



Agenda Item 4: Analysis of the safety oversight level achieved in the SAM Region

a) Results in the application of the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP)

(Presented by the Secretariat)

SUMMARY	
<p>This working paper presents the results obtained in the application of the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) under the comprehensive systems approach (CSA) audits cycle undertaken from October 2005 to December 2009 to the States of the SAM Region.</p>	
<p>References:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Annex 6, Part I,- Doc 9734 - Safety Oversight Manual- Doc 9735 - Safety Oversight Audit Manual;- Third Edition of the report on the results of the comprehensive systems approach (CSA) audits;- ICAO Assembly Resolutions; and- State letter LT 2/6B.17 – SA316 of 20 May 2011	
ICAO strategic objective:	<i>A – Safety</i>

1. Background

1.1 ICAO Assembly Resolution A35-6 resolved that the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) be expanded to include the safety-related provisions contained in all safety-related Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Doc 7300) from 1 January 2005 and instructed the Secretary General to adopt a comprehensive systems approach in conducting safety oversight audits in all Contracting States.

1.2 The CSA audit programme started in the SAM Region with Panama, in October 2005, successively auditing the rest of the SAM States, and ending with the audit to Suriname in December 2009:

-	Argentina	25 November to 5 December 2007
-	Bolivia	19 to 28 May 2008
-	Brasil	4 to 15 May 2009
-	Chile	6 to 15 May 2008
-	Colombia	28 May to 6 June 2007
-	Ecuador	18 to 27 May 2009
-	Guyana	12 to 21 February 2007
-	Panama	18 to 27 October 2005
-	Paraguay	18 to 27 May 2009
-	Peru	15 to 24 May 2007
-	Suriname	7 to 16 December 2009
-	Uruguay	8 to 17 December 2008
-	Venezuela	26 January to 4 February 2009

2. Discussion

2.1 Audit reports

1.1.1 Pursuant to Assembly Resolution A35-6, safety oversight audit reports have been restructured to reflect the critical elements of a safety oversight system as presented in ICAO Doc 9734, *Safety Oversight Manual*, Part A — *The Establishment and Management of a State's Safety Oversight System*.

2.1.1 In addition, final safety oversight audit reports are made available to all Contracting States through a secure website, providing them as well with access to all relevant information derived from the Audit Findings and Differences Database (AFDD). As of 31 December 2011, the audit final reports of the 13 SAM States have been posted. Detailed information on the status of implementation of ICAO provisions and the critical elements of the system is also posted on the secure website.

2.2 States corrective action plans

2.2.1 In conformity with duly signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), States committed to prepare and present ICAO with a corrective action plan, within 60 working days after the date of presentation of the safety oversight audit provisional report, in response to the findings and recommendations in their report, by including specific measures and terms and the offices responsible for each measure. As of 31 August 2010, all SAM States had presented their corrective action plans to ICAO.

2.3 Audit results

2.3.1 Upon analyzing the results of the audits conducted to the SAM States, observation was made that critical element CE-4, related with **technical personnel training** and critical element CE-7, related with **oversight activities**, showed the highest lack of compliance rates.

2.3.1.1 As to CE-4 **Technical personnel qualification and training**, most SAM States face implementation problems, since in most cases training programmes have been established, but not effectively applied. To a lesser degree, observation was made that these programmes are very general in most cases and do not cover certain areas, such as technical personnel training on dangerous merchandise handling or accident prevention and flight safety for operations inspectors and non destructive tests, or most specifically, training on safety management systems (SMS), including operations inspectors competency on certain types of aircraft.

2.3.2 With regard to CE-7 **Surveillance obligations**, SAM States indicated having difficulty in establishing surveillance programmes including appropriate follow-up mechanisms where the solving of problems identified in air operators, are complied within acceptable periods of time. The lack of surveillance becomes also present in the air navigation services (ANS) and aerodromes (AGA) fields, areas which were not audited in the previous comprehensive systems approach (CSA) audit cycle, where in many cases there were new requirements in the Annexes that had not been taken under consideration in the State's regulations.

2.3.3 As to the results obtained from the analysis made by area, the major difficulties were mainly identified in the air navigation services (ANS) and aerodromes (AGA) services.

2.3.4 With respect to ANS, SAM States had difficulties in establishing surveillance mechanisms guaranteeing the effective application of safety related policies and procedures in the flight procedures design, aeronautical charts (MAP), aeronautical telecommunications and aeronautical meteorology (MET) fields. In additions, deficiencies were observed in the establishment of guides and manuals for the orientation of their inspectors, including ANS personnel training.

2.3.5 As regards AGA, the analysis results show difficulties in the aerodrome certification process, in guides and procedures, both by the service provider as by the ACC technical personnel. Consideration should also be given to the lack of surveillance programmes and follow up to the problems identified, without leaving aside the technical personnel training aspect.

2.3.6 In general terms, the establishment of safety management systems (SMS) and of language proficiency, are recurrent aspects in the CSA audit reports.

3. **USOAP development after 2010**

3.1 The comprehensive systems approach audits cycle officially concluded in August 2010. During the ICAO Council 185 session, the decision was made to adopt the continuous monitoring approach (CMA) as the best and more efficient option for USOAP after 2010. In addition, the Council also requested the Secretariat to draft a CMA transition plan permitting not only ICAO but also the States, to prepare for this new approach.

3.2 The CMA is based on the continuous assessment of a State's capability for safety oversight, on the basis of a safety performance in due time. In addition, CMA widens the scope of the compliance audits to incorporate the safety management systems (SMS) principles by using the safety risk management (SRM) concept and the safety assurance (SA).

3.3 The transition period established started in 2011 and will last until 2012, until the launching of the CMS, whose main objective is to promote global safety through the continuous observation and oversight of States on their capacity to oversee safety.

3.4 The established transition period requires that States keep their corrective action plan (CAP) updated, as well as the State aviation activity questionnaire (SAAQ). Also, as of 2013, States should complete the audit protocols (questionnaires), being essential that States keep these USOAP documents/tools properly updated to face the new challenges to present themselves with the start of CMA.

3.5 The South American Regional Office, in coordination with the ICAO HQ Continuous Monitoring Oversight (CMO) section and the State Aviation Safety Tool (SAST) unit, organized a seminar/workshop on CMA implementation and SAST (Lima, Peru, 19 to 23 September 2011).


4. **Action suggested**

4.1 The Meeting is invited to take note of the:

- a) information contained in this working paper and comments the results obtained by CSA in the SAM States.
- b) CMA workshop/seminar.
- c) Actions required by States on the permanent updating of the:
 - corrective action plan, as necessary;
 - SAAQ questionnaire, as necessary;
 - Compliance checklists (CCs) through the electronic notification of differences (EFOD).

APPENDIX A


LACK OF EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION RATE OF THE EIGHT CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEM



CE 1 Primary aviation legislation
 CE 2 Specific operating regulations
 CE 3 State civil aviation and safety oversight functions
 CE 4 Technical Personnel Qualifications and Training

CE 5 Technical guidance, tools and the provision of safety-critical information
 CE 6 Licensing, certification, authorizations and approval obligations
 CE 7 Surveillance obligations
 CE 8 Resolution of safety concerns

- END -

APPENDIX B**LACK OF EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION INDEX BY AUDIT AREAS**

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