



**Agenda Item 3: Lessons learned by CAR/SAM States to reduce LHD**

**STEPS AND MEASURES ADOPTED BY JAMAICA TO MITIGATE LHD REPORTS**

(Presented by Jamaica)

<b>SUMMARY</b>	
The purpose of this information paper is to present to the Meeting the steps and measures adopted by Jamaica to mitigate the amount of LHD reports regarding flights transiting the Kingston FIR.	
<b>References:</b>	
• .GTE/14 Meeting report, Mexico City, Mexico (December 1 - 5, 2014)	
<b>ICAO strategic objectives:</b>	A - Safety.

**1. Background**

1.1 Of the six (6) territories which surrounds the Kingston Flight Information Region (FIR) 38% of Large Height Deviations (LHD) validated occurred with Panama.

- This may be as a result of challenges faced because of no RADAR and poor air/ground radio coverage at the southwestern boundary between the States.

1.2 Of the twenty five (25) LHDs filed between all States and Kingston, nineteen (19) have been validated; there was sufficient evidence to confirm the others did not constitute a LHD

- 66% of invalidated LHDs occurred between Kingston and Curacao

A contributory factor is poor ground/ground communications between both States. Efforts to improve the communication system has been done by the technical engineers of both countries, however, we await the approval from the operational personnel in Curaçao.

- Many potential LHDs were avoided, RADAR contact was established with aircraft and coordination effected prior to them reaching the five (5) minutes stipulations adopted from the GTE/14. These were evident especially with Havana and Barranquilla
- Internal mitigating measures implemented by Kingston includes:
  - cross checking of flight progress strips approximately 10 minutes before the aircraft arrives at the transfer control prior;

- rigidly enforcing the read back/hear back process;
- emphasising key elements of the transfer (estimate).

1.3 These measures were implemented to ensure that LHDs attributable to Kingston remains within the acceptable level of safety however our objective is to eliminate it all together.

- Notwithstanding the 'just culture' approach adopted by the JCAA, our controllers are still attempting to mutually settle coordination loop errors. Also, they fail to report some occurrences.
- States should ensure that this practice is discontinued; it distorts the facts which results in an incorrect interpretation of an accepted level of safety

## 2 **Modernisation programme**

2.1 Our ATS Modernisation programme is underway:

- Contract signed.
- Delivery within 21 months.
- Will include Mode S radars.
- AIDC, CPDLC and ADS-B.
- Interoperability.
- Radar sharing capabilities.
- Expanding our MEVA111 capabilities to include shout lines with all adjacent FIR's.
- Expanding our air to ground capabilities with radios in PZA, this is achievable due collaboration with COCESNA.

2.2 States involved should validate all alleged LHDs before they are submitted to CARSAMMA.

- This would significantly reduce the time spent during teleconference validating these reports
- Time would be better utilized brainstorming ways to improve how we collaborate, coordinate and communicate information which is vital to a safe, efficient and expeditious flow of air traffic within the region

## 3 **Question:**

3.1 While on duty a controller observes two aircraft in an adjacent FIR on courses which do not guarantee adequate separation. It is also observed that one of the aircraft is at a level which would constitute a LHD. The controller is in communication with both aircraft and is experiencing challenges contacting the adjacent FIR to alert them of the developing situation. What action(s) should the controller take understanding that safety of both aircraft is paramount?