



WORKING PAPER

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Agenda Item 9 Other Business

SETTING A SECURITY AGENDA: STATES' RESPONSIBILITIES AND A FOUNDATION OF SECURITY CULTURE

(Presented by United States)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	
<p>The 39th Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the ongoing development of the Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) offer opportunities to more clearly define ICAO's security agenda and strategic approach to assist Member States in effectively deterring, detecting, and disrupting a threat that is decentralized and complex.</p>	
Action:	The suggested action is presented in Section 6.
<i>Strategic Objectives:</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security & Facilitation

1. Introduction

1.1 Through Annex 17 and the security components of Annex 9, ICAO has set baseline global aviation security Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). Continuously evaluating, updating, and strengthening these SARPs are critical actions toward raising the global security baseline. However, the security SARPs in Annexes 17 and 9 are only as strong as their operational implementation and continued evaluation of the effectiveness of the measures by States. In order to assure the safest possible environment for the traveling public and crews, States must sustainably and consistently maintain their sovereign, yet interconnected, security systems.

1.2 This paper outlines three key components necessary in strong aviation security systems where SARPs are effectively implemented: the acknowledgement of States' responsibilities as partners in the aviation network and building a strong security culture as a foundation to the aviation system with risk-based security principles. This paper notes that ICAO is currently developing a new Global Aviation Security Plan (GASeP) to reflect ICAO's security strategy entering the new triennium. For the GASeP to maintain relevance and mirror an evolving security environment, regional structures must provide inputs on goals and objectives to ensure its success. As such, the United States urges States to support its development by ensuring that these fundamental concepts are clearly outlined and appropriately resourced to ensure its success.

2. States' Responsibilities

2.1 As partners in maintaining the global aviation network, States have multiple responsibilities in ensuring the safety and security of that network. These responsibilities are outlined in the Chicago Convention itself and expounded on in the 19 supporting Annexes. The global system is stronger when States are committed to effective partnership through these outlined responsibilities.

2.2 A key security responsibility is the sharing of pertinent, sometimes imminent, security information with those parties who have the vested need to know for operational purposes. Given that the global aviation network is interconnected, the security of all is dependent on international cooperation and communication. Annex 17 outlines the responsibilities of States in order to constantly assess threats to civil aviation, as well as how States respond to threats and acts of unlawful interference. Standard 3.1.3 directs States to constantly review the level of threat to civil aviation within their borders. Standard 2.4.3 directs States to establish and implement procedures to share threat information impacting the aviation security of other States to the extent possible. The United States fully recognizes challenges related to sharing intelligence with partners; however, to the extent practicable, States are encouraged to identify appropriate mechanisms to share information that impacts the entire aviation network in a timely manner. In responding to acts of unlawful interference, Standard 5.3.1 directs States to report events and provide information to ICAO. However, Recommended Practice 5.3.2 encourages States to share information regarding events with other States, as appropriate, during the management of incident response. The flow of news over social media and the internet is such that States can ill-afford to allow anecdotal reporting to outpace real-time sharing of critical threat and incident information between aviation security professionals and partners.

2.3 Acknowledging the challenges associated with information and intelligence sharing, it must be accepted that efforts to improve these activities are integral to strengthening and securing the global aviation network. The United States has undertaken efforts to streamline its own information sharing capabilities. As we continue to refine our bilateral dialogues and find new avenues for enhanced multilateral sharing, the United States seeks opportunities for enriched engagement on this vital component to a secure aviation network. The focus should turn to States' combined efforts in improving the level of action and effectiveness of sharing through sub-regional and regional mechanisms underpinned, in part, through ICAO's strategic plan for aviation security.

3. Security Culture

3.1 In order for States to fulfil the responsibilities outlined above, there first must exist a foundation rooted in a security culture. This security culture must be engrained from the top to the bottom of a system—from the national regulations to the standard operating procedures at the operational level. The United States has recently undergone a reshaping of our own security culture and a re-evaluation of the way in which we measure our effectiveness in deterring, detecting, and disrupting threats. In the United States, we worked to identify the root causes for lapses in our aviation security system as highlighted through covert testing of our operations. The challenge in closing these gaps in the United States can be succinctly described as a set of foundational factors that have influenced the conduct of screening operations, creating a disproportionate focus on screening operations' efficiency rather than security effectiveness. These challenges range across six critical elements of operating an effective security regime: leadership, technology, workforce performance, environmental influences, operating procedures, and system design. In addressing these issues, the United States has found it to be essential that all involved in the execution of the security system must have a clear understanding of security goals and how each actor in the security system plays a role in the effectiveness of that system—from the government regulators to the screeners at the airport. Security culture must become second nature, and all partners in the implementation of an effective system must understand the threat context in which they operate. Training must target areas of known weaknesses or deficiencies.

3.2 Recognizing that each sovereign State also has a unique culture and security culture, a solid foundation is vital for an aviation security regime to be successful in the primary mission of deterring, detecting, and disrupting threats. Through establishing a strong security culture, States will be more effective in meeting full compliance with security measures; ensuring awareness of security risks throughout the system; in prompt reporting of incidents or deficiencies of a security nature to partners with the critical need to know; and in the proper handling of restricted and confidential information. During AVSECP/25, WP 29 was tabled touting the importance of addressing security culture. As a result, the Working Group on Guidance Material reviewed guidance material that was approved during AVSECP/26 and now exists as an addendum to Doc 8973. This material addresses the importance of leadership, positive work environments, "just cultures" of reporting systems, quality control mechanisms, awareness training, and the necessary coordination and communication among actors in a security system.

3.3 Updating this material was the right first step in addressing the importance of security culture to the very foundation of any security regime. Moving forward, ICAO and its Member States need to address the individual components of security culture and to identify areas for improved guidance and training, as well as the development of a hearty quality control system and evaluation process to ensure the sustainable and consistent implementation of measures. Tying the expenditure of resources to assessed needs and deficiencies is a critical element to valuable training and flexibility in the system. A State's inability to maintain a strong security culture will increase the vulnerability to a successful attack. Creating and maintaining a sharp focus on the culture of aviation security awareness is essential to mitigating a threat that is constantly evolving, decentralized, diffuse, and complex.

4. Risk – Based Security

4.1 A cornerstone in the U.S. security culture is our implementation of the principles of Risk-Based Security (RBS). Coupling RBS methodology with a high-performing, aware, trained, motivated, and informed workforce is a powerful tool in mitigating threats. The aim is to apply the most effective security measures in the most efficient way possible while recognizing the vast majority of people, goods, and services moving through the global transportation network are legitimate and pose minimal risk. Achieving risk-based security means incorporating multiple and overlapping elements of security at airports and recognizing the importance of communication and the training of all invested government entities, as well as commercial partners, as imperative to the sustained awareness of security risks.

4.2 RBS Security Culture Principles: Includes multiple and overlapping elements of security at the airport-level. Multiple elements of security must be applied in an intelligence-driven, risk-based approach and implemented in a random and unpredictable manner. A flexible, highly trained workforce must understand the link among intelligence, technology, and the procedures they perform. Efficiency and effectiveness rely on cutting-edge technology and innovation that allows for adjustments to the evolving threat environment. An equally critical principle is constant engagement with aviation stakeholders, security professionals, and the traveling public throughout the security process.

4.3 Considerations: When constructing a risk-based security culture, a number of considerations need to be taken into account to make it both effective and efficient. This trade-space must balance a number of factors that take into account not only security but operations, policy, and passengers. While the best way to secure and prevent attacks to the system would be to shut it down, this is obviously not possible for any vibrant system. Instead, States must balance security needs while ensuring that people and goods can move efficiently and securely.

4.4 Continuous Evaluation and Refinement: Frequent testing and evaluation of the system's effectiveness provides continuous assurance of a State's capabilities and is an important element in the ongoing evolution of aviation security. This self-assessment allows States to validate existing capabilities and procedures against current risks by testing and attempting to defeat the current system before others attack it and implement improvements to incorporate lessons learned.

4.5 Lessons Learned: When the current system indicates shortcomings, States must adopt a holistic approach to implementing corrective actions. This requires constant evaluation and retraining of the workforce, modifying certain processes and procedures, improving technology, and addressing systemic vulnerabilities to deter, detect, and disrupt future attacks. An agile security regime with a solid foundation will systematically be able to accomplish the following agenda: progress operations; implement innovations; develop its workforce; and invest consistently in pioneering capabilities without sacrificing the standard of security.

5. Conclusion

5.1 Evaluating when Annex 17 SARPs should be added, revised, or strengthened is integral to securing the global aviation network. However, SARPs are only as strong as effective implementation and timely communication. As the overarching security strategy for the next triennium, the GASeP should focus on strengthening current frameworks and ensuring that tools are available to aid all 191 Contracting States in building and sustaining more effective aviation security cultures and systems that deter, detect, and disrupt threats and mitigate risks to civil aviation.

6. Suggested Actions

6.1 The Meeting is invited to:

- a) agree that the three fundamental concepts should be clearly reflected in the GASeP and that resources should be properly devoted to ensure the success of a strategic approach to aviation security by ICAO and its Member States; and
- b) urge States to support the development of the GASeP and partner with the ICAO Secretariat to ensure that the framework aligns with evolving risks, trends, and core issues.