

International Civil Aviation Organization South American Regional Office Sixteenth Meeting on the improvement of Air Traffic Services Over the South Atlantic (SAT/16) Recife, Brazil, 04 to 06 May 2011

# Agenda Item 1: Air Traffic Management (ATM)

## UNKNOWN TRAFFIC IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC

(Presented by Uruguay)

SUMMARY	
This working paper presents a proposal of a Safety Case with the aim to identify hazards and safety risk management in the South Atlantic Region.	
References:	
<ul> <li>Doc 9859 AN/474 Safety Management Manual (SMM); and</li> <li>Workshop/Seminar for the assessment of system risks prior to RNAV-5 Implementation and SAM Region ATS Routes Network Optimisation, Lima, Peru, 2 to 6 August 2010.</li> </ul>	
	A – Safety; and
objectives:	<i>C</i> - Environmental protection and sustainable development of air transport

#### 1 Introduction

1.1 The SAT Group in its SAT/15 Meeting expressed its concern about the unknown traffic coming to/from Falkland Islands, Ascension Island and other uncontrolled flight in South Atlantic and called to find a solution adopting the Conclusion SAT15/07 - **Unknown traffic in the South Atlantic.** 

1.2 Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay held a coordination meeting in Lima, Peru, in August 2010, in order to improve operational procedures, as mentioned in SAT/16- WP/13.

## 2 Analysis

2.1 Unknown traffic in the South Atlantic can be considered as a latent condition, and it poses a most significant threat to the safety of the region.

2.2 Safety is increasingly viewed as the outcome of the management of certain organizational processes, which have the objective of keeping the safety risks of the consequences of hazards in operational contexts under organizational control.

### 3 Discussion

3.1 Active failures are actions or inactions, including errors and violations, which have an immediate adverse effect. Active failures are generally associated with front-line personnel (pilots, air traffic controllers, etc.) and may result in a damaging outcome. Active failures may be the result of normal errors, or they may result from deviations from prescribed procedures and practices.

3.2 Active failures by operational personnel take place in an operational context which includes latent conditions. Latent conditions are conditions present in the system well before a damaging outcome is experienced, and made evident by local triggering factors. The consequences of latent conditions may remain dormant for a long time. Individually, these latent conditions are usually not perceived as harmful, since they are not perceived as being failures in the first place. Latent conditions become evident once the system's defenses have been breached. These conditions are generally created by people far removed in time and space from the event.

#### 4 Suggested action

4.1 Analyze the current ATM and CNS situation of the Oceanic FIRs of the Atlantic ACC, Ezeiza ACC and Montevideo ACC as a Safety Case developing the Risk assessment and deployed mitigation strategies.

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