RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION SECURITY POLICY

SEVENTH MEETING OF THE AVIATION SECURITY AND FACILITATION REGIONAL GROUP (AVSEC/FAL/RG/7)

ICAO SAM Regional Office, Lima, Peru, 4 to 6 October 2017
Security & Facilitation

Enhance global civil aviation security and facilitation. This Strategic Objective reflects the need for ICAO's leadership in aviation security, facilitation and related border security matters.
Programme components

1. Aviation Security Policy
2. Aviation Security Audits
3. Aviation Security Implementation and Support
4. Facilitation
Aviation Security Policy
SUMMARY

• Present information on recent developments in aviation security policy:
  – policy discussions during the Twenty-eighth Meeting of the Aviation Security Panel (AVSECP/28), Montréal 29 May to 2 June 2017,
  – subsequent decisions of the Council during its 211th Session. The topics are grouped under three key areas, namely:
    • the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP),
    • Amendment 16 to Annex 17,
    • the newly established Task Force on Improvised Explosive Devices, and
    • other key developments/initiatives in aviation security policy.
GLOBAL AVIATION SECURITY PLAN (GASeP)

• Centerpiece of a global holistic and coordinated effort to counter aviation threats.

• Ensure that a secure aviation system becomes a pillar of global economic growth and prosperity.
GLOBAL AVIATION SECURITY PLAN (GASeP)

• State letter AS8/1.10-17/84 was dispatched on 11 July 2017 seeking comments from Member States and appropriate international organizations on the GASeP.

• As of 20 September, 104 replies from States and 5 replies from Organizations were received. These replies will be analysed and a final GASeP will be presented to the Council for endorsement during its 212th Session.

• States who have replied to the GASeP from the Americas: 13 total.
10th Edition Annex 17 – Amdt. 15

- The tenth edition of Annex 17 including Amendment 15 was published in April 2017 with an applicability date of 3 August 2017.
Amendment 16 to Annex 17

- State letter AS 8/2.1-17/90 dated 6 July 2017 was circulated to States and concerned international organizations for comments on proposed Amendment 16 to Annex 17, which includes:
  
  - provisions on information sharing and communication,
  - passenger and cabin baggage screening, as well as security controls for in-flight supplies.

Proposed Amendment 16 to Annex 17 will be presented to the Council for adoption during its 213th Session and is envisaged to become applicable in November 2018.
TASK FORCE ON IEDs

• The Panel also recommended the establishment of a Task Force on Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) to address the threat posed by IEDs concealed in personal items, including portable electronic devices.

• Met in Paris, France, from 17 to 19 July 2017 and assessed possible mitigating measures taking into account a number of factors such as technology capabilities, insider threat and personnel training.
ICAO AVIATION SECURITY MANUAL (DOC 8973)

• The 10th Edition of the ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973 — Restricted) in English is available as from September. Other languages to follow soon.

• Of particular interest is new and/or updated guidance material on the following subjects:
  – the security of landside areas of airports,
  – staff screening and vehicle screening, and
  – cyber threats to critical aviation information and communication technology systems.
• the 39th Session of the ICAO Assembly called for a coordinated approach to achieve an acceptable and commensurate cyber resilience capability on a global scale. To that end, ICAO established a Secretariat Study Group on Cybersecurity (SSGC).

• first meeting on 29 August 2017 in Montreal with several participants taking the option to join the meeting via voice/video conferencing. The SSGC developed a set of Terms of Reference and established several working groups with a view to addressing all elements and domains of the international aviation framework that may be affected by cyber incidents and attacks.
OTHER

- ICAO held its first annual Global Aviation Security Symposium (AVSEC2017) from 12 to 14 September 2017 at ICAO Headquarters in Montréal.

- Promote the work of ICAO, its Member States and stakeholders in the area of aviation security.

- Strategically enhanced international cooperation and collaboration to address the threat posed by terrorists targeting civil aviation by reinforcing, strengthening and promoting the international framework of aviation security.
Aviation Security Audits
USAP-CMA Objective

- Continuous auditing and monitoring of Member States’ aviation security performance by:
  - assessing the level of EI of the CEs of an aviation security oversight system and the degree of compliance with Annex 17 Standards and security-related provisions of Annex 9
  - identifying deficiencies and assessing associated risks
  - providing prioritized recommendations
  - evaluating and validating corrective actions
  - re-assessing Member States’ aviation security performance
Security Audits

USAP-CMA activities

- Documentation-based audits
- Oversight-focused audits
- Compliance-focused audits
State’s USAP-CMA Indicators

Oversight Indicator

Compliance Indicator

PQ Indicator
USAP-CMA Audits in NACC - 9 /SAM - 6

- 2014 - 1
- 2015 - 6
- 2016 - 5
- 2017 – 3 ( +2 )
<table>
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<tr>
<th>SARP</th>
<th>CE</th>
<th>PQ</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATION</th>
<th>COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS</th>
<th>CORRECTIVE ACTION(S) PROPOSED</th>
<th>ACTION OFFICE(S)</th>
<th>ESTIMATED IMPLEMENTATION DATE(S)</th>
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<td>3.1.1 CE-1</td>
<td>1.050</td>
<td>a)</td>
<td>establish in the national documentation a clear requirement for the development of a written NCASP;</td>
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<td>3.1.1 CE-2</td>
<td>1.060</td>
<td>b)</td>
<td>urgently revise the NCASP in order that it is consistent with the current status of aviation security in the State. The NCASP should accurately reflect all national aviation security requirements and procedures, as well as all Annex 17, Amendment 13, Standards with sufficient accuracy, clarity and detail to facilitate their implementation. Relevant national requirements detailed in other national-level documentation should be clearly referenced in the NCASP;</td>
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<td>3.1.1 CE-5</td>
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<td>c)</td>
<td>establish sufficient guidance, performance criteria and/or procedures to ensure efficient, effective and consistent application of the NCASP;</td>
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<td>3.1.1 CE-2</td>
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<td>approve and implement the NCASP; and</td>
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<td>3.1.9 CE-5</td>
<td>1.080</td>
<td>e)</td>
<td>ensure that pertinent portions of the NCASP are disseminated to all aviation security stakeholders, including foreign aircraft operators to enable these entities to develop and implement security programmes that are consistent with national requirements.</td>
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Corrective Action Plan

ADMINISTRATION

CE-1: Primary Aviation Security Legislation
CE-2: Aviation Security Programmes and Regulations
CE-3: State Appropriate Authority for Aviation Security and its Responsibilities
CE-4: Personnel Qualifications and Training

ACTION

CE-6: Certification and Approval Obligations
CE-7: Quality Control Obligations
CE-8: Resolution of Security Concerns
Implementation Support and Development - Security
No Country Left Behind Objectives

- More effective support to ALL willing States that need assistance to develop and improve the aviation system by implementing ICAO policies and provisions in all Strategic Objectives
  - Not only for SARPs implementation
  - Not only to raise States to 60% EI in safety/security or for States with lowest EIs
  - Not for States which have local challenges which ICAO can’t influence

- Convince those States that are unwilling

- Assist those States which are willing but unable to progress alone

- Collaborate and pool resources with partners and donors
ICAO Aviation Security Assistance and Capacity Building Strategy

• Implementation of the Strategy
  – a cohesive and coordinated ICAO-wide approach
  – a disciplined focus that prioritizes States with the greatest needs and addresses all requests for assistance
  – assistance modalities respond to evolving aviation security needs and circumstances
  – strong engagement of partners and regional mechanisms
  – accountability mechanisms focused on sustainable results
New Roles and Responsibilities: HQ

- **Decentralization:**
  - Starting Jan 1st 2017
  - ISD-SEC:
    - Global subjects,
    - Council, UIC, AVSECP, PRC, MARB
    - Assistance Quality Control, Priority Assistance Evaluation,
    - International Partnerships, UN Interagency projects, and
    - Training material development
New Roles and Responsibilities: RO

• Decentralization:
  – Shifting implementing responsibilities to Regional Offices: Needs Assessment Reports, ASIPs, ASIP Implementations, presentations, speeches for Regional Activities, etc.
Assistance Methods and Tools

• Assistance:
  – Aviation Security Improvement Plans (ASIPs)
  – Aviation Security Training Packages/Workshops
  – Aviation Security Training Centre (ASTC) Network
  – Ad-hoc assistance
  – Support for regional initiatives
  – Fostering partnerships and coordination of assistance activities
Assistance and Capacity-Building Activities

• **Aviation Security Improvement Plan Details:**
  – Risk-based prioritization
  – Multi-phase assistance framework
  – Tailored to a State’s specific needs
  – Developed collaboratively
  – Focused on capacity-building

• **In 2017: 2 NACC and 3 SAM States have ASIPs**
Aviation Security Training Centre Network

• **Current Status:**
  
  – 32 ASTCs worldwide
  – ICAO Certified Instructors NACC / SAM region:
    • NACC - 31 (25 M and 6 F)
    • SAM - 12 (9 M and 3 F)
Aviation Security Training Centres (ASTCs)
Challenges: Global

• Assistance aligned with ICAO Documentation
  – Amendment 15 to Annex 17; updated ICAO Aviation Security Manual (Doc 8973- Restricted)

• Proactive to new threats
  – Addressing new and emerging threats (cybersecurity, etc.)

• AVSEC Professionalization
  – Preparing instructors as subject matter experts
Challenges: Regional

• **Efficiency in Assistance**
  - Identifying regional needs and solutions
  - Timely deployment of materials

• **Progression on ASIPs**
  - Ongoing State dedication to implementing ASIP objectives
  - Management of ASIP process
Remedies: Global

• Human
  – Developing revised training materials
    • Leveraging ASTCs expertise to create and provide training
    • Fostering partnerships to expand on the types of training provided and the areas where training is delivered
    • Increased collaboration with the GAT
  – Identifying subject matter experts to deliver material

• Budgetary
  – Funds for external experts to update materials
Remedies: Regional

• **Human**
  – Collaboration between Regional Office and Secretariat
    • Secretariat management of training and assistance provided
    • RO identification and implementation of training and assistance

• **Budgetary**
  – Funding for ASIPs
  – Fellowships for attending training activities
  – Adherence to cost recovery process for providing ad hoc assistance
Facilitation
Annex 9 related developments

• Amendment 26 to Annex 9 adopted in June 2017

• State Letter to be sent in July 2017

• Amendment 26
  – Effective October 2017
  – Applicable February 2018

• Next Facilitation Panel (FALP/10), ICAO HQ September 2018
Major highlight: Passenger Data Exchange Systems (New Ch. 9)

- **3.48 to 3.49.2 → (proposed) New Chapter 9**
  - A. General
  - B. Advance Passenger Information (API)

**New Standard:** Each Contracting State shall establish an Advance Passenger Information (API) system.

- C. Electronic Travel Systems (ETS)
- D. Passenger Name Record (PNR) data
ICAO TRIP Strategy

Globally interoperable applications that provide for timely, secure and reliable linkage of MRTDs and their holders to relevant data in the course of inspection operations: API/PNR, watch lists, information sharing...

Credible evidence of identity, involving the tracing, linkage and verification of identity against breeder documents to ensure the authenticity of identity

Manufacture of standardized MRTDs that comply with ICAO specifications (Doc 9303)

For the efficient and secure reading and verification of MRTDs (PKD, forensic travel Doc examination, etc..)

Processes for document issuance by appropriate authorities, and controls to prevent theft, tampering and loss

Objective: All Member States can uniquely identify individuals

ICAO TRIP Strategy

NO COUNTRY LEFT BEHIND
- Enhance Security of the document
- Biometrics to confirm identity

Every ePassport has an embedded electronic chip that contains the holder’s personal information and photo found in the passport.

The ePassport chip is digitally signed to prevent unauthorized alteration. The technology used is called Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
Connection between PKD and ePassports

**MRP**

Machine Readable Passport (MRP)

**CHIP RFID**

14443

**IMAGE**

FACE

**Logical Data Structure (LDS)**

PKI DIGITAL SIGNATURE

Public Key Directory (PKD)

0111001001010
Value of PKD for ePassports

• More than 110 States claim that they are currently issuing ePassports
• There are nearly half a billion ePassports in circulation worldwide
• States still need to do significant work to ensure ePassports are fully compliant with ICAO specifications as in Doc 9303
• ICAO encourages all States to use the ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) as a means of verifying and authenticating ePassports and to enhance security in cross-border movement.
• As of 1 January 2016, the PKD Registration Fee have been reduced from 56 000 to 15 900 USD and the Annual Fees (Operator Fees) have decreased from 34 000 USD to 29 900 USD
What is the PKD & What does it do?

- A central storage location, highly secure where States and other entities can input and retrieve the security information to validate the electronic information on the passport.
- It allows Border control authorities to confirm that the ePassport:
  - Was issued by the right authority
  - Has not been altered
  - Is not a copy or cloned document
PKD status (as of June 2017)
UNSC Resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2309 (2016)

• “2. Reaffirms that all States shall prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by **effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents**…”

• “9. **Calls upon** Member States to require that airlines operating in their territories provide advance passenger information (API) to the appropriate national authorities in order to detect the departure from their territories, or attempted entry into or transit through their territories, by means of civil aircraft, of individuals designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011)…”
Noting that “Annex 9 — Facilitation to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago on December 7, 1944 (the “Chicago Convention”) contains standards and recommended practices relevant to the detection and prevention of terrorist threats involving civil aviation”

Further calls upon all States to “require that airlines operating in their territories provide advance passenger information to the appropriate national authorities in order to detect the departure from their territories, or attempted entry into or transit through their territories, by means of civil aircraft, of individuals designated by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015);”
ICAO Training Package

Control of the Authenticity and Validity of Travel documents at Airport Borders – Level I

**Purpose of this four-day course:**
Examine travel documents effectively, allowing border officers to expedite the movement of legitimate travellers while identifying high-risk individuals.

2016: Available in English and French
Available in other ICAO Languages in 2017

For more information: [http://www.icao.int/Training/Pages/TDexam.aspx](http://www.icao.int/Training/Pages/TDexam.aspx)
Highlights of some 2017-2019 expected outcomes

- Integrate the ICAO TRIP Strategy in the Global Aviation Facilitation Plan to be developed jointly by the FAL Panel and the TAG/TRIP
- Develop an ICAO TRIP Roadmap
- Develop and implement the Doc 9303 Compliance Programme
- Increase the number of ICAO PKD participants
Highlights of some 2017-2019 expected outcomes

- Increase outreach to States on Passenger data exchange such as API and PNR programmes as well as use of the SLTD Database for checking passports during border controls through collaboration with International Organizations.

- Develop and update guidance material for each of the TRIP elements.

- Develop a Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) template for evaluation of benefits by each State of the PKD participation in coordination with Automated Border Control (ABC) and ePassport implementation.

- Assist States for the completion of Machine Readable Passports (MRP) implementation.

- Develop a compendium of all TRIP activities and outputs (October 2017).

- Increase capacity building initiatives for Small Developing Island States (SDIS).
Forthcoming Events

TRIP Regional Seminar (Hong Kong, 11 to 13 July 2017)

13th TRIP (ex-MRTD) Symposium (ICAO HQ, 24 to 26 October 2017)

These events are a world-class forum for the exchange of information on all aspects of traveller identification management, and the ICAO Traveller Identification Programme (TRIP) Strategy providing decision makers and technical experts with valuable insight on key current and emerging issues.