



| ICAO

GLOBAL AVIATION SECURITY PLAN

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In September 2016, delegates at the 39th Session of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Assembly agreed that there was a need for the accelerated development of a Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) as a future aviation security policy and programming framework. The GASeP, which replaces the ICAO Comprehensive Aviation Security Strategy (ICASS), addresses the needs of States and industry in guiding all aviation security enhancement efforts through a set of internationally agreed priority actions, tasks and targets.

The GASeP provides the foundation for States, industry, stakeholders and ICAO to work together with the shared and common goal of enhancing aviation security worldwide and achieving five key priority outcomes, namely: a) enhance risk awareness and response; b) develop security culture and human capability; c) improve technological resources and innovation; d) improve oversight and quality assurance; and e) increase cooperation and support.

The Plan calls for action at the global, regional and national levels, as well by industry and all other stakeholders, in raising the level of implementation of Annex 17 – *Security*; intensified efforts are also required for ICAO to enhance its capacity to support States in this regard.

Central to the Plan is a Roadmap that outlines 94 tasks, accompanying 32 actions under 5 key priority outcomes, which set out objectives until the 40th Session of the ICAO Assembly in 2019. A set of indicators and target dates also accompanies each individual task. This Roadmap is a “living” document and shall be periodically reviewed and adjusted as necessary, taking into account new and emerging aviation security threats.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

1.1.1. The air transport industry plays a significant role in the global economy. Secure air transport service enhances connectivity in trade, tourism, political and cultural links between States. Annual international air passenger traffic is expected to reach 6 billion by 2030 from about 3.3 billion today, while air cargo transported is expected to increase to 125 million tonnes from 50 million. With air traffic projected to increase significantly in the future, there is a need for a planning framework at the international, regional and national levels to manage growth in a safe, secure and efficient manner. Aviation promotes global economic growth, and is a critical enabler for economic progress and development in many States. Security incidents have an obvious impact on the travelling public, especially when incidents result in injury and loss of life, but also by affecting confidence in air travel and by disruption to travel and trade. By ensuring the security of the aviation system, States help to establish public confidence in their aviation system and provide a strong foundation for trade and tourism globally.

1.1.2. The current threat and risk environment demands that aviation security remain among the highest of priorities for States and the global international community. This was highlighted by United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2309 (2016) – *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts: Aviation security* adopted in September 2016 (UNSCR 2309), which calls upon ICAO, States and stakeholders to comply with their treaty obligations and international responsibilities as they relate to aviation security, and by ICAO Assembly Resolution A39-18 (Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security), in accordance with international law.

1.2. PURPOSE

1.2.1. The GASeP incorporates the key aspects and themes from UNSCR 2309 (2016) and ICAO Assembly Resolution A39-18, in particular: the need for effective, risk-based measures that are assessed regularly to reflect the evolving threat picture; ensuring that measures are effectively implemented on the ground on a sustainable basis; resource allocation and the promotion of a culture of security; and establishing effective national oversight of aviation security systems.

1.2.2. The global nature of aviation means that States are dependent on the effectiveness of each other's aviation security systems to provide a common secure aviation environment. Despite enhancements to the security system, terrorists continue to view civil aviation as an attractive target and continue to exploit real or perceived vulnerabilities in the international civil aviation system, with the aim of causing substantial loss of life, economic damage and disruption to connectivity and trade between States.

1.2.3. The GASeP provides guidance for priority setting at the international, regional and State levels, creates a framework within which ICAO, States and stakeholders can work together to meet shared objectives, supports ICAO's *No Country Left Behind* initiative to address common challenges, and guides efforts to jointly further enhance aviation

security.

1.2.4. Target-based planning complements international conventions and resolutions, as well as the framework of Annexes and guidance material by establishing security priorities with tangible and measurable outcomes.

1.3. RISK CONTEXT

1.3.1. ICAO uses information from the following sources to assess the risk facing international civil aviation: ICAO Acts of Unlawful Interference Database; risk assessments carried out by the Aviation Security Panel's Working Group on Threat and Risk (refer to the ICAO Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement); and analysis of audit findings by the Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP). These same sources, also used in identifying priorities in the GASeP, indicate that air transport is challenged by a number of security risks, as evidenced by the following:

- a) sixty-nine acts of unlawful interference were recorded between 2011 and 2016. Twenty-one out of 69 incidents had fatalities (a total of 884 deaths). Facility attacks represented the highest number with 24 incidents (or 32 per cent), followed by unlawful seizure with 18 incidents (or 26 per cent), sabotage with 15 incidents (or 22 per cent) and other acts with 12 incidents (or 17 per cent);
- b) as the weapon of choice in attempts to attack civil aviation and airport infrastructure, improvised explosive devices (or IEDs) and person-borne IEDs continue to pose a significant threat. Screening regimes play a critical role to deter and detect threat items in the aviation security system but can be undermined by ineffective implementation in practice;
- c) attacks on the landside areas of airports have highlighted a growing threat to locations where members of the public and passengers circulate with minimal restrictions and congregate at predictable times. ICAO assesses landside threats to be credible and real; and
- d) USAP data confirms critical improvements are urgently needed in the implementation of Annex 17, to address the following gaps: inadequate access control measures to Security Restricted Areas (SRAs); deficiencies in the implementation of airport personnel identification and vehicle pass systems; lack of airport-level human and technical resources for aviation security; ineffective screening and security controls of non-passengers granted access to the SRA.

1.3.2. The above challenges establish a need for more aviation security awareness, deploying more appropriate resources, stronger political will, improved security culture, and increased quality control and oversight, amongst others.

1.3.3. As terrorists find innovative ways to target the system, States must continue to address the risks identified above, while also attending to complex issues such as cybersecurity, remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), and risks arising from conflict zones.

1.4 BENEFITS OF THE GASeP

1.4.1 Without question, enhancing aviation security globally will bring financial and other economic benefits. The economic and financial cost to States, airports, airlines, and stakeholders of terror attacks and security breaches can be very significant, and the loss of human lives cannot be measured. On the financial and economic side, some recent

attacks have caused losses as high as US \$4.47 billion as a result of close to two weeks suspension of airport and airline operations, repair to infrastructure, and other losses suffered from terror attacks.¹ The terror attacks of 11 September 2001, where terrorists hijacked four civil aircraft to commit the attacks, led to total estimated losses of around US \$2 trillion.² Other repercussions may also be suffered as a result of poor aviation security standards and measures, including the loss of public and investor confidence, and effects on tourism, trade and connectivity.

1.4.2 The GASeP therefore aims to foster amongst ICAO, States, industry, and stakeholders a greater commitment to enhancing global aviation security. With all stakeholders fulfilling their responsibilities set out in the Roadmap, the sustained level of secure and safe civil aviation operations will prevent stakeholders from suffering human, economic, financial and other losses. A strengthened global aviation system will provide a conducive environment for global economic growth and development that will benefit all States.

1. Source: Damien Sharkov, *Newsweek*, 23 March 2016.

2. Source: www.iags.org/costof911.html.

Chapter 2

OBJECTIVE

2.1. OBJECTIVE OF THE GASeP

2.1.1. The objective of establishing the GASeP is to help ICAO, States and stakeholders **enhance the effectiveness of global aviation security**. The GASeP therefore seeks to unite the international aviation security community and inspire action in this direction, taking into account that the threats and risks faced by the civil aviation community continue to evolve. It is also intended to achieve the shared and common goal of enhancing aviation security worldwide and to help States come together to fulfil the commitments set out in UNSCR 2309 (2016) and relevant ICAO Assembly Resolutions.

2.1.2. The **overarching principles** that support the GASeP's objective are:

- **No Country Left Behind.** To ensure that the implementation of security SARPs are urgently undertaken globally so that all States have access to the significant socio-economic benefits of safe, secure and reliable air transport.
- **Effective implementation and compliance.** Appropriate measures that are applied to ensure consistent outcomes, coupled with a robust security quality control and oversight system.
- **Sustainability.** Utilizing measures that are proportionate and realistic in the long term, duly coordinated with entities from other sectors (e.g. aviation safety, air navigation, facilitation).
- **Cooperation and information sharing.** Strengthen cooperation and sharing of information between and amongst States and stakeholders. To ensure that the principles of cooperation defined in bilateral and/or multilateral air services agreements, recognition of equivalent security measures, and focus on security outcomes continue to be the basis for international cooperation.
- **Security culture and human capacity development.** Establish a strong and robust security culture and develop human capital, skill and competency.
- **Innovation.** Encourage States and stakeholders to devise, establish and share new and innovative ways to implement security policies and measures.
- **Identifying, understanding and managing risk.** Enhance understanding of aviation security risks, and take appropriate and effective action.

2.2. APPLICATION

2.2.1. Continued improvement in States' effective implementation of Annex 17 is paramount to assure the security and regularity of air transport. The GASeP applies to ICAO, its Member States and stakeholders to guide effective implementation and compliance efforts, promote accountability for these security responsibilities, and enhance the effectiveness of global aviation security.

2.2.2. The Roadmap in Appendix A contains many tasks for States to implement and it is acknowledged that States have limited resources with which to operate. When implementing these tasks, States should consider where their greatest areas of risk are and prioritize the tasks listed in Appendix A accordingly. Information to assist with this prioritization can be obtained from the ICAO Global Risk Context Statement, USAP audit results and feedback from other States that conduct last port of departure assessments.

Chapter 3

PRIORITY OUTCOMES

3.1. FIVE KEY PRIORITIES

In order to make rapid progress on its core objective of enhancing the effectiveness of global aviation security, and improving the practical and sustainable implementation of preventive aviation security measures, the GASeP identifies five **key priority outcomes** where ICAO, States and stakeholders should focus their urgent attention, resources and efforts. These priorities derive from the main challenges that may face member states in delivering this objective. They are:

- a) **Enhance risk awareness and response.** Understanding risk is essential for policies and measures that are effective, proportionate and sustainable. Undertaking risk assessments will help to identify gaps and vulnerabilities, which can then be urgently addressed in the most practical way possible, and with optimal use of resources.
- b) **Develop security culture and human capability.** The promotion of effective security culture is critical to achieve good security outcomes. A strong security culture must be developed from the top management across and within every organization. The existence of a well-trained, motivated and professional work force is a critical prerequisite for effective aviation security.
- c) **Improve technological resources and foster innovation.** Promoting and applying better technological solutions and innovative techniques can provide the tools for enhancing security effectiveness while ensuring operational efficiency.
- d) **Improve oversight and quality assurance.** Effective quality control and oversight processes globally, nationally, and locally are critical in delivering sustained effective aviation security.
- e) **Increase cooperation and support.** Increasing collaboration between and within States will enable the key security objectives to be achieved more quickly and efficiently.

Chapter 4

PRIORITY ACTIONS

4.1. PRIORITY ACTIONS

In order to deliver the five priority outcomes, consistent with the overarching principles, the following priority actions should form the basis for the GASeP. Some require action at the global level (which may include delivery by ICAO through its Secretariat and/or expert groups¹); while some call on action from States and industry at national and local levels.

1. ENHANCE RISK AWARENESS AND RESPONSE

- 1.1 Keep global threat picture under regular review and enhance dissemination of threat and risk advice.
- 1.2 Improve training on risk assessment.
- 1.3 Review relevant ICAO Annex 17 provisions and guidance for highest risk areas.
- 1.4 Up-to-date framework established in each State for conducting national and local risk assessments.
- 1.5 Ensure effective internal mechanisms for communicating information/assessments to those who need it.
- 1.6 Review current screening arrangements in light of national risk assessment.
- 1.7 Review personnel security measures taking into account risk advice and guidance on insider threat.
- 1.8 Ensure holistic aviation perspective and appropriate impact assessments.

2. DEVELOP SECURITY CULTURE AND HUMAN CAPABILITY

- 2.1 Build and promote security culture.
- 2.2 Develop/review national training programmes, taking account of risk.
- 2.3 Professionalise work force and ensure continuous performance.

1. Including but not limited to the Aviation Security Panel and its Working Groups, which comprise: Working Group on Threat and Risk (WGTR), Working Group on Guidance Material (WGGM), Working Group on Air Cargo Security (WGACS), Working Group on Training (WGT), Working Group on Innovation (WGIAS) Working Group on Annex 17 (WGA17), Secretariat Study Group (SSG) on the Universal Security Audit Programme.

- 2.4 Develop baseline requirements/minimum qualification for personnel involved in security.
- 2.5 Revise ICAO training material and guidance, focusing on core aviation security skills/needs.
- 2.6 Review and enhance ICAO security-related training activities.

3. IMPROVE TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES AND FOSTER INNOVATION

- 3.1 Enhance technical advice to States.
- 3.2 Promote innovative techniques and technologies by States and industry.
- 3.3 Promote consistency of technical specifications for security equipment.
- 3.4 Consider minimum technical specifications for security equipment.
- 3.5 Increase use of appropriate technology for screening and facilitation.
- 3.6 Develop and improve the efficiency of certification processes and operational use of security equipment, including human factors.
- 3.7 Consider and evaluate the use of passenger information to inform and assist aviation security.

4. IMPROVE OVERSIGHT AND QUALITY ASSURANCE

- 4.1 Develop regional USAP-CMA targets on the levels of effective implementation of security measures.
- 4.2 Coordinate efforts between States, stakeholders and ICAO on audits and peer review.
- 4.3 Develop and implement rectification plans at national and local levels to address gaps and vulnerabilities identified.
- 4.4 Enhance USAP-CMA to provide reliable information regarding the effective implementation of aviation security measures.
- 4.5 Enhance training and guidance on quality assurance.

5. INCREASE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT

- 5.1 Contribute resources to ICAO, States and stakeholders for auditing/peer review.
- 5.2 Provide increased assistance (where possible) for capacity development.
- 5.3 Commitment to enhance effective implementation by recipient States.

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- 5.4 Ensure all national entities concerned are actively involved in implementation of measures.
 - 5.5 Identify and utilize new funding sources (e.g. UN, World Bank, States, industry, etc) in addition to existing funding sources.
 - 5.6 Enhance ICAO's capability and effectiveness in delivering assistance.

Chapter 5

IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND REVIEW

5.1. IMPLEMENTATION

The GAsEP is applicable to all ICAO Member States, industry and stakeholders. Each entity is encouraged to adopt the recommended priorities and targets contained in the GAsEP based on the Roadmap, which outlines priority outcomes, priority actions, and associated tasks, and indicators and target dates, to help ICAO, States and stakeholders focus and work towards implementing effective measures and actions to achieve the Objective of Enhancing Global Aviation Security.

5.2. MONITORING AND REVIEW

Different data sources are used to measure and monitor the performance of States. Data analysis is conducted through USAP audits and validation missions, and reports by the Regional Offices, including reports of existing Regional AVSEC Groups to ICAO Headquarters. The ICAO Secretariat will conduct a review of the GAsEP as and when appropriate in coordination with the AVSEC Panel, on the progress of ICAO and Member States moving towards achieving the targets. ICAO will also undertake status updates of the targets and the intended deadlines, as outlined in the GAsEP. These will include identifying areas where States may need assistance to meet the targets through aviation security training and capacity building assistance, and other relevant efforts, and update the Roadmap where necessary, amend or adjust any of the implementing actions where practical, and add actions to address new and emerging threats as they arise and as needed..

5.3. WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP

All aviation stakeholders need to be involved in the effort to continually improve aviation security. The GAsEP provides a common frame of reference for all stakeholders and identifies the roles played by ICAO, States and industry. In addition to the development of SARPs, ICAO supports the implementation of the GAsEP by providing resources, implementation tools and assistance via different programmes and initiatives, such as the *No Country Left Behind* initiative.

5.4. ROLE OF ICAO, STATES AND STAKEHOLDERS

5.4.1. ICAO will have an important global leadership and monitoring role in the implementation and coordination of the GAsEP. This includes:

- a) updating the GAsEP as required;
- b) developing and maintaining SARPs, supplemented by manuals and other guidance;
- c) monitoring and reviewing of security threat and risk picture;

- d) auditing the effective implementation of aviation security through USAP; and
- e) implementing targeted assistance to address deficiencies in the aviation security system.

5.4.2. States and industry also have important roles to undertake towards the implementation and effectiveness of the GAsEP, recognizing the coordinating role States have on tasks attributed to industry. It is important that States and other stakeholders demonstrate year-on-year improvement in the implementation of operational standards. The overall cumulative improvements to aviation security globally will enhance the security, safety, facilitation and operations of the international civil aviation system.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

6.1. CONCLUSION

The GASeP will bring together ICAO, States, industry, and other stakeholders in a holistic and coordinated effort to address current and emerging global aviation security challenges. Security is a critical pillar for the growth and sustainability of the global aviation industry. It is envisaged that the GASeP will serve as an important document to assist all stakeholders to strengthen international collaboration in aviation security, including the areas of harmonizing security principles, approaches and measures; information sharing; innovation and better use of security technology, and in aviation security training and capacity development. The GASeP will also move ICAO, States, industry and all stakeholders towards fulfilling the intent and direction of UNSCR 2309 (2016), and towards enhancing the level of global aviation security for the benefit of all States, as well as contributing to the wider benefit of strengthening economic growth and development across the world.

APPENDIX A

GLOBAL AVIATION SECURITY PLAN ROADMAP

<p>ASPIRATIONAL GLOBAL TARGETS</p> <p>a) By 2020 80% of States reach above 65% EI</p> <p>b) By 2023 90% of States reach above 80% EI</p> <p>c) By 2030 100% of States reach above 90% EI</p>
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Priority Outcome	1. ENHANCE RISK AWARENESS AND RESPONSE			
Priority Actions (PAs)	<p>1.1 Keep global threat picture under regular review and enhance dissemination of threat and risk advice.</p> <p>1.2 Improve training on risk assessment.</p> <p>1.3 Review relevant ICAO Annex 17 provisions and guidance for highest risk areas.</p> <p>1.4 Up-to-date framework established in each State for conducting national and local risk assessments.</p> <p>1.5 Ensure effective internal mechanisms for communicating information/assessments to those who need it.</p> <p>1.6 Review current screening arrangements in light of national risk assessment.</p> <p>1.7 Review personnel security measures taking into account risk advice and guidance on insider threat.</p> <p>1.8 Ensure holistic aviation perspective and appropriate impact assessments.</p>			
Actions				
By	Specific Measures / Tasks		Indicators	Target
Global	PA 1.1	1.A Identify and address cybersecurity threats to civil aviation’s critical infrastructure, data and information and communication technology systems through collaboration using horizontal, cross-cutting and functional approaches to achieve an acceptable and commensurate cyber resilience capability on a global level. It should involve air navigation, communication, surveillance, aircraft operations and airworthiness and other relevant disciplines to ensure the safety and security of civil aviation operations in full alignment with ICAO’s Global Air Navigation Plan (GANP) and Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP).	Compliance with relevant Annex 17 provisions. ICAO survey/questionnaire.	On-going
		1.B Monitor and address emerging and evolving risks, such as cyber security, remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), and risks arising from conflict zones.	Compliance with relevant Annex 17 provisions. ICAO survey/questionnaire.	On-going
	PA	1.C When considering aviation security	Coordinated provisions at ICAO level (e.g.	On-going

	1.8	risks and measures, ensure appropriate holistic consideration of the aviation sector. Where relevant, early and appropriate coordination with aviation safety, air navigation and facilitation experts to take place at global and national levels.	cross-references on horizontal topics such as cyber security) Appropriate documentation of impact assessment. Effective coordination channels established and implemented.	
States and Industry	PA 1.1	1.D States' authorities work together with industry to most appropriately and effectively allocate responsibilities for the delivery of measures to counter the threat from landside attacks.	Definition of responsibilities in NCASP and Airports' Security Programs Attendance of responsible parties at Airport Security Committees Evidence of implementation of measures as defined in Airport Security Program Evidence of clear communication and appropriate response to threats	On-going
States	PA 1.5	1.E Implement and review secure, systematic mechanisms to share threat and risk information at national level.	ICAO survey/questionnaire.	2019
	PA 1.6	1.F States' National Aviation Security Committees and appropriate security authorities periodically review physical screening and access control methods, based on national risk assessments, to ensure that they are appropriate, effective and using up-to-date technologies and techniques.	ICAO survey/questionnaire. USAP findings.	On-going
	PA 1.7	1.G Review adequacy of current measures to address insider threat, including background checks, physical measures, training and awareness and reporting mechanisms. To incorporate into the State's relevant aviation security programmes.	ICAO survey/questionnaire	2019
Industry	PA 1.5	1.H Enhance and promote global platforms for sharing of security information with, from and between industry.	Establishment of appropriate forums; usage levels.	2018
ICAO	PA 1.1	1.I Develop strategy for increasing States' awareness of and access to the ICAO Global Risk Context Statement (RCS), including through Regional offices and organizing regular seminars.	ICAO survey/questionnaire.	2018
		1.J Encourage use of the ICAO Aviation Security Point of Contact (PoC) Network to	Substantial increase in use of PoC Network; conduct annual test on the PoC Network	2018

		share information.		
		1.K Assess the effectiveness and usability, in consultation with States, of the PoC system in its existing state in order to identify what is working well and any areas for potential improvement including information security matters	Improvements to PoC system incorporated	2019
	PA 1.2	1.L Establish team of volunteer experts available to provide risk management training.	Number of volunteers and from across various regions.	As necessary but no less than one workshop yearly
		1.M Deliver revised workshop on risk management in every region.	Conduct the workshop to train participants on risk management in each region; obtain feedback on courses and areas for improvement	1 workshop yearly
		1.N Identify key staff for States in greatest need of risk assessment training and conduct outreach activities to promote awareness and understanding of risk assessment among key staff.	Key AVSEC personnel from State authorities, including the Appropriate Authority, and key industry agencies (e.g. airlines, airports, etc) to undergo risk assessment training.	Five activities globally per year
ICAO	PA 1.3	1.O Identify key Standards for detecting Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) carried by passengers and non-passengers having access to SRAs, and conduct review of their adequacy and levels of effective implementation.	AVSECP/29 report to Council.	2018
		1.P Consider new Annex 17 Standard on screening for explosives.	AVSECP/29 report to Council.	2018
		1.Q Review and update guidance on screening for explosives.	Publication of updated guidance.	2018
	PA 1.4	1.R Identify priority States in each region in need of assistance risk management and offer support.	Overall level of effective implementation of Annex 17 Standard 3.1.3.	Priority States identified in early 2017
		1.S Develop regional plan for delivering support to priority States.		New risk frameworks in 5 States by mid-2018
		1.T Provide risk assessment mentoring and assistance.		
	PA 1.5	1.U Develop guidance on communicating threat and risk information within States and with industry.	Publication of guidance.	2018

PA 1.7	1.V ICAO to issue State letter on insider threat.	Level of responses to State letter.	2018
	1.W ICAO to issue guidance and training materials on recognizing and reporting issues of concern within the workforce.	Publication of guidance.	2018
	1.X Consider new Recommended Practice on continuous vetting.	ICAO questionnaire/survey.	2019
PA 1.8	1.Y Subject to AVSECP consideration, develop a Manual on Investigating Acts Of Unlawful Interference Against Civil Aviation.	AVSECP report to Council	2019
PA 1.8	1. Z Subject to AVSECP consideration, develop a Manual on Aviation Security Management Systems at the level of the State and relevant organizations	AVSECP report to Council	2019

Priority Outcome	2. DEVELOP SECURITY CULTURE AND HUMAN CAPABILITY			
Priority Actions (PAs)	2.1 Build and promote security culture. 2.2 Develop/review national training programmes, taking account of risk. 2.3 Professionalize work force and ensure continuous performance. 2.4 Develop baseline requirements/minimum qualification for personnel involved in security. 2.5 Revise ICAO training material and guidance, focusing on core aviation security skills/needs. 2.6 Review and enhance ICAO security-related training activities.			
Actions				
By		Specific Measures / Tasks	Indicators	Target
Global	PA 2.1	2.A Review or develop training material to teach security culture and its principles.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased awareness and incident reporting 	2018
		2.B Develop security awareness programmes that effectively promote a positive security culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence in relevant security programmes 	
		2.C Continuous promotion of security awareness campaigns.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Persons designated as appropriate authorities and top AVSEC personnel from States (e.g. Directors-General of Civil Aviation Authorities, and/or their deputies), airlines, airports, stakeholder agencies (e.g. Chief Executive Officer / Chief Operations Officer), to undergo AVSEC management training for senior management level. 	
		2.D Develop and enhance joint training programmes.	New and updated AVSEC programs developed and delivered.	
	2.E Develop and disseminate to all other stakeholders communication plans, reporting tools, promotional materials and model training	Materials developed.		
States and industry	PA 2.1	2.F Develop communication strategies to build the general public's awareness of Aviation Security and the importance of complying with security measures.	ICAO questionnaire/survey.	2019
	PA 2.2	2.G Increase management oversight and leading by example.	Measured through National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme (NQCP).	On-going
2.H Share best practices.				
		2.I Include provisions in quality control programs to monitor the effective implementation of security culture.	Measured through NQCP.	2019
		2.J Develop methods of measuring potential security challenges in States and organizations.		

ICAO	PA 2.3	2.K Implementation of 'just culture' " of reporting all security-related and potential security issues without fear of reprimand to involved parties.			
		2.L Ensure robust vetting procedures for all staff are introduced.			
	PA 2.4	2.M Develop and implement a Universal Aviation Security Accreditation Programme (UASAP) for all staff involved in security functions.	Programme developed and implemented.		
		2.N Ensure sufficient funding is provided for a robust, trained and motivated security workforce.	Measured through NQCP.		
	PA 2.1	2.O Define, revise and enhance guidance on Security Culture as required.	Materials reviewed.		2019
	PA 2.4	2.P Determine internationally recognized competency levels.	Competency levels established.		
		2.Q Identify optimum model and delivery plan for new global professional qualifications.	Table produced within relevant training material.		
		2.R Develop guidance for UASAP	Guidance published		
	PA 2.5	2.S Identify core aviation security skills and needs and revise training material and guidance focusing on these.	Training skills matrix.		
	PA 2.6	2.T Develop and agree on new global training policy document and model.	Document developed.		
		2.U Review role and effectiveness of Aviation Security Training Centres.	Review completed.		
		2.V Carry out a regional training needs analysis involving all States from the Region.	ICAO survey/questionnaire.		
		2.W Promote regional and subregional cooperation in the field of AVSEC training.			
		2.X Produce a template and guidance for States on conducting review of National Civil Aviation Training Programmes.	Template produced.		

Priority Outcome	3. IMPROVE TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES AND FOSTER INNOVATION		
Priority Actions (PAs)	<p>3.1 Enhance technical advice to States.</p> <p>3.2 Promote innovative techniques and technologies by States and industry.</p> <p>3.3 Promote consistency of technical specifications for security equipment.</p> <p>3.4 Consider minimum technical specifications for security equipment.</p> <p>3.5 Increase use of appropriate technology for screening and facilitation.</p> <p>3.6 Develop and improve the efficiency of certification processes and operational use of security equipment, including human factors.</p> <p>3.7 Consider and evaluate the use of passenger information to inform and assist aviation security.</p>		
Actions			
By	Specific Measures / Tasks	Indicators	Target
States	PA 3.2	3.A Develop a package on conducting operational trials of innovative techniques.	Number of States conducting operational trials and sharing information on such trials.
		3.B Encourage and support trials and tests of new processes and equipment.	
		3.C Organize and support innovation events and challenges and encourage participation of start-up and entrepreneurial companies.	
States	PA 3.4	3.D Establish detailed threat item identification for each type of security equipment.	Greater information sharing between States equipment information, requirements and specifications.
		3.E Establish initial minimum detection requirement for each type of security equipment.	
		3.F Establish operational specifications for each type of security equipment.	
		3.G Assess available technologies for each type of security equipment.	
		3.H Establish and maintain technical specification for each type of security equipment.	
States and industry	PA 3.5	3.I States and industry to conduct outreach activities to promote the use of appropriate technology, including human factors considerations.	ICAO survey/questionnaire.
	PA 3.6	3.J States and industry to keep under review the certification process of security equipment to assess its efficiency, reactivity and whether it is providing accurate and updated information.	

States and industry		3.K States to ensure appropriate authorities for aviation security coordinate with other agencies (e.g Customs and Immigration) to facilitate data sharing and risk assessment.		
		3.L States and industry to encourage competition in the supplier market.		
	PA 3.6	3.M States and industry to improve management of security equipment at airports (include site acceptance tests, routing testing and maintenance).		
ICAO	PA 3.1	3.N Improve and update AVSECPaedia.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of States signing up to AVSECPaedia. • Number of States signing up to edit AVSECPaedia. • Number of connections per month. • Number of operational guidance available on AVSECPaedia. • Availability of function in AVSECPaedia. • Number of States and organizations sharing information on trials. • Number of States encouraging trials. 	On-going
		3.O Promote use of AVSECPaedia through State letter, communications and incentives.		
		3.P Regular publication of operational guidance on the use of technology and innovative techniques.		
	PA 3.2	3.Q Ensure exchange of information between States and industry on innovative techniques and technology.		
		3.R Develop a package on how/why to conduct operational trials of innovative techniques and technologies .		
	PA 3.3	3.S Identification of States establishing technical specifications and/or performance requirement for security equipment.		
		3.T Facilitate a meeting between States identified in the survey to share classified information on technical specifications.		
PA 3.3	3.U Continue consideration for possible SARPs in the appropriate ICAO Annex(es) and related guidance on how to equip airports and aircraft with control systems based on video surveillance on-board aircraft, outside aircraft, on the ground, and in flight, as well as a methodology for analyzing and using data obtained.	AVSECP report to Council.	2019	

Priority Outcome	4. Improve Oversight and Quality Assurance			
Priority Action (PA)	<p>4.1 Develop regional USAP-CMA targets on the levels of effective implementation of security measures.</p> <p>4.2 Coordinate efforts between States, stakeholders and ICAO on audits and peer review.</p> <p>4.3 Develop and implement rectification plans at national and local levels to address gaps and vulnerabilities identified.</p> <p>4.4 Enhance USAP-CMA to provide reliable information regarding the effective implementation of aviation security measures.</p> <p>4.5 Enhance training and guidance on quality assurance.</p>			
Actions				
By	Specific Measures / Tasks		Indicators	Target
Global	PA 4.1	4.A Each region to develop USAP-CMA targets on effective implementation of security measures on the ground, including regions where the USAP-CMA is conducted through other established cooperative arrangements.	Targets and results to be reviewed every triennium during the Assembly.	2018
	PA 4.2	4.B Develop processes and procedures to conduct quality control (QC) and coordinate efforts between stakeholders within a State and with other States on auditing and peer review activities. This could include tools, models and QC training.	Development of mechanism for the sharing of QC information between government agencies and industry on peer review audit activities.	2018
	PAs 4.2 & 4.5	4.C Develop best practices on conducting quality control and coordinate efforts between States, stakeholders on auditing and peer review activities. This could include tools, models and QC training.	Development of mechanism for the sharing of QC information between government agencies and industry on peer review audit activities.	2019
States	PA 4.3	4.D States to establish a framework to work with other States and industry to rectify gaps and implement immediate response measures.	Enhancements and amendments to national oversight systems as evidenced by results from ICAO and State's surveys/questionnaires.	2018
		4.E Analyse national quality control data to identify implementation issues that are systemic and require attention at a foundational level.	Development and implementation of corrective action plans.	2018
Industry	PA 4.3	4.F Industry partners to work with States to assist with the development of action plans and identify possible channels of assistance, training or knowledge transfer.	Consideration of the IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) and IATA Safety Audit for Ground Operations (ISAGO) results by States.	2019
ICAO	PA 4.3	4.G Update of the Aviation Security Oversight Manual ICAO Doc 10047 to possibly include new procedures for state oversight and effective preventive measures aimed at preventing noncompliance with mandatory aviation security requirements based on a consolidation of best practices	Update completed	2018-2019

ICAO	PA 4.4	4.H Restructure the reporting of USAP-CMA results to provide a more meaningful understanding of the level of implementation across the range of areas audited.	New format for the annual reporting of USAP-CMA results.	2018
		4.I Study and consider how to effect the limited disclosure of USAP-CMA results in an appropriate manner.	Review of the level of disclosure of USAP-CMA results, tabled to Council in 2018 and to Assembly at 2019.	2018
		4.J Review and revise the USAP-CMA.	Review USAP-CMA objectives, methodology and Protocol Questions and analyse USAP data to make recommendations.	2018-2019
			Conduct and review audits using the updated USAP-CMA approach.	
			Final USAP-CMA product delivered / ICAO Report.	
		4.K Consider how to make more efficient use of scarce resources and manpower in USAP-CMA.	Consider the deployment of trained and competent regional aviation security officers to conduct USAP-CMA ground audits to maximize the limited resources within the Secretariat for more effective and efficient use of resources.	2018
			Consider the recruitment and use of additional and well-trained full-time ICAO auditors for a more thorough audit system and framework.	2018
	Conduct regular competency and harmonization workshops to ensure all USAP auditors attain minimum competence and are thoroughly familiar with SARPs and guidance materials.		2019	
	4.L Analyse national quality control data to identify implementation issues that are systemic and require attention at a foundational level.	Monitor and review States' corrective action plans and implementation.	On-going	
	PA 4.5	4.M Develop, review and revise guidelines and guidance materials to help States to regularly assess the effectiveness of their national programmes.	Review USAP-CMA report with State's Appropriate Authority following an -audit to identify gaps in QC where audit results show the need for assistance.	2018-2019
Helping States to develop their national audit programme as needed.				

Priority Outcome	5 INCREASE COOPERATION AND SUPPORT		
Priority Actions (PA)	<p>5.1 Contribute resources to ICAO, States and stakeholders for auditing/peer review.</p> <p>5.2 Provide increased assistance (where possible) for capacity development.</p> <p>5.3 Commitment to enhance effective implementation by recipient States.</p> <p>5.4 Ensure all national entities concerned are actively involved in implementation of measures.</p> <p>5.5 Identify and utilize new funding sources (e.g. UN, World Bank, States, industry, etc).</p> <p>5.6 Enhance ICAO's capability and effectiveness in delivering assistance.</p>		
Actions			
By	Specific Measures / Tasks	Indicators	Target
Global (PAs 5.1 to 5.6)	5.A Support and encourage all stakeholders to conduct peer review, transfer knowledge, or share knowledge on security processes, procedures and technologies.	Needs, priorities and funding sources identified.	2018
	5.B Provide funding for assistance activities carried out by States/industry.	Develop peer-to-peer reviews, workshops and training.	2018
		Increase speed of implementation of assistance and peer review process and follow-up actions.	
States (PAs 5.1 to 5.6)	5.C Publicize UNSC Resolution 2309 (2016) and GAsEP's objectives/Roadmap to local entities involved in AVSEC	ICAO survey/questionnaire	Ongoing
	5.D States that have resources to provide assistance commit to the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – long-term engagement; – ascertain own level of expertise, transferable knowledge; and – target assistance on the basis of risk profile. 	Model/template accountability framework regarding roles and responsibilities of donor recipients of assistance programmes.	2018
	5.E States that receive/require assistance commit to the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – that all relevant national entities participate in training, information sharing, knowledge transfer; – undergo risk-based identification of root causes for deficiencies; 		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – long-term political will to improve; and – apply assistance to improve effective implementation. 		
Industry (PAs 5.1, and 5.2)	5.F Enhance capacity to provide peer to peer knowledge transfer, review and audits.	Industry associations develop peer-to-peer reviews, workshops, seminars and training events.	2018
ICAO (PAs 5.2, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6)	5.G Ensure that the ICAO strategy for promoting and facilitating targeted assistance includes establishment of an information and coordination mechanism (e.g. Clearing House) to promote more effective and efficient capacity building and includes elements such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Database of all capacity-building activities (States, ICAO, other organizations, industry, etc); – targeting, scheduling, location, subject matter; – “Helpdesk” to connect States’ requests; – online platform to promote/exchange best practices; and – draws capabilities mapping of potential donors. 	Mapping of donor capabilities.	2018 / 2019
		Develop needs assessment manual.	
		Risk-based priority-setting framework and specific tools.	
		Key performance measures.	
	5.H Implement risk-based assessment tools to target assistance taking into account: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – needs assessment methods to identify root causes for States’ deficiencies; – risk-based prioritizing of needs within States, between States and regions; – risk-based targeting for assistance, corresponding to the ICAO RCS and national risk assessments; – ICAO Regional Offices evaluate the States. 	Development of a “Needs Assessment Manual”	2018
	5.I Develop new ICAO strategy for promoting and facilitating targeted capacity development linked to appropriate conditions, commitment and assessment tools.	New strategy approved by ICAO leadership.	2019
	5.J Explore opportunities for increased short-term subject-matter expert (SME) deployments to ICAO in order to close the SME gaps.	Report on a strategy for potential short-term deployment of SMEs.	2018