



| ICAO

SECURITY & FACILITATION

NO COUNTRY LEFT BEHIND



Third Africa-Indian Ocean (AFI) Aviation Safety & Security Symposium

The ICAO Traveller
identification Programme
(TRIP) Strategy

Malabo, 27 June 2016





ICAO

SECURITY & FACILITATION

NO COUNTRY LEFT BEHIND



ICAO's strategic objectives 2014 to 2016 & 2017 to 2019

Safety: Enhance global civil aviation safety

Air Navigation Capacity and Efficiency: Increase capacity and improve efficiency of the global civil aviation system

**Security & Facilitation: Enhance global
civil aviation security and facilitation**

Economic Development of Air Transport: Foster the development of a sound and economically-viable civil aviation system

Environmental Protection: Minimize the adverse environmental effects of civil aviation activities



ICAO

SECURITY & FACILITATION

NO COUNTRY LEFT BEHIND



Guidance Material

- ICAO manuals and circulars provide guidance and information to facilitate the uniform application of SARPs
- Approved by Secretary General and published under his authority






Filing of Differences

- Article 38: Departures from int'l standards
 - Requirements to notify ICAO of differences to standards
- Assembly Resolution A35-14, Appendix D, Associated Practice No. 3
 - Council to urge States to notify ICAO of differences from SARPs





ICAO mandate for Facilitation programmes



A38-16 Appendices:

A : Development and implementation of facilitation provisions

B : National and international action in ensuring the security and integrity of traveller identification and border controls

C : National and international action and cooperation on facilitation matters



World Air Transport in 2015

3.5 billion
+6.4%
vs. 2014

Passengers carried

34 million
+3%
vs. 2014

Commercial flights performed

6.6 trillion
+6.8%
vs. 2014

Revenue Passenger-Kilometres

199 billion
+2.2%
vs. 2014

Freight Tonne-Kilometres

Scheduled commercial traffic

Total (international and domestic) services



| ICAO

SECURITY & FACILITATION

NO COUNTRY LEFT BEHIND




30,000 International daily flights to accommodate

Estimated 3.5 Million (2014 data) International passengers per day for whom border clearance need to be expedited and is expected to continue to grow steadily for the next 15 years. The goal is to reduce the average time of assessing travel documents:

- Automated Border Control (ABC) for Nationals and low-risk Passengers
- Use of eMRTDs for the Registered Traveler Programme (e.g. NEXUS)




World outlook to 2030 for passenger traffic



*: Scheduled services **: Average Annual Growth Rate
Source: ICAO's Global Air Transport Outlook to 2030 – Cir 333



What is Facilitation?



Immigration, Customs, Health, Quarantine



Annex 9 - Facilitation

- Integrates functions of agencies related to border controls – **travel documents, immigration, customs, quarantine, law enforcement, transport operators, etc.**
- Requires inter-agency (and cross-border) cooperation to implement Annex 9 obligations



Implementation of the Annex 9 SARPs: essential to facilitate the clearance of aircraft, passengers and their baggage, cargo and mail and manage challenges in border controls and airport processes so as to maintain both the Security and the efficiency of air transport operations



From MRTDs to ICAO TRIP Strategy:



2006

Changes in Fraudulent methods

2009

- Identity Fraud= 31%
- Documents Fraud= 54%
- Others = 15%*

- Identity Fraud = 71%
- Documents Fraud = 29%



*Intergraph Study, 2010

Current threat: Identity fraud



ICAO TRIP Strategy

Globally interoperable applications that provide for timely, secure and reliable linkage of MRTDs and their holders to relevant data in the course of inspection operations: API/PNR, watch lists, information sharing...

Credible evidence of identity, involving the tracing, linkage and verification of identity against breeder documents to ensure the authenticity of identity

Manufacture of standardized MRTDs, that comply with ICAO specifications (Doc 9303)

For the efficient and secure reading and verification of MRTDs(PKD, forensic travel Doc examination, etc..)

Processes for document issuance by appropriate authorities, and controls to prevent theft, tampering and loss



Objective: All Member States can uniquely identify individuals



Example of SARPs supporting TRIP


- Standards (ex. MRTD) - **Shall**
 - All passports issued to be Machine Readable Passports (MRPs) according to Doc 9303 (3.10)
 - All passports in circulations after 24/11/ 2015 to be MRPs (3.10.1)
 - One Person, One Passport (3.15)
- Recommended Practices (SARPs) - **Should**
 - Incorporation of biometric data and issuance of ePassport (3.9)
 - Introduction of API systems (3.47)
- Differences to Standards
 - Obligation from States to report to ICAO that they cannot implement a Standard.



ICAO Mission: To contribute to the capacity of Member States to uniquely identify individuals by providing appropriate authorities worldwide with the relevant supporting mechanisms to establish and confirm the identity of travellers.

Different actors involved

Holistic Traveller identification



- ID Management
- Foreign Affairs
- Civil Registry
- Security
- Immigration
- Border Control

Main challenge: Various types of actors under different management structures

Urgent need: Consolidate cooperation with all International/Regional Organizations such as UN Agencies, INTERPOL, WCO, OSCE, FRONTEX, etc...



Identification Management

- Criminal focus shifting to lesser developed areas:
 - Evidence of Identity
 - Issuance process
 - Travel document fraud
 - Identity fraud at the border
- Unless addressed, weakens the core MRTD programme and global trust!



Evidence of Identity (EOI)

- EOI is growing internationally as an area of focus
- Some States have developed national standards and frameworks
- Importance of breeder documents: the weakest link of the passport issuance process
- Breeder documents do not have the **same protection level and are much easier to counterfeit**





EOI Authentication Principles

Identity Exists
and is Living

Applicant
Links to
Identity and is
the Sole
Claimant


Applicant
Uses Identity
in the
Community

Social Footprint

- First-time interaction **MUST** be robust so that subsequent contact can leverage off initial EOI



EOI Principle 1: Proving



- Data Validation
- Reports

Data Validation Services

Validation Results

Document Type: <i>Nama Uruwhenua</i>	Citizenship
Certificate Number:	1234567
Surname: <i>Ingoa Whānau</i>	SMITH
First/Given Name(s): <i>Ingoa Tapa</i>	john
Date of Birth: <i>Te Rā i Whānau Ai</i>	06/04/1978
Country of Birth: <i>Te Whenua i Whānau</i>	England
Data Status:	Invalid Data
Transaction Number:	C10000181



ICAO

SECURITY & FACILITATION

NO COUNTRY LEFT BEHIND



24 November 2015 deadline

- 1) As of **today**, a total of 156 Member States had responded to the questionnaire of SL EC6/3-12/70.
 - 139 Member States (and 1 non-Member State) will comply with the Standard, i.e. their non-MRPs have expired or are due to expire by 24 November 2015; and
 - 17 Member States will not comply with the Standard, i.e. their non-MRPs will not expire by the deadline.
- 2) Possible reasons for non-compliance with Standard 3.11 include **lack of capacity, insufficient training and costs of implementation.**
- 4) While the worst case scenario (e.g. South Africa, Columbia, India) is that citizens of a State not having MRPs will be denied entry into other States, the acceptance or refusal to accept non-MRPs is a State matter.
- 5) However, information received from some States suggests that a certain flexibility will be allowed for a limited time period following 24 November 2015 in permitting admission of the holders of non-MRPs. This position may be revised if States will face a great number of non-MRPs to treat.



ePassport: The trust imperative

- ePassport must be ICAO compliant
- ePassports are Machine Readable Passports (MRPs) with a chip. The chip is an additional security feature for passports; does not replace it
- ePassports are issued by entities that assert trust – Identification supply chain
- Achieve global exchange of certificates and other information
- Improper validation of ePassports leads to a “false” sense of security



Public Key Infrastructure

- PKI plays major role in eMRTD security
 - Technology supporting political trust decisions
- National PKI deployment
 - Must be reliable, secure, ICAO 9303 compliant
- International Trust
 - Initial trust establishment out-of-band
 - Compliant electronic processing extends trust
 - Certificates of States must be accessible (PKD/websites)
- Benefits of PKI realized ONLY if issuing and receiving ICAO member states participate

MORE INFOS WILL BE PRESENTED ON THE ICAO PKD TOOL



ICAO

SECURITY & FACILITATION

NO COUNTRY LEFT BEHIND



Interoperable Applications for traveller identification

- INTERPOL Stolen and Lost Travel Document (SLTD) Database
- Advanced Passenger Information (API)
- Passenger Name Record (PNR)
- “Watch lists” Bilateral and multilateral exchanges (e.g. Al-Qaeda, Taliban, etc...)
- “Trusted” or “expedited” travellers (e.g. Nexus in Canada)



| ICAO

SECURITY & FACILITATION

NO COUNTRY LEFT BEHIND



INTERPOL SLTD

- The need to report in a timely manner accurate information about stolen, lost, and revoked travel documents, issued by a State, to INTERPOL for inclusion in the SLTD database.
- Starting from February 2016, this will be a new Standard of Annex 9.
- In addition States are strongly encouraged to query at entry and departure border control points the travel documents of individuals travelling internationally against the SLTD database, and this will be also a new Recommended Practice of Annex 9.

ICAO OACI ИКАО

© ICAO All rights reserved.

This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of ICAO. No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without prior permission of ICAO. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied.

The statements made herein are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, ICAO will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.

国际民航组织