



ICAO

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

**AFI COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR AVIATION
SECURITY AND FACILITATION IN AFRICA, (AFI SECFAL PLAN)**

7TH STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING

Niamey, NIGER (19th July 2018)

**Agenda Item 2.2: Report on the Analysis of USAP-CMA Results to determine
common areas of deficiencies, needs and Proposed projects**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This working paper presents a cohesive in-depth report of AFI States' deficiencies and needs based on analysis of the results of the USAP-CMA audits and ICAO Regional Office mission reports. The report proposes '*State needs based*' remedial measures to address the common deficiencies and needs, in a more specific way for more credible, reliable and sustainable results of the Plan in form of support projects and related activities.

1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION


1.1. The request to conduct a USAP-CMA results analysis was directed by the Steering Committee to identify the deficiencies and needs of States and to allow a defined basis of developing specific projects. Since the 4th Steering committee meeting, appreciation of the progress was made in the implementation of the short term plan Work Programme (2015-2017). Nevertheless, the Steering Committee among other things, requested the Secretariat to analyse, as a priority, the results of the Universal Security Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA) audits and Regional Office mission reports and provide a cohesive in-depth report of States' deficiency and needs status in collaboration with AFCAC and other stakeholders.

1.2. On that basis, the secretariat has conducted an analysis adopting a methodology to identify AFI States common deficiencies and needs using USAP results data as posted in the ICAO USAP secure website. In particular, the analysis used the information contained in the USAP-CMA Analysis Booklet of Audit Results, 7th Edition 2017, that cover USAP audits from Circle II and USAP-CMA up to December 31st, 2017. Also used was the updated data for the AFI Region, as at 25th May 2018. Data from mission reports conducted by the Regional offices of WACAF and ESAF provided supplemental information in the analysis. *The detailed report of the analysis is attached to this Working Paper as Attachment A.*

1.3. In the USAP results, the state’s level of effective implementation of the eight (8) Critical Elements of an aviation security oversight system is expressed as a percentage (%) of the Satisfactory PQs divided by the total applicable PQs. When grouped by CEs, it provides an indication of the State’s aviation security oversight capacity for each CE and hence the overall CEs score average (EI).

2. DISCUSSION

2.1 The following chart shows the aggregated results for the USAP audits conducted **globally** and in **AFI region** under the second cycle and under the USAP-CMA up to 25 May 2018, indicating the effective implementation (EI) of the CEs of a State’s aviation security oversight system.



2.2 The table above reflects the results and a vivid indication that CEs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are the weakest and have a score average below the global EI average (72.20%). In the AFI Region, the average EI for the five weakest CEs is at 44.74%. It is therefore evident that the “**establishment CEs**”, i.e. 4 and 5 fall under the category of less fully and ineffectively established provisions within the State’s aviation security oversight system. With exception are the high scores in CEs 1, 2 and 3 at both Global and AFI Region levels.

2.3 However, the “**implementation CEs**”, CEs 6 through 8 suggest that provisions of Annex 17 are not fully or effectively implemented within the State’s aviation security oversight system in most of the AFI States. Notable specific weaknesses include the following;

- a) Failure by the States to clearly define and establish personnel qualifications and selection criteria for national aviation security inspectors and personnel responsible for implementation of security controls at operations areas hence weak oversight capabilities;
- b) Underdeveloped personnel capacity leading to ineffective provision of technical guidance for quality control activities and to the industry;
- c) Failure to approve airport, aircraft operator and other operator security programmes;
- d) Deficiencies in the implementation of security measures at airports, cargo, etc.);
- e) Potential Significant Security Concerns (SSeCs) in most of the AFI States; and

- f) Absence of legal framework for security provisions of Annex 9 necessary guidance materials, ATFCs, ATFPs. API System, etc.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1 The common areas of deficiencies and needs by the AFI States in line with Annex 17 SARPs and Security related provisions of Annex 9 cover CEs 4 through 8. It has been noted that, although CEs 1 through 3 (“**part of establishment CEs**”) appear to have relatively fair scores, the root cause of deficiencies in CEs 5 through 8 is contributed by the deficiencies from some aspects of CEs 1-3 and 5 and but mainly through CE 4. Therefore, to remedy weaknesses in the “**implementation CEs**” (6 to 8), one needs to address weaknesses in the “**establishment CEs**” first (CEs 1 through 5).

3.2 It’s worthwhile to note that in the AFI region, there are States with very strong aviation security oversight system with scores over and above global average and others with very weak systems lagging well below global average, but each with heterogeneous root causes. Consequently, to address the common deficiencies, a “*State needs based*” approach is proposed as opposed “*to one size fits all*” assistance methodology. The Secretariat proposes a project based approach to address the deficiencies and needs. In this regard, a *detailed list of Proposed Remedial Projects is attached to this Working Paper as Attachment B*

4. ACTION BY THE STEERING COMMITTEE

- 4.1 The Steering Committee is invited to:
- a) Note information contained in the paper and the attached Analysis report;
 - b) Approve the “*State needs based*” approach/ methodology, and the proposed *Projects under attachment B*, aimed at addressing the common deficiencies and needs identified in the analysis for specific and sustainable remedy of low EIs in AFI States
 - c) Request the Secretariat, States, International organizations and Partners to coordinate during the implementation of support projects utilizing the ‘*State needs approach*’.
 - d) Encourage States with weak AVSEC Oversight Systems to arrange bilaterally, support from States with strong aviation security oversight system.

-END-

ATTACHMENT A

REPORT ON THE ANALYSIS OF USAP-CMA RESULTS TO DETERMINE COMMON AREAS OF DEFICIENCIES AND NEEDS.

1.0 BACKGROUND

1.1 Genesis of the Analysis

This analysis report follows the report of the implementation status of the AFI SECFAL Plan presented by the secretariat during the 6th Steering Committee Meeting (SC), Montreal in December 2017, covering the period from the 5th SC Meeting held on 24th May 2017 in Gaborone, Botswana. In considering the report, the Meeting appreciated the significant progress made in the implementation of the short term plan Work Programme (2015-2017). Nevertheless, the Meeting, among other things, requested the Secretariat to analyse, as a priority, the results of the Universal Security Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA) audits and Regional Office mission reports and provide a cohesive in-depth report of States' deficiency status in collaboration with AFCAC and other stakeholders.

1.2 Methodology and Sources of Data for the Analysis

From the above mentioned decision by the SC, the secretariat has conducted an analysis the results of which are contained in this report. The analysis adopted a methodology to identify AFI States common deficiencies using USAP results data as posted in the USAP secure website, by the Aviation Security Audit section (ASA), responsible for the implementation of the USAP-CMA, under the ICAO Air Transport Bureau (ATB)

The secretariat also used individual state results so far audited under USAP-CMA since its inception in 2015 up to January 2018 and various data from mission reports conducted by Regional Officers, in the Regional offices of WACAF and ESAF. More so, , the secretariat has used the USAP-CMA Analysis of Audit Results, 7th Edition 2017 also published in the USAP secure website, containing analysis of results for audits conducted by ASA under either the USAP 2nd cycle or USAP-CMA, as appropriate, up to December 2017.

2.0 UNIVERSAL SECURITY AUDIT PROGRAMME – CONTINUOUS MONITORING APPROACH (USAP-CMA) CONCEPT

USAP-CMA audits adopt a methodology using Protocol Questions (PQs) that covers all aspects of each auditable Standard of Annex 17 or Security related Standard of Annex 9, to ensure their full assessment. Each Protocol Question bears a relevant Critical Element (CE), as a tool to measure the status of State's effective security oversight system. This is what gives the basis for average Effective Implementation (EI) contained in the USAP-CMA results.


Two key performance indicators are used in the USAP-CMA process, *that is* **Compliance Indicator**; the State's level of compliance with Annex 17 Standards and security related Standards of Annex 9 and **Oversight Indicator**; The State's level of implementation of the eight (8) Critical Elements of an aviation security oversight system.

The effective implementation (EI) is expressed as a percentage (%) of the Satisfactory PQs over the total applicable PQs (satisfactory or not). When grouped by CEs, it provides an indication of the State’s aviation security oversight capacity for each CE and hence the overall CEs score average.

Compliance Indicators provide only a picture of indicative compliance of the State with Standards of Annex 17 and security-related Standards of Annex 9 **and** are obtained from average EI of Annex 17 Standards and average EI of security-related Standards of Annex 9.

3.0 AGGREGATED RESULTS FOR THE USAP GLOBALLY AND IN AFI REGION UP TO 25 MAY 2018

The following chart shows the aggregated results for the USAP audits conducted globally and in AFI region under the second cycle and under the USAP-CMA up to 25 May 2018, measuring the effective implementation (EI) of the CEs of a State’s aviation security oversight system. The chart includes USAP-CMA data relating only to audits where the audit report had already been finalized by 25 May 2018. **Global Average EI of CEs: 72.20% Vs AFI Average EI of CEs: 56.95%**



From the results, it is apparent that the AFI Region remains the lowest with an average of **56.95%**, below the global average of **72.20%**. This score is below all the established Targets as follows:

- **Windhoek** -50% of States to achieve Global Average CEs by 2017
-All States to have established NCASCs, NATFCs, NCASP, QCP,TPs
- **AFI SEC FAL Plan** 35% of Sates to attain 65% Average EI of CEs by 2017
- **GASeP** 80% of States to attain 65% Average EI of CEs by 2020
- **AFI/MID** Same as GASeP

4.0 HIGHLIGHTS OF SPECIFIC WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED FROM THE NINE AUDIT AREAS (AAs) AND RESPECTIVE WEAK CRITICAL ELEMENTS (CEs)

4. AA.1 Regulatory framework and the national civil aviation security system (LEG);

% of States	Particular /Specific Deficiencies Identified and respective CEs Affected	CE
31%	Outdated national aviation security policies and requirements in line with current amendments to Annex 17	2
56%	NCASPs not consistent with Annex 17 requirements	2
25%	Lack of establishment and implementation of procedures for dissemination of aviation security regulations, programmes, procedures,	5
17%	Absence of sufficient legal powers of enforcement by national aviation security inspectors	1
39%	Lack of appropriate risk assessment methodology to be utilized for adjusting relevant elements of the security measures established in the NCASP	5
43%	Insufficient personnel to accomplish all State regulatory and oversight activities	3
25%	Inability to attract and retain qualified national aviation security inspectors to effectively manage a State's aviation security oversight system	3
47%	Absence of regular functioning of National Civil Aviation Security Committee for the purpose of coordinating aviation security activities	3

4. AA.2. Training of aviation security personnel (TRG);

% of States	Particular /Specific Deficiencies Identified and respective CEs Affected	CE
46%	Ineffective training Programme for national aviation security inspectors.	4
40%	Deficient or absence of National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme	5
40%	Absence of approved Training Programmes for entities with aviation security responsibilities	6
40%	Absence of oversight process to ensure that training is completed as required	7
43%	Lack of implementation of an effective training oversight	7
47 %	Failure to ensure that all persons who carry out screening operations are certified	6
20%	Absence of established terms and conditions for the certification of aviation security instructors	5
36%	Failure to ensure that all persons who carry out aviation security instructional activities are certified	6

4. AA.3. Quality control functions (QCF);

% of States	Particular /Specific Deficiencies Identified and respective CEs Affected	CE
28%	Deficient National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme (NQCP)	2
50%	Absence of detailed procedures, forms, checklists or protocols for conducting standardised quality control activities.	5
56%	Absence of utilised appropriate risk assessment methodology for determining the priorities and frequency of NQC activities.	5
47%	Lack of implementation of a comprehensive annual schedule of different types of quality control activities	7
56%	Inability to apply NQC activities to all relevant entities with aviation security responsibilities	7
38 %	Ineffective monitoring of supervision of the movement of persons and vehicles to and from aircraft	7
38%	Ineffective monitoring of screening/security controls for persons other than passengers, together with items carried, prior to entry into SRA	7
39%	Ineffective monitoring of security checks and searches of originating aircraft	7
35%	Ineffective monitoring of measures to ensure that any items left behind by passengers disembarking from transit flights are removed from the aircraft before departure of the aircraft	7
30%	Ineffective monitoring of screening of originating passengers and their cabin baggage	7
35%	Ineffective monitoring of measures to ensure that an aircraft subject to a security check or search is protected from unauthorized interference	7
43%	Ineffective monitoring of the implementation of procedures for the reconciliation and authorization of hold baggage	7
31%	Ineffective monitoring of security controls for cargo and mail, including screening using appropriate method or methods	7
47%	Ineffective monitoring of the implementation of enhanced security measures for high-risk cargo and mail	7
36%	Ineffective monitoring of measures to ensure that merchandise and supplies introduced into SRAs are subjected appropriate security controls	7
35%	Ineffective monitoring of measures to ensure that cargo and mail that have been confirmed and accounted for have then been issued with a security status.	7
46%	Ineffective monitoring of maintenance and performance testing of security screening equipment	7
39%	Ineffective implementation of procedures to resolve the deficiencies identified through quality control activities.	8
54%	Absence of robust system of recording quality control activity results and monitoring progress to ensure that corrective measures to resolve security Concerns are implemented.	8
47%	Absence of established and implemented effective tools and procedures for the reporting and analysis of quality control findings	8
32%	Absence of an established confidential reporting system for analysing security information provided by other sources to supplement the NQCP.	8

4. AA.4. Airport operations (OPS);

% of States	Particular /Specific Deficiencies Identified and respective CEs Affected	CE
43%	Lack of implementation of a process to ensure that the ASPs of airports serving civil aviation meet the requirements of the NCASP on continual basis	6
48%	Failure of the ASPs to address all relevant national aviation security requirements in sufficient detail	6
32%	Failure to ensure that all aircraft operators providing service from the States and other relevant airport-level stakeholders have copies of relevant portions of ASPs	7
47%	Lack of implementation of internal quality control programmes	7
32%	Absence of establishment or regular functioning of airport security committees at each airport serving civil aviation.	3
40 %	Lack of supporting resources and facilities required for aviation security at the airport, such as human and technical resources	8
58%	Lack of consistent and effective implementation of access control measures to airside areas of airports	8
50%	Lack of consistent and effective implementation of procedures for airport personnel identification and vehicle pass systems	8
44%	Non establishment of minimum detection settings, including specifications of performance test pieces, for security screening equipment	5
52%	deficiencies in the screening and security controls for persons other than passengers	8

4. AA.5. Aircraft and in-flight security (IFS);

% of States	Particular /Specific Deficiencies Identified and respective CEs Affected	CE
51%	Absence of implementations of a process to ensure that aircraft operators (both national and foreign) have established and maintain AOSPs	6
47%	Approved AOSPs do not address all relevant national aviation security requirements applicable to aircraft operator operations in sufficient detail	6
25%	Absence of clear requirement in the national documentation for aircraft security checks or searches of originating aircraft to be performed based upon a security risk assessment	2
40%	Absence of established and/or implemented appropriate risk assessment methodology to determine whether a security check or search of originating aircraft is required.	5
31%	Lack of consistent and effective implementation of procedures for aircraft security checks and searches of originating aircraft	8
24 %	Absence of requirements for the carriage of potentially disruptive passengers	2
35%	Absence of detailed instructions and/or directives in regard to the carriage of weapons in an area of the aircraft inaccessible to passengers during flight	5

4. AA.6. Passenger and baggage security (PAX);

% of States	Particular /Specific Deficiencies Identified and respective CEs Affected	CE
44%	Absence of established minimum detection settings, specifications of performance test pieces, for security screening equipment used in the screening and regular maintenance and performance testing of such security screening equipment are not consistently and effectively implemented	5, 8
40%	Absence of sufficiently detailed procedures for screening of originating passengers and their cabin baggage by relevant airport-level entities	6
34%	Inability to ensure that the relevant airport-level entities have developed sufficiently detailed procedures for the screening of originating hold baggage	6
62%	Lack of consistent and effective implementation of screening of originating passengers and their cabin and hold baggage	8

4. AA.7 Cargo, catering and mail security (CGO);

% of States	Particular /Specific Deficiencies Identified and respective CEs Affected	CE
25%	Absence of detailed instructions, guidance material or performance criteria for the application of security controls to cargo and mail	5
40%	Absence of established minimum detection settings, including specifications of performance test pieces, for security screening equipment, regular maintenance and performance testing	5, 8
32%	Absence of the relevant airport-level detailed procedures for the application of security controls to cargo and mail, prior to their being loaded onto an aircraft	6
24%	Lack of consistent and effective implementation of security controls, including screening, where practicable, of cargo and mail prior to their being loaded onto an aircraft	8
30%	Absence of detailed instructions, guidance material or performance criteria developed regarding appropriate methods of screening of cargo and mail, based on the nature of the consignment	6
38 %	Failure to ensure that the relevant airport-level entities have developed procedures to ensure protection of screened cargo and mail to be carried on an aircraft until departure	6
24%	Lack of consistent and effective implementation of measures for the protection of cargo and mail subjected to screening or other security controls	8
20%	Lack of definition as to what constitutes high-risk cargo or mail, and absence of established requirement for such consignments to be subjected to enhanced security measures	2
35%	Lack of detailed instructions, guidance material or performance criteria for the application of enhanced security measures to high-risk cargo and mail	5
44%	Absence of procedures for the application of enhanced security measures to high-risk cargo and mail by relevant airport-level entities	6
31%	Lack of consistent and effective implementation of enhanced security measures to appropriately mitigate the threats associated with high-risk cargo and mail	8
32%	Absence of established guidelines for the consignment security declaration	5
36%	Lack of implementation of measures to ensure that the consignment security	8

	declaration is issued	
27%	Lack of developed appropriate procedures by the entities responsible for the application of security controls to catering, stores and supplies, and for their protection until loaded onto the aircraft	6

3. AA.8. Response to acts of unlawful interference (AUI);

% of States	Particular /Specific Deficiencies Identified and respective CEs Affected	CE
38%	Deficient airport contingency plans (ACPs) in addressing contingency measures in sufficient detail to ensure the proper management of responses to acts of unlawful interference	6
21%	Absence of established requirement for the conduct of exercises to test ACPs on a regular basis	2
46%	Inability to ensure that exercises to test ACPs are regularly conducted.	7
22%	Absence of established requirement to conduct of evaluations following an exercise to identify deficiencies and remedy weaknesses in response mechanisms	2
28%	Failure to conduct evaluations following an exercise to identify deficiencies and remedy weaknesses in response mechanisms	8
24 %	Inadequate resources available to support the ACPs	3
39%	Failure to ensure that personnel responsible for responding to acts of unlawful interference receive regular training in the airport environment	4
34%	Absence of established notification procedures and minimum response times for entities responsible for providing specialist response to an act of unlawful interference	5
38%	Lack of implementation of a process to ensure that air traffic service providers operating in States' territories have established security provisions appropriate to meet the requirements of the NCASP	6

4. AA.9. Security aspects of facilitation (FAL).

% of States	Particular /Specific Deficiencies Identified and respective CEs Affected	CE
44%	Absence of established National Air Transport Facilitation Programme based on the Chicago Convention and Annex 9 thereto	2
50%	Absence of established National Air Transport Facilitation Committee and/or Airport Facilitation Committees	3
16%	Absence of guidelines for reporting information about stolen, lost, and revoked travel documents to INTERPOL	5
30%	Absence of appropriate measures and procedures to assist aircraft operators in the evaluation of travel documents presented by passengers in order to deter fraud and abuse	5
60%	Lack of introduction of an advance passenger information system under their national legislation	2

5.0 ANALYSIS OF PROBABLE CAUSES OF WEAK AREAS AND NEEDS AS REFLECTED FROM REGIONAL OFFICE MISSION REPORTS AND USAP-CMA RESULTS

Reflection of the results from the above mentioned sources gives a vivid indication that CEs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are the weakest and have a score average below the global EI average (72.20%). In the AFI Region, the average EI for the five weakest CEs is at 46.07%. This suggests that portion of the “**establishment CEs**”, i.e. 4 and 5 fall under the category of less fully and ineffectively established provisions within the State’s aviation security oversight system, with the exception of CEs 1, 2 and 3.

However, the “**implementation CEs**”, CEs 6 through 8 suggests that provisions of Annex 17 are not fully or effectively implemented within the State’s aviation security oversight system in most of the States.

As detailed in the tables above, failure by the states to clearly define and establish personnel qualifications and selection criteria for inspectors (46%), and personnel responsible for implementation of security controls at operations areas (40%), leads to staffing that lacks minimum knowledge and experience to perform aviation security oversight and operations functions. Capacity at the regulatory level in the state is a cornerstone for spearheading the implementation of policies established under CEs 1, 2 and 3 which show relatively fair scores.

This affects provision of technical guidance for quality control activities (50%) and to the industry (56%), a CAA obligation under CE 5. As a result, standardised implementation of policies established under CE 2 fails because of lack of criteria for required certification systems and deficiencies in the approval processes under CE 6, and national quality controls functions under CE 7.

From the Analysis, 50% and 56 % of States have not approved airport and aircraft operator security programmes respectively. 56% of States were found unable to conduct national quality control activities to cover all relevant entities with aviation security responsibilities.

Ineffective Implementation of CEs 4, 5, 6 and 7 has a direct bearing to deficiencies in the implementation of security measures operationally, particularly in audit areas 4 (Airport Operations), 5 (Aircraft Protection and Inflight Security), 6 (Passenger and Baggage Security), and 7 (Cargo, Catering and Mail Security).

Deficiencies in these areas, which are more operational, attract potential Significant Security Concerns (SSeCs). From the analysis, while 52% of the States were found to have ineffective screening procedures for persons other than passengers accessing the SRAs, 62% of the States lacked effective screening procedures for passengers and baggage.

As pertains to Security Aspects of Facilitation (Audit Area 9), most of the states (40%) have not established a legal framework for security provisions of Annex 9 leading to absence of necessary guidance material (50%) and establishment ATFCs and ATFPs. Lack of introduction and implementation of API System stands at 60% of States globally.

6.0 DESCRIPTION OF DEFFICIENCIES, ROOT CAUSE AND PROPOSED REMEDIAL MEASURES

CE-1 Primary aviation security legislation; CE-2. Aviation security programmes and regulations; and CE-3. State appropriate authority for aviation security and its responsibilities

Description	Outdated or deficient national aviation security policies (Primary and secondary legislation) and requirements consistent with current amendments to Annex17 such as insufficient enforcement or legal powers to national aviation security inspectors, deficient NCASPs, unclear designation or allocation of responsibilities to entities in the state and less functional National Civil Aviation Security Committees(NCASC) and Airport Security Committee(ASCs)
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Root Cause	Low capacity (CAA Personnel) in terms of knowledge, subject matter qualifications and staffing levels. This impairs effectiveness of the States to ensure up to date, quality and detailed national aviation security policies relevant to ICAO SARPs and other international requirements
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Remedial action/Projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tailored Workshops and courses (to identified States): Inspectors Course, QC, Risk Management and NCASP workshops • National AVSEC Oversight System setup. Assistance missions for establishment of a sound State AVSEC Oversight System and Proper domestication of ICAO SARPS (Some States)
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CE-4. Personnel qualifications and training

Description	Lack of Policy, establishment and implementation of minimum knowledge and experience requirements for the technical/ aviation security oversight personnel and those implementing security controls at operator level, to include lack of appropriate training to maintain and enhance their competence at the desired level.
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Root Cause	Inability to establish detailed National Civil Aviation Security Training Programmes (NCASTP) with sufficient details and guidelines and absence of approved operator security training programmes that meet the requirements of the NCASTP could be escalated to stakeholders training programmes for their implementation, supervised by the appropriate trained personnel of the State's regulatory entity.
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Remedial action/Projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tailored Workshops (to identified States) for development of NCASTPs and Operator Training Programmes Consistent to ICAO Annex 17 SARPs • AVSEC Instructors Course to equip States internal capacity to conduct trainings (ab initio and OJT) of their personnel locally. • AVSEC Certification Systems Workshop to enable identified States to be capable of establishing Screener and Instructor Certification systems to meet the requirements of STDs 3.1.7 and 3.4.3.
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CE-5. Provision of technical guidance, tools and security-critical information and CE-6. Certification and approval obligations

Description	Absence of and failure to develop and provide technical guidance material, security-critical information (including processes and procedures), tools and implementation of processes and procedures for both for regulatory/oversight and operator levels to enable oversight personnel and entities performing aviation security activities meet the established requirements (such as development of detailed operator security programmes, certification systems and approval of operator security programmes).
Root Cause	Inability of the State (CAA Personnel) to develop procedures and guidelines for use by quality control/oversight personnel and industry stakeholders/operators in the implementation of national AVSEC policies and requirements in a standardised fashion.
Remedial action/Projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tailored Workshops and courses (to identified States): Quality Control, National Civil Aviation Security Programme, Airport Security Programme, Crisis Management workshops) • Tailored Assistance Missions for Development of Technical Guidance Materials, Tools, Checklists, SOPs, and Templates.
<i>CE-7. Quality control obligations and CE-8. Resolution of security concerns</i>	
Description	Inability to monitor and ensure consistent and effective implementation of Annex 17/National AVSEC requirements. Failure to consistently ensure resolution of identified deficiencies impacting aviation security.
Root Cause	Limited capacity and knowledge to conduct effectively and in a standardised manner, different types of oversight activities (audits, inspections, surveys, and tests) of all security measures implemented by stakeholders/operators. Absence of detailed checklists for oversight functions covering all different types of oversights and security measures
Remedial action/Projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity Building for National Aviation Security Inspectors through tailored trainings (Inspectors Course, QC, Risk Management and NCASP workshops) • Tailored Assistance Missions for Development of Technical Guidance Materials, Tools, Checklists, Sops, and Templates.
<i>Annex 9(Facilitation) – Security Related Provisions CEs2, 3 &5</i>	
Description	Absence of established NATFPs, AFCs, NATFCs, API Systems, legal framework and other guidance materials in line with the Chicago Convention and Annex 9 thereto
Root Cause	Inability to establish or incorporate the security provisions of Annex 9 leading to failure of establishment of the respective coordination mechanisms, programmes and Systems (NATFCs, API and NATFPs)
Remedial Action/Projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity Building (Industry tailored training package for Security Provisions of Annex 9 • Specialised trainings/ Workshops for (Border Control, TRIP Strategy, PKD, PNR ,API , MRTDs • Tailored Assistance Missions for establishment of a

legislative framework for Security provisions of Annex 9 and associated **Technical Guidance Materials, Tools, Checklists, Sops, and Templates.**

7.0 CONCLUSION

The outcome of this analysis to determine common areas of deficiencies and needs by the AFI States regarding compliance with Annex 17 SARPs and Security related Standards of Annex 9 has clearly revealed that the majority of the States have a challenges with CEs 4 through 8.

Nevertheless, although CEs 1 through 3 appear to have relatively fair scores, there are still States which are weak in these CEs which affect the rest. Root causes for the individual State weaknesses have been found to be diverse, which suggests that a State-needs based approach in remedying them would be most appropriate. It has also been found that personnel at the State's regulatory entity with qualifications, competencies and knowledge to guarantee staffing with capacity to spear head the development of adequate policies, guidance material and effective implementation of quality control obligations is a major challenge.

It is recommended that States should strive to ensure proper selection and retention of staff with minimum experience and knowledge to drive effective implementation of the SARPs. Tailored training and assistance projects to address specific weaknesses are expected to supplement the efforts to be taken by the States to address the weaknesses.

ATTACHMENT B

PROPOSED PROJECTS

Project 1

Enhancement of Primary aviation security legislation, Aviation security programmes and regulations; and State appropriate authority for aviation security and its responsibilities

Project Description	Develop or update national aviation security policies (Primary and secondary legislation) and requirements consistent with current amendments to Annex 17 to include sufficient enforcement or legal powers for national aviation security inspectors, detailed NCASPs, clear designation or allocation of responsibilities to entities in the State and ensure functional National Civil Aviation Security Committees(NCASC) and Airport Security Committee(ASCs)
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Project Output	<p>a) Familiarize senior or middle management level Personnel within the State’s appropriate authority, who are responsible for the development, implementation, and maintenance of NCASP with the requirements applicable to the primary and secondary aviation security legislation, and enable them to draft and review such a Programme and update the legislation.</p> <p>b) Provide aviation security management personnel in the State (<i>those directly involved in the assessment or management of threats, vulnerabilities and/or risk on behalf of their State, to include but not limited to the appropriate authority for aviation security, National Police, Intelligence Services, or, airports, airlines and other aviation security stakeholder</i>), with the opportunity to assess risk through the identification and evaluation of threats, consequences and vulnerabilities. Expose participants to guidance material incorporated in the ICAO Global Risk Context Statement and provide the skills necessary to apply risk management methodology when determining the appropriate level of security measures to be implemented</p> <p>c) Provide aviation security management personnel (<i>senior or middle management level with responsibility for the development, approval and/or implementation of quality control activities</i>) with the knowledge and skills needed to develop effective aviation security quality control measures under the context of a National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme (NQCP), assist in the development of documentation, implementation methodology, and maintenance of appropriate oversight and internal quality assurance procedures.</p>
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Project Activities	<p>Conduct in identified State, the following Workshops/ activities;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) workshop • National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme Workshop (NCASQCP)
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- **Risk Management Workshop**
- **National AVSEC Oversight System setup.** (Assistance missions for establishment of a sound State AVSEC Oversight System and Proper domestication of ICAO SARPS)

Project 2

Operational capacity building -Improvement Personnel qualifications and training

Project Description Establishment and implementation of minimum knowledge and experience requirements for the technical/ aviation security oversight personnel and those implementing security controls at operator level, to include appropriate training to maintain and enhance their competence at the desired level.

- Project Output**
- a) Familiarize State’s (*senior or middle management level with a role in the development, implementation and/or oversight of the NCASTP*) with the general principles of a National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme (NCASTP), also provide participants with the knowledge and skills necessary to develop and implement a NCASTP that addresses training requirements, including certification according to the respective National Civil Aviation Programme. Personnel will get opportunity to develop a NCASTP by utilizing the ICAO template.
 - b) Build internal training capacity by providing personnel involved in the development, management and/or instruction of training materials related to a civil aviation security training programme, with knowledge in the general application of training principles, the preparation of appropriate teaching aids and the tailoring of course material to harmonize course objectives with local and national requirements.
 - c) Familiarize State’ AVSEC personnel (those responsible for the development, implementation and/or oversight AVSEC certification systems) with the general principles of developing, implementing and maintaining aviation security certification systems, with an emphasis given to screener certification, AVSEC instructor certification and national aviation security inspector certification. Also expose participants to guidance material incorporated in the Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973 – Restricted) and provide an opportunity to develop sample programmes that can be used as the foundation for developing specific State certification systems and/or be incorporated into existing ones.

- Project Activities** **To identified/assessed States)**
- **Awareness and familiarisation workshops/seminars for managers**
 - **National Aviation Security Inspectors’ Course**
 - **AVSEC Instructors Course**
 - **National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme Workshop (NCASTP)**

• **Aviation Security Certification Systems Workshop**

Project 3

Development of technical guidance, tools and security-critical information to improve States Certification and approval obligations capabilities.

Project Description Initiate availability and ability to develop and provide technical guidance material, security-critical information (including processes and procedures), tools and implementation of processes and procedures for both regulatory/oversight and operator levels to enable oversight personnel and entities performing aviation security activities meet the established requirements including development of detailed operator security programmes, certification systems and approval of operator security programmes.

Project Output

- a) Provide aviation security management personnel (*senior or middle management level with responsibility for the development, approval and/or implementation of quality control activities*) with the knowledge and skills needed to develop effective aviation security quality control measures under the context of a National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme (NQCP), assist in the development of documentation, implementation methodology, and maintenance of appropriate oversight and internal quality assurance procedures
- b) Familiarize senior or middle management level personnel within the State's appropriate authority who are responsible for the control, drafting, review, updating and/or implementation of NCASP with the requirements of a (NCASP) and enable them to draft and review such a Programme
- c) Familiarize (*senior or middle management level within the State's appropriate authority, or within an airport, who are responsible for the approval, quality control, drafting, updating and/or implementation of ASPs*) with the requirements of an Airport Security Programme (ASP), cargo and mail security requirements and enable them to draft and review such Programmes. This will be preceded by the NCASP Workshop.

Project Activities To identified/assessed States), provide the following workshops and assistance:

- **National Civil Aviation Security Programme Workshop (NCASP)**
- **National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme Workshop (NQCP)**
- **Airport Security Programme (ASP) Workshop**
- **Cargo and mail security course**
- **Provide templates and tailored assistance in development of**

Technical guidance materials and tools.

Project 4

Strengthening States Quality control obligations and Resolution of security concerns

Project Description Enable the implementation of oversights for compliance of all established aviation security requirements and procedures effectively and ensure or monitor consistently and effectively, the implementation of Annex 17/National AVSEC requirements, and consistently ensure resolution of identified deficiencies impacting aviation security.

Project Output

To provide aviation security personnel with theoretical and practical knowledge of audits, inspections and tests as part of a National Quality Control system, and to enable them to plan, coordinate and conduct quality control measures utilizing Annex 17 and ICAO methodology in accordance with approved operator security programmes

Familiarize senior or middle management level Personnel within the State's appropriate authority who are responsible for the control, drafting, review, updating and/or implementation of NCASP with the requirements of a (NCASP) and enable them to draft and review such a Programme

Provide aviation security management personnel (*senior or middle management level with responsibility for the development, approval and/or implementation of quality control activities*) with the knowledge and skills needed to develop effective aviation security quality control measures under the context of a National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme (NQCP), assist in the development of documentation, implementation methodology, and maintenance of appropriate oversight and internal quality assurance procedures

Provide aviation security management personnel in the State (*those directly involved in the assessment or management of threats, vulnerabilities and/or risk on behalf of their State, to include but not limited to the appropriate authority for aviation security, National Police, Intelligence Services, or, airports, airlines and other aviation security stakeholder*) with the opportunity to assess risk through the identification and evaluation of threats, consequences and vulnerabilities. Expose participants to guidance material incorporated in the ICAO Global Risk Context Statement and provide the skills necessary to apply risk management methodology when determining the appropriate level of security measures to be implemented.

Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• National Inspectors Course• National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme Workshop (NQCP)• Risk Management Workshop• Resolution of security concerns seminar
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Project 5

Improvement of implementation of National Air Transport Facilitation |Programs and ICAO TRIP Strategy

Project Description	Enable States to establish and implement NATFPs, NATFCs, AFCs, API Systems, ICAO TRIP Strategy, Annex 9 legal framework and other guidance materials in line with the Chicago Convention and Annex 9 thereto.
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Project Output	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Equip personnel with knowledge to establish or incorporate the security provisions of Annex 9 leading to failure of establishment of the respective coordination organs, programmes and Systems (NATFCs, ICAO TRIP Strategy, API and NATFPs)• Raised awareness on NATFPs and NATFCs)• Available STP for Security provision of Annex 9.
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Project Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Development of Industry tailored training package for Security Provisions of Annex 9 in collaboration with ASTCs• Conduct specialised trainings/ Workshops for (Border Control, TRIP Strategy, PKD, PNR ,API , MRTDs• Tailored Assistance Missions for establishment of a legislative framework for Security provisions of Annex 9 including provision of templates of Technical Guidance Materials, Tools, Checklists, SoPs.
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