the AirHub at CDG cannot be quantified at this stage.

It should be noted that the barometric setting risk discussed in this note affects in the same way, and to the best of our knowledge most likely with a quantitative level of the same magnitude as that discussed here, special procedures of the RNP AR type that use barometric vertical guidance.

It is planned to continue the measurement of inconsistencies in 2024 and subsequent years in order to further expand the statistical basis for measuring inconsistencies, and with the aim of quantifying the effect of specific mitigation measures.

In addition, DSAC is studying the interest of raising the minima of the Baro-VNAV approaches as a risk mitigation measure.

Finally, these orders of magnitude are confirmed by two other independent sources: a French airline as part of its flight data monitoring program (FDM) on the one hand, and a study conducted by Eurocontrol to validate an error detection algorithm on the other hand. This last study is available on Researchgate [Ref. 4].

REFERENCES

[Ref 1] *“The SBAS Integrity Concept Standardised by ICAO. Application to EGNOS”*, Benoit Roturier, Eric Chatre, Javier Ventura-Traveset, 2001.

[Ref 2] *“France DSNA position over the use of BaroVNAV”*, WP 33 prepared and presented by Benoit Roturier, NAVIGATION SYSTEMS PANEL (NSP) JOINTWORKING GROUPS – 2nd MEETING Montréal, 13-23 June 2017.

[Ref 3] *Flight Safety Foundation, Airport Operations, “Studies investigate the Role of Memory in the interaction between pilots and air traffic controllers, January- February 1998.*

[Ref 4] Mourousias, Nikolaos & Robert, Emilien & Smedt, D. (2025). *An Algorithm for Identifying Altimeter Setting Errors from ADS-B Data. 1-12. 10.1109/ICNS65417.2025.10976916.*

⁷ Only the safety impact with regard to the vertical obstacle clearance margin is considered, deviations in the event of a go-around or losses of vertical separation from other aircraft are not taken into account in the risk assessment.

Appendix

Reminder on the risk of integrity of navigation systems

Navigation systems are standardized by ICAO in Annex 10 to the Chicago Convention, Aeronautical Telecommunications, through a set of specifications for the quality of navigational information critical to flight safety.

For the landing phase which is the subject of this note, the following table gives the minimum performance of satellite navigation systems for approach and landing operations, taken from Annex 10.

Table 3.7.2.4-1 Signal-in-space performance requirements

Typical operation	Accuracy horizontal 95% (Notes 1 and 3)	Accuracy vertical 95% (Notes 1 and 3)	Integrity (Note 2)	Time-to-alert (Note 3)	Continuity (Note 4)	Availability (Note 5)
En-route	3.7 km (2.0 NM)	N/A	$1 - 1 \times 10^{-7}/h$	5 min	$1 - 1 \times 10^{-4}/h$ to $1 - 1 \times 10^{-8}/h$	0.99 to 0.99999
En-route, Terminal	0.74 km (0.4 NM)	N/A	$1 - 1 \times 10^{-7}/h$	15 s	$1 - 1 \times 10^{-4}/h$ to $1 - 1 \times 10^{-8}/h$	0.99 to 0.99999
Initial approach, Intermediate approach, Non-precision approach (NPA), Departure	220 m (720 ft)	N/A	$1 - 1 \times 10^{-7}/h$	10 s	$1 - 1 \times 10^{-4}/h$ to $1 - 1 \times 10^{-8}/h$	0.99 to 0.99999
Approach operations with vertical guidance (APV-I) (Note 8)	16.0 m (52 ft)	20 m (66 ft)	$1 - 2 \times 10^{-7}$ in any approach	10 s	$1 - 8 \times 10^{-6}$ per 15 s	0.99 to 0.99999
Approach operations with vertical guidance (APV-II) (Note 8)	16.0 m (52 ft)	8.0 m (26 ft)	$1 - 2 \times 10^{-7}$ in any approach	6 s	$1 - 8 \times 10^{-6}$ per 15 s	0.99 to 0.99999
Category I precision approach (Note 7)	16.0 m (52 ft)	6.0 m to 4.0 m (20 ft to 13 ft) (Note 6)	$1 - 2 \times 10^{-7}$ in any approach	6 s	$1 - 8 \times 10^{-6}$ per 15 s	0.99 to 0.99999

Table 1. Annex 10 ICAO VII 1 Table 3.7.2.4-1, Performance Requirements for Navigation Information Generated on Board by Navigation Satellite Systems.

Of particular note in this table, outlined in red, is the requirement on the integrity risk of vertically guided approaches. Integrity is defined in Annex 10 as: "A measure of the level of confidence in the accuracy of information provided by the system as a whole. The concept of integrity encompasses the ability of a system to provide valid warnings (alarms) in a timely manner."

In concrete terms, this means that for approaches with vertical guidance, the navigation system on board the aircraft must not provide guidance error above a predefined threshold that is a function of the phase of flight, without alerting the crew in less than 6 seconds, more than twice every 10 million landings.

These performance requirements should be understood (see Figure 1) as measured on the navigational information transmitted to the crew and/or aircraft systems at the exit of a flawless "black

box". This "black box" represents the on-board navigation system the aircraft and the information sent to it (navigation signals affected by atmospheric propagation, multi-paths, satellite failures, etc.).⁸




Figure 1. To specify the required performance on the navigation information generated on board the aircraft (from external information), a fault-free navigation system on board the aircraft is assumed.

The integrity requirement of Annex 10 is the result of work carried out by the All Weather Operation Panel (AWOP) in the 1990s. Starting from the overall safety objective for the approach and landing phases (Target Level of Safety – TLS, accident risk less than 10^{-8} /approach) AWOP's work has resulted in precise performance specifications on safety-critical parameters, such as integrity, as shown in Figure 2 below [Ref 1].




Figure 2. Allocation tree deriving the performance requirements necessary to meet the overall approach safety objective. The red arrow describes how a failure in the integrity of the navigation information generated on board the aircraft impacts the level of safety of approaches.

The requirement for integrity on the navigation information generated on board the aircraft could be deduced from the overall safety objective (TLS), and conversely, an out-of-tolerance integrity of navigation signals, regardless of its origin, can seriously affect the safety objective of approaches. It is on this reasoning that the impact of the frequency of occurrence of the error on the probability of an accident is based.

⁸ The requirements to protect against possible failures of the on-board navigation system of the aircraft and also against database corruption are defined elsewhere (see Figure 2).

In this regard, four factors that can significantly affect the integrity risk of BaroVNAV operations can be cited:

- *The frequency of use of barometric guidance vs. geometric guidance,
NB: there has been a sharp increase in Europe since 2018 with the PBN regulation, as a result of the absence of a mandate to carry SBAS avionics.*
- *The criteria for the design of procedures influencing the BaroVNAV operational minima,
NB: more conservative in the United States*
- *The Transition Level
NB: the lower it is, as in Europe, the more the risk that the 1013 to local QNH change will be made during a phase with a high workload increases, which negatively impacts the risk of QNH error.*
- *The choice of unit for local atmospheric pressure, two different units being available on-board commercial aircraft, hectopascals (hPa) or inches of mercury (in Hg)
NB: there is a ratio of 1 to 3 between an error of one unit of in Hg and one unit of hPa, and consequently the most frequent human error of 10 units generates a vertical error of the order of 300 ft with the hPa unit, while it is limited to 100 ft in Hg, used in North America.*

Each of these factors leads to an increased risk of error in the QNH setting.